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
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
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BANKERS' MAGAZINE  
ESTABLISHED 1846

RHODES' JOURNAL  
ESTABLISHED 1873.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

## RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING

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THE  
BANKERS' MAGAZINE

RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING AND THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

CONSOLIDATED.

VOLUME LVIII.  
JANUARY TO JUNE,  
*1899.*



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NEW YORK:  
BRADFORD RHODES & CO., PUBLISHERS,  
78 WILLIAM STREET.

HG1501  
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v. 58

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THE  
BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTY-THIRD YEAR.

JANUARY, 1899.

VOLUME LVIII, No. 1.

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THE REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY must cause considerable surprise because of the views expressed in regard to the advisability of substituting bank currency in the place of notes issued by the Government. None of the propositions for the reform of the financial system and the enlargement of the note-issuing function of the banks meets with his approval.

The chief ground of his opposition to the "plans and propositions for the modification of our currency and banking systems which are now, and for some time have been, the subject of economic and general discussion throughout the country," is that "in their present form they seem to ignore the interests of bank depositors, with whose protection the Comptroller is peculiarly charged."

The Comptroller does not think that there exists any such condition of the United States finances, revenues or credit as to justify the proposition of shifting the burden of gold redemption of outstanding currency from the Government to the banks by radical changes and concessions in the National banking laws relative to the issue of notes, unless such changes and concessions were considered wise if the interests of the community, irrespective of Government finances, were alone considered. That is, the Government, the Comptroller thinks, can take care of itself; and if the proposed changes do not benefit the people who deal with banks the changes and concessions should not be made. The Comptroller seems, for the purpose of his argument, to ignore the important fact that the Government, the banks and the people are parts of one great entity, no part of which can exist or thrive without the other. The propositions which he criticizes have been formulated after the most careful and mature consideration by men of character and experience, who represent the interests of the whole business community. The plan of the Monetary Commission was based on a most minute study of the financial

necessities of the country; not those of the Government alone, not those of the business and productive interests alone, not those of the banks alone, but those of all, in their inseparable relations to each other. This plan of the Monetary Commission, in so far as it makes recommendations as to changes in the banking laws of the country, founds these recommendations on the best features of plans proposed by former Comptrollers of the Currency, by the most experienced bankers and financial experts, and these plans find a still more solid foundation in the history and experience of practical banking in this and other countries. The McCLEARY bill embodies the features of the proposition of the Monetary Commission, of Secretary GAGE'S plan, and of the Baltimore and RHODES' plans, for which the political wisdom of the Banking and Currency Committee deemed it possible to secure legislative support.

The Comptroller's whole argument against these proposed changes, which have been so carefully studied, consists when it comes to be sifted down of two points: First, that the Government does not need any assistance in maintaining the gold redemption of its demand obligations; and, second, that in the proposed changes of the banking laws the protection of the depositor is lost sight of. Contrary to all those who have been regarded as authorities in the science of banking, the Comptroller holds that there is no reason why the note holder of a bank should be protected any more than a depositor, and he apparently seems to believe that all the provisions which in the banking laws not only of the United States, but of the States, and of foreign countries, give a preference to the note holder over all other creditors, have been founded in error. On this point the following quotation will show that no injustice has been done in the above statement:

“ It is the belief of the Comptroller that the proposed preference of the note holder over the depositor, which is the fundamental basis of all these plans, is not only inherently wrong and unjustified by any grounds of public policy, but that its practical effect upon the present relation of depositors to banks in the smaller communities of the United States would be so revolutionary as to bring about the most injurious conditions in the general business of the country.”

The promissory note of a bank and a bank credit to the account of a depositor are of course both debts of the institution and are both payable on demand, and the non-payment of either when demanded is an act of insolvency. Why, therefore, although the Comptroller says, “ it is unjustified on any grounds of public policy,” did those who drafted the National banking laws, and before them the banking laws of the several States, deem it necessary to insert, almost invariably, provisions giving special protection to the note holder. The reason appears to be that in assuming the relation of depositor the citizen was



under no compulsion either direct or indirect. He could suit his own pleasure and convenience in depositing his money, and when he did so he looked for reciprocal benefit from the bank. This might be interest, or simply the safe keeping of his money, or the hope of loans in his business, and the safety and convenience of drawing checks. Moreover he legally knows, when he deposits his money, what preferences other debts of the bank may have over the debt to him in case of insolvency. When, however, a promissory note is issued by a bank, by law and custom it becomes current money passing from hand to hand, and every citizen to whom it is offered is more or less compelled by law and custom to take it. When a bank becomes insolvent, its notes are chiefly in the hands of innocent third parties who have taken such notes because by law and convention they are current money. Therefore lawmakers and jurists have held that a creditor holding a bank note was entitled to a special protection.

Under the National banking laws now in force, the note holder is doubly protected. The law not only gives him a preference over all other creditors, in the distribution of assets, but it goes further and compels the bank to segregate a portion of its assets in bonds and place these bonds out of the reach of its own management in the hands of the Government. If, therefore, the Comptroller is right and the note holder is entitled to no greater protection than the depositor, the present system is all wrong. The propositions he doubts the wisdom of would tend to place the note holder on a more equal footing with the depositor, by gradually depriving him of the protection afforded by the segregation of assets in the shape of United States bonds.

It is true that the tendency of the MCCLEARY bill is to level the protection to note holders down to that afforded depositors, and does not bring the protection afforded depositors up to that now enjoyed by note holders.

The Comptroller would appear more logical if he recommended the protection of depositors by bond deposits, than he is in the recommendation he does venture, that in times of panic the issue of uncovered circulation be permitted under such a tax as would cause its retirement when the emergency had terminated. But while the argument used may appear inconsistent, the conclusion that is arrived at, that the present system of bank notes issued on Government bonds should not now be abandoned may, under the new and startling conditions in which the nation finds itself, not be very far wrong. The main argument against the system of note issues on the security of general assets alone is derived not from any theoretical defect in the system, but from the danger of its application to the large number of independent banks of small capital, which have grown up under our institutions and which have in their usefulness and adaptability proved more con-

genial to the customs and opinions of the people than any other form of the employment of bank capital. The banking business of the United States is still in a state of growth and development. It is doubtless much further advanced toward a satisfactory condition than it ever has been, but considered as a whole, that is including all our financial institutions, National, State and private banks, Savings banks and trust companies, many of the points of weakness to-day are the same as those criticized in the early history of banking business. There are still large sections of the country where the opportunities for careless and fraudulent banking are as good as they were in 1812, in 1837 and in 1857. The general permission to issue uncovered circulation might, it is feared by many, open again the door to many of the practices which formerly prevailed and the opportunities of this kind would be even more available in the newly-acquired territory. Therefore it is perhaps better to make haste slowly in this direction. That a very powerful opposition can be made to the McCLEARY bill and other similar measures is evident from the style of argument used by the Comptroller of the Currency.

It cannot be doubted that Mr. DAWES has been led or inspired to take a position so widely different from any of his predecessors, only after much consideration of the whole situation. He probably has not only looked at the matter from a political standpoint, in which he has had the best advice, but he probably has sounded as far as possible the real sentiments of influential bankers.

As before stated, the banking business of the country is in a state of development and growth. There are indications that with the growth of the country in wealth and importance there will be concentration of banking capital. Already the tendency to this consolidation is marked. The large solid institutions have always found it for their interest to preserve a financial control over the small and scattered institutions. This control will be exercised with much more difficulty if the door is opened to the issue of notes based on general assets. There is therefore a feeling of uncertainty on the part of the greater financial institutions as to the wisdom of taking so radical a step as that proposed in the McCLEARY bill.

But however this may be as to the banking part of currency reform, it is evident that something should be done to prevent the recurrence of the drain on the Treasury through the unlimited redemption and reissue of Government notes. The Comptroller thinks this can be done by means of revenue laws, and the reissue of legal-tender notes for gold only, as recommended by the President.

The financial situation of the Treasury is now strong and the balance of trade in favor of the United States is every day bringing unprecedented wealth to the country. It is safe at such a time to proceed

carefully. There is every reason to believe, if no more can be accomplished, that the check proposed on the reissue of Government notes, with the further provision for an emergency circulation to be issued by the banks in time of panic, subject to a sufficient tax to cause its retirement when the money market shall have returned to its normal condition, would prevent the recurrence of the drain on the Treasury which caused so much alarm in 1893. Especially as the laws regulating the issue of silver are now on a safe basis. If Congress in addition shall pass a resolution for the settled adoption of the gold standard, it would not be unsafe to leave the question of perfecting the bank-note currency of the country until a later stage of development of its banking and financial institutions.

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“THE CHARACTER AND FUNCTIONS OF MONEY,” is the title of a series of papers begun in this number of the *MAGAZINE*. They are written by CHARLES A. CONANT, of Boston, and will constitute the first chapter of a work which Mr. CONANT has in course of preparation. This chapter will be followed by others, most of which will appear in the *BANKERS’ MAGAZINE*, and the work will afterwards be published in book form as a complete treatise upon monetary science.

Mr. CONANT will treat the subject largely from the standpoint of the evolution of money, monetary types, and various forms of credit, tracing their growth from the barter of primitive times down to the perfected mechanism of modern exchange, with a glance at the possibilities of further development in the future.

The necessity for a new and comprehensive treatise in English upon the science of money and banking is well understood by economic students and the officials of our great universities. There is obviously room for a work upon the subject which conforms to sound doctrine and brings the results of monetary experience down to date. The book which has heretofore come nearest to fulfilling these requirements is that of Gen. FRANCIS A. WALKER, on “Money.” Gen. WALKER differed from most students upon the questions of bimetallism and Government paper money. Admirable as his book was, moreover, when it was written more than twenty years ago, much has happened in the financial world since that time and much has been learned regarding the monetary history of earlier times by recent researches. Aside from this book of Gen. WALKER’S, there are several other works—notably those of Mr. STANLEY JEVONS, Prof. CHARLES F. DUNBAR, and Mr. HORACE WHITE—which are written with great ability and are employed to some extent in university courses, but none of these was prepared with the purpose of covering the entire field of the theory of money, coinage, banking and the foreign exchanges.

This field it is the purpose of Mr. CONANT to deal with in a comprehensive manner, with a view to making a standard text-book upon the subject. Without expressing here any opinion upon the merits of the work, which must be unfolded as its several chapters appear, we think it will attract attention because of its scope and the modern experience and authorities of which the author will be able to avail himself. The first chapter almost necessarily keeps more closely in beaten tracks than some of those which will come after, but the points dealt with are covered with greater fulness and completeness than most existing works in English upon the subject.

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THE BRANCH BANKING SYSTEM OF CANADA has been suggested as a model for imitation in improving the banking laws of the United States. It is claimed for this system, and no doubt with justice, that it has worked excellently in developing the resources of the newer and thinly-settled parts of the Dominion. But a careful consideration of the subject will show that even with the many conceded excellences of this system it follows rather than leads the local accumulation of wealth, and that if adopted or copied in the United States, it would not obviate the lack of banking facilities in places which now complain of their absence, while as a system savoring very strongly of monopoly, it would be open much more than our National banks to the political attacks of demagogues.

The worst that can now be said against the National banking system resolves itself into complaint of sins of omission, but a system like the Canadian would be openly accused of sins of commission. It is noticeable that the Canadian banks do not find use in the poorer sections for all the money they receive in the richer parts of the Dominion, because they send large amounts for investment in the United States. Almost every prominent bank in Canada establishes offices for the investment of its surplus funds in the larger money centres of the United States. Now, this is all right; but if Canada were like the United States, how long would it be before this practice of sending money out of the country would be the subject of political attack. But on this part of the matter there is no need of any further remark. The practice shows, however, that the money collected in Canada is not all used there. In the same sense as the expression, lack of banking facilities, is used here there are many places in British America, all supposed to be under the Dominion, which lack banking facilities for the same reason that many places in the United States lack banking facilities. These places have not yet accumulated enough wealth to render a bank necessary. The grain is still so scanty that it can be cut with a sickle, and an improved economical reaping-machine

would find no work to do. Branches of Canadian banks are established in new places, much as new banks State and National are established in the United States. The place for some reasons begins to evince signs of prosperity; there are mines or lumber or manufacturing advantages, and people flock there and business begins. The news reaches the head offices of all the thirty banks of Canada, and one or more of them thinks it worth while to open a branch. The same thing happens on similar lines in this country, only the bank is started locally by the men who have the money and can inspire confidence in the community. In both cases if the bank draws more deposits from that locality than can be used there, the money goes to the money center, and when again wanted in the locality it came from, it goes back there, having while idle at home been given a chance to earn something elsewhere. No Canadian bank, however, it may safely be ventured, would as long as its management had their senses, establish a branch in any place in the Dominion which if it were in the United States would not sustain a local bank. In short there is nothing in the branch bank system of Canada which does not strengthen the proposition that the bank follows business prosperity and aids it, but that it does not undertake to usurp the functions of the Creator, and make prosperity out of nothing. The places complaining as to lack of banking facilities in the United States would complain as bitterly under a branch bank system as they do under the present one.

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THE GREAT OBJECTION TO NATIONAL BANKS in the agricultural sections of the country seems to be that they are not permitted by law to loan money on real estate security. This complaint comes chiefly from those parts where land is very cheap, and it is difficult to see how the grievance can be remedied. No possessor of capital, whether a bank or an individual, cares to loan money on poor security. The owner of valuable real estate, whether in town or country, seldom has any difficulty in getting a loan from a bank on personal security, which is of course ultimately backed up by his real estate property.

Even if National banks were permitted by law to loan directly on real estate security, no relief would be felt by those whose farming land was so cheap as to be comparatively unsalable at forced sale, as is often the case.

The real difficulty in those sections of the country where the lack of banking facilities is most complained of is the absence of home capital. A bank is not an institution for doing pioneer work. Wealth must be already created to some extent in a community before a bank can be of any use. The bank does not create wealth; it merely collects and economically employs the wealth already created. There seems

to be an erroneous impression in the minds of many, that all that is needed to make a desert bloom and flourish like a green bay tree is to establish a bank, and that automatically and continuously it will pour out money and create an industrious and wealthy community.

Before banks were ever thought of communities became rich and prosperous by the proper employment of their labor upon the natural resources around them. When banks were invented they afforded a means of economy in the use of accumulated capital that doubled its power. But no bank can ever exist without the money which represents the industry and enterprise of its stockholders, depositors and customers. No bank will ever establish itself in places where it cannot get both security and interest for the money it loans. National or other kinds of banks only make loans where value to return the loans is plainly in sight somewhere.

In many States the State banks are permitted by law to loan on real estate security, but they do not, when conducted in a manner to insure their continual existence, ever loan on real estate which cannot straightway be converted into cash. In fact, the holders of real estate that has any market value can ordinarily raise money upon it for longer periods and at less rates of interest from other capitalists than they can from banks of any description. Therefore, there seems to be much that is fallacious in the expectation that the permission of branches to National or State banks would bring prosperity to those sections of the country which complain most loudly of the lack of banking facilities. If such a locality is investigated the reason for the absence of the much-talked-of facilities is soon very apparent. It would probably be found that there is no basis upon which a loan of money could be honestly asked for with any hope of repayment. How can a bank officer be found fault with for not loaning on real estate, for instance, in a community where there is no sale of land among the inhabitants themselves. If there is a community in the country to-day where there is any good security for loans to the amount of fifty thousand, yes, twenty-five thousand dollars, and a constant demand for this amount of money to be used in paying business, there are probably plenty of capitalists who would be in a hurry to place a bank of some kind there.

Many of the complaints of the lack of bank facilities come from the cotton-growing sections of the South. Of late years cotton growing has not been a paying business, and any amount of money loaned with the idea that cotton growing was extremely profitable would most likely be lost. One bank, or fifty banks, would probably have no effect on the price of cotton, or any other product, except if anything to make it less profitable by stimulating over-production.

There is no doubt, however, that the establishment of a well-regulated and properly-managed bank in a community capable of using loans with some profit, but which has been the victim of excessive rates of interest, would conduce to the greater prosperity of that community, by lowering the interest rates, and according fair and honorable treatment to its customers. It may, however, be set down as an axiom that no bank, whether it loans on real estate or not, will build up or afford any real aid to a community that does not build itself by its own brains and energy. The bank is merely a machine for the proper distribution of the money of a community so that each member may receive the greatest benefit from the capital and industry of the whole community. If any one takes any other view or has any other expectations, disappointment is sure to ensue.

It is, however, this mistaken view of the functions of banks which arouses so many prejudices against them. The ignorant observer sees the ordinary bank located in a thriving and prosperous place, and he thinks it the fountain head and source of all the prosperity and plenty. He might as well ascribe the rich harvests of ripened grain to the reaping-machine which cuts and binds it and give no credit to the fertility of the soil. The people of places where there are no banking facilities ascribe their absence to the natural cussedness and perversity of banks, and revenge themselves by covering those perverse institutions with all the opprobrium that skill in the use of language permits.

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THE PROSPECT OF CURRENCY LEGISLATION during the present Congress, or the calling of an extra session for the purpose, seems now to be rather problematical. This appears to be the general feeling on all hands, and none but the very sanguine seem to have any hope that any of the measures looking to the retirement of the legal-tender notes and the adoption of a freer system of note issues by the banks will become law in the near future.

The period of fever and anxiety succeeding the panic of 1893 is gradually coming to an end. Even if the measure of banking reform which many have believed to be absolutely necessary to the future welfare of the country does not now materialize as the result of the repentance and humiliation caused by the financial crisis, yet there is no doubt that a very large dose of financial sense has been forced down the throat of the people of the country by that event and its depressing consequences. When that crisis arrived the country was expending its resources in a vain attempt to bolster up the price of silver by purchases of 4,000,000 ounces monthly. The coinage of the silver dollar had ceased. But the silver purchased was paid for in a special legal-

tender note payable in gold. Sooner than any one expected demand was made on the Treasury for the gold these notes represented, and the difficulty with which the Government responded to these demands was soon perceived, and the apprehensions of a total failure soon led to the panic. Under the influence of the terror inspired by the constant draft on the Treasury gold, and the struggle of the Government to replenish that gold by the creation of an interest-bearing debt, Congress repealed the silver-purchase law. By the courageous action of the Administration in placing bonds on the market, the danger period was at length passed and confidence was slowly restored. Since then Congress has refused to recognize any but the existing monetary standard, and has also disposed of the stock of silver purchased by providing for its gradual coinage.

The campaign of 1896 was fought on a distinct issue between those who sought to maintain the gold standard and those who desired the free coinage of silver at 16 to 1. The former were victorious, and although Congress has not been anxious to debate financial or currency questions it has vigorously resented any interference with the existing status. This policy of non-interference has prevailed since 1896. During this period the country has been gradually recovering from the effects of the financial crisis caused by too much silver and the fear of a permanent depreciation of our currency, and is now in confident view of an unprecedented prosperity. The causes of this prosperity are not connected with the monetary system of the country. They have been due to the impetus given to our foreign trade by the low prices following the panic and the fortunate market for the bountiful grain crop of 1897. The repeal of the silver-purchase law took away the most seriously depressing feature of the monetary law, and the natural recuperative power of an energetic people combined with good fortune did the rest. But this sequence of events appears to show that the existing monetary laws do not retard the growth of the country. The Spanish war made the nation conscious of its strength to a greater extent than ever.

There never was a more unsatisfactory or vexatious political issue than that based on the silver question. It was unsatisfactory to politicians because it tended to division instead of unification of parties. Although it was ostensibly an attempt to remonetize silver, no clear-cut issue could ever be made upon it, because the whole monetary question became involved and questions of finance have so many ramifications and modifications, and branch out in so many social and economic directions, where every man is guided by his own individual interests, that it seems impossible to secure unity upon any recognized ground. The maintenance of the gold standard, the banking question, the paper money of the Government, silver dollars, the free coin-



age of silver, all caused a web of opinions that seems impossible of disentanglement. The prominent men of both the principal parties had laid themselves open to many charges of inconsistency in their course on this question, and its persistence and impracticableness as a political issue have at length created insuppressible disgust. Inasmuch as the matters which seemed to make the monetary question of so much importance have during the past two or three years seemed to be in a fair way of settling themselves, it is not to be wondered at that legislators are unwilling to revive all the profitless and everlasting discussions of the last quarter of a century. As a matter of fact the gold standard is now in full operation and all business transactions are based upon it. No one seems to have any disposition to revive the silver question. The average member of Congress is always willing to let unpleasant matters rest, and it is almost a certainty that if an attempt be made to modify the present National banking laws that the whole monetary question would be revived. As was remarked last month, the attempt to substitute a satisfactory bank currency in place of Government notes will be represented as an attempt to foster an odious monopoly, and it may be better to wait for currency reform until the minds of the people diverted by other issues will cease to look upon banking reform as being of any political significance. It is therefore regarded as extremely doubtful whether any serious attempt will be made in this Congress to pass the McCLEARY bill or any other similar measure. If anything is done in reference to our financial laws, it will probably be limited to adopting the President's recommendation that legal-tender notes when redeemed shall only be paid out in exchange for gold.

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THE INCREASED USE OF CHECKS in all lines of business causes greater economy in the use of currency and lessens the danger of complaints of scarcity of circulating medium, which are the foundation of the hopes and arguments of those who live by fomenting and nursing financial heresies. Stringency of the money market may be the result of actual shortage of money in what is known as the market, but this shortage is a symptom not a cause. It is caused by a prior state of mind characterized as a want of confidence on the part of those who supply the money market. The sources which supply currency to the financial centres are multifarious, and they seem all to be governed by similar laws, and when the chill of lack of confidence strikes any source of supply it has a tendency to soon invade all. Currency and money are in existence somewhere in times of stringency, in the same quantity as in times of so-called plenty. The only kind of money that leaves the country is gold. The exportation of this precious

metal is subject to almost exact observation and it is not the actual exportation so much as the apprehension of its continuance that increases the tendency to withdraw non-exportable money from its ordinary channels and depositaries.

In decreasing the demand made upon the stores of actual money the use of checks acts as a cushion or buffer, in relieving those symptoms which precede financial crises. The more the banks and financial institutions become accustomed to the exchange of checks by means of clearing-house machinery, the less fear they have of failing to meet demand for actual money. The history of clearing-houses of the United States shows a constant growth of the daily exchanges. This is usually ascribed to the growth of business, and it is no doubt in great measure due to this, but it is probable that the increase in clearings is also due in a considerable degree to the increase in the use of checks based on bank accounts.

The complaints that have for many years been heard of the large number of out-of-town checks, which have to be handled by banks in all parts of the country, had a mournful sound; but they were in a measure the creaking of an old system that was gradually being strained and developed into new and stronger lines of action. Novelties and improvements are to some degree painful to the latent conservatism of mankind. Growth in any direction is always attended with some unpleasant sensations.

Early in the use of individual checks for payment there were those who recognized that they had come to stay and who wished to invent ways to handle and circulate them which would be economical to banks and financial institutions. Not so many years ago when a remittance had to be made, even by a person who had a bank account, it was the custom to purchase a draft on some convenient financial centre. But now in such a case the party sends his individual check instead. Of course this deprives the bank of the profit on the exchange and places the cost of collection upon the bank of the payee of the check or of his assignee. But the practice of thus making remittances is one that recognizes the unity of the country regardless of State lines, as the practice of drawing personal checks for town payments recognizes the unity of the town. It is also a concomitant of the rapid growth of transportation and news facilities. The telegraph and telephone have done much to encourage this new custom.

But while the use of country checks is sure to grow notwithstanding short-sighted attempts to discourage it, yet the system of handling these checks has not by any means been developed to the perfection that will probably be attained in a few years. Many tentative systems have been proposed by experts for doing this collection of country checks on a large scale, but so far the banks have not taken very

kindly to any of the plans. The accommodation of customers in the collection of the outside checks placed in their accounts has been a favorite weapon with competing banks to secure business, and the cheap and rapid and sure collection of these outside items has exercised the skill and ingenuity of the employees in the large city banks, until the systems followed by these institutions are perfect models of labor-saving contrivance.

In the financial centres and particularly in New York the saving effected by the use of the clearing-house is marvelous. In the last-named place, especially since the enlargement of the boundaries of the city, there are a number of banking firms and private banks that do not belong to the clearing-house, and their checks are collected in the old manner by sending directly to each bank. It has recently been proposed to establish a clearing for these checks by means of which each of these outside banks can avail itself of the checks it receives to diminish the cash necessary to meet the checks drawn upon it. The success of this proposition will have a greater effect in regulating the money market and rendering it less open to unseen influences than may appear at first sight. The success of any system depends on many details, and great as is the New York Clearing-House Association, it cannot fully guard the money market from sudden shocks when there are so many banking offices which are compelled to use cash in their settlements, with an old-fashioned lack of economy. In the aggregate these offices do a very important business, and by the plan proposed it is probable that the cash now necessary to settle the daily collections on them may be reduced to one-sixth or less of the present amount required. This will represent a saving of the resources of the larger institutions and be so much less to provide in stringent conditions of the money market. The present system of collection involves the sending of the checks on each of these outside offices to the counter of that institution where payment is made in full either in cash or by check on one of the clearing-house banks. Under the new plan the checks on these offices will be sent to the place selected for clearing and after the exchanges are completed each of these offices will only be called upon to pay its debit balance. Probably in time some method of collecting out-of-town checks on banks in all sections of the country may be devised which will be similar in its working to that now proposed for the private banking offices in New York.

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THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY in material power and wealth is to-day more marked than ever before. Never have the exports of raw material and manufactures been so great, with constant openings for new trade, which indicate that these conditions will continue to

grow. The panic of 1893, with its consequent low prices, evil as it appeared to be, has turned out in the long run an advantage. The prices and quality of our products have attracted the attention of foreign markets in all parts of the world, and American manufacturers are now receiving orders from countries that have heretofore appeared to be unapproachable competitors. Sending machinery and locomotive engines to England seems like sending coals to Newcastle, but even this feat has been accomplished by our manufacturers. The home market has heretofore been regarded as of the highest importance and the tariff has been the great means by which this market has been retained for home industry. But in time the competition for this market became excessive, and while it seemed an evil yet this very competition developed the wits and energies of capitalists and inventors to such an extent that now, as they have outgrown the home market, they find themselves on the wider field of the world's trade and equals if not the superiors of their competitors abroad.

The reports from American consuls and foreign ministers abroad are pointing out new fields for the exploitation of American commercial energy. The much-abused trusts, the growth of keen home competition, have been one immediate cause of the ability to compete in foreign fields. Their form of management of great industries, compelled to take account of all economies and labor-saving inventions, have in many respects outstripped foreign methods. In settlement of the balances caused by the increased and increasing exportations, large sums of money become due to the people of this country, and investments must be found for the surplus accumulations. The state of the money markets and the low rates of interest prevailing at our financial centres have delayed the importations of gold which would naturally follow the settlement of balances due, by causing these balances to be retained abroad as a loan.

If this condition of affairs continues to manifest itself for a few years longer, it is very possible, as was predicted by the late JNO. JAY KNOX several years ago, that New York will supersede London as the financial centre of the world. The great banks and banking firms of New York city are already alive to these possibilities, and are preparing themselves for the requirements of this high financial position.

There is no doubt, however, that the natural conservatism of American financiers will lead them to first provide for the requirements of home enterprise before taking up with investments in foreign countries, and with the large surplus accumulation of the past two years there cannot fail during 1899 to be a more startling development of domestic resources than has been known for many years.

## TAXATION OF BANKING CAPITAL.

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Whatever may be the fate of the present agitation for the modification of the Federal banking laws, it is much to be desired for the advantage of business and exchange of products between one section of the United States and another that there should be a uniform system prevailing in all parts of the country in regard to governmental treatment of capital engaged in banking. As it is now the most diverse provisions prevail in the several States relative to the taxation of the different forms of wealth which constitute the basis of the banking business, particularly as to taxation.

The Federal Government imposes no tax which bears universally on all banks, except the tax on circulating notes. In the case of State banks this tax is made prohibitive. In the case of National banks it is for revenue purposes. The uniformity of these taxes within the classes of institutions they affect tends to cause uniformity in the distribution of bank capital. If, for instance, the ten per cent. tax on State bank notes were enforced in some States and not in others, it is plain that the greater part of banking would be carried on in the States where the tax was least burdensome. If in some States the circulation of National banks were taxed and in others not, the banks would gather in those States where the tax was the lightest. Any inequality of this kind on the part of a Federal law would be an impossibility, but if it were possible, it could not long continue because of the outcry that would be raised against it.

But just such an inequality does exist and has always existed in regard to what is styled State, county and municipal taxation of bank shares, etc. This inequality may be observed not only in the treatment of banks by the laws of different States, but in the treatment of banks in the different counties of the same State, and it is this inequality of taxation which has as much to do with the lack of banking facilities in many places as the defects in the laws relative to the establishment of banks or relative to bank-note circulation. If the States should voluntarily surrender the power to tax bank capital, and leave the banks untaxed except by a uniform Federal law, the distribution of banking facilities throughout the United States would be much more satisfactory to the people of the country. The same effect would be produced if there could be uniformity in the several State laws and in their administration. The inequality affects banking capital in two ways; it either drives it together at points where the taxation is light, even though profits are not so great, or it concentrates at points where the profits are large and enables the banks to thrive notwithstanding the tax.

Any State has it in its power to attract banking and other capital within its borders by insuring good treatment in this respect. What is lost by lightening taxes on personal and corporation capital is gained in the greater prosperity of the general population, the increase of wealth in the State and the rise in value of real estate.

The great difficulties encountered in the taxation of monetary capital naturally arise from the mistaken views which prevail as to the nature of

this form of wealth and its relations to other forms of property. The so-called wealth accumulated in banks and financial institutions and which attracts the attention of the tax-gatherer is, with the exception of actual coined standard money, simply titles to property. Actual property is visible and tangible. It consists of land and improvements, mechanics' tools, products and manufactures. The tax-gatherer, inspired by a laudable desire to do his duty, sees the actual property first, as far as it is possible for him physically to do so, and then he often views the title to it as a kind of additional wealth, although it is in reality one and the same as what he has already seen. In taxing such titles it is almost impossible to avoid double and even triple and quadruple taxation.

As no human system can be found which will render perfect justice, and as the practice of holding property by negotiable titles capable of being divided and subdivided is one of the most imperative conveniences of social life and is constantly on the increase, the danger is that increase in injustice of taxation will also constantly grow, until this subject is better understood by those who are elected to carry on the functions of government, Federal, State and municipal.

On a broad view of the matter it is plain that all property should be subject to taxation ratably according to its value. But if property is taxed as such, and the titles to it as such are again taxed, there is manifestly gross injustice somewhere. The banks and financial institutions are the great depositories of these titles, and it is almost impossible to tell, so much are they divided and subdivided, who are the real owners. The capital stock of a bank, for instance, is represented chiefly by the loans made by the institution. These loans consist of notes given by numerous persons or corporations, and the means by which they are to be paid, if they could in each case be accurately traced out, would be found to consist in the end of improved real estate, mines, ships, products and manufactures, either imported or for export or for home consumption. The great majority of these forms of actual property are taxed wherever they are found or consumed.

In tracing out the property on which the payment of a given bank loan rests it is possible that there may be several titles to property intervene between the note held by the bank and the actual property from which the payment will be ultimately derived. Thus a note may be secured by collateral consisting of stock in another corporation, which again depends for value on the loans of that corporation, which again may be secured by stock or bonds of a railroad whose earnings depend on the business it does. If the stock of the bank and the stock of the corporation and the stock of the railroad and its earnings are all taxed, here is repeated taxation of the same thing. The tax-gatherer in most places looks on the bank as the holder of the real wealth, and without listening to any fine-drawn arguments as to the status and foundations of the titles held by the bank, seeks to collect on all he finds.

The difficulty of avoiding injustice in general taxation is crudely recognized in what is known as the process of assessment for purposes of taxation. Property or titles to property are seldom assessed at their real market, or nominal value, but usually at a much less figure. It is this margin between what might be salable value of real and personal property and its assessed value which more or less compensates for the unavoidable injustice inseparable from most forms of taxation. The deduction of debts also is another

method of lessening this injustice. Bank stock, however, is usually treated with less leniency in this respect than almost any other form of title to property. Both in the assessment and in the deduction of debts, the usual State, county and municipal laws are extremely hard on bank stock. If the bank itself were the object of taxation, an examination of its accounts would at once show that whatever its assets, its debts to stockholders and depositors are just equal thereto. The stock and profits belonging to stockholders are, however, indubitably the property of these stockholders taken as individuals, and if they have no debts, might be taxed at their book value. But there is no individual but has his own private balance sheet, of which the bank stock he owns forms an item among the resources. If he is treated fairly he should be taxed merely on the excess of his resources over his liabilities. In specially taxing his bank stock injustice is apt to be done either by taxing him too heavily when no account at all is taken of his real surplus, or too lightly by allowing him to deduct all his debts from his bank stock, which may be only one item of his resources.

After all, however, the great trouble with local bank taxation is the inequality of its imposition in the several States, counties and municipalities. One way in which this may be cured is by the adoption of uniform taxation laws and provisions for their enforcement by all the States. This remedy is one that it is impossible to think will ever be put on trial. But the same end would be reached by the Federal Government taking all power of the State, county and municipal taxation of banks out of the hands of the State.

The constitutional power of the Federal Government to control State banking has already been shown by the effect of the law taxing State banking circulation. This law was declared by the U. S. Supreme Court to be constitutional. The same court has declared that the power now exercised by the States in taxing National banks could not be exercised except by the consent of Congress. To settle the whole question of uniform bank taxation it would only be necessary for Congress to withdraw its consent to the present method of State taxation of National bank shares, and either permit no taxation of this kind or prescribe a method of assessment and collection which should be equal and uniform in all parts of the country. The States would then be forced to adopt a similar method in taxing their State banks, or these latter would become National banks to secure similar advantages in taxation.

There seems to be every reason to think that the regulation of bank taxation by the Federal Government, on a uniform basis throughout the land, would be acceptable both to the banks and to the people. The taxation of banks would not be an unpopular measure, nor could it be used as a handle for stirring up political agitation. The commerce and trade of the country is not bounded by State lines. The railroads stretch across the whole area. The banking business, equally important, should be brought to a harmonized uniformity. There is no reason why Congress, even if it should hesitate to pass laws containing provisions which demagogues style privileges, should not confer a general benefit by regulating the burden of taxation which the banking business should bear in sustaining State, county and municipal government. The result would be a larger and more regular sum paid into all the local treasuries throughout the United States in addition to the saving of the expense of the endless litigation which is the concomitant of the present system of taxation of banks by State authority.

## THE ISSUE OF GOLD CERTIFICATES.

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In a communication to the New York "Evening Post," under date of December 29, Hon. E. O. Leech, former Director of the Mint and now Cashier of the National Union Bank, New York city, makes a strong argument in favor of the resumption of the issue of gold certificates by the Treasury, which was suspended by Secretary Carlisle in April, 1893.

The Act of July 12, 1882, authorizes and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to receive deposits of gold coin and to issue certificates therefor in denominations of not less than \$20 each, "Provided, that the Secretary of the Treasury shall suspend the issue of such gold certificates whenever the amount of gold coin and gold bullion in the Treasury reserved for the redemption of United States notes falls below one hundred millions of dollars."

It was under this provision of the Act that Secretary Carlisle suspended the issue of the certificates in 1893 when the gold reserve fell below the \$100,000,000 mark.

Mr. Leech contends that the contingency which caused the suspension of the issue of the certificates having passed, the general law becomes operative, and that it is mandatory in its terms. He supports his position by citing decisions of the English and American courts, and by reference to a ruling of the Attorney-General of the United States.

He says that "The gold Treasury certificate is the best form of paper money which has ever been devised. It is a note issued against a deposit of gold held by the Government specifically for its redemption. It is safe, convenient, and economical, a valuable substitute for more cumbersome coin. It corresponds in our currency system to the Bank of England note, the highest form of currency known to Europe. It is generally agreed that the free influx of gold into our currency would have a beneficial effect upon our monetary system, and that our people should be accustomed to the use of gold money. As the use of metallic money—especially gold—is expensive and inconvenient, expensive by reason of the loss by abrasion in handling the coin, and inconvenient by reason of weight, gold certificates issued, as the law directs, in the denominations of United States notes, would serve the beneficent purpose of accustoming the people to the use of gold money without the inconvenience of actually carrying the coin. One of the most serious questions that confronts the Treasury Department to-day is how to supply the demand for paper money. The Treasury is practically bare of currency. Next autumn, when the demand for money to move the crops sets in, the currency situation is certain to become acute. The supply of currency in the large money centres is barely sufficient for local uses, and the banks will not ship currency to out-of-town correspondents, but only gold, where actual shipments are required on their part. Gold coin is not a convenient form of currency for the farmer. Already there is a strong belief, notably



in the South and West, that there is not sufficient money in circulation for the convenient transaction of business, and that the rate of interest in those sections is unnecessarily high by reason of such scarcity.

Out of this belief has grown a pressing demand for a larger medium of exchange in the form of Government paper issues and State bank issues. This want could be readily met through the medium of gold certificates. It is estimated by the Director of the Mint that the stock of gold in this country at the present time aggregates \$925,000,000, all of which could be utilized as current money. The enormous increase in the product of gold from the mines of the countries of North and South America, aggregating for the present year about \$100,000,000, all of which (except the amount used in the arts and industries) must find a lodgment in the monetary circulation of this country, not to speak of the unprecedented trade balances rendering certain the importation in the near future of vast quantities of foreign gold, make it evident that the currency of this country for many years to come must consist largely of gold, and the question of handling this tremendous mass of metal is certain to become a serious one."

Mr. Leech thinks that the issue of these certificates would tend to supply the currency needed to move the crops, and counteract the demand for further issues of Government paper money which is sure to be made should a scarcity of notes arise.

The objections urged that the issue of gold certificates enables people to hoard gold and to draw it out when most needed by the Treasury, Mr. Leech does not regard as well founded. The international movement of gold is determined by natural laws of trade the operations of which it is difficult to circumvent.

Concluding his very able argument on the subject, Mr. Leech says:

"In view of these considerations it seems to me that it is unwise, not to say illegal, to withhold from the people of this country what the law clearly gives them, the best form of money, limited as to issue only by the amount of gold which finds its way into our country. Certainly no form of money yet devised is superior to gold notes, payable on demand in gold, and not reissued except for gold. It is the only form of paper money to which no one objects."

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COMMERCE IN 1898.—In an interesting article published elsewhere in this issue, Mr. O. P. Austin, Chief of the Bureau of Statistics of the United States Treasury Department, presents a striking review of the commerce, manufactures and productions of the country for 1898, making comparisons with other years. The net results of the movement of gold for a number of years are also shown.

The large increase in our exports of manufactured articles and agricultural products, occurring simultaneously with a decline in imports, has resulted in an extremely large trade balance in our favor and the consequent heavy net imports of gold as recorded in the statistical tables presented.

Mr. Austin has collected a large amount of valuable information in regard to our productive industries, and the exhibit of the operations for the year makes it apparent that 1898 has in many respects surpassed all previous years in adding to the wealth and prosperity of the country.

## COMMERCE, MANUFACTURES AND PRODUCTS.

### *A REVIEW OF THE RECORD MADE IN THE YEAR 1898.*

The commerce of the United States for the year 1898 has been in many respects the most satisfactory of any like period in the history of the country. Necessarily in preparing statements for publication early in January, the returns for the month of December must be partially estimated, but sufficient is known to warrant the above assertion. The exports of the year are the largest in our history, and the imports the smallest in more than a decade. For the first time the exports will amount to a billion and a quarter of dollars in round terms, while in only two preceding years have they been as much as one billion. On the other hand, the imports are the smallest since 1885, although the consuming population is now thirty-three per cent. greater than at that date. With exports the largest in our history, and imports so small as to make it apparent that the manufacturers and producers have enjoyed an unusually large market among the prosperous home population, it seems reasonable to assume that the manufacturing and producing interests and their employees have been unusually prosperous and active, and consequently internal as well as external commerce unusually great and successful.

#### HEAVY EXPORTS OF ALL CLASSES OF ARTICLES.

The foreign commerce of the year, whose statistics are obtainable from month to month, has been the subject of frequent—almost constant—discussion. In its prosperity every branch of the great industries has shared. The farmer has made his highest record, his supply for exporting purposes being unusually large and prices unusually high, so that the total exportation of breadstuffs, provisions, and other great lines of agricultural production, is the largest, in value, of any year in the history of the country. The cotton producers of the South, while not obtaining high prices, because of the enormous crops which this, the great cotton-producing country of the world, has offered from year to year of late, have exported during 1898 larger quantities of cotton than in any preceding calendar year, while their actual receipts for that staple have been surpassed in but few earlier years. The product of the mines exported exceeds by more than twenty-five per cent. that of the preceding year, and those of the forest will be greater than in any earlier year, with possibly two exceptions. The manufacturers have made not only their greatest record in the value of their exports, but have for the first time achieved the proud distinction of exporting more manufactured goods than have been imported.

#### AGRICULTURE.

Four great classes of articles form the bulk of agricultural products exported; namely, breadstuffs, provisions, live animals, cotton. During the eleven months whose record has been already made the exportations of

breadstuffs was \$55,000,000 in excess of those of the corresponding months of the great exporting year 1892 ; provisions are \$23,000,000 greater than in the corresponding months of 1892, and cotton, as already indicated, reaches a higher figure in pounds than in any preceding year, and exceeds those of last year as to value. Exports of agricultural products, which in the year of their highest record, 1891, amounted to \$730,069,702, and in 1892 to \$712,461,791, will in 1898 reach about \$855,000,000, and thus prove more than \$120,000,000 higher than that of the record year 1891 when it was, as above indicated, \$730,069,702.

#### MANUFACTURES.

In all the great manufacturing lines the year's exports have also been satisfactory and have shown a gratifying growth. Iron and steel and their manufactures show an increase of nearly thirty-three per cent. over 1897 and seem likely to almost double the export figures of 1896, while the importations of iron and steel and their manufactures have fallen forty per cent. compared with 1896. Cotton cloths show an increase of nearly 20,000,000 yards. Mineral oils have increased at the rate of more than a million gallons a month through the year. Cars and carriages show a marked growth in exportation, while agricultural implements show an increase of more than sixty per cent.

The tables on the following page show the exports of the great classes of domestic production during each calendar year from 1890 to 1898 ; also the importation by classes during the same period, the figures for the closing month of 1898 being in each case estimated.

#### DECLINE IN THE VALUE OF IMPORTS.

The import figures of the year are quite as interesting as those relating to exports. They show, as already indicated, that the importations of the year have been smaller than those of any year since 1885, although the consuming population is now thirty-three per cent. greater than at that time. These unusually small imports are the more remarkable in the fact that the year has been one of prosperity and consequent large purchasing power among the people. That the apparent reduction is due in some degree to a reduction in values is evident. The coffee importations of the year, for instance, are about equal, expressed in pounds, to those of 1897, yet the value of coffee imported is more than twenty-five per cent. below that of 1897. Sugar importations are nearly a billion pounds less than last year in quantity and nearly ten million dollars less in value, those of the early part of the year 1897 having been abnormally large, especially during the months immediately preceding the enactment of the tariff law. Tea importations are but about two-thirds those of the preceding year in quantity, and show a fall in value of \$3,500,000, and a reduction of more than ten per cent. in import prices. Tropical fruits, which we have obtained largely from the West Indies, have, because of the war, fallen very greatly in the quantity imported and consequently in values. The average import price of coffee brought into the country during the year has been less than half the average price in 1895 or 1896, so that, although the coffee importations of the year have been twenty per cent. greater than in those years, the value is very much less, the figures for 1898 being \$54,000,000 against \$80,000,000 in 1896, and \$96,000,000 in 1895. It is not surprising, therefore, that the class "Articles of food and live animals" shows a reduction, expressed in values, of \$35,000,000 in round numbers, while in fact a con-

Exports by Classes—1890 to 1898.

CALENDAR YEAR.	Exports by Classes—1890 to 1898.						Total.
	Agricultural.	Manufactures.	Mining.	Forest.	Fisheries.	Miscellaneous.	
1890.....	\$628,779,597	\$157,126,803	\$20,787,873	\$29,496,148	\$6,076,668	\$3,532,514	\$845,999,603
1891.....	730,069,702	168,598,804	21,447,128	27,209,539	6,040,564	3,972,814	997,338,561
1892.....	712,539,832	152,397,392	20,566,870	28,513,096	5,579,910	3,639,209	923,237,315
1893.....	619,135,633	177,347,876	21,656,256	27,617,868	4,538,329	4,433,492	864,729,454
1894.....	573,684,383	177,800,969	17,568,704	28,796,851	5,239,818	4,231,391	807,312,116
1895.....	545,715,881	201,153,663	19,820,502	30,662,093	6,232,228	4,168,047	807,742,415
1896.....	684,955,372	253,681,541	21,405,774	36,281,504	6,594,463	3,911,426	986,830,080
1897.....	730,323,514	278,616,898	19,792,796	40,884,864	5,649,945	3,645,001	1,079,863,018
1898*.....	858,000,000	300,000,000	25,000,000	39,000,000	5,500,000	3,500,000	1,237,000,000

\* December estimated.

NOTE.—The above figures relate to domestic products only. Foreign exports for 1898 estimated at \$21,000,000.

Imports by Classes—1890 to 1898.

CALENDAR YEAR.	Imports by Classes—1890 to 1898.				Articles of voluntary use, luxuries, etc.	Total.
	Articles of food and live animals.	Articles in a crude condition for domestic industry.	ARTICLES MANUFACTURED.			
			For mechanic arts.	For consumption.		
1890.....	\$261,509,841	\$185,989,543	\$96,994,018	\$149,757,777	\$129,147,547	\$923,397,726
1891.....	300,015,891	291,015,478	96,078,472	128,556,166	102,655,937	828,320,943
1892.....	287,383,397	211,698,915	90,416,889	137,069,546	114,367,708	840,930,955
1893.....	275,509,539	184,162,972	86,290,331	125,829,598	104,462,484	776,248,924
1894.....	263,542,858	160,524,331	69,504,987	91,223,845	91,517,010	676,312,941
1895.....	231,548,775	219,527,000	102,482,996	150,858,735	97,261,851	801,648,347
1896.....	234,187,158	162,172,736	86,238,808	120,438,995	78,541,889	691,579,556
1897.....	220,494,113	238,301,995	81,171,885	118,895,882	83,327,475	742,631,350
1898*.....	186,000,000	190,000,000	59,000,000	106,000,000	84,000,000	634,000,000

\* December estimated.

siderable share of this reduction is due to reduced prices rather than reduced quantities imported.

Another large item of reduction in imports is found in the class "Articles in a crude condition for use in domestic industries." This class shows a reduction in round terms of \$40,000,000 as compared with last year, but it will be seen on examination of the table that last year's importations of raw materials were abnormally large, having been \$75,000,000 in excess of those of the year 1896, and even larger than in the great importing year which followed the enactment of the tariff of 1894. The reduced importation in 1898 in a single article—wool—accounts for practically all of this. Wool importations in 1897, as is well known, were abnormally large, the total for the year having been 356,849,482 pounds against 159,776,015 in 1896, thus making it apparent that a full two years' supply of foreign wool was brought into the country in the single year 1897. It is not surprising, therefore, that the wool importations of the year 1898 have fallen \$40,000,000 below those of 1897, and that the great class "Articles in a crude condition for domestic industry" shows a reduction equal to this sum, all the other important articles included in this class holding their own or showing a slight increase.

The class "Articles wholly or partially manufactured for use as materials in the manufacturers' and mechanic arts" shows a reduction of \$22,000,000, which is distributed through a large number of articles, but more especially cotton, woollen and jute yarns, and other articles of this kind. "Articles manufactured ready for consumption" also show a reduction of about \$12,000,000, while "Articles of voluntary use, luxuries, etc.," show a slight increase over 1897.

#### INTERNAL COMMERCE.

While it is, as already indicated, impossible to obtain accurate figures regarding the internal commerce, it is practicable to determine in some degree through an examination of the import and export statistics whether or not the manufacturers and producers generally have been busy, and to that extent at least reach some conclusions regarding the internal as well as external commerce. If the figures of our exports show that the people have sold an unusually large quantity of products of the farm, factory and mine and received good prices therefor, it may be assumed that they have had money to expend for the necessities, conveniences and comforts of life. If the figures of the year show that the importations of those articles have been at the same time unusually light, it is reasonable to assume that the people in making their purchases have bought from the home producers and manufacturers, and consequently that their sales to our own people, which are always vastly in excess of those abroad, have been this year unusually large and that the internal as well as the external commerce has therefore made a high—perhaps its highest record. A closer examination of the figures relating to imports and exports makes it perfectly clear that the manufacturers must have been unusually active since they have sent abroad more of their products than in any preceding year, while supplying a larger home demand than usual, larger probably than ever before experienced.

The three great classes of imports—articles manufactured for mechanic arts, articles manufactured for consumption, articles for voluntary use and luxuries—which are given in the table already presented, contain all the impor-

tations which could be classed as manufactures and are practically made up of articles which must be so classed. To be sure, in the last-named class, "Articles of voluntary use, luxuries, etc.," are included a few articles not actually manufactures, such as diamonds, statuary, paintings, feathers, etc., but for practical purposes a combination of the three classes presents in a single group the manufactures imported. It is interesting, therefore, to compare the grand total of these three classes of imports during the year 1898 with those of preceding years, and in that way determine whether the importations of manufactures have really fallen off and to what extent both in the present and earlier years. The following table shows the combined importation in each year since 1890 of the three classes of articles in question, and thus presents in a form for convenient observation a concise statement of the importation of manufactures from year to year since 1890:

YEAR.	Importations of manufactures.	YEAR.	Importations of manufactures.
1890.....	\$375,899,342	1895.....	\$350,593,572
1891.....	327,299,574	1896.....	285,219,662
1892.....	341,843,643	1897.....	283,325,262
1893.....	316,532,413	1898*	249,000,000
1894.....	252,245,752		

\* December estimated.

An examination of the above table shows that the importation of manufactures in the year 1898 is \$34,000,000 less than in 1897. It also discloses another important and interesting fact, that the importation of manufactures in 1897 was not as excessive as popularly supposed. The fact that unusually heavy importations were made in the months just preceding the enactment of the tariff of 1897 led to a popular belief that the country was being largely overstocked with manufactured goods from abroad. While this was probably true with reference to a few articles such as woollen goods, cloths, etc., the excessive importation of those months was largely in raw wool, sugar and some other articles which do not come under the head of manufactures. That this is true is shown by the fact that the total of the three classes which are for convenience here grouped as manufactures is slightly less for the year 1897 than for the year 1896, the total for the year 1897 being \$283,325,262 and that of 1896 \$285,219,662, while that of 1895—the year of the great importation of manufactures—was \$350,593,572. The average annual importation of manufactures from 1890 to 1897 inclusive was, if we still consider the total of the three groups as manufactures, \$316,626,649 per annum, while that of 1898 was, as indicated above, \$249,000,000 per annum, or \$67,000,000 below the annual average of the preceding eight years.

This detailed examination seems to indicate that our home manufacturers are occupying home fields to a greater extent each year while they are at the same time increasing their sales abroad. With the importations of manufactures in 1896 and 1897 rather below than above the average, and those of 1898 far below the average, it is apparent that the home manufacturers have been supplying to an unusually large degree the home market. It goes without saying that the purchases of manufactured articles during the years of depression through which the country has just passed must have been in a large majority of cases unusually light, and that the stock in a large proportion of the homes of the country needed replenishing when the improved receipts from crops and earnings came during the past year. So it seems

probable that the purchases of manufactures by the people of the United States have been unusually heavy during the past year, and as the importations of manufactures have been in the meantime phenomenally light and the stock on hand prior to that time was not abnormally heavy, it is evident that the demand upon the home manufacturers has been great. That they have been quite equal to the occasion, however, is shown by the fact that they have supplied this home demand, which, of course, is always the first to be recognized, and have at the same time increased their exports until the year 1898 will show the largest exportation of goods of American manufacture in the history of the country.

By way of illustrating the rapid growth of our manufacturing interests, the following figures showing the imports and exports of manufactures from 1890 to 1898 by calendar years are presented:

YEAR.	<i>Imports of manufactures.</i>	<i>Exports of manufactures.</i>
1890.....	\$375,899,342	\$157,126,803
1891.....	327,289,574	168,593,804
1892.....	341,843,643	162,397,392
1893.....	316,582,413	177,347,876
1894.....	252,245,752	177,800,969
1895.....	350,593,572	301,163,663
1896.....	255,219,662	253,681,541
1897.....	283,335,262	279,616,898
1898*.....	249,000,000	306,000,000

\* December estimated.

It will be seen that the imports of manufactures fell from \$375,899,342 in 1890 to \$249,000,000 in 1898, and that during the same time the exports of manufactures increased from \$157,126,803 to \$306,000,000, the figures for December in each case being estimated. When it is realized that we are now importing for 75,000,000 people only two-thirds as much of manufactures as we imported for 62,000,000 in 1890, it will be seen that the home manufacturers must be furnishing to this increased population a very much greater supply than they did in 1890, while at the same time, as shown by this table, they are exporting twice as much of their manufactures as they then exported.

Another evidence of the increased activity of the manufacturers in 1898 is found in the fact that the importation of the four great classes of foreign raw material required by them—silk, rubber, fibers and hides—has been larger in 1898 than in any preceding year, the total of these four classes of articles being in round numbers \$110,000,000 in 1898 against \$97,000,000 in 1897 and \$65,000,000 in 1896, \$97,000,000 in 1895 and \$69,000,000 in 1894. A similar evidence of the reduction of imports of manufactures in 1898 is found in the fact that in the eight great classes, manufactures of silk, cotton, wool, fibers, iron and steel, leather, china and glass, and chemicals, the importations of the year were nearly \$40,000,000 below those of 1897, \$88,000,000 below those of 1895, and \$100,000,000 below these of 1890. The largest reductions in these classes are found in woollen manufactures and those of iron and steel, though in each of the classes named the figures of 1898 are less than those of earlier years.

#### LARGE NET IMPORTATION OF GOLD.

With the largest exports in our history and the smallest imports in many years, there comes naturally the largest net importation of gold. The total

gold imports of the eleven months ending with November were \$149,396,370, which is a much larger sum than was ever imported in any full year prior to 1898, while the total exports of gold for the eleven months were but \$14,975,316, making the net gold importations of the eleven months \$134,421,054. The following table shows the importation and exportation of gold by years from 1890 to 1898, the figures for only eleven months of the year 1898 being given:

CALENDAR YEAR.	Gold imports.	Gold exports.	Excess of imports.	Excess of exports.
1890.....	\$20,230,090	\$24,063,074	.....	\$3,832,984
1891.....	44,970,110	79,086,561	.....	34,116,471
1892.....	17,450,946	76,532,056	.....	59,081,110
1893.....	72,762,389	79,775,820	.....	7,013,431
1894.....	21,350,607	101,978,689	.....	80,628,082
1895.....	84,396,392	104,967,402	.....	70,571,010
1896.....	104,781,259	58,256,860	\$46,524,399	.....
1897.....	34,030,592	34,276,401	.....	255,809
1898 (eleven months).....	149,396,370	14,975,316	134,421,054	.....

The effect of the great gold importation of 1896 and 1898, coupled with the unusually large production from our mines and mints, has made itself plainly apparent in the increase both in the gold in circulation and in the Treasury. The following table shows the gold in the United States Treasury and in circulation at the beginning of each month from July 1, 1896, to December 1, 1898:

MONTHS.	Total gold in Treasury, coin and bullion.	Gold coin in circulation.	Total.
July, 1896.....	\$144,020,363	\$456,128,483	\$600,148,846
August, .....	150,012,224	445,293,944	595,306,168
September, .....	139,825,200	463,965,969	603,791,169
October, .....	162,771,311	478,771,490	641,542,801
November, .....	155,323,832	516,340,979	671,664,811
December, .....	169,527,101	516,79,882	686,256,983
January, 1897.....	175,203,962	517,743,229	692,947,211
February, .....	182,367,121	515,468,129	697,855,250
March, .....	186,206,028	516,315,696	702,521,724
April, .....	189,242,808	517,125,757	706,368,566
May, .....	190,762,888	517,321,596	708,084,484
June, .....	181,707,391	520,221,923	701,929,314
July, .....	178,076,656	519,146,675	697,223,331
August, .....	178,044,577	519,074,302	697,118,879
September, .....	181,234,165	521,846,563	703,080,728
October, .....	184,561,664	523,093,753	712,660,417
November, .....	190,367,256	539,273,953	729,641,209
December, .....	194,089,260	544,494,748	738,584,008
January, 1898.....	197,469,235	547,568,360	745,037,595
February, .....	200,781,551	551,584,924	752,316,475
March, .....	204,063,971	553,884,888	757,948,859
April, .....	210,903,334	582,129,742	793,033,076
May, .....	217,190,185	617,088,510	834,278,695
June, .....	207,701,263	649,571,881	857,273,144
July, .....	202,825,048	660,950,880	863,775,928
August, .....	225,138,398	645,246,054	870,384,452
September, .....	223,377,498	690,693,166	914,070,664
October, .....	278,691,452	622,649,812	901,341,264
November, .....	275,224,071	649,846,727	925,070,798
December, .....	276,944,062	658,986,513	935,930,605

In closing this article it is proper to again call attention to the fact that statements regarding the commerce of the calendar year 1898, prepared for publication in the first month of the year 1899, must necessarily be estimates as to at least the last month of the year 1898.

O. P. AUSTIN.



## THE FUNCTIONS AND QUALITIES OF MONEY.

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Money, or currency, is one of the necessary implements of modern civilized life. It is one of the results of the subdivision of labor and the exchange of the products of labor. The simplest form of existence supposes that each individual shall produce all that is necessary to sustain life—that he shall kill and dress his own animal food, gather his vegetable food, and prepare his own clothing and shelter, so far as his degree of civilization suggests the necessity for these things. When human economy advanced another step, exchange came into being. In theory, at least, exchanges were first conducted by means of barter. The man who had an excess of game and a deficiency of skins exchanged a part of his game with the man who had an excess of skins and a deficiency of food. But three difficulties were discovered in this method of dealing. The man who had a brace of birds and wanted a goat skin might find a man with the skin, but who wanted no birds; or he might find that the man with the skin wanted birds, but not enough of them to pay for the skin;\* or he might find that the man with the skin had been in the habit of exchanging skins for deer or fish and did not know how to calculate its value in birds. Then followed what was so well described by Aristotle more than twenty centuries ago: †

“From this barter arose the use of money, as might be expected; for as the needful means for importing what was wanted, or for exporting a surplus, was often at a great distance, the use of money was of necessity devised. For it is not everything which is naturally useful that is easy of carriage; and for this reason men invented among themselves, by way of exchange, something which they should mutually give and take, and which being really valuable in itself, might easily be passed from hand to hand for the purposes of daily life, as iron and silver, or anything else of the same nature. This at first had a fixed standard simply according to its weight or size; but in process of time they put upon it a certain stamp, to save the trouble of weighing, and this stamp was affixed as a sign of its express value.”

In these words of the old Greek philosopher are expressed the fundamental reasons for the use of money—the necessity for an article of merchandise desired by all men because it was capable of being exchanged against all other things—an article which should be an intermediate merchandise between all others and should give the holder the power of getting all others. The essential character of metallic money is that of a merchandise having value in exchange. It derives this value in exchange in some degree from its use as money, and in large degree also because it is prized for other uses. As a means for conducting exchanges it has the character of a tool rather than an object of direct use, and the demand for it as a tool is governed by the number, character and rapidity of exchanges. In its character as a tool for making exchanges, money constitutes in the hands of the holder a title to all

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\*These difficulties are called by Mr. Jevons, “want of coincidence in barter;” and he declares that “to allow an act of barter, there must be a double coincidence, which will rarely happen.”—(“Money and the Mechanism of Exchange,” 4.)

† “The Politics and Economics of Aristotle,” trans. by Edward Walford, 22; London, 1894.

other commodities to the amount of its exchange value. In the language of Prof. Gide, "Every piece of money should be considered as a bond issued against the aggregate of existing wealth and giving the right to the bearer to have delivered to him any portion whatever of this wealth, at his option, to the amount of the value of the piece."\* This conception, now held by most students of monetary laws, has been more fully set forth by another eminent French economist in these terms:†

"You have a crown piece. What does it mean in your hands? It is, as it were, the witness and the proof that you have at some time done work, which, instead of profiting by, you have allowed society to enjoy, in the person of your client. This crown piece witnesses that you have rendered a service to society, and, moreover, it states the value of it. It witnesses besides, that you have not received back from society a real equivalent service, as was your right. To put it into your power to exercise this right, when and where you please, society by the hands of your client, has given you an acknowledgment or title, an order of the state, or token, a crown piece in short which does not differ from titles of credit, except that it carries its value in itself, and if you can read with the eyes of the mind, the inscription it bears, you can see distinctly these words:

'Pay to the bearer a service equivalent to that which he has rendered to society, value received and stated, proved and measured by that which is on me.'

Money is a special merchandise which, by its natural value and by the convention of society, serves as the intermediary for the exchange of other merchandise and services.‡ "It is a true merchandise," in the language of M. Laurent, "If one may call thus a product capable of exchange against another."§ It has, however, some peculiar characteristics, which are thus set forth by Prof. Block:§

"If money is a merchandise, it has its special character. It is received in preference to all others; its value at a given moment is the same everywhere (at least for moneys whose nominal corresponds to their intrinsic value); it is not destined, like a product or raw material, to remain finally with a consumer to be destroyed or transformed, for its mission is to pass from hand to hand to fulfill its work and resume its course—to circulate; it is a means and not an end."

The service of money to society is very similar in its character to that of roads and other means of communication. This fact was noted by Adam Smith, in laying the foundations of modern political economy, when he declared that "The gold and silver money which circulates in any country may very properly be compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grass and corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either." The same image is gracefully presented by Prof. Tucker in the following terms:¶

"Its useful functions can be compared to nothing more aptly than to those of a canal or artificial road, by which the conveyance of articles from hand to hand is performed with greater ease, despatch and safety, and which have always been found to give a great spring to useful industry and commercial enterprise, not only by improving existing markets, but also by creating new ones."

\* "Principes d'Économie Politique," 96.

† Bastiat, *Oeuvres*, II, 80; quoted by MacLeod, "The Theory of Credit," I, 78.

‡ A similar definition is that of M. Courcelle-Seneuil—"A merchandise of known quality, of value varying little and easy of division, for which are exchanged all the objects offered in the market."—"Traité des Opérations de Banque," 9.)

§ "Théorie des Opérations Financières," 10.

¶ "Les Progrès de la Science Économique," II, 37.

¶ "The Theory of Money and Banks Investigated," 17.

This comparison does much to clear away the mists surrounding the subject of money in many minds, and to call attention to the fact that money is not in itself the object of trade except so far as it gives command over useful commodities. The object of trade is the exchange of commodities. Money enters into such transactions chiefly as an intermediary. As a medium of exchange, representative money, or paper credit, often takes the place of real money, but such representative money is measured in the standard money, and the standard money must have real exchange value in order to constitute the standard. The experience of civilized societies for twenty-five centuries has resulted in making silver and gold the standard, separately or together, because of the many respects in which they conform to the ideal requirements for money. Their adoption has been the result of an evolution in which many other things have been used, but in which there has been a steady tendency to adopt as the standard an article so highly prized that it was generally acceptable in exchange apart from its conventional use as money.

Because of the high value of money to the individual in giving command over commodities, some of the early societies fell into the error of believing that the community itself was richer according as it piled up metallic money, without reference to its power of producing and exchanging useful things.\* They forgot its character as a medium and treated it as an end. For a civilized community there is no advantage in possessing a larger accumulation of metallic money than is necessary for carrying on current transactions and affording sufficient guarantee of the security of its financial system. There is much less advantage in such an accumulation than in the possession of capital wisely invested abroad, which is paying an annual return, measured in money, but paid in commodities. Great Britain, in many respects the richest country in the world, possesses a less amount of metallic money than Russia or France. She has put her capital into railways and factories in foreign countries, with such beneficent results that they are compelled to pay her annually about \$500,000,000 more in merchandise than she sends to them. In spite of mistakes in investments and heavy losses, Great Britain is infinitely richer to-day in this command over the production of the world than if she had undertaken the impossible task of piling up her surplus wealth in gold or silver coin.

One of the most important facts to be kept in view in the study of monetary problems is the distinction between money and capital. Metallic money is a form of capital, but capital includes many other things than money. Capital includes the whole aggregate of exchangeable things capable of ministering to production or fulfilling the desires of men. The classification of capital adopted by most modern economists is that between fixed and circulating capital.† Fixed capital includes that which has been converted into a more

\* It will be seen in a later article that this error was not without some justification in social and economic conditions. (Con. Cossa, "Introduction to the Study of Political Economy," 209.)

† It does not seem necessary or desirable here to enter into any of the disputes regarding the classification of consumers' goods and other subdivisions of capital. The subject of capital is fully discussed by Bohm-Bawerk ("The Positive Theory of Capital," 36-77); Leroy-Beaulieu ("*Traité d'Économie Politique*," I, 224-251); Hobson ("The Evolution of Modern Capitalism," 209-215), and many others. While the author regards consumption goods as capital, they do not play a large part in the forms of capital with which strictly monetary problems have to deal.

or less permanent and unchangeable form—capital which is employed in an intermediate process of production or simply ministers to human comfort or pleasure without being consumed in the process. Circulating capital includes raw materials and finished products which are converted or consumed in the process of application to their intended uses. Examples of fixed capital are factories, railways, and paintings. Examples of circulating capital are wheat, wool, and leather. Money is usually classified as circulating capital because of its freedom of movement. It has the characteristic of fixed capital in the fact that it is not physically destroyed or changed in use, but it has the essential characteristic of circulating capital that it passes from the possession of the owner in exchange instead of remaining permanently in his hands as a means of production, like a mill or tool.

Money is often spoken of as though it were the sole capital, because it is the most negotiable representative of capital.\* There might, in theory at least, be abundant capital without money and there might be sufficient supplies of money with deficient capital. Each of these conditions is illustrated to a certain extent during the progress of an economic crisis. Money becomes scarce and its price becomes high when commercial activity is arrested at the first outbreak of a crisis, when capital in the form of consumable goods is abundant and its owners are trying in vain to realize upon it in the more negotiable form of money. The situation becomes somewhat changed after the intensity of the crisis is over and the period of depression sets in which is marked by the accumulation of idle money in the banks. Even this accumulation of money, where it is in the form of bank credits, represents command over capital quite as much as command over money, but there is usually at such times a surfeit of actual currency for which there is little demand, because of the distrust and prostration which have followed the arrest of active commercial operations. The volume of money in the world may be substantially the same under both conditions, but it is subject in the first instance to an exaggerated demand, not merely for its usual function as a medium of exchange but as a store of value, while at a later stage of the crisis it ceases to be required so much as usual as a medium of exchange and is no longer hoarded as a store of value to the same extent as during the days of acute panic.

The reason for the frequent confusion between capital and money is that they are often coincident—either name fits a given sum of money and negotiable capital is transferred in terms of money.† Another reason for the confusion of capital and money is the fact that the increase of the one is usually accompanied by the increase of the other. While it is conceivable in theory that there might be large accumulations of capital without money and large accumulations of money without much other capital, such conditions are rarely realized in fact. A case approaching the realization of capital without an adequate supply of money is where too much of the capital of the community has been sunk in fixed improvements and a severe strain is put upon the supply of money to meet the demand for negotiable capital, perhaps for

\* "Before the economists, the word *capital* was reserved for a sum of money lent at interest. It was not the only form of capital or the oldest, but it was that most in view." (Block I, 424.)

† "One does not take note that when capital takes the form of money, it retains it but a little while, and that more often it passes from hand to hand until consumed, valued in money without taking the form of it at all." (Courcelle-Seneuil, 17.)

the settlement of foreign interest charges. Under ordinary conditions, however, an ample supply of money accompanies an ample supply of capital. A large volume of production, carrying with it accumulations of surplus capital and large transfers of capital into a fixed form, calls for a considerable volume of money in the process of these operations. There is, moreover, in a rich community a larger surplus of capital for putting into tools of business than where every energy of the community is strained in providing the means of bare subsistence. A medium of exchange is so necessary to any society which has advanced beyond savagery that some medium is usually found even in the poorest communities. If this medium is irredeemable paper or depreciated metal, it is largely because the community cannot afford to set aside a part of the proceeds of its yearly production for investment in the useful but costly tool of a metallic medium of exchange. An ample supply of money, therefore, usually accompanies an ample supply of saved capital and adds to the tendency to confuse money, the tool of exchange, with capital, the subject of exchange.

#### THE FUNCTIONS OF MONEY.

Having taken a general view of the character of money it becomes possible to consider its several functions. The statement of the difficulties of barter and the search for the means of curing them naturally lead to the definition of several of these functions of money. First of all was the requirement that there should be a common medium which any person should be able to exchange against any desired object, because the medium was generally desirable and generally exchangeable. Second came the necessity that the medium should be easily divisible and capable of expression in units, that it might be made a common denominator of all exchanges. Third came the necessity that the medium should have exchange value, in order that it might constitute a safe standard for the common denominator and might be so acceptable that it would not be parted with except at the value for which it was obtained. Out of these requirements, refined by the necessities of modern commerce, have grown the five essential functions of money as they are recognized to-day:

- (1) A medium of exchange.
- (2) A common denominator.
- (3) A standard of value.
- (4) A store of value.
- (5) A standard of deferred payments.

It has sometimes been contended that there are not five distinct functions of money, but that the function of a standard of value is linked with that of a common denominator, and that the function of a store of value is not applicable to money, but only to the precious metals when withdrawn from monetary uses. It is convenient, however, to discuss each function separately, in order to discover if real distinctions exist and to make as clear as possible even those functions which blend with each other.

I. The first important use of money in nearly every society is as a medium of exchange. It is difficult to conceive of such a medium without there being also a common denominator or a standard of value; but the distinction between these functions of money is of high importance and when clearly understood puts an end to much confusion of thought upon the subject.

The necessity for a medium of exchange has been pointed out by Professor Nicholson, in these words: \*

"Without a complete revolution in the conditions of society, a medium of exchange is indispensable. Production rests on division of labor, and division of labor involves easy and prompt exchange, which again involves a common medium. Money in this sense is as essential to the interchange of commodities as language to the interchange of ideas, and in the last resort the interchange of commodities is for the most part exchange of the services through which they are made. Thus money, in the sense of a common medium of exchange, is necessary in order to exchange all kinds of labor, from the highest to the lowest."

The effect of such a medium, not only in permitting exchanges, but in stimulating production and adapting it to every human need, has been thus defined by Professor Tucker: †

"As every article has its known market price in the general measure of value, where there is one, every producer can thereby better adapt his supply to the varying demands and diversified tastes of the community. Money furnishes a very sensitive barometer of these variations, by consulting which the industrious classes will be less likely to misdirect their labor, and create redundancy on the one hand, or subject the community to scarcity on the other. Where the value of the articles produced had to be exchanged some three or four times before the producer obtained what he wanted, it would not be easy to say what was the market value of his commodity. The knowledge at least would be far less prompt, easy, and precise, than it is where there is a general measure of value.

The introduction of money has also a manifest tendency to beget frugality, and encourage accumulation. Without such a convenient and unchanging representative value, or mode of investment, many things would be wastefully consumed, supposing them to be produced, which would be saved, if convertible into money, instead of being exchangeable merely for other merchandise."

The last point made by Professor Tucker is put in even stronger terms by Roscher, when he says: ‡

"Only when money has become the instrument of trade, is it possible to separate the net from the gross returns, and, therefore, to manage income properly (Schaffle). Now, also, it becomes for the first time really remunerative to produce more than one needs for his own use and to save. Without money, the owner of any one kind of capital, who could not employ it himself, would be obliged, if he desired, to loan it, to find not only a person who was in need of capital, but one who needed the very kind of capital he had."

II. A common denominator affords the opportunity for referring each transaction to a common unit and comparing the value of articles, one with another. § If there were no common denominator, it would be necessary to calculate the value of every exchangeable article in the value of every other article. If two chickens were worth a hat, and three pair of shoes were worth a coat, these equations would afford no means of comparison between the value of chickens and coats. Such a basis of comparison might be found by adopting the chickens or the hat as the fixed point of departure. This would make it a common denominator and the problem would be solved. The most extensive properties, even to railways and steamboats, could be measured in chickens, as they are now measured in dollars, francs, or pounds

\* "A Treatise on Money and Essays on Monetary Problems," 16. The comparison of money with letters is made also by Gibbon and Chevallier. (*Vide* Walker, "Money," 14.)

† "The Theory of Money and Banks Investigated," 14.

‡ "Principles of Political Economy," I, 348.

§ "There is need of such a measure, and it is analogous to the want experienced by the mathematician who has a column of fractions to sum up, and who does it by first reducing them all to a common denominator." (Roscher, I, 341.)

sterling. But in the absence of a common unit, a tabular table of values for twelve articles exchangeable against each other would involve one hundred and thirty-two different comparisons. The first article taken would have to be measured against each of the other eleven, the second would have to be measured against eleven others, and so on throughout the list. It would be impossible for any person to carry these relations constantly in his mind, with the great multiplicity of articles now the subject of commerce, and changes in value, even in two or three articles, would practically destroy the value of a tabular statement. In the language of Mill, regarding the tailor, "The calculations must be recommenced on different data, every time he barter his coats for a different kind of article; and there could be no current price, or regular quotations of value." \*

III. The function of money as a standard of value is related to its function as a common denominator. It is the standard which gives form and fixity to the common denominator. The denominator affords the terms for comparing the value of one commodity with another; the standard provides the unit in which these terms are expressed. The conception of a standard of value for the expression of price is more complex than the conception of such measures as those for weight or heat, because value and price are not inherent qualities, but are relationships between commodities which grow out of human wants and satisfactions. An article does not have value according to the amount of weight or heat it possesses, but according to the conception of its utility present in the human mind. A standard of value, therefore, is not a measure of value, but only a convenient scale by which values are expressed after their measurement has been made in terms of human desire or satisfaction. As Professor Bourguin expresses it: †

"The true reason why it is not proper to speak of the measure of value is that value is not a property, a magnitude. The franc is not the unit of the measure of value, but only the unit of the measure of money, of the quantity of silver figuring in exchanges. It is a certain physical quantity of coined silver, a piece of five grammes, which has been adopted as a unit for measuring the quantity of silver constituting the value of each article in relation to silver."

The adoption of a standard as nearly fixed as may be is of cardinal importance in the creation of a proper monetary system, but the standard having been chosen it does not follow that the material of which it is composed needs to be employed in all transactions based upon the standard. In the words of a high authority: ‡

"The one important idea to be kept firm hold of in all discussions of money is that when it comes to exchanging goods the metal chosen as the standard is not necessarily used as the medium of exchange. If gold, for instance, is chosen as the standard by a country, it does not at all follow that gold is used in all the transactions requiring a medium of exchange. The failure to keep this point clearly in mind has been a stumbling-block to many, and it has been wrongly supposed that an increase of transactions always required a proportional increase in the standard coin. But if it happens that goods are in fact exchanged readily and safely by means of other things than the metallic standard, then such a conclusion is entirely unwarranted."

\* "Principles of Political Economy," B. III, Ch. VII, Section 1 (II, 17).

† "La Mesure de la Valeur et la Monnaie," 38. The French monetary law of 1793 preserves this distinction, always referring to "the monetary unit" and never to "the standard." M. Wolowski proposed the use of the term, *Évaluateur* instead of *Étalon* (standard), and M. Block proposes *unité de valeur* (unit of value). ("Les Progrès de la Science Economique," II, 37.)

‡ Report of the Monetary Commission of the Indianapolis Convention, 79.

It is not a merely theoretical proposition that the standard and the medium of exchange are not always the same. It has happened repeatedly in monetary history. The famous Bank of Amsterdam and the Bank of Hamburg, in the seventeenth century, created a standard and common denominator in the form of "bank money," based upon a fixed weight of silver, although no coins of this weight were created. Silver and other metals were received at the bank by weight and intrinsic value and converted into bank money upon the books of the bank. Upon these books, and by means of certificates of title to bank money, were recorded the transfers of money wealth in the community. When this was exclusively the case, the bank money constituted in a sense both a medium of exchange, a common denominator and a standard of value; but in retail transactions there circulated much silver and gold which was a medium of exchange, but which was a common denominator only in a restricted sense and was hardly a standard of value at all. It was only when the medium was converted into bank money that the terms in which it was expressed became the common denominator, and the weight of silver which the bank money represented became a standard of value. Thus money transactions were consummated without the transfer of coin and the advantages of the system made it the germ of the great use of credit instruments in modern times.

The use of money as a standard of value has become of constantly increasing importance in modern industrial societies. The fact that money is a common denominator has led to the expression of nearly all contracts in terms of money.\* This make it of the highest importance that the standard shall be invariable in value. In so far as this is not the case, injustice is likely to be done between contractors, whether the purchasing power of money rises or falls. If its purchasing power rises, independently of the increased productive power of labor, the person having money to pay is compelled to pay a larger purchasing power than he would have paid if the value of money had remained constant. If the purchasing power of money falls, the person receiving it finds that he has received less purchasing power than the amount which he expected when the contract was made.

A reasonable degree of fixity in the standard is what makes it useful for measuring values at different times and places. We wish, says Professor Gide, "to compare the values of merchandise situated in different places or to compare the value of the same merchandise at different dates."<sup>†</sup> The importance of this certainty in the standard was recognized by Copernicus nearly four centuries ago, when he declared in his famous memorial to the King of Poland: †

"Money is then in some sort a common measure for calculating values, but this measure ought always to be fixed and to conform to an established rule. Otherwise, there will be, of necessity, disorder in the State. Buyers and sellers will be constantly deceived, as they would be if the ell, the bushel, or the weight should not preserve a fixed proportion."

In a country having a fixed standard the assurance exists that contracts expressed in terms of money will be discharged in a known quantity of metal of a comparatively stable value. This gives certainty to business transac-

\* "Money is best defined as a thing which, by common consent of the business community, is used as a *basis of commercial obligations*." (Prof. Arthur T. Hadley, "Economics," 180.)

† "*Principes d'Économie Politique*," 90.

‡ "*Monete Cudende Ratio*," edited by L. Wolowski, 49.



tions and permits large enterprises to be carried on upon a small margin of profit. Efforts have been made in several States to preserve the value of money by changing the weight of metal in the coins without changing their denominations. Such a process may affect contracts expressed in terms of money to the disadvantage of the creditor, but the effect upon current exchanges is soon offset by changes in prices. Prices rise in the proportion that the metallic money has been deteriorated, and it requires the same weight of metal as before to obtain a given article.\* Such changes in the weight or fineness of coins were common during the Middle Ages as a means of increasing the revenue and diminishing the debt of governments. The depreciation of the coinage is not now employed by any civilized State except where paper has been the actual medium of exchange and the new coins are adapted to the actual exchange value of the paper.

IV. Money is a store of value, because it enables value to be embodied in a compact commodity, generally acceptable, and capable of being kept for an indefinite period without loss. The proposition that money is a store of value is disputed by Gen. Francis A. Walker and some other writers upon the ground that the metal ceases to be money when it is converted into hoards.† This might be true in a limited sense, where coin was melted up into jewels, as is often the case in India, for the purpose of a permanent hoard against old age or emergencies. Money is, however, a store of value of the highest character under modern commercial conditions. It is the one store of value which never loses its exchangeability against all other commodities. In the language of Mr. Bagehot, "Money is never 'second hand;' it will always fetch itself, and it loses nothing by keeping."‡ This is the reason for the great hoards of gold and silver formerly accumulated by powerful States for war necessities—illustrated in modern times by the hoard of 120,000,000 marks (\$30,000,000), which is kept by the Imperial German Government in the Fortress of Spandau.

Money is not only a store of value of the highest character, but it was almost the only store of value of an exchangeable character until the creation of negotiable securities. There can be only three general classes of property having value: (1) Consumable commodities (including raw materials); (2) fixed capital (invested, for instance, in factories, railways, and land); and (3) money. Consumable commodities cannot be hoarded without loss. Fixed capital may become useless if the demand for its products ceases or may deteriorate in value for a variety of reasons. Such capital may be represented by negotiable securities, which escape the inconvenience of not being capable of ready exchange, but they are liable to deterioration from the same causes as the fixed capital itself and for other causes inherent in the operations of the stock market. This leaves money as the only store of value which is not in danger of deterioration and is always readily exchangeable. The character-

\* This fact—that metallic money sinks to its value as merchandise, irrespective of the name given to it—is an entirely distinct proposition from that of the quantitative theory—that the value of money is in inverse ratio to its quantity—although the two propositions are often confused by careless thinkers.

† "Money," 12. M. Block, who takes the contrary view, cites the case of a farmer who converts 100 hectoliters of grain into 2,000 francs, and declares, "The 2,000 francs in the bureau do not cease to be money or available capital; they are capable of being put in circulation at any moment. Does a horse cease to be a horse while he is permitted to rest in the stable?" ("Les Progrès de la Science Economique," II, 41.)

‡ "The Transferability of Capital," Works, V, 285.

istic of money as a store of value has attained a new development in modern times by the use of banking credits.

Banking credits constitute titles to metallic money. Both metallic money and banking credits are instruments for transferring wealth. They represent the titles vested in the holders of the credits to command the products and services of the community. But banking credits owe their value to their negotiable character. They are exchanged against commodities when commodities are desired, but they are capable of exchange against metallic money, when money becomes more desirable than commodities.

Money becomes the best store of value under the conditions of an economic crisis, because at such a time other commodities become of uncertain exchangeability. Money never suffers the loss of its general power to command commodities, in spite of some fluctuations in prices. The greatest danger of a crisis, for a man engaged in commercial business, is the demand for the settlement of liabilities which he cannot meet. These liabilities are expressed in money and can no longer be settled, as under normal conditions, by the conversion of his products into titles to credit. Money, at such times, is the most effective store of value for the protection of personal and corporate credit and the fulfilment of contracts. Such conditions are not permanent and do not justify conclusions based upon the mercantile system—that all credits should be represented by metallic money and that metallic money is the sole symbol of wealth; but the peculiar qualities of money are such as to make it the most secure store of value at times when other commodities lose something of their exchange value.

The use of money as a store of value is important, even under ordinary economic conditions, in effecting transfers from place to place. The power to transmit money obviates the necessity of transmitting commodities, where there is not an even interchange of commodities between two communities. Money then takes the place of other articles, as the most compact, invariable, and generally acceptable method of making payments. This is pointed out by Mr. Jevons in the following words:\*

“At times a person needs to condense his property into the smallest compass, so that he may hoard it away for a time, or carry it with him on a long journey, or transmit it to a friend in a distant country. Something which is very valuable, although of little bulk and weight, and which will be recognized as very valuable in every part of the world, is necessary for this purpose. The current money of a country is perhaps more likely to fulfil these conditions than anything else, although diamonds and other precious stones, and articles of exceptional beauty and rarity, might occasionally be employed.”

V. The use of money as a standard of deferred payments is one of the results of the development of credit in civilized societies. Contracts for the payment of money at a future time are of ancient origin, but have attained a wide development with the modern extension of trade. The reasons already stated why there should not be a change in the standard of value apply with added force in reference to contracts for deferred payments. Such contracts, made in the present with a view to the future, should be capable of certainty in a civilized State in order to promote the extension of trade, by making possible large enterprises looking to the distant future for their completion. Professor Nicholson says: †

\* “Money and the Mechanism of Exchange,” 15.

† “Principles of Political Economy,” Vol. II, Bk. III, 94.

"Speaking generally, everyone is bound by a series of contracts or *quasi* contracts to give and to receive certain sums of money at various future dates, and his whole industrial life depends on the fulfilment of these contracts and *quasi* contracts. The workingman expects during a certain time to receive so much money and therewith to provide himself and his family with goods. On the expectation of this demand other people provide the goods, and others the means to make the goods, and other the means to make the means, and so on indefinitely."

These operations are correctly described as "instances of deferred payments," and are seriously affected by changes in the standard. It is possible in such cases for traders to protect themselves in some measure against anticipated changes, where they are not too rapid and too arbitrary, by changing their prices. It is less easy for the wage-earner to make an advance in the customary payment for services, where the value and purchasing power of money have been reduced. In both cases, however, there is less disposition to make contracts looking to the distant future, and thus the great enterprises which give life to modern industry are restricted and hampered.

The most common illustration of the violation of the rule of fixity of value and depreciation of the standard is in the cases where contracts are expressed in the lawful money of a country, then based upon a metallic standard, but subsequently changed for a paper standard. Such contracts, where not payable in specific terms in metallic money, are often held to be payable in the depreciated paper currency which has become the usual medium of exchange. This fact has sometimes led to the belief that the value of paper money could be maintained at parity with the metallic standard by making it a legal-tender for past debts. This belief is based upon the theory that there will always be a demand for the legal-tender money for the discharge of past debts and that this demand will maintain its value. The investigations of Mr. Charles S. Fairchild, ex-Secretary of the Treasury, show that the use of money in deferred payments for long terms has not, even under modern conditions, attained a volume which would sustain this theory. Mr. Fairchild says:\*

"If the census of 1890, where it is attempted to show the past debts of the country of one kind and another, be compared with the clearing house transactions of any year, you will see that not more than four per cent. of the transactions of any single year can consist of the liquidation of debts that antedated that year; and that is a comparison simply with the clearing-house transactions, and we know that there is a vast body of transactions that do not appear in the clearing-house transactions at all. Therefore the liquidation of past debts is statistically shown to be relatively very small as compared with current transactions, and the final consideration is that it must be so, because out of what fund are you going to accumulate the money with which to discharge past debts? It must be that the only place from which it can be gotten is from the profits of current transactions. Therefore the current transactions must bear an enormously greater proportion to past debts."

CHARLES A. CONANT.

(To be continued.)

\* Hearings and Arguments before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives, Fifty-fifth Congress, Second Session," 91.

**INSURING BANK LOANS.**—While the propriety of insuring the depositors in banks is being agitated it might be well to consider whether anything can be done to insure the bank against loss when it loans its money to depositors. If they do not repay their loans, how can the bank pay off its deposit liabilities? The banker who loans money has only human powers of discernment. Even with the best of intentions, and exercising the most careful discrimination, banks sometimes loan money to concerns that fail, carrying the bank down with them. If banks could be insured against loss on their loans, the insurance of depositors would, in most cases, be a very easy matter.

## BRANCH BANKING AND DISCOUNT RATES.\*

The prohibition of branch banking imposed upon incorporated banks of issue is peculiar to the banking legislation of the United States. There are no such restrictions abroad, so far as any rate as the principal European countries and their colonies are concerned.

In the British possessions all banks, not only the Bank of England, but also the joint-stock banks, the country banks of issue and the Scotch banks, as well as the corporations active in Ireland and the colonies, are permitted to

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\*The special literature of branch banking is extremely scant, the brief essay of J. B. Attfield, "The Branch Bank System," being about the only work exclusively devoted to this theme. Occasional references to branches, however, may be found in the general works of Gilbart, and others, in which the advantages of the device are well brought out, in Wagner, "Zettelbank-politik," Freiburg, I, Br., 1873, pp. 579, 582, 603, 606; further in his article in Schoenberg's "Handbuch der Politischen Oekonomie," Bd. I, pp. 487, 489, 496; Tuebingen, 1896. Cf. also, for Germany, Lexis, in "Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften," Bd. II, article on "die Koenigliche Bank of Berlin," p. 71; Lotz, article in the same volume, pp. 933-934 on *Diskonto u. Diskonto-Politik*; and finally various passages in Lotz, *Geschichte u. Kritik des deutschen Bankgesetzes*, Leipzig, 1888. Scotch conditions are described in Somers "The Scotch Banks and System of Issue," pp. 43, 234, Edinburgh, 1873. Cf. also Easton, "Banks and Banking," p. 67, London, 1896; and still better, Graham, "The £1 Note," etc.; London, 1886. For the situation in provincial England, see Rae, "The Country Banker," pp. 132-138, 266; New York, 1886. Noél in his "*Les Banques d'Emission en Europe*;" pp. 55, 129-136, 298-301, 430-435, 504-506; Paris, 1888; presents a good statement of existing conditions in England, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, while for the Latin countries des Essars should be consulted in the "History of Banking in all the Leading Nations," Vol. III, pp. 80, 170, 171, 175, 178, 180, 248, 272, 318; New York, 1896. Sumner's "History of Banking in the United States," published as Vol. I of the same general work, probably contains more facts upon the American experience with branches than any other work. This phase of Canadian practice and its results have been discussed by Walker, Hague, Cornwell, Root and others in pamphlets, and by the present author in "The Canadian Banking System, 1817-1890," pp. 375-386, 412-424; New York, 1895.

Upon the territorial distribution of loanable capital there is still less material. Studies of variations in the rate of interest have usually been based upon differences at various times rather than differences between various places. Statistical exhibits of the funds in control of the banks in various localities, or tables showing the per capita banking power of different communities and sections, are of slight avail in the study of this distribution, since they convey no indication of the abundance of loanable capital available in such neighborhoods as compared with local needs. Even the systematic collection and publication of rates of discount in numerous and divers markets of the same land have been neglected except in the United States. It has been necessary, therefore, to base statements as to conditions abroad upon the well-known practice of central banks in establishing uniform prices for simultaneous services at their different offices, the only exceptions being those countries where the price of capital has become the subject of agreement among the banks, e. g. Scotland, or where persons familiar with the situation throughout the land have formulated a general description, as in England, Canada and Australia. The distribution in the United States has latterly received more or less attention from contemporary writers on the banking and currency questions. Cf., *inter alia*, "Sound Currency," Vol. II, No. 2; IV, No. 6; V, No. 12; Dunbar, in "Quarterly Journal of Economics," Vol. XII; article on "National Banking System," pp. 23-25; Eckels, Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, Vol. I, pp. 103-105, 1896; Laughlin, Report of the Monetary Commission, pp. 186-196, 309-336, Chicago, 1898. In the document last cited, however, altogether too much influence has been attributed to the system of circulation secured by deposits of bonds.

carry on banking operations at a great variety of places other than those in which their principal offices are established.\*

The conduct of branches is likewise among the privileges of the Imperial Bank of Germany, the minor banks of issue, the discount and deposit banks and the "credit institutions" which play so prominent a part in the German money market.

Branch banking is also an important feature of bank organization in Russia, Austria, Italy, Belgium and Holland.

In France, finally, the establishment of subsidiary offices and agencies has been made obligatory upon the Bank of France, although the fulfilment of its duty has caused it no loss, while the great non-issuing institutions and the French colonial banks have extended operations beyond their legal domiciles in pursuit of their own advantage. The former reluctance of the Bank of France in this particular was due to exceptional circumstances. Elsewhere the privilege of opening branches has almost invariably been improved.†

#### THE UTILITY OF BRANCH BANKING.

From the bankers' view, in fact, there is hardly room for question as to the utility of branch banking. By the help of branches he is able to draw his business from a greater territory. They are the means of opening up new fields for discount operations, of acquiring deposits in accumulating communities which lack convenient access to his principal office, and generally of enlarging the volume of transactions which have a favorable effect on the account of profit and loss. And because it is less dependent upon the prosperity of a single town and its tributary district, his business becomes more stable. He is able to set off losses due to the mistakes or mishaps of producers in one section, against exceptional returns obtained where sound judgment and good fortune have caused a more flourishing condition of industry and trade. By a judicious distribution and variation of risk, his prospect of profit is better assured.

In the long run, moreover, a bank with branches can carry on a business in credits at less expense than independent local institutions. Instead of a President and directorate at each establishment, there is but one of each for the entire group of offices. The administrative apparatus is simpler, for the branch Manager, guided and fortified by advice from the head office, is an ample substitute for the elaborate organization of local executive and board. Unusual ability is given wider scope and put to better use. The talents of a

\* According to the "Banking Supplement" of the London "Economist," October 22, 1896, there were in

England and Wales.....	90	joint-stock banks with 3548 branches and agencies.
Isle of Man.....	3	" " 17 "
Scotland.....	11	" " 1154 "
Ireland.....	9	" " 580 "
and with offices in London....	29	colonial " 1653 "

† Branch offices have been opened, or may be established (in a few cases, however, only after special permission has been obtained from the Government), by banks in Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chili, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Newfoundland, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Uruaguay and Venezuela. (See the material on Foreign Banking Systems, collected by the diplomatic representatives of the United States and published in the Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1893, Vol. I, pp. 115-193.)

capable general Manager can be applied to the solution of banking problems, at as many different offices as he is able to supervise, while the local direction of branches may be entrusted to agents whose services need not be so highly paid as those of men who bear an undivided responsibility.

Greater yet is the saving incidental to branch banking where banks may issue circulation on their general credit. It is then unnecessary for banks with more than one establishment to keep considerable money reserves at any save their central offices. It is there that the principal calls for redemption arise, or thither that settlements are mostly shifted. Elsewhere the purposes of customers desiring a medium which easily passes from hand to hand, are ordinarily served by the bank's own notes. Branch establishments, therefore, may be equipped with this costless form of till money, instead of the reserves of coin or Government notes which local banks are obliged to keep. The mother banks save the interest, and are frequently able to maintain prosperous branch offices, where local banks would have no chance.

Judged by the broader standard of the general welfare, the case for branch banking, theoretically stated, at least, is equally clear. One function of a banker is to furnish circulating capital, or that with which it can be bought, to those who wish to borrow and are likely to repay. If capital and that with which it can be bought, or purchasing power, be used for the time as synonymous expressions, it may be said that the banker meets such demands in part, but only in small part, from the money forming his own stock. A larger portion is provided from the funds entrusted to his care, a larger portion still, perhaps, consists of undertakings of his own, which he exchanges for the promises of others. Within a single town or village, or within any territorial unit between the different parts of which there is quick and easy communication, the banker who has the confidence of the community is thus able to mediate between borrowers and lenders—to provide capital for those who can put it to productive use. Prudence, of course, forbids him to concentrate his investments in a particular line of paper, and wisdom commands that no advance shall exceed a safe proportion of the borrower's total wealth. But within these limits fair play requires that customers of an equal degree of credit shall receive accommodation on substantially the same terms. The banker, therefore, if the banking profession may be so personified, adjusts the demand for discounts to his supply of funds by raising the rate when his resources are relatively scant, and lowering prices when, without the larger market thus created, a portion of the capital at his disposal would lie unemployed.

Suppose, however, that instead of lowering prices, the banker undertakes to expand his business by opening branches and extends his activity from one to several localities. If it so happen, after this step is taken, that the supply of capital bears a like proportion to the demand for it in each of the towns where he has an office, the banker's problem in regard to the discount rate will still be simply that of finding the price, or of accepting the price, at which all the loanable capital at his command can be safely invested. But should the rate of interest usual in one town be higher than in another, and lower in a third perhaps than in either two, the situation is of quite another sort. In the absence of differences of risk in the securities offered, such differences of rate indicate an inequality in the proportion of loanable capital in the different towns to the amounts which borrowers there trading could profitably use,

were the rates the same in each. In other words, there is a faulty distribution of the loan fund among the several markets. Some have more, some less, than their due share.

Furthermore, these differences of rate afford the banker an opportunity for profit, over and above the ordinary profit from a local business in credits, in borrowing where capital is cheap and lending where the ruling price is high. For the special service of correcting the distribution he can obtain a special return. He is even able to offer his depositors and other creditors unusual inducements where capital is relatively abundant; where it is scarce, he can discount at something under the market rate and yet derive a gain. And so long as the margin between any two local markets is more than the cost of transporting and managing capital, the exploitation of differences will present attractions which keen business men, under most circumstances, are quite unlikely to despise.

#### THE EQUALIZATION OF RATES OF DISCOUNT.

What, now, is the probable effect of such operations upon local discount rates, particularly when conducted on a large scale? Theoretically speaking, there can be but one result. Given competition or the effective fear of competition, and local rates will inevitably develop a tendency to move towards a common level throughout the territory in which branch banking is carried on. The tendency may be obscured for a time by inferior security of the paper circulating in some markets; for a time its operation may be suspended by extraordinary local demand for discounts or the unusually high degree of productivity characteristic of trade and industry in particular sections; but in the end it is certain to prevail.

It is the peculiar virtue of a well-developed system of branch banking that it overcomes the natural and psychological obstacles to the transfer of capital from markets where it is relatively abundant to those in which it is comparatively scarce, in a manner at once effective and persistent. By means of his branches a banker can engage in active competition for commercial paper in a great variety of places, where, without the familiarity with local conditions obtained through his local representative, he would scarcely presume to invest at all. To the extent, therefore, that the local provision may be lacking, a system of branch banking places the banking resources of all communities within the reach of each. It counteracts the local dearth and relieves the local glut, facilitating and guiding the flow of circulating capital to those parts of the country in which it is most needed and can be best employed. By merging many markets into what is practically a single one, it puts all borrowers on the same footing, enabling them, on the sole condition of being worthy of credit, to obtain credit on equal terms.

Even where there is no direct competition, where a single banker becomes the controlling factor in the lending business of several localities, he will soon perceive an advantage in exacting substantially the same rate at all his offices. It may be higher in some markets than when each community had to rely upon local resources; in others it is likely to be considerably lower; but, as a rule, it will be the highest rate and consequently the most profitable one at which the banker can keep the whole of his disposable capital productively engaged. Attempts to maintain diverse rates at different offices would involve useless discrimination between localities, and in most instances

actually lessen the net gain. When two or more banks are working the same field, any inequality of rates ordinarily gives rise to a process of mutual under-bidding in the higher markets, supplemented in some cases, by increased competition for deposits in the lower ones, which goes on until the inter-local differences have practically disappeared. Worse still, then, is the folly of the banker who should seek to stop or to slacken the progress of equalization, be it yet incomplete, or to disturb it when once brought about, where branch banking is open to active competition. The innovator under such circumstances would suffer not only an immediate diminution of profits, but also, in all probability, the loss of his best accounts to more sagacious rivals.

Now as a matter of fact there is not one of the leading States of Western Europe in which this process of equalization between domestic discount markets is not already far advanced. Take whichever of these one may, it will be found that the price of capital in provincial cities varies in close and usual correspondence to the rates prevailing in the principal financial centers. In Germany, for example, there are no less than 260 towns where paper of a standard quality is discounted at precisely the rate paid upon like securities in Berlin. In France there are more than 200 communities in which borrowers of good standing and credit can obtain loans on terms as favorable as those accorded in Paris. Similar conditions exist in Italy, Belgium, and Holland. In England again the country bank rate is seldom more than five or less than four per cent. in any part of the Kingdom, *while in Scotland the banks of issue have agreed to charge, and do charge, identical rates at each of their thousand banking offices.*

The uniformity elsewhere, though approximate, is not so complete. Thus the "private discount" rate in Berlin, Frankfort, and Hamburg is generally somewhat lower than the official rate of the Imperial Bank. It is also true that money is usually cheaper at the London "market rate" than at the price fixed by the Bank of England, and cheaper on these terms, again, than at the rate demanded by provincial banks. Such prices, however, are available only to persons of exceedingly good credit, those, for example, who are able and willing to repay on demand, or whose time paper is especially esteemed. The lower rates indicate rather a lessened premium for risk than a plethora of funds in the central market as compared with other cities of the same land.

#### DIVERSITY OF INTEREST RATES IN THE UNITED STATES.

In any case, the advantages of European financial centers over provincial towns dwindle to insignificance in contrast with the diversity of rates prevailing in the different discount markets of the United States. That the younger and smaller communities of the American South and West are handicapped by oppressive, if not usurious rates of interest, is a proposition concerning the organization of credit in this country which few now venture to dispute. It rests on too notorious and well-authenticated facts. Indeed, it has become a commonplace of discussion on currency and banking, that the dearth of capital in such communities should be relieved, and schemes of banking reform are no longer considered complete without some provision for sections in which credit facilities are altogether lacking or inadequate to business needs. Further to examine conditions in small communities, however, is aside from our purpose. For one thing, no comprehensive data on discount rates in these outlying regions are available. The reports that we have are neither regular



nor complete, but fragmentary and accidental. Information of this sort, though sufficiently explicit and accurate to permit certain general conclusions, is not enough for a careful study of the number and location of the minor markets in which there is a scarcity of capital available for short-time loans, or of the extent to which the price of loans is thus enhanced. Another consideration is the more decisive nature of the commentary on the efficiency of American banks which can be derived from an examination of rates in the more important discount markets of the United States.

For forty-three such markets there are full and trustworthy statistics, collected at frequent intervals and extending over a series of years, in the "Rates of Discount," on first-class two-name commercial paper, published weekly by "Bradstreets." Not a city in the whole list had less than 25,000 inhabitants by the census of 1890, and the table includes twenty-two of the twenty-seven cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants, nineteen of the twenty-three reserve cities, and all three of the central reserve cities of the National banking system. All but four of them had clearing-houses in operation by the beginning of 1897, the only exceptions being Charleston, Duluth, Little Rock and Mobile. From these facts, then, if not from the names of the cities, it is manifest that the list includes only communities of some consequence in the political economy, populous and long-established centers of industry and trade, in whose markets it would be but natural to expect the circulation of first rate commercial securities in considerable volumes. And it is only to first class, two-name commercial paper that "Bradstreet's" figures are intended to apply. If the work of the commercial experts serving as correspondents of that journal has been correct—as there is slight reason to doubt—the comparison of averages, in which the influence of temporary disturbances is eliminated, and only the effect of more enduring forces appears, ought to permit approximately exact conclusions upon the relative abundance of loanable capital in the forty-three cities concerned. The presence of two rates against the names of many cities in the weekly list cannot impair the conclusions. So far as the present inquiry goes, it is immaterial whether these indicate the lower and upper limits of the week's movement, or the highest and lowest rates at which securities nominally of like quality are discounted, when there is a chance to discriminate according to the transactions from which that paper arises, the time it has to run, or the relative strength of borrower and lender. The point of interest is less the absolute height of rates in particular cities than the differences between rates in a number of cities. The averages of both the higher and lower weekly rates, as well for each of the years 1893-1897 as for the five years, are presented in the following table, and the relation may be ascertained from either set of columns.

The lower averages of the table have already been published in another connection.\* In one sense, these alone, representing as they do the lowest prices at which borrowers of high credit obtain loans in the several cities to which they apply, afford a conclusive demonstration, stronger and more convincing than page on page of eloquent argument, that there are extraordinary inequalities in the distribution of circulating capital among the more

\* In the Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XIII, No. 1, in an article by the writer on "Discount Rates in the United States."

*Average rate of discount in forty-three cities of the United States, for the years 1893-1897, and for the five years, as reported weekly in "Bradstreet's."*

PLACE.	LOWER RATES—PER CENT.						HIGHER RATES—PER CENT.					
	1893-7.	1893.	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.	1893-7.	1893.	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.
Boston .....	3.83	5.27	2.76	3.19	4.92	2.99	5.05	6.60	3.77	4.54	6.29	4.03
New York.....	4.41	6.73	2.90	3.55	5.40	3.46	5.36	8.72	3.65	4.24	6.17	4.
Baltimore.....	4.56	6.11	4.62	4.	4.	4.09	5.16	6.63	5.23	4.82	4.50	4.64
Hartford.....	4.60	6.09	3.43	4.06	5.72	3.70	5.41	7.16	4.32	4.61	6.67	4.27
Philadelphia.....	4.64	6.15	3.46	4.31	5.57	3.09	6.01	7.01	5.31	5.56	6.27	5.88
Providence.....	4.98	6.12	3.81	4.65	6.07	4.24	5.73	6.80	4.83	5.25	6.82	4.96
Cincinnati.....	5.01	5.88	4.60	4.83	5.61	4.12	5.87	6.96	5.44	5.61	6.17	5.17
Chicago.....	5.74	6.49	5.24	5.33	6.54	5.08	6.53	7.10	6.25	6.24	6.92	6.07
Pittsburg.....	5.83	5.94	5.28	5.96	6.	6.	6.49	6.46	6.	6.01	7.	7.
New Orleans.....	5.85	7.01	4.98	4.76	6.50	6.	7.05	7.61	6.34	6.65	7.73	6.88
St. Louis.....	5.90	6.65	5.38	5.25	6.23	6.	7.23	7.74	7.01	6.98	7.44	7.
Portland, Me. }												
Richmond, Va. }	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.	6.
Buffalo.....	6.00	6.11	6.	6.	6.	5.92	7.66	7.78	7.65	7.	7.94	7.92
Memphis.....	6.10	7.48	5.98	5.38	6.25	5.42	7.85	8.03	7.96	7.86	8.	7.42
San Francisco.....	6.21	7.11	5.80	5.94	6.	.....	6.90	8.48	6.78	6.32	6.	.....
Milwaukee.....	6.27	6.98	6.11	6.	6.28	6.	7.02	7.	6.98	7.	7.15	7.
Indianapolis.....	6.36	7.15	6.69	6.	6.	6.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.
Cleveland.....	6.37	7.	6.88	6.	6.	6.	7.	7.	7.	7.	7.	7.
Detroit.....	6.41	7.	6.23	6.	6.84	6.	6.67	7.19	7.23	6.09	6.84	6.
St. Paul.....	6.60	7.61	7.69	6.	6.34	5.38	7.41	8.	7.69	6.32	7.69	7.38
Nashville.....	6.67	8.	7.65	5.96	6.	5.75	7.70	8.	8.	8.	8.	6.53
Louisville.....	6.82	7.03	6.40	6.78	6.94	6.96	7.05	7.07	7.23	7.	6.96	7.
Minneapolis.....	6.90	7.57	6.98	6.50	7.21	6.25	7.80	8.	7.82	7.84	7.96	7.40
Kansas City.....	6.91	6.90	6.28	6.53	8.	6.84	8.38	8.	8.	7.86	9.57	8.48
St. Joseph.....	6.96	6.84	7.	7.	7.	7.	7.96	7.84	8.	8.	8.	8.
Charleston.....	7.02	7.13	7.	7.	7.	7.	7.96	7.84	8.	8.	8.	8.
Los Angeles.....	7.05	7.28	7.	7.	7.	7.	9.05	9.23	9.	9.	9.	9.
Duluth.....	7.25	7.96	7.01	7.	7.38	6.90	8.23	9.	7.88	8.	8.26	8.
Galveston.....	7.31	7.01	7.	7.	7.53	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.
Mobile.....	7.95	7.78	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.
Omaha.....	7.98	8.	8.	8.	8.	7.90	9.69	8.65	10.	10.	10.	9.80
Savannah.....	7.99	8.	8.	8.	8.	7.96	9.75	8.80	10.	10.	10.	9.96
Atlanta.....							8.00	8.03	8.	8.	8.	8.
Birmingham.....							9.86	9.46	10.	10.	10.	9.88
Houston.....	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.	8.
Portland, Ore. }							10.	10.	10.	10.	10.	10.
Salt Lake City. }							10.	10.	10.	10.	10.	10.
Little Rock.....	8.01	8.07	8.	8.	8.	8.	9.69	9.88	9.84	10.	10.	8.73
Dallas.....	8.34	8.78	7.57	8.42	8.92	8.	9.90	10.38	9.15	10.	10.	10.
Tacoma.....	9.27	10.	9.38	9.	9.	9.	11.13	11.69	11.	11.	11.	11.
Seattle.....	9.96	10.	10.	10.	10.	9.84	11.96	12.	12.	12.	12.	11.84
Denver.....	10.	10.	10.	10.	10.	10.	11.67	10.38	12.	12.	12.	12.

important discount centers of the United States. The higher figures have been added, however, as cumulative proof that the American system of domestic arbitrage is inadequate and inefficient. In truth, as compared with that international system which hurries capital across frontiers and over seas, for the sake of differences of often less than one per cent., it might better be said that the United States has nothing in the way of arbitrage apparatus for domestic purposes, in any sense worthy of the name.

Coincident with the diversity of rates on this side of the Atlantic, is that other striking contrast between the American and European organizations of credit already pointed out. There is no widespread network of branch banks in the United States. A National bank is confined by law to a single city, town or village as the scene of its banking operations;\* according to a recent decision of the Comptroller of the Currency, it may have but one office. In like manner, State banks, though not always forbidden to maintain branches, usually conduct but one establishment.† For any consideration of expediency in favor of its retention, the statutory prohibition of branches must be regarded as obsolete. Its origin is undoubtedly traceable to an amendment, adopted by the Legislature in 1848, to the law which, ten years earlier, had established "freedom of banking" in the State of New York. Certain persons, acting under the provisions of that law, had set up their so-called principal offices in obscure villages of the backwoods, while issuing their notes, and attending to such other business as came their way, in the important cities. As they were thus able to evade or delay redemption at city offices by referring holders of their paper to the remote counters at which alone it was payable, or later might refuse to redeem in Albany or New York except at a discount, the Legislature sought to mitigate the scandal by requiring that the usual business of a "free bank" should be transacted at the place named in its certificate.‡ When the Federal Government also adopted a system of bond-secured issues, a like provision was included in the National Bank Act. |

Logically, of course, the prohibition of branches should have been repealed when the present system of redemption was established in 1874. From that time on the circulation of bank notes at their face value has been fully assured by the requirement that National banks shall receive them in payment and by the five per cent. redemption fund at Washington. The retention of the prohibition might be excusable, nevertheless, if it were true that American bankers, with the ingenuity characteristic of their race, had devised other apparatus facilitating the flow of capital from one section to another as effective and economical as that of branch banks. It is conceivable, for example, that a powerful syndicate of banks situated in dif-

\* Revised Statutes of the United States, §§ 5134, 5190.

† The branches conducted by some State banks, in the exercise of corporate privileges, or by certain National banks, of whose action no official cognizance has been taken, are few in number, and in influence unimportant.

‡ Cf. Laws of New York, 1838, Ch. 200; 1840, Ch. 202, 363; 1848, Ch. 340.

| That the conduct of branches, nevertheless, is by no means generally contrary to American banking policy is shown by the fact that the practice is permitted in Arkansas, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Nevada, South Carolina and Wisconsin, while the law is silent upon the subject or does not forbid branches in Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Washington. (Cf. the official material on "State Banking Systems," in the Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, Vol. I, 1896, pp. 195-254.)

ferent towns, by pooling their resources and combining their lending business, might eventually establish a uniformity of rates throughout the territory in which they worked. Or, if local banks had as extensive opportunities for borrowing in cheap markets, either on their bills payable, or by way of credits to depositors in such neighborhoods, as the banker on the spot, known of all men and trusted by many, they too might augment inadequate local loan funds and gradually bring about a like uniformity of rates. Still further assistance might be obtained by communities in which credit is dear, through placing the capital stock of local banks in the hands of absentee shareholders, and through the pledge of securities discounted by such banks to institutions in other localities.

In actual practice, however, cases of combination among banks for general purposes are exceedingly rare, and the most conspicuous examples of such syndicates, in being perverted by their promoters to other ends than those of legitimate banking, have speedily come to grief. On the other hand, the acquisition of additional funds by the issue of interest-bearing deposit receipts, payable only after notice or at fixed terms to persons living at a distance, is more or less discountenanced by the banking profession, and when such obligations have been reported to the Government merely as deposits, the practice has provoked official reprimands. Aside, therefore, from an increase in the deposits of local customers, or an addition to its share capital which is taken up at home, there are but three ways in which an American bank can augment the fund of loanable capital at its disposal—rediscounting, borrowing and increasing the non-resident holdings of its capital stock.

To what extent the State and private banks make use of these devices is not shown in the reports. But they belong to the same class of comparatively small local banks as the National banks and, in great measure, the business traditions of all these types are drawn from a common source. The methods of corporations working under State laws are not likely to differ widely from those of banks subject to Federal regulation. So the results of an inquiry into this phase of American practice will lose but little in significance, though it be based entirely on the statistics of National banks. At any rate, these form the more important element of the American banking system, the loans and discounts of National banks, the country over, being more than three times those of the State and private banks, according to the latest reports of 1897; their capital stock, more than two and one-half times as great. The total capital, surplus, undivided profits and individual deposits of National associations exceed those of the State and private banks even in those sections of the country, except the Pacific States,\* in which the latter institutions are especially prominent factors in the loan market. In the Southern and Middle States the proportion is more than ten to seven; † in the Western States it is more than ten to six. The preponderance of State banks in the Pacific group is due to the exceptional development in California, where more than seven-elevenths of the banking capital of the whole Pacific section is in their hands.

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\* The geographical divisions mentioned in this paragraph are those which have been used of recent years by the Comptroller of the Currency in his annual Report.

† The State banks have much the larger capital in Virginia, Mississippi and Kentucky, while in Texas, where the National banks had a capital of \$18,731,000 on October 5, 1897, there are but four State banks in operation.

Now the Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency show that during the five years 1892-1897, the National banks, taken as a whole, have reported amounts under the headings "notes and bills rediscounted" and "bills payable" equal, on the average, to 1.33 per cent. of their total loans and discounts. The proportion rose as high as 3.1 per cent. but once, on July 12, 1893; by the end of February, 1894. it had fallen below one per cent. So much for the grand average of the twenty five reports made between December 9, 1892, and October 5, 1897. If, instead of one average, five be computed, that is one for each of the five reports which must be made each year, it appears that the extent to which banks in the New England, Eastern, Middle, Western and Southern States supplement their resources by rediscounting and borrowing, does not vary by one-half per cent. of their total loans and discounts in the course of the average year. In the Southern States, on the contrary, the influence of the seasons is very marked, the proportion standing at the lowest point in March (roughly) 2 11-16 per cent., rising in May to 3¼ per cent., in July to 6¼ and in October to 8 per cent., while it falls again in December to 4¼ per cent. of total loans and discounts.

The information published by the Comptroller on the subject of absentee ownership of capital stock has not been gathered at so frequent intervals. Inasmuch, however, as figures relating to share capital are far less variable than other items of liabilities, it will not be amiss to compare the amount of National bank stock in the possession of persons not resident, on July 5, 1897, in the States in which the reporting banks respectively were situated, with the average amount of loans and discounts of banks in the several geographical divisions of the country during the last five years. This comparison, therefore, is presented in the form of percentages, in the first column of the following table; in the second, there appears the percentage borne by rediscounts and bills payable to loans and discounts; in the third, the first two columns have been combined, the better to show the proportion borne by all outside assistance to the sums directly employed for lending purposes.

	<i>Percentage borne by the par value of stock owned by non State-resi- dents to average loans and dis- counts.</i>	<i>Percentage borne by bills payable and notes and bills rediscount- ed to average loans and dis- counts.</i>	<i>Total per- centage of aid received from with- out.</i>
New England.....	3.2	1.4	4.6
Eastern States.....	3.11	.47	3.58
Southern States.....	7.12	4.53	11.65
Middle States.....	4.56	1.32	5.88
Western States.....	11.92	3.0	14.92
Pacific States.....	11.83	2.23	14.06

The table of discount rates was an exhibit of conditions; the foregoing table shows how little the devices, by the aid of which it is conceivably possible to improve those conditions, are actually used. The inquiry as to practice confirms, from another view, the deductions already derived from results. There are no branch banks; there is nothing which takes the place of branch banks. The local borrower is at the mercy of the local lender. He is doubtless accorded every facility possible under the circumstances, but the local lender is himself the creature of a situation. With the best of will, he cannot, at any rate he does not, take measures adequately to augment the volume of

capital locally available for discount operations by supplies from cheaper sources.

Taken together, the tables make it impossible to resist the conclusion that the American system of domestic arbitrage not only fails to perform, but is also incapable of performing, the functions it ought to discharge.

#### IMPERFECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM.

The explanation of the failure is not far to seek. It lies, if it lies anywhere, in the technical inferiority of the American mechanism, whether viewed as an instrument of economic policy for the purpose of equalizing discount rates and counteracting the concentration of the country's surplus funds in its greatest cities, or as a practical device of bank organization. As an instrument of economic policy the small bank is not only powerless, as a rule, against persistent inter-local diversity in the price of loans, but also frequently incapable of furnishing the amount of accommodation which its discount customers require, be the rate of discount what it may. The loans which a local bank may make to single persons or firms are limited by prudence and by the amount of its ready resources. Of really heavy discount customers, it is often positively unable to take the proper care. The transactions of a National bank are further restricted by law.\* The effect of these limitations is seen on the one hand in the practice pursued by many borrowers of keeping accounts at two or more banks, and on the other, in the trade with outside commercial paper carried on between professional note-brokers and metropolitan banks. A good part, no doubt, of the paper handled in New York is sent thither merely to escape the higher rates usually prevailing in the home market. But it is a way to obtain money practicable only for borrowers to whom great wealth, large trade, or an influential connection has brought exceptional credit, and in any case would hardly be followed were as ample facilities and as reasonable prices available near at hand. Either practice involves a diminution of the control rightly exerted by a banker over the transactions of his debtors. Either practice increases the opportunities of bill-kickers, over-sanguine traders and persons intent on fraud. Both necessitate neglect of a maxim which other Anglo-Saxon bankers are accustomed to think fundamental—"one customer, one bank."

The inferiority of local banks is further visible in the slight degree in which they counteract the influence of distance and ignorance on the estimation of risks. Within his own field, to be sure, the local banker knows pretty accurately how much credit should be given to those who seek it. Of individual borrowers outside the local field, he knows practically nothing at all. So the bank in Boston or Philadelphia which has a temporary surplus of loanable funds, or wishes generally to increase the productiveness of its investments, is barred, to all intents and purposes, from taking advantage of the higher markets in the West and South. It is unwilling, as a rule, to hand over the management of any part of its bill portfolio to another bank; to appoint an agent to look after possible customers where loans are relatively dear, would be tantamount to erecting a branch. Yet the only trustworthy basis for a judg-

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\* It may not be indebted for more than the amount of its capital stock except by way of deposits, circulating notes, profits, dividends and drafts on moneys due to it, or actually on deposit to its credit. Nor may it lend to any one person, firm or corporation amounts which exceed in the aggregate one-tenth of its capital paid in (*§5300, 5202 Revised Statutes, U. S.*).

ment on the commercial paper arising in a given neighborhood is an acquaintance with local borrowers gained on the spot, either by the banker himself, or through his responsible representative. Ignorance of securities induces suspicion. Suspicion enhances the premium for risk. Until, then, some means have been found to overcome distance, enlighten ignorance and dispel suspicion in this regard, it is most unlikely that the discount funds of the older and accumulating sections of the United States will become accessible on reasonable terms to communities less distinguished for their present wealth than for the possibilities of wealth in the exploitation of their natural resources and the development of their trade.

#### STABILITY OF THE BRANCH SYSTEM.

Certain aspects of the technical superiority of branches as a device of bank organization have already been pointed out. The banker's interest in less restricted business, diversification of risk, less expense per unit of service, greater regularity of return, and larger profits from minor transactions, is too obvious for further elaboration. But the superiority in point of stability is also of great importance to the general welfare, so great, indeed, that it may well be reckoned a third advantage of branch banking from the viewpoint of economic policy. This appears on the one hand in the diminished effects of local disasters. It rarely happens, in localities served by branch banks, that a succession of mercantile failures, no matter how serious, brings a series of bank failures in its train. The institutions which branches represent are generally able to bear losses which would wipe out the capital of small local banks and force them to close their doors. Sporadic commercial disorders, therefore, sufficient to overwhelm local banks, and throw the credit machinery of entire communities into confusion, leave branches working no less smoothly than before. Solvent houses are not compelled to suffer sympathetically by having their deposits locked up or their discount lines withdrawn. Ordinarily, indeed, the facilities usually accorded are not even curtailed.

It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the dominating forces in a system of local banks make rather for disintegration and weakness, than unity and strength. In times of danger the instinct of each bank is to look to its own safety, regardless of what may happen elsewhere or to other banks. At best, it is only the banks within single communities which take common measures against common perils. As between localities the rule is *saave qui peut*. Hence, in great measure, the scramble for currency before and during a panic—the eagerness and insistence with which, in the United States, the usual deposits of National banks with reserve agents are reduced at the first sign of approaching trouble. The policy is sound enough from the local banker's view, for he is more or less well advised in showing less confidence towards his reserve agents than in the security of his own locks. But the derangement of the banking system thus engendered cannot fail to react upon commercial disorders. It has been known to precipitate panic in markets where otherwise the disturbance could have been allayed.

A well-developed system of branch banking is less individualistic in its action. For convenience's sake most banks locate their head office, or at least an important agency, in one of the principal financial centers. And as in the United States, the bulk of the whole country's banking reserve is kept in the chief money markets, partly to be drawn against as exchange is needed, partly

to be invested as occasion offers in loans at call. The difference lies in the manipulation of that reserve. Under a system of branch banking, the matter is decided by general managers at head office, familiar with the situation over a large territory, it may be the country through, and assisted to their decisions by careful reports from local managers wherever their banks have opened branches. As crises approach, it is seldom necessary to weaken the central reserve in order that the fears of panic-stricken country bankers may be relieved. The branch in a minor city or country town is no better off with a proportionate reserve in its own vaults than when such funds are left at head office. The fortunes of individual offices are inextricably involved with those of the mother bank by which they are controlled. For a branch to doubt the solvency of the institution which ordinarily fills for it the place of the American reserve agent, is to question its own.

Under a system of branch banking, therefore, it is possible so to harmonize the interests of different sections with respect to the central reserve that even in emergencies it may be left in charge of its usual custodians unimpaired through any action of the banks, at least by individualistic precaution or groundless apprehension. It is possible, in short, to avoid that clash of interests and action at cross purposes which not infrequently occurs at critical junctures between the city and country banks of the United States.

The pre-eminent advantage of branch banking, nevertheless, is its tendency to equalize domestic discount rates. We have seen that there is a substantial uniformity among numerous and distant localities in countries where branch banking is practiced; we have seen that in the United States, where branch banking is now as good as extinct, there subsists the utmost diversity of rates in even the more important markets for commercial paper, notwithstanding resort to rediscounting, borrowing and absentee ownership of capital stock. It seems but a fair inference, then, that conditions abroad should be imputed to the employment of an instrument which American banks of issue are forbidden to use.

Or is it true that European uniformities are due to other circumstances than the use of so simple a device as branch banks? Denser and less heterogeneous population, less fluctuating conditions in agriculture and industry and more stable commercial policy, greater uniformity in the productivity of labor and capital, superior means of communication and less uncertain markets, above all, greater accumulations of fluid capital and more widespread, active competition for investments, have each been advanced in explanation of the differences between the European situation and our own. But to make the explanation conclusive, it would first be necessary to show that a distinct advantage in this particular pertains to all those continental towns, as compared with the cities in the table of American rates, which enjoy a substantial parity of prices with the financial centers of the countries in which they lie. Even then it would be impossible to accept this view, unless one quite ignores the state of things in certain countries in comparison with which the advantage in the specified aspects of economic development lies on the side of the United States. One of these is Australia, where, according to official documents, there is seldom a difference of more than one or one and a half per cent. in the rates charged by the chartered banks at any of their offices, no matter how remote a branch may be from the principal seats of Australian trade. Still better an example is provided by the British colony



on our northern frontier, for Canadian economic conditions, though the development, generally speaking, is not so advanced, are not unlike those in the northern tier of the American States.

But with respect to the equalization of domestic discount rates, Canada, with its branch bank system, is far in the lead of the United States. Borrowers in such cities as Halifax, St. John, Quebec, Hamilton and Winnipeg, are served on substantially the same terms as those in the chief financial centers. Only in the remoter, newer and less populous communities, where the pressure for loans is great and the risk somewhat higher, can a small addition to city rates be required on paper which banks of issue are willing to buy. So keen, in fact, is the competition between these thirty-seven chartered banks that wherever one of their six hundred offices is open, be it the lumber district of Ontario, a farming village of Manitoba, or a mining camp in the Rocky Mountains, the rate of discount is not more than one and a half to two per cent. higher than in the wealthy cities of Toronto and Montreal.

Others, again, may argue that if the uniformity of foreign rates is not due to the greater wealth and better-rounded development of European countries, it can best be explained by the centralization peculiar to their banking systems. The organization of credit in England, France and Germany is led if not dominated by great central banks, with partial or complete monopoly of issue and intimate relations to government. Is it not rather these enormous institutions which have spread their networks over whole countries and established uniformities, less for purposes of gain than in pursuit of the economic policy of furnishing credit to all parts of their commonwealths on identical terms? Some color is lent this view by the obligation of the Bank of France to open at least one agency in each Department, and by the remarks of certain writers on the useful activity of this or that central bank in the backward communities within its territory. But the explanation weakens when applied to England, for the Bank of England has only eleven branches. And when Scotland and Canada are included in the survey, it becomes clear that neither centralization, monopoly of issue, nor benevolent policy, but a wide diffusion of branches among domestic markets is the means of bringing the demand and supply of loanable capital into equilibrium at practically the same price for all.

A third objection, finally, might be based on the contrasts between the methods of securing bank emissions adopted here and elsewhere—on the difference between the circulation against special security required by the National Bank Act and the issue against general credit, or on commercial assets, which, outside of England, is a characteristic privilege of the note banks abroad.

In exercising its power of issue the National bank must deposit securities with the Government, in return for which it receives sums of notes of a face value less than the cost of its deposit by amounts which range from fifteen to thirty per cent., according to the premium paid on the bonds. Plainly enough the National bank which attempts to issue notes in a locality where interest is high must resign itself to a double embarrassment. It gets less profit from its investment in bonds than on equivalent sums employed at home, and it actually diminishes the resources available for discount operations in its own market. A bank which issues against its general credit on the contrary is able not only to keep the resources derived from capital and de-

posits intact for local uses, but also to increase the local loan fund by the emission of its own notes. The issue of bank paper based on commercial assets is calculated, therefore, though practiced merely by local banks, somewhat to relieve the dearth where loanable capital is now scarce.

But it would be most effective in communities the circulating medium of which is mostly made up of money and notes. Less benefit, relatively speaking, would be derived by the larger towns, and least of all by such cities as appear in the table of discount rates, for there the still more elastic deposit currency is already in well-nigh universal use. In any case, the limit to the augmentation of local loans by this means would soon be reached. It would be imprudent to permit small banks to issue notes in excess of their capital stocks, and we have seen that the bank capitalization in needy communities is pretty closely restricted, under the present system, to the meager sums which local investors are able to provide. Inter-local differences of rate might be somewhat less, but they would not disappear. It is only through the action of branch banks that a thoroughgoing equalization can be brought about—that the many discount markets of the country can be merged into one. Without branches, the opportunity of exploiting differences would still be lacking; the system of domestic arbitrage would still be incomplete.

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**BREAKING THE ENDLESS CHAIN.**—If President McKinley were not wiser than the men who, ever since his election, have been pressing him to head a crusade against the greenbacks and in favor of a stupendous banking scheme, he might easily effect a disruption of the sound-money forces. He knows that his proposition, if adopted, would break “the endless chain” short off, and thus protect the gold reserve. And he knows that if the administration were to attempt to push for radical reform at this time, it would do just what all the opponents of the gold standard are longing to see it undertake.—*Washington Post*.

Without criticising the proposition to reissue the legal tenders in exchange for gold only—which is good so far as it goes—we should like to inquire how President McKinley or any one else can know, as the “Post” assumes, that this apparently simple device would break the “endless chain.”

If the legal-tenders were thus locked up, and a demand came for gold for export, who would supply it? The banks can not be compelled to, as they have no gold obligations, and the theory advanced in the above quotation seems to be that the Treasury would not do so. The exporter, then, could only get the gold by buying it in the open market—which is, perhaps, what he should be compelled to do—but in this case what becomes of the unrepealed parity clause in the Sherman law? If the exporter who held silver dollars, or silver certificates, could not get gold for them without paying a premium, would not the parity of the two metals be destroyed?

The Treasury has declared its readiness to exchange gold for silver if necessary to preserve the parity, and whenever the legal tenders are locked up or permanently retired, that is an issue that is sure to be raised, unless the burden of supplying gold shall be shifted to the banks.

There is another point that should not be overlooked. In the calendar years 1890–1895 we exported net more than \$255,000,000 of our gold. If this amount had been obtained by a deposit of legal tenders in the Treasury—and a large part of it was so obtained—it would contract the currency just that much, if the legal tenders should be permanently locked up. The retirement of Government paper money without some provision for a bank currency would no doubt work incalculable mischief.

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

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### The Balance of Exchanges

The subject of the balance of trade and the effect of other elements than merchandise imports and exports upon the actual foreign exchange operations of a country, is discussed in several recent articles in the foreign financial journals. M. Edmond Théry, in one of his articles on "Europe and America" in "*L'Economiste Européen*" of December 2, points out that even where foreign loans are contracted in a more or less frequent manner, if, in spite of these loans the exchanges preserve their theoretical parity, except for slight oscillations, and if gold remains in general circulation, it is a proof that the country under consideration, in spite of the appearance of a commercial deficit afforded by the customs statistics, is a permanent creditor of foreign countries. "Being a permanent creditor of foreign countries," says M. Théry, "the new capital which reaches its territory by the natural route of foreign balances becomes, if new enterprises do not absorb it, a competitor of the capital already employed within the country; whence arises the rise of national securities and the decline in their annual earnings in relation to the price, the fall of the rate of discount and finally the general decline of the domestic rate for the rental of capital."

The most striking case of a permanent balance of trade against a prosperous country is that of Great Britain. The recent rapid growth of this balance has attracted attention in England and was the subject of a careful analysis by Mr. Ritchie, President of the Board of Trade, at a Chamber of Commerce banquet in November. Mr. Ritchie points out that while the adverse balance upon the face of the customs returns has been steadily growing in recent years, it has not been accompanied by any marked indication of losses of gold or decline in savings. The deposits in the Savings banks from January 1, to October 31, 1898, increased £8,000,000, railway receipts increased £1,500,000 and the volume of foreign commerce has progressed, although not perhaps in an entirely satisfactory manner. The excess of importations over exportations of merchandise, which was only £89,058,000 in 1888, rose to £127,550,000 in 1893, £145,420,000 in 1896 and £157,055,000 in 1897. The excess for the first ten months of 1898 has been £140,165,000, indicating £168,000,000 for the complete calendar year.

One of the principal sources of British revenue is found in foreign investments, whose extent it is difficult to determine. The value of capital thus placed abroad constantly varies. There is a continual exchange of securities between England and other countries. Mr. Ritchie undertakes, nevertheless, to make a general estimate of the items which go to make up the revenue of Great Britain other than her commodity exports. The amount of British capital placed abroad from 1892 to 1896, according to the calculations of the London "*Economist*," reached an average of £56,000,000 per year. Sir Robert Giffen estimated the British capital held abroad in 1882 at

£1,500,000,000. If an annual increase is computed since that time of £50,000,000, the present volume of British investments abroad would exceed £2,000,000,000. The interest on this sum at four and a half per cent. would represent £90,000,000. This interest is paid in the form of commodity imports and accounts for an excess of importations for this amount.

There is still another chapter of invisible exports of high importance, represented by freight charges and profits on shipping. The amount of these earnings by Great Britain was computed by Mr. Giffen in 1882 at £76,000,000. Mr. Ritchie estimates that it must now reach £90,000,000. Another item of some importance is the sale of English vessels abroad, which is estimated at £7,000,000 per year. These several items, aggregating £187,000,000, more than cover the excess of commodity imports into Great Britain and, in the opinion of Mr. Ritchie, remove any ground for apprehension on account of the trade balance. British exports have not, however, shown an increase commensurate with those of other countries. The London "Times" declares that between 1891 and 1897 French exports increased one and a half per cent., German, Dutch and Belgian exports twelve and three-quarters per cent., and the exports of the United States eighteen per cent., while those of the United Kingdom declined five per cent. These figures relate to money values and not to quantities.

Exchange is less favorable in the case of countries with depreciated currency, high taxes and deficient resources. The subject is discussed by Signor Maggiorino Ferraris, a member of the Italian Parliament, in a recent number of "*Nuova Antologia*." He declares that "the commercial balance gives only the excess of imports and exports of merchandise between Italy and other countries, while the monetary balance is the result of the entire economic movement; it includes merchandise, national securities, stocks and bonds, Italian bills of exchange discounted abroad, foreign capital employed in Italy, remittances of Italian emigrants and the enormous expenditure annually made by tourists in our country." The great importance of arbitrage and stock exchange operations in affecting exchange is thus referred to by Signor Ferraris:

"The movement of international exchanges is governed not only by the import and export of merchandise and products, but by two factors or elements quite distinct—the commerce in commodities and the commerce in securities, credits and stock exchange operations. The influence of the first factor tends to decline, while that of the second increases in proportion to the development of international banking and stock exchange transactions. To-day it is the stock exchanges and the international banks which govern the foreign exchanges and which make them rise or fall with a rapid and decisive action, sometimes almost like a thunder-clap. In order to increase by 100,000,000 lire per year the export of wine, silk or other Italian products, and to create in this manner one hundred millions of credit abroad in our favor, would require years and years, if success were assured. But within a few days, by means of the telegraph, one hundred millions of bonds, obligations and bills of exchange may be purchased on the Italian stock exchanges and sold or discounted at London and Berlin. There are created in this manner, 100,000,000 lire of credits which have for the moment the effect of improving exchange. In a reverse sense, 100,000,000 lire of securities and Italian paper placed abroad may be brought back into the country in a few days, increasing by that amount our debt abroad and creating an unfavorable exchange. The mighty and decisive action of these great modern forces—the stock exchange and the international banks—is exercised indifferently in favor of the rise or fall of exchange, according to the transient probability of profits on one side or the other."

The existence of a spirit of speculation in Germany, which is shared and promoted by the great banks, continues to be a subject of warning by financial journals and economic students. The "*Deutsche Economist*," in the course of a thoughtful review of the situation, states that the great banks are involved too deeply in commercial operations. It declares:

"The English, who have larger interests than we to defend throughout the globe and whose energy yields in no respect to ours, have never made their banks depend upon commercial enterprises. They demand of the banks only security. Their enterprises are adventurous but their banks are secure. When they have been subjected to disasters they have found in the bank something to lean upon. This regard for security and solidity is also the principal preoccupation of the private banks. The English law imposes upon them the obligation of holding aloof from every extraneous operation. They are forbidden to create stock companies, to borrow or to speculate. The English bank knows no other revenue than that from discount and supplying money. The Englishman is perfectly right in his comprehension of banking operations. We, in Germany, who lack financial traditions and understand transactions in a different manner, have permitted our banks to venture in the most varied enterprises, in which they have engaged with an extraordinary activity. It remains to be ascertained if there is not a grave danger in this situation from which we shall some day suffer. Our small banks seek to make a fortune in new ventures and stock issues. The great ones exaggerate this tendency and make syndicates for operations which go far beyond banking business properly so called. As to the great private banking houses, they mingle banking affairs with the most varied enterprises—loans to States and cities, railways in Africa and America, mining ventures, and so on. Our bankers are our pioneers, and the extraordinary growth of German influence and commerce in the world is due to their initiative."

Notwithstanding the immediate benefits of this daring policy the German journal questions whether it will not bring disaster when some of these enterprises prove unproductive and the working resources of the bank are found locked up in unavailable form. The pressure for money, the great issues of securities, and the growing conservatism in Germany are also discussed by the Berlin correspondent of the London "*Economist*" in the issue of November 26, as follows:

"While there is nothing like alarm here over money market conditions, still notes of warning have multiplied remarkably of late, and almost everywhere one hears now the imperious demand for greater conservatism in the matter of new emissions of stock, conversions of loans, and, in fact, any enlargement of obligations. It is known that the Reichsbank has for a considerable time been convinced that large financial transactions were rushing over each other at a too reckless pace, and that the thing must be checked. It is reported, for example, that when the great Loewe-Schuckert deal was projected, President Koch expressed a very strong opinion as to its inopportuneness.

The joint-stock banks, &c., have been for some time pressing upon their customers to close out their too large engagements. The highly favorable state of German industry has tempted private individuals in extraordinary numbers to speculate in industrial shares. There has been such a long period of rising prices that there seemed to be no end of the present movement to be apprehended; hence the books of the big banks have shown an ever-increasing volume of buying orders from their customers. \* \* \*

The causes leading to the present stringency here are to be sought in the larger movements of German capital at home and abroad during the past year or two. China and Russia absorbed in loans £12,550,000 of German capital in 1894, £19,700,000 in 1897, and £19,250,000 in the first half of the current year. German cities, hitherto rather backward in introducing modern improvements, are now absorbing unusual amounts of capital for lighting plants, sewage and water systems, and various other purposes. Town and provincial loans amounted in 1894 to about £5,000,000, in 1897 to £9,500,000, and in the first half of this year to £5,600,000. A factor in the present situation is the circumstance that the

public has not yet bought these latter loans in any considerable quantities, and the great banks are still loaded up with them. Industrial joint-stock companies have of late been great absorbers of capital. Leaving out of account their loans, I find that the new shares in these concerns, issued in 1894, amounted to only £4,750,000. The upward movement began in 1895, with £11,950,000, and reached £15,350,000 in 1896. Last year, under the influence of the bourse law, there was a slowing up, new issues reaching only £14,150,000, but for the first half of the present year they amounted to £18,700,000.

It is estimated that in Germany alone the electrical industry, including city and suburban railways, absorbs about £15,000,000 of capital yearly, and besides this about £10,000,000 of German capital is invested or contracted for in electrical undertakings in foreign countries. Last year there were built 730 kilometres (452½ miles) of electric railways in Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and England together, and of this amount Germany alone built 489 kilometers, or slightly over two-thirds of the whole."

The committee of experts appointed for the examination of the charter of the new central Swiss bank, to be known as the Bank of the Confederation, held meetings on November 23 and 24 last and completed their recommendations to the Government. They accepted most of the details already recommended by a previous committee and leave the governments of the Confederation and the Cantons with a large share in the ownership and management.

The chief differences between the new plan and that rejected by popular vote on February 28, 1897, is that the Confederation does not assume unlimited responsibility and ownership in the Bank and the capital is increased from 30,000,000 to 60,000,000 francs. The capital will be raised, one-third by the Confederation, one-third by the Cantons and cantonal banks, and one-third by private subscriptions, which will be taken up by the Confederation in case the subscriptions are not sufficient. The Confederation, the Cantons, and the private subscribers will each name twenty-five delegates to a Council which will form the governing body of the Bank. There will be no General Assembly of shareholders, because of the difficulties which might arise from the different status of the official and individual shareholders. The Council of seventy-five will name a Council of the Bank composed of fifteen members who will in turn elect a committee of five members, with two alternates. Each interest will be represented in the same proportions as in the Council of the Bank. The General Council will also appoint a committee of revision, will receive reports, approve the rules and otherwise exercise some of the general supervision exercised in other banks by the General Assembly. The active directors of the Bank will be named by the Federal Council of Switzerland, upon the nomination of the Council of the Bank, the local directorates being named in the same manner.

The general supervision of the Government over the Bank, granted to the Confederation by Article 39 of the Federal Constitution, will be exercised by the Federal delegates in the Council of the Bank and also by independent officials, who will have the right to supervise the issue and redemption of notes, the metallic reserve for the notes and the reserve against other short-term obligations of the Bank. The Bank will be created for twenty years, and if its privileges are not renewed and the management of the institution is assumed entirely by the Confederation, a third of the reserve funds will go to the Confederation before the other two-thirds are divided equally between the Confederation, the Cantons and individual shareholders according to their proportion of the capital. The metallic reserve is fixed at forty per

cent. of the note issues and notes will be of the denominations of 50, 100, 500 and 1,000 francs. The business of the Bank will be limited to the issue of notes, to transfers and to discounts. Fifteen per cent. of the profits will be carried to the reserve fund, after which a dividend of four per cent. will be distributed upon the capital, and the surplus divided among the Cantons according to population.

The success of the new "*Banque Spéciale des Valeurs Industrielles*" in Paris has been so great that a special meeting of the shareholders was called on November 5, for the purpose of authorizing the purchase of ground for a building. It was voted unanimously to buy a tract of 1,054 square metres situated at the corner of the streets *Notre-Dame-des-Victoires* and *Réaumur* at 1,600 francs per metre, where a building will be constructed for the bank, with additional space for rental. The purchase, construction and furnishing will involve an expense of about 3,500,000 francs (\$700,000), and is considered a profitable use of the surplus of 9,000,000 francs which the bank has already accumulated.

The occasion of the meeting was availed of by M. Bernhard, the President, to outline the scope of the institution and the degree of its success. M. Bernhard declared that two general principles had been adhered to in the business of the bank. The first consisted in not presenting to the public any new enterprises, which, however brilliant their future appeared, always involved certain risks, but in taking up industrial or commercial enterprises already prosperous and which had given results sufficiently favorable to justify the expectation of dividends of at least seven or eight per cent. to the shareholders of the new corporation upon the paid-up capital. These dividends would naturally increase, because these enterprises would be able, by means of the larger capital placed at their disposition, to enlarge the circle of their operations, and with the greater ease because the men who had created and directed them would continue as directors to give their aid until the time when they should have themselves created a force capable of replacing them. The second principle adopted by the bank consisted in the formation of syndicates, constituted for eighteen months or even for two years. These syndicates not only served for distributing the securities of new corporations created by the efforts of the bank, but continued their activity for the purpose of repurchasing the securities distributed, if necessary, in order to maintain their value. The *Banque Spéciale*, it was declared, desired to afford the original subscribers for securities indisputable proof of the performance of the promises given upon the creation of the corporation in which they became shareholders.

The success of the work of the new bank is indicated by the present quotation of the shares of *Société des Chaussures Incroyables*, which were issued at 100 francs and are now quoted at over 200 francs. The capital of 1,500,000 francs realized during the last year net profits of 378,000 francs, which permitted a dividend of twelve and one-half per cent. and a surplus of 45,000 francs. This is only one of a number of similar enterprises which the new bank has given the benefit of its endorsement. The *Banque Spéciale* itself, at the end of its first six months, had obtained results which would permit the distribution of a dividend of fifteen per cent. of which five had already been paid.

The Bank of Austria-Hungary. The Bank of Austria-Hungary will probably continue its present organization, even if the two parts of the Monarchy become politically independent. It is declared by the Vienna correspondent of "*L'Economiste Européen*," in the issue of November 25, that the political rupture between the two parts of the Monarchy will not involve economic or financial rupture. The plan which was under consideration, of reducing the capital of the Bank, has been abandoned. Some changes may be made in the manner of operation of the Bank, in order to encourage Hungarian local pride, but they will not be radical. The directorates at Vienna and Buda-Pesth will be endowed with greater powers, especially in regard to the magnitude of the credits granted. This is in accordance with the growing competition of Buda-Pesth with Vienna as a financial center, which has in several years carried the volume of business at the Hungarian branch abreast of that at the old Austrian capital. It is proposed, in renewing the charter of the Bank, to give the two governments a greater influence than at present over its affairs and administration. The Government will name not only the Governors of the Bank, as heretofore, but the Deputy-Governors, subject to confirmation by the crown. The Bank will continue upon its old basis until an adjustment is reached, and only in the case of an absolute separation between the two parts of the Monarchy will independent banks be established. The Vienna correspondent of the London "*Economist*," in the issue of November 19, says:

"The new statutes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank contain a paragraph according to which the new bank notes will have a German text on one side and a Hungarian text on the other. This is not to be taken literally. The notes will, on the contrary, be a fine illustration of the real state of affairs in the Monarchy. Whilst the text on one side will indeed be purely Hungarian—since the nationalities ruled over by the Magyars, Germans, Croatians, Roumanians, have nothing to say—the German side of the notes will be adorned with inscriptions in Czech, Polish, Italian, Ruthenian, Roumanian, Servian, Croatian, and Slavonian, eight languages besides German."

The Discount Rate in Recent Years. The average discount rate during the last seven years at the leading European banks is discussed in an interesting manner by Prof. Edmond Théry in "*L'Economiste Européen*" of December 2. He prints a table showing that the changes in the average official rates for each year, between 1892 and 1897 (both inclusive), were: At Paris, from 2.66 per cent. in 1892 to 2 per cent. in 1897; Amsterdam, 2.70 to 3.14; Berlin, 3.20 to 3.84; Berne, 3.09 to 3.83; Brussels, 2.70 to 3; Madrid, 4.95 to 5; Lisbon, 6 to 5.50; London, 2.54 to 2.78; Rome, 5.20 to 5; St. Petersburg, 4.88 to 5.87; Vienna, 4.02 to 4 per cent. M. Théry discusses the changes in rates as follows:

"According to this table it is France which takes the lead in the low rate of the rental of capital. The average of her discount rate for the period 1892-97 has been scarcely 2.31 per cent., while the average has been 2.49 per cent. in England, which comes second in rank. But it should not be forgotten that the table gives the official average in the banks of issue of the different countries and that this rate—which is actual and uniform for the Bank of France and for most of the European banks of issue—is simply a maximum which the Bank of England does not exceed. The Bank of England is not bound, in short, as is the Bank of France, to discount only at the rate officially announced. The official rate indicates simply that it does not discount above this rate, but it is free to discount good paper at a lower rate and does it upon a large scale. One would certainly come near the truth in saying that



for three or four years the domestic rate for the rental of capital has been nearly the same in France and England.

Belgium comes next, then Holland, then Switzerland, and then Germany. Austria-Hungary and the United States, as much by the position of their foreign exchanges as by the average rate of their domestic discounts, seem to have reached the state of creditor countries. But this can only be affirmed when Austria-Hungary shall have completely realized the reform of her paper currency and resumed payments in gold and when the United States shall have reformed its paper circulation. As to the other countries of Europe and the world, they are all more or less the debtors of France, England, Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland."

An indication of the rapid economic development of Russia within the last few years is afforded by the table of applications for capital by stock companies during the present century which appears in the "*Bulletin Russe de Statistique*" for July-September. The total applications for the century, not including banks and railways, have been 1,768,555,000 roubles (\$900,000,000), of which about one-third have been made during the three years ending with 1897 and more than 225,000,000 roubles have been added during a part of 1898. It appears that there have been established during the century more than 1,500 stock companies, of which it is declared by the "*Bulletin Russe*:"

"In this total the companies which have disappeared—those which have gone into liquidation and those (much more numerous) which have never seen daylight outside the Bulletin of Laws—represent a capital of about 530,000,000 roubles. The capital of commercial and industrial corporations of which there is no reason to assume the death or failure amounts to a total of 1,460,000,000 roubles. If there is added to this the nominal capital of credit institutions, 240,000,000 roubles, and of railway companies, 110,000,000 roubles, the existing shares and those which are on the eve of creation by Russian corporations represent a total of 1,810,000,000 roubles."

The applications for share capital in several representative years during the century are indicated by the following table:

YEAR.	Proposed issues of capital in roubles.	YEAR.	Proposed issues of capital in roubles.
1799-1864.....	27,174,000	1890.....	63,415,000
1865.....	28,760,000	1891.....	27,495,000
1866.....	6,769,000	1892.....	25,232,000
1867.....	7,450,000	1893.....	61,118,000
1870.....	30,779,000	1894.....	59,550,000
1875.....	37,040,000	1895.....	129,363,000
1880.....	51,165,000	1896.....	232,640,000
1885.....	38,460,000	1897.....	239,424,000

An interesting summary of the relations between the English and Scotch banks, apropos of a new departure by the London and Northern Bank, is presented in the London "*Bankers' Magazine*" for December in a general review of the banking position at home and abroad. The "*Magazine*" says:

"Many banks, up to the present time, have centralized in London. Every Scotch bank of any importance has now a London office, and almost every English bank of any size has provided for its customers the advantages which a head office in London can give. But the London and Northern Bank, which has recently been established, is going to operate in an entirely different direction. Its head office will be in London, but besides offices in Bradford, Birmingham, Hull, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Sunderland and other large English towns, it will have offices in Scotland, in Edinburgh and Glasgow, and in Ireland offices

in Belfast and Dublin. It is in the establishment of banking offices in Scotland and in Ireland that this new bank departs from the precedents which have usually been observed. While both Irish and Scotch banks do business in England, up to the present time no English bank has had the hardihood to compete with the native banks of Scotland and Ireland. The London and Northern Bank starts with a certain amount of established business, as it has taken over the Leeds Joint Stock Bank, which has been established seven years, and enjoys a high reputation. We shall watch its operations with great interest. English banks have long had to complain of the charges made in Scotland and Ireland by the banks of those countries for checks drawn on the branches of those banks and received by banks in England. A check on an English bank, however remote from London, can always be cashed without charge through the medium of the English country clearing, and Scotch and Irish banks share in this privilege exactly as English banks do, but there is no possibility of dealing with a Scotch or Irish check in the same manner. The check has to be sent down either to the office of the bank itself or to some bank with which a private arrangement has been made as to the commission to be charged, and each draft has to be dealt with individually. Proposals, as we know, have been made more than once for establishing a clearing office for English banks both in Scotland and in Ireland. At present, however, this plan has never been carried into effect, and we shall watch with interest the progress of the London and Northern Bank across the Tweed and in the sister isle."

The upward movement of the discount rate and a tight money market continued to be features of the financial situation in Europe during November and December. The London market alone showed some relaxation and private discount rates fell to three and a quarter per cent. early in December. The Bank of England, according to the London "Economist," appeared at that time to have been making no effort to control the market, and did not reduce its official rate of four cent. "Probably," said the "Economist," "it is reckoning upon regaining control without any special effort at the beginning of the new year, when the revenue payments will sweep money off the market."

The Austro-Hungarian Bank made another advance from four and a half to five per cent. on November 23, in spite of the reluctance of the directors to take such a step. The rate has not been so high since 1895, when a five per cent. rate lasted from November 12, 1895, to January 3, 1896. The Manager of the Bank announced that no urgent consideration constrained the institution to make the advance, but it was considered a wise precaution. Money has not been lacking at the new rate nor at the private discount rate, which advanced as high as four and three-quarters.

The situation at the Bank of Germany improved somewhat after the advance of the rate to six per cent. on November 19 and discounted bills showed a decrease. The Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist," in the issue of December 10, says:

"Between the last two statements the Bank had temporarily got its note issues within the tax limit, but the monthly settlement carried the volume of notes up again to £1,833,000 above the limit, whereas a year ago the note issues were £4,959,000 within the limit. In correcting an interview in a London paper last week, President Koch has taken occasion to express the conviction that the Bank will be able to pass the end of the year without a further advance of the rate, and in response to this announcement a better tone has prevailed in the money market as well as on the bourse. Nevertheless, the difference between last year and this, with the metal stock £4,850,000 lower and the discounts £9,136,000 higher than at that time, shows in a very striking way the weaker position of the Bank."

The Bank of Russia advanced its discount rate on November 8 from five and a half to six per cent.

**Spanish Credit and the Bank of Spain.** The means of meeting the national obligations and preventing bankruptcy at the Bank of Spain are under serious consideration by the Spanish ministry. An official note published late in November declared that all parties should unite in the effort to pay the interest on the public debt or to act in perfect good faith in order to reach some arrangement required by the situation. "It is essential," said this note, "that all who do not wish to see foreign capital withdrawn from Spain should lend their aid for saving the national credit. There are those who believe that Cuba should be held responsible for her debt, into whatever hands may fall the sovereignty of the island, because Cuba alone possesses the guarantee given to the holders of the debt—the custom-house receipts. If no one will accept this debt, Spain should reimburse whatever the Cuban revenues do not afford." This is regarded in European financial circles as an acknowledgment that Spain will do her best to pay the interest on the Cuban debt.

A loan for 1,000,000,000 pesetas (\$200,000,000) is under discussion, for the purpose of guaranteeing the advances made by the Bank of Spain and for the loans upon Cuban bonds, which have suffered a serious decline. The rate of the loan will be four per cent, but it will sell for far less than par in gold. There are indications of a serious awakening among Spanish business men regarding the unfortunate financial condition of the country. A congress was held in Saragossa early in December, which adopted some resolutions regarding the financial status. The Government, it was stated, should not make use of the authority granted by the Act of 1891 to increase the circulation beyond 1,500,000,000 pesetas without the specific authority of the Cortes. To justify the increase of the note issues beyond this amount, there should be a new increase of capital and adequate guarantees for the numerous engagements which will be imposed upon the future of the Bank. It was further resolved that the Bank should reorganize its accumulation of securities upon a more solvent basis.

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#### BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

—The South African gold production promises to approach \$80,000,000 for the current calendar year. The returns show a production of 400,791 ounces in October, which is by far the largest month in the history of the Rand district. The production of October, 1897, was 274,175 ounces and of September, 1898, 384,080 ounces. The total yield for the first ten months of 1898 has reached 3,482,788 ounces (about \$65,000,000) as compared with 2,426,837 ounces for the same months of 1897.

—The Austro-Hungarian Government has authorized the creation of a "Bank of Inventors" with a capital of 250,000 florins (\$100,000), which may be doubled. The object of the bank is to place industrial inventions and furnish the means for certain commercial enterprises. The concession will lapse if the bank is not in operation within six months.

—The Russian Savings banks continue to increase their deposits. The outstanding liabilities of the banks to depositors at the close of August last was 508,512,000 roubles (\$255,000,000), standing to the credit of 2,675,536 accounts.

C. A. C.

## MODERN BANKING METHODS.

*A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL POINTS DERIVED  
FROM EXPERIENCE.*

### ORGANIZING A NATIONAL BANK.

#### THE RECEIVING TELLER.

The receiving teller is the next employee in importance in the bank. He is, as his name implies, the one who receives the money. This money (or checks which represent money), may come from various sources—from depositors, from other banks, from collections, from the payment of loans, and by mail. All these he must keep a record of under their respective heads, his assistants in many banks doing much of this work.

The receiving teller is in reality the first assistant to the paying teller.

His position is one requiring accuracy, care, patience and courtesy, since much of the good will of the bank may depend upon his manner of treating people.

He should be a man of high ability, and of the highest standing as to integrity. He should be a good judge of counterfeit money, as all kinds of money, some in very bad condition, come into his hands.

In receiving deposits he should carefully prove each deposit ticket presented with the currency, or checks received, and verify the footing, and in entering the deposit in the depositors pass book it is advisable that the receiving teller write his initial on both the pass book and the deposit ticket for future identification. I have seen cases where such a practice was of great advantage.

In receiving deposits the currency should be assorted according to denominations and placed in their proper tills in the money drawer, ready to be recounted and put up in packages, and the checks placed in proper compartments, according as they are on other banks in the same town, on out-of-town banks, or on the teller's own bank, and from there, after a proper record of them is made on the receiving teller's settlement book, they are taken to the clearing-house desk, the foreign desk, or the individual desk.

When money is received in payment of collections or of loans the amount so received should be entered under their respective heads and numbers on the settlement book. The amounts received from deposits are entered from the deposit slips on the deposit scratcher.

If a stranger or a new customer desires to make a first deposit in the bank he should be referred to the Cashier, who will, if satisfactory, receive his deposit and take his signature in the signature book, or on the indexed card which is coming much in favor in banks, and will then introduce him to the receiving teller. This care is important, as a bank should be particular as to the character of its depositors. Many a "sharper" has opened an account with a bank with the intention of "fleeing" it at his first opportunity.

At the close of the day the receiving teller should prove his cash and turn over his currency, together with a statement, to the paying teller, taking a receipt for it. The following is a form in use for the statement mentioned.

RECEIVING TELLER'S STATEMENT.

Monday, December 5, 1906.

Exchanges.....			
Due by paying teller.....			
Sundries.....			
Gold.....			
Silver.....			
National bank notes.....			
Legals.....			
Checks.....			
Due to paying teller.....			
Discount and collections.....			
Scratcher.....			
Sundries.....			
Balance .....			

Customers frequently come to the receiving teller to have deposits entered in their pass books that had been made at some previous date, when they had not their pass book with them. In doing this it is safest to make such entries from the deposit tickets. I have known claims to be made for erroneous credits on the pass book which the bank has had to lose, as the pass book is considered a receipt by the bank for the money deposited.

The chief books which the receiving teller keeps are the deposit scratcher, and the receiving teller's settlement book, a full account of which, with diagrams, will be given in another chapter.

GENERAL LEDGER BOOKKEEPER.

The general ledger bookkeeper is the next employee to be considered. With many it is a question whether this employee does not stand on an equal footing with the paying teller. While he may not be as skillful in the handling of money as the paying teller, yet he should be "par excellence" in the handling of all bank accounts. As with the others mentioned, his character must be above reproach. He should be a good clear penman, quick and correct at figures, very careful, and have a thorough acquaintance with the various other desks in the bank.

All the business of the bank throughout its various channels comes by aggregates into the general ledger, so it can be seen that this is one of the most important desks in the bank.

The general bookkeeper must keep the accounts with the capital stock, all the profit accounts, and expense accounts. He must also keep the accounts with the reserve agents, with the United States Treasurer and with the correspondent banks.

He must be able to furnish the officers of the bank a daily or weekly statement of the condition of the bank, giving its assets and liabilities. He should at the close of each month make out an account current for each bank that keeps an account with his bank, except such banks as settle their account weekly, or at specified periods, and should receive and reconcile all accounts current sent his bank from other correspondent banks.

In some banks he fills up the reports of condition that are sent five times a year to the Comptroller of the Currency, and when the bank examiner comes it is from this desk that the foundation for his examination is obtained.

The principal books kept by the general bookkeeper are the general ledger, the general journal (or cash book), the foreign scratcher and statement book. In many large banks there are sub-divisions of some of these books, consequent upon the voluminous business, but those mentioned will cover most cases. A full description of the books with diagrams will be given in a later chapter.

THE INDIVIDUAL LEDGER BOOKKEEPER.

Next in order comes the individual ledger bookkeeper. In many banks there are more than one, the ledgers being necessarily sub-divided in consequence of the number of accounts, from 300 to 500 accounts being generally considered as many as one man can take care of.

High character being the first consideration, the other chief points to be considered in the selection of an individual ledger bookkeeper are rapidity, accuracy, care, and good clear penmanship. He should also be endowed with much patience and courtesy, for it is generally his lot to meet many of the depositors, and to answer very numerous questions regarding their accounts. One important thing an individual ledger bookkeeper should always observe, and that is never to mention anything regarding a depositor's account outside the bank, or to any one but the depositor or his representative, except to those connected with the bank who have the right to know. The Cashier is the one who has the right to know anything connected with the depositors' accounts, and any irregularity appearing therein should be at once communicated to him. If any account should become overdrawn the Cashier should at once be informed, and unless instructed otherwise, the bookkeeper should send a notice at once to the depositor.

As the overdraft may be caused by some error in the bank, it is well to send at first a notice similar to the following, which is in use in many banks.

MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK,  
CENTRE CITY, December 1, 1898.

Mr.....

Your account with this bank is overdrawn to the amount of \$.....  
Please send us your pass book that we may compare the account.

Yours respectfully,

.....  
*Bookkeeper.*

If the account is proved to be correct, it is well to send a notice reading the same as the above with the exception of the last clause, which should read "Please give the matter your immediate attention."

The pass books of the depositors should be balanced once a month if possible, and checks returned, unless the account is overdrawn.

It is a good plan to send out notices for pass books that have not been obtained every three months; it helps to correct any errors that may creep into the accounts.

Wherever possible it is best to have the pass books written up and proved by some one other than the bookkeeper.

The position of individual ledger bookkeeper is no sinecure, for the care of the depositors' accounts probably has more detail connected with it than most any other department in the bank, and detail that should be carried through the books complete daily.

The necessary books used in this department vary much according to the system adopted, and will be treated of in full with diagrams in later chapters.

THE DISCOUNT CLERK.

The discount clerk, the next to be considered, is one of the most important employees in the bank. Part of the business of a bank is to loan money, and from this is derived the chief source of its income, and the care of the records of these loans falls to the discount clerk.

He should be a man above reproach as to character, and skillful, accurate and rapid in his work. Coming frequently in contact with the customers he should exercise judgment, extreme courtesy, tact and great promptness. The confidential nature of his duties are such that he should always avoid mentioning anything regarding them outside the bank or to any one but those entitled to know.

The discount clerk should be adept in figuring time and interest, for although there are excellent interest tables in use in almost every bank, yet the ability to figure it quickly without the trouble of turning to the tables is a qualification that should not be overlooked.

He has much to do with both tellers, as the proceeds of some discounts are paid in cash to the borrower upon a Cashier's check and some are placed to the credit of the borrower's account in the bank. Of course the Cashier's check is only issued by the Cashier, but generally the discount clerk has to figure out the proceeds.

It is customary for the discount clerk to send a notice to the makers of the various notes made payable at bank a week or ten days before they are due. This is not obligatory on the part of the bank, but is the general custom and is done out of courtesy. The customary form of such notice is as follows:

MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK,  
CENTRE CITY.

Mr. ....

Your note for \$..... will be due at this bank ..... 1899.

At least once a month the discount clerk should balance his notes, both time and demand. He should check them off with his discount register and tickler, and take the aggregate of all on hand, which should agree with his notes discounted account and demand loan account on the general ledger.

Some discount registers are so made that it is a very simple and easy matter to prove the notes at any time. A full description of this kind will be given in the chapter on books and records. The customary books for the discount desk are the discount register, the note tickler, and the offering book, a full description of which, with diagrams, will be given in later chapters. The notes, after being entered properly in the discount register, should be filed away in a large pocket-book, according to maturity date. Some banks have two pocket-books, one divided monthly and the other daily, which is found very convenient where much paper is handled.

COLLECTION CLERK AND MESSENGER.

The collection clerk and messenger are the next important employees to be considered. The collection clerk takes charge of the various drafts, bills of exchange and notes placed in the bank for collection. These sometimes come from the bank's customers and sometimes from other banks out of town.

The care necessary for the proper handling of the various classes of collection paper requires a man of excellent capacity, with a clear head, good judgment, pleasing manners and much tact. He should also be a good clear penman, and last, but not least, he should be a man of the highest character.

The collection clerk should familiarize himself with the laws and customs regarding notes and bills of exchange, and should study the books devoted to this subject and read regularly the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

Collections coming into his hands from depositors of the bank should be entered (short) in memorandum on the deposit side in their pass books. This is the bank's receipt for the collection paper. When any of the items have been collected they should be then extended in the credit or deposit column in the pass books. Some depositors, who send many collections through the bank, have a special pass book for that purpose.

Collections are divided into two classes—domestic, or those upon parties in the city in which the bank is located, and foreign, or those upon parties in other towns.

In most banks the records of these two classes are kept in the same books, but in some, especially in cities where the business is heavy, it is necessary to separate them.

The principal books in use in this department are the collection register, the collection tickler, the foreign collection book, and the foreign credit book. A full description of these, with diagrams, will be given in later chapters.

The messenger is so intimately connected with the collection clerk that they must be considered together. He should be above reproach, and should have the qualifications of accuracy, promptness, carefulness, courtesy, and ability and should be well posted in banking rules regarding collections, for many questions often arise when presenting paper for collection, and he should know how to act to protect the interests of the bank. To a young man desirous of becoming familiar with the banking business, the position of messenger offers especially fine opportunities.

The messenger's duties are to take out collections (drafts, notes, and bills of exchange), and present them to the parties who are to pay or accept them. Many times these parties are difficult to find, or are careless about preparing for payment, in which cases it is customary to leave a notice.

The messenger should make every effort to find the proper party and make presentation personally, and obtain direct answers if payment or acceptance is refused, in fact it is a good plan to have them state their reasons for refusing in their own handwriting, in pencil, on the back of the paper, if possible. Of course in the case of sight or demand paper settlement must be made on the day presented, before the close of banking hours.

It is never advisable to leave the draft or paper at the drawee's office, in case of his absence. Some banks have a strict rule regarding this, and they are wise. In such cases leave the notice but not the paper.

The following is a usual form of notice mentioned :

MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK,  
CENTRE CITY.

....., 189

Please call and ..... draft or note for \$..... before 3 P.M. to-day.

.....  
*Messenger.*

The blank space before the word draft is to be filled in with the word pay or accept as the case may require, and either the word draft or note may be scratched off, leaving the other as the paper intended to be mentioned.

The only book which the messenger keeps is a scratcher in which are listed the items which he takes out. This is simply a plain journal ruled book of which no special description is necessary, but the leaving of this list in the bank before going out is a very important thing and should never be neglected.

In a bank in a large city, not long ago, the messenger went out to make collections with about \$3,000 worth of paper. A considerable portion he collected in currency and never returned. That bank had great difficulty in determining what he took out, because he left no list behind.

In small towns, and in small banks, sometimes the janitor acts as messenger, but it is generally better, I think, to have one of the clerks perform these duties. In the large cities many banks have several messengers.

In clearing-house cities it is customary for the banks to have a clearing-house clerk, sometimes called the settling clerk. This is often one of the first positions a young man is given, and to be able to fill it satisfactorily he must, as with others, first of all be a man of high character, and must possess the qualifications of promptness, rapidity in figuring, accuracy, care, and neatness.

It is his duty, in large banks with assistants, to collect each day the checks on other clearing-house banks in the same city that come into the bank, stamp them with the bank number, distribute them in tills according to their respective banks, list them on properly-prepared slips, enter the total of these slips on a properly-prepared sheet opposite their respective bank numbers and names, and take them to the clearing-house and make the proper exchanges with the clearing-house clerks from the other banks. He generally takes a messenger with him for safety and to assist him.



A full description of the method employed, with diagrams of the various blanks, will be given in a later chapter.

In our new bank great care was exercised in selecting the men for the various positions, and until the business of the bank warranted a larger force it was thought best to combine several of the desks under one man. Thus the general ledger book-keeper could take charge of the individual ledger, the discount clerk could take charge of the collections, and the messenger could act as clearing house clerk, assist in writing up pass books, filing away checks, etc., and be very useful as a general assistant. The Cashier could of course take charge of the correspondence and to facilitate this and at the same time not run into unnecessary expense, a stenographer and typewriter was engaged to come in every afternoon and receive the dictation of letters, which were quickly written and returned to the Cashier for his signature, and when a letter-press copy of them was taken they were ready for mailing.

This plan of taking a letter-press copy of all correspondence is often neglected in banks, and yet it is exceedingly important. Many times a law suit has come to naught because of the inability to prove certain matters in the correspondence, and questions and misunderstandings often arise which could easily have been settled had a press copy of the correspondence been taken.

In some very well-managed banks that I have seen it is an excellent custom to use carbon paper between the writing paper when writing all kinds of the usual correspondence, letters of transmittal of items for collection or for credit, letters enclosing remittances, etc. In these cases the letter sheets are made of moderately thin linen paper and are double fold, perforated at the fold, the blank forms being printed on each sheet, so that when the carbon paper is placed between the folds and the letter written with a pen, not too fine pointed and a little stiff, a complete reproduction of the letter is made upon the second sheet. The original is filed and the copy sent with the inclosures. The best pen I have found for that purpose is "The Neutric Chemical Co.'s Manifold Pen," being prepared with the proper stiffness and point. It is generally one of the duties of the messenger, or general assistant, to collect the letters after the close of the bank and take the press copies.

#### SELECTION OF THE LEGAL ADVISER.

One exceedingly important officer of a bank is the attorney. Questions regarding the legal rights and duties of the bank and its customers in such matters, for instance, as the management of business paper, transfers of shares of stock, the holding and disposing of real estate, besides numerous others, will continually arise, and the bank that has its own attorney, who can be called upon at any time for a legal opinion and who will take a personal interest in serving the bank, is placed at a great advantage.

Select a good, clear-headed man, well versed in the law. If possible to secure him as a stockholder and director so much the better, as he will naturally feel a stronger interest in the affairs of the institution. It is wise to pay him a yearly salary wherever possible, or have an understanding with him that all the legal business of the bank is to be given to him, he to be allowed to charge the customary fee. But I think the salary plan will be found to be the best. By securing such a man the bank is always in a position to act safely in legal matters, and a live bank attorney, if not already posted, will soon become expert on banking law.

The directors of our new bank, after thoroughly discussing the matter, decided to appoint Mr. Billings, one of their number, attorney for the bank. This was done and Mr. Billings, being much interested in the welfare of the bank, agreed to give his services for a nominal sum until the bank had become thoroughly established.

BANK EXAMINER.

(To be continued.)

## THE NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW.

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The present United States Bankruptcy Law was approved on July 1, 1898, and became fully operative four months later. The effect of its enactment was to suspend the "insolvency laws" of the various States and inaugurate a uniform system for the distribution of insolvent estates, and also to provide a means by which debtors might obtain a discharge which should be effective throughout the United States. The direct and indirect effects of this law will be felt by all classes in the community, and it is perhaps of a special interest to bankers to consider its most striking features.

The law provides for both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy. Under it creditors may force the insolvent debtor to turn out all his property for the equal benefit of all, and under it the insolvent debtor may of his own motion surrender his property for equal distribution and obtain a discharge from his debts.

In order to force a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy, two things must, generally speaking, be established; first, that the debtor is insolvent, and, second, that he has within four months committed an act of bankruptcy. In its definition of insolvency the new law differs materially from the former law. In construing the former law the courts held that insolvency was "an inability to pay debts as they matured and became due and payable in the ordinary course of business." The present statute, on the contrary, expressly provides that a person is insolvent "whenever the aggregate of his property exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed or removed \* \* \* with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." Under the old law it was sufficient to prove that the debtor did not pay his debts as they matured; under the new law it must appear that the total assets are less than the total liabilities. The new definition puts a heavy burden on the creditor, perhaps, but it protects the debtor from oppression.

The creditors must in addition show that the debtor has within four months either conveyed, concealed or removed a part of his property with intent to hinder or defraud his creditors; or transferred some part of his property to a creditor with intent to prefer him; or suffered a creditor to obtain a preference by legal proceedings, without vacating such preference at least five days before the sale; or made a general assignment; or admitted in writing his insolvency or willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt. So long as the debtor avoids the commission of these five acts of bankruptcy, he may keep control of his property and his creditors are powerless.

If three creditors whose claims amount to at least \$500 are prepared to establish the debtor's insolvency and the commission of an act of bankruptcy, they may file a petition in the proper district court of the United States and bring the debtor into court by service of the petition and subpoena upon him. Suits against the bankrupt may then be stayed, and if upon hearing the allegations of the petition are proved, the debtor will be adjudged a bankrupt.

This adjudication may often be delayed and it may become important that the debtor's property should be impounded to prevent its removal, waste or dissipation. To bring this about the creditor must give a bond to indemnify the debtor for any damages he may suffer by the seizure in case he be not adjudged bankrupt, and if this is given and if the judge is satisfied that the debtor is causing his property to deteriorate, the judge will issue a warrant to the marshal to seize it. The debtor may, however, regain control by giving a bond on his part.

If the debtor is adjudged a bankrupt, the case is referred to a referee who in all except the most important matters supervises the administration and distribution of the estate. A meeting of creditors is immediately called at which one or three trustees are appointed (subject to approval) by vote of a majority, both in number and amount of claims, of all the creditors present whose claims have been allowed, or if no appointment is made by the creditors, a trustee is appointed by the referee. In this trustee is vested all the property of the debtor, and under the supervision of the referee and the judge he collects and distributes the estate.

The effect of the adjudication and the election of the trustee are far reaching and to some extent retroactive. Not only is the trustee vested with title to all the property of the bankrupt, including title deeds, patents, copyrights, and trademarks, powers and rights of action, but he is also empowered to avoid any prior transfers of property which could have been avoided by a creditor. He is empowered, moreover, to avoid preferential transfers and liens made or obtained within four months. All judgment liens, attachment and other liens, obtained by legal proceedings begun within four months are *ipso facto* dissolved by the adjudication if the debtor was then insolvent, and the property passes to the trustee free of the lien. Again, the trustee may at his option avoid any transfer made by the debtor within four months if the effect of such transfer would be to enable the transferee to recover a greater percentage than other creditors and if such transferee had reasonable cause to believe that a preference was intended. These provisions are of the utmost importance as tending to prevent frauds upon the law by prior preferences and as tending to bring about that absolutely equal distribution of insolvent estates which should be the aim of bankruptcy laws, and it is unfortunate that in case of preferential transfers the burden is put upon the trustee to prove that the preferred creditor had reason to know that he was being preferred. This burden it will often be difficult to sustain and the purpose of the law will often be defeated by lack of proof.

After the appointment of the trustee, the success of the administration and the size of the dividend depend largely upon the care and skill of the trustee. The provisions of the law bearing upon the administration are wise. Thus, adequate provision is made for the bond of the trustee. The referee must declare and the trustee pay a dividend of five per cent. or more, if possible, within thirty days after adjudication, and after that a dividend of ten per cent. whenever there is sufficient in hand, and unnecessary delays in distribution are thus prevented. Again, the fees both of clerks, referees and trustees are very reasonable, the referee's fee being \$10 at the start and one per cent. on dividends paid, and those of trustees being \$5 at the start and a commission of not more than three per cent. on the first \$5,000, two per cent. on the second \$5,000 and one per cent. on the balance; and thus one of the greatest evils of the former law, depletion of the estate by fees, is avoided. But under the best possible law, no estate will be well administered by a poor trustee, and with the provisions allowing creditors to elect the trustee, it seems clear that if the administration of estates under this law proves to be bad it will be due to the carelessness of the creditors.

Claims must be proved by affidavit and original notes and other writings must be filed. Creditors who have received a preference with knowledge that a preference was intended can receive no dividend unless they surrender their preferences, and creditors who are otherwise secured can prove only for the excess of their debts above their security. Claims for wages within three months, not to exceed \$300, are preferred and also such other claims as are preferred by the laws of the State or the United States.

Compositions are carefully provided for and the method is much more simple than under the former law. If a majority of all the creditors holding a majority in amount of the claims against the bankrupt accept in writing his offer of settlement,

and if the amount of money required by the terms of settlement be paid into court, a hearing is had and the judge confirms the composition if satisfied that it is for the best interest of the creditors and made in good faith and that the bankrupt has not been guilty of any fraudulent concealment or false swearing in connection with the bankruptcy proceedings. The money is thereupon distributed and the debtor discharged.

Discharge under the new law is particularly easy to obtain. In involuntary proceedings it may be obtained by the confirmation of a composition, or if there is no composition the bankrupt may apply for discharge and the judge, after hearing objections, must grant the discharge unless the bankrupt has either been guilty of some fraud or false swearing in connection with the proceedings or has "with fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial condition and in contemplation of bankruptcy destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books of account or records from which his true condition might be ascertained." The discharge releases the bankrupt from all debts which can be proved against him, whatever may be their form, except taxes, judgments for fraud or malicious injuries, debts which the debtor has failed to insert in the schedule and liabilities for fraud or embezzlement in a fiduciary capacity.

By far the greater number of petitions filed under the new law have been petitions in voluntary bankruptcy whose primary aim is of course to procure a discharge. The debtor files a petition showing that he is insolvent and that he is willing to surrender all his property for the benefit of his creditors. He attaches full schedules of all his assets and the subsequent proceedings are substantially the same as in involuntary proceedings. The trustee may be elected by the creditors and his rights and duties are the same as in involuntary proceedings. A composition may be made and an application for discharge allowed in the same way and the distribution is governed by the same rules.

Comment upon this law is perhaps unnecessary, as the readers of this sketch will be able to determine from their own experience whether the law will work well or not. The statute itself is in some respects incomplete and in minor details somewhat contradictory, but on the whole it seems to be wisely planned and well drawn and compares very favorably with prior laws. The interests of the debtor are very carefully protected throughout and it is surely not open to criticism as being harsh or oppressive. It might well have been more comprehensive in its condemnation of preferences prior to the filing of the petition, as it can work no real hardship to compel a creditor to give up his preference even though he did not know it was intended as such, and no bankruptcy law can be wholly satisfactory which does not within the fixed time limit avoid all preferences.

RALPH S. ROUNDS,

*Of the New York Bar.*

**Counterfeit \$10 Treasury Note.**—Series of 1891, check letter C, plate number 18, J. Fount Tillman, Register, D. N. Morgan, Treasurer, portrait of Sheridan, small scalloped seal. This counterfeit is printed from photo-mechanical plates of fair workmanship on two pieces of paper between which silk threads have been placed. The general appearance of the note is good. The numbering is dark red instead of bright carmine. A number of bare white spots appear on face and hair of the portrait. In the genuine the heavy down strokes of the W in "Washington" lower, right, face of note are crossed at top by short horizontal lines similar to the cross line on the small letter t, while in the counterfeit these horizontal lines only show on the left side of the down strokes. The letter t in "Washington" has a curled top in the genuine while in the counterfeit the curl is missing. In lower left corner face of counterfeit a spray of the ornamental work runs into the check letter; in the genuine this spray just touches the edge of the check letter. The period after "Series of 1891" lower left face of counterfeit touches the "J" of the Register's signature, while there is a small space between the period and letter in the genuine. The lathe work on face of counterfeit is good but that on back of note is poor. The seal is good both as to color and workmanship. The green ink used on back is darker than the genuine.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### *INSOLVENCY—RECOVERY OF MONEY.*

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, November 7, 1898.

**CORN EXCHANGE BANK NATIONAL BANK vs. SOLICITORS' LOAN AND TRUST CO.**

A bank delivered to a trust company a package of \$2,000 in bills, and received therefor the trust company's check on another bank. The trust company was at the time insolvent, and closed its doors the next day, before the check was paid. The package of bills remained intact, and in this form passed into the hands of the assignee of the trust company. *Held*, that the bank was entitled to recover the bills from the assignee.

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**DEAN, J.:** The plaintiff and defendant—one as a bank, the other as a trust company—each did business in Philadelphia. The bank frequently accommodated the trust company with currency of the various denominations on request and without charge. On January 2, 1896, the trust company, by telephone, asked the bank for \$2,000 in \$2 bills, and on a favorable response sent its check for that amount on the Fourth Street National Bank, where it had funds to meet it, by messenger, who returned with the bills put up in packages. On the next day the trust company, without opening its doors, failed, and made an assignment for benefit of creditors, of which the Fourth Street National had immediate notice. The Corn Exchange Bank, the plaintiff, in the regular course of business, sent the check to the clearing-house before 8:30 on the morning of the 3d, but the Fourth Street National, because of the assignment, refused to honor it, and the Corn Exchange the same day was compelled to take it up. The \$2,000 received by the trust company remained in the package in its possession, unbroken, and was turned over to its assignee.

The plaintiff then filed this bill, setting out the foregoing facts, and prayed for an order on the assignees to restore to it the unopened package. The assignees filed demurrer, averring that no special trust relation calling for the interposition of equity was established by the foregoing facts, and, further, that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. The court below sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the bill, from which decree we have this appeal.

From the averments of the bill, which are admitted by the demurrer, and the statements in the deed of assignment, the trust company was insolvent on January 2, when the transaction took place, and it received the plaintiff's money, and the officers of the company were aware of its condition. Keeping its doors open on that day was, whether intentional or not, a representation to the public of solvency. Whether they still hoped, on that day, by some means to recuperate, and avoid closing, is not material; the fact of insolvency on that day remains. There is no difference in principle between this transaction and that of a depositor who leaves his money with the bank a few hours before it suspends. The acceptance of the money under such circumstances is a fraud upon the depositor, and if it has not

been used or mixed with the common funds, and can be identified, he can maintain replevin for it. (*Furber vs. Stephens*, 85 Fed. 17.)

In *Craigie vs. Hadley*, 99 N. Y. 131, it was held that, where drafts were deposited for collection with a bank which failed the next day, the title did not pass out of the depositor, and he could recover. It will be noticed, no question of confusion of assets arises in this case. The very package delivered by plaintiff remains in possession of the assignees.

It would be highly inequitable to pass over to the creditors of the insolvent trust company plaintiff's money because defendants acquired possession of it by a misrepresentation of solvency.

Besides, plaintiff was not a customer of the trust company, and did not adopt it as a convenient place of deposit, but, as a pure accommodation, accepted a worthless check for the \$2,000. We say worthless, because in the course of business it could not be presented until the insolvency of the drawer became known, and the fund on which it had been drawn had constructively passed to the assignee for the benefit of the creditors. The jurisdiction of equity is sustainable, because, under the facts, the package of money is impressed with a trust. The title never passed from plaintiff, because the possession was obtained by a plainly implied misrepresentation.

The decree is reversed, and it is ordered that the assignees deliver to plaintiff the package or packages of \$2 bills, amounting to \$2,000, as in plaintiff's bill averred; costs to be paid by appellees.

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#### INSOLVENT BANK—DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS.

Court of Appeals of Kansas, Southern Department, E. D., September 22, 1898.

CITIZENS' BANK OF MOUND CITY, *et al. vs. STATE, ex rel. ATTORNEY-GENERAL.*

The rule declared in *Bank vs. Branch* (45 Pac. 88, 57 Kan. 27) as governing proof of claims by and dividends to creditors of an assigned corporate estate, where such creditors held notes negotiated and guaranteed by the corporation, and secured by mortgages on real estate (that is, that dividends should be paid out upon the amount remaining unpaid upon such claims after such creditors should have exhausted their special liens), is here *held* controlling in respect to the distribution of the estate of an insolvent banking corporation in the hands of a Receiver appointed under the provisions of the State banking law. (Syllabus by the Court.)

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This was an action by the State on the relation of the Attorney-General, against the Citizens' Bank of Mound City, in which A. G. Seaman was appointed Receiver. The motion of Milton F. Mitchell for an order requiring the Receiver to pay him a dividend was granted, and the Receiver, for himself and on behalf of the unsecured creditors, brought error. For the reasons stated in the syllabus, the order was reversed.

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#### WHEN BANK OFFICER AGENT OF BANK—LIABILITY OF BANK.

Supreme Court of Arkansas, July 9, 1898.

CITY ELECTRIC STREET RAILWAY CO. *vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK.*

A bank is not liable to a company for proceeds of the company's note, made payable to one who was President of the bank and an officer of the company, though in negotiating it he used the bank's name, and though he deposited the proceeds in the bank, the deposit having been made to his own credit, and having been drawn out by him.

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MCCAIN, *Special Judge*: This is an appeal from the Pulaski chancery court. Two suits were consolidated in the court below. One of these was a suit brought by Nick Kupferle, as trustee, on an account which H. G. Allis had, or claimed to

have, against the Electric Street Railway Company, and which he had assigned to Kupferle as collateral security for his indebtedness to the First National Bank of Little Rock. The amount claimed in this suit was \$157,500.

The other suit was an action brought by the Receiver of said bank against the same defendant for an amount claimed to be due on several overdrafts and promissory notes, aggregating a little over \$110,000.

The street-car company, by answer filed in each case, disputed the correctness of the claims sued on, denied any liability on either claim, averred that the Receiver was not the holder or owner of certain of the notes embraced in his suit, and by way of counterclaim asked for judgment over against the Receiver for the proceeds of certain notes alleged to have been negotiated by the bank for the street-car company. The chancellor appointed a master to state an account between the parties, and on the coming in of the master's report the Receiver was awarded a decree against the street-car company for \$106,850.26. Both parties appealed.

1. We conclude that the street-car company has no right to complain of the chancellor for refusing to give judgment over against the Receiver on the counterclaim. The contention of counsel on this point is plausible, but underlying it there is the fallacy that in negotiating the notes in question the action of Allis was the action of the bank. Allis was President of the bank, it is true; but he was also payee of the notes, and he was personally interested in their negotiation. This of itself made him a stranger to the bank, so far as the handling of these notes was concerned.

An agent cannot prostitute the name of his principal to the service of his own personal ends, and this rule applies with full force to the official of a corporation in making use of the corporate name. (*Surety Co. vs. Pauly*, 170 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 552; 1 Mor. Corp. § 517.)

Not only so, but it was held by this court in *Grow vs. Cockerill* (83 Ark. 418, 39 S. W. 60), that a National bank cannot engage in the brokerage business. It follows that officers of the bank had no authority to negotiate notes which did not belong to the bank.

But it is said that the bank got the proceeds of the notes when they were discounted, and that for this reason the bank ought to account for the amount received. It is true that Allis deposited the proceeds of the notes in the bank, or—which is the same thing—he had the amount passed to the credit of the bank by its metropolitan correspondents, to whom he remitted the proceeds.

To deposit money in bank is the same, in legal effect, as to place an amount, with its approval, to its credit in another bank. But the bank did not in this case get the proceeds of these notes, because Allis deposited the same to his own credit. It is no answer to this to say that he ought not to have done this, or that the bank ought not to have allowed him to do this. When you go to deposit money in bank, it must be a very extraordinary case in which the bank can challenge your right to say whether the deposit offered shall go to your credit, or to that of some one else.

As Allis in this case had unlawfully used the name of the bank in procuring the money on the notes, the bank official making the entry might well have refused to credit Allis with the deposit, and might have placed it to the credit of the bills payable, or re-discounts; but we are not satisfied that there was anything in the circumstances of the case to require the bank to credit the amount to the street car company, over the objection of Allis, or without his direction.

It is said that the bank knew that this paper in Allis' hands was accommodation paper. We are not certain that the bank did know this; but, if it did, that was the most satisfactory evidence that the street car company intended him to have the money.

If you intrust a friend with your negotiable note, either for his accommodation

or your own, you would hardly be allowed to complain that some one had discounted the paper for your friend, and allowed him to have the proceeds.

But, even conceding this, counsel say it was wrong for the bank to allow Allis to check out the money without Brown also signing the checks, as the latter was a joint payee with Allis in some of the notes.

This is a matter of which it would seem that Brown alone could complain, but we may be sure that Allis did not get any money on a note payable to Allis and G. R. Brown without Brown's signature to the note, and an inspection of the notes filed show that they bear Brown's indorsement. This indorsement puts an end to any further demand for Brown's signature.

We need not discuss what are the duties, if any, of a bank, when it finds a trustee depositing trust funds and checking them out in his own name. We do not think the street-car company have made a case calling for the determination of that question. It is a circumstance not to be overlooked, in this connection, that all these transactions took place long before either one of the corporations ceased to do business, and renewal notes were given by the street-car company after they knew, or had an opportunity to know, what had been done with the proceeds of the original notes.

What we have said disposes of the contention that the street-car company is entitled to judgment against the Receiver on the counterclaim. If we are wrong in our conclusion on this point, however, it would not follow that the street-car company should have the affirmative relief claimed, since the chancellor allowed the street-car company a credit for the amount claimed on the account sued on by Nick Kupferle as trustee; and, if the claim of Nick Kupferle were found to be just, then a credit on this is all that the street-car company could ask.

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*NATIONAL BANK—LIQUIDATION—CONTINUATION OF CORPORATE  
EXISTENCE.*

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, November 1, 1898.

PRITCHARD vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MANITOWOC.

A National bank which has gone into liquidation continues to exist as a body corporate capable of suing and being sued, until its affairs are completely settled.

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This was an appeal from an order setting aside the service of the summons on the defendant.

CASSODAY, *C. J.*: It appears from the record that the defendant was duly organized as a banking corporation in 1865, under the National Banking Act, and continued doing a general banking business at Manitowoc for twenty years next thereafter; that thereupon, as provided by law, it procured an extension of its corporate existence for twenty years, or until 1907, unless sooner terminated, as provided by law; that it continued its general banking business at that place until January 2, 1892; that the date of the last election of its directors occurred January 13, 1891; that the last election of officers occurred on the same day, at which time five persons named were elected directors, and one of them was thereupon elected President, another Vice-President, another Cashier, and another Assistant Cashier of the defendant; that since such elections the defendant had held no election whatsoever of directors or officers; that at the time of such election the plaintiff and such directors were stockholders of the defendant; that December 26, 1891, there was a meeting of the stockholders, at which the plaintiff and such directors attended, all participating in the proceedings had; that, among other things, such stockholders adopted resolutions to the effect that, in the opinion of the stockholders, it was deemed best to place the bank in voluntary liquidation; that the bank should cease to do a gen-



eral banking business, and go into voluntary liquidation, as soon as practicable ; that the board of directors were thereby instructed to cause a notice of the fact to be certified to the Comptroller of the Currency, and also cause publication thereof to be made for two months in a newspaper in the city of New York, and also in the city of Manitowoc, according to law ; that the association was closing up its affairs, and notifying the holders of its notes and other creditors to present their claims against the bank for payment, and that other steps be taken towards winding up its affairs ; that the minutes of the stockholders' meeting were read and passed by the stockholders ; that notices were published accordingly ; that the bank had gone into voluntary liquidation, and requested all holders of notes of the bank and other creditors to present their claims for payment ; that the stockholders who adopted such resolutions owned more than two-thirds of the stock ; that the officers of the bank proceeded to carry the bank into liquidation, and close up its affairs ; that the bank then provided for the payment of all its liabilities in the manner stated ; that persons owning all of the stock, except twenty shares thereof, including the plaintiff, procured the incorporation of another banking association, named the "State Bank of Manitowoc," January 2, 1892, which took all the assets and assumed all the liabilities of the defendant, and the defendant thereupon transferred and turned over all its assets to the said State Bank in consideration of the assumption by the latter of the former's liabilities ; that since January 2, 1892, the Comptroller of the Currency had neither exercised, nor caused to be exercised, any supervision over the defendant or its affairs, had required no report to be made to him or to be filed in his office showing the condition of the defendant, as provided by Section 5211, Rev. St. U. S., nor had the defendant, since that time, been examined as required by Section 5240, *Id.*, nor required directors or other officers to file their oaths of office, but during that time the Comptroller had annually issued a volume containing a report of the condition of each National bank in the United States which was at the time of such publication a going concern, but which omitted all mention of the defendant ; that during each of such years the Comptroller had issued a volume called his "Annual Report," in which he reported the defendant as having gone into liquidation December 26, 1891 ; that since January 2, 1892, the defendant has owned no property whatsoever, has transacted no business of any kind, has maintained no organization, and has held no meeting of stockholders or directors ; that May 9, 1898, this action was commenced by the service of a summons upon John W. Barnes, who was elected a director and Vice-President of the defendant, January 13, 1891 ; that thereupon said John W. Barnes intervened for the purpose of moving the court, upon the facts stated, to set aside the service of the summons herein, and hold such service to be null and void, with costs of the motion. Whereupon, and after hearing the respective parties, the court ordered that the motion of the intervener, Barnes, be, and it was thereby, granted ; that the service of the summons be, and was thereby, set aside, and held and declared to be null and void. From that order the plaintiff brings this appeal.

The only question presented is whether the defendant bank was dissolved by going into liquidation as stated. The Federal question thus presented must be determined by the Federal adjudications applicable. The Supreme Court of the United States has expressly held that "a National bank in voluntary liquidation, under Section 5220 of the Revised Statutes, is not thereby dissolved as a corporation, but may sue and be sued by name for the purpose of winding up its business." (*National Bank vs. Insurance Co.* 104 U. S. 55.)

Referring to Sections 5136, 5220-5224, Rev. St. U. S., Mr. Justice Matthews, speaking for the whole court in that case, said that "it is to be observed that the sections under which the proceedings took place, which, it is claimed, put an end to the corporate existence of the bank, do not refer, in terms, to a dissolution of the

corporation, and there is nothing in the language which suggests it, in the technical sense in which it is used here as a defense. \* \* \* The very purpose of the liquidation provided for is to pay the debts of the corporation, that the remainder of the assets, being reduced to money, may be distributed among the stockholders. That distribution cannot take place, with any show of justice, and according to the intent of the law, until all liabilities to creditors have been honestly met and paid. If there are claims made which the directors of the association are not willing to acknowledge as just debts, there is nothing in the statute which is inconsistent with the right of the claimant to obtain a judicial determination of the controversy by process against the association, nor with that of the association to collect by suit debts due to it.

It is clearly, we think, the intention of the law that it should continue to exist as a person in law, capable of suing and being sued, until its affairs and business are completely settled. (104 U. S. 73, 74.) That language is quoted approvingly in a recent case by Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the whole court. (*Chemical Nat. Bank of Chicago vs. Hartford Deposit Co.* 161 U. S. 8, 9, 16 Sup. Ct. 439.) In *Combes vs. Keyes* (89 Wis. 297, 62 N. W. 89), there had been a complete failure to exercise the franchises of the corporation for twenty-six years, and the Acts of the Legislature had impliedly accepted the surrender of the same; and so it was held that the corporation was dissolved, and ceased to exist, but there was nothing said in the opinion in that case not in harmony with the decisions of the Federal court mentioned. This is apparent from the subsequent cases in this court. (*Attorney-General vs. Superior and St. C. R. Co.* 93 Wis. 604, 67 N. W. 1138; *Wright vs. Light Co.* 95 Wis. 29, 38, 69 N. W. 791.)

We must hold that the corporation was not dissolved by going into liquidation. The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

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**NATIONAL BANK—ATTEMPT TO EVADE LAWS—ESTOPPEL.**

Supreme Court of Nebraska, November 3, 1898.

GADSEN vs. THRUSH.

A National bank took as security for a debt, partly pre-existent and partly created at the time, a real estate mortgage, naming an individual, an officer of the bank, as mortgagee. The transaction was usurious. *Held*, that, having given the transaction the form of one with an individual, for the purpose of evading the liabilities peculiar to National banks, the bank could not be heard to assert its true nature, for the purpose of evading the liabilities attaching to individuals, and of claiming the privileges of National banks. (Syllabus by the court.)

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IRVINE, C. This was an action by Gadsen to foreclose a mortgage made to him by George Thrush and wife. No controversy exists between the parties named. Certain other parties claimed liens on the mortgaged premises. The decree establishes a first lien in favor of the First National Bank of Schuyler, a second in favor of the Schuyler National Bank, a third in favor of the Nebraska State Bank, and a fourth in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff and Thrush appeal; the plaintiff because the court awarded the First National Bank priority over him, and Thrush complaining against the allowance of any lien to the First National Bank, and also because, on a plea of usury by him interposed against the claim of the Schuyler National Bank, the court declined to permit the remedy offered by the State law, but allowed the principal of the debt with a forfeiture only of unpaid interest.

We now come to the lien of the Schuyler National Bank. Thrush was largely indebted to that bank. He obtained a further loan, and executed to the bank a note

for \$5,000 to represent the consolidated indebtedness. At the same time there was made a note for a like amount to William H. Sumner, and a mortgage to Sumner to secure the latter note. Sumner was an officer of the bank. He had no individual dealings with Thrush, and the sole purpose of the note and mortgage to him was to secure the debt to the bank. Certain payments were made on the bank's note, so that, when it came to foreclosure, the bank claimed as due only \$3,229.

To the cross petition of Sumner, in which the bank was permitted to join, Thrush pleaded usury. It was clearly shown that the transactions between Thrush and the bank were tainted with usury, and the court so found. But the view was taken that, as the transaction was, in effect, with a National bank, the remedies afforded by the Act of Congress in that behalf were exclusive, and that Thrush was not entitled to the benefit of the State laws, whereby he might set off against the principal all payments made of interest. Accordingly, there was allowed this bank its principal.

It is now firmly established that, as against a National bank, the remedies allowed by Act of Congress in case of usury are exclusive, and that payments of usurious interest may not be set off in an action for the debt.

But the case before us is complicated by the fact that the mortgage and note here in question were not made to the bank, but to an individual amenable to the State laws, who joins the bank in enforcing the security.

We have been cited to no authority on the precise question thus presented, nor, in the course of an independent investigation, necessarily somewhat cursory, have we discovered any.

We think, however, that under the circumstances the bank is in no position to assert any privilege under the Act of Congress.

The inference from the direct testimony and from the circumstances is that, if the object of procuring the note and mortgage to be executed to Sumner was not to evade the penalties of the Act of Congress with respect to usury, it was to evade the inhibition against the taking by a National bank of real-estate security for loans made at the time. Whether that inhibition applies to a case where a portion of the debt was pre-existent, we need not inquire, because it is now settled that a violation of that enactment does not afford the debtor any ground of relief; the Government alone may complain. Still, whichever motive influenced the bank, the object was to evade the burdens attaching to its position as a National bank.

It would be highly unconscionable to permit a person to give a contract a false form to evade the burdens which would follow from its true expression, and then permit him to show the truth as against the form to evade the burdens cast by a contract in the form which has been so chosen.

It is said that Thrush might certainly have recovered the penalty denounced by Congress by an independent action within the period of limitations against the bank, and that, therefore, the transaction must be regarded as one within the Act of Congress. This does not follow. One may render himself liable because of a false aspect he throws upon his transactions, and at the same time be thwarted in his effort to evade another liability, to evade which he had selected the false aspect.

The terse headnote to *Hayes vs. People* (25 N. Y. 390), illustrates the principle: "A married man, it seems, imagining himself to effect mere seduction, may blunder into bigamy."

The decree of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to ascertain the amount of money advanced to Thrush by the Schuyler National Bank, deduct therefrom all payments, whether of principal or interest, and award foreclosure for the remainder, if any, to postpone the lien of the First National Bank to that of the plaintiff, and for such further proceedings as may be necessary, and not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.

*NOTICE TO CASHIER—WHEN BANK AFFECTED BY.*

Supreme Court of Tennessee, November 2, 1898.

MERCHANTS AND PLANTERS' BANK *vs.* PENLAND.

Where the Cashier of a bank has full authority to make loans and discounts, notice to him of equities affecting a note discounted by him for the bank is notice to the bank.

WILKES, J.: This is an action to recover against defendant, Penland, two notes, for \$66.66 each. The notes were given by Penland to the Newport Development Company, and by it indorsed, and complainant claims to be an innocent holder for value of the same. Penland answered the bill, and filed a cross bill, in which he seeks to avoid the notes, and rescind the contract out of which they arose, upon the ground that they were obtained by the fraudulent representations of the bank and Development Company that the lot for which they were given was free of all incumbrance and liens; that the bank had notice of the liens held by the parties who sold to the Development Company, and took the notes subject to the equities of Penland against the Development Company.

The Court of Chancery Appeals find that the bank had notice of the lien of the Newport Real-Estate Company upon this lot, and was affected, in consequence, with all Penland's equities against that part of the lot purchased from that company, but that a portion of the lot was purchased from one Denton, and the bank did not have such notice of a lien in favor of Denton as would affect it. Hence that court canceled one note, and entered a credit on the other, and gave judgment against Penland for the balance, the idea being to release Penland from liability for so much of the lot as was bought from the Newport Company, but hold him for so much as was bought from Denton by the Development Company. Both parties have appealed, and in this court it is insisted for complainant that Penland should be held for the whole of both notes, and for defendant that he should be released from both.

Disposing of complainant's assignments first, it is insisted that the Court of Chancery Appeals erred in holding that notice to the Cashier of complainant bank was notice to the bank and the contention is that the bank would only be affected by notice to one of its discount committee or directors.

The Court of Chancery Appeals finds a fact that the Cashier of this bank was allowed full liberty, and the widest authority, to make loans and discount paper, and that the discount committee and board of directors rarely met, and did not look after the discounts, as was their duty.

Having given full authority to the Cashier to make discounts, the bank cannot be heard to say that notice to him was not notice to the bank in the discounting of notes.

*NATIONAL BANKS—CORPORATE EXISTENCE—RECEIVER'S EXPENSES.*

Supreme Court of Minnesota, November 22, 1898.

FARMERS' NATIONAL BANK OF OWATONNA *vs.* BACKUS, *et al.*

A National bank, after the expiration of the time limit of its charter, continues to exist as a person in law, capable of suing and being sued, until its affairs are completely settled.

START, C. J.: The respondent, James A. Owens, presented his verified petition to the district court of the county of Ramsey, which set forth substantially these facts:

The petitioner, on July 3, 1895, was by order of the court appointed receiver in this action of the real estate which was the subject-matter thereof (conceded on the argument to be an apartment house on which the plaintiff had a second mortgage),

and has continued to act as such receiver to the present time. That the defendant, Hiram Backus, appealed from the order to this court, giving to the plaintiff in this action a bond conditioned for the payment to it of such loss as it might sustain on account of the appeal. Pending the appeal, the income of the property was paid to the defendant. This court affirmed the order appointing the receiver. (64 Minn. 43, 66 N. W. 5.) Thereupon the plaintiff, by action on the bond, recovered from the defendant and his sureties the sum of \$3,100, as damages for the income from the property it was unable to collect through the receiver pending the appeal.

The petition further sets forth the amount of respondent's costs and expenses necessarily incurred in the receivership, the amount of his reasonable fees for services, the amount of money which actually came to his hands as receiver from the property, which was less than his expenses and fees; also, that the property had been lost by foreclosure of a prior lien, that the defendant was insolvent, and that the receiver had no money or funds in his hands to pay the balance of the fees and expenses.

The prayer of the petition was that the plaintiff be required to pay such balance. The district court made its order requiring the plaintiff to show cause why the prayer of the petitioner should not be granted. The plaintiff appeared specially in response to the order, filed an affidavit to the effect that its charter expired by limitation, and it went into voluntary liquidation, which had been consummated, and that at the date of the order its corporate existence had ceased, and on this ground objected to the jurisdiction of the court. The objection was overruled, and it then appeared generally; but, so far as appears from the record, it did not put in issue any of the facts of the petition, or question the propriety, necessity, or reasonableness of the respondent's charges for expenses and fees as receiver.

The trial court found, among other facts, that the respondent was appointed receiver at the request of and for the benefit of the plaintiff, and adjudged the balance due to the respondent for such expenses and fees to be \$578.52, and ordered that the plaintiff pay this amount to the receiver. The plaintiff appealed from this order.

The appellant here insists on two propositions only:

1. That the trial court erred in overruling the objection to its jurisdiction. It is urged that after the expiration of the appellant's charter, it had passed through liquidation, "the law determined its status,—it was dead. How could an order of the district court galvanize it into life?" It seems to have done so, for since the making of the order the appellant has been very much alive. It appealed to this court, gave a supersedeas bond, and presented a vigorous and able argument on another question involved in this appeal.

A National bank, after the expiration of the time limit of its charter, continues to exist as a person in law, capable of suing and being sued, until its affairs and business are completely settled. (22 Stat. 162, § 7; *National Bank vs. Insurance Co.* 104 U. S. 54.)

The appellant commenced this action, and the business then undertaken by it has not as yet been fully completed. The objection to the jurisdiction of the court was properly overruled.

2. The second proposition is that, a receiver being an officer of the court, subject to its control, and not to that of the party asking for his appointment, his fees and expenses are chargeable solely against the fund which comes into his hands as receiver. The parties to the action are not personally liable therefor, unless they have given a bond or other contract to pay them as a condition of the appointment or continuance of the receiver.

This may be conceded to be correct as a general rule, but there are cases where the court will, if the fund in court be insufficient to give the receiver reasonable compensation and indemnity, require the parties at whose instance he is placed in pos-

session of the property to pay him. *Johnson vs. Garrett*, 23 Minn. 565; *Knickerbocker vs. Mining Co.* 67 Ill. App. 298; High, Rec. § 796.)

The special facts of this case fully justify the order of the trial court.

*INCREASE OF CAPITAL STOCK—RESCISSION OF CONTRACT OF SUBSCRIBERS.*

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, October 3, 1898.

SCOTT vs. LATIMER.

The provision of Sec. 5142, Rev. Stat. U. S., to the effect that no increase of capital stock shall be valid until the whole amount thereof is paid in, does not create a condition, express or implied, that shares subscribed and paid for in full are not valid unless the entire amount of the proposed increase is subscribed and paid for in full.

Where for a long time the person has actually sustained the relation of stockholder to a National bank, he will not be permitted to escape the statutory liability by rescinding his subscription after the appointment of a Receiver for the bank, although his subscription was obtained under such circumstances that he would be entitled to rescind as between him and the bank.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.

This action was brought in the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Missouri, by W. A. Latimer, Receiver of the First National Bank of Sedalia, to recover from George H. Scott an assessment made by the Comptroller of the Currency upon the capital stock of the named bank, it being claimed that Scott owned and held fifty shares of the stock.

In the answer filed it was admitted that the bank had been duly incorporated in 1865; that it closed its doors and was put in liquidation in May, 1894, the plaintiff, Latimer, being appointed Receiver on May 10, 1894; that the Comptroller had determined that it was necessary to enforce the individual liability of the stockholders in favor of the creditors, and to that end had made an assessment of seventy-five per cent. upon the stock held in the bank, and that payment thereof had been demanded of the defendant, Scott.

As matters of defense it was averred in the answer that on September 6, 1890, the bank, by a vote of the owners of two-thirds of the capital stock, voted to increase the capital from \$100,000 to \$250,000; that said bank notified the Comptroller that the whole amount of said increase had been paid in, and on January 17, 1891, the Comptroller, basing his action wholly upon the notification from the bank, issued his certificate, stating that the amount of the increase was \$150,000, and that the same was paid in, and was approved by him as Comptroller.

It is further averred that in September, 1890, the officers of the bank represented to the defendant, Scott, that the bank proposed to increase its capital stock by the addition thereto of \$150,000; that this increase was made desirable on account of the increasing and flourishing condition of the business of the bank, which was earning large dividends, and had a surplus then earned which would make the shares, including the proposed increase, worth \$108 per share; that, relying upon these representations, the defendant subscribed for fifty shares of the proposed increase, and in October, 1890, deposited in the bank the sum of \$5,400, it being then and there the understanding between the defendant and the bank that said sum, so deposited, was to be held by the bank, and applied in payment of defendant's subscription for fifty shares, when all the proposed increase was subscribed and paid for; that about October 25, 1890, the bank, with intent to deceive defendant, falsely represented that the whole amount of the proposed increase of the capital stock had been subscribed and paid in, and thereupon issued to defendant a certificate for the fifty shares of stock by him subscribed for; that defendant, relying upon these representations, accepted the

certificate, and held and claimed the same as owner until after the closing of the bank, and in the years 1891 and 1892 received and retained alleged dividends amounting to eighteen per cent. ; that as a matter of fact in September, 1890, and for many months prior thereto and ever afterwards, the bank was insolvent, its liabilities exceeding its assets ; that only about two-thirds of the proposed increase of the capital stock was ever paid in ; that the officers of the bank made false entries on the books for the purpose of showing an apparent surplus, and declared a dividend thereon, turning in the same in pretended payment of a large part of said increased stock ; that the whole transaction was a sham and fraud, of which the defendant had no knowledge until after the bank closed its doors in May, 1894 ; that the books of the bank were so kept that the defendant could not, by the utmost diligence, ascertain the true condition of the bank ; and that, as soon as defendant discovered that the increase of stock was not fully paid in, he disclaimed that he was, or ever had been, a stockholder in the bank.

Upon the filing of this answer, the plaintiff, Latimer, moved for judgment in his favor on the pleadings on the ground that the answer admitted all the facts necessary to sustain his action in the first instance, and that the matters set up as a defense were insufficient to defeat the claim sued on. The court held the motion to be well taken, and gave judgment accordingly, and thereupon the case was brought to this court by writ of error, it being contended by the plaintiff in error that the facts averred in the answer showed that there had not been a valid increase of the capital stock, because the whole amount of the proposed increase of \$150,000 had not been paid in ; and, further, that the facts averred in the answer entitled the defendant, upon discovery thereof, to rescind the contract of subscription on the ground of false and fraudulent representations made to him by the officers of the bank.

Before Sanborn and Thayer, Circuit Judges, and Shiras, District Judge.

SHIRAS, *District Judge* : It appears that the plaintiff in error relies upon two distinct grounds of defense to the claim asserted by the Receiver ; the one being that the plaintiff in error never was a stockholder in the bank, because the whole amount of the proposed increase of the capital stock was not in fact paid in to the bank, and the other being that the plaintiff in error is entitled to rescind the contract by which he became a purchaser of stock in the bank for two reasons : First, because his subscription was conditioned upon the payment in full of all the proposed increase of stock ; and, second, because he was induced to purchase the stock through fraudulent representations as to the pecuniary condition of the bank.

In support of the first defense it is contended that the fifty shares of stock subscribed for by the plaintiff in error were not valid shares, because some of the shares subscribed for by other parties were not in fact paid for. This contention is based upon the provisions of Section 5142, Rev. St., which are as follows :

"Any association formed under this title may, by its articles of association, provide for an increase of its capital from time to time, as may be deemed expedient, subject to the limitations of this title. But the maximum of such increase to be provided in the articles of association shall be determined by the Comptroller of the Currency ; and no increase of capital shall be valid until the whole amount of such increase is paid in, and notice thereof has been transmitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, and his certificate obtained specifying the amount of such increase of capital stock, with his approval thereof, and that it has been duly paid in as part of the capital of such association."

The theory of the plaintiff in error is that under the provisions of this section no share of a proposed increase of the capital stock can become a valid share unless all the shares of the proposed increase are subscribed for and are paid up in full, or, in other words, if the shareholders should determine, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, to increase the capital stock by the sum of \$100,000, or 1,000 shares

of \$100 each, and the entire number should be subscribed for, and all the shares except one should be fully paid for, and certificates should be duly issued therefor, the holders of such full-paid shares cannot be held to be stockholders, because another person has failed to pay up one share by him subscribed for.

It cannot be denied that if the words, "and no increase of capital shall be valid until the whole amount of such increase is paid in," found in Section 5142, are construed literally, support would be given to the contention of counsel for plaintiff in error; but it is an accepted and fundamental rule in the construction of statutes that the several clauses thereof are not to be viewed as separate enunciations of the legislative will, to be literally construed without reference to other parts of the Act, but, on the contrary, each each part must be construed with reference to the language and purpose of the entire Act, so as to make all parts harmonize, and conduce to the carrying out the general purpose of the statute, and a literal construction of particular clauses will not be adopted if the effect thereof would be to operate unjustly or to cause an absurd result.

\* \* \* \* \*

Under the doctrine of these cases it is clear that in construing the particular clause of Section 5142 which declares that no increase of the capital stock shall be valid until the whole amount of the increase shall have been paid in, we must regard not only the words of the special clause, but also the other provisions of the entire Act, and the effect which a given construction will have upon the admitted or undoubted purposes of the statute as a whole. Turning to Section 5140, we find it therein declared that in the original organization of National banks at least fifty per cent. of the capital stock must be paid in before the bank is authorized to commence business, the remaining fifty per cent. being payable in installments of at least ten per cent., payable at the end of each month succeeding to the date when it is authorized to commence business.

The provisions of this section make it imperative that within six months from the time when the bank begins business each share must be paid in full. If, after the original stock has been paid in, it is deemed advisable to increase the capital stock, provision is made therefor in Section 5142, as amended by Section 1 of the Act of May 1, 1886 (24 Stat. 18). If it were permitted, for the purpose of increasing the capital stock, to issue shares without requiring the same to be fully paid up, two evil results would follow. So far as the public are interested, the bank would be doing business on an apparent capital, which, in fact, it did not possess; or, in other words, the capital stock would be watered, and, so far as the holders of the original full-paid stock are concerned, the new stock, though only partly paid for, would stand on an equality with the full-paid stock, both as to voting power and right to draw dividends, which would be manifestly unjust. These are the evils intended to be prevented by enacting that, when an increase of the capital should be made, the increase should not become valid unless the whole amount thereof should be paid. The statute does not require that the proposed increase shall be subscribed by one person, or at one time, but it is permissible to have as many subscribers as there are new shares.

Let it be assumed that the stockholders of a National bank, by a two-thirds vote, should determine to add \$100,000 to the capital stock, and should obtain in a month a subscription for \$25,000—that is, for 250 shares—and the full par value thereof should be paid in, and this increase should be reported to the Comptroller, and be by him approved, and certificates should then be issued to the subscribers, would not the holders of these certificates, from that time forward, be stockholders, even though the remaining part of the voted increase never was subscribed for? Could the bank, after receiving the money for the shares, with the approval of the Comptroller, be



permitted to deny to the subscribers the rights of stockholders, simply because the full amount of the proposed increase had not been obtained.

\* \* \* \* \*

The conclusion deducible from these decisions of the Supreme Court is that in cases wherein the stockholders of a National bank decide, with the approval of the Comptroller, to increase the capital stock therein by the addition of a named amount, the clause found in Section 5142 of the Revised Statutes, to the effect that no increase shall be valid until the whole amount thereof is paid in, does not create a condition, express or implied, that shares subscribed and paid for in full are not to be held valid unless the entire amount of the proposed increase is subscribed and paid for in full.

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In thus defining the essentials to a valid increase of the capital stock of a National bank the Supreme Court, in *Delano vs. Butler*, and this court in *McFarlin vs. Bank*, make use of the words found in Section 5142, to the effect that, to be valid, the whole amount of the proposed increase must be paid; but in construing the meaning of the clause in question, thus quoted, we must follow the construction placed thereon by the Supreme Court in the subsequent cases of *Aspinwall vs. Butler*, 133 U. S. 595, 10 Sup. Ct. 417; *Bank vs. Eaton*, 141 U. S. 227, 11 Sup. Ct. 984, and *Thayer vs. Butler*, 141 U. S. 234, 11 Sup. Ct. 987, in all of which cases it was held, as already stated, that the clause in question did not import into the stock subscriptions a condition, either express or implied, to the effect that the validity of the shares that were in fact subscribed and paid for in full was dependent on the question whether the whole of the proposed increase was subscribed and paid for.

In the answer filed in this case it is averred that on September 6, 1890, the First National Bank of Sedalia, Mo., by a vote of the owners of two-thirds of the capital stock, voted to increase the capital of the bank by the addition thereto of the sum of \$150,000; that subsequently the bank notified the Comptroller that the whole amount of this increase had been paid in; that thereupon the Comptroller, on January 17, 1891, issued his certificate, stating therein that the capital of the bank was increased in the sum of \$150,000, the whole of the increase being paid in, and that the increase of the capital stock was approved.

It is also averred that the plaintiff in error, in October, 1890, subscribed for fifty shares of the proposed increase, and paid to the bank the sum of \$5,400, and received, on or about October 25, from the bank, a certificate showing him to be the owner of the fifty shares.

It is also averred that in fact only about two-thirds of the proposed increase was ever paid in, and, relying on this averment that about one third of the proposed increase had not been paid for the claim is made that the shares which were subscribed and paid for in full, and for which certificates were duly issued, cannot now be held to be valid.

If this contention is well founded, then, as already said, it follows that, if all the shares but one had been subscribed and paid for, nevertheless the holders of the certificates for the full-paid shares could not be heard to assert that they were the owners of valid shares, which would be a most unjust result. If this is the true meaning of the statute, it is made possible for parties in control of a National bank, with the approval of the Comptroller, to authorize the increase of the capital stock, to obtain subscription and payment in full for all the shares but one or two, and then, if that be desirable, to deny to the holders of these full-paid certificates any participation in the control of the bank, or, in case the bank becomes insolvent, to shield these holders of certificates from liability to creditors. Certainly, a construction of the statute having such results should not be adopted unless the statute as a whole imperatively demands it. According to the provisions of Section 5142 as

originally adopted, the articles of association of each bank might provide for an increase of the capital stock, the maximum of such increase in each case to be determined by the Comptroller, and named in the articles. By Section 1 of the Amendatory Act of May 1, 1886 (24 Stat. 18), it is declared :

“That any National banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, by the vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of such association, increase its capital stock in accordance with existing laws, to any sum approved by the said Comptroller, notwithstanding the limit fixed in its original articles of association and determined by said Comptroller.”

Under this amendatory statute, the maximum of increase is not the sum named in the articles of association, but repeated increases may be made from time to time by affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the capital stock, approved by the Comptroller. Thus, in a given instance, the vote of the requisite number of shareholders, approved by the Comptroller, to increase the capital stock by the addition of \$100,000, makes that amount for the time being the maximum of the increase that can be lawfully made, and of necessity it authorizes the addition of sums less than the maximum. Such action taken under the provisions of the Amendatory Act of 1886, means that the shareholders, by a proper vote, have authorized the increase of the capital stock by amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the maximum sum of \$100,000, and that the Comptroller has approved such action.

Each subscription for portions of such increase, when paid up in full, becomes valid and binding until the maximum is reached ; and the statute does not incorporate into such subscriptions a condition that the subscriber, paying his subscription in full, cannot become a holder of valid stock unless the maximum amount of the proposed increase is subscribed and paid for.

The action of the stockholders in voting to increase the capital stock by a given sum, though approved by the Comptroller, does not, in any sense, increase the capital stock. It authorizes an increase, but does not make it. The increase is created by the procurement of subscriptions to the capital stock, the payment of each subscription in full, and the issuance of the Comptroller's certificate under the provisions of Section 5142.

The clause providing that no increase shall be valid until the whole amount of such increase is paid in does not refer to the maximum amount of the authorized increase, but to the actual increase created by a subscription for a given number of shares. To make the subscription valid, this clause requires that it shall be paid in full, the object being to prevent the issuance of shares which are only partly paid up ; but it does not require, in order that validity may exist with respect to shares subscribed for and paid up in full, that the whole amount of the authorized increase should be subscribed and paid for. To so hold would be to rule directly contrary to the Supreme Court in *Aspinwall vs. Butler* and *Thayer vs. Butler, supra*, wherein it was held that the statute did not create a condition in each subscription to the stock, that the same should not become effectual unless the entire proposed increase was subscribed and paid in ; and it therefore follows that, if it be true that only two-thirds of the proposed increase of the capital stock was subscribed and paid for, as is claimed in the answer, that fact would not invalidate the shares subscribed and paid for in full and for which certificates were issued to and received by the subscribers and under which they exercised the privileges and received the benefits of shareholders for a period of over three years.

The remaining grounds of defense relied on by plaintiff in error are based upon the assumed right to rescind the contract of subscription to the capital stock of the bank on the ground that such subscription was procured through false representations made to plaintiff in error touching the actual pecuniary condition of the bank,

and to avoid the effect of the acceptance by the plaintiff in error of the shares of stock issued to him on the ground that it was falsely represented to him that the whole amount of the proposed increase of \$150,000 had been paid in. It will be borne in mind that this is not an action on behalf of the bank, based upon the original contract of subscription, but it is a suit wherein the creditors of the bank, represented by the Receiver, are seeking to enforce the liability which the statute imposes upon those who occupy the position of stockholders in a National bank; and the question is whether it is open to the plaintiff in error, after the bank has become insolvent, and has been put into liquidation, to disclaim liability as a stockholder after having occupied that position for nearly four years.

\* \* \* \* \*

As already stated, the answer herein filed admits that the plaintiff in error in fact became a subscriber for fifty shares of the stock in September, 1890; that he paid in to the bank the full value thereof, and received the certificate issued therefor; that he received all the dividends declared thereon; and that when the bank closed its doors and was put in liquidation, in May, 1894, he had not taken any action indicating a purpose to disclaim being a stockholder in the association. Even if the situation is such that there exists a right of rescission as against the bank, such right cannot be asserted as against the creditors. If it be true that the subscription to the stock was obtained by false representations touching the pecuniary condition of the bank, that did not make the contract absolutely void, but only voidable at the option of the subscriber; and, therefore, when the bank was put in liquidation, the corporate creditors had the right to enforce the statutory liability against all persons who were then stockholders.

\* \* \* \* \*

The liability sought to be enforced in this case is not one created by a contract existing between the corporation and the stockholders, but is one created by statute in favor of creditors, and not in favor of the corporation. It is a liability which cannot be affected, discharged, or released by any action taken by the corporation, or by the combined action or agreement of the corporation and its stockholders.

\* \* \* \* \*

In cases like the present, wherein it appears that for years a person has actually sustained the relation of a stockholder in a banking association, although under circumstances which may justify a rescission of the contract of stock subscription, as between the subscriber and the corporation, the just protection of creditors whose rights have intervened during this period requires it to be held that, as against creditors, the one who held the position of stockholder cannot escape the statutory liability by rescinding the subscription contract after the bank has been put into liquidation.

The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, affirmed.  
Sanborn, Circuit Judge, dissented.

#### AUTHORITY OF CASHIER—RATIFICATION.

Supreme Court of Minnesota, November 14, 1898.

LANDIN vs. MOOREHEAD NATIONAL BANK.

The Cashier of the defendant shipped for the plaintiff, in the name of the bank, a carload of wheat to Duluth, to be sold on account of the plaintiff. The wheat was sold, and the proceeds remitted to and received by the defendant bank. *Held*, that although the Cashier, in shipping and selling the wheat for the plaintiff in the name of the bank, acted beyond the scope of his authority, yet the bank, having received the proceeds, is bound to account for them to the plaintiff, and the fact that it has, through the mistake of its Cashier, paid over the money to another party, is no defense. (Syllabus by the Court.)

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

COLFAX, Wash., Dec. 19, 1898.

SIR:—The following is a form of receipt used in drawing funds over the counter:

No. .... COLFAX, Wash., ..... 189 .  
Received from The Second National Bank of Colfax ..... Dollars.

Does it require a stamp?

ALFRED COOLIDGE, *President*.

*Answer*.—No. The Attorney-General of the United States has held that such a receipt need not be stamped. (See *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for November, 1898, p. 810.)

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MORRISVILLE, Vt., December 21, 1898.

SIR:—Please advise us whether or not there is any legal objection to the taking by one of our directors, as a notary public, of acknowledgments to mortgages given to this bank.

H. M. RICH, *Treasurer*.

*Answer*.—It has been held that a notary who is an officer of the bank may legally protest paper belonging to the bank (*Nelson vs. First Nat. Bank*, 69 Fed. Rep. 798; 16 C. C. A.); and although he is also a stockholder in the bank (*Moreland's Assignee vs. Citizens' Savings Bank* [Ky.], 30 S. W. Rep. 19). We see no reason, therefore, why a director may not take the acknowledgment to a mortgage given to the bank.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BUFFALO, N. Y., November 27, 1898.

SIR:—How long will an indorser continue to be liable on a note payable on demand? Is there any difference where the note is secured by collateral?

CASHIER.

*Answer*.—It was formerly the rule in this State that a promissory note payable on demand is a continuing security, on which an indorser remains liable until an actual demand, and the holder is not chargeable with neglect for omitting to make such demand within any particular time (*Merritt vs. Todd*, 23 N. Y. 28; *Pardee vs. Fish*, 60 N. Y. 205; *Herrick vs. Woolverton*, 41 N. Y., 581). But this rule has been changed by the Negotiable Instruments Law (Laws of 1897, Ch. 612), which requires that presentment shall be made within a reasonable time after the issue of the note (Sec. 131); and in determining what is a reasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business (if any) with respect to such instrument, and the facts of the particular case (Sec. 4).

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

CHICAGO, Ill., November 28, 1898.

SIR:—I understand that an effort is being made to pass the Negotiable Instruments Law in this State. Will you kindly inform me if that law changes the rule of this State that the making and delivery of a check is an assignment of the deposit, which entitles the holder of the check to sue the bank?

*Answer*.—Yes. That law provides: "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts and certifies the check." (New York Act, Section 325; Commissioners' draft, Section 189.) We think that the bankers of Illinois would find this the more convenient rule in practice. The present Illinois rule results in many complications and many difficult questions arise under it. The rule adopted in the Negotiable Instruments Law is the rule which prevails in England and in the Federal courts and in many of the State courts, among them the courts of New York.

# ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.  
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 6, 1898.

SIR:—I have the honor to submit the following report:

## RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1898.

The revenues of the Government from all sources for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1898, were:

From internal revenue.....	\$170,900,641.49
From customs.....	149,575,062.35
From profits on coinage, bullion deposits, etc.....	4,756,469.71
From District of Columbia.....	3,693,282.98
From fees—consular, letters patent, and land.....	2,689,750.54
From tax on National banks.....	1,975,849.28
From sales of public lands.....	1,243,129.42
From navy pension and navy hospital funds.....	1,146,590.41
From miscellaneous.....	1,007,362.96
From sinking fund for Pacific railways.....	781,986.83
From sales of Indian lands.....	576,687.41
From customs fees, fines, penalties, etc.....	576,487.50
From payment of interest by Pacific railways.....	526,286.18
From immigrant fund.....	306,962.86
From sales of Government property.....	224,331.32
From deposits for surveying public lands.....	113,049.06
From Soldiers' Home, permanent fund.....	107,612.49
From donations.....	102,394.87
From sales of lands and buildings.....	99,273.95
From sales of ordnance material.....	94,638.59
From reimbursement for cost of water supply, District of Columbia.....	93,086.98
From deprecations on public lands.....	29,154.30
From sale of Kansas Pacific Railroad.....	6,308,000.00
From sale of Union Pacific Railroad.....	53,448,223.75
From Postal Service.....	89,012,618.55
<b>Total receipts.....</b>	<b>\$494,331,953.75</b>

The expenditures for the same period were:

For the civil establishment, including foreign intercourse, public buildings, collecting the revenues, District of Columbia, and other miscellaneous expenses.....	\$86,016,464.75
For the military establishment, including rivers and harbors, forts, arsenals, seacoast defenses, and expenses of the Spanish war.....	91,982,000.29
For the naval establishment, including construction of new vessels, machinery, armament, equipment, improvement at navy yards, and expenses of the Spanish war.....	53,823,984.80
For Indian Service.....	10,994,687.70
For pensions.....	147,452,368.61
For interest on the public debt.....	37,585,066.23
For deficiency in postal revenues.....	10,504,040.42
For Postal Service.....	89,012,618.55
<b>Total expenditures.....</b>	<b>\$532,381,201.35</b>
Showing a deficit of.....	38,047,247.60

In addition to the revenues collected during the year and the amounts received from the sale of the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific railroads, the cash in the

Treasury was increased by the following sums: From National bank fund deposited under Act of July 14, 1890, in excess of bank notes redeemed, \$6,034,510, and from the issue of four per cent. bonds in liquidation of interest accrued on refunding certificates converted during the year, \$2,340, making a total of \$6,036,850. The securities redeemed on account of the sinking fund were as follows:

Loan of July and August, 1861.....	\$11,000.00
Funded loan of 1881.....	2,650.00
Funded loan of 1881, continued at three and one-half per cent.....	100.00
Funded loan of 1891.....	21,350.00
Loan of July, 1882.....	100.00
Fractional currency and notes.....	4,900.00
Total.....	\$40,100.00

As compared with the fiscal year 1897, the receipts for 1898 increased \$63,946,785. There was an increase of \$77,594,423 in the ordinary expenditures.

#### ESTIMATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1899.

The revenues of the Government for the current fiscal year are thus estimated upon the basis of existing laws:

From customs.....	\$196,000,000.00
From internal revenue.....	270,000,000.00
From miscellaneous sources.....	20,000,000.00
From Postal Service.....	92,874,647.37
Total estimated revenues.....	\$577,874,647.37

The expenditures for the same period are estimated as follows:

For the civil establishment.....	\$93,000,000.00
For the military establishment.....	250,000,000.00
For the naval establishment.....	60,000,000.00
For the Indian Service.....	12,000,000.00
For pensions.....	141,000,000.00
For interest on the public debt.....	41,000,000.90
For Postal Service.....	92,874,647.37
Total estimated expenditures.....	\$689,874,647.37
Or a deficit of.....	112,000,000.00

#### OPERATIONS OF THE TREASURY.

The aggregate receipts for the fiscal year, under warrant, as shown by the report of the Treasurer of the United States, were \$738,549,255, and the disbursements, \$827,588,124. There was consequently a decrease of \$89,038,869 in the general Treasury balance, which stood at \$864,790,237 at the opening of the year and at \$775,751,368 at the close. Besides the ordinary revenues, there were receipts on account of the public debt which swelled the total income available in the fiscal operations of the Government to \$481,612,255, while corresponding additions to the ordinary expenditures brought the total on this side of the account up to \$543,561,104, and created a deficiency of \$61,948,849 as the net result. These figures, however, do not include any part of the loan of \$200,000,000, the proceeds of which had begun to come in before the close of the year, though none were formally covered into the Treasury until afterwards. On the side of the receipts is included the sum of \$64,751,223, realized from the sale of the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific railroads, while, on the other hand, the expenditures are increased by \$29,850,952, disbursed in the redemption of Pacific Railroad subsidy bonds.

A better view of the results of the year's fiscal operations is afforded by the changes in the assets of the Treasury. The total holdings available in this branch of the business show only the insignificant falling off from \$283,295,424 to \$275,747,808. So unusual a variance as this between the accounts of the Department and the actual

condition of the Treasury is due chiefly to the receipts from the new loan, on the one hand, and to unexpended advances to disbursing officers on the other.

In the character of the assets there was such an improvement as to constitute a substantial gain in strength. The changes were an increase in gold and in deposits with National banks, while the losses were in silver and Treasury notes. With insignificant interruptions, the free gold, which stood at \$139,867,158 at the beginning of the year, continued to increase until it reached \$181,240,388 on May 4, 1896. After this, the extraordinary expenditures caused by the war, together with the depletion of the other forms of cash, compelled the use of gold in current disbursements, and drew down the Treasury reserve, by June 18, to \$163,474,057. After that date the proceeds of the loan began to afford relief, and the reserve grew rapidly, until it reached \$245,063,795 on October 7, 1898, the highest point this fund has ever attained. Since then the necessities of the situation have required an enlarged use of the coin in disbursements, which has had the inevitable result of diminishing the holdings, though only to an insignificant extent.

By forethought and care an ample stock of notes of suitable denominations was provided to meet the demand for the annual movement of the crops, and the difficulties presented by this task in former years have been in large part avoided. Within forty days after September 1, Chicago alone was supplied with \$5,150,000 in small notes in exchange for larger denominations. In the twelve months ended September 30 last the amount of outstanding notes of the denomination of \$20 and under increased from \$861,433,826 to \$903,090,863, while the increase of the gold coin in circulation in the same period, all of course of the like denominations, amounted to \$49,551,059, making a total addition to such currency of \$136,208,096.

Although the net gold in the Treasury during the past year has exceeded the needs of the Government, having been greater, both absolutely and in proportion to other moneys, than ever before, it was found possible, up to the middle of October, to accept gold coin to the extent of over fifteen millions of dollars in exchange for notes of small denominations, which were needed to facilitate the business of the country.

The first proceeds of the popular loan of \$200,000,000 were received on June 14, and from that date forward the inflow of money from this source has been rapid and constant. The total amount received up to November 1 was \$195,444,187.

With the object of averting the possibility of financial stringency, which might have been apprehended as the result of the drain upon the currency in circulation, the payment of the interest due October 1 on the four per cent. loan of 1907 was anticipated, the maturing coupons being made payable on September 10, while the checks for the interest on the registered bonds were sent out September 20. Like anticipation was also made in the case of the interest falling due November 1. The total amount of the payments thus advanced was \$9,815,116. With like purpose, under the circular of September 3, 1898, the Pacific Railroad bonds which will fall due on January 1, 1899, amounting to \$14,004,560, were made payable, principal and interest, in full, with a rebate of one-half of one per cent. It was also directed that a large share of the proceeds of the popular loan be deposited in National banks, so that these funds, while at all times available for use, might, until needed, remain in the channels of trade. The deposits in National banks were thus increased by \$66,775,610 between May 31 and October 31.

The effect of these measures has proved in all respects satisfactory.

#### DEPOSITS OF GOLD AND SILVER BULLION.

The receipts and deposits of bullion at mints and assay offices, including re-deposits, aggregated \$215,566,261, of which \$198,740,492 was gold and \$16,825,769 silver.

The deposits of gold were greater than in any previous year of our history. In but one other year have the original deposits exceeded \$100,000,000, the exception being the fiscal year ended June 30, 1881, when they were \$180,833,102.

[Other facts in regard to coins and coinage given in the Secretary's Report will be included in the Annual Report of the Director of the Mint, which will be published in a later number of the MAGAZINE.]

#### LOANS AND CURRENCY.

The interest-bearing debt July 1, 1897, included unmatured United States bonds outstanding in the amount of \$847,320,000. No material change appeared in the debt statements in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1898, but on June 13 a circular was published inviting public subscriptions for \$200,000,000 three per cent. bonds authorized by the Act of June 13, 1898.

The public response to this invitation was not confined to any section of the country, and during the thirty days prescribed in the circular as the period for subscriptions there were received 232,224, of \$500 and less, accompanied by full payment for the bonds, and over 88,000, in sums greater than \$500, accompanied in each instance by a deposit of two per cent. of the amount subscribed. The total subscriptions of \$500 and less was \$100,444,560, and the total in greater amounts than \$500, including certain proposals guarantying the loan, amounted in the aggregate to more than \$1,400,000,000.

As provided by the circular, the allotment of bonds to subscribers of amounts greater than \$500 began immediately upon the close of the books July 14, the smallest subscriptions being first allotted until those of \$4,400 and less had been reached. There was a residue, ascertained to be about two million and a half dollars, which was allotted *pro rata* among the subscribers of \$4,500, each subscriber for that amount being awarded the sum of \$1,300.

The bonds were dated August 1, 1898, and their preparation was carried on as rapidly as possible. Soon after that date the Department began their delivery, subscribers for \$500 and less being the first to receive their bonds substantially in the order of the receipt and acceptance of their subscriptions. The delivery of the bonds to subscribers of this class was practically completed about September 1; though there are still some undelivered, owing to incomplete address or some other irregularity not yet adjusted.

Before the delivery of the bonds to subscribers of \$500 and less had been completed, the Department began the delivery on account of greater subscriptions. This has continued to the present time, and is still in progress, as subscriptions amounting to about \$200,000,000 are still in part unpaid under that provision of the circular of June 13 which provided for payments in installments of twenty per cent. at intervals of forty days.

#### FOREIGN COMMERCE.

The foreign commerce of the fiscal year 1898 in many respects has been phenomenal. The exportations of the products of both field and factory exceeded in value those of any preceding year, and the grand total of exports was the largest ever recorded. For the first time in the history of our foreign commerce, the year's exportations averaged more than \$100,000,000 per month, the total being \$1,231,482,330, against \$1,050,993,556 in 1897 and \$1,030,278,148 in 1892, no other years having reached the billion-dollar line.

Of our domestic exports, the value of agricultural products was \$353,683,570, surpassing by \$54,355,338 the highest record ever before made, that of 1892. Our manufacturers also made their highest record of exports, those for the year being \$290,697,354, against \$277,285,391 in the preceding year. For the first time also in the history of our foreign commerce, the exports of domestic manufactures were



greater than the imports of foreign manufactures, while the total exports of the year were twice as great as the total imports—a condition heretofore unknown, the trade balance in our favor being more than twice as great as that of any former year. Nearly all branches of the great manufacturing industries shared in this increase of the export trade, particularly manufactures of iron and steel, leather, boots and shoes, and mineral oils, the principal exception being cotton goods, the demand for which was somewhat reduced by the fact that certain countries formerly buying our manufactured goods are now buying our raw cotton for use in their own factories. Nearly all classes of the great agricultural products made their highest record of exports in the past year. The value of the wheat and flour exported was greater than in any preceding year, except 1893; the quantity of cotton, corn, and oats surpassed in each case that of any preceding year, and the exports of meat and dairy products, grouped under the general head of provisions, exceeded in value those of any former year.

The prices realized on nearly all important articles of export were higher than in the preceding year, the notable exceptions being cotton and mineral oils, in each of which the production in the United States, the world's chief producer of these articles, has been in the past few years phenomenally large, thus affecting the prices abroad as well as at home.

In importations, the year has shown an equally remarkable record, the value of foreign imports being less than in any previous year, with a single exception, 1880, though the population has increased fifty per cent. since that time. The total imports were but \$616,049,654 in value, against \$764,730,412 in the preceding year, and \$779,724,674 a year earlier. The falling off was almost entirely in manufactures and articles of food. The importation of woollen manufactures was \$14,823,771, against \$49,162,992 in the preceding year; of cotton goods, \$27,267,800 against \$34,429,363 in 1897; of manufactures of iron and steel, \$12,626,431, against \$16,094,557 in the preceding year; of earthenware and china, \$4,687,860, against \$9,977,297 a year earlier; of glass and glassware, \$3,782,617, against \$5,603,868 in 1897; and of tin plate, \$3,809,148, against \$5,344,638 in the preceding year.

The year's record of the imports and exports of the precious metals was also an unusual one. The importations of gold were greater than in any preceding year in the history of the country, and the exports smaller than in any year in the present decade, making the net importations the largest ever known. The total imports of gold were \$120,391,674 and the exports \$15,406,391, the net imports being \$104,985,283, the largest in any preceding year being \$97,466,127 in 1881, while on only twelve previous occasions since 1850 have the year's imports of gold equalled the exports. The importation of silver, most of which comes into the country in lead ore and base bullion, amounted to \$30,927,781 in value, against \$30,533,227 in 1897 and \$28,777,186 in 1896, while the exportations of the year amounted to \$55,105,289 in value, against \$61,946,638 in the preceding year.

This satisfactory condition of our foreign trade extended to our commerce with practically every nation and all the great geographical divisions. Our sales to Europe alone increased \$160,420,601, while our purchases from that section of the globe decreased \$124,258,514; and to all the great divisions, except Oceanica, there was an increased sale, and from all, except Asia and Oceanica, decreased imports. Our exports to Asia show a gratifying gain, those of 1898 having been \$44,707,791, against \$25,630,029 in 1896 and \$11,645,703 in 1880, thus having quadrupled since 1880, and nearly doubled within two years.

#### OPERATIONS OF THE TARIFF.

Domestic industrial enterprises are unquestionably benefited by the tariff Act of 1897, designed as well to encourage home industries as to increase the revenues of

the Government. By reason of the fact that importers, anticipating the passage of the Act referred to, provided themselves with large stocks of merchandise of every description, the tariff of 1897 can not be regarded as fairly tested by the receipts immediately following its passage. As an illustration of the correctness of this view, it may be stated that during the first four months of the fiscal year 1899 the receipts from customs (exclusive of the duty on tea provided by the war-revenue law) amounted to \$62,776,080, which is \$4,683,026 in excess of the receipts for a similar period in any year since 1892.

A reciprocal commercial agreement has been entered into between the United States and France, under the provisions of Section three of the tariff Act of 1897, and negotiations with a similar object in view are in progress with other countries.

#### MONEY SITUATION IN PUERTO RICO.

An important question, which will no doubt demand consideration in Congress at an early day, is the money situation in Puerto Rico. The existing currency of that island consists of silver coins known as pesos and centavos. The peso is of the weight and fineness of the Spanish piece of five pesetas and corresponds in both respects to the five-franc pieces of the Latin Union. Its bullion value, compared to the bullion value of the American dollar, is as 98.5 is to 100. The centavo is one-hundredth of a peso, and the smaller coins consist of pieces of twenty centavos and forty centavos, these being the exact counterparts in weight and fineness of the Spanish pieces of one and two pesetas and the French coins of one and two francs.

The Puerto Rican coins bear no fixed relation to gold, not being anywhere redeemable in the yellow coin. They were introduced into the island by Spain in 1895, and by a forced exchange were substituted for Mexican coins, which had previously constituted the principal money medium. The best estimates obtainable place the volume of this silver money now circulating in Puerto Rico at 5,500,000 pesos. The fact that the Spanish Government put the same quantity of fine silver into the peso as it did into the five-peseta Spanish coin, indicates a purpose to have maintained the two on a parity. If so, the purpose was not accomplished; the Puerto Rican coins quickly fell below the value of the coins of the home government, and have since had no established relation in value to them. The oscillation in value as related to gold coin has been constant, rising and falling, as affected by the state of exchanges between Puerto Rico and its foreign markets.

It is unnecessary here to point out at any length the general evil results upon industry and commerce of a currency medium so out of harmony with the world's money as to induce a widely fluctuating rate of exchange. It may be instructive to consider them as illustrated in Puerto Rico. Situated as that island now is, with a circulating medium void of any established relation to the world's money of commerce—gold—it is exposed, to the fullest extent, to such evil results. A brief statement of facts will make this apparent. Dating back to 1894, the peso has oscillated in its power to buy sterling bills on London, or bills on New York payable in American money, as follows: In 1894 the average value of the peso, thus tested, was 65.76 cents; in 1895 it was 60.38; in 1896 it was 63.95; in 1897 it was 60.10; in 1898 it was 58.70. But these averages by no means represent steady continuous values. Each year, each day of the year, the fluctuation has been wide. The limit of this fluctuation was, in 1894, eighteen per cent.; in 1895 twenty per cent.; in 1896, ten per cent.; in 1897, eleven per cent.

Upon this wavering, uncertain, variable money medium the commercial and industrial affairs of the island have been conducted. The determining influence upon the value of Puerto Rican money seems to have been the state of the foreign exchanges. When exports of island products—sugar, tobacco, and coffee—were large the desire to convert the value of these products, realized abroad, into the domestic

money, creating as it did an extra demand for it, caused the peso to rise, or, what is equivalent, it caused exchange to fall. From whatever point viewed, the result was the same in its effect upon the producer—he was deprived of a just realization on his product. This unfortunate currency condition was a tax upon his enterprise and industry.

Contrariwise, when foreign bills were not in supply, because crops had been marketed, and when those engaged in importing wares and merchandise from abroad were under necessity of settling their accounts in London or New York, the offering of domestic money to the bankers and brokers in exchange for drafts on London or New York increased in volume, exchange rose in price, or, what is equivalent, the peso fell in its power to exchange for the world's money.

Whichever way looked at, the effect was the same in raising to the merchant, and through him to the consumer, the cost of all products purchased abroad. The domestic and the wage-worker were the unconscious but the real victims of these financial derangements. The only beneficiaries were the speculator and exchange-dealer, for to these two it is an axiom that the wider the range of fluctuation, the greater the range for possible profits.

It is highly important that American capital should find no obstacles in its transfer to and from Puerto Rico, if the United States and the island alike are to reap the benefits which ought to flow from their proximity, their new relations, and from the enterprising commercial spirit of our people. A wide difference in the rate of exchange, occasioned by the use of a differing and unrelated currency, is a serious obstacle to the transfer of capital, as it is to legitimate industry. The obstacle can and ought to be removed.

It is therefore suggested that, at the proper time, action be taken by Congress to assimilate the currency of Puerto Rico to that of the United States, so far and so rapidly as this can be done without unduly disturbing existing conditions and contract relations in Puerto Rico. This, it is believed, can be accomplished by making custom dues in the island payable in American money, yet receiving the silver pesos and centavos at a fixed relation to our dollar. The limited amount of Puerto Rican money would thus find an important avenue where a uniform value on the basis arranged would be realized. This avenue would probably be broad enough to give the assurance needed to keep the peso and its minor subdivisions current through the island at the custom-house valuation. If any doubt should arise as to the sufficiency of such a provision, it could be made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to give American coin in direct exchange for the Puerto Rican coin at the custom-house ratio whenever in his opinion it should be necessary so to do in order to maintain the ratio established.

The rate or ratio to be adopted should be determined by the fair average of the Puerto Rican coins during the last three or five years in their power to purchase bills of exchange on London or New York. If the information necessary for fixing the fair ratio be lacking, the subject might be referred to a commission of experts, who after hearing testimony from merchants, bankers, and wage-earners in Puerto Rico, could undoubtedly fix the ratio based upon the specific facts presented to them.

From information fairly to be relied upon, it appears that the island coins have had a value in domestic exchanges and in the purchase of sterling bills considerably above their bullion value, measured by the world's price for silver. It would seem just and wise to adopt this local value in the establishment of a fixed ratio to the United States standard. To adopt the bullion value of the currency in fixing such a ratio would seriously disturb existing conditions in the value of wages and work in justice to contract relations between debtors and creditors.

If a laborer's wages be one peso per day, and the average power of that coin to

purchase what his needs require be equal to sixty cents gold, then to reduce the value of the coin in which he is paid to forty cents would by so much destroy the reward of his labor, although his nominal compensation should remain the same. On the other hand, to raise the value of the peso to the value of our dollar (though the disparity in weight and fineness between our silver dollar and the peso is small) would operate to increase the labor cost to the employer to a point where the product obtained might not justify by its market price the cost of producing it. This, of course, would depress industry and throw labor out of employment.

Again, the relations between debtors and creditors call for equitable and just consideration. It is estimated that in the form of mortgages, etc., there is an indebtedness of some twenty or twenty-five millions, and that the current shorter-time credit obligations aggregate about the same in amount. The average value of the peso for some time past is the best measure of the value that was transferred when these evidences of debt were issued. To make an arbitrary change so as either to enhance or reduce its general average value would therefore work hardship and injustice. The average power of the peso, while widely fluctuating between the two limits, has ranged from 160 to 190—that is to say, at times 160 pesos were as effective in paying a debt or buying goods in London or New York as 100 American dollars; at the other extreme, it has required 190 pesos to be as effective as 100 American dollars.

Subject to correction from a better knowledge, I think all interests would meet in giving a fixed value of 166⅔% to the peso—that is to say, the peso shall be maintained at the value of sixty cents, first by receiving it in payment for customs at that price; second, by giving for it, when required, American money at that rate of exchange. It is by a similar process that our own silver money has been kept on a parity with our gold coins.

It is not contemplated in the considerations here presented to retire the Puerto Rican coins—certainly not until the coins of the United States have become familiar and acceptable to the people. There are three things to which a simple people cling with tenacity—their language, their religion, their money of account. The peso and its fractional part, the centavo, are terms made familiar, by use, to the laborer and the tradesman. These coins, valued and fixed as above suggested, would no doubt for some time be preferred to the American coin, which to their minds would present the apparent contradiction of a coin of the same material, possessing less bulk and weight, yet carrying with it a higher exchangeable value. They would doubt at first, refuse to believe, and cling to the terms “peso” and “centavo,” rather than adopt the really effective ones, “dollars” and “cents.” Therefore the peso, if received through the custom house or for other taxes, or if received in exchange for American money at the Government agency, should be again disbursed or re-exchanged as demand from the people might require. In fact, it may be necessary, in order to give absolute steadiness to the peso, not only to receive or redeem it at a fixed price to be again disbursed at the same price, but it may also be necessary to coin at our mints an additional amount of pesos and their fractional parts for use in the island. If, as suggested, customs dues be made receivable in American money and the peso be received as equal to sixty cents, there is little or no danger that it will fall *below* that value anywhere in the island. Being effective at sixty cents for customs dues, it will not be exchanged elsewhere for less. But this would not prevent its rising *above* that value.

It is now apparent that the influx of American money is having the effect to give the peso a higher value. The peso being the domestic money, familiar to all the people of all classes, it becomes desirable to exchange American money for the domestic, and the pressure to do this raises artificially the exchangeable price of the peso. The broker and the money-changer know how to make the most of the opportunity. To counteract this operation, which tends to repress the introduction

of capital in the form of money, it may be necessary, as before stated, to coin on Government account an additional stock of the domestic money, which shall be freely offered in exchange at the uniform price, this new supply, together with the old stock, to be received at the custom house or otherwise redeemed at the same price.

At the risk of prolixity, which the importance of the subject might excuse, I submit this additional thought for such consideration as it may merit. The present Puerto Rican coins carry the emblems of Spanish sovereignty. Whether or not additions to the coinage be made, new coins should be struck, of the same weight and fineness, upon which should be imprinted proper emblems of our new relations, and these should be substituted for the old. By melting up the old as they come in and by paying out the new, such a substitution can be easily and quite rapidly effected. Gradually, custom and use would establish American money, whether of silver, gold, or paper, as the medium of exchange and payment.

Then, it may be expected that the present Puerto Rican money will not be called for, American money and American terms of account and payment having superseded those now in use. Then, upon the Government—either of the island itself or upon the United States Government, as may be determined—the loss will fall resulting from the redemption of the Puerto Rican coins at an overvaluation. If the peso be rated at sixty cents, as herein suggested, and if the bullion in the coin remains at its present value of forty cents, and, lastly, if the amount of the silver money referred to be correctly estimated at 5,500,000 pesos, the loss would amount to \$1,100,000 American money. This would be the ultimate cost of relieving the island from the grievous ills of a bad currency system. The benefits would be immediate, and, it may be hoped, would be continuous for all time. The cost, when it began to be experienced, would be distributed over a series of years, and might easily be covered by proper appropriations from the revenues of the island.

The necessity of securing stability to the peso is fully recognized by all parties in Puerto Rico, although opinions differ as to the ratio which ought to be observed in relating it to American money. Suggestions have also appeared in favor of an immediate and coercive exchange of the insular coins for our money upon a ratio to be determined. While this could be made operative to introduce American money and American terms of account at an earlier period than by the course above recommended, it is open to some objections. It would throw confusion into the minds of the simpler-minded people and excite suspicion as to the purity of our intention. It would create an immediate deficit for the difference between the bullion value of their coins and the price for which they were exchanged. This deficit would have to be faced and provided for at once, while by the slower process that deficit would be spread over a period of years, and could be more easily met.

I have so far spoken as if silver coin were the only medium of exchange in Puerto Rico. Such is not the fact. The Spanish Bank of Puerto Rico, holding a franchise from the Spanish Government, has been privileged to issue its notes to the extent of three times its capital, and the note issues of this bank at one time outstanding have been as high as 2,500,000 pesos. Under the circumstances now existing the notes of the bank are not in favor, and it is not improbable that its affairs will be liquidated. This being so, the function which it has in the past discharged should be assumed and prosecuted, within proper legal limitations, by some one bank organized with ample capital and with the right to establish branches at convenient points, and to issue its own notes to circulate as money. Or, if this should not be favorably considered, then an Act extending to the island the rights and privileges of the National banking system might merit approval.

## NEW BOND ISSUE.

Under the caption of Loans and Currency will be found particulars (in the way of information) as to the issue of \$200,000,000 three per cent. bonds, authorized by the Act of June 13, 1898. When the bill was reported, which after amendment became the law, some doubt was expressed by those best acquainted with such matters whether bonds bearing so low a rate as three per cent. could be sold except at a discount. There were substantial facts cited in support of such opinion. The then recent declaration of war with Spain had disturbed the always sensitive conditions of trade and finance. The morbidly timid along our eastern and northern coast were in a state of more or less alarm. The simpler-minded depositors in Savings banks made withdrawals of their funds; the commercial banks in the larger cities sympathetically suffered through loss of cash reserves to Savings institutions. The rate of interest rose; the price of securities declined. Even old issues of United States bonds fell to a point where they would yield to the investor from 3.1 to 3.25 per cent. per annum upon an investment then made. Such was the condition of the financial market in the latter part of April and the earlier part of May last.

There was another factor, however, which operated to ensure a successful negotiation of the new loan at three per cent., which it is well to note. That factor was the self-interest of the National banks. These institutions as a whole then enjoyed an unvalued-of privilege under the law to issue nearly four hundred millions in circulating notes. True, the condition precedent to the exercise of such privilege was the deposit of United States bonds, the price of which in the public market had so advanced as to destroy the motive of profit for the exercise of the privilege. Owing to the feature of the National Banking Act which restricts the issue of circulating notes to ninety per cent. of the face of the bonds deposited as security, a three per cent. interest bond at par, when used for the purpose indicated, yields better returns to the banks than four or five per cent. bonds at the rate of premium then or now prevailing. It is demonstrable that the three per cent. bonds at par would afford to National banks the means of obtaining through circulating notes a profit of substantially 1.4 per cent. on the amount invested. That this profit would furnish a sufficient motive for the banks as a whole to take up \$200,000,000 in bonds need not be argued; it is self-evident. These conditions practically insured the successful negotiation at par of the loan at the rate of three per cent. This was quickly perceived in the money market, and, joined to easier conditions in general finances, it operated to establish a prospective premium on the anticipated issue; in fact, at the moment when the Act was approved, the whole issue of \$200,000,000 could have been sold at a premium of probably two and one-half per cent. This could hardly have been foreseen, and it was evidently the opinion of Congress also that a wide distribution of the obligations among the people, at the uniform price of par, was of more value to public interests than the realization of a possible bonus from small groups of professional dealers. The discriminating mandate of the law was thus expressed:

"The bonds authorized by this section shall be first offered at par as a popular loan under such regulations, prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, as will give opportunity to the citizens of the United States to participate in the subscriptions to such loan, and in allotting said bonds the several subscriptions of individuals shall be first accepted, and the subscriptions for the lowest amounts shall be first allotted."

Obedient to the fair spirit of the law, the Treasury Department sought by every means to extend the opportunity for subscription to all the people. Every newspaper in the United States was supplied with interesting and instructive information relative to the issue, which, with few exceptions, was patriotically and free of charge prominently displayed. Blank forms for subscriptions, with circulars of information, were supplied to more than 22,000 money-order post offices, every express

office, and all the banks. A period of thirty-one days was allowed for the receipt of subscriptions. A summary of subscriptions received, classified as to amounts, is here given :

*Subscriptions for \$500 and less.*

Less than \$100.....	11,483
\$100 to \$180.....	14,974
\$200 to \$280.....	9,902
\$300 to \$380.....	7,594
\$400 to \$480.....	7,698
\$500 only.....	180,573
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>232,224</b>

*Subscriptions for more than \$500.*

\$520 to \$980.....	11,862
\$1,000 to \$1,980.....	25,152
\$2,000 to \$2,980.....	10,249
\$3,000 to \$3,980.....	5,165
\$4,000 to \$4,400.....	5,223
\$4,500.....	1,875
	<hr/>
More than \$4,500.....	59,626
	23,376
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>88,002</b>

The burden of work thus suddenly thrown upon the Department it is difficult to fully comprehend. In the mere matter of names and addresses, the work of writing—by reason of necessary duplication—was equal to a detailed schedule embodying several millions of names, with the address—town, county, and State—of each fully extended. To accomplish the work imposed, an addition for three months or more of nearly six hundred persons to the regular working force of the Department was necessary. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing was correspondingly overtaxed. The immense increase in the number of bonds of small denominations, as compared with any previous issues, is a partial explanation. The acquisition and installation of twelve high-grade power presses, made in anticipation of increased operations, alone saved that Bureau from a complete breakdown.

That the popular-loan method so successfully used on this occasion gave general satisfaction to the people is beyond dispute. Led to believe—whether justly or unjustly—that on former occasions advantage had been taken of public necessities by intermediaries who made unfair profit between the Government and the people, they hailed with satisfaction this attempt to deal directly with the citizen. There was a great moral value in this, difficult to estimate in terms of money, yet worthy of consideration in the mind of the statesman. Was the operation advantageous, also, from an economic standpoint? As already indicated, a bonus of perhaps five millions could have been secured by offering the loan to competitive bidding. That was the sacrifice made in order to place the loan directly with the people at the uniform price of par.

The Act now under consideration was no doubt influenced by the theory, if not definitely shaped on it, that the dissemination of Government securities among the people would attach the holders thereof by closer bonds of sympathy to the Government, and secure from all such a more zealous watchfulness over public affairs; for it is this kind of watchful interest which best secures the welfare and perpetuity of a free State. If this motive operated in the legislative councils, its practical value was not so permanent as could be hoped for. As before stated, allotments were made to less than 825,000 persons, aggregating \$200,000,000. From the moment the bonds were issued until the present time, a movement of concentration has been observable. At this time \$77,361,000, the original holdings of about 116,000 sub-

scribers, have passed into the ownership of 1,001 persons, firms, and corporations. To this extent the moral value of private ownership has already disappeared.

The loan was promptly taken; in fact, it was subscribed for many times over. From this it may be assumed that similar results would follow on future occasions. It will not do to rest securely on such an assumption. In fixing the conditions of a proposed bond as to time and rate of interest, Congress is in essence formulating a proposal. The public—the investor—is yet to determine whether or not the proposal is satisfactory. Congress can not exactly hit the mark in advance. If it determines that the proposed bond shall not be sold at less than par, it must so fix the rate of interest and time of payment as to make the new security somewhat more attractive than outstanding issues—price now being considered. It must also make allowance for a disturbance in the previous market equilibrium. A large addition to a previous supply, other things being the same, tends to reduce the price, whether of commodities or securities. I repeat that in a legislative Act it is impossible to forecast and exactly determine these ruling factors. Economically considered, the part of wisdom would seem to be to provide a sufficient margin of new advantages in interest, or otherwise, to float the loan successfully, and then allow the market, by fair competition, to reduce the margin thus provided to the narrowest limit. The new bonds were properly fixed at three per cent. Strict business logic dictated that they should enter into competition with the older issues; it was the only way by which their true relative value could be determined. Instead of this, the whole issue was offered to the subscribing public at the uniform price of par. Nevertheless, the experiment may be considered a justifiable one, and it worked out in a way to strengthen the national credit. From it, however, useful suggestion may be derived.

It is evident that an attempt by Congress to fix the proper rate of interest to justify an offer of the Government's obligations at par will always be subject to one of two dangers—

First, if the rate of interest be fixed too low—time and circumstances being considered—the loan may fail, with the consequence of serious derangements to the Treasury; or,

Second, if the rate of interest be fixed too high, and the issue offered at par, while it will be eagerly taken, the result may be a great economic waste to the Treasury.

The considerations thus presented lead to the conclusion that while the features intended to make the loan a popular one should be preserved, provision should also be taken to secure to the Government the highest value attainable under the fair operation of the popular-loan principle. It is but a commonplace to allege that in its relation to business affairs the Government should have strict regard to the principles which everywhere and elsewhere obtain, *i. e.*, in the purchase of material and supplies required for public use, it should—as it does—seek the lowest price for the same goods; and, conversely, in the sale of what it may have to sell, whether of material or of its own interest-bearing obligations, it should also seek to realize the highest attainable price. Should exigencies arise—not now observable—under which further issues under the Act of June 13 should be made necessary, it would seem wise to modify in some way the mandatory provision which would now require an offer of the same to the people at par. With a market premium of six per cent. now established, and conditions remaining the same, such a proceeding would involve an inexcusable economic waste. On the other hand, as before noted, it is not to be expected that a previous market premium can be fully realized on a large addition to the market supply. I believe that, with some extension of discretionary power to the administrative department of the Government in this connection, the popular features of the present Act can be fully preserved, while the risk of undue sacrifice in maintaining that valuable principle may be obviated.

Under the provisions of the Act one-tenth of one per cent. of the amount of the



bonds authorized was allowed "to pay the expense of preparing, advertising, and shipping the same." The records show an average cost to the Government of one per cent. as the expense of negotiating and distributing securities in the past. The experiment proves that the allowance of one tenth for expenses in connection with the late issue was inadequate. Instead of one-tenth, or two-twentieths, of one per cent., the total cost rose to thirty-five hundredths of one per cent., distributed as follows:

Compensation of temporary clerks, messengers, etc.....	\$166,966.93
Engraving and plate printing.....	86,356.80
Paper for bonds.....	16,376.61
Stationery and printing blank forms.....	12,812.37
Typewriting machines, purchase and rent of.....	1,262.45
Electric fans, electric lighting, wiring, etc., in the new city post-office building.....	2,056.42
Tables and chairs bought and rented.....	1,154.69
Miscellaneous.....	3,942.08
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$302,960.98</b>

The express charges for carrying the bonds, it is estimated, will amount to \$65,000, bills aggregating some \$23,000 already having been audited and approved, but which do not appear in the above total.

CURRENCY AND BANKING.

In submitting my report, I feel it my duty to impress upon Congress, as best I may, the important subject of currency and banking reform.

It is the misfortune of evil conditions to produce derangement and hinder progress, which, if long continued, so accustom the subject of them to their existence as to create in him apathetic indifference to needful and healthful reforms. Indeed, it is a familiar fact that individuals, families, and nations ignorantly suffer under the illusion that the very source of their affliction is itself an agency for good. Something like this has marked our financial history for thirty years. Making progress in spite of all obstacles and embarrassments to commerce and industry, we ascribe the advancement to the causes which have really hampered and disconcerted the forward and upward movement. With a financial system condemned by the judgment of the most experienced and wise, both at home and abroad, its evils illustrated in daily business, and emphasized in recurring panics, we fail, with an obtuse timidity, to face the questions which must be met and rightly solved before industry and commerce can be established upon enduring conditions of security.

The argument against Government issues of paper money as a medium for commercial exchanges have been fully made and need not be repeated in detail. Its rigidity, its failure to meet demands where demand is most urgent, the dependency of the whole industrial structure upon the state of the revenue and public expenditure—these are important links in that chain of argument. Even in a state of foreign war, the civilized demand of both contestants is for due respect to private property and individual contract relationships. How much more in a state of peace, in a free State, should private rights and contract relationships be given immunity from the incidental, though serious, effects now suffered through perturbations in Government finances. The menace to our domestic affairs, several times recurring from a threatened change in the standard under which they are carried on, and our foreign trade settled, has been a companion evil—perhaps the greater of the two.

The cure for these evils is not difficult to find. It lies within the easy range of Congressional action. Nor is the remedy one to inflict even temporary pains or penalties on the body politic. The healthful, stimulating effect of right action in these directions would be experienced with the first sense of assurance that the desired end was to be accomplished.

The proposal to substitute bank issues for Government notes is opposed with many honest prejudices and assailed by bitter denunciations. The first arise from a failure to comprehend the true philosophy of a paper currency, and must be patiently considered. The latter obscure the question by reckless statements, charging that all propositions for currency reform are bank conspiracies to exploit the people. Referring to such proposals, an eminent speaker recently warned his uninstructed hearers: "These banks will become cormorants to eat up your substance, control your politics, and warp the political views in all the communities. Send a man to Congress to help defeat this great evil." Such tirades against reason, and such appeals to prejudice and ignorance, the statesman must oppose by the simple truth. Is a system of bank credit currency, in its ability to meet the varying wants of an industrious commercial people, superior to the issues of Government paper money? If that question be answered affirmatively, it may be safely left to time to show that the nature of the banker differs not at all from the general nature of men in other callings. As every other man who gets an honest living must live by service rendered in the sphere of his activities, so the banker must perform faithfully and well his function or fail of his fair reward. The motives for his action are the same. It is not for the benefit of the banker, or any particular class, that the plea for currency reform is urged; it is urged on behalf of the whole people, who will be the recipients of the benefits thereof. And it is on this ground only that the claim is entitled to consideration.

#### RIGIDITY OF OUR PRESENT CURRENCY SYSTEM.

I shall not be outside of my duty if I venture to point out, in at least one important respect, the advantages to the poorer districts of the country, of a properly-constituted bank currency. It may be done by fairly describing the course of the financial movement as it now goes on, and by presenting in contrast the movement as it would go on under the conditions advocated. It is a familiar fact that, in the period of harvesting and crop moving, the currency is strongly drawn from the centers to the country districts. When this movement is over, the currency again tends toward the centers. The currency flows to the center to pay loans occasioned by its use and other general indebtedness, and also to secure the benefit of interest to the country banker for a portion of his funds which in a dull period would otherwise lie unemployed in his hands. At present, the currency so sent consists almost entirely of legal-tender notes and Treasury notes—that is to say, in the money which the law recognizes as lawful reserve. Thus received by the banks in the money centers, it becomes a reserve for deposits in the relation of one to four. Now, deposits may be increased by loans as well as by the deposit of cash. A loan for ten thousand or a hundred thousand goes to the borrower's credit upon the bank's books, and swells the deposit account by so much. True, the borrower may check against this fund, but his check may also be deposited in the same bank in which case it is a mere transfer to another account; or, if it be deposited in another bank and paid in money by the lending bank, it is still a transfer. The total deposits of all the banks are swelled by this original loan.

In confirmation that this expansive movement is fairly described, I quote from the "New York Herald" of November 13 as follows: "Comparing yesterday's [clearing-house] statement with that of five weeks ago, it appears that the banks hold thirteen millions more money, and have expanded their loans by the surprising amount of  $51\frac{1}{2}$  millions, the increase in 'deposits' resulting from these two items being no less than sixty-six millions." It can be easily perceived that this possibility of increasing loans against an inflow of reserve funds in the proportion of four to one is a temptation to which the city bank is likely to yield. It must be remembered that this inward movement of currency from the country occurs at the

time of year when commercial activities are the least and the general requirements for the use of loans in the interior are the smallest. The effort of the banks at the centers to increase their loans causes interest to fall. The fall in the rate of interest causes interest and dividend-paying securities to rise. The rise in securities induces speculative buying. The speculative buyer becomes the bank's borrowing customer. The banker is thus enabled to "put out his funds" as he is apt to term it, though he really does no such thing. He keeps his funds, but, in the way described, he swells his deposit liability until his funds on hand are made answerable to the rule of one of cash to four of liabilities, or twenty-five per cent. against his "deposits."

It is in the condition above described, with varying degrees of regularity and intensity, that the financial status is found when the crops in the West and South approach harvest—that is to say, a maximum of loans and deposits; a minimum in cash reserves. During the season, until then, the country banker has found that his drafts and checks on his Eastern correspondents, distributed to his customers, supplied their needs for instruments of exchange and payment; but he finds that for the payment of farm wages, the purchase and transfer of farm products, such instruments are not adequate; cash is required for these purposes, either in metallic money or paper currency. This forces him to make requisition in the form of money by express on his Eastern balances. Nay, more; if crops be large and prices good, he is forced to supplement his own resources by borrowing for a period at the centers. His correspondent at the center, in meeting his requisitions for the money due his country customer, is obliged to take it from what had before constituted his legal reserve. This disturbs the equilibrium of relationships. To recover his position, he turns upon the Street and calls in a portion of his loans. If the interior banker, after thus calling for the balances due him, asks in addition for a loan, the city banker is often obliged to inform him that "money is very close" and he can not accommodate him. It must be noted also that the effort of the city banker to restore his impaired reserve by calling money from the Street does not accomplish that direct result. There is no money "in the Street;" it is all in bank vaults, and the total stock cannot be augmented except by inducing it to come in from without. What does result is a forced liquidation, a fall in prices of securities, a rise in interest sufficient to induce outside money to come in. In this process the merchant and the manufacturer find it difficult to negotiate their credits. They also are told "money is tight," and that they must withhold applications for discount favors.

I forbear to follow into further detail the unprofitable and vexatious movement. Gradually, after more or less strain and anxiety, sometimes bordering on panic, sometimes resulting in panic, a readjustment is secured. Crops from the interior—not seldom forced from the producer's hands, with little regard to price, because of his inability to borrow from his local banker—move to the seaboard. The strain on the country is relaxed. Again currency in the form of "reserve funds" moves to the center. Again one dollar thus received becomes effective as reserve for four dollars of liability. Money is quoted easy, as the prospect for summer dullness becomes assured. "The Street" breathes easier, stocks and securities become "firm," and the movement toward an expansion in loans, with its attendant phenomenon of an increase in deposits, is again observed, to be again followed by restriction and probable distress as the active season in productive industry and trade again appears.

Whoever has followed this delineation of our financial movement, and those who are familiar with the facts which are thus portrayed, ought not to have trouble in perceiving that the bottom cause of the irregular and deranging effects described is to be found in a fixed volume of paper money clothed with full powers of a legal tender. Upon this money—itself a credit obligation—other credit obligations, in the form of bank deposits through bank loans, may be built up in the proportion of

four to one. With the volume of paper money thus fixed—with no natural movement toward its retirement when not needed in legitimate trade—the tendency to build the four-story structure upon it as a permanent base is irresistible. The withdrawal of the base by those who really own it causes the structure to vibrate and threatens it with a fall.

#### OPERATIONS OF A FLEXIBLE BANK-NOTE CURRENCY.

Consider now, as briefly as may be, the practical working of a bank-note currency—non-legal tender—if substituted for the paper money issued by the Government. Verification may be found by those who will look for it in systems now current in France, Germany, Scotland and Canada; or, if our own records be preferred, the New England system of forty years ago, or those then in vogue in Indiana, Iowa and Louisiana, will be equally good examples. Under such a system the financial movement may thus be described :

Commencing as before with an inward movement of funds from the exterior to the centers, the money forwarded would then consist largely of bank notes. These received at the centers would not, like the legal tenders of the present, form a base for expansion. The desire to obtain legal money in their place would cause the banks receiving them to push them home for redemption in legal money, but the general effort in this direction would neutralize, to a large degree, the effect desired. Bank A, sending home the notes of bank B, would be met, not by a payment in legal money, but as an offset by the presentation of the notes of bank B. There would be a mutual retirement of their respective bank note liabilities. Of course, this precision in offsets would not be the rule, but the illustration shows the general effect to be the temporary retirement of a currency when it can not be circulated in the service of the country's trade and exchange. Observe this : The power to lend is not thus lost ; it is temporarily suspended. When, with the recurring needs of the interior to handle its products of the farm, the factory, and the mine, the power to issue circulating notes may be summoned into use, then the needs of industry will coincide with the profit-moving motives of the banker, and the full value of this latent power will be experienced, not in the centers, where bank notes are not needed and will not circulate, but in the interior, where raw products are raised, and where the busy wheels of shop and factory certify that labor wages are to be paid.

The power of the bank note, so temporarily suspended, will always be restored in full upon the call of industry. The power of our present currency, on the contrary, is not suspended. It is, as pointed out, inevitably misdirected. It artificially stimulates speculative activity in securities at the centers. It periodically absorbs the credit powers at times when they should be made serviceable to the whole country. It ministers to the speculator, it prejudices the producer, the merchant, and the manufacturer, though, at last, all suffer from its deranging influences.

These are the reasons, the more important reasons, why our banking system should be reformed and made effective to commercial and industrial needs ; and these same reasons, with others not here set forth, call for the elimination, in a safe and proper way, of the injurious interference in our currency system by the legal-tender paper money of the Government.

If it be conceded that the legal-tender money issued by the Government does not possess the qualifications to make it a proper factor in the country's exchanges of products and manufactures ; if the fact also be admitted that it is a deranging and disturbing factor in its relation to industry and commerce, then the time has come to substitute for it a currency which will adequately, economically, and safely meet the ever-growing needs of the country, rapidly developing, as it is, in the power of production, in the number of its people, and the importance of its domestic and foreign trade.

Can a bank-note currency be established which will be adequate, economical and safe, and thus serve, in a better way than is now served, the public needs? Limited by space in this presentation, I point to the countries before named, where these conditions are realized. Our neighbor on the north, Canada, may be cited as a near-by witness in the same direction. With power to issue notes as profitable employment for their use in productive industry can be found, the power has never been overtaxed or exhausted. The rates of interest have varied but little between the richer provinces of Ontario or Quebec and the sparsely-settled districts of Manitoba. The terms of interest are substantially as favorable to the farmer of the west as to the merchant of the metropolis.

While these conditions, in contrast with our own, which stimulates the operation of credit at the centers and starves it at the circumference, are due in part to other features of its banking system, the influence of the currency is most important. Certain it is that were bank-note issues in Canada repressed by restrictive laws, as they are with us, and if the field of circulation these notes now occupy were filled with the legal-tender notes of the Dominion, the facilities of banking now enjoyed on the frontiers would not be afforded. The same tendency toward congestion at the centers and scarcity in the outlying districts would be there, as it is here, plainly observable.

It is not intended by anything here said to offer the Canadian system as a model from which we should make exact copy. In certain particulars it would not at present suit our different conditions. The right of the Canadian banks to issue their notes without any special pledge of security for their redemption; the law which gives to the note holder, in case of bank failure, priority of claim over the depositors, while not operative to perceived injury, under their system of large banks with small branches, might, if adopted here, with a multitude of small banks, each independent of the other, result in an unjustifiable invasion of the equitable rights of the depositor. The dangers in this regard are ably discussed and fully illustrated in the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency. To his argument nothing need be added. While the question of terms is important in itself, it is nevertheless a subordinate one.

The facts set forth by the Comptroller relate exclusively to the proposition that the notes of a failed bank shall be a paramount lien upon the assets for their full value before any rights accrue to other creditors.

#### BANK NOTES MAY BE MADE SECURE WITHOUT BEING A FIRST LIEN UPON ASSETS.

The issue of notes upon the general assets of National banks may be made perfectly secure without the requirement that the notes be a first lien upon their assets. It would only be necessary to award to the note holder the same ratable proportion of the assets which went to other creditors, and to provide that the amount required to pay the difference be obtained by an assessment upon all the National banks, collected ratably in proportion to their share in the circulation of this character. The vital question is, What percentage of assessment upon this circulation would be required in order to cover the losses to note holders in the case of failed banks? The experience of the National banking system demonstrates that the assessment would be insignificant.

The total circulation of failed banks outstanding at the time of failure, up to October 31, 1897, was \$20,893,827. The loss upon these notes, if the security for them had been impaired in the same degree as the security for other liabilities, would have been \$5,379,165, or an annual average of about \$163,000. This loss would have been made good by a tax of about one-twelfth of one per cent. per year upon the circulation of the solvent banks. A tax of one-fifth of one per cent. upon the average

circulation of the National banks since the foundation of the system would have paid such losses up to October 31, 1897, amounting to \$5,879,165 and left a surplus of about \$9,000,000 in the guaranty fund.

Whether preference be given to the note holder, as in Canada, or he be made to take his share of risk with the depositor, as in Germany, France, and Scotland, or whether the note holder shall be protected by the special pledge of security as now provided in our National Banking Act, these considerations affect the questions relative, not absolutely. Under either of these conditions provisions may be made which will furnish to the country a paper money adequate to commercial needs, economical to the people, and safe in its general workings.

In the nature of things, the banker is the proper agency for operating this important function. He must have motive for his action or he will not exercise it. Given this motive, he will, like the laborer, the merchant, or the professional man, be diligent in the employment of his powers. That this motive must be the motive of gain does not differentiate the banker from other working forces of society, whose actions are healthful and helpful to the social whole.

In my last report I ventured upon specific recommendations. These recommendations, if adopted and formulated into law, would, in my opinion, be curative of the evils herein pointed out. In House bills 10,289 and 10,333 are embodied a series of measures in some respects more meritorious. The measures therein proposed are the result of careful study by expert and experienced men. With some modifications—the reasonable fruit of full discussion—they would, I believe, meet the country's needs. I commend the subject to the early and earnest attention of Congress.

#### WAR TAXES.

The report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue possesses peculiar interest, indicating, as it does, the operation of the war-revenue Act of June 13, 1898. It shows quite clearly that the aggregate revenue to be derived therefrom will form a smaller total than was estimated by the more sanguine of its supporters.

The Commissioner's estimate of \$100,000,000 from this source seems to be fairly justified by the results to the Treasury during the period from July 1 to the present time. His report goes also to show the friction and embarrassments which have arisen from the need of interpreting obscurities in the Act itself, and the application of such interpretation to specific cases coming under the same general head, yet differentiated from each other by more or less important particulars. Many complaints have arisen from those unreconciled to such interpretations or applications, and, granted a well-balanced relation between revenue and expenditures, it might be well to consider the propriety of repealing some of the more vexatious features of the Act. Until more settled conditions, however, as to extraordinary expenditures for the army and navy are reached, even such repeal can not be recommended by this Department. Some verbal amendments, making more clear the intentions of Congress, are to be desired, and representations in this direction may be made the subject of a separate communication to Congress at an early day.

L. J. GAGE, *Secretary.*

*To the Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

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**The Money Order System.**—The Report of the First Assistant Postmaster-General for the fiscal year ended June 30, which has just been issued, contains some interesting facts in regard to the postal money-order system. A comparison of the transactions of the systems of several nations for one year shows that Germany leads with a total of 100,000,000 orders issued amounting to \$1,800,000,000; Great Britain is next with a total of 75,000,000 orders and \$310,000,000 in amount; France issued 33,000,000 orders amounting to \$300,000,000, while the United States issued 29,000,000 orders valued at \$205,000,000. The system has been in operation in France since 1627, in England since 1732, and in the United States only since 1836. A comparison of the statistics shows that since 1836 the number of money-order offices in the United States has increased from 8,241 to 23,421; the number of domestic orders issued in 1838 was 9,959,207, representing \$119,649,084, and in 1898 the number issued was 27,798,078, representing \$191,354,121.

# STATE BANKS—REPORTS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS.

## KANSAS.

Hon. John W. Leedy, Governor of Kansas:

DEAR SIR:—In accordance with the provisions of Chapter forty-seven of the Laws of Kansas, of 1897, I transmit herewith my report, showing the condition of all State and private banks, including Savings banks, doing business in the State at this date, together with banks in the hands of Receivers, and other information required by law.

There are at this date 286 State (including three Savings banks) and eighty-two private banks under the supervision of this department. Of this number three State and seven private are in process of liquidation.

During the period covered by this report (two years), sixty-five State banks, with an aggregate capital of \$784,600, have been organized. Of this number twenty-three were reorganized private banks, eight reorganized National banks, four reorganized State banks, and thirty were new organizations. During the same period, forty-eight State and fifteen private banks, with a capital of \$1,049,150, have gone into voluntary liquidation, and thirteen State and two private banks, with a capital of \$400,500, have been closed by this department.

The annual statement of receipts and disbursements for the year 1897 shows that during that year the banks charged off the following items of loss (cents omitted):

Bad paper, loans.....	\$452,716
Depreciation in value of real estate.....	168,518
Depreciation in value of furniture and fixtures.....	41,580
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$662,815</b>

The State, and especially the bankers of Kansas, should be congratulated upon the splendid showing made by our banks; in point of strength and security second to no State in the Union. With an unimpaired capital and surplus of about seven and one-half millions, deposits of twenty-two and one-half millions, and a reserve of nearly fifty per cent., as shown by the statements of July 14, we can justly feel proud of them.

While there has been a nominal reduction of capital and surplus of over four and one-half million dollars, the actual capital is greater to-day than in 1892, for the reason that the present capital is unimpaired and is represented by assets worth par, whereas in 1892 none of the losses resulting from the "boom period" had been charged off, and the impairment of capital at that time probably amounted to fifty per cent.

A tabulated statement showing a summary of the condition of our banks each year since the establishment of this department appears in this report, and presents many interesting facts. A comparison of the condition of the banks at the present time with 1892, the year in which the State is supposed to have been more prosperous than at any time since, is of special interest, and is given as follows (cents omitted):

	RESOURCES.	
	Sept. 1, 1892. No. of banks, 447.	July 14, 1898. No. of banks, 364.
Loans and discounts.....	\$19,223,324	\$16,477,473
Loans on real estate.....	1,537,871	1,071,038
Overdrafts.....	650,399	216,237
Real estate.....	2,818,181	1,243,727
Furniture and fixtures....	516,354	230,410
Expense account.....	843,212	196,832
United States bonds.....	10,000	369,717
Other bonds and warrants.....	995,835	243,634
Cash items.....	204,625	58,656
Clearing-house items.....	37,198	106,512
Currency.....	1,794,325	1,370,221
Gold.....	775,646	994,509
Silver and fractional currency.....	248,257	327,566
Due from other banks, sight exchange.....	5,496,919	8,037,106
Other resources.....		76,738
<b>Totals.....</b>	<b>\$34,637,146</b>	<b>\$31,010,377</b>

LIABILITIES.		
Capital.....	\$10,922,467	\$6,512,976
Surplus.....	1,024,438	862,050
Undivided profits.....	1,144,279	723,470
Dividends declared but not paid.....	3,762	29,182
Individual deposits.....	14,170,227	17,387,958
Banks and bankers' deposits.....	177,568	415,688
Demand certificates.....	2,217,144	1,299,433
Time certificates.....	3,578,917	2,341,875
Bills rediscounted.....	297,736	123,071
Bills payable.....	1,100,577	146,744
Other liabilities.....		192,325
Totals.....	\$34,637,146	\$31,010,877

It will be observed that the total loans have been reduced over three million dollars, and that the very objectionable item of overdrafts has been reduced \$424,155, a reduction of over two-thirds. The item of real estate has been reduced \$1,599,453, nearly sixty per cent., and furniture and fixtures \$395,944, fifty-seven per cent. The item of other bonds and warrants in 1892 consisted chiefly of stocks and bonds of questionable value. This item now consists of county and school-district bonds and warrants worth par. Cash items in 1892 represented principally expenses paid, or other items of loss that should have been charged off. This item has been reduced over seventy per cent., and now consists of legitimate items. The legal reserve, cash and sight exchange, has increased two and one-half million dollars, or over seven per cent., not including an increase of \$333,212 in the item of United States bonds; thus it appears that every item of resources has undergone a favorable change with respect to strengthening the condition of the banks.

Individual deposits increased nearly four million dollars, while demand and time deposits decreased \$1,660,000. The item of borrowed money, bills payable and rediscounts has been practically wiped out, having been reduced from \$1,400,000 to less than \$300,000. In this connection it is proper to state that at least three million dollars of the demand and time certificates shown in 1892 represented borrowed money, upon which the banks were paying from six to ten per cent. interest, a large portion of such certificates being held by banks and persons outside of the State; while at this time only \$750,000 time deposits bear six per cent., and not to exceed \$50,000 of these are held outside of the State. Thus the changes that have taken place in the liabilities are also all of a favorable character.

Since 1892 the banking business of the State has undergone many changes. Seventy-six banks, representing a capital of \$2,143,610, have been closed; 157, representing a capital of \$3,345,950, have gone into voluntary liquidation; and sixty-five have reduced their capital to the amount of \$1,155,050, making an aggregate withdrawal of bank capital of \$6,645,610. Perhaps ten per cent. of this amount has been used in the reorganization of banks, leaving a net withdrawal of nominal capital of \$5,981,100.

While there are a number of points in the State where small banks could be established with reasonable assurance of success, I am of the opinion that from this time the number of banks will not materially increase. The new banks organized will be offset by consolidations, which has been the order for some time. Since the passage of our present banking law I have urged the consolidation of banks in towns having more than the community can support, and am still of the opinion that this policy should be continued. Banks draw their support from the community in which they are located. The largest item of expense to the average small bank is officers' salaries and clerk hire, to which must be added the general expenses; by consolidating two banks this expense is practically reduced one-half, and the saving thus accomplished can and will be divided between the customers of the bank (in the form of reduced charges for accommodations) and the stockholders (in the form of increased dividends). The competition between banks in neighboring towns and cities will be sufficiently strong to insure fair treatment to the banks' customers.

#### PRIVATE BANKS.

While some of our very best banks are conducted as private banks by individuals or firms, there are many serious objections to their continuance. The fact that the death of the owner or any one of the owners of a private bank will force its closing, is in itself sufficient reason why the State should prohibit individuals or copartnerships from engaging in the banking business. Where a private banker has no other business and devotes his entire time to banking, he will probably conduct his bank in a safe and businesslike manner, and, were it not for his liability to death, he might be permitted to continue without subjecting his customers to unnecessary risk; but where he is engaged in other enterprises, as he usually is, it is a difficult matter to keep his private affairs separate and distinct from his bank, and to mingle his



private business with his banking business is liable to subject the bank and its funds to risks that may result in its failure. For five years I have urged all private bankers to incorporate, and am pleased to be able to say that a large number have done so. At this date we have just one-half the number that were doing business six years ago, and quite a number of those remaining will incorporate in the near future. For obvious reasons I refrain from giving farther details as to why private banks are objectionable. It should be apparent, however, that there are good and sufficient reasons, aside from the fact that it would greatly improve the system of State supervision to have only one class of commercial banks to which all rules and regulations would apply. The requirement of our present law that the board of directors of incorporated banks hold quarterly meetings, at which they shall examine into the condition of the bank and all its assets, has demonstrated that the wisdom of no one man is equal to the combined wisdom of a good board of directors. Many bad practices and irregularities have been corrected as a result of these examinations. The private banker and his customers are deprived of the benefits and protection afforded by this supervision by a board of directors.

While some very good lawyers are in doubt as to the power of the State to require all banks to incorporate, many of our ablest attorneys express the belief that it is within the power of the Legislature to designate the manner in which this privilege may be exercised. I therefore recommend that our banking law be so amended as to require all banks to incorporate. If this recommendation should fail of adoption, I recommend that private bankers be prohibited from engaging in other business, and that all private bankers be required to reside within the State; that, upon the death of a private banker, or of any member of a firm of private bankers, the Bank Commissioner shall be deemed to have possession of all the assets of such bank, and, if it shall appear that there are not sufficient funds on hand to immediately pay all claims against same, the Bank Commissioner shall proceed to have a Receiver appointed in the same manner as in cases of insolvency.

#### ASSESSMENT OF BANKS.

Our system of assessing banks is defective. Our law is indefinite and conflicting, and is construed differently by many assessors, thus resulting in unequal taxation, in many instances banks being required to pay excessive taxes, out of all proportion to other property, while, in other cases, they avoid paying their just portion. Our assessment law should be amended so as to provide a uniform and just basis for the assessment of banks, requiring them to bear only their just share of the burden of taxation.

#### PROVING CLAIMS AGAINST CLOSED BANKS.

Our law makes no provision for the proving of claims against closed banks, thus making it necessary for each judge who appoints a Receiver to make a rule governing this very important matter. I recommend the adoption of a uniform method by which all claims shall be proven, and the fixing of a limit of time after which claims shall be barred.

#### CLAIMS OF UNKNOWN PERSONS.

In all banks that have been in business for a long time there will be found credits to persons who are unknown to the officers of the bank. Some have died; others have moved away and have forgotten that they ever had a deposit in a Kansas bank. There should be some provision whereby such persons or their heirs can be apprised of the existence of such deposits. In some States banks are required to publish, at stated intervals, a list of such depositors and the amount standing to the credit of each. I believe this is a proper requirement, and, in view of the fact that such cases will increase as our State grows older, I recommend that all banks doing business in Kansas be required to publish, within ten days after the first day of January in each year, a list of all deposits that have not changed for a period of three years, giving the full name of the depositor and the amount to the credit of each.

In cases of voluntary liquidation, the bank liquidating shall cause to be published a list of all unclaimed deposits remaining at the expiration of six months after notice of liquidation of the bank has been published, and if any such deposits remain unclaimed for a period of six months after such list is published, same shall be paid to the State Treasurer for the benefit of the State school fund.

Receivers of closed banks should proceed in like manner.

#### COLLECTION OF ASSESSMENTS ON STOCK.

Quite a number of banks have, since the passage of the law of 1897, levied an assessment to make good an impairment of their capital. In a few instances, some of the stockholders have refused to pay the assessment, and while there is provision whereby the stock of such delinquents may be sold to pay such assessment, no provision is made whereby possession of the certificate may be obtained. Provision should be made for the surrender of such stock,

with a penalty fixed for failing to do so. This provision should also cover cases where the capital of a bank has been reduced to cover an impairment, and where owners or holders of stock refuse to surrender same.

#### LOANS TO OFFICERS.

That the loaning of the funds of a bank to its officers is objectionable will not be disputed, but where the directors of a bank are composed of the business men of a community who occasionally require an accommodation in the form of a loan, as is often the case with directors of Kansas banks, to prohibit banks from loaning to their officers would often prevent them from securing a competent board. Yet there should be some restriction placed upon this class of loans, in order to prevent misuse of the bank's funds. I recommend that the aggregate loans of a bank to its officers and directors be limited to one-third of its capital, and that violation of this provision be made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than \$100 for each offense.

#### SAVINGS BANKS.

At this time there are only three Savings banks doing business in this State. These are organized and are doing business under our very defective Savings bank law and the general banking law. I am of the opinion that the time has arrived when we should adopt a law defining the powers and duties of Savings banks, and providing proper regulations for their government. I recommend the passage of such a law, and will cheerfully assist the banking committees of the Legislature in its preparation.

#### A GUARANTEE FUND TO SECURE DEPOSITORS.

Why should not bankers be required to provide absolute security for the money intrusted to their care, is a question that has suggested itself to almost every intelligent person on the occasion of each bank failure. There is nothing that brings so much distress and inconvenience to the average community as a bank failure, and notwithstanding the bank may in time pay its depositors in full, this fact does not prevent serious loss resulting from the disturbance to all business interests in the community occasioned by the failure. Funds that have been accumulated for specific purposes are tied up; loans that under ordinary conditions could have been continued, must now be paid; the security for many loans must be sold at forced sale, thus entailing serious loss to the borrower. Numerous other direct effects of a bank failure could be recited. The indirect effects are scarcely less disastrous. The failure of one bank in a community often creates a distrust of other banks, and causes a withdrawal of deposits, which in turn forces the calling of loans, and if a number of failures happen within a short period a financial stringency may result. The evil effects of a bank failure in any community cannot be overestimated at any time, and especially during periods of financial depression.

Since the State has undertaken to supervise the business of banking, and has prescribed rules and regulations for its conduct, creating a department charged with enforcing such rules, banking has ceased to be a right which any one may enjoy, and has become a privilege which may be enjoyed only by those who conform to the requirements of law.

Is this privilege of sufficient value; are the profits resulting from its enjoyment sufficient to enable those engaged in banking to conform to present requirements of law, and in addition thereto create a fund which shall guarantee the prompt payment of deposits of all closed banks? When we consider what this privilege is; that it permits the use of the surplus funds of the community by the bank for its sole benefit; when we call to mind that a bank's profits arise solely from the use of the money of its depositors—that is to say, that the interest on its capital will not pay its officers' salaries and other expenses; when we consider the profits enjoyed by all well-managed banks, the answer must be that the privilege is of sufficient value to justify compliance with any reasonable requirement that will not only give an absolute guaranty to depositors, but will increase the business of all banks and relieve them from the bad effects of bank failures and financial panics.

For years I have looked forward to a time when the State could adopt such a requirement with safety, and with assurance that its adoption would prove a success. I have not heretofore recommended the creation of a guarantee fund, for the very good reason that it was first necessary that all banks doing business in the State should have a general house cleaning, that all bad results of the boom period be eliminated and all impairment of capital be made good. Under the operation of the law of 1897 all this has been accomplished, and on January 1, 1899, every State and private bank in Kansas will start out with an unimpaired capital and with assets worth at least the amount at which they are carried on the books of the bank. The present is therefore an opportune time to inaugurate this new feature. While all will doubtless agree that the creating of such a fund, or the providing of a guaranty for deposits, is desirable, the question of how to provide the same without imposing a burden upon the banks that could not be borne, and providing a simple method of handling

the fund, have caused a division of opinion as to its practicability. After devoting considerable thought to the subject, I have arrived at the following conclusions:

*First*—That the time has arrived when Kansas should take the lead of other States and the nation by creating a fund to protect all depositors in its banks.

*Second*—That such fund should not be raised by a tax upon the banks, but should be in the form of a deposit, based on the average deposit of each bank, to be made by it with the State Treasurer.

*Third*—That said fund should belong to the respective banks, and should be carried on their books as a part of their legal reserve.

*Fourth*—That the amount of such deposit should be five per cent. of the average deposits of the bank, as shown by the official reports made to the Bank Commissioner, same to be readjusted at the close of each year.

*Fifth*—That the funds so deposited with the State Treasurer should be deposited by him in banks in sums of not to exceed \$10,000, such banks to pay two and one-half per cent. interest thereon and to furnish a surety-company bond for the full amount of the deposit. If the banks of the State will not accept these deposits at two and one-half per cent. interest, then the fund should be invested in United States bonds.

*Sixth*—That the interest on such deposits or bonds shall be set apart as a fund out of which losses resulting from closed banks shall be paid.

*Seventh*—That immediately upon the closing of any bank a Receiver shall be appointed, who shall be given sixty days in which to prove up claims, issue his certificate therefor, and in which to collect the quick assets of the bank. That, at the expiration of sixty days, he shall pay such dividend as the funds in his possession will permit, indorsing same upon the certificate of each depositor; that upon receipt of such dividend the holders of all certificates will forward same to the State Treasurer, who will pay the balance due thereon upon presentation, charging the amount so paid to the bank, and using, first, the deposit of the closed bank in the guarantee fund; second, the interest fund; and third, if these be not sufficient so much of the guarantee fund as may be necessary; that the Receiver shall continue in charge of such closed bank, collecting its assets and remitting to the State Treasurer whenever he shall have collected \$1,000 over and above expenses, until the amount advanced shall be fully repaid, together with six per cent. interest for the time same has been invested. When the guarantee fund shall have been fully reimbursed, the Receiver may be discharged and the remaining assets turned over to the officers of the bank, or he may continue in charge and wind up the affairs of the bank for the benefit of the stockholders, as they may elect. Should the assets of the bank prove insufficient to reimburse the guarantee fund, the Receiver shall enforce the double liability against the stockholders; should there still be a deficiency, same shall be charged to the interest fund.

*Eighth*—That in case any bank should go into voluntary liquidation, the State Treasurer, on receipt of a certificate by the Bank Commissioner showing that such bank has paid all its deposits in full, shall refund to said bank the amount to its credit in the guarantee fund. In case of the consolidation of two or more banks, the amount to the credit of the bank or banks retiring from business will be transferred on the books of the State Treasurer to the bank continuing business, upon a receipt of a request from the board of directors of the bank discontinuing, approved by the Bank Commissioner.

These are the general features that I would embrace in a law creating a guarantee fund. It will be observed that the banks are not burdened by a tax, but are simply required to keep one-fourth of their legal reserve (five per cent. of their deposits) on deposit with the State Treasurer. The objection that might justly be made to requiring so large a sum to be kept on deposit with the State Treasurer is overcome by the provision that he shall deposit the fund with banks in sums of not to exceed \$10,000, at two and one-half per cent. interest, these deposits being secured by a surety company bond, making the fund absolutely safe.

The average deposits in Kansas banks under this department for 1898 will be about twenty-two million dollars; five per cent. of this sum is \$1,100,000; two and one-half per cent. on this is \$750,000. The question will be asked, Is this amount sufficient to cover probable losses? and I am asked, What have been the average losses through Kansas bank failures for the last five years? I answer that this sum would not have been sufficient to cover losses during the last five years, but would call attention to the fact that the failures of the past are not a proper basis for calculations, for the following reasons:

*First*—Prior to 1891 we had no banking law, and as a result many banks invested in speculative securities, real estate and other questionable assets of doubtful and uncertain value.

*Second*—The law of 1891 did not require banks to make good any impairment of their capital or to charge off or dispose of questionable or worthless assets.

*Third*—The law of 1897 compelled all banks to eliminate all questionable assets, and to make good any impairment of capital, and gave the Commissioner power to enforce its provisions, which the law of 1891 did not. As a result we have been undergoing a house cleaning,

and I repeat, the failures resulting from this "round-up" do not form a proper basis for future calculations.

The experience of the National banking system does form a proper basis for calculation, these banks having always been under the supervision of the Comptroller.

We are informed that the total losses by reason of National bank failures amount to one-twelfth of one per cent. per annum of the total deposits. I think we can say, without being subject to the charge of being egotistic, that State supervision in the future under our present law will at least be as efficient as national supervision has been in the past, and no Kansan will admit that Kansas in the future will have a larger percentage of losses than other States. Hence I answer that two and one-half per cent. of total deposits will create a fund sufficient to cover all losses, for it is allowing for fifty per cent. greater losses than have been sustained under the National system.

Some objections are raised to the adoption of this plan. I have discussed the subject with many bankers, and find that the chief objection offered is that the operation of this plan will result in the good banks—that is, the banks that have competent and honest management—being called upon to make good the losses arising from incompetent and dishonest management, and it is claimed that this is unfair and unjust; that the banks which are properly managed should not be required to pay for the results of mismanagement; that the penalty should attach to the mismanaged banks instead of to the others. Is it a fact that this plan imposes a tax or burden upon any bank? I contend that such is not the case. The plan does not propose a tax on the bank's capital, neither does it propose a tax based on the bank's deposits. It simply proposes that the State shall require that, for every one hundred dollars deposited with any bank, five dollars thereof shall be by the bank deposited with the State Treasurer; that the fund so deposited shall be invested by the State Treasurer in the manner indicated, and that the interest thereon shall create a fund to be used in paying the losses that may be sustained by depositors in failed banks. My contention is that the depositors are furnishing the fund which is deposited with the State Treasurer. Our banking law provides that ten per cent. of the bank's deposits shall be kept in its vault in current funds; that an additional ten per cent. shall either be kept in current funds or may be deposited with good solvent banks. Should the State conclude to require banks to keep fifteen per cent. of their deposits on hand in current funds, no one would pretend to say that this was a tax upon the banks. Why should the requirement that five per cent. of the deposits be deposited with the State Treasurer be considered a tax or burden upon the banks? Our experience during the past five years has demonstrated that our banks keep an average of over forty per cent. reserve; that the actual cash kept on hand by the bank exceeds the ten per cent. limit, and that not one bank in fifty ever permits its reserve to fall below the twenty per cent. limit. The only possible loss resulting from this requirement would be the two per cent. the bank might receive from its correspondent upon daily balances, which to the bank with \$100,000 deposits would amount to \$100 in a year. Experience has demonstrated that five per cent. of deposits in current funds is ample to meet all ordinary demands, and it might with equal propriety be argued the State imposes a burden upon the banks by requiring that they keep ten per cent. of their deposits on hand in actual cash, while five per cent. is ample to meet the demands. It is also argued that the adoption of this plan would result in a large number of incompetent persons engaging in the banking business and depending upon the fact that their deposits were guaranteed by such a fund to secure business that would otherwise not come to them; that those persons will conduct their business in such a manner as to cause loss and the fund created from the deposits of all the banks be used to make good the losses thus sustained. I do not believe that we need have any fears from this source, for, under our present stringent banking law, men will not engage in the banking business for other than legitimate purposes; and should there be such cases, the banking department will without difficulty be able to detect them, and, acting under the authority vested in the Commissioner, will deprive them of their privilege to transact business, thus protecting the legitimate business.

The adoption of this system will, in my opinion, increase the deposits of our State banks twenty-five per cent. within a year. Adopt this system and a Kansas bank failure will be a rare occurrence, and when it does come it will not create a ripple in the State or in the community where it is located. Its adoption will add to the loanable funds in the State, thereby reducing the rate of interest, and this in turn will stimulate business enterprises.

There can be no better advertisement for a State than solid banking institutions. Let us place Kansas at the head of the list. The fact that no other State has passed such a law should not deter us; Kansas leads in many things; why should she not lead in this? Other States will soon follow her leadership.

Many prominent bankers of our State have already expressed themselves in favor of the proposition. No banker should oppose it; there is no better way to create a good feeling between the banker and his customers, and to increase the confidence of the public in banks

generally, than for him to assist in providing a system that will give the depositor unquestioned security at all times.

I recommend the passage of a law embracing substantially the provisions outlined herein.

#### EXCESS LOANS.

Our banking law limits the total indebtedness of any individual, firm or corporation, including the several members of a firm or corporation, to any bank, to fifteen per cent. of the capital and surplus of the bank. This provision of law is violated to a greater extent than any other. While the Commissioner has exercised the power given him under the law to require the payment of excess loans, some further provision should be made in order to remedy the evil. I am of the opinion that the officers and directors of any bank violating this provision of law should be made personally liable for any loss that may occur by reason of such excess loans. I recommend the amending of our law in this respect.

#### OFFICIAL BOND.

Our law requires that the board of directors shall require the Cashier and other officers having the handling of the funds of the bank to give bond, same to be approved by the board. I have construed this provision to mean that officers and owners of private banks should also give bond. Some objections have been raised to this construction of the law. I therefore recommend that the section making this provision be amended so as to require all banks and bankers to give bond, and, in the event of the adoption of a guarantee fund, these bonds should be approved by the Bank Commissioner.

#### UNLAWFUL BANKING.

Our law provides that any individual, firm or corporation which receives money on deposit shall be considered as doing a banking business, and shall be amenable to all its provisions. My attention has been called to a number of instances where parties were engaged in receiving deposits without complying with the banking law. When the attention of persons thus violating the law had been called to its provisions, they have as a rule discontinued receiving deposits, but complaints continue to be made to this office of violations of law in this matter, and I am satisfied that there are a number of persons engaged in receiving deposits of money who have not complied with our banking law. I have no power to investigate cases of this character; that is to say, I cannot examine into the books or accounts of anyone suspected of receiving deposits. If those engaged in the banking business are to be protected from this illegitimate practice, power should be given the Commissioner to examine the books and accounts of any individual, firm or corporation whom he has reason to believe is engaged in violating the law, and a suitable penalty should be provided for a refusal to submit to such examination.

#### LEGAL RESERVE.

The provisions of our law relating to legal reserve should be amended so as to permit investments in United States bonds to be included as a part of the banks' reserve in lieu of deposits in other banks.

#### PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS.

In addition to present requirements, all banks should be required to calculate accrued interest on outstanding certificates of deposit and other obligations of the bank and carry a sufficient amount to undivided-profit account to cover same before paying a dividend.

A number of banks evade the provision of law requiring the creation of a surplus by paying out their entire net earnings in the form of officers' salaries. I recommend that where the total salaries of the officers of any bank exceed ten per cent. of its capital and surplus, such excess shall be considered as dividends, and such bank shall be required to carry to surplus the amount required by law before paying such excess salaries.

#### RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS.

In several instances a small majority of the stockholders control the affairs of the bank and absorb all its earnings in the payment of salaries and other expenses, thus depriving the minority stockholders of any income. Under our present law there appears to be no relief for the minority. Where a bank's business is unprofitable there should be some provision whereby its affairs could be wound up. I recommend that provision be made whereby the interests of minority stockholders may be protected.

In the matter of bank supervision Kansas is not behind any State, yet our system can be improved, and the foregoing recommendations are made with a view to perfecting same, and in addition thereto, provide adequate protection for depositors. Their adoption will, in my opinion, relieve the banking business from the stigma that attaches to it as a result of past experiences, and will operate to restore complete confidence in our banks, thereby increasing their business and their usefulness to the public.

## DEPOSITS AND RESERVES OF STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS.

Statement showing total deposits and legal reserve of all State and private banks doing business in the State at the date of each call since the banking department was established.

DATE OF CALL.		No. of banks.	Total deposits.	Legal reserve.	Reserve, per cent.
October 13, 1891	414	\$15,773,438	\$5,477,272	34.09	
January 2, 1892	439	17,377,977	6,708,067	38.60	
March 29, "	408	18,121,839	6,896,932	38.06	
June 4, "	444	18,445,944	7,341,325	39.80	
September 2, "	447	20,143,884	8,252,347	41.41	
January 3, 1893	445	21,139,913	7,449,205	35.24	
April 5, "	447	21,977,914	7,983,312	36.32	
June 20, "	434	19,219,525	6,802,618	35.40	
October 3, "	430	15,399,909	6,050,290	39.54	
January 10, 1894	414	15,427,493	6,194,706	40.15	
May 4, "	410	18,784,322	7,344,841	43.82	
July 18, "	410	18,735,989	5,424,288	44.80	
November 2, "	412	18,871,103	6,573,937	39.00	
January 10, 1895	405	17,112,465	6,575,501	38.42	
April 15, "	407	18,374,275	6,681,140	39.80	
July 11, "	408	18,587,434	6,257,238	37.54	
December 24, "	404	18,191,739	5,995,997	37.48	
February 23, 1896	396	16,528,831	6,023,539	36.80	
June 1, "	395	15,022,783	5,646,149	37.53	
September 1, "	392	15,220,107	6,439,656	42.31	
December 19, "	373	14,552,633	6,319,891	43.42	
March 9, 1897	381	15,975,501	6,656,545	41.67	
June 21, "	377	17,484,057	8,169,879	46.73	
October 5, "	383	23,044,873	11,072,745	50.22	
December 24, "	372	22,154,236	10,184,864	46.00	
April 5, 1898	385	22,218,164	10,469,696	46.99	
July 14, "	384	22,394,956	10,835,915	48.34	

TOPEKA, KAS., Sept. 1, 1898.

JNO. W. BREIDENTHAL, *Bank Commissioner.*

## STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

OFFICE OF BOARD OF BANK COMMISSIONERS,  
CONCORD, December 1, 1898.

To His Excellency the Governor:

SIR:—The Bank Commissioners, in presenting their fifty-third annual report of the condition of the various institutions placed under their supervision, are gratified to be able to show a general improvement in the Savings banks of New Hampshire, both in regard to the deposits and in the character of the investments. Not only has the rapid decrease of the past five years in the deposits ceased, but in a number of banks the year's business will show a gain in the amount over the previous year. What is of more importance, however, the assets of the banks are in a much better condition, both as to their actual value and in their interest-earning capacity. The new investments that have been made under the existing law are of the sound and conservative character that is requisite for trust funds, and the unremitting, painstaking attention that has been given by the officers of the banks to the investments made in previous years has borne fruit in a more accurate knowledge of their true worth, and in large collections of both principal and interest from western loans. The foreclosed real estate held by the banks is now the only item of uncertain value. What will be realized by the banks from this property, located substantially in the country west of the Mississippi River, is so dependent upon the crop prospects and local prosperity in those States that it is impossible to form an accurate estimate. There will no doubt be a shrinkage, whether of twenty-five per cent. or more, opinions vary; but whatever loss there may be is amply covered by the guaranty fund and surplus of the banks.

There are under the supervision of the Bank Commissioners:

Seventy-eight Savings banks.

Thirteen State banks and trust companies, ten of which have savings departments.

Of the seventy-eight Savings banks, seventeen are in liquidation under the management of their own officers, and eight are being wound up by assignees appointed by the court.

Of the fourteen trust companies, the Derryfield Savings Bank and Trust Company and the New Hampshire Trust Company, of Manchester, and the Security Trust Company, of Nashua, are in the hands of assignees, and the Bank of New England, of Manchester, is in liquidation under the management of its directors.

STATE BANKS.

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The following table gives a comparison of the resources and liabilities of the Savings banks and savings departments of the trust companies that are in active business, as compared with the condition of the same banks on June 30, 1897:

RESOURCES.	1897.	1898.	Increase or Decrease.
Loans secured by western mortgages.....	\$8,297,418	\$7,132,326	*\$1,165,092
Loans secured by local real estate.....	7,995,094	8,670,561	675,466
Loans on personal security (local).....	4,508,325	5,116,894	608,568
Loans on collateral security (western).....	487,156	455,115	*32,041
Loans on collateral security (local).....	4,168,329	3,956,499	*211,830
Loans on collateral security (western).....	566,552	58,094	*508,458
United States and State bonds.....	1,039,394	1,043,325	3,930
County, city, town and district bonds.....	8,326,041	7,964,004	*362,037
Railroad bonds.....	5,200,246	5,914,049	713,802
Miscellaneous bonds.....	3,723,296	3,530,923	*192,373
Bank stock.....	1,822,849	1,849,213	26,363
Railroad stock.....	3,432,242	3,915,175	482,932
Manufacturing and miscellaneous stocks.....	1,000,647	994,786	*5,860
Warrants and miscellaneous investments.....	312,925	176,204	*136,721
Real estate by foreclosure.....	2,983,248	3,371,686	388,440
Real estate and bank buildings.....	460,258	499,99	39,441
Cash on deposit in National banks.....	1,390,477	1,459,726	69,248
Cash on hand.....	191,239	178,829	*12,409
Totals.....	\$55,905,714	\$56,731,112	\$825,398
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Amount due depositors.....	\$49,917,710	\$49,997,654	\$79,943
Guaranty fund.....	2,920,735	2,974,502	53,767
Interest.....	989,023	1,130,270	141,246
Miscellaneous indebtedness.....	89,126	5,737	*83,389
Premium.....	\$53,918,595	\$54,108,164	\$191,568
Totals.....	1,989,118	2,622,947	633,829
Totals.....	\$55,905,714	\$56,731,112	\$825,398

\*Decrease.

A comparison of the deposit in the banks on June 30, 1897, with that of 1896 shows a decrease of over a million and a half, while on June 30, 1898, there was an increase of nearly \$60,000 over that of 1897.

The guaranty funds of the banks has increased since 1897 over \$53,000, after charging off such losses as have occurred; while the premium account, which shows the value of the assets above that at which they are carried on the books, and which is perhaps as good an index of the prosperity of the banks as any, has increased over that of 1897 by \$634,000. This premium account is reckoned upon the stocks and bonds owned by the banks, as shown by the current quotations of such securities compared with the value at which the same are entered upon the books. The notes and real estate have been reckoned at their face value unless information obtained by the banks has led them to reduce their book value, in which case the estimated value is given the same as that upon the books. In the item of foreclosed real estate the value of a large portion has thus been reduced on the books of the banks below what the land has cost, which fact tends to insure a final return from this property more nearly in accord with the present value put upon it.

A clear and accurate way of ascertaining the condition of our banks in regard to their safety as a place for the deposit of trust funds and the savings of the people is to compare the total value of the investments and cash owned by the banks with the amount they owe to their depositors, which shows on June 30, 1898, a surplus of \$6,733,458, a percentage from which losses and reductions of values can be met before the deposits are impaired.

THE BANKS IN LIQUIDATION.

Remarkable progress has been made during the year in winding up the affairs of the banks that are in liquidation. The very large sum of \$6,865,489 has been collected and declared in dividends to the depositors. The number of banks given as in liquidation is a large proportion of the total number of banks throughout the State, but it should be remembered that in a number of instances these banks could have successfully continued in business had it not been for the demands on the part of their depositors for money that it was impossible for them to immediately obtain from their investments without a sacrifice, and there is every prospect that these banks will be able to pay their depositors in full.

## VERIFICATION OF DEPOSIT BOOKS.

The Public Statutes, Chapter 185, Section 23, required the trustees of savings banks and institutions for savings to call in the books of their depositors for examination and verification in 1892, and every third year thereafter, which occurred for the first time this year, 1896.

The Bank Commissioners, in their report of 1897, expressed their opinion of the importance of this verification, and urged upon the banks a hearty compliance with the requirements and intent of the law, with what poor result an inspection of the report of the verification in the various banks will show.

The Commissioners regret this failure to obtain substantial verification by some disinterested person aside from the Treasurer or his clerks of the pass books of the depositors with the individual ledger accounts in the bank, for reasons that have been repeatedly set forth in the Commissioners' reports since 1892. The lack of verification of the books of deposit seems to be the only loose end in the system of examination of the banks that has gradually been perfected from year to year to the best of the ability of the present board and of former able commissioners. How to remedy the defect we are unable to say. Without such verification the banks are liable to have errors creep into their accounts, and are exposed to defalcations and loss. Whether the fault lies with the trustees of the banks or with the depositors is hard to say—probably with both. In some instances there has been a marked lack of interest on the part of the officers of the bank, and the selection of improper persons to act as examiners; in others, where ample notice has been given and every facility offered, there has been an equally marked neglect on the part of the depositors to present their books for examination.

The requirement of a triennial examination of the depositors' books exists in neighboring States, and is favorably commented upon by the Commissioners of Savings banks of those States. In New York the Superintendent of Banks recommended in his report for 1895 that it be made compulsory on the part of depositors to present their pass books at stated times under the penalty of loss of interest. The Bank Commissioners of Connecticut call attention to the fact that the weak feature about making an examination of any Savings bank is that an examiner cannot tell whether the individual deposit account is correct or not, and they declare there is but one way to prove the account—viz.: by calling in the pass books, and a comparison with the deposit ledgers. In the Massachusetts Savings Bank Commissioners' report of 1895 the board take occasion to point out the necessity of a complete verification of the depositors' books, and emphasize their remarks by reference to two instances (one a defalcation of \$27,000, discovered at the verification of the depositors' pass books within a few days before their report was made) where dishonest officials found no channel so readily available in which to cover their peculations and so likely to remain undiscovered as the depositors' accounts. The board reiterate the opinion expressed by them in 1893 that, "however great confidence trustees may have in the integrity of their officials, it is no excuse for neglect fully to comply with the intent of the law, and they should seriously consider whether, with the present law on the statute books, they may not be justly charged with a breach of trust should any extensive peculations hereafter occur in this way."

Whether a remedy could best be found in an amendment of the law so as to give the Bank Commissioners more extended powers in supervision of the appointment of examiners, in the matter of notice to the depositors, and in the manner of conducting the work of verification, or by a distinct declaration of the liability of trustees who are neglectful of their duty for any loss occurring to the bank through the lack of such verification, is respectfully submitted to the Legislature to determine. Whether, also, an extension of time from the three-year period to five years would produce better results, is worthy of consideration.

## CLASSIFICATION OF DEPOSITS.

There will be found in the Commissioners' report, following the returns of the verification of the depositors' books, a classification of the deposits in the Savings banks and savings departments of the trust companies. This table is worthy of some consideration. It will show that the deposits are well distributed among the people of the State, and represent their savings, for the reception and safe keeping of which the Savings bank was established.

This table shows that seventy per cent. of the total deposits do not exceed sums of five hundred dollars, and ninety per cent. of the deposits are in sums of less than one thousand dollars.

The Savings bank deposit, although aggregating a sum of money exceeding the valuation of all the railroad and manufacturing property of the State, still is the small and hard-earned savings of people of moderate means, and should have every protection possible thrown about it by wise and well-considered laws regulating its investment, and should be relieved of every unnecessary burden.

ALPHEUS W. BAKER. JOHN HATCH.  
THOMAS J. WALKER,  
Board of Bank Commissioners.



## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES**, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—At a special meeting of the directors of the Chase National Bank, on January 7, Col. Oliver H. Payne, Grant B. Schley, of Messrs. Moore & Schley, and Hon. A. B. Hepburn, former Comptroller of the Currency, were elected directors in the places of General Samuel Thomas, resigned, Hon. Calvin S. Brice, deceased, and Wm. H. Porter, resigned.

The resignation of Mr. Porter is the natural sequence of his retirement from the services of the bank to accept the Vice-Presidency of the Chemical National Bank, while the resignation of General Thomas is understood to be in pursuance of his policy of retiring so far as possible from active participation in corporate affairs.

Mr. Hepburn will, in the near future, retire from the National City Bank and accept the Vice-Presidency of the Chase National Bank.

Mr. Hepburn has a long and honorable connection with the financial world. He was Superintendent of the Banking Department of the State of New York in 1880-84; was National Bank Examiner for the cities of New York and Brooklyn, and was Comptroller of the Currency under President Harrison's Administration, and has been President of the New York State Bankers' Association and President of the Third National Bank prior to its consolidation with the City.

Hon. H. W. Cannon, President of the Chase National Bank, was Comptroller of the Currency under President Arthur's and portion of President Cleveland's Administrations.

Both Mr. Cannon and Mr. Hepburn have been uniformly successful in whatever they have undertaken. They have long been close personal friends, and their association in the management of the Chase National Bank, already one of the largest and strongest banks in the country, assures to that institution continued growth and prosperity.

The following minute was unanimously adopted at the meeting of the board:

"The directors of the Chase National Bank note with deep sorrow the death, on December 15, 1898, of their associate, Mr. Calvin Stewart Brice.

Mr. Brice has been for more than twelve years a director of this bank, and its loyal, earnest and efficient friend, laboring for its success with unwavering fidelity, characteristic energy and noteworthy intelligence. His services were of unusual value by reason of his strong, clear and original mind, his quick insight and sound judgment, his thorough understanding of the principles of banking and his complete comprehension of all the bank's relations, especially its wider relations with the great currents of finance and business.

His surviving associates here record their warm appreciation of Mr. Brice as a companion and friend. They recall that in the many years of their association with him his part in their intercourse was always pleasant and inspiring. They will long remember the charm and force of his personality, the sum of many brilliant mental gifts and many engaging traits of temperament and character.

*Resolved*, That this minute be noted in full upon the records of the bank, and that an engrossed copy thereof be forwarded to the family of Mr. Brice."

—The President and directors of the Hanover National Bank were the guests of the employees of the bank at their third annual dinner at the Hotel Savoy on the evening of December 17. None but those directly connected with the bank were present. The hosts were 110 in number, and included every employee from the Cashier to the office boy. The guests were President James T. Woodward and Vernon H. Brown, Sigourney W. Fay and James Stillman, of the board of directors.

—It is proposed by the City Comptroller to require city bank depositories to buy bonds of the city equal to the amount of the municipality's funds deposited, a requirement similar to that of the Government when making deposits with National banks.

—The Sixth National Bank has removed from 122<sup>1/2</sup> Broadway to the Astor National Bank Building, 30 West Thirty-fourth street. The control of the Sixth National was bought recently by the Astor National, and a consolidation has already practically taken place.

—Exchanges at the clearing-house on January 4 reached a total of \$815,236,183, the largest

ever recorded. The previous record was made in February, 1851, when the exchanges aggregated \$268,000,000. Balances required to be settled in cash were \$17,163,812 on January 4, also the largest ever reported.

—Messrs. J. & W. Seligman & Co., of this city, and the Anglo-Californian Bank, San Francisco, are reported to be interested in new banks at Honolulu and Manila.

—To provide for the more economical collection of checks and drafts on individuals, firms and banks not members of the clearing-house, a plan has been proposed by John E. Anderson, of 47 Broadway. His proposition is to organize a responsible collection or clearing-house institution with a capital of \$5,000,000 for the purpose of collecting and paying for only the drafts and checks on individuals, firms, and private bankers which have to be presented for payment at the places on which they are drawn.

—Wm. A. Wheelock, formerly President of the Central National Bank, was recently elected temporary President of the State Trust Co., in place of Francis S. Bangs, who resigned on account of ill health. H. M. Francis was made Secretary in place of M. S. Decker, resigned. Wm. A. Wheelock, Elihu Koot and Joel B. Erhardt were elected trustees.

—It is announced that John E. Searles will not be a candidate for re-election as President of the Western National Bank, January 10, and that he will be succeeded by Vice-President Valentine P. Snyder.

—On December 27 the building at 470 Broadway, occupied by the Pacific Bank, was damaged by fire, necessitating the temporary removal of the bank to a building near by. The clerks had been trained for such emergencies, and as a result the bank was able to go on doing business with hardly any interruption.

—Reports are current of a possible consolidation of three Brooklyn banks—the Union, Fulton and Kings County.

—Wm. H. Porter, formerly Vice-President of the Chase National Bank, entered upon his duties as Vice-President of the Chemical National Bank, January 3. Mention of his election to this position has been made heretofore. Mr. Porter received calls from numerous friends who expressed their best wishes for his success in his new position.

—Edward Clifton Brown has been admitted as a partner of the firm of Brown Bros. & Co., New York and London.

—The vacancy in the office of President of the Second National Bank, which has existed for some time, has been filled by the election of James Stillman, who is also President of the National City Bank. Wm. A. Simonson, Second Assistant Cashier of the National City, has been elected Second Vice-President of the Second National.

—Charles A. Stadler, President of the American Malting Co., has been elected Vice-President of the Nineteenth Ward Bank.

—On December 12 the Bowery Savings Bank, which has deposits exceeded by but one bank in the country, announced a reduction of interest on deposits from four to 3½ per cent.

#### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—President T. Quincy Browne has resigned as President of the Atlantic National Bank.

—The Howard National Bank (in liquidation) has removed to 80 Milk street.

—A plan for clearing country checks is under consideration by a committee of the clearing-house. It is proposed to have a system of double clearings at the clearing-house, one in the forenoon, as at present arranged, for the city banks, and another at about 1 P. M. for the country banks. Then, instead of charging anywhere from ten to twenty-five cents each for cashing their own checks and returning them to the banks on which they were presented, it is proposed to have the country banks abolish all charges and have the only cost be that of maintaining the extra clearing at the clearing-house. It is understood that the plan adopted will probably be in accordance with suggestions made by James C. Hallock in the July number of the MAGAZINE.

—A branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia, Halifax, will be established here next month.

**Worcester, Mass.**—The directors of the Mechanics' National Bank have voted to recommend to the annual meeting of the shareholders that the capital stock be reduced from \$350,000 to \$200,000.

**An Aged Banker.**—On December 2 Judge H. K. Baker, Treasurer of the Hallowell (Me.) Savings Institution, observed his ninety-second birthday. He attends to his official duties daily and is undoubtedly the oldest active banker in the country.

**Northampton, Mass.**—The annual meeting of the Northampton Institution for Savings was held December 28. Oliver Walker was re-elected President, and T. G. Spaulding, Secretary. The Treasurer's report showed total deposits of \$3,382,108—a gain of about \$60,000 since the previous statement in October. Total assets are \$3,550,145.

**A Flourishing Savings Bank.**—The Greenfield (Mass.) Savings Bank held its annual meeting on December 12, at which officers were elected. Business for the past year shows the following gains: Increase in number of accounts, 409; in guaranty fund, \$12,000; deposits \$170,000; real estate loans, \$100,000; railroad bonds, \$143,000; assets, \$185,000. The bank had no losses to charge up and has no real estate account.

**Bank to Reorganize.**—At a recent meeting of the shareholders of the failed Hampshire County National Bank, Northampton, Mass., it was reported that the Receiver had collected enough to pay all claims and leave a balance of \$100,000. A resolution was adopted favoring the reorganization of the bank with \$150,000 capital.

**Change in Officers.**—Warren M. King recently resigned as Cashier of the Orange (Mass.) National Bank to take a similar position with the Northampton National Bank. He has been succeeded by C. A. Pike, formerly teller in the Adams National Bank, North Adams. Mr. King was also Treasurer of the Orange Savings Bank, his successor in this place being George W. Andrews, teller of the bank since 1890. Hereafter the National and Savings banks will be separated, but President J. W. Wheeler will continue to be the executive of both institutions.

#### MIDDLE STATES.

**Washington, D. C.**—Deposits of the National banks in the District of Columbia show a gain of about \$3,000,000 in the past year.

**Baltimore, Md.**—The Citizens' Trust and Deposit Co. has been organized with \$2,000,000 capital and \$500,000 paid-in surplus.

—Stockholders of the First National Bank have voted to reduce the capital from \$1,110,000 to \$555,000.

—The capital of the Guardian Trust and Security Co. has been increased from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000.

—James G. Cannon, Vice-President of the Fourth National Bank, New York, delivered an address at the second annual meeting of the Baltimore branch of the National Credit Men's Association, December 9.

**Jersey City, N. J.**—The Hudson County National Bank recently promoted William M. Rouse to be receiving teller and Arthur E. Farrier, assistant. Mr. Rouse made an enviable record last summer as a member of the New Jersey Naval Reserve that manned the auxiliary cruiser Badger. He has been a clerk in the Hudson County National Bank for several years, and like Mr. Farrier, who has also filled a clerkship, he has given much satisfaction.

**New York Banks.**—The annual report of the Superintendent of the New York State Banking Department shows that the total resources of the institutions under supervision amount to \$1,824,549,630—an increase of \$129,294,670 over the previous year.

The report will be printed in full in the next number of the *MAGAZINE*.

**Bond Issue Questioned.**—A trustworthy correspondent informs the *MAGAZINE* that the legality of the recent issue of \$22,000 bonds for water-works, by the village of Bainbridge, N. Y., has been questioned.

**Pittsburg.**—The January number of the "Pittsburg Banker" contains much interesting information in regard to the banks of the city. It shows that the deposits of the National banks are now the highest ever recorded. Since 1893 deposits have made a net increase of seventy-two per cent.

#### SOUTHERN STATES.

**Bank to Incorporate.**—The Dublin (Ga.) Banking Co. reports that it will incorporate as a State bank with \$50,000 paid-up capital.

**Atlanta, Ga.**—The Lowry Banking Company recently declared its usual semi-annual dividend of four per cent., payable January 10. Since its organization, in 1888, it has paid regular four per cent. semi-annual dividends amounting to \$270,000, besides accumulating a large surplus.

**Prosperity in the South.**—Carefully collected data show a large increase in business, mercantile and manufacturing in 1896 over 1897 in Richmond, Va. The bank clearings were \$17,379,845 more and the banking resources increased \$2,000,000.

The jobbing trade increased \$1,353,738, and manufacturing sales exceeded those of 1897 by \$3,531,850. During the year sixty-one new enterprises were started, giving employment to 787 operatives. The iron trade increased twenty-five per cent.

The clearings of the Savannah banks for the year 1896 are the largest ever known. They are \$129,248,854 against \$137,777,401 for 1897. Savannah's clearances have never decreased since the formation of the clearing-house association in 1862.

The bank clearings in Knoxville, Tenn., for 1896 were \$2,681,868,546, an increase over 1897 of \$408,424,086.

**Texas Banks Consolidate.**—Miller, Hall & Co., of Temple, Texas, having purchased the Temple National Bank, will merge their private banking business into it. Officers will be:

President, J. Z. Miller ; Vice-President, H. W. Staton ; Cashier, W. E. Hall ; Assistant Cashier C. P. Dodge.

**North Carolina Banks.**—Information furnished by the State Treasurer of North Carolina shows that from September 20 to December 1 the total resources of the State Savings and private banks in that State increased \$494,394. There are now in the State seventy-two banks—forty-four of them are State banks, twenty-two are private banks and six are Savings banks.

#### WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—The Home Savings Bank reports an increase of capital to \$100,000.

—One hundred and twenty-five guests were entertained at the banquet of the Bankers' Club at Kinsley's on December 10.

—News of the recent robbery of an Ohio bank caused a banker of this city to investigate the efficacy of the time-lock in use in his bank. He found that a few blows over the lock with a heavy piece of wood allowed the doors to be easily opened.

**Springfield, Ohio.**—The Citizens' Bank has commenced business here in the rooms formerly occupied by the Second National Bank, which has gone into liquidation.

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—The Marine Bank will probably reorganize as a National bank with increased capital.

**Interest Reduced.**—The Akron (Ohio) Clearing-House Association recently decided to reduce interest from four to three per cent.

**An Ohio Banked Robbed.**—On December 25 the American National Bank, of Lima, Ohio, was robbed of \$25,000. The time lock was set, and though evidences of the presence of robbers were found, no injury was done to the safe, no explosives or burglars' tools apparently having been used. An assessment has been made on the shareholders to meet the loss.

**Denver, Colo.**—Clarence M. Kellogg, a former Wisconsin banker, has located at Denver as an attorney-at-law, at No. 600 Ernest & Cranmer Building. Mr. Kellogg's career as a banker began in September, 1886, when he was requested to leave Minneapolis, Minn., his home, and take the Assistant Cashiership of the Bank of Galesville, Wisconsin. In January, 1887, he was elected Cashier of that institution, and during the succeeding eight years and a half that he remained in that office had the satisfaction of seeing the business grow to three times its former size.

His well-known business ability caused him to be made executor and administrator, and to be called upon to counsel in settlement of several of the largest estates that had been probated up to that time in that county. In his capacity as a notary he was called upon to take depositions, and did a large amount of conveyancing and examination of abstract of titles.

His enterprise as a citizen and knowledge of corporation affairs caused him to aid in the formation of various organizations, and to act as director and officer in them. Not being a politician, he refused the solicitations of his friends to present his name for legislative honors ; but believing that every citizen was interested in the administration of local affairs, he served them in the office of mayor.

Making a visit to Colorado in 1892, he became impressed with a faith in the future greatness of that State, and in 1895 tendered his resignation as Cashier of the bank. This being refused by the directors, in the following fall he sold out his interests, and in January, 1896, tendered his resignation to take effect the following summer.

His administration as a conservative, careful, and successful banker in the various lines of investments, loaning, collections, and securing of valuable accounts, was attested by the highly complimentary recommendations voluntarily offered him by the directors, in which they stated by resolution : " They believed him to be a thorough business man, competent, honest, and a valuable citizen in any community."

Removing at once to Denver, Colorado, he thought best to supplement his previous legal studies by a regular course, and graduated from the Law Department of the Denver University with the degree of LL.B.

During his sojourn in Denver, he has built several fine modern homes on Capitol Hill, and is now occupying the one on Gilpin street.

In making a speciality of civil practice, it would seem that his business experience in commercial lines, real estate, and probate matters, and knowledge of investments, and of workings of corporations would especially fit him for that line of legal work. His having been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court, entitles him to practice in all the courts of the State.

**Council Bluffs, Ia.**—The Citizens' State Bank has purchased the First National Bank, and hereafter the business of the two banks will be carried on under the latter title.

The Citizens' State Bank commenced business in 1882, beginning with a capital of \$75,000 which was doubled in 1886. Deposits have increased from \$200,000 to \$1,200,000.

The present management of the bank is as follows, and no change will be made: President, J. D. Edmundson; Vice-President, E. L. Shugart; Second Vice-President, F. O. Gleason; Cashier, C. R. Hannan.

By the purchase of the charter the Citizens' Bank adds to its age, the First National Bank having been organized in 1865, and is one of the oldest in the Missouri Valley. It doubled its capital of \$50,000 in 1890. Since organization it has distributed about \$300,000 in dividends.

Capital of the First National Bank is now \$100,000; surplus and profits, \$50,000; total deposits, \$1,550,000; loans and discounts, \$1,240,000. Correspondents will be National Park and National City, New York; Commercial National and Bankers National, Chicago.

**Wichita, Kas.**—On December 13 the Bank of Commerce voted to increase its capital from \$50,000 to \$100,000 and to reorganize under the National banking laws.

**Kentucky Banks Consolidate.**—The Owensboro (Ky.) National Bank and the Deposit Bank, of that place, have been consolidated. The latter bank was organized in 1860 and the former in 1888; both had done a large business. The succeeding bank will be a National institution, and its President will be James Weir, who has occupied a similar relation to the Deposit Bank since its organization.

**Bank President Resigns.**—Ben F. Caldwell, Congressman-elect, who has been for ten years past President of the Farmers' National Bank, Springfield, Ill., has resigned. He gives as his reason that he is opposed to the issue of paper money by the banks, and believes that the issue of such currency is a function belonging solely to the Federal Government. Mr. Caldwell will continue to patronize the bank in a business way as usual. Titus Sudduth has been elected President, Samuel J. Stout, Second Vice-President, and Geo. Pasfield, Jr., a director in place of Mr. Caldwell.

**St. Louis, Mo.**—The National Bank of Commerce has purchased the business of the St. Louis National Bank. The resources of the combined banks will be about \$80,000,000.

**Detroit, Mich.**—Charles F. Collins, who has been Secretary and Treasurer of the Wayne County Savings Bank for several years, was elected President on December 11 to succeed the late S. Dow Elwood. Mr. Collins entered the employ of the bank in 1875, and has been promoted from bookkeeper to other responsible positions. He is regarded as a capable banker and a worthy successor of Mr. Elwood in managing the affairs of this large and prosperous institution.

#### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Changed to a National Bank.**—The Farmers' Bank of Fresno, Cal., has changed its title to the Farmers' National Bank. It was organized as a State bank in 1882 with \$200,000 capital and has been prosperous.

**New Bank in Wyoming.**—The Rawlins (Wyo.) State Bank opened for business January 3. I. C. Miller is President, and J. A. Rendle, Cashier.

**San Francisco.**—Karl Becker, who is regarded as one of the most expert forgers in the country, was sentenced recently to seven years in prison for raising a \$12 check on the Crocker-Woolworth Bank to \$22,000. The check was cashed by the Nevada Bank.

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#### Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.

**Missouri.**—The Central Savings Bank, Saint Joseph, recently suspended payments.

**New Hampshire.**—The Colebrook National Bank closed on December 29. The Cashier is reported under arrest for permitting overdrafts amounting to nearly \$85,000.

The Colebrook Guaranty Savings Bank has also suspended, pending an examination of its affairs. Its Treasurer, Harry F. Bailey, is also Cashier of the Colebrook National Bank.

**New York.**—It is announced that the Fulton County Savings Bank, of Johnstown, will go into voluntary liquidation. The bank is solvent, but the profits were not such as to justify it in continuing business.

**South Carolina.**—The American Savings Bank, Charleston, was placed in the hands of W. M. Connor, Receiver, December 5. Deposits were about \$100,000.

—At a meeting of the stockholders of the Bank of Marion, on December 9, it was decided to close up the affairs of the bank and discontinue business. The bank is reported as entirely solvent, and the liquidation is voluntary.

**Texas.**—The Tyler Banking Co. closed December 14. One of the partners has been arrested on the charge of receiving deposits knowing the bank was insolvent.

**Utah.**—Owing to the death of the senior partner, the banking firm of Swasey & Martin, Provo City, has gone into liquidation, arranging with another bank to pay off its deposits.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

- 5157—Calcasieu National Bank, Lake Charles, Louisiana. Capital, \$100,000.  
5158—National Hamilton Bank, Boston, Massachusetts. Capital, \$500,000.  
5159—Western National Bank, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Ter. Capital, \$50,000.  
5160—Citizens' National Bank, Springfield, Ohio. Capital, \$100,000.  
5161—Louisville National Banking Company, Louisville, Kentucky. Capital, \$250,000.  
5162—Farmers' National Bank, Fresno, California. Capital, \$150,000.  
5163—Colonial National Bank, Boston, Massachusetts. Capital, \$1,000,000.  
5164—National Exchange Bank, Wheeling, West Virginia. Capital, \$200,000.  
5165—Bedford National Bank, Bedford, Iowa. Capital, \$50,000.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

- First National Bank, Hattiesburg, Mississippi; by C. J. Gray, *et al.*  
National Bank of Commerce, Wichita, Kansas; by A. C. Jobes, *et al.*  
Merchants' National Bank, Carthage, New York; by A. L. Upham, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Tulsa, Indian Territory; by Oliver Bagby, *et al.*  
Uvalde National Bank, Uvalde, Texas; by W. W. Collier, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### CALIFORNIA.

FRESNO—Farmers' National Bank; (successor to Farmers' Bank); capital, \$150,000 Pres., Adolph Kutner; Cas., Walter Shoemaker.

#### COLORADO.

STEAMBOAT SPRINGS—Bank of Steamboat Springs; capital, \$10,000; Pres., J. W. Hugus; Vice-Pres., J. C. Davis, Cas., C. A. Seymour; Asst. Cas., Wm. B. Goddard.

#### GEORGIA.

GRIFFIN—Mangham Bros.  
OCILLA—Bank of Ocilla.

#### ILLINOIS.

ALBION—Edwards County State Bank (Stewart, Emmerson & Co.); successors to Edwards County Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
AMBOY—Amboy Bank (Henry Klein); successor to Cobden Exchange Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
CHAMPAIGN—Commercial Bank.  
GRANT PARK—Yellowhead Bank (H. Kramer).  
HAMMOND—Dighton & Thompson; Cas., J. A. Vent.  
LA GRANGE—La Grange State Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
MANSFIELD—State Bank (successor to Commercial Bank); capital, \$30,000; Pres., W. H. Firke; Cas., J. C. Langley.  
NEW BOSTON—Olcott, Whitham & Co.  
PONTIAC—Pontiac State Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., D. S. Meyers; Vice-Pres., C. W. Sterry; Cas., W. F. Van Buskirk.  
RAVENSWOOD—Ravenswood Exch. Bank;

Pres., E. A. Ziehme; Vice-Pres., William Ingram; Cas., E. M. Richmond.

WAPPELLA—Wapella Bank.

WARSAW—Hill-Dodge Banking Co. (successors to Hill, Dodge & Co.); capital, \$100,000; Pres., James B. Dodge; Cas., Wm. A. Dodge.

#### INDIANA.

ALBION—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$50,000.  
JONESBORO—Citizens' bank; Cas., B. F. Barze.  
PENDLETON—Bank of Pendleton.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

HOLDENVILLE—Bank of Holdenville; Pres., A. B. Dunlap; Vice-Pres., A. J. Dunlap; Cas., W. J. Smith.

#### IOWA.

BEDFORD—Bedford National Bank (successor to Bedford Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. E. Crum; Cas., Ed. E. Cass.  
GLADSBROOK—Citizens' Bank (J. G. Moeller).  
INDIANOLA—Worth Savings Bank.  
MCCALLSBURG—Farmers' Bank; Pres., A. N. Drake; Cas., C. B. Boylan.  
WALLINGFORD—Bank of Wallingford; capital, \$5,000; Cas., L. R. Woods.

#### KANSAS.

DODGE CITY—State Bank (successor to Bank of Dodge City); capital, \$10,000.  
ELSMORE—State Bank; capital, \$4,000.  
HILL CITY—Graham County State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., I. B. Parker; Cas., L. Messick.

ST. PAUL—Stillwell State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

#### KENTUCKY.

ADAIRSVILLE—R. P. Townsend & Co.; capital, \$10,000.

BERRY—Berry Deposit Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., L. D. Huffman; Vice-Pres., J. E. Renaker; Sec., N. S. Terry.

HICKMAN—Farmers and Merchants' Bank (successor to Farmers and Merchants' National Bank); capital, \$20,000.

LEXINGTON—Lexington City National Bank; James M. Graves, Cas., deceased.

LOUISVILLE—Louisville National Banking Co. (successor to Louisville Banking Co.); capital, \$250,000; Pres., Theodore Harris; Cas., John H. Leathers.

SCOTTSVILLE—Allen County Bank; capital, \$7,500; Pres., T. S. Gardner; Cas., A. S. Gardner; Asst. Cas., H. P. Gardner.

#### MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE—Citizens' Trust and Deposit Co.; capital, \$2,000,000; Pres., John A. Tompkins; Sec.-Treas., Geo. Norbury Mackenzie.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

BOSTON—National Hamilton Bank; capital, \$500,000; Pres., Henry G. Denny; Frank Tent, Cas.—Colonial National Bank (successor to Manufacturers and Continental National Banks consolidated); capital, \$1,000,000; Pres., D. J. Lord; Cas., F. E. Seaver.—Bank of Nova Scotia (branch); W. E. Stavert, Manager.

#### MICHIGAN.

KALAMAZOO—E. W. Bowman & Co.; E. W. Bowman, Mgr.

LINDEN—Linden Banking Co. (Latourette, Forte, Phillips & Cook, Props.); Cas., E. M. Newell.

TWining—Twining Bank (Whittemore & Phinney); Cas., A. H. Phinney.

#### MINNESOTA.

AVOCA—Avoca State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Cas., B. A. Stratton.

CASS LAKE—Bank of Cass Lake; capital, \$10,000; Pres., C. W. Hastings; Cas., C. C. Hastings.

FRANKLIN—Bank of Franklin; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Hans Gronnerud; Vice-Pres., F. W. Orth; Cas., H. A. Reed.

HARTLAND—Bank of Hartland; capital, \$10,000; Pres., J. C. Cheney.

HOWARD LAKE—Bank of Howard Lake; capital, \$15,000; Pres., C. M. Buck; Cas., Lemuel McGrew.

PLATO—Bank of Plato; capital, \$3,000; Pres., Henry L. Simons; Cas., F. S. Mayer.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

GULFPORT—Bank of Gulfport; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. W. Bell; Vice-Pres., S. S. Bullis; Cas., A. L. Thornton.

LAUREL Bank of Laurel; Pres., W. B. Rogers; Vice-Pres., P. S. Gardner; Cas., Geo. Bacon.

SCRANTON—Merchants' and Marine Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. E. Frederick; Vice-Pres., L. P. Dejean; Cas., E. J. Jane; Asst. Cas., Ray M. Miller.

#### MISSOURI.

KANSAS CITY—Kansas City Produce Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Geo. W. Robinson; Cas., A. E. Martin.

LACLEDE—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$10,000.

PIEDMONT—Exchange Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Guy M. Withers; Cas., Charles H. Jones.

#### NEBRASKA.

HALLAM—Hallam Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Gerhard Rippen; Cas., Jno. J. Meyer; Asst. Cas., G. H. Ruhaak.

#### NEW YORK.

CINCINNATUS—Corning & Haskins; Cas., B. R. Corning.

NEW YORK—Blodget, Merritt & Co., 15 Wall street.—T. M. Hawley & Co.—Dominick & Williams, 40 Wall street.—Seligman & Van Antwerp, 22 Broadway.—E. B. Havens & Co., 10 Wall street.

RENSSELAER—John F. Munger.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

GREENSBORO—Greensboro Loan and Trust Co.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

KINDRED—Kindred State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., W. H. Simmons; Vice-Pres., J. H. Gale; Cas., W. N. Parkhurst.

PEMBINA—Merchants' Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., H. L. Crandell; Vice-Pres., J. M. Chisholm; Cas., H. C. Carr.

WISHEK—First State Bank; capital, \$3,500; Pres., J. H. Wishek; Cas., A. P. Guy.

#### OHIO.

DEFIANCE—Produce Exchange Banking Co. (branch of Cleveland); Cas., Charles J. Daoust.

HILLSBORO—Hillsboro Bank; Pres., R. S. Evans; Vice-Pres., John Roads; Cas., Jno. Hullitt; Asst. Cas., J. W. Evans.

SPRINGFIELD—Citizens' National Bank (successor to Second National Bank); capital, \$100,000; Pres., Edward L. Buchwalter; Vice-Pres., J. S. Harshman; Cas., J. G. Benallack.

#### OKLAHOMA.

JEFFERSON—Bank of Jefferson; capital, \$5,000; Pres., A. J. Arnold; Cas., F. H. En-tricken.

OKLAHOMA CITY—Western National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., M. L. Turner; Cas., F. R. Holt.

WEATHERFORD—State Exchange Bank; capital, \$50,000.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

EAST GREENVILLE—Perkiomen National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., F. L. Fluck; Cas., R. E. Erb.

## SOUTH CAROLINA.

ANDERSON—People's Bank.  
 MARION—Marion Bank; capital, \$25,000;  
 Pres., H. C. Graham; Cas., P. G. Bethea.

## TEXAS.

DUBLIN—Reynolds Bros.; Pres., G. T. Reynolds; Vice-Pres., W. D. Reynolds; Cas., J. P. Boyle.

GEORGETOWN—Merchants and Farmers' Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., A. A. Booty; Cas., Jno. L. Booty.

NEW BOSTON—Bowie County Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Geo. T. Lemons; Cas., W. E. Stewart.

TYLER—J. L. Jester & Co.

## WASHINGTON.

REPUBLIC—Bank of Republic (A. W. Strong & Co.)

## CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

## CALIFORNIA.

EUREKA—Humboldt County Bank; Fred. Georgeron, Cas. and Sec., in place of G. A. Belcher.

## DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

WASHINGTON—Union Savings Bank; E. Q. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of I. G. Kimball; I. G. Kimball, Treas., in place of John B. Sleman, resigned; D. F. Harris, Ass't Treas.

## GEORGIA.

AUGUSTA—Irish-American Dime Savings Bank; Edward J. Doris, elected director.

CORDELE—First National Bank; Jos. E. Bivins, Pres., deceased.

## IDAHO.

LEWISTON—Lewiston National Bank; Daniel M. White, Pres., deceased.

POCATELLO—First National Bank; J. A. Murray, Pres., in place of Charles Bunting.

## ILLINOIS.

AVON—Tompkins' Bank; Stephen Tompkins, deceased.

BELLEVILLE—First National Bank; C. Andel, Cas.

CHICAGO—Home Savings Bank; capital stock increased to \$130,000. — First National Bank; Edward F. Lawrence, director, deceased.

PITTSFIELD—First National Bank; Harry Higbee, Pres., in place of C. P. Chapman, deceased; Augustus Dow, Vice-Pres., in place of Harry Higbee.

QUINCY—First National Bank; consolidated with State Savings, Loan and Trust Co., under latter title.

SPRINGFIELD—Farmers' National Bank; Titus Sudduth, Pres., in place of Ben. F. Caldwell, resigned; Samuel J. Stout, Second Vice-Pres.

## INDIANA.

COVINGTON—Covington Banking Co.; Peter M. Layton, deceased.

## WEST VIRGINIA.

WHEELING—National Exchange Bank; capital, \$200,000; Pres., J. N. Vance; Cas., Lawrence E. Sands.

## WYOMING.

RAWLINS—Rawlins State Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., I. C. Miller; Vice-Pres., Wm. Daly Cas., J. A. Rendle.

## CANADA.

## ONTARIO.

COLDWATER—J. C. McKeeggie & Co., B. P. Ritchie, Mgr.

THESSELON—Hurst & Burk.

## QUEBEC.

ORMSTOWN—Banque Ville-Marie; P. H. M. Somerville, Mgr.

## NEW BRUNSWICK.

FREDERICTON—Bank of Montreal.

SEYMOUR—First National Bank; James L. Gardiner, Pres., deceased.

## IOWA.

COUNCIL BLUFFS—First National Bank; charter purchased by Citizens' State Bank, business continued under former title.

HAMPTON—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; J. T. Glaze, Pres. in place of D. B. Parks.

MARSHALLTOWN—Marshalltown State Bank; A. F. Balch, Pres. in place of Fred J. Grumme, deceased; P. S. Balch, Cas.; C. C. Trine, Asst. Cas.

WAVERLY—First National Bank; H. S. Burr, Pres. in place of J. H. Bowman; A. F. Bodeker, Cas. in place of H. S. Burr; Henry Kasemeier, Asst. Cas. in place of A. F. Bodeker.

## KANSAS.

OSBORNE—First National Bank; P. G. Walker, Cas. in place of F. B. Denman.

SEDGWICK—Citizens' Bank; W. M. Congdon Pres., deceased.

## KENTUCKY.

OWENSBORO—Owensboro National Bank; title changed to National Deposit Bank; consolidated with Deposit Bank; capital, \$325,000; E. G. Buckner, Cas. in place of Lawson Reno.

## MAINE.

PORTLAND—H. M. Payson & Co.; Henry M Payson, deceased.

WATERVILLE—Merchants' National Bank; Edmund F. Webb, Vice-Pres., deceased.

## MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE—Guardian Trust and Security Co.; capital increased to \$1,000,000; Daniel Miller, Vice-Pres., deceased.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

BOSTON—Franklin Savings Bank; Augustus Parker, Pres.; Martin L. Bradford and James E. Whitney, Vice-Pres. — Hamilton National Bank; C. D. Richards, Acting



Cas. in place of Frank Trent, Cas.—Provident Institution for Savings; Augustus Lowell, Pres.—Massachusetts Loan and Trust Co.; Henry A. Rice, director, deceased.—Lowell & Parker; business continued under the name of E. E. Parker & Co.—Lee, Higginson & Co.; Harry K. White and Geo. L. Peabody admitted to firm.—E. C. Hodges & Co.; Frederick Swift admitted.—C. A. Putnam & Co.; A. W. Hale, retired.—Beacon Trust Co.; F. H. Prince elected director.

**FALL RIVER**—Five Cents Savings Bank; Charles S. Waring, Sec.

**GREENFIELD**—Greenfield Savings Bank; Wm. G. Packard, Sec.

**LOWELL**—Railroad National Bank; James Francis, director, deceased.

**NEWBURYPORT**—Merchants' National Bank; Albert W. Greenleaf, Cas., deceased; Wm. Daley, Asst. Cas.

**NORTHAMPTON**—Northampton National Bank; Warren M. King, Cas.

**ORANGE**—Orange National Bank; Charles A. Pike, Cas. in place of Warren M. King.—Orange Savings Bank; Geo. W. Andrews, Treas. in place of Warren M. King.

**SPRINGFIELD**—First National Bank; John M. Smith, director, deceased.

**WILLIAMSTOWN**—Williamstown National Bank; Arthur L. Perry, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**WORCESTER**—City National Bank; Nathaniel Paine, Pres. in place of Calvin Foster, deceased; Bertice F. Sawyer, Cas. in place of Nathaniel Paine.

**MICHIGAN.**

**DETROIT**—Wayne County Savings Bank; Charles F. Collins, Pres.; D. M. Ferry, 1st Vice-Pres.; Jerome Croul, 2d Vice-Pres.; Alfred K. Kiefer, Sec. and Treas.; E. H. Collins, Asst. Sec. and Treas.—Peninsular Savings Bank; T. C. Sherwood, Pres., resigned; J. A. Latta, Asst. Cas.

**EAST SAGINAW**—American Commercial and Savings Bank; William L. Webber, Pres.

**MINNESOTA.**

**CALEDONIA**—Caledonia Commercial Bank; capital, \$25,000; W. E. Beddow, Pres.; T. A. Beddow, Cas.

**MISSOURI.**

**BRUNSWICK**—Chariton County Exchange Bank; Robert H. Hoge, Pres., deceased.

**ST. JOSEPH**—Central Savings Bank; Louis Hax, Pres. and director, deceased.

**ST. LOUIS**—National Bank of Commerce; absorbed St. Louis National Bank; J. Nickerson, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of S. M. Dodd, resigned.—Lafayette Bank; Frederick Arendes, Pres., deceased.

**NEBRASKA.**

**OMAHA**—Union National Bank; A. R. Dufréne, director, deceased.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**PORTSMOUTH**—National Mechanics and Trad-

ers' Bank; Washington Freeman, Pres., deceased.

**ROCHESTER**—Norway Plains Savings Bank; Charles Grunfield, Pres., deceased.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**FREEHOLD**—Freehold Banking Co.; William Statelat, Pres., deceased.

**HOBOKEN**—First National Bank; William B. Goodspeed, Cas., deceased.

**NEW YORK.**

**AMITYVILLE**—Bank of Amityville; Joel S. Davis, Cas., deceased.

**GLOVERSVILLE**—Fulton County Nat. Bank; Frank S. Sexton, Asst. Cas.

**NEW YORK**—Second National Bank; James Stillman, Pres.; W. A. Simonson, Second Vice-Pres.—Chase National Bank; Calvin S. Brice, director, deceased—State Trust Co.; Wm. A. Wheelock, temporary Pres. in place of Francis S. Bangs, resigned; H. M. Francis, Sec. in place of M. S. Decker, resigned.—Nineteenth Ward Bank; Chas. A. Stadler, Vice-Pres.—Chemical National Bank; William H. Porter, Vice-Pres.—Naumberg, Lauer & Co.; succeeded by E. Naumberg & Co.—Henderson & Co.; Nathaniel T. Robb, admitted to firm.—Reed & Flagg; succeeded by Flagg & Worcester.—H. B. Hollins & Co.; James A. Harriman, retired from firm.—Lathrop, Smith & Oliphant; succeeded by Lathrop & Smith.—Speyer & Co.; William Salomon, retired from firm.—Asiel & Co.; L. S. Frankenheimer retired from firm; S. S. Prince and Wm. Erdmann admitted.—Richard Irvin & Co.; Gustav Heineken, Jr., retired.—Simon Borg & Co.; Myron I. Borg admitted to firm.—James D. Smith & Co.; Geo. W. Butta, admitted to firm.—Brown Bros. & Co.; Edward Clifton Brown admitted to firm.—Sutro, Scholle & Co.; Melville J. Scholle, retired from firm.—Chase National Bank; Oliver H. Payne and Grant B. Schley elected directors.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**LUMBERTON**—Bank of Lumberton; A. W. McLean, Pres. in place of T. A. McNeil, resigned.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**WILLOW CITY**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; V. B. Noble, Pres.; Reuben Noble, Vice-Pres.

**OHIO.**

**CINCINNATI**—Brighton German Bank; Max Mosler, Pres.; F. L. Haffner, Vice-Pres.; L. Winters, Cas.; John J. Heidacher, Asst. Cas.

**GEORGETOWN**—First National Bank; Ben B. Whiteman, Cas. in place of W. S. Whiteman, deceased.

**SIDNEY**—Citizens' Bank; James A. Lamb, Pres., deceased.

**TOLEDO**—Merchant's National Bank; Edwin

	ALBANY, N. Y.			BALTIMORE, MD.			BOSTON, MASS.		
	July 14, 1886.	Sept. 12, 1886.	Dec. 1, 1886.	July 14, 1886.	Sept. 20, 1886.	Dec. 1, 1886.	July 14, 1886.	Sept. 20, 1886.	Dec. 1, 1886.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$8,663,798	\$8,650,480	\$7,166,059	\$35,298,984	\$34,440,088	\$35,220,604	\$161,165,619	\$166,983,052	\$171,172,397
Overdrafts.....	2,588	6,409	8,435	29,911	43,459	28,114	116,776	100,261	225,725
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	300,000	350,000	350,000	2,698,500	2,698,500	2,915,000	7,282,000	7,077,000	6,387,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	150,000	141,000	618,000	1,823,200	2,662,980	3,442,500	4,961,000	4,961,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	33,750	158,000	148,000	600	164,000	5,340	779,000	184,500	383,200
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	86,996	36,996	37,250	298,175	328,569	323,758	338,445	337,526	455,564
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,102,087	1,063,122	891,253	2,414,762	2,150,843	2,263,021	9,063,541	9,386,627	8,180,358
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	296,210	290,500	279,562	2,330,328	2,330,328	2,332,456	2,362,456	2,331,817	2,458,888
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	86,571	86,571	128,192	217,522	217,522	217,522	441,999	444,444	558,338
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,513,833	1,230,631	2,661,418	2,561,418	2,766,598	3,064,173	14,469,767	13,149,365	16,108,789
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,214,041	565,572	871,539	4,526,612	5,071,770	4,380,504	86,510,276	1,146,052	2,044,679
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,636,745	2,150,972	3,440,853	5,773,138	5,071,770	4,380,504	86,510,276	48,168,745	48,168,745
Checks and other cash items.....	65,044	126,452	61,833	213,632	145,921	157,640	386,985	386,985	454,873
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	100,860	186,875	184,000	1,468,316	1,890,963	3,367,178	7,967,479	12,625,509	13,963,778
Bills of other National banks.....	77,730	51,158	59,528	193,417	197,867	176,528	1,012,290	1,054,044	1,160,544
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,298	1,225	1,420	16,348	12,015	21,664	21,198	19,452	21,452
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	595,627	549,460	1,064,771	1,064,771	1,064,771	1,068,180	5,725,987	4,903,314	4,861,981
Gold Treasury certificates.....	890,920	380,750	380,750	853,820	423,720	453,290	1,525,987	1,546,670	1,546,670
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	19,957	17,566	20,747	70,844	52,296	60,533	60,533	58,083	54,613
Silver dollars.....	34,417	31,618	36,410	1,077,922	1,176,170	1,181,118	1,800,066	2,063,919	2,073,068
Silver Treasury certificates.....	14,017	16,538	24,596	69,801	69,801	98,677	163,179	129,698	163,658
Legal-tender notes.....	451,276	367,310	379,731	87,802	1,027,068	1,251,411	4,553,237	5,073,766	6,310,876
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....				920,000	810,000	1,475,000	100,000	230,000	570,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	13,500	15,750	16,750	119,475	131,432	181,175	323,946	315,945	308,822
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	5,600	.....	193,165	30,832	.....	2,105	1,203,081	143,374	203,622
<b>Total.....</b>	\$17,584,438	\$16,342,701	\$16,354,195	\$59,691,897	\$59,750,298	\$63,347,572	\$293,183,212	\$273,810,573	\$304,094,370
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$13,243,290	\$13,243,290	\$13,243,290	\$48,150,000	\$48,150,000	\$49,650,000
Surplus fund.....	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,372,000	6,106,875	5,106,875	5,106,875	14,741,325	14,029,275	14,411,275
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	187,491	191,496	214,637	1,236,248	1,314,081	1,314,081	6,553,770	6,443,246	6,184,883
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	259,280	301,760	301,940	2,383,740	2,384,150	2,663,280	6,404,120	6,250,362	6,114,022
State bank notes outstanding.....	3,694,200	3,776,594	4,985,114	4,804	4,504	4,504	41,554,197	42,244,244	51,093,954
Due to other National banks.....	1,867,063	1,703,770	1,940,654	2,069,824	2,148,290	2,038,611	21,226,738	21,718,816	24,310,319
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,841	2,841	757	181,568	181,568	181,568	27,389	27,683	30,340
Dividends unpaid.....	8,461,743	7,297,254	6,331,521	27,329,976	28,873,361	28,724,070	128,016,400	133,010,955	148,293,349
Individual deposits.....	61,170	149,716	251,821	615,635	1,370,507	2,453,267	469,451	2,583,163	3,705,209
U. S. deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	18,829	4,788	4,916	.....	.....	.....	47,233	61,108	79,671
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	21,788	21,788	.....	853,000	100,000	293,000	693,811	504,717	430,543
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	94,731	141,560	146,336	113,567	273,955	104,469
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	\$17,584,438	\$16,342,701	\$16,354,195	\$59,691,897	\$59,750,298	\$63,347,572	\$293,183,212	\$273,810,573	\$304,094,370
Average reserve held.....	\$3,464,236	\$3,126,011	\$3,112,011	\$9,949,887	\$11,123,011	\$10,944,011	\$36,741,011	\$35,461,011	\$37,361,011
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,360,267	\$1,321,166	\$1,321,166	\$4,914,177	\$4,633,623	\$4,633,623	\$16,723,958	\$16,337,450	\$17,344,632

	BROOKLYN, N. Y.			CHICAGO, ILL.			CINCINNATI, OHIO.		
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$18,017,805	\$10,965,008	\$11,323,477	\$107,216,641	\$105,837,297	\$104,463,753	\$23,376,514	\$23,994,897	\$23,997,842
Overdrafts.....	1,653	1,022	922	161,718	233,761	232,060	13,884	13,884	8,497
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	300,000	642,000	1,800,000	1,680,000	1,900,000	4,067,500	4,067,500	4,067,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	550,000	643,000	1,043,000	2,195,000	2,447,500	2,898,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	9,000	9,000	9,000	306,000	449,190	401,480	68,380	818,500	1,453,880
U. S. bonds on U. S. bonds.....	20,875	20,800	20,800	88,375	70,747	53,114	986,580	986,580	984,984
Stocks, securities, etc.....	6,111,980	2,575,828	2,410,806	9,181,452	9,000,764	478,174	5,546,097	5,546,097	5,891,107
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	200,254	601,904	601,904	795,064	795,064	795,144	1,008,182	1,008,182	1,008,182
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	92,500	92,500	92,500	806,194	806,194	806,194	205,404	205,404	205,404
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	57,149	77,078	77,078	678,706	723,241	712,840	3,778,240	3,778,240	3,778,240
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	228,486	167,388	66,289	23,908,772	23,287,666	4,063,896	4,063,896	4,063,896	4,063,896
Due from State banks and bankers.....	67,649	80,149	108,342	1,480,049	1,394,188	1,552,296	5,627,788	5,627,788	5,627,788
Due from approved reserve agents.....	3,014,988	2,419,297	2,419,297	5,128,068	7,046,091	10,068,974	6,775,897	6,775,897	6,775,897
Due from other cash items.....	801,913	73,415	108,342	532,712	149,068	281,110	148,770	208,774	108,180
Checks and other cash items.....	187,282	161,714	2,249,457	6,873,961	6,873,961	9,894,504	293,982	293,982	278,794
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	8,285	8,516	110,180	1,480,049	1,480,049	1,552,296	346,686	477,622	443,072
Bills of other National Banks.....			10,944	32,569	22,543	27,548	6,594	6,594	6,594
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....				82,569	22,543	27,548	5,022	5,022	5,022
* Fractional money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	840,510	702,244	676,149	16,408,484	17,408,484	18,305,651	1,388,651	1,388,651	1,468,718
Gold Treasury certificates.....	178,000	173,700	173,000	3,097,050	3,139,970	2,791,880	304,130	307,300	296,160
Gold clearing-house certificates.....									
Silver dollars.....	18,000	19,000	36,488	206,657	196,162	280,856	62,891	60,274	68,495
Silver Treasury certificates.....	816,981	630,387	543,688	3,674,556	2,481,833	2,008,248	552,777	604,916	600,261
Silver fractional coin.....	83,728	83,885	64,110	228,657	192,268	271,069	24,516	24,261	27,189
Legal-tender notes.....	1,309,233	898,584	970,785	14,707,568	15,219,615	17,309,080	1,878,996	2,112,233	2,404,494
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....				2,120,000	1,380,000	1,480,000	600,000	610,000	570,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	27,180	28,980	28,980	49,500	71,100	81,000	223,457	214,927	224,167
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	30,170	1,050	12,500	575,019	822,688	68,060	309,310	2,456	1,408
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$23,846,142</b>	<b>\$21,965,855</b>	<b>\$23,359,324</b>	<b>\$197,947,738</b>	<b>\$202,064,239</b>	<b>\$219,466,984</b>	<b>\$55,055,294</b>	<b>\$55,024,877</b>	<b>\$57,652,785</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,362,000	\$1,362,000	\$1,362,000	\$19,450,000	\$19,450,000	\$18,450,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000
Surplus fund.....	2,800,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	9,374,900	9,374,900	9,374,900	2,715,000	2,715,000	2,715,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	960,799	436,332	447,886	1,962,866	2,311,197	2,543,240	1,154,647	1,154,647	1,154,737
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	572,960	560,960	577,800	588,066	1,029,285	1,215,676	4,303,460	4,302,786	4,275,985
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	1,846	55,000,000	55,000,000	60,401,941	9,776,472	10,615,589	10,615,589
Due to other National banks.....	400,481	318,496	419,806	30,066,599	35,102,422	38,517,981	4,380,648	4,382,287	4,382,287
Due to State banks and bankers.....	469,976	447,800	380,906	21,480	21,480	68,982,279	1,917	1,917	6,889
Dividends unpaid.....	4,987	1,068	428	80,565,684	84,004,488	68,982,279	22,078,172	22,583,500	22,583,500
Individual deposits.....	18,170,658	16,859,266	17,084,683	687,078	687,078	988,514	1,860,802	2,277,415	2,681,088
U. S. deposits.....	171,844	174,728	178,976	588,278	588,278	687,078	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	27,725	28,276	19,479	21,077	80,771	84,645	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	22,963	20,651	20,651	12,500	.....	13,000	912,000	961,100	1,080,794
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$23,846,142</b>	<b>\$21,965,855</b>	<b>\$23,359,324</b>	<b>\$197,947,738</b>	<b>\$202,064,239</b>	<b>\$219,466,984</b>	<b>\$55,055,294</b>	<b>\$55,024,877</b>	<b>\$57,652,785</b>
Average reserve held.....	34.02 p. c.	34.08 p. c.	33.08 p. c.	31.25 p. c.	31.47 p. c.	32.17 p. c.	33.84 p. c.	33.84 p. c.	31.83 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,246,755	\$3,011,761	\$2,844,188	\$40,768,684	\$40,323,288	\$42,967,215	\$4,658,952	\$4,967,313	\$5,513,307

	CLEVELAND, OHIO.		DES MOINES, IOWA.		DETROIT, MICH.	
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.
Loans and discounts.....	\$30,245,845	\$30,737,784	\$8,490,118	\$8,812,163	\$14,953,898	\$14,711,635
Overdrafts.....	25,510	48,238	10,288	23,871	2,534	2,886
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,490,000	1,480,000	948,000	967,000	1,400,000	1,400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	60,000	60,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	200,000	71,400	50,000	113,890	198,200	297,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	83,000	81,000	32,000	32,000	208,067	212,844
Stocks, securities, etc.....	983,949	648,892	290,216	298,357	986,419	1,018,944
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	608,173	606,898	838,271	853,041	30,038	30,038
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	910,113	910,113	183,041	183,041	874,744	882,108
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,453,906	2,453,906	223,820	223,820	178,096	178,096
Due from State banks and bankers.....	5,773,076	5,773,076	53,271	53,271	318,096	318,096
Due from approved reserve agents.....	118,574	118,574	694,397	694,397	401,451	401,451
Checks and other cash items.....	648,082	278,880	25,781	25,781	3,947,084	3,680,184
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	197,450	161,206	72,788	72,788	201,283	201,283
Bills of other National banks.....	6,791	6,791	19,427	19,427	298,091	298,091
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,625,407	1,625,407	4,063	4,063	143,246	143,246
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:.....	2,835,170	2,835,170	2,054	2,054	11,381	5,774
Gold coin.....	1,625,407	1,625,407	147,912	147,912	1,880,852	1,405,587
Gold Treasury certificates.....	2,835,170	2,835,170	4,850	4,850	20,000	20,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	112,428	102,121	5,870	5,870	19,500	19,500
Silver dollars.....	184,448	205,030	21,284	21,284	8,614	8,614
Silver Treasury certificates.....	30,986	31,611	16,272	16,272	12,075	12,075
Silver fractional coin.....	1,700,750	1,470,022	220,804	220,804	6,367	6,367
Legal-tender notes.....	68,550	70,680	14,485	14,485	15,436	15,436
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	108,900	20,000	47,300	47,300	50,000	50,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....						
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$47,655,082</b>	<b>\$49,284,727</b>	<b>\$6,051,596</b>	<b>\$6,068,747</b>	<b>\$24,208,888</b>	<b>\$24,514,923</b>
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,400,000	\$3,400,000	\$900,000	\$900,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000
Surplus fund.....	2,161,500	2,161,500	221,500	221,500	605,000	605,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	564,068	645,213	55,473	55,985	232,607	232,607
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	1,321,960	1,408,880	806,417	804,067	1,123,880	1,123,880
Due to State National banks.....	4,063,319	5,308,303	5,278,385	5,278,385	2,991,809	2,991,809
Due to other National banks.....	8,185,490	8,118,725	3,145,917	3,145,917	5,401,346	5,401,346
Dividends unpaid.....	1,455	1,072	3,973	3,973	4,697	4,697
Individual deposits.....	25,368,623	26,417,863	7,801	7,801	3,685	3,685
U. S. deposits.....	91,841	38,243	1,063,408	1,063,408	11,249,487	11,249,487
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	14,705	23,689	50,028	50,028	276,984	276,984
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	100,000	100,000	.....	.....	25,277	25,277
Bills payable.....	811,619	806,186	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$47,655,082</b>	<b>\$49,284,727</b>	<b>\$6,051,596</b>	<b>\$6,068,747</b>	<b>\$24,208,888</b>	<b>\$24,514,923</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$8,321,313	\$8,668,460	\$2,476,786	\$2,476,786	\$8,451,842	\$8,377,318
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,921,313	\$3,921,313	\$2,054	\$2,054	\$11,381	\$5,774

	HOUSTON, TEXAS.			KANSAS CITY, MO.			LINCOLN, NEB.		
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RECEIPTS.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,473,941	\$2,555,789	\$2,107,149	\$13,919,947	\$13,378,513	\$18,699,808	\$2,019,296	\$2,012,565	\$2,037,732
Overdrafts.....	18,815	385,775	364,664	107,071	497,000	186,568	12,604	13,073	14,680
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	260,000	260,000	260,000	50,000	623,000	609,800	150,000	160,000	160,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	314,500	609,800	609,800	.....	60,000	60,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	304,500	237,200	222,920	.....	38,000	40,160
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	22,863	22,800	22,063	36,000	43,945	45,478	.....	5,500	5,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....	20,290	22,514	23,176	1,645,033	1,392,946	1,252,054	.....	6,500	91,091
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	183,714	133,564	133,436	16,366	13,001	13,000	.....	8,645	8,645
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	131,968	121,968	123,251	418,298	385,227	439,968	.....	119,036	116,225
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	418,063	813,804	759,680	919,853	2,452,126	2,197,818	.....	244,712	172,110
Due from State banks and bankers.....	48,608	75,206	70,801	1,515,909	2,043,456	2,197,818	.....	118,908	67,976
Due from approved reserve agents.....	512,838	423,866	423,866	3,047,740	4,401,072	4,728,010	.....	399,255	196,969
Checks and other cash items.....	3,815	10,048	76,637	69,994	47,620	21,542	.....	21,662	19,543
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	18,134	11,214	9,913	723,716	731,888	731,888	.....	24,220	13,540
Bills of other National banks.....	62,239	33,569	37,373	180,440	163,511	303,760	.....	7,947	24,963
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	4,372	2,700	1,468	5,089	6,893	6,156	.....	2,764	2,338
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	393,216	306,828	289,438	890,680	953,477	1,019,560	.....	89,780	99,980
Gold Treasury certificates.....	133,940	137,080	137,080	50,000	25,000	25,000	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	38,366	9,087	66,054	66,368	96,559	199,536	.....	12,712	16,062
Silver dollars.....	76,015	142,387	104,698	1,025,464	432,633	603,286	.....	28,122	28,122
Silver Treasury certificates.....	11,951	13,247	10,748	22,457	37,089	38,441	.....	14,662	13,915
Silver fractional coin.....	643,516	1,233,218	637,147	1,032,160	951,122	876,100	.....	115,306	89,034
Legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	\$5,402,363	\$4,204,725	\$4,321,803	\$32,170,375	\$32,570,168	\$34,000,945	\$3,287,323	\$3,411,867	\$3,287,230
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$800,000	\$800,000	\$700,000
Surplus fund.....	377,200	377,200	377,200	573,000	508,000	618,000	.....	15,000	15,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	87,740	133,688	104,807	303,371	301,136	414,282	.....	4,807	14,370
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	138,480	200,800	200,800	200,000	201,149	500,000	.....	134,300	132,000
Due to other National banks.....	489,701	504,704	504,701	7,533,370	7,439,145	8,500,016	.....	243,458	237,727
Due to State banks and bankers.....	167,732	233,271	233,264	6,024,000	8,068,145	7,460,000	.....	497,772	863,156
Dividends unpaid.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Individual deposits.....	2,683,660	3,944,132	3,283,131	12,404,114	13,213,145	18,468,632	.....	1,627,669	1,737,130
U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	\$5,402,363	\$4,204,725	\$4,321,803	\$32,170,375	\$32,570,168	\$34,000,945	\$3,287,323	\$3,411,867	\$3,287,230
Average reserve held.....	61.75 p. c.	62.14 p. c.	61.33 p. c.	27.32 p. c.	27.73 p. c.	28.40 p. c.	30.36 p. c.	24.21 p. c.	21.33 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,270,094	\$1,394,068	\$1,343,506	\$3,077,074	\$2,468,130	\$2,764,795	\$350,253	\$246,108	\$293,861

LOUISVILLE, KY. July 14, 1898, Sept. 30, 1898, Dec. 1, 1898. MILWAUKEE, WIS. July 14, 1898, Sept. 30, 1898, Dec. 1, 1898. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. July 14, 1898, Sept. 30, 1898, Dec. 1, 1898.

RESOURCES.

Loans and discounts.....	\$7,110,165	\$7,294,600	\$4,905,768	\$16,765,818	\$16,548,488	\$16,940,648	\$10,892,388	\$10,299,184	\$11,798,911
Overdrafts.....	10,863	8,992	14,447	182,549	166,288	191,543	20,289	13,062	9,719
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,350,000	1,900,000	1,950,000	3,900,000	3,900,000	3,900,000	800,000	800,000	350,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	750,000	1,395,000	1,500,000	3,600,000	490,000	690,000	800,000	150,000	150,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	165,000	65,080	16,680	74,580	32,250	329,330	182,604	182,604	293,880
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	311,175	323,977	161,259	72,780	72,780	49,410	21,200	28,775	28,004
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,009,122	1,115,062	1,087,507	1,391,661	1,357,043	1,703,412	465,450	465,450	597,418
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	189,125	191,975	187,725	123,263	120,200	108,875	108,875	108,875	8,875
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	10,167	10,167	6,113	68,723	67,968	41,662	77,688	77,688	177,688
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,011,466	928,468	1,146,772	1,776,164	2,297,204	2,063,876	1,078,886	1,078,886	1,147,309
Due from State banks and bankers.....	249,988	189,624	235,088	1,027,223	948,381	877,007	882,836	1,043,288	973,273
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,210,555	1,767,182	1,692,967	5,040,389	3,944,294	5,849,465	3,081,843	3,263,307	3,147,058
Checks and other cash items.....	9,747	11,795	18,089	10,040	10,040	31,200	29,081	40,325	62,238
Exchange for clearing-house.....	199,556	113,754	119,388	397,753	387,483	484,024	450,478	784,088	784,088
Bills of other National banks.....	69,230	182,264	84,271	76,418	62,018	58,442	118,311	104,006	298,728
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,418	2,556	1,815	6,318	3,219	3,283	12,482	7,381	4,855
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz:.....	701,877	739,442	608,170	2,141,984	2,041,507	1,951,845	897,382	897,382	741,005
Gold.....	5,000	5,000	5,000	.....	.....	30,000	9,000	9,000	9,000
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	49,681	31,865	37,738	74,010	67,743	56,640	38,794	28,000	34,982
Silver Treasury certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver fractional coin.....	20,575	15,642	12,611	62,452	52,475	112,905	72,500	82,000	58,000
Legal-tender notes.....	738,794	537,008	498,380	1,698,199	1,278,279	1,383,318	21,418	20,983	21,850
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	18,480	1,000	2,000	9,260	6,500	2,920	103,082	800	3,985
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,024,914</b>	<b>\$16,754,490</b>	<b>\$16,561,287</b>	<b>\$32,378,372</b>	<b>\$30,277,208</b>	<b>\$33,615,418</b>	<b>\$18,908,838</b>	<b>\$19,197,545</b>	<b>\$21,775,282</b>

LIABILITIES.

Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500,000
Surplus fund.....	648,000	648,000	648,000	588,500	578,800	578,500	512,000	512,000	512,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	211,272	228,119	193,808	1,063,500	1,063,500	1,063,500	748,985	748,985	748,985
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	1,214,660	1,619,500	1,764,500	3,724,769	3,724,769	4,143,646	2,882,207	2,882,207	2,882,207
Due to other National banks.....	3,181,396	2,800,350	2,705,582	9,565,960	8,565,960	8,565,960	1,894,305	1,894,305	1,894,305
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,061,416	2,124,410	1,848,624	2,117,253	1,963,270	2,263,861	1,866,061	1,866,061	2,263,865
Dividends unpaid.....	11,166	4,800	13,514	11,707	11,707	11,707	11,406	11,406	8,482
Individual deposits.....	5,125,864	5,140,386	5,121,519	21,514,960	19,688,748	22,094,441	8,793,008	9,418,198	9,466,782
U. S. deposits.....	468,782	774,959	882,584	264,415	264,401	264,401	186,886	186,886	186,886
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	82,064	69,000	21,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,024,914</b>	<b>\$16,754,490</b>	<b>\$16,561,287</b>	<b>\$32,378,372</b>	<b>\$30,277,208</b>	<b>\$33,615,418</b>	<b>\$18,908,838</b>	<b>\$19,197,545</b>	<b>\$21,775,282</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>\$9,232 P. C.</b>	<b>\$1,754,490</b>	<b>\$1,561,287</b>	<b>\$29,578,372</b>	<b>\$29,277,208</b>	<b>\$32,015,418</b>	<b>\$13,908,838</b>	<b>\$14,997,545</b>	<b>\$17,775,282</b>
				<b>\$7.64 P. C.</b>	<b>\$1.16 P. C.</b>	<b>\$6.89 P. C.</b>	<b>40.36 P. C.</b>	<b>44.99 P. C.</b>	<b>40.43 P. C.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$1,518,867</b>	<b>\$1,811,978</b>	<b>\$1,161,904</b>	<b>\$4,101,516</b>	<b>\$3,694,888</b>	<b>\$3,825,089</b>	<b>\$1,457,046</b>	<b>\$1,611,945</b>	<b>\$2,028,899</b>

	NEW ORLEANS, LA.		OMAHA, NEB.		PHILADELPHIA, PA.	
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,898,308	\$11,768,048	\$9,811,775	\$9,766,541	\$93,784,700	\$100,110,745
Overdrafts.....	261,848	300,211	154,686	188,528	12,686	14,268
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	622,000	622,000	574,000	574,000	6,942,500	6,942,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	300,000	300,000	500,000	758,000	3,238,000	4,165,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	41,210	120,550	85,000	508,820	60,400	647,100
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	64,560	68,488	94,750	100,909	948,782	950,273
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,848,778	2,087,258	1,994,374	684,178	15,609,623	13,963,999
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	693,337	693,337	882,384	882,384	3,971,804	3,972,296
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	151,570	158,430	419,111	417,890	696,582	690,827
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	624,270	447,820	1,035,922	919,022	8,929,968	7,576,290
Due from State banks and bankers.....	477,149	410,415	738,541	511,048	1,484,258	1,097,949
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,304,115	1,537,338	3,910,711	3,234,853	16,180,565	19,380,684
Due from other cash items.....	37,980	10,383	4,084,015	8,910,711	20,401,471	19,380,684
Checks and other cash items.....	589,688	568,517	1,128,166	1,284,166	1,360,629	1,415,783
Exchange on other National banks.....	61,409	77,055	144,880	158,028	10,202,077	10,065,744
Bills of other National banks.....	18,180	18,118	3,033	4,287	408,404	848,355
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,016,392	1,018,233	1,128,705	1,023,317	1,740,016	2,043,233
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	107,180	109,080	37,150	38,350	170,290	159,290
Gold Treasury certificates.....	63,849	63,039	176,682	190,287	8,460,000	8,785,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	990,882	527,540	682,635	287,876	293,980	275,180
Silver dollars.....	79,917	53,867	118,145	150,385	3,901,053	4,197,452
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,429,448	1,121,787	60,614	37,370	2,582,298	2,582,298
Silver fractional coin.....	210,000	226,000	165,000	165,000	5,000,000	4,940,000
Legal-tender notes.....	27,980	27,980	25,875	25,875	312,410	312,410
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tenders.....	30,000	2,000	109,108	5,450	313,608	313,608
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	222,628,266	\$24,948,779	\$22,468,071	\$23,468,581	\$23,847,164	\$191,557,072
<b>Total.....</b>	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,750,000	\$2,750,000	\$2,750,000	\$2,750,000
Capital stock paid in.....	2,305,000	2,305,000	345,500	345,500	345,500	345,500
Surplus fund.....	384,608	391,458	112,656	112,656	167,784	2,932,621
Undiv. profits less expenses and taxes paid.....	517,995	1,090,478	504,550	472,500	6,111,465	6,310,665
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	1,225,669	1,225,669	3,967,488	4,760,312	20,811,859	27,783,287
Due to other National banks.....	40,062	12,124	9,908	373	64,083	39,095
Due to State banks and bankers.....	14,388,848	14,388,848	8,091,662	9,158,682	9,743,906	108,097,068
Dividends unpaid.....	288,317	288,317	353,701	353,701	1,228,868	2,768,595
Individual deposits.....	100,158	100,000	98,068	280,612	51,265	46,842
U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	50,000	25,000	500,000	500,000
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	100,000	100,000	131,868	131,868	82,761	118,899
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	\$23,422,380	\$24,948,779	\$22,468,071	\$23,468,581	\$23,847,164	\$191,557,072
Average reserve held.....	41.56 p. c.	31.74 p. c.	43.50 p. c.	36.64 p. c.	33.50 p. c.	30.25 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,898,513	\$3,918,688	\$3,014,181	\$3,288,704	\$2,068,820	\$32,948,788
						\$24,067,400

	PITTSBURGH, PA.		ST. JOSEPH, MO.		ST. LOUIS, MO.	
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$50,181,655	\$50,068,696	\$47,762,649	\$47,762,649	\$85,074,948	\$85,074,948
Overdrafts.....	86,312	70,470	49,915	7,868	40,948	81,779
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	5,705,250	5,655,250	5,665,250	180,000	2,760,000	2,760,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	600,000	700,000	1,000,000	50,000	980,000	980,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	912,100	659,760	880,500	58,500	75,000	60,980
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	753,000	753,445	753,000	.....	222,276	206,468
Stocks, securities, etc.....	4,451,999	4,662,137	4,478,954	14,400	2,661,898	2,661,898
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	3,663,713	3,663,261	3,210,066	73,000	14,900	825,100
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	511,567	581,036	380,253	239,254	302,640	298,533
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,694,817	3,078,443	3,078,443	168,535	7,273,241	5,974,122
Due from State banks and bankers.....	282,386	304,733	367,959	85,654	247,827	242,864
Due from approved reserve agents.....	5,463,990	6,477,480	7,828,507	1,065,283	1,246,816	1,374,405
Checks and other cash items.....	339,991	423,383	100,721	89,175	73,786	138,450
Exchange for clearing-house.....	2,097,664	2,603,680	2,918,752	108,907	1,119,353	1,616,240
Bills of other National banks.....	887,256	287,698	13,677	11,675	364,661	288,654
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	16,916	17,760	18,421	505	2,368	3,080
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:						
Gold coin.....	3,571,697	3,445,240	3,173,306	182,652	2,868,830	2,648,647
Gold Treasury certificates.....	422,870	494,610	410,550	10,660	243,440	250,150
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	205,886	199,686	182,680	8,577	21,898	42,810
Silver dollars.....	1,155,972	1,074,997	1,395,412	75,863	1,780,795	983,502
Silver Treasury certificates.....	115,748	1,077,729	1,100,000	4,864	17,090	12,610
Silver fractional coin.....	2,745,932	2,668,135	3,281,869	202,019	2,948,672	2,282,876
Legal-tender notes.....	25,641	25,429	262,851	6,750	1,910,000	1,355,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	123,132	96,133	48,022	800	103,950	121,850
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....					1,000	1,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....						
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$86,114,879</b>	<b>\$88,165,175</b>	<b>\$87,760,657</b>	<b>\$4,751,113</b>	<b>\$61,545,519</b>	<b>\$58,646,840</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>						
Capital stock paid in.....	\$12,300,000	\$12,300,000	\$11,900,000	\$350,000	\$8,400,000	\$8,400,000
Surplus fund.....	9,562,000	9,562,000	9,112,000	105,500	1,723,000	1,723,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,966,983	2,179,198	2,333,385	23,810	863,188	863,188
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	5,067,980	4,929,270	5,024,400	135,000	2,040,967	2,469,295
Due to other National banks.....	7,989,694	8,169,816	8,382,752	563,573	16,281,862	13,489,575
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,712,848	3,169,888	2,854,434	1,342,878	6,823,646	6,529,083
Dividends unpaid.....	118,712	43,776	60,163	1,361,747	1,084,235	9,413,496
Individual deposits.....	45,500,747	46,207,185	46,191,851	2,161,306	5,769	4,501
U. S. deposits.....	413,494	552,049	841,629	49,576	22,296,588	22,184,709
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	96,610	153,285	143,190	573	572,981	983,220
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	30,000	106,530	24,800	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	6,604	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$86,114,879</b>	<b>\$88,165,175</b>	<b>\$87,760,657</b>	<b>\$4,751,113</b>	<b>\$61,545,519</b>	<b>\$58,646,840</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$7,719 P. C.	\$88,165,175	\$87,750,657	\$4,751,113	\$61,545,519	\$58,646,840
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$8,318,545	\$7,889,547	\$8,435,874	\$453,447	\$9,283,696	\$7,823,595



	ST. PAUL, MINN.			SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.			SAVANNAH, GA.		
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$8,687,576	\$9,714,316	\$9,890,688	\$13,685,680	\$13,494,085	\$15,108,590	\$13,321,007	\$13,384,841	\$1,324,995
Overdrafts.....	4,958	4,141	1,280	94,880	67,715	88,708	1,709	1,709	255
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	292,000	292,000	292,000	700,000	700,000	700,000	108,000	108,000	108,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	475,000	475,000	475,000	150,000	150,000	380,000	90,000	90,000	90,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	138,500	138,500	142,500	770,000	708,000	770,440	770,440	770,440	770,440
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,755,763	1,766,143	1,778,166	188,720	190,088	186,744	10,400	10,400	10,400
Stocks, securities, etc.....	698,758	698,758	698,758	1,570,150	1,639,328	1,584,788	80,865	80,865	80,865
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	97,722	124,575	124,575	355,097	355,112	355,112	67,812	67,812	67,812
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,029,357	690,049	1,248,911	181,048	128,997	128,997	16,408	16,408	16,408
Due from National banks (not reserve agents)	160,094	243,564	351,790	428,854	507,497	418,157	40,819	39,984	98,985
Due from State banks and bankers.....	3,328,113	3,408,663	4,283,714	1,980,497	2,684,111	2,010,724	23,184	17,008	66,390
Due from clearing-house.....	86,663	71,000	140,417	708,240	708,240	1,686,801	70,481	66,390	151,739
Checks and other cash items.....	249,473	368,809	421,441	12,000	17,972	18,041	1,275	1,275	62,896
Bills of other National banks.....	130,729	122,682	113,741	491,441	567,297	498,888	58	10,142	14,500
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,345	3,481	3,108	7,680	7,680	14,068	14,000	14,500	12,000
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz:.....				8,770	8,770	14,068	14,000	14,500	12,000
Gold coin.....	1,780,145	1,749,977	1,698,987	6,216,065	6,970,625	7,044,700	9,000	18,000	5,000
Gold Treasury certificates.....	10,500	10,000	1,000	345,000	345,000	345,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	198,888	110,870	81,702	55,477	32,207	38,011	13,000	9,000	30,950
Silver dollars.....	250,044	270,704	181,722	12,273	20,145	18,298	23,965	16,384	8,000
Silver Treasury certificates.....	49,873	45,113	47,190	48,196	50,275	67,168	17,700	9,400	8,000
Silver fractional coin.....	813,417	546,490	473,452	10,176	7,374	14,363	76,000	66,000	183,826
Legal-tender notes.....	11,338	11,338	11,338	31,495	31,495	31,495	4,560	4,560	4,560
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	106,121	24,221	45,308	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,022	1,022	7,390
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	\$20,580,794	\$30,690,970	\$21,768,741	\$27,668,881	\$29,267,427	\$32,004,731	\$1,941,988	\$1,983,980	\$2,163,021
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000
Surplus fund.....	657,000	657,000	657,000	2,260,000	2,260,000	2,260,000	2,260,000	2,260,000	2,260,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	770,480	817,480	781,603	220,024	220,024	220,024	45,646	45,646	45,646
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	304,770	304,770	304,770	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
Due to other National banks.....	2,298,524	2,531,201	2,532,688	1,189,708	1,015,816	1,339,270	109,523	107,180	194,680
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,210,624	1,744,891	2,346,400	3,227,308	3,699,245	4,740,118	108,207	69,284	168,873
Dividends unpaid.....	4,891	4,891	4,891	29,145	3,280	3,280	9,098	9,098	9,098
Individual deposits.....	10,181,967	10,428,022	10,928,742	14,380,865	15,588,672	16,057,211	51,155	444,228	547,405
U. S. deposits.....	184,046	67,191	79,282	171,812	161,066	370,704	33,268	33,268	33,268
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	258,679	368,668	360,324	.....	.....	.....	54,360	54,360	54,360
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	23,000	100,000	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	\$30,580,794	\$30,690,970	\$21,768,741	\$27,668,881	\$29,267,427	\$32,004,731	\$1,941,988	\$1,983,980	\$2,163,021
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	\$3,44 p. c.	\$3,68 p. c.	\$3,44 p. c.	\$4,54 p. c.	\$5,28 p. c.	\$4,56 p. c.	\$3,97 p. c.	\$3,94 p. c.	\$3,88 p. c.
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	\$2,528,816	\$3,673,145	\$2,364,013	\$3,687,180	\$7,440,798	\$7,850,248	\$147,685	\$119,768	\$303,976

ALBANY, N. Y.		BALTIMORE, MD.		BOSTON, MASS.	
July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.
Loans and discounts.....	\$8,063,786	\$7,166,059	\$5,298,864	\$34,440,086	\$35,230,604
Overdrafts.....	2,588	3,435	30,911	43,459	28,114
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	300,000	350,000	2,655,000	2,688,500	2,915,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	100,000	281,100	518,000	3,662,960	3,442,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	38,750	158,000	143,600	6,340	184,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	38,998	37,250	283,175	328,569	332,445
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,102,067	1,063,122	2,414,762	2,150,843	9,068,641
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	296,270	296,270	2,335,368	2,335,368	2,392,663
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	90,615	80,571	217,522	217,522	441,959
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,513,333	1,239,631	2,661,418	2,793,668	8,093,767
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,214,041	1,693,672	871,539	496,641	1,146,052
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,639,745	2,130,972	3,440,833	5,071,770	4,390,504
Checks and other cash items.....	65,044	93,452	61,333	145,991	38,593,380
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	100,389	77,789	1,498,316	1,498,316	9,961,479
Bills of other National banks.....	77,789	51,168	1,993,963	1,993,963	12,622,507
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,239	1,225	19,367	19,367	1,054,669
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:.....			12.0.5	21,664	21,193
Gold coin.....	585,677	549,497	1,664,555	1,064,771	1,068,180
Gold Treasury certificates.....	390,280	390,750	365,880	423,780	1,522,980
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	19,957	17,566	30,000	205,000	6,235,000
Silver dollars.....	34,417	31,618	70,844	52,295	80,583
Silver Treasury certificates.....	14,017	16,589	1,077,962	1,176,170	2,063,919
Silver fractional coin.....	431,278	367,310	87,802	69,801	183,179
Legal-tender notes.....	13,500	15,750	680,238	98,000	4,636,237
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	5,600	1,000	980,000	810,000	1,475,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....			196,165	196,165	315,945
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....			1,000	20,822	315,945
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$17,584,438</b>	<b>\$16,842,701</b>	<b>\$50,691,887</b>	<b>\$59,750,236</b>	<b>\$76,810,573</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>					
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$12,242,280	\$13,242,280	\$48,150,000
Surplus fund, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,860,000	1,490,000	6,195,875	6,195,875	14,462,375
Undr. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	167,491	191,496	984,846	1,138,258	6,585,179
National bank notes issued, less amt' on hand.....	266,280	301,760	2,363,180	2,363,180	6,404,120
State bank notes outstanding.....	3,694,230	3,776,594	4,604	4,504	49,244,244
Due to other National banks.....	1,867,103	1,705,770	7,282,897	7,046,608	7,468,311
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,841	591	2,066,694	2,145,230	31,235,788
Dividends unpaid.....	8,461,745	7,297,294	85,985	85,985	27,669
Individual deposits.....	51,170	142,716	27,338,970	28,673,861	183,910,600
U. S. deposits.....	18,829	21,788	615,586	1,678,507	462,451
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			.....	.....	61,168
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	21,788	21,788	.....	.....	87,618
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	355,000	100,000	694,747
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	98,731	141,860	272,955
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$17,584,438</b>	<b>\$16,842,701</b>	<b>\$69,691,887</b>	<b>\$69,750,236</b>	<b>\$76,810,573</b>
Average reserve held.....	35.94 p. c.	31.96 p. c.	32.91 p. c.	31.19 p. c.	33.46 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,366,267	\$1,313,186	\$4,910,177	\$4,828,686	\$23,397,450

	BROOKLYN, N. Y.			CHICAGO, ILL.			CINCINNATI, OHIO.		
	July 24, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 24, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 24, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$12,017,305	\$10,965,618	\$11,393,477	\$107,216,641	\$106,997,307	\$108,498,723	\$23,376,514	\$23,094,857	\$23,397,242
Overdrafts.....	1,463		922	161,718	288,751	262,065	19,283	13,894	8,437
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	1,800,000	1,800,000	1,800,000	6,027,500	4,961,500	4,961,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	300,000	300,000	300,000	550,000	549,190	549,190	2,185,000	2,447,500	2,868,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	300,000	300,000	300,000	806,000	806,000	806,000	698,300	818,500	1,493,300
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	29,876	2,576,628	29,800	88,375	79,747	83,114	626,560	900,615	994,997
Stocks, securities, etc.....	600,254	601,804	601,804	9,181,422	9,000,764	10,107,381	4,766,580	5,548,097	6,391,107
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	92,500	98,151	98,151	793,094	793,094	793,094	478,174	508,132	508,132
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	57,149	57,078	57,078	678,706	723,241	723,241	305,404	305,368	305,368
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	228,488	167,368	167,368	23,995,372	26,297,868	28,870,838	4,063,698	8,773,246	8,773,246
Due from State banks and bankers.....	3,014,968	2,419,397	2,419,397	5,138,063	7,643,991	10,063,974	1,779,598	5,827,768	1,082,214
Due from approved reserve agents.....	67,649	73,419	73,419	492,712	1-9,068	1-9,068	6,765,597	6,800,378	6,498,401
Checks and other cash items.....	801,913	903,245	2,249,457	6,065,716	4,373,961	9,893,304	148,770	308,778	108,180
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	187,382	161,714	110,180	1,490,049	1,864,188	1,682,296	398,580	353,362	273,794
Bills of other National Banks.....	8,295	8,516	10,944	32,569	22,543	27,548	4,777,682	4,777,682	4,777,682
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....							6,694	6,694	
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz:.....									
Gold coin.....	840,810	702,244	676,149	16,848,288	17,408,464	18,305,467	1,183,881	1,398,378	1,468,378
Gold Treasury certificates.....	178,000	178,000	178,000	3,097,050	3,139,970	2,791,950	304,120	307,970	398,150
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	18,000	540,000	380,000						
Silver dollars.....	18,000	19,000	36,436	206,657	196,162	280,856	62,861	60,274	63,496
Silver Treasury certificates.....	816,981	693,397	643,668	3,578,556	2,851,833	2,608,243	604,916	604,916	600,861
Silver fractional coin.....	83,728	58,396	64,110	228,337	192,293	271,669	24,516	24,361	27,189
Legal-tender notes.....	1,309,236	898,554	970,755	14,707,668	15,219,615	17,309,090	1,878,996	2,112,238	2,404,494
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....				2,120,000	1,380,000	1,480,000	620,000	610,000	570,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....				28,990	49,500	81,000	223,457	314,937	294,167
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	30,770	1,060	12,500	675,019	292,558	63,050	309,310	2,458	1,408
<b>Total.....</b>	\$23,846,142	\$21,965,855	\$23,359,324	\$197,947,728	\$202,054,229	\$219,498,984	\$55,055,294	\$56,024,877	\$57,052,795
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,232,000	\$1,382,000	\$1,382,000	\$19,450,000	\$19,450,000	\$19,450,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000
Surplus fund.....	2,300,000	2,300,000	2,300,000	9,274,900	9,274,900	9,289,900	2,715,000	2,715,000	2,715,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	980,739	676,332	467,393	1,682,225	2,313,197	2,545,840	1,021,198	1,154,847	981,727
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	672,990	690,990	677,370	689,105	1,029,255	1,215,570	4,305,460	4,322,762	4,275,935
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,843	1,843	1,843	55,009,595	55,009,595	60,401,941	9,515,559	9,515,559	10,615,559
Due to other National banks.....	401,433	318,438	419,308	30,193,539	33,105,452	33,517,381	4,580,800	4,823,329	4,823,329
Due to State banks and bankers.....	459,976	447,309	380,318	7,438	7,438	6,389	1,917	1,917	1,917
Dividends unpaid.....	4,937	4,937	4,937	84,000,653	92,982,717	92,982,717	22,078,194	22,558,500	22,980,235
Individual deposits.....	18,170,658	16,959,236	17,094,683	80,565,724	84,000,653	92,982,717	1,865,802	2,277,415	2,681,069
U. S. deposits.....	17,844	174,728	178,976	687,054	694,514	994,514	84,643	84,643	84,643
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	27,725	25,270	19,479	21,077	80,771	80,771			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....									
Bills payable.....									
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	22,983	20,651	20,651	12,500		13,000	913,000	981,100	1,090,794
<b>Total.....</b>	\$23,846,142	\$21,965,855	\$23,359,324	\$197,947,728	\$202,054,229	\$219,498,984	\$55,055,294	\$56,024,877	\$57,052,795
Average reserve held.....	\$4,92 P. C.	\$4,08 P. C.	\$3,08 P. C.	\$1,74 P. C.	\$1,26 P. C.	\$1,47 P. C.	33.18 P. C.	33.64 P. C.	31.82 P. C.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,844,756	\$3,011,791	\$2,844,188	\$40,783,094	\$40,323,236	\$42,167,216	\$4,684,662	\$4,967,316	\$5,510,567

	CLEVELAND, OHIO.			DES MOINES, IOWA.			DETROIT, MICH.		
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
Loans and discounts.....	\$30,255,846	\$30,757,784	\$30,716,424	\$8,490,118	\$3,277,478	\$3,812,168	\$14,958,828	\$14,711,665	\$14,597,141
Overdrafts.....	25,810	30,335	66,811	16,288	23,318	37,961	2,854	2,886	1,432
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,480,000	1,680,000	1,680,000	848,000	848,000	800,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	60,000	60,000	60,000	50,000	100,000	800,000	700,000	700,000	297,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	200,500	717,300	711,500	50,000	321,400	115,280	168,200	168,200	219,864
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	85,986	84,907	86,186	81,876	82,050	40,668	905,367	868,154	516,841
Stocks, securities, etc.....	853,419	848,380	846,380	260,516	328,971	298,968	428,457	368,419	318,984
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	608,184	508,283	517,948	148,541	148,541	30,538	30,538	30,538	80,088
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	210,713	210,713	210,713	98,527	102,981	188,776	354,544	362,168	361,684
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,485,889	2,788,673	3,560,828	229,966	229,966	259,985	808,066	1,290,000	1,681,271
Due from State banks and bankers.....	948,308	839,824	1,194,197	88,972	754,191	88,972	318,966	318,966	568,314
Due from approved reserve agents.....	119,874	184,206	129,410	22,111	26,781	11,468	281,238	110,144	3,660,164
Checks and other cash items.....	349,082	278,880	421,680	72,788	79,905	72,082	210,649	288,031	288,086
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	197,480	161,200	288,019	19,527	40,883	88,583	258,245	142,967	176,780
Bills of other National banks.....	6,791	4,968	4,410	1,119	1,119	1,184	11,381	5,774	5,451
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,625,407	1,884,215	1,669,822	147,912	117,685	118,722	1,369,652	1,405,867	1,385,877
Gold coin.....	283,170	285,170	287,770	4,880	6,870	6,070	20,000	21,000	21,000
Gold Treasury certificates.....	112,428	102,121	108,767	8,614	8,614	19,000	93,907	109,168	118,682
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	184,468	305,050	267,450	16,272	12,075	24,810	149,748	106,060	148,809
Silver Treasury certificates.....	30,965	81,611	45,598	6,367	6,367	6,706	59,810	37,811	38,964
Silver fractional coin.....	1,700,750	1,470,082	1,765,000	228,904	198,616	263,231	798,780	669,711	712,771
Legal-tender notes.....	65,650	70,860	72,460	14,435	15,485	16,515	63,000	63,000	63,000
Five per cent. deposit for legal-tenders.....	108,000	80,000	20,500	47,300	50,000	.....	40,876	9,448	15,008
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	\$47,855,082	\$49,824,727	\$51,569,068	\$6,061,568	\$6,068,747	\$6,514,632	\$24,208,626	\$25,990,562	\$28,741,681
<b>Total.....</b>	\$9,404,000	\$9,400,000	\$9,651,750	\$900,000	\$900,000	\$900,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000
Capital stock paid in.....	2,161,700	2,161,500	2,184,500	221,600	221,600	221,600	605,000	605,000	605,000
Surplus fund.....	564,058	564,058	565,729	55,028	55,028	54,768	252,807	252,807	252,807
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,821,900	1,438,580	1,438,580	805,471	804,967	231,280	1,122,830	1,122,170	1,122,170
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	4,083,319	5,308,309	5,278,335	908,689	908,689	961,431	2,961,809	2,961,741	3,623,680
Due to State National banks.....	1,455	3,118,725	3,145,917	1,858,108	1,803,877	1,911,641	5,401,846	5,068,687	6,272,477
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,455	1,672	3,973	7,801	4,749	4,687	3,685	58	58
Dividends unpaid.....	25,268,622	26,417,893	26,532,419	1,643,403	1,643,403	2,009,822	11,249,457	11,249,457	10,940,585
Individual deposits.....	91,841	38,248	48,082	50,028	50,028	289,287	376,884	372,143	615,283
U. S. deposits.....	14,705	23,689	15,084	100,000	100,000	456	25,277	52,514	55,259
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	100,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	611,619	808,188	764,736	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	\$47,855,082	\$49,824,727	\$51,569,068	\$6,061,568	\$6,068,747	\$6,514,632	\$24,208,626	\$25,990,562	\$28,741,681
Average reserve held.....	\$3,300 p. c.	\$3,300 p. c.	\$3,300 p. c.	27.81 p. c.	28.70 p. c.	28.38 p. c.	25.61 p. c.	31.25 p. c.	32.23 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,300,000	\$3,608,480	\$4,068,905	\$264,786	\$347,377	\$461,448	\$2,481,642	\$3,377,818	\$3,376,374

	HOUSTON, TEXAS.			KANSAS CITY, MO.			LINCOLN, NEB.		
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$5,476,941	\$4,555,788	\$5,107,149	\$18,918,947	\$18,878,818	\$19,599,808	\$5,019,286	\$5,012,565	\$5,027,732
Overdrafts.....	18,815	885,775	884,664	107,071	211,257	186,508	18,604	18,878	14,660
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	260,000	260,000	260,000	260,000	260,000	260,000	160,000	160,000	160,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	314,500	314,500	609,300	60,000	60,000	60,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	804,500	287,500	222,920	.....	38,000	40,160
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	22,888	.....	22,088	38,000	45,945	45,478	5,600	5,600	5,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....	28,259	35,514	28,176	1,648,888	1,892,946	1,253,064	88,872	91,091	91,858
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	183,714	183,496	183,176	16,366	18,001	18,000	8,645	8,645	8,645
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	131,988	121,988	129,251	418,288	395,287	430,868	116,816	118,026	116,225
Due from National banks (not reserve agents)	418,088	813,804	750,680	919,868	1,262,188	1,364,818	95,680	248,712	175,110
Due from State banks and bankers.....	48,608	72,288	70,801	1,815,609	2,045,496	2,187,088	37,468	118,906	67,976
Due from approved reserve agents.....	512,868	422,868	422,868	3,647,740	4,401,672	4,728,010	394,255	247,611	196,669
Checks and other cash items.....	3,915	10,046	78,387	66,994	21,842	21,842	14,288	21,662	19,648
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	18,184	11,214	6,913	728,716	676,186	781,868	24,220	18,640	24,968
Bills of other National banks.....	62,280	38,560	87,378	180,440	168,811	204,760	7,947	6,498	6,988
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents	4,372	2,790	1,468	5,069	6,866	6,166	.....	2,764	2,868
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	303,216	305,828	299,498	860,680	953,477	1,019,560	99,780	99,980	115,602
Gold Treasury certificates.....	183,940	183,276	187,680	50,000	25,000	25,000	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	38,366	9,087	66,954	66,288	66,869	190,266	12,712	16,082	15,602
Silver Treasury certificates.....	70,015	142,867	196,588	1,025,464	482,688	606,368	28,122	28,122	14,068
Silver fractional coin.....	11,951	12,847	10,748	22,487	37,080	38,441	14,662	18,916	11,665
Legal-tender notes.....	645,516	1,298,218	687,147	1,082,160	961,122	876,100	115,806	88,064	103,604
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.	11,260	11,260	11,260	11,260	13,560	28,000	6,750	6,750	6,750
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	3,000	.....	.....	30,000	38,504	.....	68,300	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,402,868</b>	<b>\$4,208,725</b>	<b>\$4,581,908</b>	<b>\$28,170,375</b>	<b>\$28,570,168</b>	<b>\$34,000,845</b>	<b>\$3,287,828</b>	<b>\$3,411,867</b>	<b>\$3,287,280</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$800,000	\$800,000	\$700,000
Surplus fund.....	577,300	677,300	677,300	578,000	608,000	618,000	37,000	15,000	15,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	37,740	102,888	388,387	308,187	388,188	414,988	6,807	6,807	16,870
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand	183,480	210,500	210,500	295,000	291,450	560,000	184,100	184,300	183,000
Due to other National banks.....	483,791	594,704	483,671	7,428,165	8,500,016	243,558	237,498	237,727	237,727
Due to State banks and bankers.....	137,732	228,271	228,271	8,028,064	8,068,148	7,466,208	428,138	497,772	386,158
Dividends unpaid.....	6,438	4,929	4,289	24,485	1,675	989	180	180	180
Individual deposits.....	2,828,860	3,845,122	3,263,151	12,604,744	13,215,173	18,466,022	1,627,669	1,668,307	1,737,180
U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	226,800	226,800	573,774	.....	57,000	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	18,767	18,761	20,827	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	372,820	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	153,612	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	605	.....	.....	6,728	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,402,868</b>	<b>\$4,208,725</b>	<b>\$4,581,908</b>	<b>\$28,170,375</b>	<b>\$28,570,168</b>	<b>\$34,000,845</b>	<b>\$3,287,828</b>	<b>\$3,411,867</b>	<b>\$3,287,280</b>
Average reserve held.....	61.70 p. c.	62.14 p. c.	67.89 p. c.	27.23 p. c.	27.73 p. c.	29.40 p. c.	30.56 p. c.	24.21 p. c.	21.59 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,270,994	\$1,894,068	\$1,845,508	\$3,077,074	\$3,468,180	\$3,764,795	\$350,323	\$246,108	\$263,661

	LOUISVILLE, KY.			MILWAUKEE, WIS.			MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.		
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$7,170,165	\$7,294,600	\$4,903,758	\$10,754,818	\$10,548,428	\$10,940,648	\$10,992,868	\$10,290,184	\$11,788,911
Overdrafts.....	10,833	8,982	14,447	158,540	158,238	20,230	20,230	13,022	9,719
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,850,000	1,900,000	1,950,000	800,000	800,000	800,000	800,000	800,000	850,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	750,000	1,825,000	1,500,000	300,000	490,000	690,000	150,000	150,000	150,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	108,000	65,980	16,880	74,580	323,330	152,604	152,604	152,604	253,580
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	305,500	311,175	323,977	161,230	74,720	49,410	21,200	24,774	24,004
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,009,122	1,115,082	1,163,507	1,391,661	1,357,043	1,703,412	465,450	448,155	697,416
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	189,125	190,975	197,725	128,263	120,200	125,200	108,875	108,875	8,875
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	10,157	10,157	6,112	68,723	67,988	77,628	77,628	77,628	177,628
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,011,494	928,403	1,148,772	1,776,164	2,267,204	2,053,875	1,054,422	1,074,888	1,147,809
Due from State banks and bankers.....	240,928	190,624	325,088	1,027,223	948,331	877,007	583,835	1,048,238	873,273
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,210,555	1,767,182	1,663,987	3,944,264	3,940,465	3,000,842	3,263,307	3,147,058	3,147,058
Cheques and other cash items.....	9,747	15,800	11,795	18,080	10,040	31,304	29,081	40,825	52,283
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	189,588	118,764	119,383	327,763	347,433	331,208	450,473	704,068	704,068
Bills of other National banks.....	68,230	162,284	64,271	78,418	82,018	118,311	104,608	104,608	236,732
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,418	2,569	1,315	6,318	3,219	3,268	12,482	7,381	4,856
Unpaid money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold Treasury certificates.....	701,877	728,442	608,170	2,141,984	2,041,507	1,961,245	677,047	897,382	741,008
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	5,000	5,000	5,000	.....	.....	30,000	9,000	9,000	9,000
Silver dollars.....	49,621	31,965	37,733	74,010	67,743	58,640	36,734	34,942	34,982
Silver Treasury certificates.....	30,575	11,542	12,411	151,861	29,475	112,905	27,500	33,000	53,000
Silver fractional coin.....	726,794	537,008	498,380	1,689,129	731,585	1,127,831	683,351	619,664	1,163,082
Legal-tender notes.....	60,740	61,000	57,750	39,150	36,900	36,900	12,800	12,800	15,750
Five per cent. deposit for legal-tenders.....	18,480	1,000	2,000	9,260	5,500	2,900	102,082	800	3,685
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....									
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$10,024,914</b>	<b>\$10,754,490</b>	<b>\$10,561,287</b>	<b>\$32,373,372</b>	<b>\$30,277,208</b>	<b>\$32,615,418</b>	<b>\$18,903,688</b>	<b>\$19,197,545</b>	<b>\$21,772,282</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$2,250,000	\$2,250,000	\$2,250,000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500,000
Surplus fund.....	648,000	648,000	648,000	585,500	575,500	575,500	512,000	512,000	512,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	211,272	228,119	183,808	249,865	249,864	246,608	246,665	313,479	363,412
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	3,181,388	2,800,880	2,705,682	789,260	711,120	700,250	183,920	182,380	238,180
Due to State National banks.....	2,080,416	2,129,416	1,848,284	3,685,960	3,729,780	4,148,648	2,982,267	2,982,788	4,174,060
Dividends unpaid.....	11,166	11,166	11,166	2,117,263	1,965,276	2,283,861	1,594,905	1,594,905	2,293,265
Individual deposits.....	5,125,864	4,800	4,800	1,707,587	1,707,587	212	11,400	3,151	3,692
U. S. deposits.....	468,762	5,125,864	5,121,519	21,514,960	19,689,748	22,034,447	8,733,808	9,413,198	9,463,782
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	261,361	585,181	585,181	284,415	384,900	544,028	183,877	183,836	129,405
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	116,497	107,485	120,441	10,510	9,720	14,165
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	28,064	28,064	21,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$10,024,914</b>	<b>\$10,754,490</b>	<b>\$10,561,287</b>	<b>\$32,373,372</b>	<b>\$30,277,208</b>	<b>\$32,615,418</b>	<b>\$18,903,688</b>	<b>\$19,197,545</b>	<b>\$21,772,282</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>30.22 p. c.</b>	<b>31.63 p. c.</b>	<b>30.26 p. c.</b>	<b>37.84 p. c.</b>	<b>31.16 p. c.</b>	<b>35.96 p. c.</b>	<b>40.95 p. c.</b>	<b>44.99 p. c.</b>	<b>40.43 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$1,513,867</b>	<b>\$1,311,978</b>	<b>\$1,161,904</b>	<b>\$4,101,516</b>	<b>\$3,684,388</b>	<b>\$3,285,089</b>	<b>\$1,457,046</b>	<b>\$1,611,945</b>	<b>\$2,032,399</b>

	NEW ORLEANS, LA.			OMAHA, NEB.			PHILADELPHIA, PA.		
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,896,819	\$11,708,748	\$12,277,512	\$9,811,775	\$11,290,700	\$98,784,700	\$100,110,745	\$100,300,759	
Overdrafts.....	261,896	380,211	1,156,697	124,868	124,149	12,696	12,696	10,669	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	622,000	622,000	622,000	575,000	975,000	6,942,500	6,942,500	7,272,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	800,000	800,000	800,000	500,000	755,000	1,220,000	8,388,000	4,163,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	41,210	120,550	36,000	924,100	505,380	60,400	428,100	647,100	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	64,650	66,486	96,069	94,750	96,069	788,704	948,782	940,778	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,848,779	2,687,258	1,984,374	604,176	604,176	16,509,925	16,509,925	13,963,999	
Banking house, furniture and fixture.....	623,397	623,397	623,397	828,884	828,884	3,975,804	3,975,804	3,972,296	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	151,570	152,420	152,190	414,732	419,111	696,539	696,539	690,527	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	624,150	447,667	476,495	979,466	919,020	8,689,988	7,676,980	9,401,905	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	477,150	410,415	680,534	738,541	511,048	1,371,810	1,438,258	1,926,594	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,894,445	1,537,898	1,372,819	4,068,015	8,910,711	3,824,865	20,401,471	19,280,594	
Checks and other cash items.....	580,088	594,517	51,623	116,120	176,984	1,300,626	1,423,381	1,415,783	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	61,486	61,486	1,459,626	675,282	845,190	868,734	10,065,744	13,844,496	
Bills of other National banks.....	18,130	108,000	70,263	144,880	158,026	186,742	345,365	418,017	
Fractional paper currency in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	1,016,382	1,016,382	1,055,612	1,128,705	1,023,317	949,690	1,740,016	2,005,711	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	107,130	106,980	123,730	38,350	38,350	83,980	153,960	159,290	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	65,840	65,082	72,675	176,662	160,297	184,189	8,960,000	7,884,000	
Silver dollars.....	990,882	527,550	682,685	118,145	287,876	293,990	3,275,624	275,189	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	79,817	63,897	66,338	60,614	37,370	3,901,653	3,275,495	4,197,452	
Silver fractional coin.....	210,445	1,121,787	950,191	984,709	689,523	2,583,268	2,622,547	2,611,788	
Legal-tender notes.....	27,980	27,980	165,000	25,875	22,625	5,060,000	4,940,000	4,480,000	
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tenders.....	27,980	27,980	27,980	27,980	27,980	312,410	308,380	285,617	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	20,000	20,000	106,103	15,000	5,450	293,608	31,768	79,005	
<b>Total.....</b>	\$23,623,399	\$22,364,270	\$24,948,779	\$22,468,071	\$23,468,581	\$23,847,164	\$189,067,600	\$191,557,072	\$202,961,374
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,200,000	\$2,200,000	\$2,200,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$19,655,000	\$19,655,000	
Surplus fund.....	2,354,000	2,354,000	2,354,000	943,500	943,500	142,500	14,305,000	14,475,000	
Undiv. profits less expenses and taxes paid.....	354,008	307,496	448,070	112,568	112,568	157,734	2,654,942	2,902,621	
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	1,391,215	1,004,478	1,004,478	594,450	470,200	770,200	6,184,775	6,310,665	
Due to other National banks.....	1,223,069	1,004,478	1,369,743	4,506,673	4,506,673	3,948,500	27,738,297	23,622,800	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	40,002	19,124	9,908	3,897,883	373	64,683	29,086	58,002	
Dividends unpaid.....	14,324	14,324	14,324	9,154,638	9,154,638	9,743,978	109,697,098	117,771,706	
Individual deposits.....	16,368,646	14,328,176	16,500,788	383,701	390,365	534,008	1,223,968	4,072,437	
U. S. deposits.....	.....	283,517	291,506	84,068	260,612	283,880	51,265	48,842	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	100,136	131,835	50,000	26,000	.....	500,000	.....	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	100,000	450,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
<b>Total.....</b>	\$23,623,399	\$22,364,270	\$24,948,779	\$22,468,071	\$23,468,581	\$23,847,164	\$189,067,600	\$191,557,072	\$202,961,374
Average reserve held.....	\$1,56 p. c.	\$1,74 p. c.	\$0,56 p. c.	\$3,56 p. c.	\$3,56 p. c.	\$3,56 p. c.	\$0,25 p. c.	\$0,25 p. c.	\$2,50 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$9,893,513	\$9,318,688	\$3,014,181	\$2,503,985	\$2,268,704	\$2,068,820	\$22,970,190	\$22,943,788	\$24,057,400

	PITTSBURG, PA.		ST. JOSEPH, MO.		ST. LOUIS, MO.	
	July 14, 1898	Sept. 30, 1898	July 14, 1898	Sept. 30, 1898	July 14, 1898	Sept. 30, 1898
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$50,121,655	\$50,083,655	\$47,763,643	\$2,272,000	\$2,240,000	\$2,240,000
Overdrafts.....	36,332	70,470	43,915	1,665	4,005	4,005
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	5,703,500	5,665,500	5,665,500	150,000	270,000	270,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	500,000	1,800,000	500,000	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	912,100	859,700	860,500	56,800	28,100	28,100
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	753,069	753,145	760,542	.....	.....	.....
Stocks, securities, etc.....	4,451,969	4,635,337	4,473,654	14,400	14,400	14,400
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	3,053,703	3,053,261	3,210,065	72,000	72,000	72,000
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	511,387	493,391	493,391	380,253	392,640	392,640
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,694,517	2,867,181	3,078,445	183,635	171,665	171,665
Due from State banks and bankers.....	5,263,985	6,177,460	7,587,569	1,062,283	1,216,655	1,216,655
Due from approved reserve agents.....	838,591	838,591	838,591	69,176	69,176	69,176
Checks and other cash items.....	2,087,664	2,087,664	2,018,152	109,877	143,490	143,490
Exchange for clearing-house.....	87,256	297,595	312,477	11,675	14,205	14,205
Bills of other National banks.....	16,916	16,916	18,061	480	829	829
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....						
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:						
Gold coin.....	3,671,667	3,443,240	3,173,205	132,052	88,747	88,747
Gold Treasury certificates.....	423,870	424,910	410,050	10,000	12,440	12,440
Gold clearing-house certificates.....						
Silver dollars.....	233,896	199,936	183,090	8,977	16,698	16,698
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,163,972	1,013,967	1,325,412	93,254	102,867	102,867
Silver fractional coin.....	118,748	107,729	110,905	4,864	6,918	6,918
Legal-tender notes.....	2,746,652	2,966,136	3,231,869	202,019	194,079	194,079
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....						
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. U. S. Treasurer.....	255,641	254,220	252,651	6,750	9,450	9,450
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	123,132	96,133	48,022	800	860	860
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$93,114,879</b>	<b>\$93,164,175</b>	<b>\$97,750,657</b>	<b>\$4,751,113</b>	<b>\$4,813,989</b>	<b>\$4,408,353</b>
				\$61,545,519	\$61,545,519	\$61,545,519
				\$68,646,940	\$68,646,940	\$68,646,940
				\$8,400,000	\$8,400,000	\$8,400,000
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>						
Capital stock paid in.....	\$12,800,000	\$12,800,000	\$11,800,000	\$650,000	\$650,000	\$650,000
Surplus fund.....	9,812,000	9,652,000	9,112,000	105,500	107,250	107,250
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,965,963	2,179,198	2,035,385	29,810	32,974	32,974
National bank notes issued, less amt'n on hand.....	7,989,684	4,826,570	5,024,400	135,000	189,000	189,000
Due to other National banks.....	2,712,848	3,169,989	2,834,434	1,842,878	1,861,747	1,861,747
Due to State banks and bankers.....	118,712	43,776	60,163	.....	.....	.....
Dividends unpaid.....	45,500,747	46,207,185	46,191,351	2,006,911	2,025,125	2,025,125
Individual deposits.....	413,494	552,049	541,629	49,018	48,729	48,729
U. S. deposits.....	96,600	153,865	143,180	877	878	878
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	20,000	106,620	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....				.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....				.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$93,114,879</b>	<b>\$93,165,175</b>	<b>\$97,750,657</b>	<b>\$4,751,113</b>	<b>\$4,813,989</b>	<b>\$4,408,353</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$7.79 p. c.	\$7.58 p. c.	\$1.30 p. c.	42.63 p. c.	44.46 p. c.	38.59 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,813,545	\$7,889,547	\$3,435,674	\$453,447	\$385,097	\$421,173
				\$9,293,095	\$9,293,095	\$9,293,095
				\$23.62 p. c.	\$23.62 p. c.	\$23.62 p. c.
				\$7,823,595	\$7,823,595	\$7,823,595
				\$68,272,469	\$68,272,469	\$68,272,469



	ST. PAUL, MINN.		SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.		SAVANNAH, GA.	
	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	July 14, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$3,597,573	\$3,998,995	\$13,825,690	\$13,604,083	\$1,321,007	\$1,864,841
Overdrafts.....	4,953	1,281	94,530	67,715	28,708	332
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	282,000	282,000	700,000	700,000	108,000	108,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	475,000	475,000	150,000	150,000	90,000	90,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	138,500	142,500	770,000	728,000	770,440	80,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,765,722	1,765,145	188,720	180,988	10,400	10,400
Stocks, securities, etc.....	698,758	698,758	1,570,150	1,630,382	30,985	30,985
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	97,732	128,575	855,097	855,181	87,812	87,812
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,029,287	680,049	131,141	131,049	16,408	16,408
Due from National banks (not reserve agents)	160,084	243,954	428,554	407,427	40,316	39,984
Due from State banks and bankers.....	8,328,113	8,408,663	1,690,497	2,694,111	20,184	17,008
Checks and other cash items.....	88,663	71,000	708,240	708,240	70,481	66,390
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	249,473	353,459	12,000	11,972	1,275	1,275
Bills of other National banks.....	180,723	122,632	427,441	527,227	88	88
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents	2,845	3,481	6,360	7,460	14,095	14,500
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:						
Gold coin.....	1,780,145	1,749,977	6,216,085	6,970,625	7,044,780	5,000
Gold Treasury certificates.....	10,500	10,000	345,000	345,000	8,000	8,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	138,838	110,870	55,477	35,307	13,000	30,950
Silver dollars.....	260,044	210,704	19,273	23,145	30,985	31,300
Silver Treasury certificates.....	49,872	45,112	48,198	59,375	17,700	8,000
Silver fractional coin.....	818,417	546,480	10,176	7,374	70,000	65,000
Legal-tender notes.....	11,338	11,338	31,495	31,495	4,500	4,500
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders	108,121	24,221	1,600	1,600	1,002	7,380
Five per cent redemption fund with Treas.						
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	\$30,530,794	\$30,699,970	\$27,668,581	\$29,397,427	\$1,941,996	\$1,933,980
<b>Total.....</b>						
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$6,000,000	\$6,000,000	\$750,000	\$750,000
Surplus fund.....	687,000	687,000	2,250,000	2,250,000	225,000	225,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	770,420	817,660	853,632	853,632	48,646	69,381
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand	2,047,770	2,047,770	90,000	90,000	87,065	87,865
Due to other National banks.....	2,591,161	2,562,688	1,015,816	1,389,279	108,533	107,189
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,219,931	1,764,861	3,227,808	3,924,356	108,397	96,284
Dividends unpaid.....	4,324	8, 02	128,145	3,380	2,068	824
Individual deposits.....	10,181,087	10,432,375	14,380,865	16,598,672	511,558	444,238
U. S. deposits.....	196,946	87,151	79,282	79,282	38,298	38,719
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	268,979	868,968	350,824	350,824	54,350	54,350
Notes and bills received.....						
Bills payable.....						
Liabilities other than those above stated.....						
<b>Total.....</b>	\$20,530,794	\$21,699,970	\$27,668,581	\$29,397,427	\$1,941,996	\$1,933,980
Average reserve held.....	43.44 p. c.	43.86 p. c.	44.54 p. c.	45.29 p. c.	30.57 p. c.	29.54 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$2,532,516	\$2,673,143	\$4,697,180	\$7,440,736	\$147,665	\$119,738
						\$22,163,021
						85,166 p. c.
						\$303,976

(The returns of all the banks of the United States were delayed in compilation.)

THE UNITED STATES. July 14, 1898. Sept. 30, 1898. Dec. 1, 1898.

WASHINGTON, D. C. July 14, 1898. Sept. 30, 1898. Dec. 1, 1898.

RESOURCES.

Table listing resources including Loans and discounts, Overdrafts, U. S. bonds to secure circulation, U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits, U. S. bonds on hand, Premiums on U. S. bonds, Stocks, securities, etc., Banking houses, furniture and fixtures, Other real estate and mortgages owned, Due from National banks (not reserve agents), Due from State banks and bankers, Due from approved reserve agents, Checks and other cash items, Exchanges for clearing-house, Bills of other National banks, Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents, Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.: Gold coin, Gold Treasury certificates, Gold clearing-house certificates, Silver dollars, Silver Treasury certificates, Silver fractional coin, Legal-tender notes, U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes, Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer, Due from U. S. Treasurer.

Total..... \$20,426,052

LIABILITIES.

Table listing liabilities including Capital stock paid in, Surplus fund, Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid, National bank notes issued, less amount on hand, State bank notes outstanding, Due to other National banks, Due to State banks and bankers, Dividends unpaid, Individual deposits, Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers, Notes and bills rediscounted, Bills payable, Liabilities other than those above stated.

Total..... \$20,426,032
Average reserve held..... 36.24 p. c.
\* Total lawful money reserve..... \$3,060,817

Table showing resource data for THE UNITED STATES with columns for July 14, 1898, Sept. 30, 1898, and Dec. 1, 1898.

Total..... \$3,977,673,445

Table showing liability data for THE UNITED STATES with columns for July 14, 1898, Sept. 30, 1898, and Dec. 1, 1898.

Total..... \$4,008,511,044
Average reserve held..... 80.37 p. c.
\* Total lawful money reserve..... \$490,722,456

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, January 3, 1898.

A WONDERFUL YEAR OF PROSPERITY accurately describes the twelve months which have just come to a close. In the final month of the year there seemed to be a concentration of favorable conditions, and the year ended without a single depressing influence disturbing confidence.

To the stock market it is natural to look for the expression of the investing sentiment, and that at the present time is plain and emphatic. The memory of man runneth not far enough back to recall such a stock market as that of December, 1896, preceded as that was by months of advancing prices.

The essential element of a bull market long lacking in Wall Street has become a dominating force. Outside buying has been very aggressive of late, and to this fact it is due that the expected break in prices in the last week of December failed to materialize.

Rarely have there been such enormous advances in quotations as have occurred in the past year. Some of the most important advances in prices of stocks are shown as follows :

	Advance Per cent.		Advance Per cent.
American Cotton Oil.....	123%	Iowa Central, preferred.....	10%
"    "    "    " preferred.....	13	Lake Shore.....	30
American Spirits, preferred.....	17½	Long Island.....	161%
American Tobacco.....	55	Metropolitan Street.....	62
"    "    "    " preferred.....	18	Michigan Central.....	147%
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, prof.....	22½	Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	114
Baltimore & Ohio.....	55½	"    "    "    " 1st preferred.....	114
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	40½	"    "    "    " 2d.....	164
Brooklyn Union Gas.....	20	Missouri Pacific.....	117
Central Pacific.....	32	New York Central.....	167
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy.....	25½	New York, New Haven & Hartford.....	169
Chicago & Eastern Illinois, preferred.....	12½	Norfolk & Western, preferred.....	157
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	26	Northern Pacific.....	23
"    "    "    " pref.....	23½	"    "    "    " preferred.....	189
Chicago & Northwestern.....	24½	Oregon Railroad & Navigation.....	151
"    "    "    " preferred.....	25	Oregon Short Line.....	24
"    "    "    " Rock Island & Pacific.....	25½	Pacific Mail.....	169
"    "    "    " St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha	157	Pittsburg, Cinn., Chic. & St. Louis.....	247
"    "    "    "    " pref.....	17½	"    "    "    "    " pref.....	18½
Cleveland, Cinn., Chic. & St. Louis, prof.....	12½	St. Louis & San Francisco, 1st prof.....	11
Consolidated Gas.....	18	St. Paul & Duluth.....	17
Denver & Rio Grande, preferred.....	24½	"    "    "    " preferred.....	17½
Edison Electric of New York.....	69	St. Paul, Minnesota & Manitoba.....	53
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	16½	Southern Pacific.....	137
"    "    "    " preferred.....	27	Southern, preferred.....	107
Express, American.....	27½	Tennessee Coal & Iron.....	109
"    "    "    " United States.....	13½	Union Pacific.....	184
"    "    "    " Wells Fargo.....	114	United States Rubber.....	249
Great Northern, preferred.....	114	"    "    "    " preferred.....	457
Illinois Central.....	114	Wheeling & Lake Erie, preferred.....	174
Illinois Steel.....	22½		

Allowance must be made in some cases for assessments paid during the year by shareholders, but the list fairly shows the character of the stock market of 1898. The gains are net for the year based upon a comparison of the closing prices of 1897 and 1898.

The volume of business transacted at the New York Stock Exchange during the year is indicative of the marked change that has taken place in public sentiment regarding the business situation. Nor can this change be more strikingly shown

than by a comparison between April and December transactions. In April the total number of shares of stocks sold was 6,060,385, while in December 15,373,114 shares were traded in. The total par value of bonds sold in April was \$27,354,100 and in December \$129,818,980. April was the dullest month in the year for bonds but July was the dullest in stocks. December, however, was the most active in all departments of the Stock Exchange.

The year's aggregate sales exceed the total for any previous year in many years, in fact the sales of railroad and State bonds never before were as large as in 1898. The sales of stocks were about 36,000,000 shares greater than in 1897, of State and railroad bonds \$318,000,000 greater and of Government bonds \$13,995,000 greater. The sales at the Stock Exchange during the past ten years were as follows :

YEAR.	Shares of stocks.	State and railroad bonds.	Government bonds.
1889.....	61,133,161	\$304,151,406	\$4,287,050
1890.....	59,441,301	374,342,120	2,891,050
1891.....	72,725,864	389,906,700	1,539,900
1892.....	86,850,630	501,398,200	1,662,400
1893.....	77,984,965	299,372,327	2,021,451
1894.....	49,275,739	352,741,950	4,293,390
1895.....	66,440,576	495,904,950	7,046,250
1896.....	54,490,143	352,815,850	27,121,550
1897.....	77,248,347	529,343,000	10,134,030
1898.....	113,466,383	847,654,000	24,129,210

In many respects the stock market of 1898 resembles that of 1879 and 1880 when prices advanced as they never did before nor since until last year. An interesting comparison may be made of present quotations with those which ruled during the great bull era ushered in about the time of the resumption of specie payments.

Taking twenty leading stocks which were dealt in twenty years ago and now, we show the closing prices and the average for all for each of the four years 1878 to 1881 inclusive, and for the five years 1894 to 1898 inclusive :

	1878.	1879.	1880.	1881.	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.
Canada Southern.....	45	63 $\frac{1}{4}$	74	52 $\frac{3}{4}$	49	48 $\frac{1}{4}$	46	51 $\frac{5}{8}$	55 $\frac{1}{8}$
Central of New Jersey...	33 $\frac{3}{8}$	78 $\frac{5}{8}$	84 $\frac{5}{8}$	90 $\frac{3}{8}$	89 $\frac{5}{8}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	100	96	97 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago, Bur. & Quincy...	111	126 $\frac{3}{4}$	179 $\frac{3}{4}$	136 $\frac{3}{4}$	71	77 $\frac{3}{8}$	69 $\frac{1}{4}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	125
Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul.	37	74 $\frac{3}{8}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{5}{8}$	68 $\frac{3}{8}$	73 $\frac{3}{8}$	94 $\frac{5}{8}$	120 $\frac{5}{8}$
"    "    pref..	76 $\frac{3}{4}$	90	124	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	118	127	131	142 $\frac{3}{4}$	166
Chicago & Northwestern	50 $\frac{3}{4}$	89 $\frac{7}{8}$	127 $\frac{3}{4}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	121 $\frac{3}{4}$	142 $\frac{3}{8}$
"    "    pref..	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	103 $\frac{3}{8}$	141	138 $\frac{1}{2}$	142	145	152	163 $\frac{1}{2}$	188 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago & Rock Island...	120 $\frac{3}{4}$	150	138 $\frac{1}{4}$	132 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{5}{8}$	67 $\frac{5}{8}$	65 $\frac{3}{4}$	89 $\frac{3}{4}$	115 $\frac{3}{8}$
Delaware & Hudson.....	38	73 $\frac{3}{8}$	92 $\frac{1}{4}$	107 $\frac{3}{8}$	126 $\frac{3}{4}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	116	111 $\frac{3}{4}$	107 $\frac{1}{2}$
Delaware, Lack. & West.	42 $\frac{3}{8}$	82 $\frac{3}{8}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	127 $\frac{1}{2}$	106 $\frac{3}{8}$	159 $\frac{1}{2}$	158	155	167
Erie.....	22 $\frac{3}{8}$	41 $\frac{3}{8}$	50 $\frac{3}{8}$	40 $\frac{3}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	14 $\frac{3}{8}$	15	14 $\frac{3}{8}$	14 $\frac{3}{8}$
Illinois Central.....	79 $\frac{3}{8}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	127 $\frac{3}{8}$	130 $\frac{3}{8}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	92 $\frac{3}{4}$	103 $\frac{3}{4}$	114 $\frac{3}{8}$
Lake Shore.....	68 $\frac{3}{8}$	99 $\frac{1}{4}$	134 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{3}{4}$	134 $\frac{1}{2}$	141	154	171	201
Michigan Central.....	73 $\frac{3}{4}$	88 $\frac{3}{8}$	125	89	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	103 $\frac{3}{8}$	118
Missouri, Kansas & Texas	6 $\frac{3}{8}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	44 $\frac{3}{8}$	39 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{4}$	13	13 $\frac{3}{8}$
New York Central.....	114	129 $\frac{1}{4}$	154 $\frac{3}{8}$	131	98 $\frac{3}{8}$	96 $\frac{3}{4}$	93 $\frac{3}{8}$	106 $\frac{3}{8}$	123 $\frac{3}{4}$
Pacific Mail.....	13 $\frac{3}{8}$	35 $\frac{3}{8}$	51	41	22 $\frac{3}{8}$	26 $\frac{3}{4}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{3}{4}$	45 $\frac{3}{8}$
Union Pacific.....	66 $\frac{3}{8}$	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	116 $\frac{5}{8}$	11 $\frac{3}{8}$	4	9	25 $\frac{3}{4}$	43 $\frac{3}{8}$
Wabash.....	22 $\frac{3}{8}$	42	45 $\frac{1}{4}$	37	6	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{3}{8}$
Western Union.....	95 $\frac{3}{8}$	101 $\frac{3}{8}$	81 $\frac{3}{8}$	73 $\frac{3}{4}$	87	85 $\frac{3}{8}$	83 $\frac{1}{4}$	91 $\frac{1}{4}$	93 $\frac{3}{4}$
Average for 20 stocks.	59 $\frac{3}{4}$	85	105 $\frac{5}{8}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	76 $\frac{7}{8}$	79 $\frac{5}{8}$	79 $\frac{3}{4}$	89 $\frac{5}{8}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$

At the end of 1896 the average price of the twenty stocks was 79 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., or just twenty per cent. higher than on December 31, 1878. There was a net advance of 9 $\frac{7}{8}$  per cent. in 1897, and of 12 $\frac{7}{8}$  per cent. in 1898, or 22 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. for the two years. In 1879 and 1880 the advance was 45 $\frac{7}{8}$  per cent., but the average on December 31, 1898, was within 3 $\frac{1}{8}$  per cent. as high as the average on December 31, 1880.

While it is not within the province of this review to indulge in any predictions as to the future, it is proper to note that whatever suggestion may be found in a comparison of stock prices in 1898 and 1899, any comparison of financial and trade conditions of the two years must be favorable to the year just ended.

In all the statistical data which furnish trustworthy tests of the condition of business we find the records at the highest point. It is so with bank clearings, with exports of merchandise, with gold imports, with iron production, with gold production, with money supply, with railroad earnings and with other recorded trade and economic operations.

The volume of transaction at the New York Produce Exchange was not equal to that of the previous year, in fact the sales of most classes of grain, excepting corn, were smaller than for several years past. Only about 787,000,000 bushels of wheat were dealt in as against 1,286,000,000 bushels in 1897, and only 3,555,000 barrels of wheat flour as against 4,346,000 barrels in 1897. The sales of corn aggregated 142,772,000 bushels as compared with 107,385,000 bushels in 1897. The sales of the principal grain products in each of the last five years were :

	<i>Wheat flour.</i>	<i>Wheat.</i>	<i>Corn.</i>	<i>Oats.</i>	<i>Barley.</i>
	Barrels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.
1894.....	5 001,000	1,251,705,000	132,410,000	69,505,000	1,900,000
1895.....	5,556,400	1,665,232,000	147,785,000	57,686 000	3,150,000
1896.....	4,513,000	1,129,690,000	90,501,000	37,458,000	6,120,000
1897.....	4,346,000	1,286,290,000	107,385,000	50,578,000	6,358,000
1898.....	3,555,025	787,290,000	142,772,000	32,294,000	4,108,000

There was a very wide fluctuation in the price of wheat during the year. No. 2 red winter wheat selling at 100 $\frac{5}{8}$ ¢ at the beginning of the year and advancing to 193 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢ on May 10 as the result of the Leiter speculation. The price fell to 68 $\frac{3}{4}$ ¢ on September 8, but closed at 81 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢ on December 30. Corn advanced from 34 $\frac{1}{4}$ ¢ cents, the lowest price of the year, made on January 13, to 45 $\frac{3}{8}$ ¢ cents, the highest price recorded on December 28, and closed at 43 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢ cents on December 30.

The cotton trade has failed to share in the general prosperity, and the price fell to the lowest recorded in fifty years, 5 5-16 cents, and was quoted at 5 $\frac{3}{8}$ ¢ cents at the close of the year. The commercial crop of cotton for the season of 1897-98 was 11,215,953 bales as compared with 8,705,802 bales for the previous year. Estimates of the crop of 1898-99 range from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 bales, while the generally accepted view is that the yield will be about as great as last year's.

The cotton planter at the present price of cotton is not getting more than about 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢ cents per pound, and this is from a cent to 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢ cents below the cost of production.

The wool trade has also had an exceptional experience. A comparison with 1897 particularly makes the year 1898 appear in a very unfavorable light, for the earlier year was one in which wool industries were very prosperous. The total sales of wool in Boston, Philadelphia and New York were the smallest in ten years with the exception of 1893. The sales in each of the past nine years in those markets were :

YEAR.	Pounds.	YEAR.	Pounds.	YEAR.	Pounds.
1890.....	253,503,590	1893.....	199,504,303	1896.....	244,311,300
1891.....	245,030,393	1894.....	220,208,512	1897.....	527,053,574
1892.....	308,644,170	1895.....	379,875,923	1898.....	230,496,336

Prices were generally well maintained until in the autumn when a decline set in.

The iron trade closes the year with conditions existing the most favorable in its history. The only year in which the present activity was ever paralleled was 1879, and the prospect is that 1899 will surpass it. Many producers are booked for months ahead, and the tonnage contracted for in 1898 for delivery in 1899 is enormous. Prices have been and still are low, but advances are being made by produc-

ers who are now confident of their control of the market. The estimated output of pig iron in 1898 was 11,645,000 tons, the largest ever known; and the present rate of production is greater than at any previous time. The weekly output of pig iron on the first day of each month in the past four years as reported by the "Iron Age" was as follows:

## WEEKLY OUTPUT OF PIG IRON.

	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
January.....	168,414	207,481	159,720	226,606
February.....	163,361	196,599	162,959	223,338
March.....	156,979	189,583	169,986	234,490
April.....	158,132	187,451	173,279	233,399
May.....	156,554	189,398	170,528	234,168
June.....	157,224	182,220	168,380	235,398
July.....	171,194	180,532	164,084	216,311
August.....	180,525	157,678	165,878	204,777
September.....	194,029	126,500	185,506	213,043
October.....	201,414	112,783	200,128	215,635
November.....	217,806	124,077	213,159	223,985
December.....	216,797	142,273	226,124	235,523

There has also been a remarkable expansion in the Lake Superior iron ore industry. The year's output is estimated at 14,110,351 tons as compared with 12,469,638 tons in 1897 and 9,934,828 tons in 1896. The output with the shipments from Lake Superior and Lake Michigan ports, and receipts at Lake Erie and Lake Michigan points for each of the past four years ended December 1, was as follows:

YEAR.	Output.	Shipments.	RECEIPTS.	
			Lake Erie.	Lake Michigan.
			Tons.	Tons.
1895.....	10,429,037	10,233,910	8,112,228	2,121,683
1896.....	9,934,828	9,644,036	8,026,432	1,617,604
1897.....	12,469,638	12,215,645	10,120,906	2,094,739
1898.....	14,110,351	13,650,788	11,023,321	2,627,467

The copper mines of the Lake Superior district have also produced as never before in their history. While official figures will not be had for some months to come it is estimated that the copper production of Lake Superior mines for the year 1898 aggregated 158,250,000 pounds, as against 142,530,646 pounds in 1897, 142,119,230 pounds in 1896 and 131,363,945 pounds in 1895. The dividends paid by Lake Superior copper mines to the close of 1898 have aggregated \$32,181,875, while the total assessments were \$5,757,500.

The evidence of general improvement afforded in the statistics of railroad construction is very encouraging indeed. There is little doubt that the new mileage constructed last year will exceed 3,000 miles, exceeding that of any previous year since 1892. We give the figures compiled by the "Railway Age" as follows:

YEAR.	Miles.	YEAR.	Miles.
1897.....	12,983	1893.....	2,635
1898.....	7,106	1894.....	1,949
1899.....	5,230	1895.....	1,503
1890.....	5,670	1896.....	1,845
1891.....	4,281	1897.....	1,530
1892.....	4,192	1898.....	3,018

The work of construction was well distributed, every State except five being represented. Minnesota leads with 250 miles.

There has also been a great increase in the construction of locomotives and cars by contracting companies. The locomotives constructed numbered, according to

the "Railroad Gazette," 1,875 against 1,251 in 1897, and only 695 in 1894. There were 99,809 freight cars built as against 43,598 in 1897 and only 18,000 in 1894.

The most available test of the activity of business is afforded by the record of clearing-house exchanges. In New York the operations of the Stock Exchange have been largely eliminated from the banking records, making the exchanges of the clearing house a truer index of trade activity. The total exchanges for the year were \$41,971,781,684 against \$33,427,027,471 in 1897. The record of 1898 has been exceeded only twice, in 1881 and 1882, when the Stock Exchange had no clearing-house of its own. In those years the clearings were \$49,376,882,882 in 1881 and \$46,916,965,030 in 1882.

The total bank clearings for the United States in 1898 were about \$68,750,000,000 comparing with \$57,403,000,000 in 1897.

The growth in the resources and reserves of our local banks has been one of the most impressive features of the year. Never before did New York take as prominent a position as a world's money centre. Its bankers have been lending on foreign exchange, and Europe has been a borrower in New York. There have been rumors of a large national loan to be made here by Russia but denials have followed the rumor.

The increased wealth and power of our financial institutions is reflected in the following table showing the condition of the New York Clearing-House banks on December 31 of each of the past five years:

	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.
Loans .....	\$492,647,000	\$478,466,500	\$491,375,900	\$607,781,200	\$718,308,700
Deposits .....	549,291,400	501,089,800	530,375,000	675,064,200	823,037,700
Specie .....	73,760,600	67,114,200	76,342,800	104,730,700	189,756,300
Legal tenders .....	96,831,100	74,097,800	89,640,900	79,824,100	55,184,100
Total reserve .....	172,591,700	141,212,000	165,983,200	184,554,800	224,940,400
Surplus reserve .....	35,268,850	15,939,675	33,286,950	15,788,750	19,180,975
Circulation .....	11,294,700	13,226,700	19,600,100	15,507,200	16,270,900

The banks have increased their loans more than \$100,000,000 and their deposits nearly \$148,000,000 in the past year, and both these items are the largest ever recorded. Reserves are also very large, \$140,000,000 more than a year ago, but the increase is all in specie, it showing a gain of \$65,000,000.

The extreme range of loans, deposits, and reserve yearly, since 1892, and for the three years, 1879, 1890, and 1881, is shown as follows:

	LOANS.		DEPOSITS.		RESERVE.	
	Maximum.	Minimum.	Maximum.	Minimum.	Maximum.	Minimum.
1879 .....	\$278,098,100	\$230,442,900	\$254,770,700	\$193,121,700	\$77,307,500	\$50,180,800
1880 .....	324,970,000	272,250,800	377,796,700	242,087,100	91,530,900	61,005,900
1881 .....	362,856,800	296,252,900	352,658,800	271,668,800	96,006,800	68,183,300
1892 .....	496,584,000	437,722,000	543,663,100	444,370,100	135,915,775	111,062,525
1893 .....	464,910,200	390,960,400	506,437,800	370,302,400	207,424,800	76,505,500
1894 .....	517,733,500	418,185,400	595,104,900	518,524,600	249,575,100	172,528,100
1895 .....	522,698,900	478,466,500	577,223,300	500,822,300	186,040,800	149,135,500
1896 .....	497,673,300	442,179,700	525,837,200	438,437,600	164,172,200	119,996,500
1897 .....	610,606,300	488,765,700	675,169,900	530,736,000	202,963,000	165,983,200
1898 .....	718,308,700	570,196,100	823,037,700	658,503,300	249,532,200	182,257,300

One of the notable features of the year has been the remarkable inflation of our circulating medium. With the possible exception of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1863, we doubt if in any other year in the country's history has there been a larger addition to the volume of money in circulation than there was in the calendar year 1898.

The amount in circulation increased \$176,000,000 during the year, and the amount in the country including money in the United States Treasury increased for the year nearly \$224,000,000. This is an increase of ten per cent. in a single year. Most of the increase is represented by gold, although additional National bank notes have been issued and the Government has been making silver dollars out of the old stock of silver bullion thus increasing to some extent in the supply of money.

The following table shows the change in the supply of money annually in the past eight years :

DECEMBER 31	IN U. S. TREASURY.		IN CIRCULATION.		IN COUNTRY.	
	Net gold.	Net money.	Gold coin and gold certificates.	Total money.	Gold.	Total money.
1890.....	\$148,972,965	\$185,063,638	\$555,127,876	\$1,523,786,268	\$704,100,811	\$1,713,789,801
1891.....	130,740,681	159,938,165	556,105,299	1,582,781,729	686,845,980	1,748,684,994
1892.....	121,296,668	154,252,049	530,064,099	1,610,689,874	651,330,762	1,764,985,923
1893.....	80,891,600	117,143,042	566,014,990	1,729,018,266	666,906,690	1,846,161,308
1894.....	86,244,445	176,432,466	538,833,235	1,628,568,622	626,107,730	1,802,991,088
1895.....	63,282,268	204,202,686	534,694,966	1,519,203,724	597,927,254	1,783,409,410
1896.....	137,316,544	235,367,336	555,630,668	1,650,234,000	662,947,212	1,905,561,738
1897.....	160,911,547	234,135,678	584,123,049	1,721,100,640	745,067,596	1,955,235,318
1898.....	246,529,175	281,747,712	702,996,888	1,997,301,412	949,626,013	2,179,049,184

The estimate made by the Director of the Mint of the gold production of the United States in 1898, if correct, makes another new record for the year. The estimate makes the yield \$65,782,677, which exceeds all previous records, the largest previous yield being estimated at \$65,000,000 for the year 1853. The yield in 1852 and 1854 was \$60,000,000 per annum, and with those exceptions the largest yield until 1897 was \$55,000,000. The 1898 production is nearly \$3,500,000 greater than 1897 and nearly \$30,000,000 more than in 1893. Colorado has jumped into first place leading California nearly \$10,000,000; prior to 1860, however, California produced from \$50,000,000 to \$60,000,000 per annum, while Colorado's high record as yet is \$24,500,000 made last year. The annual yield of gold in the United States, by States, during the past six years has been as follows :

	1893.	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.
Colorado.....	\$7,527,000	\$9,491,514	\$13,305,100	\$14,911,000	\$19,104,200	\$24,500,000
California.....	12,080,000	13,570,397	14,923,600	15,235,900	14,618,800	14,989,721
South Dakota.....	4,006,400	3,239,100	3,869,500	4,669,900	5,694,900	5,841,406
Montana.....	3,676,000	3,651,410	4,101,400	4,324,700	4,373,400	5,209,308
Arizona.....	1,184,300	1,784,475	1,965,300	2,604,200	2,895,900	3,185,490
Nevada.....	968,500	1,137,819	1,552,200	2,468,300	2,976,400	3,969,731
Idaho.....	1,648,900	2,061,281	1,779,600	2,155,300	1,701,700	2,373,908
Utah.....	853,600	868,081	1,373,000	1,899,900	1,726,100	2,170,543
Alaska.....	1,010,100	1,114,550	1,615,300	2,055,700	1,778,000	3,099,530
Oregon.....	1,645,300	1,422,056	898,300	1,261,000	1,353,100	1,343,669
Other States.....	1,467,000	1,060,367	1,281,700	1,140,500	1,140,900	1,374,963
<b>Total United States..</b>	<b>\$35,965,000</b>	<b>\$39,500,000</b>	<b>\$46,610,000</b>	<b>\$53,083,300</b>	<b>\$57,368,000</b>	<b>\$65,782,677</b>

Nothing has attracted more general attention or had more to do with the restoration of confidence than the enormous volume of our foreign trade. The wonderful records of 1878 and 1879, which stood for nearly 20 years have been dimmed by the immense figures of 1898. The figures for December are yet unreported, but the exports of merchandise for the year will no doubt approximate \$1,250,000,000 or \$150,000,000 more than in 1897, and the net exports go above \$610,000,000 or \$250,000,000 more than in 1897, while the net imports of gold will reach \$140,000,000.

A comparison of our foreign trade of the last three years with that of the four



years 1878-1881 will show some interesting results. It is presented in the following table :

CALENDAR YEAR.	MERCHANDISE.			GOLD.
	Exports.	Imports.	Net Exports	Imports.
1878.....	\$737,092,073	\$421,812,488	\$305,279,585	\$1,821,911
1879.....	765,159,325	513,802,796	251,356,529	74,632,495
1880.....	889,683,422	693,807,176	195,876,246	70,682,239
1881.....	863,549,127	670,309,448	193,239,679	57,795,077
Four years.....	\$3,225,484,447	\$2,312,431,908	\$913,052,544	\$204,851,729
1896.....	\$1,005,837,241	\$681,579,556	\$324,257,685	\$46,474,419
1897.....	1,099,743,554	742,651,850	357,112,204	* 255,809
1898†.....	1,242,000,000	631,000,000	611,000,000	140,000,000
Three years.....	\$3,347,580,795	\$2,055,210,906	\$1,292,369,889	\$186,218,610

\* Net exports.

† December estimated.

While the exports of manufactured articles have been growing very rapidly it is a fact that our agricultural products have been an important part of our export trade. Particularly have our exports of wheat and corn been very large. The following table for eight years past shows how large the grain movement has been in the past year :

CALENDAR YEAR.	Wheat.	Wheat flour.	Corn.
	Busbels.	Barrels.	Busbels.
1891.....	120,639,994	13,023,622	20,091,851
1892.....	125,518,441	17,408,713	77,471,179
1893.....	108,377,589	16,440,693	55,143,918
1894.....	72,523,389	16,056,390	41,806,711
1895.....	63,304,693	14,523,761	61,956,638
1896.....	83,745,829	15,845,836	131,990,530
1897.....	109,909,328	13,596,359	189,127,570
*1897.....	95,761,356	11,674,607	169,393,948
*1898.....	123,597,623	14,615,532	185,277,340

\* Eleven months ended November 30.

The full return for the year will show wheat exports larger than in any previous year of the period included in the table, wheat flour exports but slightly exceeded in 1892, and corn exports the largest ever known.

At no time during the year has the financial condition of the United States Treasury caused any apprehension. The beginning of the war with Spain and the sudden increase in the expenditures for war and navy purposes made it necessary for the Government to increase its revenues by means of internal revenue taxes. It also placed a loan of \$200,000,000. By these means the Treasury has been well supplied with funds and it closes the year with a net surplus of \$294,764,000 as compared with about \$235,500,000 a year ago and only \$90,000,000 five years ago.

The ordinary revenues of the Government are, however, still below the ordinary expenditures. The deficit for the year just ended is \$138,916,000, while in 1897 it was only about \$27,500,000 and in 1896 \$49,500,000. The increase in disbursements for the war and navy departments more than accounts for the deficiency of last year even after making allowance for the increased revenue from war taxation.

For six years past the Government revenues have been deficient, and the war only aggravated the condition. The following table show the receipts from customs and the total revenues with the expenditures, those for war and navy being separately stated for each of the past seven years.

We have eliminated the receipts from the sale of the Pacific Railroads which in 1897 were \$49,909,822.40 and in 1898 were \$14,841,401.85, also from the expenditures \$4,549,363.26 paid on account of those roads in 1897.

YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31.	RECEIPTS.		EXPENDITURES.		Excess of ex- penditures.
	Customs.	Total.	War and navy.	Total	
1892.....	\$191,787,986	\$309,763,088	\$76,525,817	\$397,292,595	*\$2,471,168
1893.....	173,291,436	330,102,572	67,415,379	352,484,556	43,381,984
1894.....	181,915,004	305,962,205	84,304,599	365,100,951	58,115,746
1895.....	165,584,947	322,478,133	78,578,728	352,049,069	29,570,898
1896.....	144,221,511	315,323,310	79,058,978	364,785,068	49,454,778
1897.....	171,969,420	346,005,862	80,936,851	374,049,842	27,442,480
1898.....	176,810,559	425,964,067	281,161,063	564,860,843	188,916,798

\* Excess of receipts.

The cost of war is plainly shown in the above table, the war and navy expenditures being more than three times the total for 1897 and almost four times the total for 1896. Not since 1866 have these disbursements been as large as in 1898, and not since 1865 have the total expenditures of the Government equalled those of last year.

The effect of deficient revenues or of excessive expenditures will be observed in the table printed below, which shows the changes in the public debt in recent years. Four times in the last five years the Government has been compelled to borrow money, in 1894 \$100,000,000, in 1895 \$62,000,000, in 1896 \$100,000,000 and in 1898 \$200,000,000. The table is as follows:

	Interest bear- ing debt.	Total debt.	Cash in Treasury.	Net public debt.
August 31, 1865.....	\$2,381,530,205	\$2,844,640,637	\$28,218,065	\$2,756,431,571
June 30, 1893.....	585,087,100	1,545,985,686	707,016,210	838,969,476
January 1, 1894.....	545,089,310	1,567,923,341	694,632,979	873,290,362
" " 1895.....	679,168,130	1,854,875,379	743,471,684	910,903,695
" " 1896.....	747,381,980	1,633,349,135	748,050,873	947,298,262
" " 1897.....	847,384,693	1,802,050,534	800,129,952	992,920,582
" " 1898.....	847,385,620	1,811,543,270	812,431,702	999,111,568
" " 1899.....	1,040,215,980	1,977,388,765	818,212,479	1,129,176,286

The table shows that the bonded debt was reduced from \$2,381,000,000 to \$585,000,000 between August 31, 1865, and June 30, 1893, and the net debt less cash in the Treasury from \$2,756,000,000 to less than \$839,000,000. Since June 30, 1893, however, we have increased the bonded debt to \$1,040,000,000 and the net debt to \$1,129,000,000. Amid the general rejoicing over good times there is still something to regret in the backward step taken by the United States as a debt-paying country.

THE MONEY MARKET.—Until the last week of the month call money ruled at about 2 to 2½ per cent., but a flurry occurred on December 28, the rate advancing

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Aug. 1.	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	Per cent. 1 — 1½	Per cent. 2 — 2½	Per cent. 3 — 4	Per cent. 1½ — 2	Per cent. 2 — 2½	Per cent. 2 — 3
Call loans, banks and trust compa- nies.....	1½ —	2½ —	3½ — 4	2 —	2½ — 3½	3 — 3½
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	2½ —	2½ — 3	3½ —	2½ —	3 —	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	2½ — 3	3½ — 4	3½ — 4	2½ — 3	3 — 3½	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	3 — 3½	4 —	4 —	3 — 3½	3½ —	3½ —
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	3½ — 3¾	4 —	3¾ — 4¼	3½ — 3¾	3½ — 3¾	3 —
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	3¾ — 4¼	4 — 5	4 — 4½	3¾ — 4¼	3½ — 4	3¾ — 3¾
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	4¼ — 5½	5 — 6	5 — 6	4¼ — 5	4 — 5	4 — 5

sharply to six per cent., but falling to two per cent. by the close of the day. In view of the activity of the stock market and the usual calling in of loans incident to the last days of the year in anticipation of January settlements, the flurry was short lived and unimportant. The supply of money is large with the demand only moderate.

At the close of the month call money ruled at 2 to 3 per cent., the average rate being about  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. Banks and trust companies quote 3 to 3 per cent. as the minimum. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at three per cent. for sixty days to four months, and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for five to six months. For commercial paper the rates are three per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable,  $3\frac{1}{4}$  @  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. for first-class four to six months' single names, and 4 @ 5 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

NEW YORK CITY BANKS.—For the first time in the history of the New York Clearing House banks the loans of those institutions reached \$700,000,000 on December 10, and one week after the deposits for the first time reached \$800,000,000. Both these items have increased largely since and loans are nearly \$21,000,000 more than they were a month ago and deposits \$33,000,000 larger. The specie holdings of the banks have further increased during the month more than \$11,000,000, and now amount to nearly \$170,000,000. Legal-tenders decreased nearly \$1,000,000. The surplus reserve increased \$2,000,000 and is now more than \$19,000,000.

NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 3...	\$697,747,400	\$158,462,300	\$58,017,100	\$789,525,800	\$17,097,950	\$16,439,200	\$1,001,138,114
" 10...	702,309,300	161,066,500	54,873,900	796,788,090	16,748,300	16,385,300	954,918,100
" 17...	708,555,800	164,223,100	54,376,300	806,912,100	16,573,375	16,341,700	1,119,888,300
" 24...	712,213,100	168,965,700	54,391,300	814,951,800	19,619,050	16,286,300	1,022,496,900
" 31...	718,306,700	169,756,300	55,184,100	823,087,700	19,180,975	16,270,600	975,690,300

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following tables :

BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 3.....	\$184,489,000	\$215,985,000	\$16,587,000	\$7,476,000	\$5,816,000	\$120,791,300
" 10.....	184,708,000	220,875,000	17,077,000	7,188,000	5,777,000	120,411,000
" 17.....	183,836,000	224,478,000	17,668,000	7,721,000	5,942,000	134,989,200
" 24.....	181,981,000	220,877,000	17,968,000	8,012,000	5,448,000	126,594,900
" 31.....	185,806,000	228,450,000	18,266,000	8,202,000	5,468,000	109,066,000

PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 3.....	\$123,238,000	\$141,558,000	\$41,919,000	\$6,099,000	\$85,816,500
" 10.....	122,658,000	142,592,000	43,975,000	6,095,000	84,378,600
" 17.....	122,578,000	145,476,000	45,815,000	6,101,000	91,291,400
" 24.....	122,859,000	144,207,000	45,814,000	6,082,000	88,682,800
" 31.....	122,668,000	146,506,000	46,855,000	6,089,000	80,794,700

MONEY RATES ABROAD.—While the rates of discount of the leading banks in Europe are the same as a month ago, Bank of England four per cent., Bank of France three per cent., and Bank of Germany six per cent., open market rates on the Continent are generally a trifle higher. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London at the close of the month were  $3\frac{1}{8}$  per cent. against  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @  $3\frac{5}{8}$  per cent. a

month ago. The open rate at Paris was three per cent. the same as a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfurt  $4\frac{5}{8}$  per cent. against  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. a month ago.

MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	July 8.	Aug. 19.	Sept. 16.	Oct. 14.	Nov. 18.	Dec. 16.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	4	4	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
6 months bankers' drafts.....	2	$2\frac{1}{8}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Loans—Day to day.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Paris, open market rates.....	$1\frac{3}{4}$	$1\frac{3}{4}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	2	3	3
Berlin, .....	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{7}{8}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$
Hamburg, .....	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$
Frankfort, .....	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$
Amsterdam, .....	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	2	2	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Vienna, .....	$3\frac{7}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	4	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$
St. Petersburg, .....	5	$4\frac{1}{2}$	4	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$
Madrid, .....	5	5	5	5	5	5
Copenhagen, .....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	5	5

BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Sept. 14, 1898.	Oct. 12, 1898.	Nov. 16, 1898.	Dec. 14, 1898.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£27,429,180	£27,704,575	£27,043,175	£26,940,525
Public deposits.....	8,349,941	7,178,652	5,804,566	5,783,478
Other deposits.....	40,240,040	36,464,251	35,244,984	35,408,396
Government securities.....	13,413,598	12,901,640	9,900,640	10,989,535
Other securities.....	20,589,405	28,240,396	26,779,448	27,212,363
Reserve of notes and coin.....	24,021,628	20,291,376	22,195,987	20,548,354
Coin and bullion.....	34,650,908	31,195,951	32,439,112	30,983,879
Reserve to liabilities.....	$49\frac{1}{2}\%$	$46\frac{1}{2}\%$	$53\frac{1}{2}\%$	$50\frac{1}{2}\%$
Bank rate of discount.....	$2\frac{1}{2}\%$	3	4	4
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$ @ $17\frac{1}{2}\%$	$3\frac{1}{2}\%$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ @ $3\frac{1}{2}\%$	3
Price of Consols ( $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cents.).....	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	110 $\frac{1}{4}$	107 $\frac{1}{2}$
Price of silver per ounce.....	28d.	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$
Average price of wheat.....	26s. 10d.	26s. 6d.	26s. 4d.	27s. 6d.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The sterling exchange market has been dull during the greater part of the month. Commercial bills for cotton and grain have come freely upon the market but were promptly absorbed. There has been some investment buying of long exchange, but it is expected that when the bills bought last November mature in January they will not be renewed and that there will be a decline in short exchange and heavy gold imports.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	January 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ —3	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.82— $\frac{1}{4}$	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ —2
“ “ Sight.....	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ —5	4.84— $\frac{1}{4}$	4.84— $\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$
“ “ Cables.....	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85— $\frac{1}{2}$
“ Commercial long.....	4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.81— $\frac{1}{2}$	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.81— $\frac{1}{2}$
“ Documentary for paym't.....	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $2\frac{1}{2}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $1\frac{1}{4}$	4.81—2	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $1\frac{1}{4}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $1\frac{1}{2}$
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ —20	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
“ Bankers' 60 days.....	5.22 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $3\frac{1}{4}$	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
“ Bankers' sight.....	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.22 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $1\frac{1}{4}$	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Antwerp—Commercial 60 days.....	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $3\frac{1}{4}$	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $2\frac{1}{2}$	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $3\frac{1}{4}$	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $94\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
“ Bankers' sight.....	95— $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $23\frac{1}{2}$	5.22 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40— $\frac{1}{4}$	40— $\frac{1}{4}$	40— $\frac{1}{4}$	40— $\frac{1}{2}$	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ —40
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $29\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
Italian lire—sight.....	5.58 $\frac{1}{2}$ —55 $\frac{1}{4}$	5.62 $\frac{1}{2}$ —50 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.66 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $2\frac{1}{2}$	5.55—50	5.52 $\frac{1}{2}$ —50

FOREIGN TRADE.—The statistics of our foreign trade for November show that the value of our merchandise exports was \$129,783,512, the largest aggregate ever reported for any month. The November exports were exceptionally large both in

1896 and 1897 but the figures for those years have been exceeded by \$20,000,000 and \$13,000,000 respectively. The imports continue very small, being only about \$52,000,000, or about the same as in 1897. The result is a net balance of exports amounting to nearly \$78,000,000, exceeding the extraordinary balance of \$64,000,000 in November, 1897, and of \$59,000,000 in 1896. For the eleven months of the year the total exports of merchandise are \$1,117,681,000, an increase of \$143,000,000 over 1897 and of \$335,000,000 over 1895. The total imports were \$579,844,000, a decrease from 1897 of \$111,000,000 and from 1895 of \$160,000,000. The net exports over imports are nearly \$538,000,000, an increase over the previous year of \$254,000,000. The net imports of gold in November were \$4,911,734, making a total for the eleven months of \$134,421,000, which exceeds the total for any previous entire year. The exports of silver continue small, being \$1,754,000 in November and \$22,048,000 for the eleven months.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF NOVEMBER.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1893.....	\$91,659,698	\$49,263,363	Exp., \$42,396,335	Imp., \$4,139,832	Exp., \$3,247,190
1894.....	79,954,005	50,567,482	" 29,386,523	" 1,550,773	" 2,189,688
1895.....	87,312,581	63,844,817	" 23,967,764	Exp., 13,255,640	" 3,364,454
1896.....	109,072,839	50,043,288	" 59,029,551	Imp., 7,019,290	" 2,007,611
1897.....	116,672,325	52,354,651	" 64,317,674	" 2,354,576	" 1,829,815
1898.....	129,783,512	52,109,560	" 77,673,952	" 4,911,734	" 1,754,444
<b>ELEVEN MONTHS.</b>					
1893.....	782,557,052	726,324,057	Exp., 56,232,995	Exp., 5,105,131	Exp., 23,700,254
1894.....	740,225,402	614,177,510	" 126,047,892	" 71,257,549	" 27,508,989
1895.....	732,331,019	739,468,300	Imp., 7,137,281	" 56,503,172	" 27,143,363
1896.....	888,651,315	622,598,896	Exp., 266,052,419	Imp., 44,105,151	" 29,841,864
1897.....	974,655,084	691,089,266	" 283,565,818	Exp., 2,257,998	" 22,497,246
1898.....	1,117,681,199	579,844,153	" 537,837,046	Imp., 134,421,054	" 22,048,103

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.—There was an increase of \$1,033,067 in bank note circulation in December, making an increase of \$14,804,824 for the year, the total now being \$243,735,105, of which \$214,015,987 is secured by the deposit of Government bonds. There was an increase of \$87,444 in bonds so deposited for the month and of \$17,869,894 for the year. The lawful money deposited to retire circulation increased in amount \$945,622 in December but is \$3,065,070 less than a year ago.

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Sept. 30, 1898.	Oct. 31, 1898.	Nov. 30, 1898.	Dec. 31, 1898.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$235,356,950	\$239,544,281	\$242,702,088	\$243,735,105
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	205,056,063	210,579,193	213,928,548	214,015,987
Circulation secured by lawful money....	30,300,887	29,500,825	28,773,495	29,719,118
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Pacific RR. bonds, 6 per cent.....	3,206,000	2,906,000	3,138,000	1,815,000
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	21,730,150	22,047,750	21,975,750	21,496,750
" " 1907, 4 per cent.....	142,640,700	139,436,050	136,596,550	133,972,050
Five per cents. of 1894.....	17,219,900	16,291,900	15,696,900	15,010,400
Four per cents. of 1895.....	24,987,150	23,990,650	21,915,650	20,726,650
Three per cents. of 1896.....	20,176,220	31,006,120	40,136,280	46,938,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$239,960,120</b>	<b>\$235,618,470</b>	<b>\$239,840,180</b>	<b>\$239,942,850</b>

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: Pacific Railroad 6 per cents., \$1,288,000; 2 per cents. of 1891, \$1,534,500; 4 per cents. of 1907, \$2,130,500; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$7,867,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$9,907,500; 3 per cents. of 1896, \$2,098,420; a total of \$71,323,920.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$82,765.

GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.—The mints coined \$9,492,045 gold and \$3,275,481 silver, of which \$2,006,260 was in silver dollars, and \$58,938, minor coin, a total of

\$12,826,484. The total coinage of gold for the year amounted to \$77,985,757 and of silver to \$23,084,084.

UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	November, 1898.	Since July 1, 1898.	Source.	November, 1898.	Since July 1, 1898.
Customs.....	\$16,764,325	\$96,045,889	Civil and mis.....	\$6,063,487	\$50,720,733
Internal revenue...	22,621,318	128,394,840	War.....	18,184,676	146,096,920
Miscellaneous.....	2,019,150	11,521,711	Navy.....	4,373,730	26,509,459
Total.....	\$41,404,793	\$245,961,800	Indians.....	897,254	5,674,065
Excess of expenditures.....	\$480,014	\$38,719,422	Pensions.....	11,171,898	71,506,833
			Interest.....	573,787	19,173,151
			Total.....	\$41,864,907	\$229,661,211

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.—The volume of money in circulation was increased nearly \$10,500,000 in December making \$105,000,000 increase in the last four months and \$176,000,000 for the year. There was an increase in gold coin in circulation of \$8,810,000 during the month and of \$1,203,220 in silver dollars, while certificates and Treasury notes were reduced \$1,405,282.

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1898.	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$547,568,300	\$649,846,727	\$658,968,513	\$667,796,579
Silver dollars.....	61,491,073	63,437,255	63,980,333	65,188,553
Subsidiary silver.....	65,720,308	68,873,962	69,997,378	70,687,318
Gold certificates.....	86,537,689	85,338,949	85,280,649	83,201,259
Silver certificates.....	376,966,502	391,177,575	392,818,148	392,831,995
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	103,443,936	96,589,780	95,781,432	94,942,741
United States notes.....	263,480,827	306,391,620	311,736,046	312,415,738
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872.....	43,315,000	20,065,000	20,180,000	20,465,000
National bank notes.....	223,827,715	234,969,964	236,108,059	238,337,729
Total.....	\$1,721,100,640	\$1,986,575,782	\$1,896,979,504	\$1,897,301,412
Population of United States.....	73,725,000	75,059,000	75,194,000	
Circulation per capita.....	\$23.34	\$24.87	\$25.09	

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.—The net money in the Treasury increased nearly \$5,000,000 in December, about \$1,300,000 of which was in gold coin, \$3,572,000 in gold bullion, \$1,900,000 in silver dollars and \$804,000 in National bank notes, partly offset by decreases in silver bullion, subsidiary silver and United States notes.

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Jan. 1, 1898.	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$151,910,176	\$141,800,498	\$138,441,547	\$139,654,545
Gold bullion.....	45,559,080	133,423,574	183,502,545	142,074,889
Silver Dollars.....	394,327,049	403,399,342	404,258,264	405,061,304
Silver bullion.....	102,284,736	94,675,773	93,359,250	92,192,207
Subsidiary silver.....	10,679,899	7,864,660	6,673,206	5,959,343
United States notes.....	84,200,089	40,379,396	34,944,970	34,255,278
National bank notes.....	5,186,886	4,659,172	4,675,744	5,480,141
Total.....	\$794,147,895	\$836,192,415	\$820,855,525	\$824,687,707
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	560,012,217	543,141,264	544,070,277	542,939,995
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$234,135,678	\$293,051,151	\$276,785,248	\$281,747,712

SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.—The addition to the total stock of money in the country last month was about \$16,000,000 of which \$13,500,000 was gold and \$1,000,000 National bank notes. The increase in total supply for the year is nearly \$224,000,000.

SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1898.	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$609,478,536	\$791,847,225	\$797,428,080	\$807,451,174
Gold bullion.....	45,559,060	138,428,574	138,802,545	143,074,889
Silver dollars.....	455,818,132	464,838,597	468,238,597	470,244,887
Silver bullion.....	102,284,736	94,675,773	93,269,250	93,142,307
Subsidiary silver.....	78,400,807	78,733,612	78,670,481	78,587,161
United States notes.....	345,681,016	345,681,016	345,681,016	345,681,016
National bank notes.....	229,014,641	229,626,136	242,784,308	243,817,870
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,955,226,318</b>	<b>\$2,149,626,968</b>	<b>\$2,163,664,752</b>	<b>\$2,179,049,124</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—More than \$7,000,000 of the ten-twenty bonds of 1896 are still unreported in the debt statement, although \$3,800,000 were included in the one issued January 1. The interest-bearing debt is now \$1,040,000,000, and the net debt less cash in the Treasury is \$1,129,000,000. The latter increased \$1,700,000 in December and \$130,000,000 in the past year.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1898.	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
1907, 4.....	559,641,540	559,646,900	559,650,000	559,650,200
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	44,220	40,980	39,250	39,100
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
1925, 4.....	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
Ten-Twenties of 1898, 3 per cent.....		179,260,180	189,027,480	192,346,780
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$847,365,620</b>	<b>\$1,028,766,960</b>	<b>\$1,036,366,630</b>	<b>\$1,040,215,980</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,330,270	1,246,870	1,241,630	1,267,200
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,735,363	346,735,013	346,735,013	346,735,013
National bank note redemption acct.....	22,268,146	29,572,280	23,593,029	23,868,814
Fractional currency.....	6,886,937	6,883,974	6,883,974	6,883,974
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$385,890,446</b>	<b>\$383,191,267</b>	<b>\$382,212,017</b>	<b>\$382,487,801</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.....</b>	<b>1,234,586,337</b>	<b>1,411,906,197</b>	<b>1,419,850,277</b>	<b>1,423,940,988</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	38,128,149	36,940,149	36,901,049	36,808,999
Silver.....	387,925,504	398,753,504	399,163,504	399,430,504
Certificates of deposit.....	44,555,000	20,105,000	20,640,000	20,685,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	106,348,280	97,323,280	97,198,280	96,523,280
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$576,956,933</b>	<b>\$553,681,983</b>	<b>\$553,897,833</b>	<b>\$553,447,783</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>1,811,543,270</b>	<b>1,964,837,130</b>	<b>1,973,748,110</b>	<b>1,977,388,765</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	861,391,370	938,249,297	926,117,182	910,431,851
Demand liabilities.....	625,916,601	633,011,122	633,740,362	636,666,656
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$235,474,769</b>	<b>\$300,238,275</b>	<b>\$292,376,790</b>	<b>\$294,764,695</b>
Gold reserve.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	135,474,769	200,238,275	192,376,790	194,764,695
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$235,474,769</b>	<b>\$300,238,275</b>	<b>\$292,376,790</b>	<b>\$294,764,695</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.....</b>	<b>999,111,568</b>	<b>1,110,968,922</b>	<b>1,127,471,487</b>	<b>1,129,176,286</b>

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .55	.65	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.75
Mexican dollars.....	.46½	\$.47½	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	.42	.42	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.82
English silver.....	4.82	4.85	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.53	19.60
Five francs.....	.98	.98	Ten guilders.....	3.98	4.00
Twenty francs.....	3.84	3.88			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 37½d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 59½ @ 59¾c. Fine silver (Government assay), 59¼ @ 60¼c.

# PRICES AND SALES OF STOCKS AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE IN THE YEAR 1898.

The following table includes all stocks traded in to the extent of 1,000 shares during the year. (Quotations except where marked with an \* are for 100 share transactions.)

	YEAR 1898.			1897.	1896.
	High.	Low.	Close.	Close.	Sales year.
American Cotton Oil .....	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	507,866
American Cotton Oil preferred.....	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	66	89	76	88,814
American District Telegraph.....	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	23	1,877
American Maltng Company.....	38	24	34	.....	143,330
American Maltng Company preferred.....	88	70 $\frac{1}{2}$	86	.....	101,914
American Spirits Manufacturing Company.....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	488,265
American Spirits Manufacturing Company pref....	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	134,434
American Steel & Wire Company.....	50	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	236,843
American Steel & Wire Company preferred.....	118	82	118	.....	102,007
American Sugar Refining Company.....	146 $\frac{1}{2}$	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	126 $\frac{1}{2}$	140 $\frac{1}{2}$	13,689,565
American Sugar Refining Company preferred.....	116	108	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	71,746
American Telegraph & Cable Company.....	*98 $\frac{1}{2}$	*88	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	90	9,710
American Tobacco.....	153 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	143 $\frac{1}{2}$	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	6,706,061
American Tobacco preferred.....	135 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	181	113	44,589
Ann Arbor.....	15	11	14	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	5,254
Ann Arbor preferred.....	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	34	39	34	32,464
Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	875,171
Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 preferred.....	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,459,976
Baltimore & Ohio.....	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	377,582
Baltimore & Ohio, \$10 assessment paid.....	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	23	.....	68,546
Baltimore & Ohio, \$15 assessment paid.....	45 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	51,354
Baltimore & Ohio, \$20 assessment paid.....	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	69 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	137,536
Baltimore & Ohio, when issued.....	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	31	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	146,164
Baltimore & Ohio preferred, when issued.....	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	68	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	123,306
Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern preferred.....	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	98,880
Bay State Gas.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	4	710,984
Brooklyn Elovated.....	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	5,831
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,184,084
Brooklyn Union Gas Company.....	140 $\frac{1}{2}$	106	138	118	57,281
Brunswick Company, assessment paid.....	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	12,975
Brunswick Dock & City Importation Company...	14	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	50,237
Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg.....	34	25	32	31	7,215
Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg preferred.....	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	62	74	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	7,613
Canada Southern.....	53	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	275,697
Canadian Pacific.....	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	72	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	111,917
Central of New Jersey.....	99	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	96	292,606
Central Pacific.....	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	443,965
Chesapeake & Ohio.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,047,310
Chicago & Alton.....	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	*150	170	162	44,452
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy.....	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	87	125	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	5,552,491
Chicago & Eastern Illinois.....	66	49	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	53	114,484
Chicago & Eastern Illinois preferred.....	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	100	45,653
Chicago Great Western.....	18	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	1,308,323
Chicago Great Western preferred A.....	54	23	52	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	67,846
Chicago Great Western preferred B.....	32	20	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	30,659
Chicago Great Western debenture.....	85	71 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	72	11,530
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.....	11	7	8	9	35,967
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville preferred.....	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	23	32	30	42,198
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	7,695,108
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul preferred.....	166 $\frac{1}{2}$	140	168	142 $\frac{1}{2}$	90,345
Chicago & Northwestern.....	143 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	142 $\frac{1}{2}$	127 $\frac{1}{2}$	756,465
Chicago & Northwestern preferred.....	191 $\frac{1}{2}$	163	188 $\frac{1}{2}$	163 $\frac{1}{2}$	8,674
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific.....	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	80	114	89 $\frac{1}{2}$	3,453,881
Chicago, St. Paul, Minnesota & Omaha.....	94	65	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	815,552
Chicago, St. Paul, Minnesota & Omaha preferred.....	170	*148	*168	150 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,670
Chicago Terminal & Transfer.....	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	109,094
Chicago Terminal & Transfer preferred.....	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	38	.....	158,065
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis.....	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	459,157
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis pref....	97	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	96	83	7,756
Cleveland, Lorain & Wheeling.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	49	433,348
Cleveland, Lorain & Wheeling preferred.....	53 $\frac{1}{2}$	43	44	49	98,210
Colorado Coal & Iron Development.....	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,700
Colorado Fuel & Iron.....	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	32	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	113,364
Colorado Midland.....	9	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	17,438
Colorado Midland preferred.....	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	22,470
Colorado Southern, when issued.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	3,290
Colorado Southern 1st preferred, when issued.....	50 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	43,341
Colorado Southern 2d preferred, when issued.....	20	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	48,446
Columbus & Hocking Coal & Iron.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,782
Columbus, Hocking Valley & Toledo.....	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	77,200
Columbus, Hocking Valley & Toledo preferred.....	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	15	18,335
Consolidated Gas.....	205 $\frac{1}{2}$	164	195	177	451,605
Consolidated Ice.....	52	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	45 $\frac{1}{2}$	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	98,995
Consolidated Ice preferred.....	94	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	15,533
Delaware & Hudson.....	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	96	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	170,867
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western.....	159	140	157	155	53,336



NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE PRICES AND SALES IN 1898. 149

PRICES AND SALES OF STOCKS, Etc.—Continued.

	YEAR 1898.			1887.	1898.
	High.	Low.	Close.	Close.	Sales year.
Denver & Rio Grande.....	21½	10	23¾	11	61,506
Denver & Rio Grande preferred.....	71¾	40	70¾	45¾	508,261
Des Moines & Fort Dodge.....	23½	8¾	22¾	13	100,418
Detroit Gas.....	67	45	62½	55¾	49,801
Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic.....	3¼	2¾	3¼	4¼	1,220
Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic preferred.....	8¾	5	8¾	6¾	4,194
Eastern Elevator.....	66	61¼	64¼	.....	9,100
Edison Electric Illuminating of N. Y.....	195	119	194	125	31,627
Edison Electric Illuminating of Brooklyn.....	122½	100½	122	110	1,775
Erie.....	16¼	11	14¾	14¾	91,255
Erie 1st. preferred.....	43¾	29¼	30¼	28¼	820,960
Erie 2d. preferred.....	21¾	16¼	20	20¾	122,192
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	41¾	22	41¾	25	30,166
Evansville & Terre Haute preferred.....	72½	40	72	43	12,546
Express, Adams.....	*180	97½	*109	180	16,607
Express, American.....	*153	*116	*145	117½	16,380
Express, United States.....	*58¼	38	53¼	40	16,910
Express, Wells Fargo.....	131½	112½	131½	116	3,272
Federal Steel Company.....	62	29	52	.....	1,199,216
Federal Steel Company preferred.....	85¼	69¾	83¾	.....	1,019,968
Flint & Père Marquette.....	18¾	10	17¾	12	31,340
Flint & Père Marquette preferred.....	49	36	43¼	42	8,100
Fort Worth & Denver City.....	28	*15	25	18¼	6,219
Fort Worth & Rio Grande.....	17¼	10	16	16	5,054
General Electric.....	50¼	29¼	48¼	34¼	591,158
General Electric new.....	97	76	95¾	.....	128,306
Glucose Sugar Refining Company.....	72¼	65	70¾	.....	52,184
Glucose Sugar Refining Company preferred.....	109¾	107¼	108¾	.....	3,611
Great Northern preferred.....	180	122	144¾	132	118,789
H. B. Claffin Company.....	96¼	*87¾	96¾	95	3,146
Hawaiian Sugar.....	61	55¾	58	2¾	187,877
Homestake.....	50	43	50	40	1,513
Illinois Central.....	115¾	96	114¾	108¼	396,358
Illinois Steel Company.....	75¼	44¼	71	48¾	137,633
Illinois Steel Company trust receipts stamped.....	102	90¾	102	.....	3,084
International Paper Company.....	67	48	63¾	.....	298,918
International Paper Company preferred.....	95	85	94¼	.....	85,108
Iowa Central.....	11¼	7¼	11	9	27,673
Iowa Central preferred.....	42½	25	42¼	32	35,642
Kanawha & Michigan.....	8	5¾	8	7¼	4,512
Kansas City.....	25¼	15	16¼	20¼	185,478
Kookuk & Des Moines.....	5¼	3	5	4	4,104
Kookuk & Des Moines preferred.....	18¾	15	17	15	2,937
Knickerbocker Ice Company.....	57	54¾	57	.....	3,104
Laclede Gas.....	54¾	37¼	52¾	43¼	191,075
Laclede Gas preferred.....	96¼	85	94	91	17,531
Lake Erie & Western.....	23½	12	21¼	18¼	116,901
Lake Erie & Western preferred.....	83	53	74¼	72¼	120,607
Lake Shore.....	215	170¾	201	171	97,761
Long Island.....	59¼	40	55¾	30¼	18,346
Louisville & Nashville.....	65¼	44	64¾	56¾	2,450,229
Manhattan Consolidated.....	120¼	90	97¾	111¾	4,294,427
Mergenthaler Linotype.....	145¾	140	145¾	.....	1,441
Metropolitan Street Railway.....	104¾	125¼	191¾	129¾	1,751,707
Mexican Central.....	7¾	4¾	6¾	6¾	14,151
Mexican National certificates.....	11¾	7¾	7¾	1¼	9,316
Michigan Central.....	118	99¼	118	103¼	146,625
Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	38¾	24	26¾	25¾	106,310
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st preferred.....	100	94	100	88¾	9,307
Minneapolis & St. Louis 2d preferred.....	78¾	48	74¾	58	50,968
Minnesota Iron.....	89¼	57	97	58	214,594
Minnesota Iron trust receipts.....	98	90	97	.....	6,840
Minnesota Iron trust receipts stamped.....	142¼	123	142	.....	15,178
Missouri, Kansas & Texas.....	14¼	10	13¾	13	100,192
Missouri, Kansas & Texas preferred.....	41	28¾	38	35¾	562,282
Missouri Pacific.....	40¼	22	45¾	34	1,714,845
Mobile & Ohio.....	32¾	24	32	28¾	28,723
Morris & Essex.....	*180	*167¼	176	*170	3,798
National Biscuit Company.....	52¾	30¾	52	.....	155,755
National Biscuit Company preferred.....	106	94¼	104¾	.....	15,780
National Lead Company.....	59¾	26¼	39¾	37¾	315,327
National Lead Company preferred.....	114¾	99	114¼	105¼	34,383
National Lined Oil.....	21¾	2¼	8¾	17	183,240
National Starch.....	9	3¾	6¾	6	3,233
National Starch 1st preferred.....	80	60	65	60	1,269
New Central Coal.....	8¼	6¼	8	7	4,480
New Central Coal, new.....	45	40	40	.....	1,450
New York Air Brake.....	120	14	113	24	184,245
New York Central.....	124¾	105	123¼	109¾	1,794,327
New York, Chicago & St. Louis.....	15¾	11¾	14¾	15	21,716
New York, Chicago & St. Louis 2d preferred.....	40¼	28	35¾	35	26,451

## PRICES AND SALES OF STOCKS, Etc.—Continued.

	YEAR 1898.			1897.	1898.
	High.	Low.	Close.	Close.	Sales year.
New York, Lackawanna & Western.....	127	121	127	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	2,097
New York, New Haven & Hartford.....	201	*178 $\frac{1}{4}$	199 $\frac{3}{4}$	189 $\frac{1}{2}$	9,004
New York, Ontario & Western.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{3}{8}$	18 $\frac{3}{4}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	479,822
New York, Susquehanna & Western.....	18	8	14	19 $\frac{3}{8}$	8,006
New York, Susquehanna & Western preferred.....	38	23	28	33 $\frac{1}{4}$	51,081
Norfolk & Western.....	19 $\frac{3}{8}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	19	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	27,247
Norfolk & Western preferred.....	63 $\frac{3}{8}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{3}{8}$	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	487,755
North-American.....	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{3}{8}$	315,097
Northern Pacific.....	44 $\frac{1}{4}$	19	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,203,730
Northern Pacific preferred.....	79 $\frac{3}{8}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{3}{4}$	59	3,275,782
Ontario Mining.....	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	1,224
Oregon Imp. 4th & 5th assessments paid.....	31	19	29	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	52,845
Oregon Railroad & Navigation.....	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	50 $\frac{1}{4}$	35 $\frac{1}{4}$	79,772
Oregon Railroad & Navigation preferred.....	78	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	72	69 $\frac{1}{2}$	32,047
Oregon Short Line.....	43	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	43	19	95,207
Pacific Coast.....	48 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	46 $\frac{1}{2}$	....	45,658
Pacific Coast 1st preferred.....	91	79	84 $\frac{3}{4}$	....	6,383
Pacific Coast 2d preferred.....	69	57	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	....	23,987
Pacific Mail.....	46	21	45 $\frac{3}{4}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	660,900
Pennsylvania Railroad.....	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	110 $\frac{3}{4}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	544,785
People's Gas, Chicago.....	112	86 $\frac{1}{2}$	110 $\frac{1}{4}$	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	3,463,836
Peoria, Decatur & Evansville.....	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{7}{8}$	1 $\frac{7}{8}$	$\frac{9}{8}$	19,256
Peoria & Eastern.....	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	5	2,197
Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis.....	63 $\frac{3}{8}$	38 $\frac{3}{8}$	63 $\frac{3}{8}$	39	164,215
Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis pref.....	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	57	84 $\frac{1}{4}$	66	56,943
Pittsburg & Western preferred.....	12 $\frac{3}{8}$	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	10	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	14,766
Pullman Palace Car Company.....	216	182	158 $\frac{1}{4}$	173	213,395
Quicksilver.....	3	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	3,050
Quicksilver preferred.....	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	6,158
Reading.....	23 $\frac{3}{8}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{3}{8}$	22	533,900
Reading 1st preferred.....	54 $\frac{3}{8}$	36	53 $\frac{3}{8}$	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,160,086
Reading 2d preferred.....	29	17 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{8}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	289,849
Rio Grande Western.....	32	22	25	23	7,782
Rio Grande Western preferred.....	69 $\frac{1}{4}$	50 $\frac{1}{4}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{4}$	17,623
Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg.....	128 $\frac{1}{2}$	*116 $\frac{1}{4}$	128 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	2,911
St. Joseph & Grand Island.....	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	6	8	30,315
St. Joseph & Grand Island 1st preferred.....	63	45	52	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	48,413
St. Joseph & Grand Island 2d preferred.....	23 $\frac{1}{4}$	13	14 $\frac{3}{4}$	19	36,389
St. Louis & San Francisco.....	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	6	8 $\frac{3}{8}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	93,866
St. Louis & San Francisco 1st preferred.....	70	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 $\frac{3}{4}$	56 $\frac{3}{4}$	82,127
St. Louis & San Francisco 2d preferred.....	35	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	33 $\frac{3}{8}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	271,757
St. Louis Southwestern.....	7 $\frac{5}{8}$	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	62,117
St. Louis Southwestern preferred.....	18	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{3}{8}$	220,435
St. Paul & Duluth.....	38 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	38	21	17,331
St. Paul & Duluth preferred.....	100	78	99 $\frac{1}{4}$	81 $\frac{1}{4}$	6,237
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba.....	175	123 $\frac{3}{8}$	175	122	31,813
Silver bullion certificates.....	60 $\frac{3}{8}$	56	59 $\frac{1}{4}$	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	89,000
Southern Pacific.....	35	12	34	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	222,270
Southern Railway.....	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	7	10 $\frac{3}{8}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	322,331
Southern Railway preferred.....	43 $\frac{3}{8}$	23 $\frac{3}{8}$	41 $\frac{3}{8}$	31 $\frac{3}{8}$	1,198,013
Standard Distilling & Distributing Company.....	23 $\frac{3}{8}$	19	21	....	26,766
Standard Distilling & Distributing Company pref.....	75	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	....	15,140
Standard Rope & Twine.....	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	102,754
Tennessee Coal & Iron.....	38 $\frac{3}{4}$	17	36 $\frac{3}{4}$	26	917,179
Texas Pacific.....	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{4}$	11 $\frac{1}{4}$	634,077
Texas Pacific & Land Trust.....	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	26,012
Third Avenue.....	194 $\frac{1}{2}$	145	170	165	76,500
Twin City Rapid Transit.....	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	23,182
Union Pacific, old.....	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	23	26 $\frac{3}{8}$	25 $\frac{1}{4}$	1,000,312
Union Pacific, new.....	44 $\frac{1}{4}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{3}{8}$	....	1,669,820
Union Pacific preferred.....	74 $\frac{1}{4}$	45 $\frac{1}{2}$	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	....	4,881,900
Union Pacific, Denver & Gulf.....	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	588,930
Union Pacific, Denver & Gulf, \$5 instalment paid.....	8	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	....	18,810
Union Pacific, Denver & Gulf, \$10 assessm't paid.....	13 $\frac{3}{8}$	11 $\frac{3}{4}$	12 $\frac{3}{8}$	....	615,394
United States Leather.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	223,291
United States Leather preferred.....	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	53 $\frac{3}{4}$	72 $\frac{3}{4}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,159,088
United States Rubber.....	48 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	44 $\frac{3}{8}$	16 $\frac{1}{4}$	960,744
United States Rubber preferred.....	113 $\frac{1}{4}$	60	111	65 $\frac{1}{4}$	324,100
Wabash.....	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{3}{8}$	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	72,789
Wabash preferred.....	24 $\frac{1}{4}$	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	22 $\frac{3}{8}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	564,477
West Chicago Street.....	102 $\frac{3}{8}$	87 $\frac{1}{4}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	100,692
Western Union Bef.....	8	6 $\frac{3}{8}$	6 $\frac{3}{8}$	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	5,800
Western Union Telegraph.....	95 $\frac{3}{8}$	82 $\frac{1}{4}$	93 $\frac{1}{4}$	91 $\frac{1}{4}$	969,989
Wheeling & Lake Erie, 1st assessment paid.....	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	2	86,609
Wheeling & Lake Erie, 3d assessment paid.....	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{7}{8}$	1 $\frac{7}{8}$	....	29,776
Wheeling & Lake Erie, 4th assessment paid.....	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	3	6	....	228,571
Wheeling & Lake Erie pref., 1st assessment paid.....	16	8	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	24,698
Wheeling & Lake Erie pref., 3d assessment paid.....	19	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{3}{8}$	....	14,395
Wheeling & Lake Erie pref., 4th assessment paid.....	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	....	71,736
Wisconsin Central.....	3 $\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{7}{8}$	2	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	14,702
Wisconsin Central preferred.....	8	5	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	6	4,615

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of December, and the highest and lowest during the year 1898, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1897:

	YEAR 1897.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1898.				DECEMBER, 1898.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.		
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	17	9½	10½—Dec. 21	10¼—Apr. 21	10½	18	18¾		
"    preferred.....	35¼	17	52½—Dec. 21	22½—Mar. 12	52½	45½	52½		
Baltimore & Ohio.....	21¼	9	72½—Dec. 21	12½—Jan. 25	72½	57¼	60¼		
Bay State Gas.....	16¾	37¼	9¼—Dec. 27	2½—Mar. 21	9¼	4¼	8		
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	37½	18½	78½—Dec. 30	35—Mar. 12	78½	67¼	77¼		
Canadian Pacific.....	82	40¼	90¼—Jan. 20	72—Apr. 21	85¼	68¼	85¼		
Canada Southern.....	62¼	44¼	58—Dec. 16	44¼—Mar. 12	58	54	55¼		
Central of New Jersey.....	108¼	65¼	99—Dec. 30	83¼—Oct. 17	99	82	97¼		
Central Pacific.....	18	7¼	44¼—Dec. 30	11—Apr. 23	44¼	31	45¾		
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cdfs.	27½	15½	28½—Dec. 12	17¼—Mar. 26	28½	23½	25¼		
Chicago & Alton.....	170	140	172—Dec. 21	150—Mar. 14	172	163	170		
Chicago, Buri. & Quincy	102¼	68½	12¼—Dec. 30	87½—Mar. 26	125¼	118¼	125		
Chicago & E. Illinois	61	37¼	66—June 1	49—Apr. 19	62½	50¼	61¼		
"    preferred.....	103	85	113½—Feb. 1	102—Jan. 7	113	110¼	112½		
Chicago Gas.....	108¼	73¼							
Chicago, Great Western.....	20½	3½	18—Aug. 22	9¼—Feb. 24	16½	14½	16½		
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville	13	8	11—July 27	7—Feb. 24	13	8½	7¼		
"    preferred.....	38¼	26	38¼—July 27	23—Apr. 16	37	31	32		
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	102	60¼	120¼—Dec. 30	83¼—Apr. 21	120¼	113½	120½		
"    preferred.....	148	130¼	160½—Dec. 13	140—Apr. 25	160½	163	166		
Chicago & Northwestern.....	152¼	101¼	143¼—Dec. 16	113¼—Mar. 12	143¼	136	142½		
"    preferred.....	165¼	153	191½—Nov. 16	163—Jan. 3	184¼	186	188¼		
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.....	97¼	60¼	114½—Dec. 28	89—Mar. 25	114½	107½	114		
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	89¼	47	94—Dec. 16	65—Mar. 12	94	84½	89¼		
"    preferred.....	150½	133	170—Nov. 17	148—Jan. 5	170	168	168		
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	41¼	21¼	47½—Aug. 16	23—Mar. 12	44½	41¼	45½		
"    preferred.....	80¼	63	97—Dec. 19	77¼—Dec. 9	97	89¼	96		
Col. Coal & Iron Devel. Co.	2	¾	1¼—Nov. 14	¾—Apr. 7					
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.....	27½	15¼	32½—Dec. 27	17—Mar. 12	32½	23	32		
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	18	1¼	8¼—Feb. 10	2¼—Nov. 1	18	4¼	2½		
"    preferred.....	46	14	27¼—Feb. 10	13½—Dec. 6	46	16¾	4¼		
Consolidated Gas Co.....	241¼	186¼	205½—June 9	164—Oct. 3	197¼	187½	195		
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.....	123	99½	114½—Feb. 3	93—Nov. 21	108	99	107¼		
Delaware, Lack. & Western.	164	140¼	159—Feb. 5	140—Oct. 19	157	144½	157		
Denver & Rio Grande.....	14¾	9¼	21¼—Dec. 28	10—Apr. 26	21¼	15	20¼		
"    preferred.....	50¼	36	71½—Dec. 28	40—Apr. 21	71½	61¼	70¾		
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	132¼	101¼	195—Dec. 29	119—Apr. 8	195	164¾	194		
Erie.....	19	11¼	16¼—Feb. 4	11—Apr. 21	14¾	13¼	14¼		
"    1st pref.....	46½	27	43½—Feb. 11	29¼—Apr. 22	36¼	35¼	36¼		
"    2d pref.....	25½	15¼	21½—Feb. 11	15¼—Apr. 22	20	18	20		
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	84	20	41½—Dec. 30	22—May 9	41½	30	41¼		
Express Adams.....	165	147¼	180—Feb. 10	97¼—Apr. 29	110¼	108	109		
"    American.....	119¼	109½	153—Nov. 9	116—Jan. 5	150	143	145		
"    United States.....	48	37	58¼—Dec. 5	38—Apr. 14	58¼	49	53¼		
"    Wells, Fargo.....	120	87	131½—Dec. 8	112½—May 5	131½	128	131¼		
Great Northern, preferred.....	141	120	180—June 30	122—July 1	144¼	137	144¼		
Illinois Central.....	110¼	91¼	115½—Dec. 13	96—Apr. 21	115½	111	114½		
Iowa Central.....	13¼	6	11¼—Dec. 27	7¼—Mar. 18	11¼	9½	11		
"    preferred.....	41¼	23	42¼—Dec. 27	25—Apr. 28	42¼	34¼	42¼		
Laclede Gas.....	49¼	22	54½—Aug. 9	37½—Mar. 25	54	50¼	52¼		
"    preferred.....	96	70¼	96¼—Aug. 8	85—Mar. 12	93	94	94		
Lake Erie & Western.....	22¼	13	23¼—Aug. 22	12—Oct. 11	23	14¼	21¼		
"    preferred.....	70½	58¼	83—Aug. 19	53—Oct. 19	76½	62½	74¼		
Lake Shore.....	181	152	215—Dec. 14	170¼—Jan. 4	215	197	201		
Long Island.....	55	38	59¼—Aug. 10	40—Jan. 20	56	48	55½		
Louisville & Nashville.....	63½	40¼	65¼—Dec. 13	44—Apr. 21	65¼	62½	64¾		
Manhattan consol.....	113	81¼	120¼—Jan. 14	90—Oct. 3	100½	95¼	97¼		
Metropolitan Street.....	193¼	99¼	194¼—Dec. 12	125¼—Mar. 26	194¼	179¼	191¼		
Michigan Central.....	111¾	90	118—Dec. 15	99¼—Mar. 12	118	110	118		
Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	31¼	16	36¾—Dec. 27	24—Mar. 11	38¼	28	36¾		
"    1st pref.....	90	77¼	100—Dec. 22	84—May 14	100	95	100		
"    2d pref.....	63¼	48	78¼—Dec. 27	46—Mar. 26	78¼	61	74¼		
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.....	16½	10	14¼—Jan. 26	10—Apr. 13	14	11¼	13½		
"    preferred.....	42	24¼	41—Jan. 28	28¼—Mar. 12	38½	34½	38		

ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1897.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1898.				DECEMBER, 1898.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.		
Missouri Pacific.....	40½	10	46¼—Dec. 14	22 —Mar. 12	46¼	30¾	45¾		
Mobile & Ohio.....	32	18	32¼—Feb. 7	24 —Nov. 8	32	29¼	32		
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River..	115¼	92¾	124¾—Dec. 16	105 —Mar. 26	124¾	118	122¼		
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis...	17½	11	15½—Jan. 31	11½—Mar. 14	14½	13¼	14½		
1st preferred.....	81¼	67¾	76 —Jan. 31	65 —May 10	70	70	70		
2d preferred.....	43¼	24	40¼—Jan. 29	28 —Mar. 25	38¼	34	35¼		
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.	186	160	201 —Dec. 13	178¼—Jan. 7	211	195	199¾		
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	20¼	12¾	19½—Dec. 30	13½—Apr. 25	19½	15½	16¾		
N. Y., Sus. & Western.....	20	6¼	18 —Jan. 5	8 —Jan. 8	.....	.....	.....		
preferred.....	45	18¼	38 —Feb. 11	23 —Jan. 10	.....	.....	.....		
Norfolk & Western.....	17¼	9	19½—Dec. 30	11¼—Apr. 21	19½	16	19		
preferred.....	48¼	17	65½—Dec. 28	42¼—Mar. 12	63½	54¼	62¾		
North American Co.....	6¼	3½	7¼—Dec. 2	4¼—Jan. 15	7¼	6½	7½		
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.	22¾	11	44¼—Dec. 28	19 —Feb. 24	44¼	40	41¾		
pref tr. receipts.....	61¾	32¾	79½—Sept. 6	56½—Mar. 12	79¼	75	77¼		
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	41	10	61¼—Aug. 22	35¼—Jan. 7	59¼	50¾	50¾		
preferred.....	73¼	37¾	78 —Nov. 11	65¼—Mar. 29	75½	71	72		
Oregon Short Line.....	23¼	10½	43 —Dec. 30	19½—Jan. 3	43	37¼	43		
Pacific Mail.....	39¼	24	46 —Dec. 27	21 —Apr. 21	46	36¾	45¾		
Pennsylvania R. R.....	119	103¼	123¼—Dec. 30	110¼—Mar. 12	123¼	116¾	122¾		
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis..	39¼	11¼	63½—Dec. 30	38½—Jan. 5	66½	44¼	62¾		
preferred.....	70¼	44¾	84¼—Dec. 27	57 —Mar. 23	84¼	72¾	84¼		
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	185	152	216 —July 5	132 —Nov. 2	159¼	139	159¼		
Reading Voting Tr. cdfs.....	29¼	16¼	23½—Jan. 6	15¼—Mar. 25	23½	19¼	23½		
1st preferred.....	57¾	38¼	54½—Dec. 30	36 —Mar. 12	54½	44¾	52¾		
2d preferred.....	35¾	21½	20 —Jan. 6	17¼—Oct. 17	28	23¼	27¾		
Rome, Wat. Ogdens' g.....	122¼	117	128¼—Dec. 27	116¼—Mar. 26	128¼	127¼	129¼		
St. Louis & San Francisco....	9	4	9¼—Nov. 29	6 —Mar. 23	9½	8¼	8¾		
1st preferred.....	59¾	37	70 —Nov. 23	52¼—Mar. 12	70	66¼	67¾		
2d preferred.....	27¼	12	35 —Nov. 30	22¼—Feb. 24	34¼	31¾	33¾		
St. Louis & Southwestern....	7	1	7½—Dec. 27	5¼—Jan. 24	7½	5½	7½		
preferred.....	14½	8¼	18 —Dec. 22	7¼—Mar. 12	18	15½	17½		
St. Paul & Duluth.....	30	20	38½—Dec. 27	18½—July 6	38½	25	36		
preferred.....	87¼	75	100 —Dec. 28	78 —Apr. 20	100	96	99¼		
St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba..	125	114	175 —Nov. 11	123½—Jan. 12	175	163¼	175		
Southern Pacific Co.....	23¼	13¼	35 —Dec. 21	12 —Apr. 13	35	27¾	34		
Southern Railway.....	12¼	7	10¾—Dec' 14	7 —Apr. 21	10¾	10¼	10¼		
preferred.....	38¾	22¾	43¾—Dec. 13	23½—Mar. 26	43¾	40¾	41¾		
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	35¼	17	38¼—Dec. 27	17 —Mar. 12	38¼	29¾	36¾		
Texas & Pacific.....	15	8	20½—Dec. 28	8½—Mar. 12	20½	15¼	16¼		
Union Pacific trust receipts..	27¾	4¾	44½—Dec. 22	16½—Mar. 25	44½	37½	43¾		
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf...	11½	1	13½—Nov. 23	5½—Nov. 4	13½	12	12¾		
Wabash R. R.....	9¼	4½	9½—Aug. 31	6¼—Mar. 25	9½	7¾	7¾		
preferred.....	24¾	11¼	21¼—Aug. 31	14¼—Mar. 7	24	21¼	22¾		
Western Union.....	96¾	77¼	95¾—Aug. 17	82¼—Mar. 26	95¾	91¾	93¼		
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	6¼	4	6¼—Dec. 15	3¼—July 23	6¼	4	6		
preferred.....	29	2½	30¼—Dec. 12	8 —July 9	30¼	29¾	27¼		
Wisconsin Central.....	4¾	1	3½—Jan. 17	¾—Jan. 6	2	1¼	2		
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:									
American Co. Oil Co.....	20¾	9¼	30¼—Aug. 26	15¼—Mar. 25	35¼	32	35¼		
preferred.....	80¼	52¼	90¾—Aug. 22	66 —Mar. 14	89¼	87¼	89		
American Spirits Mfg Co.....	15½	6¼	15½—June 9	8¼—Jan. 20	14¼	12	13¾		
preferred.....	36	15	41¾—Aug. 25	16 —Mar. 6	38¾	35	37¼		
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	159¼	109¼	140¾—Aug. 26	107½—Mar. 26	135¾	120¼	126½		
preferred.....	121¼	100¼	110 —Jan. 6	103 —Mar. 25	115	110¾	112¼		
American Tobacco Co.....	96¾	67¼	153¾—Sept. 19	83¼—Jan. 24	145½	135¼	142¼		
preferred.....	115	100	155¼—Aug. 26	112¼—Mar. 26	130	127¼	131		
General Electric Co.....	41¾	28¾	97 —Dec. 28	76 —Sept. 15	97	84¼	95¾		
National Lead Co.....	44	21¾	39¾—Aug. 23	26¼—Mar. 26	39¾	35¼	38¾		
preferred.....	103¼	88¾	114¼—Dec. 13	99 —Apr. 22	114¼	112¾	114¼		
National Linseed Oil Co.....	23¼	10	21¾—May 23	2½—Sept. 17	13½	8¼	8¼		
National Starch Manfg. Co....	13	3	9 —Feb. 10	3¼—Nov. 17	6¼	4	6¼		
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	11¾	2¾	10¾—Aug. 5	3¼—Jan. 3	9¼	7¾	8¼		
U. S. Leather Co.....	10¼	8¼	8½—May 24	5¼—Apr. 25	8	5¾	7¼		
preferred.....	72	50¼	75¼—Dec. 27	53¾—Mar. 26	75¼	67¼	72¾		
U. S. Rubber Co.....	25¼	10	48¼—Aug. 17	14¼—Mar. 12	48	42¼	44¾		
preferred.....	70¾	50	113¼—Dec. 12	60 —Mar. 12	113¼	106¾	111		

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

**LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.**

**NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.**

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'st Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	91	Nov. 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1995	7,000,000	Q J	90	Dec. 30, '98	90	88½	150,000
Atch., Top. & S. F.								
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.1995		124,074,000	A & O	99¾	Dec. 30, '98	100	98	4,267,000
{ " registered.....			A & O	93¾	July 1, '98			
{ " adjustment, g. 4's.....1995		51,728,000	NOV	79	Dec. 30, '98	79½	73½	9,540,500
{ " registered.....			NOV					
{ " Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.1902		750,000	J & J					
{ " Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's...1915		1,500,000	M & S					
{ Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.1934		1,500,000	J & J	82½	Feb. 8, '96			
{ Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....1950		1,238,000	J & J	102¼	Dec. 13, '98	102¼	102¼	1,000
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.). 1919		3,000,000	A & O	115	Nov. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				112	Oct. 19, '98			
{ " g. 5's.....1885-1925				115	Oct. 5, '98			
{ " coupons off.....								
{ " registered.....		10,000,000	F & A	111¼	Aug. 1, '98			
{ " Speyer & Co. eng. cf. dep.								
{ " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				118	Nov. 29, '98			
{ " con. g. 5's.....1888				118½	Sept. 7, '98			
{ " registered.....		11,988,000	F & A	116	Aug. 22, '98			
{ " J. P. M. & Co. cfs. dep't. ....				114¼	July 29, '98			
{ " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				118¾	Oct. 29, '98			
{ " bonds of loan of 1853 ext.		1,161,000	A & O	120	Nov. 18, '98			
{ " to 1935 at 4½ Tr. Co. cfs.								
{ " sterling 6½ loan of 1872 due		£1,921,800	M & S					
{ " 1902 Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ " sterling 6½ loan of 1874 due		£1,990,600	M & N					
{ " 1910 Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ " 4½ term. bonds.....1894		8,500,000	J & D					
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ " sterling 4½ loan of 1883		£2,400,000	A & O					
{ " (Philadelphia Branch).....								
{ " ster. 5½ loan of 1877 due		£1,382,200	J & D					
{ " 1927 (B. & O. & Chic.) Tr.								
{ " Co. cfs.....								
Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd., 1900		6,000,000	M & N	105	Dec. 14, '98	105	105	13,000
W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's...1990		4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
Monongahela River 1st g. 5's 1919		700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s. 1930		2,500,000	M & S	108½	Dec. 21, '98	108½	108½	6,000
Colo. & Cin. Mid'd 1st ext 4½'s. 1930		2,000,000	J & J	75	Oct. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ak. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. int. g. 5's. 1930		1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....				105	Aug. 9, '98			
{ " Tr. Co. cfs. of dep.....								
Pittsb. & Connellsville 1st g. 4's. 1946		2,536,000	J & J	107¾	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....								
{ " 1st 7½ bds 1898 Tr. Co. cfs..		1,419,000	J & J					
{ " con. 6½ bonds Tr. Co. cfs..		1,315,000	J & J					
B & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s. 1990		10,667,000	J & J	105	Oct. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st c. g. 4½'s.....1893		10,511,000	J & J	90	Nov. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st inc. g. 5's ser. "A" 2043		8,651,000	NOV	31	Dec. 20, '98	31	31	2,000
{ " "B".....2043		9,655,000	DEC	11½	Dec. 29, '98	12½	10½	284,000
B. & O. Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's...1942		1,200,000	M & N	105	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ohio & Miss. 1st con. 4's.....1947		2,615,000	J & J	105	Dec. 16, '98	105	105	1,000
{ " 2d con. 7's.....1911		2,952,000	A & O	124	Dec. 20, '98	124	124	8,000
{ " 1st Spr'gfield div. 7's. 1905		1,984,000	M & N	103	Dec. 29, '98	103¾	103	25,000
{ " 1st gen. 5's.....1932		405,000	J & D	98	Apr. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn E. Tr. Co. cfs 1st g. 6's's. 1924		3,464,000	.....	94¼	Dec. 28, '98	95	91¼	113,000
{ " Tr. Co. cfs. 2d g. 5's...1915		1,240,000	.....	86	June 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " all instal. paid.....			.....	70½	Dec. 14, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ Seas. & B. B. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 5's. 1942		1,357,000	.....			.....	.....	.....
{ " all instal. paid.....			.....			.....	.....	.....
Union Ele. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 6's. 1937		6,124,000	.....	94	Dec. 30, '98	94½	90	281,000
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's...1945		6,625,000	A & O	107¼	Dec. 29, '98	109	105¼	73,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest price and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Bklyn City R. R. 1st con. 5's 1916. 1941		4,373,000	J & J	117¼	Dec. 14, '98	117¼	116½	3,000
Bklyn Qu. Co. & Sur. 1st con. gtd g. 5's. 1941		2,255,000	M & N	105¼	Dec. 29, '98	106	104¾	810,000
Brunswick & Western 1s g. 4's. 1928		3,000,000	J & J	74	Sept. 1, '98			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's. 1927		4,407,000	M & S	109	Dec. 21, '98	109	107½	20,000
deb. 6's. 1947		1,000,000	J & J					
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's. 1921		1,300,000	F & A	127	Mar. 2, '98			
cons. 1st 6's. 1922		3,920,000	J & D	123	Dec. 7, '98	123	123	1,000
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's. 1943		650,000	J & J	121¼	May 28, '98			
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's. 1913		1,211,500	A & O	100	Feb. 27, '98			
registered.			A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's. 1906		6,500,000	J & D	108¼	Dec. 23, '98	106¼	106¼	10,000
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's. 1904		6,425,000	A & O	110¼	Dec. 30, '98	110¼	110	16,000
registered.			A & O	97	Feb. 9, '98			
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st 7's. g. 1927		150,000	A & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
Ced. Rap Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's. 1921		825,000	J & O	105¾	Nov. 25, '98			
1st 5's. 1921		1,905,000	A & O	108	Jan. 4, '93			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1908		13,420,000	J & M	111	Dec. 29, '98	111¼	109¾	44,000
2d mortg. 5's. 1913		5,100,000	M & S	111	Dec. 19, '98	111¼	110¾	69,000
registered.			M & S	108¼	May 22, '98			
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's. 1943		2,500,000	J & D	91¼	Dec. 27, '98	92	90	270,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1927		4,880,000	M & N	94	Dec. 23, '98	94	94	1,000
Central R'y of Georgia. 1st g. 5's. 1945		7,000,000	F & A	118	Dec. 22, '98	118	118	2,000
registered \$1,000 & \$5,000			F & A					
con. g. 5's. 1945		16,500,000	M & N	92¼	Dec. 30, '98	93¼	89	3,542,000
con. g. 5's. reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000			M & N					
1st. pref. inc. g. 5's. 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	40¼	Dec. 30, '98	41	38	632,000
2d pref. inc. g. 5's. 1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	12	Dec. 21, '98	14¼	12	100,000
3d pref. inc. g. 5's. 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	6¼	Dec. 8, '98	7¼	5	51,000
Macon & Nor. Div. 1st g. 5's. 1948		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 23, '98	95	95	5,000
Mobile div. 1st g. 5's. 1948		1,000,000	J & J	99	July 6, '98			
Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5's. 1947		413,000	J & J	89¼	Sept. 6, '98			
Central Railroad of New Jersey.								
1st consolidated 7's. 1889		3,836,000	Q J	102¾	Dec. 17, '98	102¾	102¾	9,000
convertible 7's. 1902		1,167,000	M & N	112	Nov. 17, '98			
deb. 6's. 1908		486,000	M & N	110	July 21, '98			
gen. g. 5's. 1927		43,924,000	J & J	118	Dec. 30, '98	116	113¾	256,000
registered.			Q J	112	Dec. 29, '98	112¼	111	73,000
Lehigh & W.-B. con. ased. 7's. 1900		5,384,000	Q M	100	Dec. 29, '98	100	98½	84,000
mortgage 5's. 1912		2,691,000	M & N	85¼	Dec. 14, '98	85½	85½	14,000
Am. Dock & Improvmt' Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	115¼	Dec. 5, '98	115¼	115¼	1,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's. 1920		1,082,000	J & J					
N. J. Southern int. gtd 6's. 1899		411,000	J & J	104	Nov. 13, '98			
Can. P. ex g. 5's Speyer & Co. cfs. A. 1898		2,985,000		103	Oct. 20, '98			
B C D. 1899		3,383,000		103	Feb. 13, '98			
E. 1898		3,997,000	J & J	101¼	May 5, '98			
FG H I. 1901		15,508,000		105	Dec. 29, '98	105	105	2,000
San Joaquin br. g. 6's. 1900		6,080,000	A & O	102¼	Oct. 12, '98			
gtd. g. 5's. 1939		4,279,000	A & O	84¼	Sept. 16, '98			
Speyer & Co. eng. cfts. 1900		8,004,000						
land grant g. 5's. 1900		2,294,000	A & O	102	Mar. 19, '98			
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's. 1918		4,358,000	J & J	101¼	Dec. 6, '97			
Western Pacific bonds 6's. 1899		2,735,000	J & J	103¾	Dec. 23, '98	103¾	103¾	7,000
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's. gtd. 1907		3,864,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97			
gtd. g. 5's. 1938		4,800,000	A & O	103¾	Dec. 19, '98	105¼	105	115,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1936		1,500,000	J & J	108¼	Dec. 13, '98			
Ches. & Ohio 6's. g., Series A. 1908		2,000,000	A & O	118¼	Dec. 1, '98	118¼	118¼	2,000
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	119	Nov. 14, '98			
1st con. g. 5's. 1939		25,858,000	M & N	117¾	Dec. 30, '98	118	116	119,000
registered.			M & N	116¼	Dec. 8, '98	116¼	115	51,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1922		23,728,000	M & S	91	Dec. 30, '98	91	89¼	2,482,000
registered.			M & S	85	Dec. 30, '93			
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1929		6,000,000	J & J	107¾	Dec. 29, '98	107¾	105¼	814,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1929		1,000,000	J & J	97	Dec. 2, '98	97	97	19,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	95½	May 27, '98			
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	88	Dec. 21, '93			
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	103	Dec. 30, '98	103	102¼	44,000
Chicago & Alton s'king fund 6's. 1933		1,722,000	J & J	110¼	Dec. 16, '98	110¼	109¼	9,000
Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. 1900		1,785,000	F & A	107¼	Dec. 20, '98	107¾	107¾	8,000
2d 7's. 1900		300,000	M & N	107	July 20, '98			
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. P'd g. 6's. 1912		512,000	A & O	105¼	Oct. 30, '95			

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1908		28,924,000	J & J	117½	Dec. 27, '98	117½	117¼	80,000
5's, sinking fund..... 1901		2,315,000	A & O	101½	Nov. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
5's, debentures..... 1913		9,000,000	M & N	110¼	Dec. 30, '98	110¼	109	42,000
convertible 5's..... 1908		12,594,000	M & S	126	Dec. 30, '98	126	119½	210,000
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,818,000	A & O	111½	Dec. 6, '98	111½	110½	9,000
4's..... 1919		9,050,000	A & O	104½	Dec. 23, '98	104½	103	14,000
Denver div. 4's..... 1922		5,881,000	F & A	102	Oct. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
4's..... 1921		3,180,000	M & S	100	Nov. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's..... 1905		2,330,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Nebraska extens'n 4's. 1927		26,110,000	M & N	104½	Dec. 30, '98	106¼	102¾	408,000
registered.....			M & N	97	May 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	122	Dec. 7, '98	122	123	1,000
Chic. Burl. & Northern, 1st 5's. 1923		8,241,000	A & O	108¾	Dec. 21, '98	108¾	108¾	2,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	115	Dec. 27, '98	115	115	3,000
small bonds.....		2,653,000	J & D	112	Apr. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 6's. gold..... 1924		9,767,000	A & O	134	Dec. 22, '98	134	132	7,000
gen. con. 1st 5's..... 1927		9,767,000	M & N	109¼	Dec. 13, '98	109¼	108¼	60,000
registered.....			M & N	103¼	Nov. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's..... 1926		4,628,000	J & J	105	Sept. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville. { Louiev. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	116½	Dec. 9, '98	117	116	6,000
{ Chic. Ind. & Louiev. ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,177,000	J & J	92	Dec. 22, '98	92	92	8,000
{ refunding g. 6's..... 1947		4,700,000	J & J	107¼	Dec. 23, '98	107¼	106	31,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul. Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's g. R.d. 1902		2,723,500	J & J	160	Nov. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's E..... 1902		147,000	J & J	120	Feb. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
1st m. Iowa & D. 7's..... 1899		1,822,000	J & J	162	Dec. 20, '98	162	162	1,000
1st m. C. & M. 7's..... 1908		9,808,000	J & J	162½	Dec. 19, '98	162½	162½	2,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1905		3,099,000	J & J	162½	Dec. 19, '98	162½	162½	14,000
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		4,000,000	J & J	163	Dec. 30, '98	163	162	24,000
1st 6's, Southw'n div. 1909		2,500,000	J & J	119¼	Nov. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. 1919		7,432,000	J & J	115½	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st So. Min. div. 6's..... 1910		5,680,000	J & J	121¾	Dec. 28, '98	121¾	120¼	11,000
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		990,000	J & J	129¼	Oct. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
5's..... 1910		3,000,000	J & J	109½	Dec. 7, '98	109½	109½	5,000
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		25,340,000	J & J	122	Dec. 29, '98	122	122	1,000
1st Chic. & P. W. 5's. 1921		3,083,000	J & J	121½	Dec. 27, '98	122¼	119¼	53,000
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1923		2,840,000	J & J	118	Dec. 10, '98	118	116	10,000
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		1,360,000	J & J	109¼	Apr. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		4,755,000	J & J	115¼	Dec. 14, '98	115¼	115¼	3,000
Wis. & Min. div. 5's..... 1921		4,748,000	J & J	118	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
terminal 5's..... 1914		1,250,000	J & J	115½	Dec. 27, '98	115½	115½	2,000
Par. & So. 6's assu. 1924		610,000	J & J	127¼	Jan. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
cont. s'l'k. f'd 5's..... 1916		2,856,000	J & J	106½	July 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
Dakota & Gt. S. 5's..... 1916		23,676,000	J & J	114	Dec. 5, '98	114	114	10,000
g. m. g. 4's, series A..... 1929		2,155,000	J & J	109	Dec. 28, '98	109	107¼	41,000
registered.....			Q J	105½	Feb. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		5,062,000	I & D	121	Dec. 27, '98	121	121	5,000
1st convt. 6's..... 1913			J & D	123	Oct. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's. 1915		13,771,000	Q F	145¼	Dec. 28, '98	145¼	144	2,000
coupon gold 7's..... 1902		10,492,000	J & D	113½	Dec. 28, '98	113½	112½	21,000
registered d. gold 7's. 1902		6,019,000	J & D	113	Dec. 27, '98	113	113	15,000
sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929		7,197,000	A & O	117½	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			A & O	117½	Oct. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
5's..... 1879-1929		9,800,000	A & O	109½	Dec. 17, '98	109½	109¼	6,000
registered.....			A & O	108¾	Dec. 2, '98	108¾	108¾	5,000
debenture 5's..... 1923		5,930,000	M & N	120	Oct. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			M & N	119¼	Dec. 27, '98	119¼	119¼	10,000
25 year debent. 5's..... 1909		10,000,000	M & N	110	Dec. 29, '98	110	110	4,000
registered.....			M & N	109¼	Mar. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
30 year debent. 5's..... 1921		18,632,000	A & O	116	Dec. 2, '98	116	116	2,000
registered.....			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95	.....	.....	.....
extension 4's..... 1886-1923		7,133,000	F A 15	105¾	Nov. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			F A 15	103	June 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 2¼'s..... 1927			M & N	102½	Dec. 30, '98	102½	102½	171,000
registered.....			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's. 1901		455,000	J & J	107¾	May 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's. 1907		1,094,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84	.....	.....	.....
Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's..... 1900		1,562,000	A & O	127	Oct. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's..... 1907		1,800,000	M & N	108	Apr. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's..... 1905		1,800,000	M & S	117	Jan. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's. 1909		1,500,000	M & S	109	Mar. 3, '98	.....	.....	.....
Northern Illinois 1st 5's..... 1910		5,000,000	M & S	105	Apr. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
MIL. Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's. 1921		498,000	M & N	128¼	Dec. 27, '98	128¼	137	23,000
con. deb. 5's..... 1907			F & A	105¼	Feb. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
ext. & imp't. a. f. d. g. 5's 1929		4,148,000	F & A	120%	Dec. 20, '98	120%	119	14,000
Michigan div. 1st 6's. 1924		1,281,000	J & J	188	Dec. 13, '98	188	138	5,000
Ashtand div. 1st 6's. 1925		1,000,000	M & S	138	May 19, '98			
income. ....		500,000	M & N	112	Apr. 27, '98			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup. 1917		12,100,000	J & J	134 1/4	Dec. 23, '98	134 1/4	134 1/4	2,000
registered. .... 1917			J & J	123	Nov. 29, '98			
gen. g. 4's. .... 1988		47,971,000	J & J	107 1/2	Dec. 30, '98	107	106 1/2	1,098,000
registered. ....			J & J	104	Sept. 21, '97			
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's. 1905		1,200,000	J & J	98	Dec. 8, '98	98	95 1/2	9,000
1st 2 1/4's. .... 1905		1,200,000	J & J	80	Nov. 17, '98			
extension 4 s. ....		672,000	J & J	83	Mar. 15, '97			
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's. 1923		2,750,000	A & O	110	Dec. 23, '98	110	109	26,000
small bond. .... 1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		13,780,000	J & D	135 1/4	Dec. 30, '98	135 1/4	134	26,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		2,658,000	M & N	123	Dec. 27, '98	133	133	3,000
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	135	May 4, '98			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. .... 1919		6,070,000	A & O	132 1/2	Dec. 19, '98	132 1/2	132 1/2	1,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's. 1947		18,000,000	J & J	95 1/4	Dec. 30, '98	95 1/2	91 1/2	844,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f. d. g. 6's. 1919		878,000	M & N	106	June 23, '98			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's. .... 1922		9,868,000	Q M	119 1/4	Dec. 16, '98	120	119 1/4	4,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. .... 1931		5,753,000	J & D	98 1/2	Mar. 13, '98			
coupons off. ....								
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f. d. 7's. 1905		988,000	A & O	119	Oct. 26, '98			
2d g. 4 1/2's. .... 1937		2,000,000	J & J	103 1/2	Mar. 13, '97			
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	110 1/4	Nov. 17, '98			
City Sub. R'y, Balto. 1st g. 5's. .... 1922		2,430,000	J & D	105 1/2	Apr. 17, '95			
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1930		730,000	F & A					
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st 5's for. 1917		1,907,000	.....	71 1/2	Dec. 29, '98	71 1/2	70	75,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1933		7,574,000	J & D	85	Nov. 19, '98			
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & J	91 1/4	Dec. 5, '98	91 1/4	91 1/4	2,000
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1990		9,750,000	M & N	99 1/2	Dec. 29, '98	99 1/2	98	49,000
registered. ....				90	Mar. 24, '97			
Sp'ngfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. .... 1940		1,085,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '95			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. .... 1940		650,000	J & J	87	Aug. 31, '98			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1941		4,000,000	J & J	92 1/2	Nov. 3, '98			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,685,000	Q F	101 1/2	Dec. 14, '98	101 1/2	101 1/2	4,000
registered. ....				95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's. .... 1920		731,000	M & N	107 1/2	June 30, '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's 1928		2,571,000	J & J	114	Oct. 7, '97			
Ind. Bloom. & W., 1st pfd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	107 1/4	Feb. 19, '97			
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's. .... 1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. .... 1940		8,103,000	A & O	84	Dec. 30, '98	85	77 1/2	638,000
income 4's. .... 1990		4,000,000	A	22	Dec. 30, '98	22	20	135,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f. d. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	101 1/2	Dec. 19, '98	101 1/2	101 1/2	2,000
consol mortg. 7's. .... 1914		3,991,000	J & D	137 1/2	Dec. 27, '98	138	137 1/2	38,000
sink. fund 7's. .... 1914			J & D	119 1/2	Nov. 19, '99			
gen. consol 6's. .... 1934		3,206,000	J & J	132 1/4	Nov. 23, '98			
registered. ....			J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	107 1/2	Oct. 16, '97			
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's 1933		4,300,000	A & O	107	Dec. 27, '98	109	107	7,000
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1932		2,936,000	J & J	121	Sept. 9, '98			
registered. ....			Q J					
Col. Middl Ry. 1st g. 2-3 4's. .... 1947		6,250,000	J & J	67 1/4	Dec. 30, '98	69 1/4	64 1/2	397,000
1st g. 4's. .... 1947		1,011,000	J & J	76 1/2	Dec. 30, '98	77 1/2	73	477,000
Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. ....								
J. P. M. ctf. 8 1/2 pd. .... 1931		8,170,000	.....	80	Dec. 30, '98	86	75	1,268,000
gen. mort. g. 6's. .... 1904		2,000,000	J & D	56	Dec. 15, '98	58	46	113,000
gen. lien g. 4's. .... 1906		852,000	J & J					
registered, \$5,000. ....			J & J					
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '98			
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,067,000	M & S	124	Nov. 7, '98			
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1916		1,966,000	A & O	126	July 23, '98			
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. .... 1914		5,000,000	M & N	143	Dec. 7, '98	143	143	1,000
bonds, 7's. .... 1900		281,000	J & J	109	Nov. 23, '97			
7's. .... 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	110 1/2	Dec. 10, '98	110 1/2	110 1/2	14,000
1st c. gtd 7's. .... 1915			J & D	139	June 2, '98			
registered. ....		12,151,000	J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98			
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. .... 1921		12,000,000	J & J	137	Sept. 12, '98			
const. 5's. .... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	118 1/2	Nov. 17, '97			
Warren 2d 7's. .... 1900		750,000	A & O	108	Aug. 1, '95			



BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's...1917		5,000,000	M & S	146	Sept. 13, '98			
reg. ....1917			M & S	143	May 4, '98			
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's...1906		3,000,000	A & O	122	Dec. 6, '98	123	121½	2,000
registered.....1906			A & O	123½	Feb. 12, '94			
6's .....		7,000,000	A & O	116¾	Dec. 1, '98	116¾	116¾	1,000
registered.....1906			A & O	117	Nov. 21, '98			
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's...1921		2,000,000	M & N	147	Sept. 27, '98			
1st r 7's .....			M & N	141	May 6, '98			
Denver Cen. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's...1933		780,000	A & O					
Denver T'way Co. con. g. 5's...1910		1,219,000	J & J					
Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's...1911		913,000	J & J					
Denver & Rio Grande 1st g. 7's...1900		1,334,500	M & N	108½	Nov. 23, '98			
1st con. g. 4's.....1933		23,650,000	J & J	102¾	Dec. 22, '98	102¾	99¾	350,000
con. g. 4½'s.....1933		4,848,000	J & J	110¾	Dec. 22, '98	111	108¾	277,000
impt. m. g. 5's.....1923		3,103,500	J & D	102¾	Dec. 22, '98	106	100	263,000
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's...1917		623,000	M & N	102	Oct. 20, '98			
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s...1905		900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95			
g. 4s.....1905		1,250,000	J & D					
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....1937		6,734,000	A & O	109¼	Dec. 23, '98	108¼	108¼	55,000
registered.....1916			A & O	101¼	July 23, '99			
2d 1 m 6s.....1916		2,000,000	J & J					
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's...1923		500,000	J & J	92¼	Feb. 11, '98			
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's...1937		4,000,000	J & J	113¾	Dec. 14, '98	113¾	113¾	3,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's...1941		7,417,000	M & N	104¼	Dec. 30, '98	106	103¾	230,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's...1907		2,482,000	M & S	114¼	Dec. 19, '98	114¾	114¾	5,000
2d extended 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & N	119¼	Aug. 2, '98			
3d extended 4½'s.....1923		4,618,000	M & S	112	Nov. 11, '98			
4th extended 5's.....1920		2,923,000	A & O	118¼	Nov. 29, '98			
5th extended 4's.....1923		709,500	J & D	104¼	June 3, '98			
1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		16,890,000	M & S	144	Dec. 27, '98	145½	144	29,000
1st cons. fund c. 7's.....1920		3,705,977	M & S	143	Dec. 30, '98	143	142¾	6,000
Long Dock consol. 5's.....1933		7,500,000	A & O	139	Sept. 20, '98			
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's...1916		2,380,000	J & D	133	June 6, '98			
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's...1908		1,500,000	J & J					
small .....			J & J					
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's...1909		2,800,000	A & O	103	Nov. 2, '98			
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's...1932		12,000,000	M & N	112	Dec. 22, '98	112	111½	53,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co. 1st g currency 6's.....1922		1,100,000	M & N					
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913		3,396,000	J & J	102	Aug. 31, '98			
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake grt g 5's...1943		1,452,000	M & N	100	Oct. 27, '98			
small .....								
Erie R.R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds...1906		30,000,000	J & J	94¼	Dec. 30, '98	94¼	93¼	657,000
registered.....1906			J & J					
gen. lien 3-4s .....		30,927,000	J & J	75¾	Dec. 30, '98	75¾	74	585,000
registered.....1906			J & J					
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refdg. g. 5's...1937		3,750,000	J & J	110	Dec. 16, '98	111	110	12,000
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		453,000	F & A	93¼	Aug. 23, '98			
gen. g. 5's.....1940		2,547,000	F & A	94¾	Dec. 30, '98	95¾	90	343,500
term. 1st g. 5's.....1943			M & N	111	Oct. 6, '98			
registered.....\$5,000 each		2,000,000	M & N					
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g 5's...1942		3,000,000	J & D	99	Dec. 30, '98	99	95	30,000
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's...1910		3,500,000	A & O	122	Dec. 21, '98	122	120	32,000
500,000 .....			F & A	65	Nov. 10, '97			
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1913		500,000	F & A	123	Dec. 27, '98	123	123	13,000
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's...1921		3,000,000	A & O	100	Dec. 30, '98	101	98	613,000
1st General g 5's.....1942		2,223,000	A & O	110	May 10, '98			
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		975,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91			
Sul. Co. Sch. 1st g 5's.....1930		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91			
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's...1923		1,581,000	J & J	103¾	Dec. 23, '98	103¾	94	136,000
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's...1920		3,999,000	A & O	121¾	Dec. 30, '98	121¾	118½	50,000
1st con. gold 5's.....1939		2,600,000	M & N	100	Dec. 22, '98	101	98¼	189,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.....1939		3,993,000	A & O	102¼	Dec. 22, '98	102¾	99	224,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's...1918		3,000,000	J & J	103	Aug. 14, '96			
1st land grant ex. g 5's...1930		423,000	J & J					
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	89¾	May 14, '96			
Ft. Smith U'n. Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s...1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98			
Ft. Worth & D. C. cts. dep. 1st 6's...1921		3,176,000		85¼	Dec. 30, '98	87	77	329,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st 6's...1923		2,833,000	J & J	64	Dec. 30, '98	66½	62½	573,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s...1913		2,000,000	A & O	99	Dec. 27, '98	99	99	25,000
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's...1943		2,230,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12, '88	106	106	5,000
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's...1927		5,360,000	J & J	97	Dec. 2, '98	97	97	1,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Houston E. & W. Tex. 1st g 5's. 1933		2,700,000	M & N	98½	Dec. 29, '98	98½	94	226,000
Illinois Central, total out-standing.....	\$18,950,000							
1st g. 4's.....	1894-1961	1,500,000	J & J	112½	Nov. 30, '98			
registered.....			J & J	112½	Nov. 23, '98			
1st gold 3½'s.....	1961	2,499,000	J & J	102	Oct. 28, '98			
registered.....			J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98			
1st g 3s sterl. 2500,000. 1961		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 18, '98			
registered.....			M & S					
collat. trust gold 4's. 1962		15,000,000	M & N	105	Dec. 27, '98	105	104	67,000
regist'd.....			M & N	102	Dec. 21, '98	102	102	2,000
col. t. g. 4s L. N. O. & Tex. 1963		24,679,000	J & J	102½	Dec. 23, '98	108	102	79,000
registered.....			J & J					
col. trust 2-10 g. 4's. 1904		4,806,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 23, '98			
registered.....			J & J					
West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1961		5,425,000	F & A	106	Nov. 23, '98			
registered.....			F & A					
Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1963		14,320,000	J & J	96	Dec. 30, '98	96	95½	102,000
registered.....			J & J					
St. Louis div. g. 3's.....	1961	4,989,000	J & J	82½	Dec. 5, '98	88	82	2,000
registered.....			J & J					
g. 3½'s.....	1961	6,831,000	J & J	96	Dec. 30, '98	96	95	131,000
registered.....			J & J					
Calro Bridge 4's g. ....	1960	3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98			
registered.....			J & D					
Middle div. registered 5's.....	1921	600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '98			
Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s. 1961		2,000,000	J & J					
registered.....			J & J					
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's.....	1961	16,565,000	J D 15	125	Nov. 21, '98			
gold 5's, registered.....			J D 15	123	Sept. 12, '97			
g. 3½'s.....	1961	1,352,000	J D 15					
registered.....			J D 15					
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		3,500,000	J & D	104½	Dec. 27, '98	104½	100½	3,000
registered.....			J & D					
Belleville & Carold 1st 6's.....	1923	485,000	J & D	115	June 22, '98			
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1961		550,000	M & S	93	Dec. 2, '97	98	93	2,000
Carbond'e & Shaw't'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		250,000	M & S	90	Nov. 22, '98			
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....	1965	1,824,000	J & J	105	Nov. 16, '98			
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st refdg. 5's. 1948		2,500,000	A & O	105	Dec. 29, '98	105	104½	30,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st. 6's, gold. 1919		7,964,000	M & N	122½	Nov. 30, '98			
2d g. 5's.....	1919	6,593,000	M & S	95	Dec. 30, '98	93	90½	92,000
3d g. 4's.....	1921	2,719,500	M & S	61	Dec. 29, '98	62½	59	114,500
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....	1938	6,572,000	J & D	107	Dec. 30, '98	107	103½	45,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1929	3,000,000	A & O					
Kan. C. Pitt. & Gulf 1st & col. g. 5's 1933		22,578,000	A & O	69½	Dec. 30, '98	76½	67½	1,161,000
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's. 1925		3,177,000	J & J	69½	Dec. 30, '98	70½	49½	323,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A. 1929		1,979,000	M & S	60	Dec. 30, '98	61	44	127,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....	1937	7,250,000	J & J	120	Dec. 27, '98	120	118	40,000
2d mtge. g. 5's.....	1941	3,625,000	J & J	106	Dec. 29, '98	106	102	40,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1945	2,500,000	A & O	101½	Dec. 28, '98	101½	100½	33,000
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's.....	1997	5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98			
registered.....			M & N					
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s. 1940		15,000,000	J & J	106	Dec. 28, '98	106½	105½	53,000
registered.....			J & J					
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1941		10,000,000	A & O	113	Dec. 30, '98	113	113	15,000
registered.....			A & O					
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1933		10,280,000	J & J	109½	July 1, '97			
registered.....	1933		J & J					
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's.....	1945	2,000,000	M & S	91	Oct. 21, '98			
registered.....			M & S					
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's 1914		750,000	A & O					
g. gtd 5's.....	1914	1,250,000	A & O	101	Sept. 16, '97			
Litchfield Car'n & W. 1st g. 5's.....	1916	400,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '98			
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. ctf's. for 1st g. 5's.....	1937	3,145,000	Q J	38	Dec. 5, '98	38	33	2,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....	1981	3,810,000	Q J	124	Dec. 5, '98	124	123½	10,000
1st con. g. 4's.....	1931	1,121,000	Q J					
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & D	97	Dec. 27, '98	97	95½	23,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....	1922	1,500,000	M & S	97	Dec. 29, '98	97½	95	40,000
g. 4's.....	1932	325,000	J & D	91	Sept. 27, '97			
deb. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & D	100	May 26, '97			

BOND SALES.

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's, 1927		984,000	M & S	98	Dec. 5, '98	98	98	1,000
2d m. inc. 1927		1,000,000	S	108½	July 9, '97			
N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's, 1936		1,728,000	A & O	100	Nov. 4, '98			
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's, 1911		250,000	M & S					
1st 5's, 1911		750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '98			
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's, 1932		1,075,000	QJAN	108½	June 17, '98			
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. g'd 5's, 1943		300,000	J & J					
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's, 1945		300,000	J & J					
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. Tr.Co.ct. gold 5's, 1939		3,584,000	J & J	52	Dec. 22, '98	53½	51	107,000
Gen. mtg. g. 4's, 1943		2,432,000	M & S	5	Dec. 23, '98	5	5	1,000
Louis & Nash Cecilia brch. 7's, 1907		490,000	M & S	108	Nov. 11, '97			
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's, 1930		5,000,000	J & J	129	Dec. 23, '98	129	128	7,000
2d 6's, 1930		1,000,000	J & J	111	Dec. 13, '98	111	111	1,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's, 1919		1,990,000	J & D	117	Nov. 22, '98			
general mort. 6's, 1930		10,068,000	J & D	117½	Dec. 23, '98	118	117½	6,000
Pensacola div. 6's, 1920		580,000	M & S	103½	Sept. 24, '97			
St. Louis div. 1st 6's, 1921		3,500,000	M & S	125	Dec. 7, '97	125	125	5,000
2d 5's, 1930		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '98			
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's, 1900		1,900,000	J & J	107	Nov. 17, '98			
So. & N. Ala. si'g fd. 6s, 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '98			
con. gtd. g. 5's, 1936		3,678,000	F & A	108½	Nov. 23, '98			
gold 5's, 1937		1,764,000	M & N	107	Dec. 22, '98	107	105	20,000
Unft'd gold 4's, 1940		14,004,000	J & J	98	Dec. 30, '98	98	94½	550,000
registered, 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '98			
Pen. & At. 1st 6's, g. 3, 1921		2,758,000	F & A	111½	Dec. 22, '98	111½	110	27,000
collateral trust g. 5's, 1931		5,129,000	M & N	107½	Dec. 20, '98	107½	106	30,000
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st. g. 4's, 1945		4,000,000	M & S	109½	July 18, '98			
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's, 1937		2,098,000	F & A	104½	Dec. 9, '98	104½	103½	8,000
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's, 1937		6,742,000	J & J	90½	Nov. 19, '98			
L. & N. Louv. Cin. & Lex. g. 4½'s, 1931		3,258,000	M & N	108	Jan. 18, '98			
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's, 1945		3,000,000	M & S					
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's, 1930		4,800,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98			
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's, 1930		24,065,000	A & O	95½	Dec. 30, '98	97½	96	418,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's, 1908		10,818,000	J & J	118½	Dec. 30, '98	119½	117½	22,000
2d 6's, 1909		4,000,000	M & N	102	Dec. 15, '98	102	102	12,000
Manitoba Swn. Coloniza'n g. 5's, 1934		2,544,000	J & D					
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's, 1913		3,000,000	J & J					
Metro. St. Ry. gen. col. tr. g. 5's, 1937		12,500,000	F & A	118½	Dec. 30, '98	119	117½	516,000
B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's, 1937		7,650,000	J & D	122½	Dec. 19, '98	122½	121½	13,000
registered			J & D	112½	May 29, '98			
Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's, 1938		3,000,000	M & S	123½	Dec. 23, '98	123½	123	37,000
registered,			M & S					
Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's, 1933		5,000,000	M & S	124½	Dec. 30, '98	125	123	37,000
registered,			M & S					
Mexican Central.								
con. mtg. 4's, 1911		59,011,000	J & J	65½	Dec. 3, '98	65½	65½	1,000
1st con. inc. 3's, 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '98			
2d 3's, 1939		11,310,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '98			
equip. & collat. g. 5's, 1917		950,000	A & O					
Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's, 1942		4,635,000	M & S	84½	Dec. 30, '98	85	80½	448,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's, 1927		11,416,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95			
2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,286,000	M & S	15	Dec. 7, '98	15	15	500
March 1, 1890, stamped 1½ paid								
2d inc. 6's "B" 1917		12,286,000	A	6½	Dec. 7, '98	6½	6½	5,000
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's, 1910		1,313,000	J & D	97	Feb. 11, '97			
registered,			J & D					
Midland Terminal R'y, 1st g. 5's, 1925		600,000	J & D					
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's, 1926		6,103,000	F & A	101½	Nov. 3, '98			
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's, 1927		950,000	J & D	143	Oct. 13, '98			
1st con. g. 5's, 1934		5,000,000	M & N	109½	Dec. 15, '98	110	108½	19,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's, 1909		1,015,000	J & D	125	Oct. 4, '97			
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's, 1910		636,000	J & D	129	May 16, '98			
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's, 1921		1,382,000	J & A	128	Dec. 12, '98	128	128	50,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's, 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87			
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.								

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apl. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	.....	.....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1888		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,050,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1980		39,718,000	J & D	91¼	Dec. 30, '98	91¼	89	787,000
2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1980		20,800,000	F & A	88	Dec. 30, '98	68¼	65	4,547,000
1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		988,000	M & S	88	Aug. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,688,000	M & S	88	Dec. 29, '98	89¼	81½	140,000
Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1980		2,500,000	F & A	88	Dec. 29, '98	75	75	36,000
Dal. & Waco 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	88	Dec. 30, '98	88½	82¼	168,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. ... 1906		558,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tobo. & Neosho 1st 7's. .... 1908		187,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mo Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	101¼	Dec. 22, '98	101¼	101	47,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,804,000	M & N	109¼	Dec. 30, '98	110¼	104	1,881,000
3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	114¼	Dec. 30, '98	112	112	18,000
trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,876,000	M & S	91¼	Dec. 30, '98	92½	83½	610,000
registered		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	89	Dec. 29, '98	90	76½	601,000
re-registered		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	106¼	Dec. 30, '98	107	106	14,000
2d extended g. 5's. .... 1938		2,578,000	F & A	111¼	Dec. 30, '98	111¼	111¼	4,400
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1926		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. L. & I'n. Mt. 1st ex. 4½'s. .... 1897		4,000,000	F & A	108	Dec. 29, '98	108¼	108	7,000
2d. ext. g. 5's. .... 1946		6,000,000	M & N	108	Dec. 29, '98	108	108	48,000
Ark'nsas b'nch ext 5's. 1885		2,500,000	J & D	108	Dec. 9, '98	108	108	1,000
g. con. R.R. & l. gr. 5's. 1931		18,274,000	A & O	105	Dec. 30, '98	105¼	98	1,568,000
stamped gtd gold 5's. .... 1981		6,946,000	A & O	101	Dec. 17, '98	101	98	14,000
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small		228,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small		500,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	125	Dec. 28, '98	125	124	8,000
1st extension 6's. .... 1927		914,000	J & D	116	Dec. 8, '98	116	116	1,000
gen. g. 4's. .... 1938		9,547,000	Q J	82¼	Dec. 30, '98	83¼	81	587,000
Montg'ry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	108	Dec. 27, '98	108	104½	15,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	132¼	Dec. 22, '98	132¼	133	6,000
2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	105¼	Nov. 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		6,218,000	A & O	107	Dec. 28, '98	107¼	105½	30,000
1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's McM. M. W. & A. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108¼	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. 1903		22,487,000	J & J	118	Dec. 15, '98	118	118	25,000
1st registered		.....	J & J	118	Nov. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
debenture 5's. .... 1904		5,775,000	M & S	110½	Dec. 30, '98	110½	110	8,000
debenture 5's reg. .... 1904		815,000	M & S	110	Dec. 16, '98	110	109	18,000
reg. debent. 5's. .... 1889-1904		815,000	M & S	108¼	Feb. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
debenture g. 4's. .... 1905		8,205,000	J & D	104	Dec. 20, '98	104	103½	5,000
registered		.....	J & D	104¼	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1906		4,297,000	M & N	103¼	Dec. 17, '98	103¼	103¼	4,000
registered		.....	M & N	104½	June 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
g. mortgage 3½'s. .... 1907		27,601,000	J & J	110	Dec. 9, '98	110	109½	28,000
registered		.....	J & J	108	Nov. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		18,297,000	F & A	96¼	Dec. 30, '98	96½	95¼	323,000
registered		.....	F & A	93	Nov. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		90,833,000	F & A	99¼	Dec. 30, '98	99¼	96¼	1,137,000
registered		.....	F & A	97	Dec. 16, '98	97	96¼	44,000
Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	105¼	Dec. 9, '98	105¼	105¼	2,000
7's registered. .... 1900		.....	M & N	106½	Dec. 23, '98	106½	105½	46,000
N. Jersey Junc. R. B. g. 1st 4's. 1956		1,650,000	F & A	103	May 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
reg. certificates		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	112¼	Dec. 30, '98	113	113	138,000
registered		.....	J & J	110¼	Dec. 30, '98	112¼	109¼	160,500

BOND SALES.

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's....1906		5,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		500,000	J & J	106	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 5's.....1906		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, {		770,000	J & J	95	July 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940 {		33,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small bonds series B.....		800,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswega 1st gtd g. 5's.1942		9,061,000	A & O	130¼	Dec. 22, '98	130¼	129	74,000
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's....1922		180,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
coup. g. bond currency.....		875,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		1,800,000	J & J	107	Aug. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1911		4,000,000	A & O	103	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carthage & Adiron 1st gtd g. 4's. 1911		1,200,000	A & O	123¼	Dec. 20, '98	123¼	123¼	1,000
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1903		924,000	F & A	121	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's....1927		998,000	A & O	102¼	Dec. 12, '98	102¼	102¼	6,000
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern. {		9,153,000	J & J	108	Oct. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1908		28,166,000	J & D	108	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....1899		1,000,000	A & O	108¼	Dec. 1, '97	.....	.....	.....
" con. co. 1st 7's.....1900		840,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. 1st registered.....1901		1,501,000	J & J	121	Oct. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
" con. co. 2d 7's.....1903		3,000,000	M & N	111¼	Dec. 29, '98	112	111	24,000
" con. 2d registered.....1903		2,000,000	M & N	104¼	Dec. 20, '98	104¼	104¼	18,000
" g 8's.....1907		1,500,000	M & S	122	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....1907		3,576,000	M & S	121¼	June 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....1907		2,600,000	Q M	121	Dec. 6, '97	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....1907		476,000	J & J	108	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....1907		2,600,000	J & J	108	Jan. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....1907		476,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....1907		19,425,000	A & O	108¼	Dec. 23, '98	108¼	105¼	106,000
" registered.....1907		.....	A & O	104	Nov. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1903		2,000,000	J & D	104¼	Oct. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
" con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	173	Dec. 29, '98	173	170	8,500
" small certifs.....\$100		1,430,000	A & ..	172	Dec. 19, '98	172½	171	6,500
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's....1937		2,838,000	M & N	128¼	Aug. 8, '97	.....	.....	.....
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		875,000	M & N	115¼	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's....1905		6,000,000	J & J	121¼	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	116	Dec. 6, '95	116	116	2,000
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1939		5,600,000	J & D	108¼	Dec. 29, '98	108¼	105¼	413,500
" Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1932		8,375,000	M & S	104¼	Dec. 30, '98	105	102½	866,000
" Registered.....\$5,000 only.		.....	M & S	101¼	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m. R. R. & L. G. S. F. g. c. 6's. 1921		6,595,000	J & J	119	Dec. 28, '98	119	117	16,000
" registered.....		7,965,000	J & J	117	Oct. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered certificates....		.....	F & A	131¼	Dec. 17, '98	131¼	131¼	1,000
" registered certificates....		.....	Q F	130	Sept. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. Ry prior in Ry. & Id. g. 4's. 1907		87,901,000	Q J	102¾	Dec. 30, '98	108	101½	1,607,000
" registered.....		56,000,000	Q J	100¾	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. lien g. 5's.....2047		1,538,000	Q F	89¼	Dec. 30, '98	70	67	2,138,000
" registered.....		.....	Q F	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	Q MCH	88	Dec. 28, '98	88	88	2,000
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948		3,891,000	J & J	115	Dec. 29, '98	115¼	115	5,000
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's....1933		750,000	M & N	102	June 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's....1941		7,288,000	M & N	127	Dec. 8, '98	127	127	1,000
" New River 1st 6's.....1932		2,000,000	A & O	123	Nov. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" impmt and ext. 6's....1934		5,050,000	F & A	117¼	Aug. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" So'to Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1933		5,000,000	J & N	97	Dec. 23, '98	97¼	94	52,000
" C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g 5's. 1932		600,000	J & J	101	Feb. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'd Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.			
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.	
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s. 1906 registered.....	23,319,100		A & O	89½	Dec. 30, '98	90	89½	1,421,000	
small bonds.....				A & O					
				A & O					
Ogd'b'g & L. Chapl. 1st con. 6's... 1920	3,500,000		A & O	49	Apr. 13, '98				
Ogdensburg & Lake Chapl. inc. 1920	800,000		O						
inc. .... small	200,000		O	82	Feb. 26, '87				
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's..... 1906	2,000,000		J & D	102½	Jan. 26, '98				
gen. mortg. g 6's..... 1907	2,423,000		A & O	85	Dec. 16, '98				
Ohio Southern gen g 4's..... 1921	1,881,000		M & N	9	Sept. 7, '98				
gen. eng. Trust Co. certa...	1,417,000			8½	Sept. 8, '98				
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's..... 1901	2,376,000		J & J	82	Dec. 30, '98	82	80½	50,000	
Oregon Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1909	1,202,000		J & J	113	Dec. 29, '98	114	113	5,000	
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946	19,084,000		J & D	100¾	Dec. 30, '98	100¾	99	874,000	
Oregon Short Line 1st g. 6's..... 1922	13,651,000		F & A	130	Dec. 29, '98	131	129½	122,000	
Utah & Northern 1st 7's..... 1908	4,993,000		J & J	121	June 18, '98				
g 5's..... 1923	1,877,000		J & J	102	May 24, '94				
Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g 5's. 1946	10,337,000		J & J	111¼	Dec. 30, '98	111½	109½	279,000	
non-cum. inc. A 5's..... 1946	7,185,000		SMPT.	84½	Dec. 29, '98	85½	84½	613,500	
non-cum. inc. B. & cool. trust	14,341,000		OCT.	68	Dec. 30, '98	67¾	68½	1,195,000	
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's..... 1946	4,446,000		J & D	105	Dec. 30, '98	105	103¾	112,000	
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s..... 1917	1,869,000		A & O						
s. f. subsidy g 6's..... 1910	1,782,000		M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91				
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.									
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st..... 1921	19,467,000		J & J	115¾	Dec. 23, '98	116	115½	19,000	
reg..... 1921				J & J	110	July 8, '98			
gtd. 3¼ col. tr. reg. cts. 1937				M & S	102	Nov. 11, '98			
Pitts., C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s	10,000,000		A & O	114¾	Dec. 30, '98	114¾	114	7,000	
Series A..... 1940				A & O	111¾	Oct. 19, '98			
Series B..... 1942				M & N	113	Nov. 23, '98			
Series C..... 1942				M & N	107	Dec. 30, '98	107	106	51,000
Series D gtd. 4's..... 1945				F & A	108	Dec. 8, '98	108	108	2,000
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's. 1900	6,863,000		F & A	109¾	Apr. 23, '97				
1st reg. 7's..... 1900	2,917,000		J & J	141	Nov. 10, '98				
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912	2,546,000		J & J	141	Nov. 10, '98				
2d 7's..... 1912	2,000,000		A & O	126	Aug. 26, '95				
3d 7's..... 1912	1,506,000		A & O	113	May 14, '98				
Chic. St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932	1,310,000		A & O	110	May 8, '92				
registered.....	1,310,000		M & N	107	May 25, '98				
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's. 1900	3,000,000		J & J	113	Apr. 18, '95				
gen. gtd. g. 4½'s Ser. A. 1942	1,899,000		A & O						
Series B..... 1942	2,250,000		J & J						
E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3¾'s Ser. B. 1940	1,118,000		J & J						
C. 1940	4,447,000		J & J	107	May 18, '98				
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½ 1941	5,389,000		M & S	102	Nov. 10, '97				
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's. 1942	1,400,000		J & J						
Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945									
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's. 1923	1,675,000			108	May 12, '97				
con. sterling gold 6 per cent..... 1905	22,782,000		J & D						
con. currency, 6's registered..... 1905	4,718,000		QM 15						
con. gold 5 per cent..... 1919	4,998,000		M & S						
registered.....	3,000,000		QMch						
con. gold 4 per cent..... 1943	1,250,000		M & N	111	July 8, '97				
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s..... 1935	5,646,000		M & S	115¾	Feb. 14, '98				
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's. 1944	1,300,000		F & A						
Del. R. RR. & Bge Co 1st gtd g. 4's. 1936	500,000		J & J						
Sunbury & Lewiston 1st g. 4's. 1936									
Peo., Dec. & Ev. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g 6's. 1920	1,140,000		J & J	99	Dec. 29, '98	99	98	19,000	
Ev. div. Tr. Co. of 1st g. 6's. 1920	1,433,000		M & S	94	Dec. 7, '98	94	94	5,000	
Tr. Co. ctf. 2d mort 5's. 1926	1,851,000		M & N	20	Dec. 20, '98	20	20	20,000	
1st instal. paid.....									
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's..... 1921	1,500,000		Q F	120	May 11, '98				
2d m 4½'s..... 1921	1,499,000		M & N	90	Sept. 22, '98				
Pine Creek Railway 6's..... 1932	3,500,000		J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93				

BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 26, '93	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. .... 1922		1,440,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A, 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '93	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's, 1932		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89	.....	.....	.....
} 2d g. 6's. .... 1934		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
} McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. .... 1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's, 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	Oct. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's, 1940		3,000,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 9, '98	112½	111	13,000
} 1st cons. 5's. .... 1943		408,000	J & J	98	July 14, '97	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's, 1917		9,700,000	J & J	100	Dec. 30, '98	101¼	95½	886,000
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's, 1927		1,562,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. .... 1997		58,668,000	J & J	88¾	Dec. 30, '98	89	84¾	7,499,000
} registered. ....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. .... 1939		15,200,000	J & J	93	Dec. 30, '98	93	89¾	517,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's, 1939		1,850,000	J & D	91	June 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4, 1940		4,510,000	J & J	75	Dec. 27, '98	76	75	235,000
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's, 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.342. .... 1947		3,500,000	J & J	81½	Dec. 29, '98	84	81	76,000
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's, Class A, 1906		500,000	M & N	114	July 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
} 2d g. 6's, Class B. .... 1906		2,709,500	M & N	114¼	Dec. 30, '98	114¼	113½	22,000
} 2d g. 6's, Class C. .... 1906		2,400,000	M & N	114¼	Dec. 30, '98	114¼	113½	18,000
} 1st g. 6's P. C. & O. .... 1919		1,030,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
} gen. g. 6's. .... 1931		7,807,000	J & J	125	Dec. 30, '98	125	122½	237,000
} gen. g. 5's. .... 1931		12,236,000	J & J	110	Dec. 30, '98	110	107¼	336,000
} 1st Trust g. 5's. .... 1987		1,099,000	A & O	100	Nov. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
} Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's, 1910		304,000	A & O	105	Oct. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
} Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
} St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		6,388,000	J & D	84¾	Dec. 30, '98	86	82½	1,351,000
} South'n div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		1,500,000	A & O	97¾	Dec. 15, '98	97¾	97¾	26,000
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's., 1989		20,000,000	M & N	85	Dec. 30, '98	85½	80½	2,401,000
} 2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's. .... 1989		8,000,000	J & J	41¼	Dec. 30, '98	41¾	35	3,540,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con.g.5's. 1937		2,480,000	J&J15	90	Nov. 8, 27	.....	.....	.....
} gtd. gold 5's. .... 1937		1,138,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1913		1,000,000	F & A	121	Dec. 30, '98	121	121	1,000
} 2d 5's. .... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 29, '98	112½	110	22,000
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	124	Dec. 20, '98	124	124	7,000
} Dakota ext'n 6's. .... 1910		5,676,000	M & N	124	Dec. 21, '98	124	123	9,000
} 1st con. 6's. .... 1933		13,344,000	J & J	138¾	Dec. 19, '98	138¾	137½	21,000
} 1st con. 6's, registered. ....		21,196,000	J & J	120	Aug. 19, '95	.....	.....	.....
} 1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s. ....			J & J	114½	Dec. 23, '98	114½	113¾	27,000
} 1st cons. 6's registered. ....		J & J	105	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....	
} Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,805,000	J & D	104¾	Dec. 23, '98	104¾	102¼	20,000
} registered. ....		J & D	96	Feb. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....	
} Minneapolis Umon 1st 6's. .... 1922		2,150,000	J & J	127¼	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
} Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	130	Oct. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
} 1st 6's, registered. ....		2,700,000	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
} 1st g. g. 5's. .... 1937			J & J	112½	Sept. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
} registered. ....		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
} Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,900	A & O	110	Nov. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
} registered. ....		A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
} Eastn. R'y Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
} registered. ....		A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
} Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's, 1938		3,625,000	J & D	113	Aug. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
} registered. ....		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's, 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100½	Oct. 20, '97	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. .... 1934		4,056,000	A & O	106¾	Aug. 2, '97	.....	.....	.....
} 1st g. 5's. .... 1934		1,780,000	A & O	104½	Oct. 18, '97	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. .... 1926		2,500,000	J & J	104¾	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold, 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's, 1919		5,250,000	M & N	102	Dec. 30, '98	102¾	100	344,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Southern Pacific Co.								
{ Gal. Harris'gh & S.A. 1st g 6's. 1910		4,758,000	F & A	99½	Dec. 9, '98	99½	98½	2,000
" 2d g 7's. 1905		1,000,000	J & D	102	Dec. 8, '98	102	102	5,000
" Mex. & P. div 1st g 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	100¾	Dec. 30, '98	100¾	98¾	273,000
Houst. & T C 1st Waco & N 7's. 1908		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92			
" 1st g 5's int. gtd. 1937		7,107,000	J & J	112½	Dec. 23, '98	113	112½	23,000
" con. g 6's int. gtd. 1912		8,455,000	A & O	112	Dec. 9, '98	112	112	3,000
" gen. g 4's int. gtd. 1921		4,297,000	A & O	87½	Dec. 30, '98	87½	85½	213,000
{ Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's. 1920		1,484,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 17, '98			
" 1st 7's. 1918		5,000,000	A & O	127	Apr. 30, '98			
" N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O					
" Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's. 1927		18,842,000	J & J	98½	Dec. 30, '98	98½	94¾	170,000
" San Ant. & Aran Pass 1st gtd g 4's. 1943		18,886,000	J & J	81	Dec. 30, '98	81½	74¼	1,664,000
" Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's. 1915		1,620,000	F & A	116	Dec. 14, '98	116½	116	7,000
" Sabine div. 1st g 6's. 1912		2,575,000	M & S	106¼	Nov. 17, '97			
" con. g 5's. 1943		1,620,000	J & J	104½	Dec. 30, '98	104½	103¼	95,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	112½	Dec. 30, '98	113½	111¼	165,000
{ South. Pac. of Cal. 1st g 6's. 1905-12		30,577,500	A & O	118½	Dec. 17, '98	118½	118½	4,000
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's. 1937		7,984,000	M & N	120½	Nov. 11, '98			
" stamped. 1905-1937		12,500,000		106¼	Dec. 30, '98	107	104¼	450,000
{ Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. 1941		1,920,000	J & J	92	Dec. 23, '98	92	88½	162,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1937		5,500,000	J & J					
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. 1911		4,180,000	J & J	113½	Nov. 23, '98			
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's. 1994		27,859,000	J & J	106	Dec. 30, '98	106	104½	991,000
" registered.			J & J	98	Oct. 31, '98			
" Memph. div. 1st g. 4-4½-5's. 1996		5,983,000	J & J	107	Nov. 21, '98			
" registered.			J & J					
" East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. 1938		4,500,000	M & S	102¾	Nov. 21, '98			
" registered.			M & S					
" Alabama Central, 1st 6's. 1918		1,000,000	J & J	112¼	Aug. 17, '97			
" Atl. & Char. Air Line, income. 1900		750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95			
" Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. 1916		2,000,000	J & J	118	Sept. 30, '98			
" East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. 1900		3,123,000	J & J	108	Dec. 20, '98	108	107¼	17,000
" divisional g 5's. 1930		3,108,000	J & J	117	Dec. 23, '98	117	117	7,000
" con. 1st g 5's. 1936		12,770,000	M & N	115	Dec. 3, '98	115½	114	72,000
" Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. 1922		5,660,000	J & J	125	Dec. 15, '98	125	125	6,000
" Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. 1925		2,000,000	J & J	118½	Nov. 28, '98			
" Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. 1915		5,597,000	J & J	128	Dec. 27, '98	127	126	14,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's. 1909		818,000	M & S	101	Nov. 2, '97			
" deb. 5's stamped. 1927		3,368,000	A & O	104½	Dec. 16, '98	104½	104½	2,000
{ Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. B 6's. 1911		1,900,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. C 6's. 1916		1,100,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. D 4-5's. 1921		950,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. E 5's. 1926		1,775,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. F 5's. 1931		1,310,000	M & S					
" Virginia Midland gen. 5's. 1936		2,392,000	M & N	110½	Dec. 29, '98	111	109½	47,000
" gen. 5's. gtd. stamped 1926		2,496,000	M & N	110	Dec. 23, '98	110	109½	15,000
" W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. 1924		1,025,000	F & A	90	Aug. 25, '98			
" W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. 1914		2,531,000	J & J	118¼	Dec. 1, '98	118¼	118¼	20,000
Spokane Falls & North 1st g. 6's. 1939		2,812,000	J & J					
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4's. 1943		500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. B. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. 1939		7,000,000	A & O	109	Oct. 12, '98			
" 1st con. g. 5's. 1904-1944		4,500,000	F & A	111½	Dec. 28, '98	111½	110	4,000
" St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd. g 5's. 1930		3,500,000	A & O	103	Oct. 27, '98			
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. 1914		444,000	Q JAN	105½	Dec. 18, '95			
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. } " fm. Texarkana to Ft. W'th } 1905		3,346,000	M & S	105¼	Dec. 27, '98	105¼	105¼	4,000
" 1st gold 5's. 2000		21,216,000	J & D	110	Dec. 29, '98	110	107	192,000
" 2d gold income, 5's. 2000		23,227,000	MAR.	49	Dec. 30, '98	50	45½	9,786,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	128	Dec. 12, '98	128	127	9,000



BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's...1985		3,000,000	J & J	106¼	Dec. 6, '98	106¼	106¼	5,000
" 1st M. g 5's West. div...1985		2,500,000	A & O	102	Dec. 28, '98	102	102	2,000
" gen. g. 5's...1985		1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Kanaw & M. 1st g. 4's...1980		2,340,000	A & O	80	Dec. 29, '98	80	80	24,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's...1917		4,400,000	J & D	80	Dec. 29, '98	80	78¼	44,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's 1916		8,284,000	M & N	92	Dec. 30, '98	92	89¾	200,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's...1928		1,862,000	J & D	100	Dec. 27, '98	100	100	10,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g.5's.1945		4,237,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Pacific R. R. & ld gt g 4s.1947		90,000,000	J & J	105¼	Dec. 30, '98	106¼	101½	4,527,000
" registered.....			J & J	99¼	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Union Pac. Tr. Co. cta. g 4's.1918		2,000,000	M & N	68¼	Dec. 28, '98	68	65	39,000
" U.P. Den. & GT. Co. cf. 1st c. g 5's.1939		15,238,000	J & D	87¾	Dec. 30, '98	88¾	84½	1,603,000
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's...1989		31,664,000	M & N	113	Dec. 30, '98	113¼	111¼	569,000
" 2d mortgage gold 5's...1989		14,000,000	F & A	94¼	Dec. 30, '98	95¼	90¼	883,000
" debent. mtg series A...1989		3,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" series B...1989		25,740,000	J & J	84¼	Dec. 30, '98	86	83	1,817,000
" 1st g.5's Det. & Chi. ex.1940		3,500,000	J & J	108¾	Dec 27, '98	108¾	107¾	40,000
" St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.								
" 1st 6's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	110	June 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's...1987		10,000,000	J & J	110¼	Dec. 23, '98	111	110	51,000
" gen g. 2-2-4's...1943		10,000,000	A & O	54	Dec. 23, '98	54¼	53¼	96,000
" inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	14¾	Dec. 30, '98	20¾	14¾	163,000
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's. 1923		3,986,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 40 years con. g. 5's...1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's.1911		3,250,000	J & J	108	Feb. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's.1926		1,018,000	A & O	103	Dec. 12, '98	103	103	12,000
" Trust Co. certificates.....		1,982,000	.....	104¼	Dec. 29, '98	104¼	103	11,000
" Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's.1928		1,500,000	J & J	100	Sept. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
" exten. and imp. g. 5's...1980		1,624,000	F & A	92¼	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
" consol mortgage 4's...1982		1,600,000	J & J	57¼	Dec. 17, '98	57¼	53	3,000
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g.5's.1937		1,987,000	J & J	34	Nov. 16, '97	.....	.....	.....
" eng. Trust Co. certificates.....		10,013,000	.....	62	Dec. 30, '98	64¾	61¾	1,334,000
" income mortgage 5's...1937		7,775,000	A & O	7	Nov. 1, '98	.....	.....	.....

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	YEAR 1898.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered..... Opt'l		25,364,100	Q M	90¼	98	90¼	99¼	20,000
" 3's registered.....1898			Q F	107¼	104¼	107¼	106½	33,500
" 3's coupon.....1898		189,097,480	Q F	107¼	105¾	107¼	105¾	1,546,000
" 3's small bonds reg.....1898			Q F	105¼	104½	.....	.....	.....
" 3's small bonds coupon.....1898			Q F	107¼	104½	.....	.....	.....
" 4's registered.....1907		559,586,900	J A J E O	113¾	106	107¾	105¾	143,200
" 4's coupon.....1907			J A J E O	114¾	107	113¼	112¾	205,400
" 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	129¼	116¾	128¾	127¾	141,000
" 4's coupon.....1925			Q F	129¼	117¾	129¼	127¼	100,000
" 5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	115	103¾	112¾	112¾	50,000
" 5's coupon.....1904			Q F	115	108¾	113	112¾	53,000
" 6's currency.....1899		14,004,560	J & J	104	102¼	.....	.....	.....
" 4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee)1899		1,660,000	M A R	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
District of Columbia 3-6's.....1924			F & A	117	115	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds.....		14,083,600	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" funding 5's.....1899			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small.....		800,400	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	104½	Dec. 29, '98	105	103½	90,000
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		8,088,000	Q F	108	Dec. 30, '98	108	108	19,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S	85	Dec. 30, '98	86	83½	191,000
Barney & Smith Car Co. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		17,500,000	F & A	98	Dec. 30, '98	94½	91½	104,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	109½	Feb. 9, '97			
" non-cum. inc. 5's. 1907		2,575,000	J & J					
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	100½	Nov. 14, '98			
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1908		701,000	J & J	81	Feb. 11, '97			
" Coupon off.								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108	Dec. 1, '98	108	108	5,000
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	87½	Dec. 30, '98	87½	80	195,000
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2397.		18,000,000	Q & J	103½	Nov. 10, '98			
" registered.			Q & J	104	Feb. 16, '98			
Det. Mack. & Mar. ld. gt. 8½ S. A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	223½	Dec. 26, '98	24	18½	605,000
Erie Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. g's fd 5's. 1926		1,980,000	J & J	106½	Dec. 22, '98	106½	106	31,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,090,000	J & J	107½	June 8, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. F'd g. 6's. 1931		1,705,000	M & S	111	Aug. 23, '97			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	100	Dec. 22, '98	100	100	5,000
" non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95			
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g 6's. 1918		8,408,000	F & A					
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
" 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,975,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98			
" 2d g. 5's. 1926		1,100,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97			
Knick'r'ker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g 5's. 1926		2,000,000	A & O					
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97			
Manh. Beh. H. & L. Lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95			
Metrop. Tel. & L. 1st s'k F'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 5, '92			
" registered.								
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S	98	Dec. 2, '98	98	98	2,000
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co. 1st g 6's. 1920		3,887,000	J & J	104½	Dec. 30, '98	104½	102	104,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1990		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g 5's conv. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	92½	May 5, '98			
Peoria Water Co. g 6's. 1889-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g 6's. 1920		590,000	M & N	106½	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g 5's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	113	Apr. 4, '98			
Roch & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946		1,100,000	M & N					
St. Louis Term. Cupples Station. & Property Co. 1st g 4½ s. 5-20. 1917		2,000,000	J & D					
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1908		4,975,000	M & S					
Standard Hope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		2,912,000	F & A	84½	Dec. 30, '98	84½	79½	288,000
" inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000		24½	Dec. 30, '98	26	19½	2,297,000
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 6's. 1917		1,244,000	A & O	103½	Dec. 30, '98	103½	95	179,000
" Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,369,000	J & J	106	Dec. 30, '98	106	98	128,000
{ Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & J	84	May 2, '95			
{ De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 6's. 1910		2,428,000	F & A	98	Dec. 29, '98	97	95	11,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	117	Dec. 27, '98	117	116	49,000
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col tr. bonds.								
Series B 5's. 1899-1914		1,000,000	M & N					
" C 5's. 1900-1915		1,000,000	A & O					
" D 4½'s. 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J					
" E 4's. 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D					
" F 4's. 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S					
" G 4's. 1908-1918		1,000,000						
{ Small bonds.								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Vermont Marble, 1st a. fund 5's..1910		640,000	J & D					
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		3,680,000	M & N	108	Nov. 21, '98			
"    7's, registered.....1900			M & N	105	Mar. 11, '98			
"    debenture, 7's.....1884-1900			M & N	105 1/2	July 7, '97			
"    registered.....1900			M & N	104 1/2	Nov. 12, '97			
"    col. trust cur. 5's.....1888			8,502,000	J & J	115	Dec. 16, '98	115	113 1/2
Mutual Union Tel. a. fd. 6's.....1911		1,967,000	J & J	111	Nov. 17, '98			
Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904		1,260,000	J & J					
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.1919		846,000	J & J	68	Dec. 23, '98			
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.1947		1,150,000	J & D					
Bost. Un. Gas 1st ctfs s'k f'd g. 5's.1889		7,000,000	J & J	91 1/2	Oct. 12, '98			
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.1945		13,230,000	M & N	116 1/2	Dec. 30, '98	117	114 1/2	113,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1922		1,215,000	J & J	104 1/2	Jan. 28, '98			
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,313,000	J & J	98 1/2	Dec. 30, '98	99 1/2	95	888,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918		1,046,000	F & A	94	Aug. 10, '98			
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's.1910		4,212,000	M & S	112	Dec. 30, '98	112	110 1/2	38,000
"    1st con. g. 5's.....1885		2,156,000	J & J	120	Dec. 5, '98	120	120	19,000
"    Brooklyn 1st g. 5's.....1940		1,500,000	A & O	110 1/2	Feb. 4, '97			
"    registered.....			A & O					
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1922		2,500,000	M & S	102	Feb. 14, '98			
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....1922		6,000,000	J & D	108	Dec. 29, '98	108	107	34,000
Grand Rapids Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....1915		1,225,000	F & A	92 1/2	Mar. 11, '95			
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's.1922		3,750,000	A & O					
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.1919		10,000,000	Q F	107	Dec. 30, '98	107	105 1/2	53,000
"    small bonds.....			Q F	97 1/2	Nov. 1, '95			
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 6's.1904		2,100,000	M & N	117 1/2	Nov. 22, '98			
"    2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	105 1/2	Dec. 29, '98	105 1/2	105 1/2	10,000
"    1st con. g. 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	124	Dec. 10, '98	124	118 1/2	6,000
"    refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 16, '98	106	104 1/2	10,000
"    refunding registered.....			M & S					
Chic. Gas Lt. & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's.1987		10,000,000	J & J	111 1/2	Dec. 29, '98	111 1/2	111	2,000
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1936		4,346,000	J & D	106 1/2	Dec. 21, '98	106 1/2	105	29,000
Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1905		2,000,000	J & J	105 1/2	Oct. 21, '98			
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1947		5,000,000	M & N	105	Dec. 20, '98	106	104 1/2	153,000
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....1933		3,806,500	M & N	101	Mar. 16, '98			

BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

Arendes.—Fred. Arendes, President of the Lafayette Bank, St. Louis, Mo., died December 21, in his sixty-fourth year. He worked his way up from humble beginnings to a high position in the financial world.

Bivins.—Joseph E. Bivins, President of the First National Bank, Cordele, Ga., died December 27.

Congdon.—W. M. Congdon, President of the Citizens' Bank, Sedgwick, Kans., died December 17. He was born in Vermont in 1829, and resided in Sedgwick county, Kans., since 1871. He had been a member of both houses of the Kansas Legislature.

Davis.—Capt. Joel S. Davis, Cashier of the Bank of Amityville, N. Y., died December 30, aged sixty-five years. He was formerly master and owner of a vessel trading between New York and ports in the West Indies and South America.

Ferris.—Benson Ferris, President of the Westchester County Savings Bank, Tarrytown, N. Y., died December 7, aged seventy-four years.

Freeman.—Washington Freeman, President of the National Mechanics and Traders' Bank, Portsmouth, N. H., died in New York city December 8. He was sixty-eight years of age.

**Frederich.**—Wm. J. Frederich, Cashier of the Rosenberg Bank, Galveston, Tex., died December 14.

**Gardiner.**—James L. Gardiner, President of the First National Bank, Seymour, Ind., since 1865, died December 13.

**Goodspeed.**—Wm. B. Goodspeed, Cashier of the First National Bank, Hoboken, N. J., died January 3. He was fifty-four years of age, and had been Cashier of the bank for nineteen years.

**Graves.**—J. K. Graves, who was formerly prominently connected with banking at Du-  
buque, Iowa, died December 9.

**Graves.**—James M. Graves, for twenty years Cashier of the Lexington (Ky.) City National Bank, died January 7, aged sixty-three years.

**Greenleaf.**—Albert Greenleaf, Cashier of the Merchants' National Bank, Newburyport, Mass., and former President of the Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank, died January 8, aged sixty-two years.

**Grunfield.**—Charles Grunfield, President of the Norway Plains Savings Bank, Rochester, N. H., died December 19. He was born at Rochester in 1826.

**Hax.**—Louis Hax, President of the Central Savings Bank and director of the First National Bank, Saint Joseph, Mo., died December 25.

**Hovey.**—A. G. Hovey, died at Eugene, Oregon, November 27. He founded the Lane County Bank in 1879, it being the first bank established in the county, and continued one of the proprietors up to the time of his death. Mr. Hovey was born in New Hampshire in 1824, removing to Ohio when quite young, where he remained until 1849, when he went to the Pacific Coast. He had held a number of important political offices.

**Jones.**—O. Perry Jones, Cashier of the First National Bank, Phillipsburg, Pa., died by his own hand December 30. His accounts at the bank are reported correct.

**Lamb.**—James A. Lamb, President of the Citizens' Bank, Sidney, Ohio, died December 9, aged about eighty-three years. He was for many years engaged in mercantile business, and had been President of the bank since its organization in 1870.

**Layton.**—Peter M. Layton, President of the Covington (Ind.) Banking Co. died December 7.

**Payson.**—Henry M. Payson, who in 1854 established the banking firm of H. M. Payson & Co., Portland, Me., died December 21.

**Perry.**—Thomas Perry, until recently prominently connected with banking at Westerly, R. I., died December 23. He became President of the Westerly Savings Bank in 1856 and held the position until about a year ago. He was also formerly President of the Washington National Bank, holding the position for many years, and was a director at the time of his death. Mr. Perry was born at Westerly in 1814.

**Ramsdell.**—Thomas Ramsdell, formerly President of the Windham (Ct.) Bank, died December 2.

**Rice.**—Henry A. Rice, formerly President of the Massachusetts National Bank, and a director of the Massachusetts Loan and Trust Co., Boston, died December 15, aged eighty-two years.

**Statesir.**—Wm. Statesir, the oldest and one of the most prominent citizens of Freehold, N. J., died January 2, aged almost ninety-four years. At the time of his death he was President of the Freehold Banking Company—a position he had held since 1864.

**Swasey.**—R. D. Swasey, of the banking firm of Swasey & Martin, Provo City, Utah, died December 20.

**Tompkins.**—Stephen Tompkins, of the banking firm of S. Tompkins & Son, Avon, Ill., died December 26. He was born near Hamilton, N. Y., in 1815, but had resided in Illinois since 1837. For over sixty years he had been in the mercantile business at Avon, and had been a banker since 1854.

**Webb.**—Hon. E. F. Webb, for many years Vice-President of the Merchants' National Bank, Waterville, Me., and who had been Speaker of the House and President of the Senate in the Maine Legislature, died December 7.

**White.**—Daniel M. White, President of the Lewiston (Idaho) National Bank, died December 11. He was born in Indiana in 1843, and had resided in the Far West since 1858. Mr. White was connected with many business enterprises, and was one of the pioneers of Idaho.

**Wlster.**—William Wynne Wlster, ex-President of the National Bank of Germantown, Philadelphia, died December 16. He had long been a director and Vice-President of the bank, and in 1866 was elected President, holding the position until within a few weeks of his death. He was born in Philadelphia in 1807, and belonged to an old and well-known family.

**WANTED**—Situation as Bookkeeper in Bank in Kansas by young man of valuable experience. Credentials given upon reply to this notice.

J. I. CROMWELL, Coffeyville, Kans.

THE

# BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTY-THIRD YEAR.

FEBRUARY, 1899.

VOLUME LVIII, No. 2.

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THE BILL INTRODUCED BY MR. HILL, and favorably reported by the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures, is intended as a substitute for the various measures of currency reform. It declares gold to be the standard, provides for the gradual retirement of the legal-tender notes and the substitution of National bank currency.

The chief advantage of the measure is that it effects these various objects with the least possible change of existing conditions. The declaration as to the standard of value is the mere recognition of present conditions. The greenbacks are retired very gradually as the National bank notes increase in volume, and the increase of National bank notes is rendered feasible by permitting issues to the par of the bonds deposited, and by the repeal of the tax of one per cent. per annum on circulation and the substitution therefor of a tax of one-fifth of one per cent. per annum on capital, surplus and undivided profits.

After making the gold dollar the standard of value and leaving the silver coinage as it now is, the bill provides for a division of issue and redemption in the Treasury Department which shall have charge of the issue, redemption and exchange of all kinds of United States money. The gold coin and bullion held against outstanding gold certificates, the United States notes held against outstanding currency certificates, the silver dollars and bullion held against outstanding silver certificates and Treasury notes, are all to be transferred to the accounts of this division. There is to be similarly transferred gold coin and bullion equal to twenty-five per cent. of the United States notes and Treasury notes and a further amount equal to five per cent. of the aggregate coinage of silver dollars. This fund is to be used solely for the redemption of the notes and certificates and in exchange for notes and silver dollars. These funds are to be kept intact at the

percentage named, the Secretary being given authority to sell three per cent. gold bonds payable in twenty years, but redeemable at the option of the United States in one year. The gold certificates and currency certificates when redeemed are to be cancelled, and all provisions of law for the issue of such certificates are repealed. The Treasurer of the United States and such assistant Treasurers as are designated by the Secretary are to pay out gold for gold certificates, currency for currency certificates, gold coin for legal-tender notes and Treasury notes, silver dollars for silver certificates, and issue silver certificates for dollars in denominations of five dollars and less, such small certificates in exchange for certificates of larger denominations. They are also to pay out gold for silver dollars, and silver dollars for gold coin, United States or Treasury notes, and United States notes and Treasury notes in exchange for gold coin. As the United States and Treasury notes are paid in gold they shall be cancelled to an amount equal to the increase of National bank notes issued after the passage of the Act. If at the end of five years from the date the Act takes effect any legal-tender and Treasury notes shall remain outstanding, one-fifth of such amount shall be cancelled each year thereafter, and at the end of ten years these notes shall cease to be a legal tender except for dues to the United States. United States notes or Treasury notes once redeemed in gold shall not be again paid out except for gold. No United States notes or Treasury notes of a less denomination than ten dollars are to be issued after the Act takes effect. The effect of this will be that denominations of United States money of five dollars and less will be confined to silver certificates and the legal-tender and Treasury notes will all be of ten dollars and over. The National banks will be permitted to receive circulation for issue equal to the par value of their bonds instead of ninety per cent. as is now the case. Their notes are to be all of denominations of ten dollars and more. The tax on circulation is repealed and a tax of one-fifth of one per cent. on capital, surplus and undivided profits substituted. The provision of law limiting the retirement and increase of circulation of National banks is repealed. The bill also provides for National banks with a capital of \$25,000 in places of not more than three thousand inhabitants. It also permits the establishment of branches by the National banks under suitable regulations by the Comptroller of the Currency.

If this bill shall become a law, the National banks could immediately issue, upon the bonds now deposited to secure circulation as shown by their report of September, 1898, \$30,145,075 additional circulation. Without reference to new banks which may be organized the existing banks, if they chose to purchase the full amount of bonds to which their capital entitles them, could hold \$396,889,055 additional

bonds and could issue on such bonds \$376,889,055 additional circulation. In other words, if there were a public demand for additional circulation so as to make it an inducement to the banks to issue it, the present National banks could increase their notes by the sum of \$427,034,130. The total amount of legal-tender and Treasury notes to be retired is \$441,623,757.

If, therefore, the existing National banks shall, as soon as this Act becomes a law, purchase \$396,889,055 additional bonds and issue circulation upon them, the retirement of the legal tenders will be effected at once.

But it is difficult to see where so large an amount of bonds could be procured. The whole interest-bearing debt of the United States on January 1, 1899, was \$1,040,215,980, and of this the banks already held about 224 millions to secure circulation and 115 millions for other purposes—339 millions in all; an additional 396 millions would make their total holdings of United States bonds about 735 millions, or more than two-thirds of the whole debt. The sudden demand for bonds by the banks would cause a great rise in premiums, perhaps to such an extent as to stop purchases. Many of the banks now holding bonds would be tempted to await this rise of premiums and would retire their circulation rather than take out new notes. In fact the bill will open the way for a very considerable speculation in United States bonds if an attempt be made by the banks to increase their circulation to anything like the extreme limit. In fact the probability is that the retirement of legal-tender notes and the issue of bank circulation will be a rather slow process unless the United States shall be obliged to resort to new issues of bonds, which as things now appear is very unlikely.

The bill, however, apart from this feature places the monetary system of the country on a much firmer basis than ever before. Even if the legal-tender notes are not retired they will be placed by this measure in such a position of security that they will not be used to deplete the Treasury reserves. The public knowing that the notes will always be backed up by an adequate reserve and that the Treasury has power to maintain this reserve by the issue of bonds, will never be inclined to repeat the operations of 1893. The redemption of the notes once made they will thereafter even if not cancelled be issued only in exchange for gold, and they will in the end become virtually gold certificates. A certain amount, too, will be retired, with the gradual increase of National bank circulation.

The bill would not accomplish all the reforms of the currency that are desirable, but its effects as a whole would be beneficial. In the present temper of Congress, however, even so moderate a measure as this will hardly stand any chance of favorable action.

THE SECURITY OF DEPOSITORS is believed by the Comptroller of the Currency to be put in jeopardy by allowing banks to issue circulation based upon their general assets. Some figures given in the last report of the Comptroller derived from the record of the complete liquidation of 195 insolvent National banks during a period from 1865 to May, 1898, seem to require examination. They appear to be regarded by the Comptroller as proving that it would be detrimental to the interests of depositors in National banks to change the present law as to the issue of circulation so as to permit the issue of notes on the security of general assets, instead of on bonds deposited with the Treasurer, if such circulation be made a first lien on all assets.

The average dividend paid to depositors who proved their claims, against the 195 banks, was 74.16 per cent. The 195 banks were located in all sections of the country and were of capitals varying from \$50,000 to over \$500,000. The total assets of the banks taken possession of by the Receivers at time of failure are listed at \$102,744,162. These assets appear to be exclusive of the bonds deposited with the Treasurer to secure the circulation and of the stockholders' liability, although the tables are not definite on these points. From these assets \$51,694,475 was collected, of which \$15,929,019 was used for offsets and other expenses, leaving \$35,765,456 actually available for dividends. The total collections from assets are 50.31 per cent. of the listed assets. Of these 34.8 per cent. was available for dividends, and 15.5 per cent. was exhausted in offsets and expenses. The entire dividends paid, however, amounted to \$42,543,265. The difference, \$6,777,809, appears to have been obtained from the excess of the proceeds of bonds to secure circulation, after the redemption of the circulation was provided for, and perhaps from the stockholders' liability.

Although the Comptroller's table gives the percentage of good assets as 50.31 per cent. of the nominal assets listed by the Receivers, yet this includes expenses, and it would seem fairer for purposes of comparison of the sums which would be actually received by depositors to deduct the expenses, and take the percentage 34.8 actually available for dividends.

The object of the tables is to give a basis for estimating what would have been the result had these 195 banks been operating under a law permitting them to issue circulation equal to certain percentages of their capital (100, 80, and 60 per cent.) based entirely on the security of their general assets without the deposit of bonds. In this supposed case all the resources of the banks would have been in the control of those who by their mistakes or frauds caused the failures. As it actually was these managing officers had placed a certain portion of their resources out of their own hands in the shape of United States bonds lodged with the Treasurer. In every case, on the failure of the



bank, these bonds not only provided for the outstanding circulation, but also something more for the benefit of depositors. In the assumed case the resources represented by these bonds would have been in the hands of the management of the bank, and it is fair to presume that they would have suffered the same deterioration and been subject to the same charges for collection as the other resources under the same management. The tables, however, do not give the amount of these bonds, nor is it very important that they should, because in the assumed case the comparison may be made on the basis of capital. The capital of the 195 banks was \$30,730,000. If they had issued circulation equal to 100 per cent. of capital, the management would have had \$30,730,000 additional nominal assets and \$30,730,000 additional liability. Supposing that 34.8 per cent. of these additional resources were collected exclusive of charges of collection, there would have been an additional sum of \$10,694,040, to be added to the \$35,765,456, making in all \$46,459,496, available to meet claims for circulation and deposits. In addition there would be the stockholders' liability, which if an equal percentage were collected free of charges, would increase the \$46,459,496 by \$10,694,040 more, making a total of \$57,153,536. If the circulation (\$30,730,000 less the five per cent. redemption fund) were a first lien on the assets, there would remain \$27,960,036 for the payment of depositors, about forty-eight per cent. of the claims instead of the seventy-four per cent. which was actually paid. If the circulation issued in the assumed case had been eighty per cent. instead of 100 per cent., the amount remaining to pay depositors would be \$31,609,888, or about fifty-four per cent. If sixty per cent. the amount remaining for depositors would be about \$35,958,820, or about sixty-two per cent.

The probability is that no law would ever be enacted permitting banks to issue more than sixty per cent. of circulation secured by general assets, and at this percentage of circulation the difference would not be very great between the dividends paid to depositors under the one system and the other. Continuing the same method and it will be found that with circulation based on general assets restricted to twenty-five per cent. of the capital, the amount remaining for depositors would be \$41,835,506, or about the same as that actually paid to the depositors of the 195 banks the records of which are given in the Comptroller's tables. In other words, with circulation based on assets restricted to twenty-five per cent. of capital, the new system would be just as safe for both note holders and depositors as the old one.

It is possible, moreover, that the statistics of the 195 banks taken by the Comptroller are not a strictly fair representative of the results of liquidations with the degree of experience now obtained in such matters. These 195 banks seem to include all the very early failures of the system when the legal and other processes involved in the

liquidations were not so well understood and were much more expensive than they generally are at the present time. But taking the basis of computation given in the Comptroller's tables and the same processes of reasoning as far as they can be gathered from the text and tables, it can be proved that banks could issue free circulation to the amount of twenty-five per cent. of their capital and the results to note holders and depositors remain as they are under the present system. If circulation had been issued as assumed, to the extent of sixty per cent. of capital of the 195 banks selected, the loss to depositors if the circulation were first redeemed would have been \$6,584,445. If instead of making the circulation a first lien on assets note holders had received *pro rata* dividends with depositors, both would have received about seventy per cent. of their claims. This would leave about \$5,374,830 of the notes unredeemed, during a period of thirty-three years, or an annual loss of about \$162,900, which could easily be provided for by a safety fund.

The Secretary of the Treasury in his report seems to agree with the Comptroller of the Currency that the figures given in the tables relative to the 195 banks show that at the percentages of free circulation assumed, depositors of failed banks will not be as well protected as they now are. He does not, however, seem to have investigated the matter in the manner indicated above, nor does he seem to agree with the position taken by the Comptroller that depositors should have equal protection with the note holders. In fact, he relies on a safety fund to protect such notes as could not be redeemed without impairing the present position of depositors. He estimates that the "total circulation of failed banks outstanding at time of failure on October 31, 1897, was \$20,893,827. The loss on these notes, if the security had been impaired in the same degree as the security for other liabilities, would have been \$5,379,165, or an annual average of about \$163,000; the loss would have been made good by a tax of about one-twelfth of one per cent. per year upon the circulation of the solvent banks."

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THE CURRENCY REFORM BILL which was reported to the House from the Banking and Currency Committee has been withdrawn from the calendar and recommitted. On January 17 Mr. McCLEARY, on behalf of the committee, made a statement that the vote on the bill reported at the last session had been irregularly taken in the committee. When asked whether the bill would again be reported, he was unable to give any definite answer. While it is not beyond the range of possibility that the measure may be again taken up by the present Congress, there is reason to believe, owing to the short time yet remaining, and the uncertainty that seems to prevail in Administra-

tion circles as to the advisability of resolutely taking up the reform of the bank and Government currency, that no further action will be taken by the Banking and Currency Committee.

In the meantime the House Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures is considering the HILL bill to define and fix the standard of value and regulate the coinage. This bill also contains provisions relative to increasing the taxation of National banks by assessing one-quarter of one per cent. annually upon capital, surplus and undivided profits. This taxation feature was opposed by the Secretary of the Treasury when called upon to express his views on the measure. He contrasted the burdens of local taxation borne by the National banks as compared with trust companies.

If National banks were relieved from State and municipal taxation, they could easily bear some increase of Federal taxation, but discriminated against as they are in comparison with financial institutions under State laws, any increase in burdens imposed by congressional legislation would be crushing.

The work of currency reform in the House of Representatives seems to be much retarded by the division it is subjected to among the three committees which have to deal with various phases of the subject—the Committee of Ways and Means, the Banking and Currency, and the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures.

The subject of monetary reform includes the national obligations, interest-bearing and non interest-bearing, the banking laws, and the laws relating to coinage and the standard of value.

The Ways and Means Committee is really the most important of the three, and makes the largest claims, but the other two committees have each their peculiar province, of which they are each extremely tenacious. As there seems to be no concert of action between the three, every comprehensive proposition of currency reform has to be split up into the parts which are referred to the different committees. The results of the labors of these committees then come before the House by pieces, which are very apt to be incongruous and even contradictory, affording the best grounds for opponents to defeat the entire project.

It would be a great help to the cause of financial reform if these three committees were combined under the Committee of Ways and Means, the present Banking and Currency and Coinage Committee becoming sub-committees of the first named. The whole committee would then occupy the position of the Finance Committee of the Senate. The entire scheme of financial reform could be referred to the Committee of Ways and Means, which could refer the appropriate parts to the proper sub-committees. The whole measure could thus be perfected and assimilated, and reported to the House in its en-

tirety including all the germane propositions, and could thus be made congruous and intelligible in the dependence of its various sections. But as things now appear, it seems improbable that anything more will be done at this session than to attempt to pass a resolution making the gold dollar the sole standard of value. This would, of course, greatly strengthen the financial position of the country, and add to the credit of national obligations and commercial securities.

If, however, the reason for the apparent dread of financial legislation shown by the Administration is the possibility of arousing rancorous and protracted debate, it seems probable that the attempt to pass a gold standard declaration will cause as bitter a contest as if the whole subject of retirement of Government notes and enlargement of bank-note circulation were precipitated at the same time.

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THE COLLECTION OF THE WAR TAX of one-fifth of one per cent. on the capital and surplus of banks raised a question between the banks and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as to the status of that portion of a bank's savings technically known as undivided profits. The Commissioner ruled some time ago that undivided profits are a part of the surplus, and demanded payment of the tax upon them. The Attorney-General has over-ruled this decision.

In one sense undivided profits are a part of the surplus above and beyond the capital stock, but the National banking laws certainly make a distinction between surplus and undivided profits, whatever may be the case with the laws of the States in reference to the banks organized under those laws. It would seem to be fair, however, that if in the case of National banks it be decided that undivided profits are not taxable as surplus, the same rule should be applied to banks other than National.

The surplus fund as known to the National banking law is accumulated under Section 5199 of the Revised Statutes. This section grants permission to the directors of National banks to declare dividends semi-annually from the net profits of the association, with the proviso, that "each association shall, before the declaration of a dividend, carry one-tenth part of its net profits of the preceding half-year to its surplus fund until the same shall amount to twenty per cent. of its capital stock." A clear distinction is here made between net profits and surplus.

Section 5151 of the Revised Statutes also provides, in regard to the double liability of shareholders, limiting this liability in cases of converted State banks, with a capital of not less than five millions of dollars, and a surplus of twenty per cent. on hand, which is to be in addition to the surplus required in the case of other National banks.

The surplus here last referred to is the surplus mentioned and described in Section 5199.

There is no provision preventing banks from accumulating surplus faster than mentioned in the Act or in refraining from paying dividends. A bank need not carry any sum whatever to surplus until it declares a dividend, but the Comptroller's office appears to have held that where, for instance, a bank declares no dividend for a longer period than six months, when it does declare a dividend, ten per cent. of the net profits, not for the preceding six months but for the whole time since the payment of the last dividend, must be carried to surplus. The surplus accumulated by the method described, at least until it exceeds twenty per cent. of the capital stock, cannot be taken to meet dividends. The twenty per cent. surplus can only be used to meet actual losses of the bank, after all net profits are exhausted. It becomes almost a part of the capital of the bank, with the exception that its impairment by losses is not required to be made good, as would be the case with an impairment of capital.

The undivided profits of a bank distinct from capital and surplus are the fund from which a bank usually meets its expenses and losses and pays its dividends. The account is usually stated at the end of each semi-annual dividend period. On one side of the balance sheet are the undivided profits, and on the other are the expenses, losses, etc. The two latter are deducted from the undivided profits and this leaves the net profits mentioned in Section 5199. One-tenth of these net profits must then be carried to surplus, that is if the surplus has not already reached twenty per cent. of the capital, and from the remainder a dividend may be declared.

It would be very unjust to tax undivided profits before deducting expenses and losses, and to tax the net profits would be the same thing as taxing the dividends of the bank. Even if the management of a bank, with the consent of stockholders, has seen fit to accumulate its net profits, foregoing dividends for this purpose to strengthen the bank, that is no reason why the dividend should be taxed unless the law has imposed a tax on dividends.

The law imposing a war tax on capital and surplus can only be construed to mean a tax on what is usually understood as surplus. In the case of National banking associations, not only is the meaning of surplus well understood by banking custom, but it is clearly defined in a Federal law. In the case of banks other than National, although they do not come under the Federal statute, yet surplus should be understood to mean the account separate from undivided profits as defined by banking custom. Moreover, the tax on capital and surplus is invariably a part of the expense account of a bank. It is paid out of the undivided profits and goes to reduce the sum that a bank has to

meet losses and to pay dividends. To collect another tax upon undivided profits as such makes virtually a double tax on the same item.

It is not surprising that the ruling of the Commissioner including undivided profits as taxable surplus has been reversed, and this decision of the Attorney-General may be the means of correcting abuses in bank taxation by State authority where it is the rule to count undivided profits as a part of the surplus in assessing the accumulated earnings of banks.

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THE SPECULATIVE EXCITEMENT which has been so marked at all the money centres during the past month is the natural concomitant of the advancing prosperity of the country and the operation of the existing monetary laws.

It is difficult to draw the line between the manifestations of legitimate enterprise and speculation which is injurious to the interests of the public. In its widest sense speculation is the outgrowth of the intelligence which seeks to provide for its future welfare and to discount future difficulties ; but pushed to an extreme it becomes mere gambling, which produces nothing and causes the unjust transfer and needless change of values.

In its legitimate phase speculation bases itself on the widest possible knowledge in regard to economic and commercial facts. It studies, with an intelligent selfishness no doubt, the public needs and the resources from which these needs may be supplied. In the machinery by which the operations of the produce exchanges are conducted the greatest attention is paid to the procurement of information in regard to the crops and products of this and all other countries, so that the supply may be always ample and the prices within ordinary limits. In former times, before this machinery was invented, one-half of the world might be enjoying a plenty accompanied by waste and loss, while another part was suffering from the pangs of famine.

All the efforts of human wisdom in the line of invention of devices for manufactures, for agriculture and for transportation, have been directed toward acquiring the present use of resources which otherwise might have lain idle through long future periods. The future is a fund which experience has shown may be drawn upon without suffering perceptible diminishment. The history of national debts is an illustration of how this fact has gradually dawned upon the minds of men. MACAULAY, in some of the most brilliant passages of his History of England, shows with what apprehension the growth of the debt was regarded by some of her philosophers and statesmen, points out the fallacies which lay under these apprehen-

sions, and adds: "If it be true that whatever gives to intelligence an advantage over brute force and to honesty an advantage over dishonesty, has a tendency to promote the happiness and virtue of our race, it can scarcely be denied that in the largest view, the effect of this system (funding) has been salutary. For it is manifest that all credit depends on two things, on the power of the debtor to pay debts and on his inclination to pay them. The power of a society to pay debts is proportioned to the progress which that society has made in industry, in commerce and in all the arts and sciences which flourish under the benignant influence of freedom and of equal law."

All modern speculation depends on credit and commercial honesty, and the words of MACAULAY in regard to the beneficent effects of funding may well be applied to the effects of legitimate speculative enterprise. The apprehensions which are entertained by many as to the operations of our exchanges may be well classed with the apprehensions which were formerly entertained in regard to national debts. While, however, the foresight which wisely and systematically looks to realizing on the resources which as yet are undeveloped, founding itself on a credit based on commercial and business honesty, can only work good both in a physical and a moral sense to the public, there is always a development of this spirit which tends to the disadvantage of the country and its people. It is of course impossible to repress entirely the gambling spirit which takes advantage of and perverts legitimate methods. But much can be done to confine and circumscribe this tendency, and certainly every feature of the laws of the country should frown severely upon it. But above all things the laws of the country should not be such in any particular as to give encouragement and temptation to those who otherwise would be prone enough to engage in forms of speculation which are but little better than gambling.

In every exchange and business mart, in addition to the sound and authentic information sought to be gathered from all quarters in regard to the products and manufactures either in existence or prospective, there fly about constantly rumors of various kinds, more or less unfounded, simulating genuine information, which tend to cause a rise or fall of prices in accordance with the wishes of those who start these rumors. They are started with great ingenuity and seem to fit in with the greatest exactness and accuracy to existing conditions. They are the loaded dice with which speculative gamblers seek to deceive the unwary. With a condition of the money market favorable to speculation these inventions increase and fly about with unusual activity. There is no way of suppressing them, they are the shadows of legitimate enterprise.

It is not to be doubted that much of the speculative dealing in products and securities which prevails in all our business centres is due

to the ebb and flow of a currency fixed and rigid in volume which never contracts when legitimate enterprise has ceased, and rushes its whole unemployed volume into the hands of the speculator pure and simple. Then when again needed for the transaction of productive business, it is loth to flow back into more useful channels, and there occur those periodical stringencies of the money markets verging on and frequently developing into panics which rend the whole business fabric. These stringencies are the symptoms of the struggle occurring in recovering the currency from speculative into ordinary business channels. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report to Congress, has vividly depicted this effect of our present currency. When the demand for money in the interior for the movement of the crops and to meet the yearly settlements due to the effect of the seasons on agricultural industry has ceased, then the currency flows to the great money centres and tempts the banks there to extend their loans. The speculative buyer becomes the bank's customer. The bank can extend its loans and thereby enlarge its deposit line to four times the amount of its increased cash. "With the volume of money fixed—with no natural movement towards its retirement when not needed in legitimate trade"—says the Secretary, "the tendency to build up a four-story structure, on the cash sent from the interior, is irresistible."

This encouragement of speculation in all forms of produce and securities at the money centers is not the worst of it. The demoralization spreads all over the country, the whole outside public desires to become speculators and partake in the supposed opportunities to make fortunes easily and quickly. Some perhaps find their expectations realized, but the great majority of speculators at a distance only manage to partake of the disasters which follow the reactions sure to occur, and thus the greater extent of the country is drained to contribute to the already swollen wealth of the centers.

The present system, if there be any benefit in it all, tends to augment and foster the financial growth of the existing money centers. This is contrary to the usual arguments advanced by the opponents of currency reform. It is true they bewail the abnormal growth of Wall Street and accuse it of plotting to absorb the wealth of all sections, but with great inconsistency they also accuse Wall Street and the money power represented thereby of plotting for the reform of the currency laws. As a matter of fact, it is easy to see that the worst opponents of this reform are the speculators of Wall Street. The present currency is their best weapon in carrying on their business of transferring to their own pockets the resources of the whole country.

The present currency has caused business to crystallize into a fixed routine, and however obvious a better method is, it will be opposed chiefly by those who have learned to make the old way profitable to



themselves however disastrous it may prove to the great majority. The growth of the gambling instinct, spreading throughout the country and so much to be deplored, is no doubt very largely due to the encouragement given to speculative business by the present currency system.

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THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY is a lucid and interesting document. The state of the revenues and expenditures, the history of the recent loan, the discussion of the necessity of currency legislation, and the suggestions for the improvement of the money conditions in Porto Rico, are sure to attract great attention. The growth of the foreign trade and its effect upon importations are set forth in an impressive and terse style.

The revenues from all sources for the last fiscal year were over \$494,000,000, and the total expenditures \$532,381,201. There was thus a deficit of about \$38,000,000. In the expenditures are included the cost of the Spanish war up to the close of the fiscal year, and in the revenues the sums received from the sale of the Pacific Railroads. These sums amounted to about \$65,000,000, and without them the deficiency would have been about \$103,000,000. For the next fiscal year the Secretary estimates revenues amounting to \$577,000,000, and expenses to \$689,000,000, leaving an estimated deficit of about \$112,000,000. The total deficit for the two years will aggregate about \$150,000,000. The loan of \$200,000,000 is not included in any of these figures, and therefore without any further loan, the Treasury can meet the deficit of the fiscal year 1898 and the expenditures of the fiscal year 1899 and still have a surplus of \$50,000,000. The proceeds of the loan did not begin to come into the Treasury until after June 18, but after this the Treasury reserve grew rapidly and reached its highest point on October 7, 1898, when it stood at \$245,063,795. The danger of stringency in the money market, from the large payments on account of the loan, was averted by the anticipation of the payment of interest, and the use of the National banks as depositories to a greater extent than ever before. Perhaps a critical period of this kind was never passed through with less friction. An unwise policy during the summer and fall might easily have disarranged the commercial rates for money and caused serious inconvenience to business. The country was, however, fortunate in having as Secretary of the Treasury a man who is thoroughly grounded, both theoretically and by practical experience, in all the peculiarities of currency circulation in all parts of the country at the different seasons of the year. The danger of the undue accumulation of money in the independent Treasury was averted by the deposits left with the

designated depositories, and the anticipation of interest payments, while the annual movement of crops was supplied with the currency required, by the previous accumulation of notes of suitable denominations.

The Secretary gives a complete history of the loan authorized by the Act of June 13, 1898. The circular inviting popular subscriptions was issued immediately on the approval of the loan bill, and the bonds for the new loan were dated August 1, 1898. In commenting on the success and policy of the popular feature of this loan, the Secretary balances the advantage derived from quieting the popular suspicions aroused by former methods of loan negotiation, against the loss of such bonus as might have been obtained had the loan, instead of being sold at par to subscribers, been sold to the highest competent bidder. This bonus the Secretary estimates at perhaps five millions. He also states that the supposed popular distribution of the loan was more in appearance than reality, as the holdings of about 116,000 subscribers were at the date of the report concentrated in the ownership of 1,001 persons, firms and corporations. The success of the loan is ascribed primarily to the demand for the bonds as a basis for National bank circulation.

These facts are the fulfillment and endorsement of inferences made at the time the loan was offered, which appeared in the *MAGAZINE* in the editorial comment. It was also suggested there that the popular feature of the loan could be maintained, and the Government still retain the advantage to be derived from competitive bids. The Secretary makes a similar suggestion. As a matter of fact Congress has given the \$5,000,000 bonus to the subscribers to the loan, which to that extent might have lightened the burden of taxation for the whole people. If this bonus could have been distributed among the whole population, its distribution would have been fair enough. But less than half a million people got the whole benefit, the total number of subscribers being 320,226. By restricting the acceptance of bids to those of the smaller denominations the competitive feature could be secured, and the popular feature of a loan would not be very much diminished. The advantage of the going market price could be obtained by the Government as the Secretary suggests, by taking out of the Act the provision requiring the bonds to be sold at par, and giving a greater discretion to the department. The eagerness to obtain the bonds was indicated by the fact that the subscriptions and guarantees together received by the Treasury amounted to \$1,400,000,000.

The foreign commerce of the year 1898 the Secretary characterizes as phenomenal, the total being \$1,231,482,330, averaging more than one hundred millions per month. Of the total \$853,683,570 were agricultural products and the remainder domestic manufactures.

The total importations fell off more than one hundred millions. The importations of gold were greater than ever before. The Secretary thinks that the present tariff will eventually meet expectations, both as an encouragement to home industry and as a source of revenue.

The Secretary's recommendations in regard to Porto Rico are timely and necessary and they cover every point that with his present information can well be provided for. The gradual approximation of the present silver currency of the island to the standard of the United States will cost the Treasury about \$1,000,000—a very light expense considering the betterment of commercial and business conditions sure to follow. If Congress was willing to give a bonus of \$5,000,000 to secure the moral effect of a popular loan at home, it truly should be willing to pay \$1,000,000 to place the inhabitants of Porto Rico on an equal business footing with other American citizens. He also suggests the establishment of a bank to take the place of the Spanish Bank of Porto Rico, either a special bank with branches, or National banks under the National Banking Law. It would seem a good opportunity to try the experiment of a bank with branches.

In regard to the reform of the banking currency and the retirement of Government notes, the Secretary is almost as explicit as ever. He distinctly shows the relations between the use of a non-redeemable system of currency such as the present legal-tender notes and the temptation to undue speculation which renders pressure in the money markets possible at such frequent intervals, and shows how this state of things might be obviated by a suitable bank currency. He seems, however, to coincide with the views of the Comptroller of the Currency that making bank notes a first lien on the general assets of the banks would jeopardize the security of depositors. He yields the point as to making the notes a first lien and relies for their security upon a safety fund to be contributed by all the banks. He recommends House bills 10,289 and 10,333 to the attention of Congress, waiving his own recommendations on the same subject in previous reports. He also recommends some changes in the internal revenue laws, to make them more clear and easy of administration.

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THE VALUE OF ADVERTISING as a means of increasing banking profits is becoming more generally recognized by progressive bank managers. It is not very many years since a bank that advertised more than its dividend notices and statements was looked upon as breaking the time-honored traditions of the business, and was made the subject of criticism for its temerity, even if it was not regarded with more or less suspicion. But this antiquated notion has disappeared before modern ideas, and to-day it is the custom of the largest

and best-managed banks to advertise continuously. That they do so is of itself a proof of the value of bank advertising. They do not find it possible, even with their prestige and the magnitude of their transactions, to dispense with publicity. Likewise the smaller country banks find it an advantage to have their merits spread abroad, for in these days of rapid communication the inter-relations of trade are such that no commercial bank can be regarded as strictly local in its character.

Good management is, of course, the first essential of profitable banking, but the earning power of a bank will not be what it should unless the results of its good management are made known by advertising.

Conservatism in banking no longer implies that such institutions shall refuse to avail themselves of legitimate means for increasing their patronage; on the contrary, a bank that does not judiciously proclaim its facilities and advantages for doing business, even though it may have acquired a high reputation for careful management, is apt to find itself superseded in public esteem by a more progressive rival.

As to what is the best way in which to make known the advantages of a bank, the very nature of the business imposes limitations that will at once suggest themselves. Anything of a sensational nature is to be avoided as a matter of course; yet this does not imply that only a stereotyped form of announcement should be used. Bank advertisements may keep quite within the range of propriety and still be so varied as to attract attention and increase business. As a rule the announcements should be so worded as to convey the impression that the bank is properly equipped for transacting all legitimate banking operations, and that while it desires as much of this kind of business as possible, it is not making a bid for any other kind. This idea is tersely and fitly expressed in the advertisement of a prominent New York city bank, familiar to the readers of the *MAGAZINE's* advertising pages. It is so well put, in fact, as to be recognized by every banker as an epitome of the principles upon which banking should be conducted. Such an advertisement suggests stability combined with a determination not to miss any legitimate opportunity for profit.

Where a bank is comparatively new, but with a growing business, it will doubtless be found advantageous to make this latter fact apparent, and this may be done very easily by publishing its statements in comparative form. The exhibit made by such an advertisement will often be a gratifying surprise to the bank itself, and will prove a sure means of establishing the institution in the confidence of the public and the other banks with which it may wish to do business.

Good wine may need no bush hung out to proclaim its virtues, but a bank run on this theory is not likely to be in a condition to cause much rejoicing among its shareholders when the annual dividend period rolls around.

## COMPARATIVE LOSSES OF NATIONAL AND OTHER BANKING SYSTEMS.

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The safety of a banking system is the feature by which it can be most easily recommended to the public, and in the comparison of different systems one of the strongest arguments in favor of one over the others is that the losses through failures have been the least in that one.

It may be safely predicted that there never was a system of banking as a practical business invented from which all danger of loss was eliminated. The operations of receiving deposits, of making loans, of basing notes on credit of various kinds, to circulate instead of coined money, depend for their safety on a nice balance and adjustment, which under usual conditions is automatic, but which is liable to unforeseen disturbances. Some of the solidest bank-institutions known in history have succumbed to disaster.

During the discussion of banking systems which has been going on as part of the great question of monetary reform, every well-known method of banking has had its advocates. Some praise great State banks like those of England, France, and Germany, others systems of chartered banks with branches like those of Canada, Scotland, England, and its colonies; others again praise the National banking associations of the United States, and still others the banks which conduct their business under State laws.

In respect to the losses which have been suffered by depositors and stockholders under these various systems, there is no means of accurate and exact comparison. The National banking system is the only one in which anything like an exact record of losses to the general public has been kept. From the very commencement the Comptroller of the Currency has preserved in his office and published annually the precise figures showing what has been lost by the depositors of National banks which have failed and been placed in the hands of Receivers. But similar records of other systems are either entirely lacking or they are so imperfect as to be almost useless for purposes of comparison. Without dwelling on the failures of such institutions as the Bank of Venice or Amsterdam, or of the organizations instituted by John Law or of private banks in England or any of the earlier financial corporations, where is there any tabulated statement such as is furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency in regard to National banks, of the losses incurred by the failure of the joint-stock banks of the United Kingdom, of Canada, of other British Colonies, or of banks of other foreign countries. Even when an attempt is made here at home to arrive at the losses of the public by banks in the United States other than National, it must necessarily come to a very unsatisfactory conclusion. All is vague and uncertain. History assures us that the failures of the State banks at various periods resulted in enormous losses to depositors and note holders, but how much these losses actually were is a matter of mere estimate. The reports of the Comptroller of the Currency covering a period of twenty-four years show just how many National banks were organized and how many failed. They show just what the debts of

these failed banks were, and what assets they had to meet these debts, the sums collected from the assets, the amount of debts paid, the cost of collection, and finally just what debts remained unpaid and were a loss to the creditors.

In regard to any other class of financial institutions no such definite knowledge can be obtained, and it is highly probable that the historical tradition of enormous losses by the State banks in former times and at present gives a very exaggerated idea of the real truth.

When bank failures of any magnitude occur, as they did in the panics of 1812, 1817, 1837, 1857, 1873 and 1893, all is excitement and confusion ; the actual statistics of the assets and liabilities cannot be immediately known. The failed institutions go into the hands of Receivers or liquidators, who for a short time are beset and overrun by anxious creditors. After a time the excitement cools down, the liquidators begin to proceed in an orderly manner to collect the assets and pay the creditors as far as possible. These settlements are made silently and quietly and when the affairs of the bank are all wound up, all that the general public remembers of the catastrophe is the excitement, the outcry and exaggerated statement of loss suffered made when the failure took place.

If, for instance, in the case of the State banks that failed in 1837 the affairs of each could be as accurately accounted for as are the affairs of failed National banks by the Comptroller of the Currency, it is highly probable that the result would be that the losses to the public in the end would perhaps be shown to be smaller than tradition alleges them to have been.

Such partial comparisons as have been possible between the results of failures of State banks and those of National banks have shown to the disadvantage of State bank liquidations after failure, but the figures for the State banks are taken from the most conspicuous failures and do not cover enough ground to make the test a fair one.

In his report for 1879 the Comptroller of the Currency reports the losses to depositors of eighty-one National banks which had failed up to that time with proved claims against them amounting to \$24,859,472, at \$6,240,000. He also gives the losses occasioned by the failures of 210 State, Savings and private bankers, during the three years prior to January 1, 1879, with claims against them amounting to \$88,440,028, at \$32,616,661. In the one case the losses are those of sixteen years under the National banking system, and in the other of three years among other classes of banks. A large part of the losses of the last division of banks were however those of Savings and private banks, so that the exact status of the State banks of the same commercial character as the National banks in respect of losses by failures is not by any means clear.

It must also be borne in mind that in the twenty years elapsing since 1879 many of the State banking systems have been greatly improved, most of the States now exercising a degree of supervision but little less stringent than that exercised over the National banks. Relatively, perhaps, the tendency toward improvement in the State banking laws is greater than in reference to the National banking laws, as in a number of States banks are being placed under more severe restrictions, while Congress steadily refuses to make any alterations in the National Banking Act.

From 1865 to May, 1898, the affairs of 195 insolvent National banks were finally liquidated, against which claims were proved amounting to \$57,367,-

958, the total realized from the assets being \$51,694,475, and the total dividends paid amounting to 74.16 per cent. A comparison of the percentage of dividends paid by the banks shows that those with \$50,000 capital paid 64.64 per cent., and the others as follows: \$100,000 capital, 63.31 per cent.; \$200,000 capital, 79.47 per cent.; \$300,000 capital, 75.94; \$500,000, 75.13 per cent.; over \$500,000 capital, 82.43 per cent. It will be seen that in some instances the banks of smaller capital paid the larger dividends, and except as regards banks of \$500,000 capital and over, the difference is not so great, perhaps, as has been supposed.

On taking the National bank failures individually, it will be found that some of the banks with large capital that have failed have paid as small or smaller dividends than the banks with less capital. This only shows that when a large bank does fail it may turn out to have been as completely wrecked as if it had been a smaller institution.

On the whole it is not at all apparent from examining the records of the failed National banks that the amount of capital is any protection against disaster, unless it is much greater than the usual figures shown by what are considered very strong banks in this country. In other words there seems to be no greater liability that a \$50,000 bank will come to grief, than that a \$500,000 bank will go the same road. If this is so, the usual argument against reducing the minimum capital of National banks to \$25,000 has not as much force as is imagined.

There are throughout the country a very large number of State banks with not more, and perhaps with less than this amount of capital, that do a profitable business acceptable in every respect to the communities in which they are located. Now, if it can be shown that the percentage of failures in proportion to numbers is not much greater than it is among the \$50,000 National banks and that the losses are no greater, it would further prove the safety of reducing the minimum of capital of the latter. It would not be surprising if the failures among small State banks were somewhat more numerous in proportion to their number than those of National banks. This need not be ascribed to their smaller capital, but to the fact that in some States they are not under as careful supervision and examination as are the National banks.

It may be accepted as highly probable that National banks with \$25,000 capital under the strict and uniform supervision of the Comptroller of the Currency would be less liable to failure, as a general rule, than State banks of the same capital, in those States where supervision is lax.

It seems important that some precise data as to the percentage of failures among State banks, and especially among that class of State banks having a small capital, should be collected and compiled for purposes of accurate comparison. But the collection of statistics in regard to bank losses should be carried further than this until it can be seen whether the National banking system is inferior in respect of safety to some of the other systems in operation in foreign countries which some urge could be advantageously substituted for the National banking system. Such data carefully collected, together with data in respect to the degree of supervision exercised over the management of the business in each case, whether by the Government or by accountants and auditors employed by the banks themselves or by clearing-houses or other combinations with which the banks may be connected, would

afford not only the necessary foundation for judging of the comparative merits of the respective systems of banking, but also for judging of the efficiency of outside supervision. It is contended that without data of this kind, much more complete than any yet compiled, the opinions expressed as to the value of the several systems of banking are more or less founded on mere predilection and inference. As before remarked the National banking system is the only system in regard to which complete statistics of this kind are at present procurable. But it is believed that it is not too late to obtain tolerably complete information as to State banks of the country for the period covered by the existence of the National system, viz., from 1863 to 1898. Without expressing any confident opinion the surmise may be ventured that if the necessary pains were taken to obtain the required data, that the final comparison will show that the failures and consequent losses to the public under the National banking system will compare most favorably with those of any system ever tried.

The greatest objection to the popular and anti-monopolistic system of banking which has grown up in the United States has been the alleged weakness of a great number of independent banks with small capital as compared with chartered institutions with branches controlling under one management large aggregations of capital. If it can be shown that the losses to the public under our system of National and State banks do not exceed, or are even less than those under alleged stronger rival systems, then one chief reason for a change would be removed.

It would be an interesting and profitable study to compare the losses of the State and National banks in the different States, but unfortunately statistics for this purpose are not available. Such a comparison might demonstrate that a number of the States could bring the management of their banks up to a higher standard by adopting the safeguards of the National system. On the other hand, those States enforcing a rigid method of supervision would no doubt make a most favorable showing.

The data collected by the Comptroller of the Currency prove that the National banks might be safely entrusted with the power to issue notes on more liberal terms than are now authorized by law, and if this power were granted and the minimum capital reduced to \$25,000, many of the State banks would find that by entering the National system they would gain a substantial advantage for themselves and at the same time enlarge their powers of usefulness in the various localities where they are situated.

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CHEAP MONEY AND SPECULATION.—Stock speculation in Wall Street has reached such an extent as to call forth a warning from some of the most conservative financiers in New York city. Doubtless the present era of high prices in stocks is based upon the gradual return of confidence since the '93 panic, and the more stable condition of business since the subsidence of the free-silver agitation and the successful ending of the war. To this extent the rise in prices is legitimate. It has been greatly fostered also by the prevailing low rates for money, which bid fair to continue. The operation of our present currency system in promoting stock speculation was graphically described by Secretary Gage in his recent report to Congress, and it is also further described in an article by John W. Fries, published in this number.



## THE FUNCTIONS AND QUALITIES OF MONEY.\*

### THE QUALITIES OF MONEY.

Having determined the character of money and its functions, it remains to be determined what articles of merchandise are most nearly capable of performing these functions and correspond most closely to this character. The experience of mankind, as the result of historical evolution, fixed upon two metals—gold and silver—as the most appropriate material for money even before coinage under public authority was practiced. These metals have been in use among civilized nations for twenty-five centuries as the medium of exchange and standard of value, and various fractions of them, determined according to the history and traditions of each nation, have served as the common denominator of transactions.† The processes by which other articles were eliminated from the competition and the unanimous choice of civilized men fixed upon the so-called precious metals, will be set forth in a future article. It is desirable, before reviewing this historical evolution, to point out the qualities which are required in money, in order to demonstrate the special fitness of the precious metals to do money's work. The seven most essential qualities in money, which are fulfilled by the precious metals, are these :

- (1) Value in exchange.
- (2) Stability of value.
- (3) Homogeneity of material.
- (4) Preservation against deterioration.
- (5) Divisibility without diminution of value.
- (6) Large value in small compass.
- (7) Adaptability to coinage.

I. Value in exchange is the primary quality of money. Money should be a merchandise capable of exchange without loss for every other merchandise. "The experience of centuries as well as reasoning," says Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu, "has demonstrated that money is a merchandise which is worth only the quantity of the precious metal which it contains."‡ It is sometimes contended that money is only the sign and symbol of value and does not contain value in itself. All value, in strict scientific reasoning, is a relationship rather than an inherent quality. The term intrinsic value is a misnomer in its etymological sense, but there is hardly any substitute term which expresses equally well the value in exchange of articles which are highly prized. Gold and silver have intrinsic value in this sense, that they have become in the course of forty centuries the most highly-prized articles within human knowledge. | It is

\* Continued from January number, page 37.

† Isidore de Seville laid down these requirements: "*In numismate tria quaeruntur: metallum, Agra et pondus; si ex his aliquid defuerit, numisma non erit.*"

‡ "*Traité d'Economie Politique*," III, 127.

| Boscher declares that as people advance in civilization they at each step choose a more and more costly object as the medium of exchange. "Commodities which barbarians can consume immediately are objects of the first necessity, whereas more civilized people, who are in a condition to undergo greater expense, look more to the technic qualities of money, such as divisibility, capacity for transportation and durability."—"Principles of Political Economy," I, 351.

conceivable in theory that they might lose some of their value if they were no longer employed for monetary use, but by the same process of reasoning wheat would lose its value if it were no longer employed for food. The peculiar characteristic of the precious metals, and more particularly of gold in advanced societies, is that they have not been adopted as money arbitrarily by a single people or a few peoples, but that their inherent responsiveness to all the conditions of a medium of exchange, a standard of value and a store of value, have made them the chosen medium and standard of every civilized community.\* This essential quality of universal value in exchange is the fundamental quality of money, which distinguishes it from other merchandise. The man who takes a gold eagle or a gold sovereign takes it with the knowledge that he can exchange it again at any time for the same value for which he received it. Changes of prices may occur, whose relations to the value of money are too complicated for discussion here, but (in the case of gold at least) these changes have rarely led the possessor of money to regret that he held it in preference to some other merchandise.

Money does not derive its value wholly from its use as a medium of exchange, even though that use rests upon the test of twenty-five centuries of human experience. Gold and silver were valued even in primitive times because they possessed value as merchandise and conformed to the other requirements of money. In India at the present day silver serves at once as an object of ornament and of exchange. It was the practice, down to the suspension of the free coinage of silver by the British Government in 1893, for the Hindoos, when afflicted by famine or poverty, to take their ornaments to the mint for conversion into silver rupees. When the crisis was passed and coin flowed again into their hands, it could be converted without loss back into ornaments. Silver has sometimes been preferred to gold among savage peoples because of its greater bulk and effectiveness in ornamentation. The British commanders in the recent invasion of the Soudan found it necessary to carry silver for the payment of the Soudanese troops, because they would not accept gold.† Both silver and gold, however, since the beginning of the working of the metals, have been capable of conversion to so many uses in the arts that they have derived from this fact alone a high value in exchange.‡ Nearly a third of the gold production of the world at the present time is absorbed in the arts, and half of the production of the precious metals within historic times, except a small proportion lost by abrasion, has been devoted to manufactures and ornamentation. |

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\* "It is true that the monetary use of the precious metals is the principal cause of their value; it is an error to think that the legislator can regulate this use at his pleasure. We employ things because of their utility, or, more precisely, according to our opinion of their utility. It is in this respect with the the precious metals as with other commodities. If gold and silver have general purchasing power, it is not because the legislator has prescribed it, but because every one desires to possess them."—Arnauné, "*La Monnaie, le Crédit et le Change*," 22.

† Ridgeway, "The Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards," 56.

‡ Mr. Jevons points out, as bearing upon the contention that the precious metals owe their value chiefly to their use as money, that they "are endowed with such singularly useful properties that, if we could only get them in sufficient abundance, they would supplant all other metals in the manufacture of household utensils, ornaments, fittings of all kinds, and an infinite multitude of small articles."—"Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," 34.

| The production of gold in the world in 1896 was \$202,953,000, and of silver, at the coining value in the United States (16 to 1), \$213,463,700. The amount of gold consumed in the arts in 1896 was \$59,351,640, and of silver at the coining value, \$38,580,184.—"Twenty-fourth Annual

II. The precious metals derive the high quality of stability of value through successive centuries from two qualities—the difficulty of making large annual additions to the supply and their indestructibility. Changes in the purchasing power of a given weight of silver or gold have occurred, but no other substance has yet been found which meets so well the demand for stability of value. “In the early periods of industrial life,” in the language of Professor Meyer, “the people were in the habit of using various products as money, which did not possess the attributes above mentioned; as, for example, hides, cattle and grain. The meagre development of trade prevented the disadvantages resulting from the want of a proper money service from being disagreeably felt. So soon, however, as trade became brisk and extended, then only such material was given and received which best served the purpose of a universal exchange medium.”\* No article whose production was annually consumed could meet the conditions of stability of value which belong to the precious metals. The estimated stock of gold money in the world in 1896 was \$1,359,600,000. This supply could not be subjected to changes amounting to more than a small percentage in any one year. Even the large gold production of 1898, estimated at \$280,000,000, would be subject to a deduction of \$65,000,000 for industrial uses, leaving not more than \$215,000,000 for addition to the world's stock of money. This would not be more than five per cent. of the existing stock and would not materially affect the amount available in the world as a medium of exchange.

It is one of the important conditions of a sound monetary standard that it shall not be subjected to violent fluctuations in the supply of the standard metal. If gold could be produced by a cheap chemical process or if it were dug out of the earth in many hundreds of millions in some years and in only tens of millions in others, it would cause changes in the supply which might affect its value in exchange. The value of metallic money in exchange does not necessarily vary in exact proportion with the supply, but it is essential that the article employed should be precious, difficult to obtain, and should cost for production nearly as much as its value in exchange. Gold conforms preëminently to these conditions. There have been fluctuations in the supply, but they have not been radical enough to seriously affect its value except upon two occasions—the opening of the American mines in the sixteenth century and the output of California after 1849. The fluctuations which then occurred in the exchange value of gold were due to the relative smallness of the stock which was then in existence. Later years have brought much larger supplies into the market without affecting in any material degree the exchange value of the metal, because the new supplies bore a smaller proportion to the accumulated stock.

III. Silver and gold both conform fully to the requirement that their material shall be so homogeneous that a given weight of either is equal to another given weight in value. There is some difference in the coloring of gold, that of some mines being light in shade and that of others of a reddish or orange tint, but this difference does not affect the value of the metal. An

Report of the Director of the Mint for the Fiscal Year 1897,” 49. Washington, 1897. Professor Soetbeer is inclined to put the use of gold somewhat higher. *Vide* “Bimetallism in Europe,” 126.

\* “Theory of the Coin, Coinage and Monetary Systems of the World.” House of Representatives, Forty-fifth Cong., 3d Sess., Misc. Doc. No. 8, p. 12.

ounce of pure gold from the mines of California is of equal value in exchange with an ounce of equal purity from Australia, South Africa or the Ural Mountains. There are only a few commodities which conform to this condition. Wheat has to be classified by qualities in order to permit its sale upon the exchanges without the separate examination of each car-load. There is more homogeneity of quality in two bars of iron or two bars of copper, but they are not always of equal value. This uniformity of value is of great convenience and high importance in the material used for money. Differences in the qualities of gold and silver would remit society to many of the inconveniences of barter, because of the necessity of placing a different exchange value upon the coins of different countries even where there was identity in the weight and purity of the metal.

IV. The durability of the precious metals, without deterioration, is a quality of high importance for their monetary use. The precious metals do not evaporate like alcohol, mould like wheat, or putrefy like the flesh of fish or cattle. Tin, which was occasionally used as money in antiquity, corrodes so rapidly that this fact accounts for the finding of very few specimens in the refuse heaps of ancient cities. Iron, the money of Sparta, also yields in the course of time to rust, and copper is susceptible of oxidization. Silver loses a little of its brilliance of coloring by long exposure, but does not lose its intrinsic weight and value. Gold changes hardly at all by mere exposure to the air. Both metals wear slightly by handling in long use, but only a fraction of one per cent. a year even when passing constantly from hand to hand. This wear, or abrasion as it is called, is so slight that it affects the value of a coin only after many years and can be determined with almost mathematical precision by those in charge of the mintage.

This quality of durability without deterioration is of importance where the precious metals are hoarded as a store of value. The quality is of equal importance, however, in giving them value in exchange and in permitting their conversion from money to industrial uses and back again into money. An article which was constantly deteriorating could not be converted at its old value from money into objects of use and art nor back again from those objects into money. It would lose in a large measure its general acceptability. Durability and capacity for preservation are accompanied, in the case of metals, with the condition that preservation does not involve any expense for maintenance. The importance of this quality is illustrated by the anecdote cited by Jevons and other writers, where the Parisian singer, Mlle. Zélie, making a tour of the Society Islands, was paid in pigs, cocks, turkeys and fruit, and having no immediate use for all the fowls had to employ the fruit in keeping them alive.\*

V. The quality of divisibility fits the precious metals peculiarly for use as money. It is divisibility which contributes largely to their value both as a medium of exchange and as a common denominator, so far as the latter expresses a physical fact and not merely the terms of exchange. Ten pieces of gold containing one-tenth of the weight of a gold eagle are worth exactly as much as an eagle. The division of gold into the most minute quantities or its accumulation in the greatest bulk do not change the value of each particle. This is not a quality common to most commodities. Many articles, like building timber, granite, and even coal, depend upon the size of the pieces for

\* "Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," 1.

much of their value. This is preëminently the case in respect to diamonds, which are occasionally cited as an important store of value. A diamond of ten carats is worth many times the value of ten diamonds of one carat, and a diamond of thirty carats is worth much more than three diamonds of ten carats. Gold and silver are subject to no such limitations in their qualification for use as money. Silver is capable of division into fractions sufficiently minute to equal the value of the labor of a few minutes, while gold in small compass has sufficient value to equal the labor of weeks or months.

VI. The element of large value in small compass is an important one in modern exchange, because it contributes to the easy transfer of money from place to place. It is this fact which gives money a substantially uniform value in all parts of the world at the same time.\* The cost of conveying gold or silver from London to Paris, including insurance, is stated by Mr. Jevons at about four-tenths of one per cent. and between the most distant parts of the commercial world it does not exceed two or three per cent. It is necessary that the material of money should be neither too minute nor too bulky. Gold cannot be divided conveniently into fractions small enough for small change and there are metals of which a pin head in amount would represent the price of a day's labor. Cases of money too bulky for modern use are thus defined by Mr. Jevons: †

"There was a tradition in Greece that Lykurgos obliged the Lacedaemonians to use iron money, in order that its weight might deter them from overmuch trading. However this may be, it is certain that iron money could not be used in cash payments at the present day since a penny would weigh about a pound, and instead of a five-pound note, we should have to deliver a ton of iron. During the last century copper was actually used as the chief medium of exchange in Sweden; and merchants had to take a wheelbarrow with them when they went to receive payments in copper dalers."

VII. Adaptability to coinage and to use as money is one of the qualities which gold and silver possess in an eminent degree. They offer, in the language of a French author, "At once sufficient malleability and hardness to receive and permanently retain the imprint of a monetary type, which cannot be worn except by incessant and prolonged handling nor be cut in pieces without a serious effort. Of all the metals they are those most easy to recognize at the first effort, by sight, by sound, by weight, or by chemical tests." ‡ Other metals have been tried as the material for coinage, but have not proved so workable as gold and silver except for subsidiary coins. Platinum was tried by the Russian Government in 1828. It is a metal of an extremely high melting point, oxidizes slowly, and its white color and high specific gravity easily distinguish it from other metals. The Russian Government was the owner of the principal platinum mines in the Ural Mountains, and had pieces struck of the face value of three, six and twelve roubles. Sev-

\* "Transportation of values supposes an equality of the value of the money in two places, while the transportation of goods supposes different values of the same kind of goods in both places."—Kniep, "*Geld und Credit*," I, 218.

† "Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," 25. Even silver has been subjected to criticism because of its bulk, and M. de Laveleye declared that in Belgium in 1891 the declining proportion of gold money was indicated by "the great sacks of crowns which begin to reappear upon the backs of bank messengers."—"*La Monnaie et le Bimétallisme International*," 115.

‡ Babelon, 241. This quality is described by Mr. Jevons as "cognizability." He also lays stress upon the importance of adaptability to coinage under the name of "impressibility—the capability of a substance to receive such an impression, seal, or design, as shall establish its character as current money of certain value."—"Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," 40.

eral objections to the use of the metal soon disclosed themselves. Platinum is not largely used in commerce and there is no large stock on hand to steady the value of the portion used as money. The cost of making the coins was found to be great, owing to the difficulty of melting. The Russian Government abandoned the experiment in 1845 and withdrew the coins from circulation. Improvements in the manner of working platinum were afterwards made and it was proposed by M. de Jacobi at the monetary conference held in Paris in 1867 that the metal be adopted as the material for five-franc pieces. The suggestion was not adopted and is not likely to be, for it runs counter to the commercial experience of the world in seeking a standard of value.\* A few of the manifold advantages of gold as money are thus summed up by General Walker: †

"The fusibility, ductibility and malleability of gold form a group of properties of the highest importance, as we shall have occasion farther to note when we come to speak of coinage, while they add vastly to its uses in the arts industrial and decorative. One cubic inch of gold, Mr. Seyd tells us, may be drawn out to cover fourteen millions of square inches. Gold may be refined and alloyed, united and divided, with absolutely no loss of the pure metal in the repeated process."

CHARLES A. CONANT.

\* Mr. Jacobi declared that platinum was found in considerable quantities in various parts of South America and that it was predestined by nature to become the universal metal for money when it should be found in sufficient abundance.—"Appendix to Report of International Conference of 1878," 855. Washington, 1879. It is said by Prof. Cauwe that platinum has the important defect that old metal is worth much less than new.—"*Cours d'Economie Politique*," II, 157.

† "Money," 41.

(To be continued.)

SCOTCH VIEW OF OUR BANKING SYSTEM.—"The Characteristics of Banking Systems" was the title of an exhaustive paper read before the meeting of the Scottish Society of Economists on December 13 by Andrew W. Kerr, of the Royal Bank, of Edinburgh. The paper is presented in full in the "Accountant's Magazine" for January. Our own banking system is thus criticized:

"The most prominent feature of it [the banking system of the United States] other than its magnitude and activity, is perhaps its individuality. Founded originally on English ideas, it has long outgrown all tutelage, either of that or any other country, and presents itself as a system *sui generis*. No other country in the world has so many individual banks in proportion to population, or so many of an ephemeral description. Thus in the New York BANKERS' MAGAZINE for May last (accidentally selected), there are notices of sixteen insolvencies, eleven new National banks formed, and more than seventy other banks started. As may be supposed, the capitals of these are small, varying from \$2,000 to \$150,000. Such a here-to-day away-to-morrow condition of banking is certainly strange to Old World views; but, perhaps, it is suitable to the genius of the people—or more likely they have adapted themselves to it. From an economic point of view, however, it cannot be considered sound. Of course it arises partly from the incessant formation of new centres of population, and is, so far, justifiable; but the causes have also to be sought for in less reasonable aspects of American civilization.

Although individualism is a leading feature, it is probable that the mercantile spirit—the association of commercial ideas, if not of practice—with banking, is also a contributing cause of the instability of American financial institutions. In a healthy condition of banking, fever is absent; although even a sound banking system, like a robust human being, may suffer occasionally from febrile attacks. But the United States banking system seems to suffer from chronic low fever, with an occasional paroxysm, probably indicative of mercantile blood poisoning. The conditions of the note issues, based on the Government debt, accentuate the sensitiveness of the situation; and, moreover, they have tended towards the introduction of the State principle in one of its worst forms. The basing of the note issues, to so large an extent, on unliquid assets is unsound, and has only been comparatively harmless because of the justifiable belief of the Americans in themselves. But in throwing on the Government the duty of maintaining the ultimate gold reserve of the nation, the banking system has been relieved of a steadying responsibility, and the State has courted grave danger. The war of the white and yellow metals, which is inextricably involved with the banking system, is another disturbing element. It must be ended before the financial condition of the States can be placed on a footing worthy of the great and powerful nation towards whom 'the course of empire takes its way.'"

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

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The usual statements of the issues of new securities and the introduction of securities upon the London and Paris markets are presented by the London "Economist" for England and "*L'Economiste Européen*" for France in late numbers of those journals. The figures for Great Britain, presented in the "Economist" of December 24, show a falling off in the last quarter of 1898. The total applications for capital during the year were £149,227,000, of which only £25,311,000 was asked in the concluding quarter. The applications in the first quarter were £48,054,000, in the second quarter £38,157,000 and in the third quarter £37,705,000. The applications for capital during 1898 were less than in 1897, when the amount was £157,289,000, or in 1896, when the amount was £152,807,000; but were greater than in 1895, when the amount was £104,690,000, or in 1894, when the amount was £91,835,000. The leading items during 1898 were foreign government loans, £24,103,400; Indian and colonial government loans, £10,136,000; British railways, £11,089,700; foreign railways, £12,003,000; breweries and distilleries, £18,386,500; merchants and manufacturing businesses, £16,074,900; and stores and trading, £6,648,100. The "Economist" comments thus upon the general character of the issues for the year:

"The bulk of the capital offered has been for the development of industrial enterprises, and these, with a few prominent exceptions, have been of a character not calculated, we fear, to prove of much advantage to those who have been tempted to put their money into them. Breweries again bulk largely in the total, accounting for a sum of £3,304,600. With the exception of £880,000 for the new issue of Allsopp's deferred shares they were mostly amalgamations or conversions of small country breweries, capitalized on the inflated basis which has become an unsatisfactory feature in this class of enterprise. The large sum appearing under the head of merchants and manufacturing businesses, of course, include companies with a wide range of objects. The most prominent issues in this list are the American Thread Combination, Doulton & Co., and Curtiss's & Harvey's gunpowder business. Apart from these the companies in this and the stores and trading section were a very mediocre collection. \* \* \* Railways have provided only one issue of large amount, that being one of £2,000,000 of bonds of the Southern Pacific Railroad."

It is a significant fact that cycle enterprises, which were floated to the amount of £7,193,000 in 1897, called for only £155,000 in 1898. The new issues in France were only a fraction of those in Great Britain. The issues of all classes of new securities which were offered upon the Paris market were 393,410,820 francs (\$76,000,000). The issues of public funds were 111,457,500 francs, other classes of bonds 133,800,420 francs, and shares of stock companies 148,152,900 francs. The total reported introductions of securities upon the Paris market were 1,615,332,208 francs, but this included 675,780,000 francs of Italian railway bonds, which were the subject of but few transactions. The deduction of these left a classification of 451,666,458 francs in public funds, 260,259,550 francs in other classes of bonds, and 227,626,200 francs in shares of stock companies. The conversions effected in France in

1898 were 933,879,374 francs, of which 397,753,874 francs was in public loans and 536,125,500 francs in the bonds and stock of industrial and other corporations. The conversions of 1897 were 589,992,000 francs, of which 178,543,000 were public loans and 411,449,000 francs were the stocks and bonds of industrial and other corporations. These conversions are not included in the statement of French issues and the introduction of securities for the first time upon the Paris market. The latter, whose totals have been given, amounted together to 1,332,963,028 francs (\$260,000,000), of which 563,123,958 of both classes were in public loans and 769,839,070 francs in industrial and other bonds and stock. The corresponding total for 1897 was 451,900,375 francs, of which 227,550,375 francs was in public loans and 224,350,000 francs in industrial and similar securities.

The year 1898 was not a favorable one upon the Paris stock market. The nominal capital of all negotiable French securities amounts, according to "*L'Economiste Européen*" of January 6, to about 63,500,000,000 francs (\$12,400,000,000), of which 520 securities, representing a capital of about 59,500,000,000 francs, are officially negotiated on the Paris Bourse. The larger portion of these are securities which have been issued for a long time and afford the basis for a regular annual estimate of their market value by Prof. Théry, the editor of the French journal. He takes 136 of these securities with a nominal capital of 53,716,000,000 francs, or a little more than ninety per cent. of the capital quoted on the Bourse, and finds that they had a value on December 31, 1898, of 58,839,371,000 francs. This is a loss from the close of 1897, when the market value was 58,925,975,000 francs. The comparison for 1893 over 1892 showed an increased value upon these same securities of 1,260,958,000 francs; for 1894, a gain of 960,679,000 francs; for 1895, a loss of 317,138,000 francs; for 1896, a gain of 1,344,203,000 francs; for 1897 a gain of 982,329,000 francs; and for 1898, a loss of 536,604,000 francs. French rentes showed the larger part of the loss, amounting to 433,392,000 francs, and railway bonds most of the remainder, amounting to 280,272,000 francs. There were slight gains in municipal obligations, the bonds of the Crédit Foncier and industrial securities. The rise of the discount rate at the large European banks is one of the causes assigned by M. Théry for the fall in the quotations of securities.

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The question whether the British people are living upon their capital, raised in some quarters on account of the large excess of merchandise imports, has been discussed in a careful manner by Mr. T. Lloyd in a series of recent articles in the London "*Statist.*" He maintains that the magnitude of the excess of imports for 1898 is due to unusual earnings by British shipping, to the return to Great Britain of capital which had been invested abroad, and to the fact that large amounts of foreign capital have been transferred through London. He says, in regard to the earnings of British shipping:

"Our ship owners have earned much more than for many years past. The Board of Trade monthly returns do not show this. In fact there is a slight falling off in the tonnage entered into and cleared from United Kingdom ports. But these returns have reference only to the direct trade between this country and other countries. The increase has been in the number and tonnage of British ships employed in the trade of other countries between themselves. When the United States went to war with Spain, it had to withdraw a great



number of ships formerly employed in trade. The American Trans-Atlantic line, for instance, stopped running altogether. Moreover, the good crops in the United States, with the revival of confidence and, consequently, of trade, the progress of Canada, the recovery in Argentina, and the improvement in India, have all caused an increased demand for shipping. Freights, therefore, have risen over fifty per cent. In the third place, it is a matter of common knowledge that we have been building ships largely, not only for our own, but for foreign governments, and also for foreign ship owners, and that we have delivered large numbers this year. Furthermore, we have sold an immense number of old ships to foreigners. Last year shipbuilding was greatly delayed by the engineering dispute. This year there has been no such hindrance."

The suggestions made by Mr. Lloyd regarding the transfer of foreign capital through London are of interest because they recall at once some of the important financial results of the year and indicate the importance of Great Britain as a factor in the world's exchanges. He says :

"Immense amounts of property have been sent to this country from other countries for various reasons. For example, the two last Chinese loans were brought out in equal parts in this country and in Germany. But almost the whole of what was raised in Germany has had to be remitted here. Within about eighteen months, that is to say, nearly sixteen millions sterling that were lent to China by Germany have been sent to London for account of Japan. A portion, no doubt, was sent to Japan. But practically almost all was paid into the Bank of England, and remains in one form or another in this country. So, again, Russia has borrowed in Germany within the past year and-a-half, as was pointed out in this journal a fortnight ago, between twenty and twenty-four millions sterling, and all but a small part of that has been sent either to London, or Paris, or St. Petersburg. Furthermore, Germany has been paying off in London large amounts of bank acceptances held here as security for money advanced. Again, during the West African dispute, and still more during the Fashoda dispute, there were large purchases of consols on French account; and doubtless the Dreyfus incident has likewise induced many wealthy persons to send money from France to this country for safe keeping. Other instances might be mentioned. But it is enough to say that very large amounts have been sent to this country, either as a consequence of the purchase of ships by the American Government, or of loans raised on the Continent, or for the sake of safe keeping. And by far the larger part of these remittances likewise appears in the imports. Yet they have not been paid for by this country, and in fact when first sent they did not belong to this country. But as they are spent by the Governments, such as Russia and Japan, or in the purchase of consols and other high-class securities, they pass into British hands. It will be seen from the foregoing that the excess of the imports over the exports, so far from proving that we are drawing upon our capital, goes to demonstrate that never before have we been so rich or have we been believed so strong by the other countries of the world."

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The demoralized condition of the currency and the foreign exchanges continues to be a fertile subject of discussion in Italy, and various plans are proposed for improving the situation. A project is before the Italian Chambers, proposing the restoration of the subsidiary silver circulation in place of the notes for small amounts which are now in use. It is believed in some quarters that this change will have a favorable effect upon the exchanges, but this is not likely in view of the fact that silver has lost its character as international money. The proposal to issue again the subsidiary silver has been made feasible by a recent agreement of the Latin Union countries, by which Italy agreed to prohibit the exportation of Italian silver coins, and other countries agreed to prohibit the exportation of their subsidiary silver into Italy. It was found, prior to this agreement, that Italian silver being received at par with French

and Belgian money, which was at par with gold, rapidly left Italy and flooded the circulation of the gold-standard countries.

The problem of the subsidiary coinage is only one of the many which confront the Italian Government. It is being urged by the Italian financial journals that the entire banking system should be reorganized upon the basis of a single bank of issue. There are at present three issuing banks—the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Naples, and the Bank of Sicily. The Bank of Italy assumed a large volume of the locked-up assets of the Bank of Rome upon the failure of the latter several years ago and is still struggling with their realization. It is understood that the Government is making arrangements to relieve the bank of a part of these obligations. One of the leading financial journals suggests that the Treasury should issue bonds to take up these obligations and concludes its discussion of the subject thus :

“ We believe that the problem might be settled, so far as the economic conditions of the country permit, if the Government would consider seriously the reduction of the amount of its notes in circulation and if the Bank of Italy, which has large resources in capital and reserves, should be put in condition to adopt definite measures for improving the situation. As to the Bank of Naples, it ought to be liquidated, in order to pay at once in good money the losses in excess of its capital.”

Signor Ferraris concludes his discussion of the improvement of Italian exchange, which is republished in “ *L'Economiste Européen* ” of December 30, by pointing out that the Government notes introduced a disturbing factor into the operation of the discount rate upon the foreign exchanges. He says :

“ There is lacking in Italy a definite control of the money market. The Treasury has no material interest in the fall of exchange, because by the payment of gold for customs it is able to cover the loss. The banks of issue, relieved from the redemption of their notes, are not bound to watch over the regulation of the rates of exchange. The Italian money market is like a ship launched upon the high sea without captain or pilot. In no country of Europe has any one succeeded in maintaining order in the circulation without a permanent and vigorous direction of the money market.”

A lively account of the embarrassing effect of the rapid fall of the gold premium in the Argentine Republic as the result of recent events is given by the Buenos Ayres correspondent of the London “ *Economist* ” in the issue of December 17 last. The appreciation of the paper currency has been beneficial to the Government by diminishing the cost of foreign exchange, but has increased prices and fixed charges in a manner which is upsetting many calculations. The correspondent, writing under date of November 17, says :

“ The ‘ delirium of optimism ’, as it has justly been styled, that has swept the market like a tidal wave for the past six weeks, and of which gold speculators for the fall have taken such full advantage, to their own great profit, culminated yesterday in the gold premium touching 116, but there has been a sharp reaction to-day to 121. The fall in a bare fortnight has been between twenty-five and thirty points, a pace of appreciation of the currency that has paralyzed and dislocated all business, and which naturally entails enormous losses that will inevitably result in a considerable measure of distress and probable commercial failures later on. The shibboleth used to promote the wild stampede in the gold premium is ‘ confidence ’ in the new Administration of General Roca. That this confidence exists to a considerable extent is true, but even a much greater measure of it than really does prevail cannot perform miracles, cannot pay the nation’s debts, cannot bring down public expenditure to a reasonable scale, cannot, in fact, do the very many things that have to be done before so low a premium on gold as the present one would be even reasonable with three hundred

millions of inconvertible currency notes, for which the State is liable, still in circulation, and no attempt whatever as yet made to redeem them at any date, however distant. There must be a reaction when the 'delirium' is over. Meanwhile, the distress caused by the terrible jerk in values is already felt, and debtors in currency see hard times before them. Some thing very like panic exists in the wool market, owing to the fall in prices due to the sharp drop in the gold premium, which will ruin many small tenants on the sheep-farms, as the rents these poor people pay are in the great majority of cases exorbitantly high, and it will be impossible to pay them unless there be a rise in the price of wool and produce in general. So demoralized are the producing classes by the change of values that the consignees' brokers in this city, who dispose of the great staples to the exporting merchants, seem to have lost their heads under the blow, and have been holding meetings and imagining vain things, and giving expression to very foolish ones. One section of them is silly enough to suppose that refusing to sell the wool consigned to them, at present low prices, will mend matters. Another calls for the suppression of time bargains in gold on the Bolsa, and so on."

The German Government is contemplating the establishment of the post office Savings bank system in Germany by executive decree. It was the intention to lay a measure on the subject before the Reichstag, but it has been determined that executive action is sufficient. The scope and purpose of the plan are thus outlined by the Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist" in the issue of December 17 :

"The essential idea of the project is less in saving money than in effecting payments by means of checks. The Government is doubtless influenced in part by the desire to give the money circulation of the country greater mobility, and thus avoid in a measure the stringency that recurs nearly every year in the money market. The report accompanying the plan lays stress upon the English and American clearing-houses as institutions which eliminate the use of money in effecting settlements. An important modification will be made upon the Austrian system in the direction of decentralization. In Austria all postal checks are cleared at the head office in Vienna; Germany, on the other hand, will establish clearing offices in eight or ten of the larger cities. Each account holder must maintain a permanent non-interest-bearing deposit of £10 (some reports say £5); only the surplus above this amount can be drawn upon by check, and on this surplus interest at  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent will be paid. Whether the scheme will be a success is not beyond doubt. At present money in small amounts can be sent by means of a money order at a cost of  $2\frac{1}{2}$ d, and many small tradesmen will hardly be willing to keep a dead capital of £10 in the post office in order to avoid this trifling expense. In Austria, however, the use of the postal checks has developed very satisfactorily."

The proposition that most of the new gold received in Europe within the past fourteen years has gone into the bank reserves is maintained by Prof Edmond Théry in "L'Economiste Européen" of December 16 last. He takes the figures of the United States Mint for the production of gold, which amounted to 10,521,000,000 francs (2,030,000,000) and figures that the producing countries, including the United States and Australia, retained 3,389,000,000 francs, leaving 7,132,000,000 francs for European use. The bank reserves of the creditor countries—France, Germany, England, Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland—increased 1,693,000,000 francs during this period and those of the debtor countries, including Russia, 3,497,000,000 francs. This leaves for the arts only 1,991,000,000 francs for a period of fourteen years, which M. Théry considers less than the amount actually absorbed. These figures go to sustain his contention that there has not been any material increase in the gold in actual circulation, but that the currency of the leading countries is

furnished by means of bank-notes resting upon the enlarged metallic reserves of the banks. He finds justification for this view in the fact that a classification of the money received upon a single day by the Bank of France and a number of banking associations showed in 1885 bank notes to the amount of 67.63 per cent., gold, 22.44 per cent., and five-franc pieces, 9.93 per cent., while in 1897 bank notes were found in the proportion of 84.21 per cent., gold, 11.27 per cent., and five-franc pieces, 4.52 per cent. In the case of France, the customs statistics tend to verify the calculation that the increase of gold money has gone solely into the bank reserves. The net imports from 1884 to 1897 were 983,000,000 francs, which is 51,000,000 francs less than the increase in the same period in the gold reserve of the Bank of France. M. Théry declares that, "according to the statistics of the industrial use of gold, it is even probable that the figures of European consumption between 1884 and 1897 were considerably above 1,991,000,000 francs, which would only give an annual average of 142,000,000 francs, while the true average should certainly exceed 220,000,000 francs. In this case, it would have to be admitted that a part of the increase of the visible monetary stocks of Europe has been drawn from the general public circulation which existed in 1884."

The summary of the progress of British banking, which has been printed annually for some years in the London "Bankers' Magazine," shows a total banking capital in the United Kingdom amounting to £85,046,500, exclusive of reserve funds of £41,368,800. The distribution of this total of £126,415,300 among the different divisions of the Kingdom appears in the following table :

*Banking Capital of Great Britain, 1898.*

	<i>Capital.</i>	<i>Reserve Funds.*</i>
Bank of England.....	£14,562,000	£3,000,000
Other banks, England.....	53,953,500	28,785,400
Banks, Isle of Man.....	105,000	99,600
Banks, Scotland.....	9,810,000	6,118,000
Banks, Ireland.....	7,125,000	3,390,800
	£85,046,500	£41,368,800

\* Partly estimated.

Comparisons are made with the conditions in 1876, when the computations of the "Bankers' Magazine" first began, which show that there has been a net increase of capital since that time amounting to £22,940,194, and an increase of reserves amounting to £19,446,504, making a total of £42,386,598 in twenty-two years. The English banks increased their capital £23,008,666 and their reserves £16,419,467, but there was a loss of capital in Scotland of £480,161, caused by the failure of the Western Bank. The Scotch banks increased their reserves £2,384,869, and the Irish banks increased their reserves £559,568.

The "Bankers' Magazine" revives the discussion which was made so conspicuous by Mr. Bagehot regarding the strength of the banking reserves. It is declared that "No steps have been taken during the past year to establish a stronger reserve fund for the country generally," and the banking public is reminded that though the arrangement made in 1890, at the time of the Baring failure, "was successfully carried out then, it would have been impossible

to repeat the operation in 1898, however needful it might have been to do so." The various aspects of the subject are discussed as follows :

"The subject is an extremely difficult one, and involves many questions of the utmost delicacy—such as the position of the Bank of England to the other banks of the country; the amount of the bankers' balances kept at the Bank of England, and the further point often discussed, but never settled in any satisfactory manner, the question whether the Bank ought not to regard those balances in a different light from the other money deposited with it, and as something which ought not to be loaned out or employed in business. The Bank of England may say, and say truly, if it is not allowed to employ this money, how can it obtain any reasonable remuneration for its services. The difficulty of making an arrangement that would take the place of this would be great, but we cannot think it insuperable. We must again bring before our readers a comparison which we have made more than once before, of the position of the Bank of England and of the great banks of the world, now and in 1876. We take the year 1876 as being that in which this statement of the position of the banks of the country was commenced, and over which our examination can be carried on with a greater accuracy. Can it be prudent or safe that the Bank of England—the central point of the financial system of the country which is the clearing-house of the world—should not maintain a sufficient reserve of specie to meet its own requirements? So far is this from being the case, that the reserve of the Bank is scarcely larger this year than it was some twenty years since, though the demands on it may at any time be much larger.

The banking institutions of the other countries of the world now stand in a totally different position from that which they occupied when we commenced this annual survey twenty-three years since. The position of the Bank of England was stronger relatively then to that of the other great banks of Europe than it is now, while the demand likely to be made on it was far smaller than may be the case at the present time, owing to the development of banking in this country in the interval, and the totally different conditions of business. Compared with twenty-three years since, there is no doubt that the deposits of the banks of the United Kingdom have increased nearly £260,000,000, if not more, within that time. In this statement the deposits of the colonial and foreign banks having offices in London are not included. These are very large at the present date. In times of difficulty these banks, as well as all the banks of the country, would look to the Bank of England reserve for assistance. The Bank of France, the Imperial Bank of Germany and the National banks of the United States now all possess far stronger specie reserves than they did twenty-three years since, while the position of the Bank of England is relatively weaker."

A bill was introduced in the Reichstag on January 17, 1898, raising the capital of the Imperial Bank of Germany from 120,000,000 marks to 150,000,000 marks (\$37,000,000), and increasing the limit of circulation not subject to tax to 400,000,000 marks. The Bank is required to hold coin to the amount of one-third of this untaxed circulation and good commercial paper for the remainder. The tax on the excess of circulation is five per cent. and the Bank has been subjected to a severe strain for the last few years, and especially in 1898, by the demand for loans, which required a constant excess of note issues above the tax limit. The circulation was brought within the tax limit early in December, for the first time since September. Much complaint has been made of these restrictions, which compelled the Imperial Bank to keep its discount rate during December at six per cent., when the rate of the Bank of France was three per cent. and that of the Bank of England four per cent.

It is anticipated that the agrarians will resist the extension of the charter upon these conditions and will favor the ownership of the Bank by the Government by the purchase of the existing stock. The subject of suppressing the few local banks of issue which have survived the law of March 14, 1875, is under discussion, but as they hold rights from the State governments, it is

probable that they will be respected. The charter proposed by the Imperial Government will probably become a law, in spite of the opposition of the agrarians.

An indication of the strain put upon the Bank is afforded by the fact that the note issues at the close of 1898 were covered by coin to the extent of 56.64 per cent. as compared with 63.81 per cent at the close of 1897. The volume of business done at the German clearing-houses reached about \$6,800,000,000 during 1898 as compared with about \$6,000,000,000 in 1897 and \$5,700,000,000 in 1896. The Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist," in the issue of January 7, points out the real significance of these figures thus :

"The English reader must, however, bear in mind that these figures do not reflect the whole volume of payments made in Germany by means of checks, since the Imperial Bank, with its nearly 300 branches, serves as a clearing-house for the Empire to a much greater extent than the clearing-houses themselves. A very large proportion of the manufacturers and larger tradesmen of the country, as well as all large joint-stock banks, have an account with the Bank or one of its branches; and the holders of such accounts can make payments by means of checks in any other part of the Empire. Such checks between customers of the Bank do not, of course, reach the clearing-houses. In the year 1897 such transfers through checks reached the sum of £4,100,000,000, against only £500,000,000 in 1876—showing that there has been an immense development in the use of checks since the Bank was organized. The same fact is strikingly brought out in the volume of payments made in proportion to the amount of deposits. In 1876 the turn-over was 240 to 1; by 1897 it had risen to 410 to 1."

The extent to which the evidences of the British debt are being absorbed by the Post Office Savings Bank and other bureaus of the Government is set forth in a striking manner in the London "Statist" for December 10 last. The recent tendency has been towards the reduction of the debt, which increased from £260,000,000 in 1791 to £895,000,000 in 1816. The population of the United Kingdom is now about double what it was in 1816 and the increase in wealth is still greater. The burden carried by the taxpayers at the close of the Napoleonic wars may be inferred from the fact that if the debt were the same per capita at present as it was in 1816, the amount would be £1,800,000,000, or nearly nine thousand millions of dollars. The debt per capita, which was £45 in 1816 was only £16 15s in 1898, and the charge per capita for the annual payments, which was £1 12s 6d in 1816, fell to 12s 6d in 1898. The total debt, including small amounts for local loans and unfunded debt, was £772,965,062 on March 31, 1879, of which £156,798,097 was held by Government departments and £616,166,965 was in the hands of the public. The total on March 31, 1898, was £675,389,472, of which £238,097,824 was held by Government departments and £437,291,648 was left in the hands of the public. The "Statist," in summing up these figures, says:

"The above contrast of figures of 1879 and 1898 shows that by the double incidence of £97,575,000 reduction of debt, and £81,299,000 increase of holdings in Government departments—Savings banks, Court of Judicature, Ecclesiastical Commissioners, etc.—the amount of debt in the hands of the public has in twenty years been reduced £178,875,000, and this reduction has undoubtedly played a considerable part in the market quotation of the funds. It will be noticed that the rise in the price of consols has been very considerable since the year 1893. In the five years the reduction of the amount of consols in the hands of the public has been very nearly fifty-seven and a half millions. This reduction has arisen from

a small decrease in the amount of consols in existence and a large addition to the holdings of Government departments in this special security. The contrast of position in 1893 and in 1898 is given below :

	1893.	1898.
3¼ per cent. consols.....	£285,260,000	£252,068,000
Held in Government departments.....	101,894,000	156,280,000
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Held by the public.....	£423,911,000	£366,438,000
Decrease in amount held by the public in five years, £57,473,000.		

#### The Austro-Hungarian Bank.

The governing body of the Austro-Hungarian Bank held a general assembly of the shareholders late in December for the consideration of the situation created by the delay in the extension of the charter of the Bank. A resolution was unanimously adopted proposing the extension until June 30, 1899, of the arrangement with the two Governments of Austria and Hungary for the maintenance of the charter and statutes of the Bank upon the old basis. A proposition which is not very favorable to the resumption of gold payments was reported early in December, but does not yet seem to have taken definite form. This was the issue of 10,000,000 florins (\$4,000,000) in new bank notes in order to cover a loan to the Government. It was proposed to issue Treasury bonds for the amount to the Bank, in order to cover a deficit in the budget, in view of the fact that the political deadlock in the Diet prevented the discussion of a scheme of taxation.

The provision of the monetary law of 1892, making calculations in gold crowns obligatory for public offices, took effect on January 1, 1899. There are still 112,000,000 florins (\$45,000,000) of the old Government notes in circulation, for which the Treasury proposes to deposit gold at the Bank for their cancellation. Most of them are in notes for five florins, which cannot be withdrawn without creating a scarcity of small money.

The Bank, according to the Vienna correspondent of "*L'Economiste Européen*," in the issue of January 6, will probably decide to issue notes for ten crowns (\$2), and the Government will strike about 30,000,000 florins in silver in pieces of five crowns. The new bank notes for ten crowns are counted upon to replace the Government notes withdrawn, while the silver pieces will be put afloat with the idea of employing the existing stock of silver.

#### BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

—The scope of continental banking at the present time is the subject for some interesting discussion in the December number of the London "Bankers' Magazine." It is asserted in reference to the recent past that "among the poorer countries, or the countries in which, though capital may have existed, it was not in a form available for immediate use, like the less settled parts of Europe, and Asia Minor and the further East, the aid of English capital usually used to be invoked." But we now find things managed differently; other sources are open to those who engage in such undertakings, and great railways are established through the interposition of German banks. Some ten years since the *Deutsche Bank* took over the *Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie*, and commenced the Anatolian Railways. Since then it has constructed the supplementary Anatolian line from Eskishehr to Konia.

Meanwhile it constructed in European Turkey, in Macedonia, the line Saloniki-Monastia. The same bank has likewise obtained a great many concessions for the further development of the Anatolian system of railways."

—The Government of Chile has made a contract with a London firm and the American Bank-Note Company for 100,000,000 piasters in notes, of which half are designed to replace the paper money in circulation and the employment of the other half has not been announced. There is serious fear in business circles that Chile is to continue in the path of Government paper issues upon which she has entered, but the Minister of Finance announced late in November in the Chamber of Deputies, in the name of the President of the Republic, that not a piaster more of paper money should be issued.

—The rapid accumulation of loanable capital in Germany has provoked a venturesome spirit among capitalists, notwithstanding the tight money market which has recently prevailed in Berlin. The correspondent of the London "Economist," in the issue of November 5, says that "It is announced that German bankers will soon undertake to float a considerable loan for Denmark, and a loan of nearly a million sterling for Bosnia is about to be arranged. The increase of the German holdings of Spanish Exteriors has already been referred to in this correspondence. An excellent authority now places the increase of these holdings at Berlin alone during the past few months at 150,000,000 pesetas, whereas the amount stamped by the Spanish financial agents in July for all Germany reached not quite 50,000,000. In this connection it may be stated that the same authority places the amounts of the various Russian loans held in Germany at about £75,000,000."

—The commercial treaty between France and Italy is leading to new banking plans for the employment of French capital south of the Alps. It is reported that several branches of French banks will be established in Italy, particularly at Milan. There are some difficulties in the Italian law to be avoided, but the German banks have already succeeded in making banking arrangements and the French will be able to adopt the same devices for escaping the prohibitions of the law. The Roman correspondent of "*L'Economiste Européen*," in the issue of December 23, says that it is to be hoped that the French bank which is interested in the subject will not restrict itself to purely banking operations, because a vast field is open for foreign capital, which the Germans and English have long since begun to enter. "It would be well," he adds, "that France also should have her part in the rich harvest which skilful hands have prepared."

—Exports of gold and silver bullion from London for 1898, as reported by Messrs. Pixley & Abell, were of the total value of £52,213,701, of which £15,623,651 was silver and £36,590,050 gold. The imports were £43,721,460 gold and £14,677,799 silver.

—An "Austrian Bank of Exportation" with a capital of 10,000,000 florins has been established in Austria-Hungary with the guarantee of the Government. The Government guarantees an interest of four per cent. upon the capital, and branches will be opened at once at Hamburg and London. Great results are expected from the operations of this bank in behalf of Austrian commerce.

C. A. C.



## BANKING AND CURRENCY REFORM FROM A COUNTRY STANDPOINT.

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It is a popular misconception that banking is the business of trading in money. This was measurably true in old times, when there was a great diversity in the value of coins in use, and when the circulation was mostly composed of such coins; when all coinage was local in its character, and could not be used outside of the State or principality which issued it. Then there was considerable business carried on and considerable profit earned by individual bankers or money-changers by trading in money. But that business was destroyed by the principle now universally recognized in all enlightened countries, that their currency must be of a definite recognized standard, which will pass current anywhere without discount; and the consequence is that the dollar, pound, franc and mark are interchangeable the world over. Local currency is a necessity now in any civilized country for "pocket change" only, and the business of the money-changers is now practically confined to the various subsidiary coinages.

In so far as a modern bank handles money—and we are now speaking of money in a restricted sense, circulating bills and coins—it does so for the convenience of its customers and without profit for itself. For example, the receipts of the retail merchant in money are deposited in bank, and then paid out to the manufacturer to meet his payroll, and this process is repeated over and over in the complicated business of a community. It involves an immense amount of labor to the bank, for which it receives no direct recompense whatever; it is a public service, gratuitously rendered, for which the bank hardly receives thanks. It is even more than a service, for in the natural movements of exchange it is constantly necessary for an institution to ship currency first in and then out at considerable cost for express charges.

Banks furnish public service in many other respects; they supply the mechanism by which the business of the country is transacted conveniently and with a minimum use of money; they handle these exchanges at a minimum of cost to their customers, a cost which hardly pays postage, stationery and clerk hire to them; they keep the money of the community safely in their vaults but ready for instant use; they largely do the financing and keep the books for many of their customers, and most important of all, they gather the deposits of what would otherwise be idle funds and lend them for the prosecution of active business.

In this last function lies the profit of the business, and it is a profit by which no one is robbed, but which on the contrary is fully earned. As the insurance premiums of the many, collected and administered by competent officials suffice to make good the risks of loss by fire or death, and are really great public benefactions, just so the deposits of the many, collected and administered by competent bank officers, suffice to pay the salaries of these officers and help to pay dividends to the stockholders. Just as the law of averages enables the insurance company, out of the many small premiums collected, to pay the few losses sustained, so the same law of averages enables the bank, out of the aggregate of the many small deposits, to lend safely a certain part of these deposits, and the interest on these loans is its profit. And this profit is fully earned, for the deposit is a benefit and convenience to the depositor; the loan is profitable to the borrower in the conduct of his business, and the whole community has the benefit of having the capable bank officer employed in the facili-

tation of its business. The profit of the bank then comes not from trading in money, but from the use of its credit and the services of officers, who ought to have, and usually do have, the capacity, the training, and the facilities for attending to certain business, which is of great benefit to the community, but for which the ordinary citizen has neither the training nor the facilities.

In the large cities and thickly-peopled sections it is almost a universal habit to have a bank deposit account. The consequence is that here all the popular banks have deposits amounting to several times, and often to very many times, their capital. Whenever they are able to lend of these deposits freely they are able to earn good dividends for the stockholders, or pay good interest if they are chartered as Savings banks. But with such large lines to be loaned the managers of these institutions find it difficult to secure plenty of good short-time paper, and still they cannot afford to have their deposits lie idle. They must have the funds earning something, and they must have a fair proportion of their loans where they can be readily realized upon. Hence has grown up the system of call loans, which is undoubtedly a natural growth from existing conditions and as such may not be criticised.

#### THE SYSTEM OF LOANING MONEY ON CALL.

The call-loan system has some features which are essentially bad. As a rule such loans are made upon stocks and bonds which are listed on the stock exchanges, and hence are made largely to the men whose business is purely speculation in fluctuations of prices for stocks and bonds. This speculative business may be very beneficial to the operators, but the public does not and will not believe that it is a benefit to the whole country, like the ordinary commercial business of mining, manufacturing and commerce. But under the call-loan system the speculator in stocks and bonds gets the means for his operations in easy times at perhaps half the interest rate paid by those engaged in the more useful business of handling the actual products of farm, mine or factory. It is probable, too, that such call loans really run longer time on the average than commercial time loans. The low rate of interest and the ease of borrowing on good stock collateral stimulate the operator to over-trading. All this is in easy times; when the pendulum swings the other way, as it inevitably will from time to time always, loans are called at the very time when it is most difficult or quite impossible to pay them, the market rate for money goes up and up and still up, and we have a panic. The call-loan system is surely a *very* panic breeder.

These city banks with their large deposits and with the need for circulating notes in their constituencies reduced to a minimum by the very general use of checks, do not require note-issue privileges. This is proved by the number of large city banks that own only as many United States bonds as are required by law, and have not taken out circulation on them. It is further proved by the fact that so large a percentage of National bank notes presented for redemption comes from the large city banks that use the redemption bureau for building up the necessary legal reserve against their deposit liabilities.

But the case of the country bank is very different from the big city neighbor; the constituency it serves is different, the functions it must perform are different, its needs are different. The country bank cannot expect and does not have a large line of deposits as a rule. It has been sneeringly said that this is because their constituency is too poor to have anything to deposit, and this is perhaps true about some unfortunate sections which ought to have kindly help rather than sneers. But it is not true as to a very large part of the country which needs and demands better banking facilities. The check system can be fully developed only where the business of the community centers at a banking town and where the exchanges between banking towns are quick, easy and convenient. The market gardener who goes to town

several times a week will readily accept a check and will likely deposit it in bank ; but the wheat or tobacco or cotton grower who goes to town only occasionally when he must, wants currency for what he may sell at the country store and uses currency to pay his laborers or his neighbors. You may say this is because they have not been well educated to the advantages of the check and deposit system ; but I say that the opinions of men in one section will not overcome the fixed habits of another, and that wherever we find fixed habits we may as well admit that they are the result of what that section has found experimentally to be the best for itself. Laws will not change fixed habits without a strain, but the wise legislator will make the laws to fit the habits and needs of all sections, as far as possible.

It is in just these sections where the deposit lines are small, and the use of circulation relatively large, that it is important for banks to have liberal note-issue privileges, both because these banks need to use their credit in this way as a source of profit, and because their constituencies want just this kind of accommodation. It is a fact beyond controversy that the rural sections do want their local banks to have freer note-issue privileges, and if Congress continues to refuse compliance with what they consider their just and reasonable demands, we will surely see the repeal of the ten per cent. tax on State bank issues and a pestilent crop of State bank notes. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the important advantages of a national system, but I conceive that next to a depreciated currency there is nothing worse than a heterogeneous currency. On general principles, and especially with reference to the solvency of banks, it makes no difference whether they use their credit with depositors on open account, or by the issue of certificates of deposit, or the issue of circulating notes ; but it is the duty of the general Government to keep its hand on note issues in so far as may be necessary to give to the whole country a circulating medium that will be uniform, safe and convenient.

What, then, is the position of the country banks to-day? They can not make any investments in call loans because their *clientele* as a rule do not own stocks and bonds, and even if they did the banks cannot afford to make loans at call-loan rates out of the limited funds at command. They must lend their capital and small deposits at not less than six per cent. in order to earn expenses and declare a six per cent. dividend. Some critics say that "if the country really needed more banking facilities, there would be more banks established and the public served at cheaper rates." But the answer to this is, that if existing banks cannot as a rule earn more than six per cent. dividends under existing conditions, the business is not sufficiently profitable to attract more capital into it.

The only way to make it more attractive to capital, to enlarge the scope of existing institutions and to increase the number of banks, and in these several ways give the rural sections better and cheaper facilities, is to give banks the right to issue notes against their assets under proper regulations. But our city friends would say, bring us good collaterals or endorsed bills and we will furnish you all the money you want to do all the business you can command. In fact, when a country bank has loaned a normal and safe portion of its assets on time paper, of which I venture to say a good part will be short time paper, and as good of its kind as any in the world, and there then comes any additional call for accommodation, the only way to meet this call is through rediscounts, and this is largely done of necessity. But I contend that it is bad practice. There is no greater fallacy than that a successful, satisfactory business can be done on rediscounts, if such paper is going to come home for payment. It is all right and safe to rediscount grain or cotton bills, based on shipments with bill of lading attached, or merchandise acceptances payable at distant points ; but only in cases of extreme necessity should a banker rediscount bills which are likely to "come home to roost." If he allows himself to be beguiled into the practice by his natural ambition to care for all the good business that offers, or

by the generous and very flattering disposition of his correspondents when money is very easy in the large centers, he is sure to suffer when the inevitable tight time comes. Of course the city banks will demand payment of all maturing paper when they themselves are straitened, or when they can make call loans on undoubted collaterals at panic rates. It is just in this way that the country banks have to suffer from panics bred in the cities, and bred by city methods of doing business. Country banks may be badly managed at times, and break sometimes; but they do not have panics, except by radiation from the centers. And though country banks be badly managed at times, and break sometimes, the whole class should not thereby be discredited, for as a rule the country banker is just as able in his field and just as successful in his environment, relatively, as his more ambitious neighbor.

**COUNTRY BANKS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE NOTES BASED ON THEIR  
GENERAL ASSETS.**

The conclusion of the whole matter is that the country banks need and should have the privilege of issuing circulating notes based on their assets, and that their constituencies need and demand the facilities which can only be secured in this way. The whole subject of basing notes upon general assets is too large to be treated in this paper, and has been exhaustively discussed in the Report of the Monetary Commission. I had the honor to be a member of that commission, and stand by its findings as a whole; but I conceive that it is no disloyalty to my colleagues to offer some personal reflections on the proper security for bank notes based upon assets.

I submit, therefore, first, that such note issues ought to be carefully guarded, supervised and guaranteed by the general Government; second, that the privilege is a valuable one, which will easily bear a tax large enough to create a fund out of which the Government should redeem the notes of all insolvent banks on presentation; third, that the Comptroller, or other proper officer of the Government, should file with the Receiver of any insolvent bank a claim for the whole outstanding issue of its notes and that this claim should participate in distribution of dividends equally with all other creditors; fourth, that the protection of the note holder would be fully provided for in this way, without any injustice to or discrimination against depositors or other creditors; fifth, that a tax amply sufficient to secure the payment of all notes of insolvent banks without decreasing the dividends to depositors would be a distinct benefit to country banks rather than a burden.

1. No one has seriously proposed to give individuals the right to issue circulating notes, and no one questions the position that corporations can exercise this function only by grace of legislative charter. State legislatures can unquestionably grant such rights to corporations, but it is well settled to-day that Congress can control or overrule State charters by the ten per cent. tax or otherwise. There is nothing more truly and broadly national in its character than the money of a country, and I hold that the duty of providing an ample, safe, convenient and satisfactory circulation is one of which the national legislature cannot divest itself. We have recently seen how dissatisfaction with existing conditions brought a large portion of the people to support the proposition for the free coinage of silver at the ratio 16 to 1, and how narrowly we escaped its enactment. This proposition is not likely to be urged again vigorously, because it was never grounded on the convictions of the masses. It was promulgated by the silver mine owners of the West, and adopted by the politicians as a possible winning card; but it lost, and lost issues are usually dead, unless they happen to be deep rooted in the hearts of the masses. It is more likely that pure greenbackism will be the issue in 1900—or still more likely, free State banking. Certainly one of these issues will have to be met, unless Congress meanwhile gives the country a satisfactory measure of currency and banking reform.

The admirable management of the Comptroller's office under the present system, and the efficient working of the Redemption Division, have proved that we have good machinery for managing the paper currency of the country, and that this machinery would merely need some adjustment to meet any changes that may be made.

2. As noted above, it makes no difference on general principles whether a bank uses its credit in the line of deposits or note issues. But practically it makes a great difference to the bank, whether its deposits are few, large and likely to be soon called; or many, small and so scattered that they will have to be met but slowly and in small amounts. Let us take extreme cases by way of illustration. Suppose a bank of \$100,000 capital had one depositor of \$100,000, it could be closed any day if it attempted to lend this deposit; but suppose it had 1,000 depositors of \$100 each average, it could safely do business on the assumption that 85 per cent. of these deposits would remain with it, because what one depositor drew out another would return.

But \$100,000 in circulating notes would likely be in the pockets of 2,000, and possibly of 5,000 people, and if they bore the guaranty of the Government, they would pass from hand to hand many times before they were returned for redemption. The average life of the note outstanding would probably be two years, and the bank could afford to pay a tax on such note, just as it would willingly pay interest on a deposit on certificate to be left two years. Such taxes could not be better applied by the Government than in the creation of a fund for redeeming the notes of insolvent banks.

3. Upon the failure of any bank, the Comptroller should file with the Receiver a claim for all the notes of that bank outstanding, which claim would be of equal standing and dignity with the claims of depositors and all other general debts of the concern, and participate equally with them in the distribution of dividends from the general assets. Thus only the deficit after final liquidation would come out of the fund raised by taxation of the notes.

4. The note holder would be better protected even than by the present system, which assumes that the note is specially secured by a Government bond. Fortunately our Government bonds are and have been ample security for the notes that are issued against them, but it is quite conceivable that bonds might decline in value under stress of war, or other national calamity, so that their value might not pay even ninety per cent. of notes, and under the present system there is nothing more to look to but the assets of the individual insolvent bank. But under the proposed system, all the solvent banks would be paying their taxes on circulation into what would really be equivalent to a mutual insurance fund for redemption of notes of the few insolvent banks. What this fund would soon amount to cannot even be conjectured, but with even a moderate tax it would soon be very large, and there is no apparent reason why the surplus, over and above some safe figure to be fixed by Congress, should not be covered into the general Treasury. The objection that to make the notes of an insolvent bank a first lien on its assets would work an injustice to the depositors, will be entirely obviated by this plan.

5. As noted above, the city banks do not need note issues for their own home business, but if they were authorized to issue them without tax, they would keep out all they could float in the rural sections, and to this extent their own natural home field would be taken away from the country banks, who need just this particular field in which to use their credit, as an offset to the advantage of position enjoyed by their city competitors. The measure of cost which would prevent city banks from issuing notes in normal times would be the market rate for call loans; for instance, if a bank had a number of outstanding call loans at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., it would not incur the liability for note issues at a tax of  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. and the expenses of the Redemption Division, especially in view of the fact that the notes of city banks come back more rapidly for redemption than those of country banks. But the country bank can well afford to pay  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. tax on notes that it can

lend at 6 per cent., especially if this tax keeps the city competitor out of the field. Hitherto I have spoken of per cent. per annum, but to make the system thoroughly elastic, and as it were automatic, the tax should be charged up monthly by the Comptroller against every bank on the amount of its notes outstanding on a certain day in that month; and it should be a progressive tax, so that in easy times what might be called the normal amount of notes would be issued at the minimum rate; a further amount would be issued in tight times at a higher rate, which might still be strictly healthy business; and then a still further amount available, which might be called an emergency issue, at so high a rate that it would only be used temporarily, like the five per cent. issues of the Imperial Bank of Germany.

I would suggest as a proper tax on bank notes issued on general assets: One-tenth of one per cent. per month on issues to an amount equal to fifty per cent. of the capital of the bank; two-tenths of one per cent. per month on issues exceeding fifty and up to seventy-five per cent. of the capital of the bank; four-tenths of one per cent. per month on issues exceeding seventy-five per cent. and up to one hundred per cent. of the capital of the bank.

The most of the country banks now have outstanding circulation only to the minimum allowed by law; that is, ninety per cent. of the par value of bonds equal to twenty-five per cent. of their capital, because at present there is no profit to them on this circulation. If allowed to do so, they would generally convert these bond-secured issues into asset issues, and increase them to an amount equal to fifty per cent. of their capital under a tax of one-tenth per cent. per month, because it would be profitable to them to do so. Their constituencies would have the benefit of more money in circulation, and it would have a tendency to stay at home, which tendency would have some material advantages as over against the present system. The proposition that this currency would tend to stay at home may be questioned, but I believe it to be true, and it is based on the further proposition, that because it will be to the interest of the country bank to keep out more of its own notes, it will send more of the notes of the city banks in for redemption. Now country banks send in but few notes for redemption, because as a rule the country is short of currency. As noted above, the practice of the city banks now is to send notes in freely to make legal reserves. A more ample supply of currency, too, would naturally tend to more rapid and frequent redemptions, because there will be more times and places when and where it is redundant. Thus in several directions there would be a tendency to more rapid redemption, which would be very healthy; for the best test and safeguard of a good currency as a whole, and of any part of it, is rapid and frequent redemption in gold or its equivalent.

If the banks are authorized to issue notes on assets, the Comptroller should have a large measure of discretion as to whether he would issue notes to any particular bank about whose solvency and good management he had any doubts. If he noted that any bank habitually kept out the notes that cost it  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. or more per annum, or frequently issued notes which cost it five per cent. or more per annum, he would at once thereby be put upon enquiry, and it should then be his duty to make a special investigation into the condition of that concern.

As it has been proposed to charge up the tax monthly on a certain day, it should be allowed any bank to discharge its liability and provide for the retirement of its own notes, by the deposit with the Government of the notes of any bank, or any form of lawful money, during that month.

We may differ as to details, but after all details may not be material; and the essential point is that all friends of sound currency and banking reform should unite and work together until we shall have secured for the country the very best that is attainable.

JOHN W. FRIES.

SALEM, N. C., January 20, 1890.

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

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### *A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL POINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.*

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#### ORGANIZING A NATIONAL BANK.

The new bank having now chosen its officers and its force of employees, and secured the necessary banking room, it became necessary to contract for the furniture and fittings, such as counters, desks, wire cages for the tellers, partitions, safes, etc. As there was no vault in the banking room, and they were not likely to have any until they built their own bank building, it was thought best to have two safes, a large one with ordinary combination lock for the books and papers, and a much smaller one for the tellers' and Cashier's safe to contain the money and securities, which should be fitted with a time lock. An excellent second-hand safe for the books was found at one-third the usual price, and one of the best and most modern patterns of safes with time lock bought for the money and securities.

It is poor economy to buy anything but the best in the way of safes for the security of the money and valuables of a bank, and many excellent ones are now made with double combinations, which together with the time lock gives greater security.

The next thing to be considered in our new bank was the necessary books and stationery.

#### BOOKS AND RECORDS OF THE BANK.

In no other line of business is it so necessary to have the daily transactions carefully and completely recorded as in a bank, and very naturally so, for the bank is the custodian of the property of other people. In consequence of the competition between banks, especially in our large cities, it becomes extremely necessary to be able to determine readily the value of the individual accounts and of the foreign bank accounts, and particularly those which ask for or expect accommodations. The competition mentioned is exerted in two ways—one to attract depositors, and the other to attract borrowers.

Banks cannot be expected to operate without profit any more than other kinds of business, and to be able to judge readily of the sources of profits or losses requires a careful system of accounts.

The officers of a bank should be able to learn daily the amount and character of their assets and liabilities; the condition of any depositor's accounts; the character and amount of their loans; the amount of matured paper; the amount of their indebtedness to other banks or other banks to them; and to keep close track of their running expenses, and of their profit items. They should also be able to see at a glance the amount and character of the currency on hand, and in case of a National bank the amount on deposit with the reserve agent or agents, and be thereby enabled to judge of the condition of the bank's reserve which it is obliged by law to keep.

It is often necessary to know readily the amount of unmatured loans to any one individual or company that are on hand, also the amount of liability to the bank of

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\* Continued from the January number, page 67. This series of articles commenced in the *MAGAZINE* for August, 1898, page 249.

individuals as endorsers. It is also necessary to be able to keep track of the items sent away for collection, also of the various forms of indebtedness represented by certificates of stock, certificates of deposit, Cashier's checks, clearing-house due bills, etc., and to be able to do all this properly requires a carefully-prepared system of accounts. Whatever the system is it should be so complete that the work in each department can be closed every day, after business hours, and a statement of the bank's condition furnished the officers.

As regards the care in making the records, I would advise that they be made so clearly and self-explanatory that in case sudden death should overtake any of the officers or employees no difficulty would be encountered.

Many banks make a mistake in permitting too much abbreviation in writing up the records. It often enables the clerks to leave the bank a little earlier in the day, but something more than this should be considered, for this habit is often the beginning of loose and careless methods, which should have no place in a bank.

The methods to be employed in keeping the records of a bank will vary according to the locality and the volume of business transacted, but whatever they are they should never be complicated.

Those for a country bank can of course be very much more simple than those in a large city bank, and in the description of the books, blanks, and methods I shall endeavor to give such forms as may be found most generally useful.

Before treating of forms one very important point should be observed, and that is neatness and cleanliness in the work. Few things look worse in a bank and reflect upon the management, more than dirty, blotted, scratched-up books and records.

The principal books of record for a bank are the minute book, stock certificate book, stock register and transfer book, stock ledger, general cash book or journal, general ledger, daily statement book, certificate of deposit register, draft register, Cashier's check register, individual or deposit ledger, check and deposit scratchers, discount register, discount ledger (sometimes called credit ledger, or liability ledger) offering book, note tickler, collection register, collection tickler, tellers' cash settlement books, proof book, dividend book.

Each department also has certain blank forms for various purposes, which will be fully described.

It is always best to have the books for a bank made to order. Select a reliable maker, one accustomed to making bank books, and have them made of good paper and well and heavily bound, particularly the ledgers. It is a good plan to have the books made several weeks, or even months, before needed for use, and place them under some weight to season, they will then wear better. Where ledgers are used of other systems than the "Boston," or those similar to it, it is particularly important to have them on hand some time before needed, that they may be properly spaced off alphabetically and according to the vowels and all preparations made for the transferring of accounts when the proper time arrives.

I cannot advise the use of ledgers made with loose or removable leaves, because, with the experience I have had, I consider that their use in a bank brings with it an element of temptation and danger which no bank should allow. With the best system there will always be more or less danger, and I consider it wrong to bring into a bank any more temptations than can possibly be avoided.

Besides the necessary books and blanks for properly caring for the business of a bank, great assistance has been derived from certain mechanical labor-saving contrivances, among which I will mention the typewriter, the registering accountant or adding machine, and the telephone. The typewriter has been so long in use that a description of it is hardly necessary. It has come to be almost as necessary an adjunct to a well-managed bank, in its great assistance in the correspondence, as the



telephone, and except in small towns, every bank has a telephone. In fact in many small towns the banks have telephonic connection so that by the long-distance call they can talk with banks at considerable distance, and often save both time and trouble.

The registering accountant, or adding machine, is of comparatively more recent introduction, but I think I can safely say it has proved itself one of the most useful instruments ever introduced to the banks. In the saving of time and labor it has become almost indispensable, especially in a busy bank.

It consists of a metal and glass case, size 9 x 11 x 15 inches, enclosing sets of type for figures so arranged that they are worked by a series of keys. At the back is a roll of paper, which unrolls automatically as fast as printed. Any size paper can be used from the full-size letter sheet to a narrow strip  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inches wide.

The keys represent the various numbers, and are so well arranged in columns representing dollars and cents, up to the millions, that their use is exceedingly easy to learn. By striking the keys lightly the proper figures are printed upon the sheet or strip in a regular column, and the most wonderful part is that when the column is completed a proper movement of an attachment to the machine instantly prints the correct footing at the bottom. And this will be found to be mechanically correct. To show how quickly the work can be done I have before me a column of figures measuring  $17\frac{1}{2}$  inches in length, the figures ranging in size from \$1.80 to \$100,000.00, and the total footing being \$211,865.63, and the time occupied to perform the whole was one and one-half minutes.

At an average speed 2,000 amounts an hour can be recorded and added. The most rapid record is, I believe, 3,500 an hour.

The chief uses for this machine have been found to be in the recording and adding of checks on slips in the balancing of pass books; recording of checks on slips, or on the envelopes for the clearing-house exchanges, taking off trial balances, especially of the individual ledger; taking off lists of the discounted paper for an examining committee; making lists of teller's cash items; listing the checks received from the clearing-house; recording the amounts on the letters of items to be sent through the mail. One of the chief aids, as stated before, being that in every instance when the column is completed the machine can be made to record the correct footing instantly. The machine will also duplicate by making carbon copies, which is sometimes desirable.

In taking off proof balances of individual ledgers, covering several thousand accounts, I have generally taken the items off on slips about three or four feet long, the machine correctly adding each strip, then making a summary by the machine of the various strips.

Our new bank, being a progressive institution, was disposed to be well supplied with all the time and labor-saving appliances possible, feeling that such a course was really true economy, and would enable them to transact more business in a better and more prompt and complete manner.

BANK EXAMINER.

(To be continued.)

### NAMES OF NATIONAL BANKS.

The selection of a suitable name for a new bank is frequently a difficult matter to determine. In this connection a study of the names of National banks will be found interesting, and will also reveal some peculiarities. The State banks that came into the National system preferred to retain their well-known names, incorporating the word national with the old title. Not less than twenty call themselves the National State bank of such and such a State. The First National Bank is the favorite designation, and not without reason. The title itself presupposes, though

not always correctly, a seniority in the matter of organization. And in the smaller towns a considerable amount of business comes through the mails to the First National Bank simply on account of its designation.

It may be noted here that when a new bank is organized the title chosen is subject to approval by the Comptroller of the Currency. In a town where there is one or more banks already organized, but none of them having the title First National, it is understood that the Comptroller's office will not now sanction the choice of that title by a new bank against the objection of another bank already organized.

Among other titles that of Citizens' comes easily ahead, there being over a hundred with that designation. Next come some ninety entitled People's and some fourscore called by the name of the Merchants'. Indeed the commercial interest is by no means neglected in the choosing of names, as witness the following: Traders' (10), Commercial and Farmers', Mercantile (3), Merchants and Farmers (4), Merchants and Manufacturers' (3), Importers and Traders', Tradesmen's (5), Merchants and Planters' (4), Exchange (34), Merchants' Exchange, American Exchange (3), First National Exchange, Commercial (34), Shoe and Leather, Hide and Leather, Corn Exchange, Commerce (14), Market, and last, but not least, the Bankers National Bank. Nor have the farmers been forgotten. One bank is called the Agricultural, and over sixty proclaim themselves as the Farmers' National Bank. Then come a number of Farmers in various company, to wit: Farmers and Mechanics' (9), Farmers and Traders', Farmers and Drovers', Farmers and Planters', Farmers and Manufacturers', Farmers and Producers', Farmers and Merchants' (8), Planters', Planters and Mechanics', Fruit Growers', Live Stock, Stock Growers' (2) and Landholders'. The Manufacturers come out strong with some seventeen banks and the Mechanics with a dozen or more, and two additional which prefer the ancient orthography Mechanicks'. Then we have the Mechanics and Traders', the Machinists', Drovers and Mechanics', Leather Manufacturers', Drovers', Butchers and Drovers', Tanners', Miners', Lumbermens' (3) and one Lumberman's. Patriotism has also found expression in our bank nomenclature. There are Union banks to the number of nearly fifty and five United States banks. Then there are others, Columbia (5), American (16), State (20), City (53), Metropolitan (4), America, Republic, Centennial, North America, Bunker Hill, Faneuil Hall, and Commonwealth. Sentiment finds expression in such names as Liberty, Government, Home (9), Independence, Enterprise, Mutual and United. There are four banks called Capital and one which prefers Capitol. The expansionists may take pleasure in knowing that there is a bank called the Asiatic. We also find the names, Havana and Scotland. And, on the same line, the Globe and the Continental (5), and the Western (16). Then, too, there are deep water names in the list, Marine (5), Ocean (2), an Atlantic and (3) Pacific. Not to be behindhand in claiming seniority in date of organization nine banks rejoice in the name of the Old National Bank. Some score or more indicate their relation to their neighbors by calling themselves the Central National Bank. Our fellow citizens from across the water are appealed to by such names as Hibernia, German (12), Germania, American-German, and German-American (6). The names Equitable, Security and Fidelity are guarantees of the character of the institutions which they adorn, while Safety Fund may be taken as a name by itself. Half a dozen banks are called Phenix and there are a Consolidated and a Consolidation. Nor have the banks in their nomenclature been lacking in respect to our public men. Four bear the honored name of Washington and six or seven that of Lincoln. Among others we find the names of Adams, Franklin, John Hancock, and Gallatin and Hamilton, the great financiers, and Roger Williams and Penn, Eliot, Winthrop, Everett, Webster and Chase are likewise honored. Garfield, Maury and Greeley are commemorated, and to one National bank good Queen Anne has given her royal name.

## OUTLOOK FOR AN AMERICAN BANK IN JAPAN.

The total value of commodities exported from Japan to the United States of America in each of the years from 1893 to 1897 has been as follows :

*Value of Exports of Commodities from Japan to the United States, 1893-1897.*

YEARS.	Value in silver yen.
1893.....	27,789,458.81
1894.....	42,823,557.06
1895.....	54,028,950.20
1896.....	81,532,341.13
1897.....	52,426,404.48

Besides commodities there were exported from Japan to the United States gold and silver coin and bullion, as follows :

*Gold and Silver Coin and Bullion Exported from Japan to the United States, 1893-1897.*

YEARS.	Value in silver yen.
1893.....	53,615.78
1894.....	52,176.96
1895.....	844.97
1896.....	281,763.87
1897.....	13,089.00

The total value of commodities imported into Japan from the United States in the years named was as given below :

*Value of Commodities Imported into Japan from the United States, 1893-1897.*

YEARS.	Value in silver yen
1893.....	6,090,408.40
1894.....	10,982,558.44
1895.....	9,276,390.35
1896.....	16,373,419.85
1897.....	27,080,537.56

Besides commodities there were imported into Japan from the United States gold and silver coin and bullion, as follows :

*Gold and Silver Coin and Bullion Imported into Japan from the United States, 1893-1897.*

YEARS.	Value in silver yen.
1893.....	2,667,310.22
1894.....	9,113,754.61
1895.....	483,779.98
1896.....	5,842,130.98
1897.....	1,961,617.05

For the ten months ending October 31, 1898, the total value of commodities exported from Japan to the United States, Hawaii, and the Philippines, was as follows : To the United States, 86,525,816.06 silver yen ; to Hawaii, 514,442.12 silver yen ; to the Philippines, 70,571.53 silver yen.

During the same period there were exported to the United States (none to Hawaii or the Philippines), gold and silver coin and bullion to the value of 8,872,488.16 silver yen.

During the same period the total value of commodities imported into Japan from those countries was as follows : From the United States, 33,261,762.40 silver yen ; from Hawaii, 3,146.48 silver yen ; from the Philippines, 2,489,234.56 silver yen.

No coin or bullion was imported from either of the three countries during this year in such a way as to bring them within the scope of the Japanese customs returns.

It will be noticed that there is a heavy falling off in exports to the United States in 1898. The explanation of this is found in the business reported in rice, tea, and raw silk. Of these articles the export value for the ten months ending October 31, 1898, is 24,675,279 silver yen. against 31,002,019.17 silver yen for the same period in 1897. This, of course, is owing, in part to the duties imposed in the United States as a war measure, and in part to the curtailment of business as a natural consequence of the war.

It is not an easy matter to convert these figures, in Japanese silver yen, into United States gold dollars (which is a desirable thing to do in order that they may be more intelligible to the American reader), since the rate of exchange has varied constantly until October 1, 1897, when Japan adopted the gold standard. In 1898 the value of a Japanese silver yen was about sixty-five (65) cents in our money. From that time it varied with the price of silver bullion, gradually declining until October, 1897, but since then it has been fairly steady at about forty-nine and a-half (49½) cents, although our mint valuation has been persistently higher, viz., .498. The value of the annual trade between Japan and the United States and her colonies is easily between 45,000,000 and 50,000,000 gold dollars now, and it is not likely to decrease. On the contrary, with anything like reasonable development of the trade and industries of the Philippines, it is sure to increase. In the single item of coal, the export to those islands from Japan must be very large in the future, and this is almost a new branch of Japan's coal trade, for the quantity exported in 1897 was only 16,850 tons valued at 82,822 yen, and since the armistice nearly that much was shipped in 1898, while we know that arrangements have been made for heavy shipments in the near future, and to be kept up indefinitely.

To be sure we must look for considerable diminution in the volume of business between Japan and Hawaii, since the bulk of that business in the past has been due to the presence of thirty thousand Japanese laborers in the Hawaiian Islands, and the disfranchisement of those who are now there, with the cessation of emigration, must tend to curtail the business; that it may not develop into much larger proportions along other lines with the changed conditions, is too much to say now. But, on the other hand, the success which is attending the efforts of American manufacturers to exploit trade in Japan bids fair to bring the balance to an equilibrium.

The whole of this large business now passes through the hands of non-American bankers, mostly English, viz.: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; paid-up capital, \$10,000,000; reserve fund, \$9,000,000. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; capital, £800,000; reserve fund, £450,000. National Bank of China, capital, £432,000. Russo-Chinese Bank, capital, 6,000,000 gold roubles (£960,000). Yokohama Specie Bank (Japanese), capital, 10,500,000 yen; reserve fund, 6,960,000 yen.

These five banks are actively engaged in foreign exchange business, and are well equipped with *their own* agencies abroad, the Hong Kong and Shanghai, the Chartered, and the Specie, being particularly well represented in the United States.

Besides these there are several other Japanese banks that are bidding for a share of the business, viz.: The One Hundredth, Ltd., capital, 400,000 yen; reserve fund, 803,220 yen. Eighteenth, Ltd., capital, 1,000,000 yen; reserve fund, 338,168 yen. Mitsui, a private unlimited liability bank; capital, 5,000,000 yen; reserve fund, 3,230,000 yen. Capital in each instance is fully paid.

It may well be that other capitalists have designs upon the monopoly which the Hong Kong and Shanghai and the Chartered held for so many years. The wonder is that no American bankers have entered the field, for the profits are enormous;

the dividends paid to shareholders range from ten to twenty per cent., and the business is exceptionally free from risks. It cannot be said that the history of banking in the Far East is without record of disaster; but such have always been due to foolish excursions into domains outside the bank's legitimate sphere, or to deliberate rascality on the part of too-much trusted servants.

In the strictest sense of the word the existing monetary institutions in Japan are not bankers at all, but merely note brokers, and for the limited accommodation they grant, they exact a heavy commission. (I do not wish to seem flippant, but I have heard them all stigmatized as "shaving-shops" many times.) The usual difference between the selling and the buying rates for demand drafts is always wide enough to leave a comfortable margin for the banker; but between the selling rate for bank demand drafts and the rate at which the bank buys commercial paper drawn against shipments at the customary usance of four months sight, the difference is anywhere from one and a half to three per cent., according to circumstances. If shipments be heavy and remittances light, so that there is difficulty in selling the bank's drafts to cover the disbursements to merchants, the rate is advanced to the great disadvantage of the seller of private bills, and at all times favors are refused save to customers who are always loyal, buying and selling alike, no matter what momentary advantage is offered by a rival bank.

We, in America, are accustomed to receive from our bankers reasonable accommodation in the matter of collecting checks and drafts on other cities than that wherein our own bank is situated, and I think we should resent as an impertinence any dictation as to our buying foreign exchange where it can be had upon the most favorable terms; and, best of all, we do receive civility from the officers of our banks. Out here in the Far East it is very different. Bank managers, agents, tellers, and clerks are autocratic to a degree, and notoriously uncivil. By way of illustration: A draft drawn by a reputable country bank in Pennsylvania upon Messrs. Kountze Bros., New York, was offered for sale to the Manager of the largest English bank in Japan by an old customer, and was refused because the Manager did not know anything about either the drawer or *the drawees!* He took the draft for collection and agreed to have the payment advised by cable at *the customer's expense*. When payment was duly notified, he charged for a cable message of five words at an expense of nearly five yen a word, when three words would have been sufficient; converted the amount of the draft at a rate one-half of one per cent. above the current rate, and charged one-half of one per cent. for collecting.

Again: The bank demand rate for drafts on China was 75½ sen Japanese per Mexican dollar. A gentleman in a Japanese port having to meet a draft drawn in Tientsin for some 240 Mexicans, was charged *par* by the bank holding the bill, because, forsooth, he kept his account with an opposition bank.

Instances of this kind could be enumerated indefinitely.

There would seem to be a fine opening for American bank capital in Japan, even if the business were restricted to buying and selling exchange on the United States. But there is no reason for such restriction, if the bankers will undertake to be fairly liberal, for the merchants of all nationalities (English included) are positively groaning under the exactions of the existing conditions, and a full share of the *entire* business might easily be controlled by a good American bank.

The volume of Japan's trade in commodities, specie and bullion in the years named amounted to:

YEARS.	Amount in silver yen.
1886 .....	201,445,608.16
1894 .....	291,890,805.00
1895 .....	298,548,619.27
1896 .....	340,258,826.98
1897 .....	488,121,724.49

(Some allowance must be made for the importation of a part of the Chinese indemnity last year.) It will be seen that there must have been a large amount of money made by the banks in financing this business.

No serious apprehension need be felt as to the conditions which will exist after the 17th of next July when the revised treaties become operative, and extra-territorial jurisdiction of consuls is abolished. At present banks, like all citizens and subjects of treaty powers, are amenable to the laws of their own countries, administered (when the bank is defendant) by consuls; under the new treaties, it is contended, banks (as well as all merchants, traders, and industrial and commercial enterprises) will have to keep their books open to the inspection of the Japanese tax-officials, in order that full income and business taxes shall be levied. This need not be feared as unduly offensive, and, indeed, it is not yet positive that this inspection will be enforced, for the treaties are reciprocal, and the agencies of Japanese banks in the United States are not subjected to any annoyance in this way. It is most improbable that the Japanese Government will be so short sighted as to enforce odious regulations which would tend to drive out from this country the large amount of foreign banking capital which is now employed, and which is of absolute, vital necessity to Japan's foreign trade. Besides, these revised treaties are tentative for a period of five years, and should their conditions prove to be too irksome or their administration be unsatisfactory, they may be abrogated before becoming final, and the nationals of the other country return to the restricted privileges, but lessened responsibilities of the present state of affairs.

A most pernicious system which has taken firm hold upon the mercantile community, and which is improperly fostered by the foreign banks, is that of employing exchange brokers. A merchant desires to ship, say, 100,000 yen worth of silk. Instead of himself arranging with his bankers for the required advance with which to buy, pack, and ship, and agreeing to deliver the shipping documents with his drafts against them to the bank—as should be done—the bank requires him to employ a broker to settle the rate of exchange and to fix the time of shipment, the merchant paying a brokerage of  $\frac{1}{8}$  of one per cent. Conversely, when the merchant has to remit the proceeds of imported goods sold in Japan, the broker is again employed, the bank, in this case, nominally paying the same brokerage for selling the drafts; but, as a matter of fact, as will be readily guessed, the rate the merchant is made to pay saves the bank's purse. I do not say anything about the "gossiping" tendency of the brokers, whereby many an important secret has been divulged, as that is only a frailty of human nature.

If an American bank be opened in Japan, it should set its face rigidly against this brokerage system by giving to its customers precisely the same buying rate that it names to the brokers, and by giving those customers the benefit of the  $\frac{1}{8}$  which it now pays to the brokers. A matter of  $\frac{1}{8}$  of one per cent. seems but a small item in one transaction, but it amounts to a handicap of \$62,500 on fifty millions.

Another evil of the present system of banking in Japan, is the employment of Chinese "Shroffs," and this burden has been permitted to lay itself upon mercantile houses as well. These men perform the actual duties of Cashier and tellers. To them is entrusted the cash, they are held responsible for the same, and are required to see that no counterfeit or bad money is received. A customer makes a deposit, the drafts and checks are scrutinized by the foreign clerk, and this is one of the times when the bad manners come out most glaringly, but the clerk scorns to touch the actual money. A Shroff is called to do that, and too often he takes advantage of the opportunity to vent his personal spite or make a "squeeze." The Shroff is utterly useless, and by requiring the tellers to perform all their duty, a heavy expense can be easily dispensed with. The opportunity to play such tricks as the following should not be permitted: A gentleman arrived at Nagasaki from Shang-

hai with a number of clean Mexican dollars in his pocket. These are not current in Japan, and he exchanged them at an English bank for, what he thought, were bills of the Bank of Japan, paying the discount of something like twelve sen on each Mexican. He received from the Shroff a pile of bills, the top and bottom ones being Japanese. At Kobe he discovered that mixed in with the Japanese bank notes were five one *dollar* notes of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation of Hong Kong, which were refused, except at the above-named discount. He kept the notes until his return to Nagasaki, when he asked at the same bank for restitution. The English agent and clerk were unable to trace the transaction, and the Shroff, of course, professed entire ignorance. He was told, most insultingly, that his charge was false, and it was intimated to him very plainly that he was trying to take advantage of the bank. The Shroff perpetrated a "squeeze" of perhaps fifty or sixty sen, and the bank sustained him, thereby losing a good customer.

I have purposely refrained from speaking of the possibilities for an American bank in China, where the volume of trade, the needs of the schemes for internal improvement, and other matters, present even greater attractions than does Japan, but the propriety of entering that field must be patent.

Above all things, if our capitalists decide to establish an American bank in the Far East, let them see to it that Managers and Agents are men of such ability and dignity that it cannot be said of them as was said of an Englishman: "Oh, if you want any special favor from the X bank, just ask Z (the agent) to tiffin and give him a bottle of good champagne well *frappée*!"

COLLIER.

NAGASAKI, Japan.

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RETURN OF AMERICAN SECURITIES. — A recent issue of the "Wall Street Journal" (New York) contained the following on this topic:

"The comparative statement of our foreign commerce for the calendar year 1896 affords the basis for a rough estimate of the value of American securities returned by foreign holders and sold back to us during the past three years.

The total exports in excess of imports for the calendar years 1896, 1897 and 1898, of merchandise and silver, were \$1,886,755,407. From this deduct \$188,059,858, the net imports of gold for the same period, and there remain \$1,198,695,549.

The invisible balance, made up of interest and dividends on our securities held abroad, freights in foreign vessels, and expenses of Americans travelling or residing abroad, is generally estimated at \$150,000,000 annually. This necessitates a further reduction of \$450,000,000 for the three years, leaving \$748,695,549.

Various estimates have been made of the balance due the United States at the beginning of the current year. That of the "Financial Chronicle" was \$100,000,000, of which \$50,000,000 was carried here through investments in long bills, and \$50,000,000 was on deposit with bankers abroad, being the proceeds of collections of commercial bills.

After making this third subtraction, there remain \$648,695,549, which must be approximately the value of the securities which have come back to us during the past three years.

Some of the best informed financiers think that the estimate of \$150,000,000 annually for the invisible balance is too low. They figure on \$100,000,000 a year for Americans abroad (100,000 tourists at \$1,000 each), about \$50,000,000 for freights, and \$40,000,000 for dividends and interest, while post-office money orders are offset by cash brought here by immigrants and travellers.

Adopting the revised estimate, a further deduction of \$120,000,000 will leave \$528,695,549, which is safely within the actual value of American securities returned since the beginning of 1896, in partial settlement of our credits to the rest of the world.

The amount is enormous, but we have high financial authority for the accuracy of the calculation, and for the statement that the condition of the foreign exchange market during the past three years can be explained in no other way.

The same authority says the gradual increase in the loans of the associated banks of New York, from \$465,580,700 on January 1, 1896, to \$718,308,700 on December 31, 1898, was based to a considerable extent upon the hypothecation of these returned securities, until they could be sold to investors."

## ECONOMISTS ON CURRENCY REFORM.

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At the annual meeting of the American Economic Association held at Cleveland, Ohio, in December, 1897, it was voted to appoint a committee of five to consider and report upon the subject of Currency Reform in the United States. The committee appointed was composed of Professors Taylor of the University of Michigan, Taussig of Harvard University, Jenks of Cornell University, Sherwood of Johns Hopkins University, and Kinley of the University of Illinois. The report of the committee was presented at the meeting of the association in New Haven, Conn., Dec. 29 last. It is given below in full.

*To the American Economic Association:*

Your committee to whom was assigned for consideration the subject of currency reform in the United States, beg leave to report that they have agreed upon a series of statements with respect to the need, the objects, and the methods of such reform, which it is believed would command the assent of economists generally, and which may with advantage be published as embodying what might be called professional opinion. The following propositions, therefore, are submitted, with the recommendation that they be printed as part of the proceedings, but with the express disavowal of any responsibility on the part of the association for the views therein set forth.

### I. THE NEED OF REFORM.

Despite the fact that much improvement has taken place within two or three years, there still exists a real need for monetary and banking reform in the United States. The standard of value upon which the whole system rests is by no means as secure as it should be. The circulating note system is still greatly lacking in elasticity. Adequate banking facilities for newer, or more backward, districts are still wanting. In the system as a whole, there is a notable lack of unity and organization.

In citing the first particular, *i. e.*, the insecurity of the monetary standard, as a proof that currency reform is needed, your committee do not mean to imply that the existing standard is the only possible one, or even the most desirable one. It is merely assumed that, so long as that standard is retained, it should have the utmost possible security; since the unquestioned security of the monetary standard is indispensable to a high degree of industrial prosperity.

It is possible, however, to argue that the defect in question no longer exists—that the stability of the gold standard is now substantially assured. There is unquestionably much force in this contention. Besides a number of temporary circumstances, such as a full Treasury, a large gold reserve, and a favorable trade balance of exceptional amount, several changes of a more permanent character have contributed to the improvement of the situation. We cite particularly the repeal of the provision in the Act of 1890 to issue Treasury notes in purchase of silver, and the insertion in the war revenue bill of a clause which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to make loans at his own discretion to meet temporary deficits. In fact, under the laws now in force, a Secretary who desires to maintain the gold standard need have no difficulty in doing so. But this is only one side of the case. It is equally true that, because of inconsistencies in these same laws, it is possible for a Secretary so disposed, to overthrow the gold standard, even though it continue to be the declared



policy of the Nation to maintain that standard. There thus remains in the situation an element of uncertainty which is needless, and which cannot but prove harmful.

As respects the need for elasticity in the note system, next to nothing has been gained. In the first place, we still retain for our bank circulation the system of bond security, and under that system it is in the nature of the case extremely difficult, if not impossible, to secure in the currency that prompt and easy adjustment of volume to need which constitutes genuine elasticity. In defense of this statement much might be said, but it may suffice to call attention to a single consideration. If bank circulation is to be elastic, the assets which are required as a security for that circulation must be such as a bank ordinarily has in its possession; since, in a stringency when expansion is needed, the bank already has its resources locked up, and consequently can not without great difficulty get hold of new assets. But government bonds are not a kind of assets which banks will, or usually ought to, have on hand in considerable amounts. The special office of banks is to provide funds for the everyday business of the country, *i. e.*, to invest their resources, not in a supply of bonds to furnish the basis of a possible issue of notes, but in commercial paper, grain bills, and the like. As a result of all this, the amount of notes which, under our system, most banks issue, is that amount which can be kept in circulation substantially all of the time. Fluctuations in the need for such notes, there is almost no attempt to meet.

In the second place, we have not attained in our circulation even that degree of elasticity of which a bond-secured system is capable. At the outset, we disregard the fundamental principle that, in order to be elastic, a circulation should be profitable. That this is a fundamental principle, needs little proof. The necessity of profitableness to secure expansion, is self-evident. In securing contraction, on the other hand, profitableness, if less necessary, is not less effective; for, in making each banker anxious to expand his own circulation, it leads him promptly to send home the issues of his neighbors in order to make room for his own. Thus, from the single fact that the circulation is fairly profitable, are derived two opposing forces which work respectively for the expansion and for the contraction of the currency as a whole. Further, the relative strength of these opposing forces is largely determined, as it should be, by the needs of business. If more notes are wanted in the ordinary circulation, they will be swifter in going out, and, since they will not naturally get into the hands of bankers, slower in being sent home to the issuer. If, on the other hand, fewer notes are needed, they will be slower in going out and more prompt in coming back; since, when idle, they will naturally accumulate in the banks, and by them will be sent home. It is thus evident that a reasonable degree of profitableness is a most important requisite of an elastic currency. Now it is a commonplace that our bank circulation is not a profitable one. Most banks deposit bonds to the least amount permitted by law, and do not always issue even the quantity of circulation corresponding thereto. It is true that conditions have in this respect measurably improved, the lower price at which bonds are now available having rendered the conditions of issue somewhat more profitable; but it is practically certain that this process has not been carried sufficiently far to furnish the necessary conditions for an elastic currency.

But again, even an increase in profitableness can not avail unless the machinery of issue and redemption is efficient. The forces which work respectively for expansion and contraction must have easy and unimpeded action. At this point our present law is not only inadequate, it is positively evil. It limits the amount of circulation which may be retired during any one month, and prohibits reissue for six months after retirement, thus actually putting a premium on inelasticity. Further, the machinery of issue and redemption is unnecessarily slow and clumsy. Even if a bank decides to expand its circulation, the process can seldom be completed till the

special need has passed. In like manner, contraction can not usually be brought about till long after a plethora has worked much harm.

The foregoing remarks have more especial reference to the experience of ordinary times ; for the case of the monetary panic, when there arises a demand for an immediate and very great increase in the stock of current moneys, absolutely nothing has been done. We thus have every reason to expect that, should another crisis as serious as that of 1898 overtake the nation, we should experience a monetary famine of equal severity, and should again be obliged to resort to numerous extemporized devices very doubtful as to their legality and still more doubtful as to their efficiency.

What has been said concerning the continued lack of security and elasticity applies in substance to every other recognized need of the monetary system. Almost no progress has been made. It thus becomes evident that the only method by which we can insure that, when less favorable conditions arise, there shall be no recurrence of the disasters formerly experienced, is to bring about some more or less fundamental changes in the monetary system itself.

## II. THE SECURITY OF THE STANDARD.

Under existing conditions, the only wise and consistent policy for the United States is the frank recognition of the fact that the actual monetary standard is now, and for some time to come will be, gold, and the adoption of legislation which shall insure the entire stability of that standard, until such time as the nation may have decided to establish some other. Assent to this statement does not commit any one to the position that the gold standard is, abstractly considered, the most desirable one. As is well known, a large number of economists hold to the opposite opinion. But, as is also well known, the particular substitute which such economists favor, *i. e.*, international bimetalism, is at present, and for a long time will be, out of the question. In consequence, the precise form which the question of standards now takes in the United States is as to whether the currency shall rest on a gold basis, or on a silver or paper basis. Thus stated, it can have, to the majority of economists, but one solution. Under existing conditions, the gold standard is, for the United States, the best available. This being the case, it is the duty of the nation to render that standard as stable as possible and to remove all uncertainty as to its maintenance and its easy working ; for uncertainty as to the basis of the currency must always be a menace to prosperity.

With respect to the means through which increased stability for the standard shall be insured, it is hardly to be doubted that much would be gained by its explicit definition in terms of gold. Still more important would be the enacting of such legislation as shall insure that the task of maintaining the standard, or, in other words, of maintaining the convertibility into gold of other forms of currency, shall be efficiently performed. At this point, your committee find themselves in accord with the commonly received opinion that, under normal conditions, the task in question can most advantageously be devolved upon some institution or institutions of a banking nature. We are also agreed, though perhaps less positively, that, even under the conditions which must prevail in the United States, this same solution of the problem is, on the whole, best. If, however, this plan shall prove impracticable—if the task of maintaining the standard of value is still to rest upon the Treasury—everything calculated to make that task an easier one should be done, and the department should be specially organized with reference to the duty thus devolving upon it, and provided with such additional powers as are necessary to insure its fitness for the work in hand. Among the various changes which would tend to the accomplishment of these objects, your committee believe the most important to be some modification of the existing system whereby the duties of the Treasury as re-

spects the management of the monetary system of the country shall be separated from those functions which are of a purely fiscal nature. It would doubtless be well, also, to find a place for silver where it will cause least trouble, by retiring all notes under ten dollars, and to authorize the Secretary to withdraw, at least temporarily, United States notes which have been once redeemed. If it should be decided not to establish a separate issue department, at least the function of the Secretary in maintaining the parity of gold and silver should be made obligatory.

### III. THE BANKING SYSTEM.

(A) *Elasticity*.—Whatever decision may be reached with reference to the much-disputed question as to whether United States legal-tender notes shall continue to hold their place as part of the paper currency of the country, it is certain that the maintenance of some system of bank issues will be indispensable. This system should, without doubt, be under Federal control and should take such form as to insure much greater elasticity than exists in the present system, provided always that the security of the issue shall be in no wise impaired.

As respects the method to be employed for attaining this needed increase in elasticity, it is believed that the really successful one must involve issuing some portion of the circulation upon ordinary banking assets. The chief reason for this, as already indicated, is that such ordinary banking assets are the only ones which are universally and readily available when expansion is needed. The superiority of such a system is further insured by the fact that there is a very close correspondence between the amount of such assets in the possession of the banks and the need of the community for currency; since these assets, like the need for money, vary in amount with the volume of business. As respects the security of such notes, there need be no anxiety, provided the system is supplemented with the device of a safety fund, or with one or more of the various other expedients which have been proposed. If it be urged that nothing can make this system really safe, at least for the banks considered as guarantors of each other's notes, so long as the securities on which those notes are based remain in the custody of the issuing bank, the objection might be met by enacting that notes of this character shall be issued only through clearing-house associations which are to hold in trust the commercial paper or other collateral by which the notes are secured, just as they now do in the case of loan certificates, and as the Treasury of the United States does in the case of National bank notes.

It may, however, prove impossible to secure legislation of the character described. In such event the existing system of notes based on United States bonds should be so amended as to give to it as large a measure of elasticity as is possible. The provisions of the law of 1883 which limits the amount of notes that may be retired in any one month, and prohibits reissue within six months after retirement, should be repealed. To secure in some degree that increase in profitableness which, as we saw earlier, is indispensable to elasticity, it would be well to raise the ratio of notes to bonds deposited and to lower the tax, or, better still, to levy it on capital and surplus. In order still further to enlist the self-interest of the banks, especially on behalf of the prompt retirement of redundant notes, we should be inclined to prohibit any bank from paying out the notes of any other bank except to the issuer or to the redemption agency. As respects making easier the processes of expansion and contraction, some gain would result from requiring the Comptroller to keep on hand a supply of notes in blank, and still more from an increase in the facilities for redemption.

In order to furnish the sort of elasticity which is needed in a panic, it is even more necessary than in ordinary times to depend on general banking assets for the security; since at such times few banks have any resources left with which to purchase Gov-

ernment bonds. To insure that some portion of the power of issue should be reserved for such occasions, as also to secure its prompt retirement after the special need has passed, there is probably no better expedient than that already tried in Germany, *i. e.*, levying on such circulation a tax so high as to be in ordinary times prohibitive. It would seem that the natural way to apply this general plan both safely and effectively, would be to intrust its elaboration and management to the clearing-house associations, which have already worked out an analogous scheme in the loan certificates that have done much service in former crises.

(B) *Country Banking.*—As already remarked, there is a real need for increased banking and currency facilities in the newer or more backward parts of the country, and legislation could do something towards satisfying this need. In the judgment of your committee, the most effective as well as the safest expedient for accomplishing this object is some system of branch banking so constructed as to supplement, but not displace, the present system of independent banks. Under such a plan, banking facilities can be furnished to communities too small to support even the smallest independent bank of issue, and capital can be most cheaply and easily transferred from districts oversupplied to those needing it; while, at the same time, the dangers of fraud or mismanagement incident to all banking are far less serious than under a system of small independent banks. There are doubtless objections to the plan; but the experience of other countries has shown that they are not of great moment.

If, however, the apparent tendency towards excessive concentration of capital shall prove too strong an objection to this system, other alternatives offer themselves. A decision to permit the issue of any portion of the circulation upon general assets would greatly increase the banking facilities of the country districts; since the chief obstacle at the present time to the establishment of National banks of issue in such districts is to be found in the circumstance that they could not afford to invest their capital in assets so unproductive as United States bonds. Another, but rather more doubtful, remedy for the difficulty in question, would be the exemption from the Federal ten per cent. tax on circulation, of such State banks as should comply with the regulations of Federal law and submit to Federal supervision. This change would, without doubt, greatly increase banking facilities, and, probably, it would prove quite safe. Again, a lowering of the minimum capital for a National bank from the present figure to twenty or twenty-five thousand dollars would be better than nothing, and would probably work no evil effects of any moment.

#### TIME OPPORTUNE FOR CURRENCY REFORM.

In conclusion, your committee cannot refrain from expressing the conviction that it will be a genuine misfortune if the very notable movement toward monetary reform, which has filled so large a place in the history of the last few years, shall pass away without having left any results in legislation. Never before have there existed among all classes so great an interest in this subject, so near an approach to unanimity of opinion, and so strong a purpose to see something accomplished. To this very promising attitude of the public mind, are added external conditions of an extremely favorable character. We allude to the exceptionally large stock of gold both in the Treasury and in the country at large, to the unprecedented trade balance, to the generally solid condition of business, to the absence of any necessity for that haste which always makes legislation in a crisis dangerous, and, not least, to the approaching control of all departments of the national Government by a single political party. A conjuncture in so many respects favorable, we can scarcely hope to meet again in the near future. Its utilization would, therefore, seem to be commended by every consideration of prudence and good judgment.

Without doubt, there are still considerable obstacles in the way of reform. It is easy, however, to exaggerate the seriousness of those obstacles. Your committee

wish particularly to remark this in respect to the much-noted divergences of opinion among friends of reform. The not uncommon opinion that these divergences are so serious as to render hopeless the prospects of reform, we consider quite unwarranted. As a matter of fact, barring differences due to the circumstance of some being more, others less, radical, the various projects of reform have a surprising similarity. Doubtless there are differences of methods so fundamental that the choice of one plan involves the rejection of its rivals; but cases of this sort are comparatively few. An analysis of a large number of plans of reform discloses the fact that of the various expedients proposed in them for accomplishing the several objects sought, a considerable proportion appear in nearly every one of the plans.

In the light of these facts your committee are of the opinion that what is most needed at this juncture, is a disposition on the part of the friends of reform to sink individual preferences as to details, and to insist that Congress shall enact such legislation as it may be possible to agree upon. Undoubtedly, there is room in this matter of currency reform for honest differences of opinion, but such a degree of persistence in one's opinion as makes a working compromise impossible has no justification in monetary principles or in the conditions prevailing in the United States. It is safe to say that, of the five or six currency bills that, during the last twelve months, have been in any serious sense before the country, the passage of any one would have resulted in great improvement and would have measurably satisfied the demands of reformers.

F. M. TAYLOR, *University of Michigan*,  
 F. W. TAUSSIG, *Harvard University*,  
 J. W. JENKS, *Cornell University*,  
 SIDNEY SHERWOOD, *Johns Hopkins University*,  
 DAVID KINLEY, *University of Illinois*.

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**GOLD IN COLORADO.**—The recent reported strike of fabulously rich deposits of gold in one of the Cripple Creek mines recalls the fact that Colorado has made a wonderful gain in the production of gold in the last few years. In 1893 the product of that metal was valued at only \$7,527,000, while in 1898 it was valued at \$24,500,000. This remarkable rate of gain bids fair to be maintained and probably exceeded for some time to come.

There is perhaps no State where the cause of free silver has been so warmly advocated as in Colorado, and while it is contended, and no doubt sincerely believed, that this stand has been taken because it was thought best for the prosperity of the country to adopt such a financial policy, yet unconsciously the larger relative production of silver in the past influenced this opinion to some extent. A gradual cooling of the enthusiasm for free silver would be in the natural course of events should the present large output of gold continue.

Certainly a State that produces so much of the yellow metal as Colorado does is in a most fortunate situation.

It is to be hoped that the reports of rich strikes in the Cripple Creek mines that have been made public recently may not prove exaggerated; but at all events the steady increase in the gold output of Colorado since 1893, and on such a large scale, is a fact clearly established by the official records.

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**COINAGE OF GOLD.**—According to newspaper reports the Philadelphia Mint coined \$14,000,000 of gold in January. These reports further say:

“All of last month's coinage was of the denomination of double eagles, the demand being ascribed to a change in the custom of European countries, who have hitherto received shipments in gold bars, but now receive them in the stamped coin. Russia and England keep large amounts of American double eagles in their bank vaults.”

It is hard to understand why the American coinage laws should be so framed as to accommodate the exporters and hoarders of gold. Instead of coining double eagles, which will not circulate, the mints should coin the pieces of the denominations of \$2.50, \$5 and \$10, and these coins would then go into actual circulation.

# THE CLEARING-HOUSE.

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## ITS METHODS OF OPERATION, CONSTITUTION, RULES AND PRACTICAL WORKING FORMS.

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The principal object of the following paper is to bring about the organization of Clearing-Houses in towns where the banks are comparatively few in number. The advantages of the Clearing-House are two-fold : first, the direct advantage resulting from the clearing of the checks ; and, second, the indirect but equally great advantage which follows the closer union of the banks and the organization of banking interests. It was thought that the practical operation of the Clearing-House could best be shown by submitting a draft of a Constitution, with such notes as might seem necessary and following this with rules for clearing the checks and some practical working forms. Much of the work must be regarded as offered in the way of suggestion and recommendation and not as setting forth any hard and fast rules to be followed under all circumstances.

Any criticisms that may be offered will be heartily welcomed both by the Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* and by the writer.

### ARTICLE I.

#### *Names and Object.*

**SECTION I.** The name of this Association shall be **THE ASSOCIATED BANKS OF OAKWOOD.**

The Association may be, and usually is, a voluntary association of the members without incorporation by the Legislature. Some prefer the title to be "The Oakwood Clearing-House," but the above title is preferred in order to avoid confusion in using the term "Clearing-House" to designate both the Association and the practical operation of effecting the exchanges between the banks and settling the balances.

**Sec. 2.** The object of this Association shall be the effecting at one place and at one time the daily exchanges between the members and the payment at one place of the balances resulting from such exchanges and also the promotion of the interests of the members.

The object of the clearing-house is twofold : first, to save time and labor in the payment of the checks which the members hold on each other ; and, second, to hold the members in an association for the common welfare. The advantages to be gained are of course greater in the large cities, but in proportion to the magnitude of the interests involved they are no less important in towns and cities having only a few banking institutions. The Constitution here presented is supposed to be drawn up for a town with half a dozen banks with a capital of from fifty to two hundred thousand dollars each. The last clause of this section is a reminder that the association may properly carry into effect other objects than the settling of the checks which the members may hold on each other. The adoption of a uniform tariff of exchange charges is an example of such an object. In going outside of the primary object of the Association, however, that is to say, the clearing of the checks, care should be taken not to press too far any plan which does not command unanimous support. In every large interest too much organization is sometimes a greater evil than no organization at all.

## ARTICLE II.

*The Members.*

**SECTION 1.** Any bank duly organized under the laws of the United States or of the State of ....., having its principal office in the city of Oakwood and having a paid-up capital of not less than fifty thousand dollars, shall be eligible to membership in this Association.

The requirements for membership vary in different localities. In certain cases private banking firms might well be regarded as eligible for membership. The same may be said of branch banks, while each town must determine for itself the limitation of capital. Should the capital of a member be impaired the impairment would be a proper subject for the consideration of the Executive Committee or of the Association, but it would not make it necessary for the member to withdraw from the Clearing-House unless the impairment reduced the capital below the limit in this Constitution.

**Sec. 2.** Any bank desiring to become a member of this Association shall make an application in writing to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee shall thereupon make an examination of the affairs of said applicant, or by and with the advice and consent of said applicant shall appoint a suitable person to make such examination. In the latter case the expense of such examination shall be paid by the applicant. As soon as practicable after such examination the Executive Committee shall report the result thereof to the Association and the Association shall thereupon, on motion duly made, proceed to vote by ballot upon the application; and if it shall appear that the application has received favorable votes equal in number to three-fourths of all the members of the Association, the applicant shall upon signing the Constitution and paying the admission fee become a member of the Association.

The Clearing-House is an organization for the common benefit of all the members, and depends largely for its usefulness upon having all the local banks included in the membership. Every new bank coming into the organization strengthens it, while every bank that remains out of the organization renders it that much less efficient for the common convenience and general welfare. The Association having once been fairly organized, great care should be taken in the admission of new members. Too much stringency is as much to be avoided as too much laxity. The rule laid down in this section seems to be entirely reasonable. Sometimes there is a little feeling of objection on the part of a bank to having its affairs examined by a committee from competing banks. For that reason the alternative of an examination by a disinterested party is offered. In any case the result of the examination goes to the whole Association in order that members may vote intelligently upon the application. Both the application and the formal signing of the Constitution should be authorized by a resolution of the board of directors. A certified copy of the resolution authorizing the signing should be lodged with the Secretary of the Association.

**Sec. 3.** If any member of the Association should reorganize its business and change its name without any reduction of its capital stock, it may be elected to membership in the Association as provided in Section 2, except that it shall not be required to pay any admission fee.

The object of this section is to make a way for an old member that reorganizes to maintain the continuity of its membership in the Association.

**Sec. 4.** Any member of this Association may withdraw therefrom at pleasure upon paying its due proportion of expenses incurred and signifying in writing to the Executive Committee one week in advance its intention to withdraw.

**Sec. 5.** For cause deemed sufficient by the Association, at any meeting thereof, any member may be expelled from the Association and debarred from all privileges of the Clearing-House, provided that three-fourths of all the members of the Association shall vote for such expulsion. And provided also that said member shall be notified at least one week in

advance of said meeting and shall be afforded an opportunity of being heard in its own defense.

It may be noted that the power to suspend a member summarily is lodged in the first instance with the Executive Committee as provided in Article V, Section 4. The power of suspension or expulsion is rarely exercised, and then only in extreme cases.

### ARTICLE III.

#### *The Officers.*

SECTION 1. The officers of the Association shall be a President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer. They shall be elected at the annual meeting of the Association or as soon thereafter as practicable, and shall hold office for one year and until their successors are elected. They shall perform such duties as usually appertain to their respective offices and as may be further provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 2. The President shall preside at all meetings of the Association and shall be, *ex-officio*, a member of the Executive Committee.

The President is, beyond doubt, the most important official of the Association. His duties are arduous and responsible. Upon his judgment, zeal and vigilance depends in large measure the success of the Clearing-House. Second only to the President in importance is the Vice-President. In the selection of these two officers every member should exercise the greatest care and should act solely with a view to the best interests of the Association. All personal feeling should be laid aside, and no effort should be spared to obtain the services of the men best equipped for these responsible offices.

Sec. 3. The Vice-President shall preside at any meeting of the Association from which the President may be absent and, in the absence of the President, the Vice-President may be present and vote at any meeting of the Executive Committee.

Sec. 4. The Secretary shall keep the minutes of the meetings of the Association and shall conduct the correspondence of the Association. The minutes of the meetings shall be open to the inspection of the members during the business hours of every day.

Sec. 5. The Treasurer shall receive and safely keep all dues, fines and other moneys of the Association. He shall make disbursements only on the order of the President or of the Chairman of the Executive Committee. But the Treasurer shall not receive, nor disburse, nor be in any way responsible for, the money paid at the Clearing-House in settlement of the balances arising from the exchanges between the banks.

It may be noted that the amount of money received by the Treasurer under this section will be really so small that it would not be worth while to require a bond.

Sec. 6. Any President, Vice-President or Cashier of any bank that is a member of this Association shall be eligible to serve as an officer of this Association or as a member of any of its committees.

This section is necessary in order to clearly define who is eligible to hold office.

### ARTICLE IV.

#### *The Meetings.*

SECTION 1. The annual meeting of the Association shall be held on the third Tuesday in January at 8:30 P. M., unless the Executive Committee shall designate some other hour of that day.

The annual meeting is the only regular meeting provided for. All other meetings are special meetings. It would rarely happen that the annual meeting could not be held on the day appointed above. If that were to occur any business could be transacted with equal propriety at a special meeting to be called as soon thereafter as practicable.

Sec. 2. Special meetings of the Association may be called by the President, the Vice-President or the Executive Committee. And it shall be the duty of the President, or in his absence or inability to act then of the Vice-President, to call a meeting of the Association upon the written request of three members of the Association.



Experience shows that apart from the election of officers at the annual meeting the business that arises will be of an irregular or special character. Regular meetings at which there is no business to be transacted are unnecessary and useless. The object of the last clause is to retain the popular character of the Association.

Sec. 3. All meetings of the Association shall be held at the Clearing-House unless otherwise ordered by the Executive Committee.

Sec. 4. At all meetings a majority of the members of the Association shall be a quorum for the transaction of business. All motions and questions shall be decided by a majority of the members present except where it is otherwise ordered in this Constitution.

Sec. 5. Every member shall be represented at the meetings of the Association by its President, Vice-President or Cashier or one of its directors, and shall be entitled to one vote. The President of the Association shall cast the vote of the member that he represents; and if there should be a tie vote, the President shall in no case have a second or casting vote, but the motion or question shall be considered as lost. The same rule shall apply to whoever may be the presiding officer. In case of the absence of both the President and the Vice-President of the Association a presiding officer shall be elected for that meeting. In no case shall a member or the representative of a member vote by proxy.

Sec. 6. Any member which shall fail to be represented at any meeting of the Association shall pay to the Treasurer a fine of five dollars.

The object of this provision is to secure a full representation of the members at every meeting. This is always very desirable in order that every question may be fully discussed and that no member can say that action was taken in its absence to which it would have had serious objection. Out of the whole board of directors and of officers surely one, at least, can be found to give the time necessary to attend the meetings of the Association.

#### ARTICLE V.

##### *The Executive Committee.*

SECTION 1. There shall be an Executive Committee of five members, four of whom shall be elected at the Annual Meeting of the Association or as soon thereafter as practicable, and shall hold office for one year from the date of such Annual Meeting and until their successors are elected. The President of the Association shall be, *ex-officio*, the fifth member of the Committee. But no member of the Association shall have more than one representative on the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee shall fill any vacancies which may occur in its body.

The Executive Committee is intended to be the governing committee of the Association. Too much care cannot be taken in its organization. Where the membership is large it should be composed of a few members as suggested above. Where, however, there are but five or six members in the Association it might be better not to have an Executive Committee at all, but to have its usual duties performed directly by the whole Association.

Sec. 2. As soon as practicable after its election the Executive Committee shall organize by electing a Chairman, but the President of the Association shall not be eligible to act as such Chairman. A majority of the Executive Committee shall be a quorum for the transaction of business, and all questions shall be decided by a majority of the members present except where it is otherwise provided in this Constitution. But no member of the Executive Committee shall vote at any meeting thereof by proxy.

Sec. 3. The Executive Committee shall have general charge of the affairs of the Association, but it shall be at all times subject to the order of the Association. It shall have authority to take into consideration any matter affecting the interests of the Association and may report thereon to the Association at any meeting thereof and may make such recommendations as it shall deem proper.

The primary object of the Association is the maintenance of the Clearing-House for effecting the exchanges and settling the balances. Outside of this, questions are always arising affecting the general banking interests of the place. Among these may be reckoned questions of usage, of law and of legislation. With these matters and many others that may come up from time to time the Association, by reason of

its organized character, is peculiarly qualified to deal. But great care should be taken not to let any of these issues overlap into the domain of the Clearing-House proper. The clearing of the checks should be kept absolutely separate and distinct from all other matters.

Sec. 4. The Executive Committee shall have authority to make at any time a thorough examination of the affairs of any member of the Association or to appoint, at any time, by and with the advice and consent of such member, a suitable person to make such examination and to report the result thereof to the committee. Should the Executive Committee deem the case one of extreme urgency, it may in its discretion suspend such member from the privileges of the Clearing-House, or it may demand from the member such securities as the committee may deem necessary to secure the balances that may be due or may become due from the member at the Clearing-House settlements. In case of suspension under this section of any member, the Executive Committee shall forthwith call a meeting of the Association and report its action with the reasons therefor, and the Association shall thereupon determine whether such suspension shall continue or be discontinued. But in no case shall action be taken by the Executive Committee under this section except at a meeting at which at least three members of the committee shall be present, no one of whom shall be a representative of the bank under consideration, and except the vote directing such examination or suspension be unanimous. If a representative of the bank under consideration should be a member of the Executive Committee he shall neither meet, vote, nor act with said committee on the question of the examination or suspension of said bank.

This section provides for a case which rarely happens, but which when it does happen calls for prompt, vigorous and decisive action. The provision by which the examination may be made by an independent examiner is inserted in order partly to facilitate the work of the Executive Committee and partly to do away with any complaint of the bank to be examined that its affairs are subject to the inspection of its competitors. It will be noticed that the suspension spoken of is from the privileges of the Clearing-House and not from membership in the Association. Should the latter step be finally necessary it will do no harm to postpone it until there is time for deliberate consideration. The remaining parts of this section are carefully drawn and are deserving of serious examination.

Sec. 6. The Executive Committee shall have charge of the Clearing-House settlements and, except where it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall make such rules and regulations for the Clearing-House as it shall deem proper. It shall also have authority to suspend any officer of the Clearing-House pending the pleasure of the Association in regard to such officer.

#### ARTICLE VI.

##### *The Clearing-House.*

SECTION 1. The effecting of the daily exchanges between the members and the settling of the balances resulting from such exchanges shall be known as the Clearing-House.

Sec. 2. The officers of the Clearing-House shall be a Manager, an Assistant Manager and a teller. They may be elected at any meeting of the Association and shall hold office during the pleasure of the Association. Their compensation shall be fixed by the Association upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee.

The number and compensation of the officers of the Clearing-House must be determined by the special needs of each organization. It is impracticable to lay down any general rule on either point.

Sec. 3. The officers of the Clearing-House shall conduct the operations thereof under the authority and supervision of the Executive Committee and according to such rules and regulations as the Executive Committee shall from time to time prescribe.

Sec. 4. The Association may, at any meeting, designate any one of its members to be a depositary for such money as may be deposited with it for the purposes of facilitating the Clearing-House settlements. Such money shall be put up in packages containing five thousand dollars or multiples thereof and shall be counted, assorted and put up to the satisfaction of the depositary bank. The depositary bank shall issue certificates of deposit therefor payable to the order of the bank making such deposit. Such certificates shall be negotiable and payable only to members of the Association and the fact that they are only so negotiable and payable shall be plainly printed upon each certificate. Should the depositary bank fail to

redeem any such certificate upon the demand of the holder thereof, then the members of the Association shall be responsible for the payment of such certificate, in the proportion that the capital stock of each member bears to the whole amount of the capital stock of all the members of the Association. The proportion which each member shall pay for the redemption of such certificate or certificates shall be a valid claim against such depository bank. All moneys deposited under the provisions of this section shall be held by such depository bank separate and apart from all other moneys deposited with or entrusted to said depository bank and shall be used by said bank only for the redemption of certificates issued by said bank under the provisions of this section, and for no other purpose whatever. The compensation of said depository bank shall be determined by the Executive Committee.

This section shall not be operative until the depository bank shall have signified in writing to the Executive Committee its acceptance of the provisions of this section.

The depository bank may withdraw from its office as depository by giving one week's notice in writing to the Executive Committee or by refusing without notice to accept any further deposits.

The object of having a depository bank is to avoid the labor and risk of carrying large sums of money to and from the Clearing-House. As the arrangement is for the general convenience and as the creditor banks are constrained to accept the certificates in payment of balances, it is only just and fair that the whole Association should stand behind every certificate and guarantee its ultimate payment. The depository bank being cut off from lending out the money so deposited, it is necessary that it should be compensated for its trouble and risk by direct compensation to be paid by the Association as a body. The amount of the compensation must be determined by local considerations. Should the deposits become too heavy at any one time, and the members insist on still increasing them, the depository should have a summary remedy for its own protection.

Sec. 5. The Association may, at any meeting, by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Association, direct the issue of Clearing-House certificates. Upon the passage of such a resolution the President shall appoint a committee of five to be known as the Committee on Clearing-House Certificates. The President shall be, *ex officio*, a member of this committee. The said Clearing-House certificates shall be executed in the form of a promissory note and shall be duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors of the bank issuing the same. A copy of such resolution shall be furnished the committee. Each note shall be for the even sum of one thousand dollars, and shall be in the manner and form as given below. When any member of this Association shall deposit with said committee securities to the satisfaction of said committee and shall execute such a note as is herein provided, then said committee shall endorse the said note as and for THE ASSOCIATED BANKS OF OAKWOOD, and the said committee is hereby made the agent of this Association to make such endorsement. The committee having made such endorsement, shall deliver the said note to the bank executing the same and the said bank may use said note in payment of its debit balance at the Clearing-House. And the Clearing-House shall pay out to any creditor bank such note as part of the credit balance of said bank. The bank issuing said note may change the securities deposited for said note, with the consent of said committee, and shall upon demand deposit additional securities to the satisfaction of said committee. Upon the demand of said committee the said bank shall redeem said note in lawful money of the United States or in National bank notes as said bank may elect.

#### CLEARING-HOUSE CERTIFICATE.

\$1,000.00

OAKWOOD, December 15, 1898.

On demand, the First National Bank of Oakwood promises to pay THE ASSOCIATED BANKS OF OAKWOOD, or order, at the Clearing-House of said Association, the sum of one thousand dollars, value received, with interest from the date of this note at the rate of ..... per cent. per annum.

And the maker of this note has deposited with the said Association as collateral security for the payment of this note and for the payment of every other obligation of the maker of this note to said Association, due or to become due, now contracted or which may hereafter be contracted, securities to the satisfaction of said Association. The maker agrees that if this note should not be paid upon demand the said Association or its assigns shall have full power and authority to sell any or all the above securities or any additions thereto or substitutes therefor, at any public or private sale, or at any board of brokers, free and discharged from any equity of redemption. At any such sale or sales the said Association or any of its members, or its assigns, may purchase any or all the above securities or any additions thereto or substi-

tutes therefor, free and discharged from any equity of redemption. If the proceeds of such sale or sales should not be sufficient for the payment of this note the maker agrees to be answerable to said Association for such deficiency. And the maker agrees to deposit additional securities upon the demand of and to the satisfaction of said Association. Upon the payment of this note the securities pledged therefor shall be returned to the maker.

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OAKWOOD.

By ..... *President*, and ..... *Cashier*.

The issuing of Clearing-House certificates should be resorted to only in a grave emergency. The form of a promissory note is given as indicating most clearly the responsibility of the bank taking out the certificate in the first instance and the further responsibility assumed by the whole Association for the ultimate payment of the note. Reduced to its simplest elements the Clearing-House certificate, in whatever form it may be issued, is a transfer by a bank of part of its discount line to the whole Association. It does not create any addition to the currency of the country.

The issuing of Clearing-House certificates is equivalent to an agreement on the part of the banks to take each other's promissory notes in settlement of checks that they may hold against each other. When issued, they should be redeemed as soon as possible, and as an inducement to redemption the rate of interest should be made at the highest market rate.

Sec. 6. Should any member of the Association owing a debit balance at the Clearing-House fail to pay such balance by eleven o'clock A. M., the Manager of the Clearing-House shall immediately notify such delinquent member, and if such balance be not paid by half-past eleven o'clock the Manager shall immediately notify the other members of the Association and the other members shall immediately send the Manager their settling sheets for that day. The amounts due to or from the delinquent bank shall be marked off of each sheet and the balances due to and from the respective members shall be ascertained and declared the same as if said delinquent had not appeared at the clerical settlement. Immediately upon the proper debit and credit balances being thus ascertained, the debtor banks shall pay into the Clearing-House the amounts due by them respectively. If any bank shall have already paid in an amount in excess of its indebtedness as thus ascertained, the Manager shall refund such excess. And if any bank shall have already paid in an amount less than the amount thus ascertained, the said bank shall pay the deficiency into the Clearing-House. After all the debit balances as thus ascertained shall have been paid into the Clearing-House, the Manager shall disburse to the creditor banks the sums due them as they may appear according to corrected settlement. The delinquent bank shall, upon demand, surrender to the several members of the Association all checks, drafts and other items received by said delinquent bank at the clerical settlement. And the several members of the Association shall, upon demand, surrender to said delinquent bank all checks, drafts and other items received by said members from said delinquent bank at the clerical settlement.

The main object underlying this method of settlement when a bank which has appeared at the clerical settlement fails to make good its indebtedness, is to put the other members in exactly the same position that they would have occupied had the delinquent bank not appeared at the clerical settlement at all. It seems to be about the simplest way of adjusting a difficulty which seldom arises but which when it does occur is likely to give considerable trouble.

## ARTICLE VII.

### *Published Statements.*

SECTION 1. Whenever the Comptroller of the Currency shall call upon the National banks for published statements of their condition, the Executive Committee shall notify such members of the Association as are not National banks of such call. Within five days after such notice such members shall make up and publish sworn statements of their condition in such manner and form as may be required by the Comptroller of the Currency to be published by National banks. But if any such members shall have published sworn statements of condition within thirty days prior to such call by the Comptroller of the Currency or shall be required by law to publish such statements within thirty days subsequent to such call, such publication shall be regarded as a sufficient compliance with this section.

## ARTICLE VIII.

*Fines and Dues.*

SECTION 1. All fines and dues shall be paid to the Treasurer of the Association.

SEC. 2. The annual dues of every member of the Association shall be at the rate of thirty cents per thousand dollars on the capital stock of each member respectively and shall be payable quarterly in advance.

SEC. 3. Every bank which shall be admitted a member of this Association shall pay an admission fee of one hundred dollars.

It is hardly necessary to state that the rates here given are intended only as suggestions. Local conditions vary too widely to give any settled rule.

## ARTICLE IX.

*Banks not Members.*

SECTION 1. No member of this Association shall clear for any bank or banker that is not a member of this Association.

The object of this section is to prevent an outside bank from enjoying the privileges of the Association without also sharing its duties and obligations.

## ARTICLE X.

*Amendments and By-Laws.*

SECTION 1. This Constitution may be amended at any meeting of the Association by a vote equal to three-fourths of all the members of the Association provided written notice of the proposed amendment shall have been sent to all the members of the Association at least one week in advance of said meeting.

SEC. 2. By-Laws not inconsistent with this Constitution may be adopted, amended or repealed by a majority vote at any meeting of the Association.

## RULES OF THE CLEARING HOUSE.

The Rules of the Clearing-House as here presented are intended largely as suggestions. Local conditions are very different and what may be entirely suitable in one place would be entirely unsuited to a town where different conditions prevail. In the main, they will be found to present an admirable framework upon which to build. The practical operation of the Clearing-House is extremely simple. The work is almost automatic. Where the membership is limited to a few, a small room, centrally located, will be found to answer every purpose. As the Manager has no money left over at the end of the day, it will be unnecessary to provide any accommodations in the way of safes or vaults except what may be thought desirable for the books and records. The running expenses are very light. In a small organization one man can attend to all the business. The convenience and usefulness of the organization can hardly be overestimated. Where there are as many as five or six banks in a town it is well worth while to make a trial of the Clearing-House if only as an experiment.

RULE 1. The effecting of the exchanges between the banks and the ascertaining of the balances due to and from the several members shall be known as the clerical settlement. The receiving and paying out of the several balances shall be known as the money settlement.

Rule 2. The Clearing-House shall meet for the clerical settlement at nine A.M. promptly. Each member shall have one or two representatives, who shall be present promptly at the time appointed above. If a member shall fail to have a representative present at the opening of the Clearing-House, the Manager shall impose a fine of one dollar for the first five minutes the said representative shall be late and a further fine of one dollar for each additional five minutes, and if such member should fail to be represented at fifteen minutes after nine, the Manager shall declare such member to be ruled out of the settlement for that morning and the settlement shall be made up without such member.

The Clearing-House should meet for the clerical settlement at such an hour that the bank messengers can return to their respective banks in time to have the checks

exam'ned before the bank opens for business. It is always desirable to give the checks that come through the Clearing-House the right of way and by following the suggestion above this can be most easily accomplished. If a member is ruled out of the clerical settlement checks on and from that bank will have to be presented at the counter. It is a great inconvenience all around.

**Rule 3.** The Manager, and in his absence, the Assistant Manager, shall have charge of the Clearing-House during the entire day. He shall maintain order and decorum among the representatives of the several members and may, in his discretion, impose a fine of one dollar upon any representative for every breach of orderly conduct.

**Rule 4.** Debtor banks shall pay in their indebtedness by eleven o'clock, and the Manager shall be prepared to pay out to the creditor banks their respective balances at half-past twelve o'clock.

The hours in this rule must be regulated by local convenience. Care should be taken to give the Manager a reasonable time to arrange the money paid in by the debtor banks.

**Rule 5.** Debit balances shall not be paid in National bank notes, nor except to make the exact amount, in one nor in two dollar notes, nor in fractional silver.

This rule is also to be modified by local needs. It must be remembered that National banks are prohibited from belonging to any Clearing-House having a rule against paying indebtedness of debtor banks in silver certificates.

**Rule 6.** A creditor bank may deliver to any debtor bank a transfer order not exceeding the balance of either bank. The manager shall receive such order from the debtor bank in payment of its indebtedness and shall pay out such order to the creditor bank that gave the same.

This is a convenient rule to facilitate temporary loans from one bank to another.

**Rule 7.** Every member of the Association shall be assigned a Clearing-House number. Such numbers shall be assigned in the order in which the members shall join the Association, and if two members shall join at the same time their numbers shall be assigned in the order of their incorporation as banks.

**Rule 8.** Every check, draft and other item sent through the Clearing-House shall be stamped with the name and Clearing-House number of the bank sending the same.

**Rule 9.** Upon every check, draft or note sent through the Clearing-House there shall be written or stamped by the sending bank a guarantee of all endorsements on said check, draft or note.

**Rule 10.** For any error in making the exchanges not reported to the Manager before twelve o'clock a fine of one dollar shall be imposed.

**Rule 11.** Errors in the exchanges shall be adjusted directly between the banks affected and not through the Clearing-House.

For example, if a bank should list a check at more than it really calls for, the receiving bank makes its settlement at the Clearing-House according to the Clearing-House figures and claims for the difference on this particular check directly against the sending bank. This is more expeditious and avoids the unsettling of the figures of the clerical settlement, which would indeed be impracticable.

**Rule 12.** Should any bank desire to refuse payment on any item sent through the Clearing-House it shall return such item to the sending bank before eleven o'clock and the sending bank shall redeem such item upon demand and in lawful money of the United States, but not in fractional silver unless the bank refusing payment shall consent to receive the same. And the bank presenting such item shall not be required to give any reason for its refusal to pay such item.

**Rule 13.** All money paid into the Clearing-House shall be put up as follows: Gold coin shall be put up in strong canvas bags properly sealed to the satisfaction of the Manager and in even sums of five thousand dollars each. Gold coin in amounts less than five thousand dollars may be paid in loose or in canvas bags properly sealed to the satisfaction of the Manager. Notes and certificates shall be put up in packages of five thousand dollars each, securely wrapped and sealed to the satisfaction of the Manager, but each package shall contain only one kind of money and only one denomination of that kind. Notes and certificates to an amount less than five thousand dollars may be paid in loose or in packages securely

wrapped and sealed to the satisfaction of the Manager. All bags and packages when properly sealed may be paid out by the Manager with the seals unbroken. Reclamations for any errors in packages so paid out under seal shall be made directly upon the bank that paid said package into the Clearing-House and before eleven o'clock on the following day.

This is also one of the rules that must be modified to suit local needs.

PRACTICAL FORMS.

In the forms here presented it is assumed that there are six banks members of the Clearing-House.

The practical operation of the Clearing-House is best shown by a series of working forms. Form 1 is the daily slip used in listing the checks, drafts, and other cash items sent through the clearing. Each bank in the supposed case of six members in the Clearing-House would use five of these slips each day. In case there should be no checks on a certain bank then the slip on that bank would be marked, "No checks." It will be found sufficient to list the amounts without naming each item. The correctness of the slip can be proved by listing a second time on a sheet ruled for the purpose or by the total of the several slips proving out with the cash at the end of the day. When sent to the Clearing-House the checks are put up in a sealed envelope (Form 5), and the slip is pinned on the outside. As soon as the runner brings the checks back from the Clearing-House they are carefully compared with the accompanying slip and the addition of the slip gone over. Any error in the listing of the checks or in the addition (or if a check be missing must be reported directly to the sending bank and adjusted with it without the intervention of the Clearing House. If any check is enclosed upon which the receiving bank desires to refuse payment, it must be sent directly to the sending bank, and likewise without the intervention of the Clearing-House. It would be practically impossible to undo the clerical settlement, and the adjusting of claims directly between the banks is very simple and answers every purpose. Thus if the Mercantile Bank desires to refuse payment on the item of \$500, it returns that item to the First National Bank and receives five hundred dollars in Clearing-House funds. The Mercantile Bank pays the check through the clearing but receives the money back by means of its direct settlement with the First National Bank. Likewise the First National Bank receives the five hundred dollars through the clearing but pays it out again in its direct settlement with the Mercantile Bank. The same result is worked out if there is an error in listing a check or if there is an error in the addition.

Form 2 is the settling sheet that each bank sends to the Clearing-House with the checks for the clerical settlement. In the form shown all the sheets are printed alike ; the space opposite the name of the bank making up the sheet is left blank as

OAKWOOD CLEARING-HOUSE.		
December 15, 1898.		
FROM FIRST NATIONAL BANK.		
	46	73
	474	91
1	924	50
	500	00
	17	18
	29	25
	47	44
	16	99
	18	43
	19	72
	216	41
1	000	00
	50	75
	16	43
	18	41
4	397	15
To Mercantile Bank.		

FORM 1.—Daily Slip.

the bank using the sheet neither sends checks to nor receives checks from itself. In the form shown the First National Bank sends to the Clearing-House the checks listed in the first column and receives from the Clearing-House the checks listed in the second column. The Clearing-House is debtor to the First National Bank for the sum total as shown in the first column and creditor by the sum total as shown in the second column. The net result shows that the Clearing-House owes the First

OAKWOOD CLEARING-HOUSE.											
December 15, 1898.											
FIRST NATIONAL BANK.											
First National Bank.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
State Bank.....	\$3	965	14	\$4	662	16					
Mercantile Bank.....	4	307	15	1	294	13					
Citizens' National Bank.....		406	18	7	842	43					
National Bank of Oakwood.....	19	041	76	4	684	09					
Commonwealth Bank.....	13	074	19	2	721	64					
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$30</b>	<b>944</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>\$21</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>45</b>					
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>719</b>	<b>97</b>								

FORM 2.—Bank Settling Sheet.

National Bank a balance of \$18,719.97, that is to say, the First National Bank is a creditor bank for that sum. The settling sheet of each bank is made up in the same way. As for every debit there must be a corresponding credit, the Clearing-House comes out exactly even. Thus the Clearing-House is debit to First National Bank on account of the State Bank for \$2,965.14 and credit by the First National Bank on account of the State Bank for \$4,662.16. On the other hand, the Clearing-House

OAKWOOD CLEARING-HOUSE.											
December 15, 1898.											
First National Bank....	\$39	944	42	\$21	224	45	\$18	719	97		
State Bank.....	36	715	18	25	224	45	11	490	73		
Mercantile Bank.....	19	744	16	31	466	74				\$11	722 58
Citizens' National Bank	8	436	17	9	743	21				1	307 04
Nat. Bank of Oakwood..	21	744	18	30	974	18				9	230 00
Commonwealth Bank..	12	432	17	20	383	25				7	951 08
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$139</b>	<b>016</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>\$139</b>	<b>016</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>\$30</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>\$30</b>	<b>210 70</b>

FORM 3.—Manager's Settling Sheet.

is debit and credit with the State Bank on account of the First National Bank in just the same amounts reversed. It takes the runners about fifteen minutes to make up this settlement.

Form 3 is the Manager's settling sheet, which shows the total and also the net amounts for which the Clearing-House is debit and credit on account of each bank. These amounts are called off to the Manager by each runner as soon as he makes up



his sheet. The first column represents the total clearing for the day and the third and fourth columns represent the net debit and credit which must always be equal.

OAKWOOD CLEARING-HOUSE.	OAKWOOD, December 15, 1898.
	<i>To the Manager of the Oakwood Clearing-House :</i>
	Please transfer to THE MERCANTILE BANK from the credit balance due us this day the sum of Five Thousand Dollars. \$5,000.00.
	.....Cashier.

FORM 4.—Transfer Order.

OAKWOOD CLEARING-HOUSE.	FROM FIRST NATIONAL BANK.
	THE MERCANTILE BANK.

FORM 5.—Enclosing Envelope.

Form 4 is the transfer order, the object of which is to enable a bank that has a credit balance to lend a part or all of its balance to one or more debtor banks. The form explains itself. The loan and interest may be collected by charging through the Clearing-House on the date agreed upon.

JOHN H. BLACKLOCK.

BALTIMORE, Md.

**SOME BANKING MAXIMS.**—Messrs. North & Co., private bankers at Unadilla, N. Y., send to the MAGAZINE a neat little folder containing some axioms in regard to banking. Inasmuch as this bank occupies a very enviable position, which it has won by over thirty years of careful management, what its managers have to say will be found of general interest. Here are some of their observations :

A bank that speculates is liable to fail, and a bank that pays high interest to secure deposits is apt to speculate.

It is not the bank that pays the highest rate of interest to secure deposits that is the safest.

In selecting a bank in which to deposit your money, remember that safety is the paramount consideration, and that it will pay you to investigate the manner in which the bank conducts its affairs and whether it transacts business on a careful conservative basis or not. A bank that is not careful in lending money is not a safe place in which to deposit money.

The records of your business with your bank may prove as valuable to you as money. Are they protected against fire?

New York drafts are taken at par in all sections but it costs time and money to collect checks drawn on country banks. And while banks usually collect these miscellaneous items for their customers at actual cost in money, they should not be expected to transact purely accommodation business at a loss.

Remember that brains, industry, economy, are the real "advance agents of prosperity."

It is not what you make but what you save that counts.

# CANADIAN BANKING AND COMMERCE.

## QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE BANK RETURNS.

The returns for the last quarter of 1898 have fully justified the anticipations of an earlier date as to the volume of business which was likely to be transacted during the last three months of the year. It is generally understood that in May or June each year the lowest circulation is reached, just the same as it is also known that in October the highest is reached. After the close of the year the note circulation begins to show a contraction, which continues, as before stated, until May or June; then in ordinary cases the upward movement begins.

The year 1898 stood well above its predecessor. Though the increases and decreases followed as usual, they were founded upon a much higher basis and the volume of trade was accordingly much larger than formerly. Bank notes in circulation reached their highest point during October which was \$42,873,869, although as reported on the 31st of that month the amount was \$42,543,446, so that the decline had set in before the end of that month was reached. From the banker's point of view also the state of affairs seems fairly satisfactory, as in all cases where the annual meeting has been held provision has been made for paying the usual dividend and placing a creditable amount to the reserve fund. Current loans to the public, another important item as related to the state of trade, show exceptional activity during the year. It may prove of interest to note the relation they have borne to each other on October 31 during a few of the years past:

	<i>Notes in circulation.</i>	<i>Current Loans.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
1891.....	\$37,182,768	\$188,090,305	20
1892.....	38,688,439	194,123,865	20
1893.....	38,906,941	204,854,797	18
1894.....	34,516,651	198,888,480	17
1895.....	34,671,028	201,753,216	17
1896.....	35,955,150	214,159,871	16.80
1897.....	41,580,928	206,485,640	20
1898.....	42,543,446	224,938,415	18.91

Usually the increase in note circulation is accompanied by an increase in current loans, but during 1897 an increase in note circulation is shown amounting to \$5,625,778, and a reduction of current loans amounting to \$5,674,231 is recorded. Public deposits during 1898 show a remarkable growth. In the October returns the monthly increase was somewhat over three-fourths of a million, but the increase over the preceding October figures was \$23,990,911. This as a liability in the bank statement, with others, augments total liabilities for the year \$28,468,333, but the assets show more than a corresponding increase, having reached \$27,479,993, although a reduction of over seven and three-fourths millions is shown under heading due from banks and agencies in foreign countries. The increase was in Canadian and other municipal securities, \$3,725,828; railway securities, \$2,068,229; loans on stocks and bonds on call, \$5,663,588; current loans, \$16,442,775, and others under less important headings. It is noticeable that the Klondike gold fields have added a new item to the bank returns, especially banks having established branches in that region, viz., bullion. This, for convenience, seems to be placed under heading "Other assets not included under foregoing heads."

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF CANADIAN CHARTERED BANKS—COMPARISON OF THE IMPORTANT ITEMS.

ASSETS.	Dec. 31, 1898.	Nov. 30, 1898.	Dec. 31, 1897.	Increase and decrease for month.	Increase and decrease for year.
Specie and Dominion notes.....	\$28,088,245	\$28,413,085	\$26,994,071	Dec., \$348,843	Inc., \$72,173
Notes of and checks on other banks.....	10,820,354	10,865,445	11,828,314	Dec., 38,091	Dec., 988,980
Due from banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	22,283,094	23,920,718	23,547,288	Dec., 676,624	Dec., 294,194
Due from banks and agencies in United Kingdom.....	12,168,589	14,287,480	16,519,940	Dec., 2,117,841	Dec., 3,880,861
Canadian municipal securities and British provincial or colonial, other than Dominion.....	17,200,572	17,207,041	13,798,562	Inc., 2,581	Inc., 3,411,010
Railway securities.....	17,280,105	17,176,160	16,944,698	Inc., 44,945	Inc., 275,467
Loans on stocks and bonds on call.....	28,522,040	24,968,968	19,869,822	Inc., 1,668,047	Inc., 6,672,218
Current loans to the public.....	239,900,080	229,261,061	205,931,017	Inc., 638,969	Inc., 23,980,018
Overdue debts.....	2,463,410	2,488,171	3,238,235	Inc., 25,229	Dec., 774,875
Total assets.....	\$390,470,288	\$391,738,255	\$380,133,068	Dec., \$1,312,927	Inc., \$30,337,240
CAPITAL.					
Capital stock paid up.....	\$63,241,533	\$63,170,293	\$63,230,326	Inc., \$71,240	Inc., \$93,297
Reserve fund.....	27,965,897	27,694,310	27,515,969	Inc., 261,497	Inc., 439,808
LIABILITIES.					
Bank notes in circulation.....	\$40,268,861	\$42,360,945	\$37,063,122	Dec., \$3,092,567	Inc., \$2,296,258
Balance due to Dominion Government.....	3,491,731	2,815,833	5,100,145	Inc., 675,899	Dec., 1,608,414
Balance due to Provincial governments.....	2,002,073	2,161,862	2,246,768	Dec., 149,799	Dec., 284,990
Deposits of the public payable on demand.....	90,747,210	89,498,722	81,861,697	Inc., 1,278,468	Inc., 8,696,623
Deposits of the public payable after notice.....	187,384,375	168,534,262	140,130,480	Inc., 1,280,613	Inc., 17,704,415
Deposits payable on demand or after notice between banks.....	2,888,319	3,605,068	3,127,751	Dec., 717,374	Dec., 239,462
Due to banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	605,804	1,450,174	840,196	Dec., 844,370	Inc., 263,668
Due to banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	2,217,758	2,248,728	658,266	Dec., 30,970	Inc., 1,561,462
Total liabilities.....	\$300,773,075	\$301,708,906	\$272,376,076	Dec., \$29,332,830	Inc., \$28,398,999
MISCELLANEOUS.					
Directors' liabilities.....	\$7,602,665	\$7,663,040	\$7,889,989	Dec., \$60,375	Dec., \$67,624
Greatest amount of bank notes in circulation at any time during month.....	43,214,303	44,024,625	40,309,118	Dec., 810,322	Inc., 2,905,183

The November returns follow very creditably in the wake of the preceding month, showing a slight reduction in note circulation, only to the extent of \$192,498, and assurance of the steadiness in trade. The increase over the preceding November was \$2,297,070. The increase in the people's deposits for month was \$6,645,841, and the yearly increase was over \$26,000,000, swelling the increase in total liabilities to \$29,806,886. Total assets increased \$30,650,286. This is made up of investments in Canadian municipal and other securities, railway securities, loans on stocks and bonds on call and current loans, the latter showing an increase of \$23,537,152 over the same month, 1897. Amounts due from banks and agencies in foreign countries and due from banks and branches in Great Britain record nearly \$7,000,000 reduction. The December figures, as is usually the case, begin to run on the down grade; note circulation dropped over two millions from November; balances due from foreign countries and Great Britain continue to show a reduction. Deposits of the people increased during the month of December over two and one-half millions, and over December, 1897, \$28,569,938. Total liabilities are increased over same month, 1897, \$28,896,999. Assets, during the same period, show an increase of \$30,337,240. Loans on stocks and bonds on call are augmented \$6,672,218, and current loans, \$23,969,013. The withdrawal of funds from foreign countries and Great Britain has continued to the extent of over three and one-half millions. Investments have been made in Canadian municipal and other securities and railway securities to the extent of over three and one-half millions during the year.

INCREASE AND DECREASE FOR QUARTER ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1898.

ASSETS.	Dec. 31, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Increase and decrease for quarter.
Specie and Dominion notes.....	\$38,066,243	\$37,485,609	Dec., \$1,419,286
Notes of and checks on other banks.....	10,829,354	10,969,833	Dec., 180,469
Due from banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	23,368,064	22,169,026	Inc., 1,064,069
Due from banks and agencies in United Kingdom.....	12,169,569	12,372,730	Dec., 103,141
Canadian municipal securities and British provincial or foreign other than Dominion.....	17,309,572	17,454,767	Dec., 245,195
Railway securities.....	17,230,106	17,227,296	Dec., 7,181
Loans on stocks and bonds on call.....	26,838,040	23,745,140	Inc., 2,786,900
Current loans to the public.....	228,900,060	222,861,628	Inc., 7,538,507
Overdue debts.....	2,463,410	3,406,913	Dec., 943,503
<b>Total assets.....</b>	<b>\$360,470,328</b>	<b>\$362,001,817</b>	<b>Inc. \$8,468,511</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Bank notes in circulation.....	\$40,258,381	\$40,071,143	Inc., \$187,238
Balance due to Dominion Government.....	3,491,731	3,606,106	Dec., 114,375
Balance due to provincial Governments.....	2,002,073	2,450,365	Dec., 448,283
Deposits of the public payable on demand.....	90,747,210	87,214,909	Inc., 3,532,301
Deposits of the public payable after notice.....	157,324,875	151,368,796	Inc., 6,466,060
Deposits payable after notice or on demand between banks.....	2,888,319	3,555,058	Dec., 666,739
Due to banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	606,804	609,277	Inc., 2,473
Due to banks and agencies in United Kingdom.....	2,217,758	2,346,813	Dec., 129,055
<b>Total liabilities.....</b>	<b>\$300,773,075</b>	<b>\$291,875,803</b>	<b>Inc., \$8,897,272</b>

The following amounts were added to capital and reserve fund during December: Subscribed capital, \$13,600; capital paid up, \$71,240; reserve fund, \$271,497. One bank has reduced reserve fund \$10,000.

The following figures will show the increased circulation for the quarter ending December 31, 1898, over preceding years, which is a fair indication of the increased business transacted:

NOTE CIRCULATION.	1898.	1897.	1896.	1895.	1894.
October.....	\$42,543,446	\$41,580,928	\$35,955,150	\$34,071,023	\$34,518,861
November.....	42,360,948	40,143,878	35,262,599	34,362,746	33,076,666
December.....	40,268,381	37,965,123	33,085,784	32,566,179	32,376,690
<b>Average.....</b>	<b>\$41,717,591</b>	<b>\$39,906,643</b>	<b>\$34,771,177</b>	<b>\$33,966,317</b>	<b>\$33,323,046</b>

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### CHECK—NOTICE OF INVALIDITY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota, December 21, 1898.

DREW vs. WHEELIHAN.

Bad faith in the purchase, for value, of an invalid and void bank check, may be partly evidenced by the gross negligence of the purchaser. It may also be shown by a variety of circumstances, some of them slight in character and others of greater significance.

*Held*, in the case at bar, that the question of plaintiff's good or bad faith when purchasing the check in question was for the jury on the evidence.

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*COLLINS, J.*: Action by an alleged good-faith purchaser, for value, against the maker of a dishonored bank check. For the purposes of this appeal it stands admitted that the check was illegal and void in the hands of MacArthur, the payee, and Smith, one of the indorsers, under the provisions of Gen. St. 1894, § 6594. The facts were that almost immediately after the check was signed by defendant at Duluth, Minn., it was indorsed by MacArthur to Smith. The latter was a business man, residing at Duluth, while defendant was a resident of Grand Rapids, Wis., temporarily in Duluth. Smith at once went to a saloon keeper in the place last mentioned, by the name of Henches, and got him to go with him to the Commercial Bank in the same city for the purpose of obtaining the money, \$400. The officers of the bank refused to cash the paper without Henches' indorsement. The check was then indorsed by Henches as demanded, and also by Smith, and the money paid over to Henches, who refused to turn it over to Smith until the check was sent to Grand Rapids and collected. Thereupon Smith and Henches returned to the bank, Henches paid back the \$400, and the check was delivered to Smith after Henches had erased his absolute indorsement, and the bank had erased an indorsement it had made to another bank in Duluth for collection (upon which it had become liable). Smith forthwith went to West Superior, in the State of Wisconsin, and called upon Drew, the plaintiff, who was in the saloon business, and then proposed to the latter that if he would cash the check he (Smith) would "buy a drink." Another person who had been present when defendant signed the check, and who knew of its invalidity, seems to have been in the saloon at the time, about three o'clock of the afternoon of the day on which the check was drawn. From plaintiff's testimony it seems that he looked at the face of the check, remarked that it was a large one, then looked at the back, saw the erased indorsements before mentioned, and asked what they were, and if the check had not been returned by the bank. To this inquiry Smith answered that he had previously turned the check over to Henches; that the latter had received the money, but wanted to retain it until the bank collected the check; that he (Smith) needed the money, so he had obtained the check from Henches, and had brought it to plaintiff to be cashed. The latter testified that he did not then

know anything about the maker of the paper, nor about McArthur, the payee, nor did he know where Grand Rapids was, except that it was in the southern part of Wisconsin; and that he had previously cashed checks for Smith, with whom he had been acquainted about seven years. Plaintiff admitted that he had at his saloon telephone communication with Henches and the Commercial Bank at Duluth, seven miles distant; that he knew there were several banks in that city, as well as in West Superior. Immediately after cashing the check, and, of course, during banking hours, plaintiff went in person to the bank in the last-named city where he kept his account and transacted his business, and there indorsed and left the check for collection, not for deposit on account. Meantime payment had been stopped, and hence this action.

The illegality of the check being admitted on this appeal, the cause must be disposed of precisely as if the admission had been made at the trial. Therefore the burden of proof was on plaintiff to establish his good faith when taking the instrument. The presumption was against him, and it was incumbent upon him to overcome it. (*Bank vs. Richter*, 55 Minn. 362.) But the plaintiff was entitled to protection as an innocent purchaser, unless he had knowledge or notice of such facts that his failure to make inquiry, when taking the check, amounted to bad faith. (*Collins vs. McDowell*, 65 Minn. 110.) Gross negligence, although not of itself sufficient, as a question of law, to defeat title, constitutes evidence of bad faith. (*Bank vs. Diefendorf*, 123 N. Y. 205.) As was stated in *Murray vs. Lardner* (2 Wall. 121), the rule may be said to resolve itself into a question of honesty or dishonesty, for guilty knowledge and willful ignorance alike invoke the result of bad faith. And bad faith in one of these transactions is based upon a variety of circumstances, some of them slight in character, and others of greater significance. (*Insurance Co. vs. Hochfeld*, 78 N. Y. 226.)

A reputable banking house might discount or purchase an invalid check, presented to it by a man of integrity, without being suspected of bad faith; while an individual not engaged in banking, or in any business which would naturally lead him into discounting or purchasing negotiable paper, taking the same check from an irresponsible party, and under peculiar circumstances, might easily be suspected of having directly or impliedly connived at wrong, or, at least, that he was not unwilling to close his eyes and ears when taking the paper, so that he might not ascertain its real character. Whether a purchaser has notice or knowledge of the invalidity of the paper, or has means or knowledge which he willfully disregards, is usually a question for a jury, not for a court. (See *Bank vs. Tagley*, 57 Minn. 391.)

It is claimed here by counsel for plaintiff that at the trial the presumption of knowledge in plaintiff was rebutted and entirely overthrown, and that by the evidence it was conclusively shown that he was an innocent purchaser, and entitled to a verdict. We cannot concur in this view.

While the testimony on which the verdict for defendant is rested is not very convincing, we are of the opinion that it was sufficient. And in saying this we are not unmindful of the fact that both plaintiff and Smith asserted under oath, and in the most positive manner, that the former exchanged his money for this check in the utmost good faith, without the slightest suspicion of its bad character, and in the absence of all circumstances which would or should arouse his suspicion. Plaintiff was not a banker, nor was he engaged, remotely or otherwise, in the banking business. He was a saloon keeper. True, he had, according to the evidence, cashed checks for Smith on previous occasions. How large does not appear, but evidently this was for a much larger sum than any check which had previously been presented, so large, in fact, that it would seem somewhat remarkable that Smith would expect plaintiff to cash it. Smith resided in Duluth, seven miles distant, in which city there were several banks, and plaintiff knew that the check, although dated at

Grand Rapids, Wis., had been executed in Duluth that day, and had there passed by indorsement into Smith's hands.

There was no direct evidence as to Smith's character, or business standing, or what plaintiff knew of him, but, in passing, it may be observed that the Duluth bank would not cash the check with his indorsement only but required Henches', and when the money was paid over to the latter he refused to allow it to go into Smith's possession until the check, which he had indorsed at Smith's solicitation, had been collected by the bank.

From this it is apparent that a banking institution in Smith's home town, and also one of his personal friends in the same place, notwithstanding his pressing need for ready money, had declined to allow the amount of the check to go out of their hands upon his indorsement alone. This tended to show that Smith was lacking either in means or integrity or both. More than this, although needing the money, Smith failed to call upon any other Duluth bank, but went out of the State to West Superior. And then, instead of presenting the check to a bank for discount, as we might reasonably expect of a business man who had formerly resided in that city, he appeared at a saloon, during banking hours, and proposed to the saloon keeper that he would buy a drink if he would cash the paper. This of itself was not an ordinary transaction. But plaintiff examined the check, which was drawn on a bank in a distant part of the State by a total stranger to him, and had on its back two recently erased indorsements—one absolute (that of Henches'); the other for collection (that of the bank). He was also told by Smith that the money had been obtained at the bank, but that Henches had refused to let it go out of his own hands until the check had been collected. Without a word of further inquiry, and with the means at hand for obtaining some information in respect to the paper, plaintiff went away from his place of business—where was not shown—procured the money, turned it over to Smith, and with great promptness took the check to the bank with which he did business, and there left it for collection.

It cannot be said that any particular one of these circumstances was sufficient of itself to warrant a finding of plaintiff's bad faith, but, taking them all together, some of them of slight significance, but others of more importance, we are compelled to hold that it was a case for the jury, and that their verdict against plaintiff cannot be disturbed on this point. These circumstances could well be considered by the jury when passing upon the testimony of plaintiff and Smith as to the *bona fide* character of the transaction. (See *Schwartz vs. Insurance Co.* 21 Minn. 215; *Harokins vs. Sauby*, 48 Minn. 69; *Bank vs. Sullivan*, 63 Minn. 468.)

Plaintiff's counsel have relied with much confidence on *Collins vs. McDowell*, supra, but an examination of the facts in that case will show that those now before us are altogether different. Judgment affirmed.

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**NATIONAL BANK—WHEN DEBTOR ESTOPPED TO DENY CORPORATE EXISTENCE—WHEN ESTOPPED TO DENY POWER TO MAKE LOAN.**

Supreme Court of California, September 26, 1898.

**CAMP vs. LAND.**

One who has dealt with a bank as having power to make a particular contract, and has received the benefits of the contract, will not be permitted to dispute the corporate existence of the bank or its power to enter into the contract.

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This was an action to redeem certain real estate, on which the owner had given a deed of trust to secure a loan made to him by the National Bank of D. O. Mills & Co. The wife of complainant in her answer denied that the bank was a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, and alleged a violation of the law by the bank in making the loan and accepting the security.

HENSHAW, *J.* (omitting part of the opinion): Of the objections to the introduction of this deed the first goes to the absence of proof of the corporate existence of the bank, and of its capacity to enter into the contract in question. But it is sufficient to answer, with reference to the plaintiff *J. E. Camp*, that, since he dealt with the bank as a corporation having power to enter into the particular contract, and since he received the benefit of that contract, upon well-settled principles of equity he may not be heard to advance these objections. (*Association vs. Clark*, 67 Cal. 684, 8 Pac. 445; *Irrigation Co. vs. Warner*, 72 Cal. 379, 14 Pac. 37; *Yancey vs. Morton*, 94 Cal. 558, 29 Pac. 1111; *Bank vs. Boyd*, 99 Cal. 604, 34 Pac. 337.)

As to his wife, those very questions were litigated by and decided against her in the foreclosure suit; while, as to both husband and wife, the evidence of the bank's President, admitted without objection, is sufficient to establish the *de facto* character of the institution.

And, even if it be admitted that the bank, under Sections 5136, 5137, Rev. St. U. S., was not authorized to make the loan in question, it did not lie with plaintiffs to raise this point. The United States alone can be heard upon this question. (*Bank vs. Mathews*, 98 U. S. 621; *Bank vs. Whitney*, 108 U. S. 99.)

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**RAISED CHECK—WHEN DRAWEE BANK NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER  
AMOUNT PAID ON.**

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department.

CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK vs. TRADESMEN'S NATIONAL  
BANK OF NEW YORK.

To entitle the drawee bank to recover the amount it has paid upon a raised check, the payment must have been made without culpable negligence; and where the drawee bank has received notice that a check has been lost and payment stopped, or facts from which it would appear that it has been raised, and pays the check under such circumstances as show culpable negligence, it does not make payment under a mistake of fact which will allow a recovery against a *bona fide* holder who has parted with or used the amount, relying on the payment by the drawee bank.

Upon the facts of the case, *Held*, a question for the jury whether, with the knowledge of the facts which the officers of the drawee bank had, they were guilty of negligence in paying a check which had been raised from \$76 to \$7,660.

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INGRAHAM, *J.*: On June 7, 1894, the Philadelphia National Bank, a depositor in the plaintiff bank, drew a draft upon the plaintiff with the serial Number 2269, dated on that day, and payable to Henry F. Thompson, for \$76. This draft appears subsequently to have been altered by changing the date from June 7 to June 12, and the amount from \$76 to \$7,660, and so altered, it was presented on June 13, 1894, at the plaintiff's bank, and certified by its paying teller. On June 14 (the following day) the draft was presented by the defendant to the plaintiff at the New York Clearing-House, and paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff subsequently brought this action to recover the amount so paid, less that for which the draft was originally drawn. The question as to the right of the plaintiff to recover back this money may be viewed in two aspects: First, with reference to its liability on the certification of the draft on June 13; and, second, respecting the right to recover the amount paid to the defendant, such payment having been made on June 14, and in the regular course of business. In the view we have taken of this second aspect of the question, it is unnecessary to discuss the obligation of the plaintiff to the defendant, the holder of the draft, in consequence of the certification on June 13.

In an action for money had and received, "the plaintiff's case depended upon the question to which party, plaintiff or defendant, does the money *ex æquo et bono*



belong? If to the plaintiff, it was because the facts created an indebtedness to him from defendant. In this respect the action has been frequently stated to be an 'equitable one,' that is, one depending upon the general principles of equity for the maintenance of the plaintiff's claim to the money. It is the most favorable way in which a defendant can be sued; he can be liable no further than the money he has received, and against that he may go into every equitable defense upon the general issue; he may claim every equitable allowance, etc., in short, he may defend himself by everything which shows that the plaintiff *ex aequo et bono* is not entitled to the whole of his demand or any part of it" (*Chapman vs. Forbes*, 123 N. Y. 536). The right of a bank to recover the amount it has paid under a *bona fide* mistake of fact to a person presenting to it a raised draft, is clearly established. The form of the action in which such a recovery can be had is that for money had and received (*White vs. Continental Nat. Bank*, 64 N. Y. 319). In such a case the defendant may, upon the general issue, show any fact to defeat the action which would make it inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recover, and if it appears that it would be inequitable to throw the loss upon the person to whom such check or draft has been paid, a recovery will not be allowed. As was said by Mr. Justice Story in *United States Bank vs. Bank of Georgia* (10 Wheat. 343):

"In respect to persons equally innocent, where one is bound to know an act upon his knowledge, and the other has no means of knowledge, there seems to be no reason for burdening the latter with any loss in exoneration of the former. There is nothing unconscientious in retaining the sum received from the bank in payment of such notes, which its own acts have deliberately assumed to be genuine."

This rule is stated by Lord Abinger in *Kelly vs. Solari* (9 Meeson & Welsby, 57), as follows:

"The safest rule, however, is, that if the party makes the payment with full knowledge of the facts, although under ignorance of the law, there being no fraud on the other side, he cannot recover it back again. There may also be cases in which, although he might by investigation learn the state of facts more accurately, he declines to do so and chooses to pay the money notwithstanding; in that case, there can be no doubt that he is equally bound."

And this rule has been followed without exception in England and this country. A drawee, when a bill or check is presented to him, is bound to use such knowledge as he has of any alteration or defect in the bill or check; and if he, having knowledge that the bill or check is forged, pays it, he will not be allowed to say that he paid it under a *bona fide* mistake of fact. Thus, it is settled that where a check is paid on presentation to the bank upon which it is drawn, and the name of the drawer of the check is forged, the payment was not made under a mistake of fact which would justify a recovery of the money paid. The ground of this rule is that the drawee is chargeable with knowledge of the signature of the drawer.

In *Daniel on Negotiable Instruments* (Section 1362), it is said:

"In all the cases which hold the drawee absolutely estopped by acceptance or payment from denying the genuineness of the drawer's name, the loss is thrown upon him on the ground of negligence on his part in accepting or paying until he has ascertained the bill to be genuine."

And Judge Ruggles, in *Bank of Commerce vs. Union Bank* (3 Com. 234), says:

"This rule is founded on the supposed negligence of the drawee in failing, by an examination of the signature when the bill is presented, to detect the forgery and refuse payment. The drawee is supposed to know the handwriting of the drawer, who is usually his customer or correspondent. As between him, therefore, and an innocent holder, the payer, from this imputed negligence, must bear the loss."

Thus, where the law imputes to the drawee of a check or draft knowledge of the signature of the drawer, the payment of the check or draft by the drawee prevents

him from recovering back the money, as the drawee was negligent in not employing the knowledge imputed to him; and as between the drawee and a *bona fide* holder of the check or bill for value, such *bona fide* holder will be entitled to retain the proceeds in his own hands. But where the forgery is not in counterfeiting the name of the drawer, but in altering the body of the bill, the drawee is not presumed to know the handwriting of the body of the bill, and is not chargeable with knowledge of the alteration in the bill itself so long as the signature of the drawer is genuine; and where he has paid such an amount without notice that the bill has been raised or altered, he is entitled to recover; for, as Judge Ruggles says in *Bank of Commerce vs. Union Bank (supra)*:

"To require the drawee to know the handwriting of the residue of the bill is unreasonable. It would, in most cases, be requiring an impossibility. Such a rule would be not only arbitrary and rigorous, but unjust. The drawee would undoubtedly be answerable for negligence in paying an altered bill, if the alteration were manifest on its face."

And Judge Rapallo, in *National Bank of Commerce vs. The National Mechanics' Banking Association* (55 N. Y. 216), applying the same principle, says:

"The bank was not bound to know the handwriting or genuineness of the filling up of the check. It was legally concluded only as to the signature of the drawer and its own certification. \* \* \* If the defendant had shown that it had suffered loss in consequence of the mistake committed by the plaintiff, as for instance, if, in consequence of the recognition by the plaintiff of the check in question, the defendant had paid out money to its fraudulent depositor, then, clearly, to the extent of the loss thus sustained, the plaintiff should be responsible."

The ground of this distinction between a case where the signature of the drawer of the bill is forged, and one where the signature of the drawer is genuine, but the body of the bill has been changed, is apparent. The law imputes to the drawee a knowledge of the drawer's signature, and where he pays the bill to which the name of the drawer has been forged, he is guilty of negligence in not applying the knowledge imputed to him, and he will not be permitted to recover the proceeds of the bill from a *bona fide* holder. On the same reasoning when the body of the bill has been forged or altered, and the drawee has knowledge thereof when it is presented for payment, and with such knowledge pays it, he has not paid it under a *bona fide* mistake of fact which would allow him to recover the money thus paid from the person to whom it has been paid, and who has relied on such payment to his injury. If the drawee has such knowledge he is bound to apply it; and if he fails to do so and pays the bill, he is as guilty of negligence as in the case where the knowledge is imputed to him. In either case he can not recover, because he has been negligent in applying either the knowledge which he actually has or that which the law ascribes to him; and such negligence prevents a recovery of the money paid.

The rule is recognized in the cases before cited, but is very clearly stated in *Clews vs. National Banking Association*, which was three times before the Court of Appeals (89 N. Y. 422; 105 N. Y. 401; 114 N. Y. 70). Upon the first appeal, when there had been a judgment for the plaintiff, Judge Earl, in discussing the liability of the certifying bank, said:

"When \* \* \* a bank has thus certified a raised check by mistake and subsequently pays the money thereon without any culpable negligence on its part, it can recover the amount thus paid as money paid by mistake." In that case a check had been certified by the defendant, and after such certification it had been altered so as to call for a larger amount than that for which it had been drawn and certified. It was offered to the plaintiff (purporting to be drawn for \$2,540) in payment for \$2,500 in Government bonds. Before accepting it the plaintiffs sent it by their messenger to the drawee, and it was presented to the paying teller with the statement

that Henry Clews wanted to know if the certification was good. The latter looked at it and answered "Yes." Relying upon that statement, the plaintiffs accepted the check in payment for the bonds and delivered them. The bank, seventeen days before the inquiry was made of its teller, had received notice from the drawer of the check that it had been lost, and payment of the original, which the defendant had certified, was stopped. Upon the second appeal (105 N. Y. 401) the court held that it was a question for the jury to say whether it was culpable negligence to answer the question without recourse to the certification book and the book of stop payments, which referred to the draft in question by its number and would have disclosed the fraud; and upon a subsequent trial that question was submitted to the jury and answered in the affirmative, and the judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the draft as raised was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (114 N. Y. 70). See, also, *Gloucester Bank vs. Salem Bank* (17 Mass. 41), where the Court says:

"In all such cases the just and sound principle of decision has been that if the loss can be traced to the fault or negligence of either party, it shall be fixed upon him."

We have thus the general rule that to entitle the drawee of a check to recover the amount it has paid upon a raised check, the payment must have been made without culpable negligence, and that where the drawee has received notice that a check has been lost and payment of it stopped, or facts from which it would appear that it had been raised, and pays the check without examination and under such circumstances as show culpable negligence, the drawee does not make payment under a mistake of fact which would allow a recovery against a *bona fide* holder who has parted with or used the amount, relying on the payment of the check by the drawee.

The facts relied upon by the defendant to show culpable negligence of the plaintiff in paying this draft are not in dispute. The Philadelphia National Bank, the drawer of the draft in question, had what is known as an active account with the plaintiff bank, and had occasion to draw drafts upon it almost daily. At the close of each day's business, the Philadelphia bank invariably notified the plaintiff of all drafts it had drawn upon the plaintiff bank on that day. The officers of both the plaintiff and the Philadelphia bank testified that there was never any deviation from this rule. These notifications were in the form of letters of advice as follows: "The following-described drafts have this day been drawn by the Philadelphia National Bank upon the Continental Bank, N. Y." Then followed a list with the serial number of each draft, the name of the payee and the amount thereof.

These letters of advice were received by the plaintiff bank on the morning following the day on which they were written, were delivered to the plaintiff's bookkeeper in charge of the account of the Philadelphia bank, and were kept by him on a clip upon his desk. As each draft specified in the letter of advice was certified or paid, the bookkeeper checked the letter of advice, opposite such draft. Thus the officers of the bank had information when each draft was presented, which would enable them to ascertain its genuineness and see if an alteration had been made in it. Each draft could be identified by its number and the name of the payee, and the plaintiff had notice of the amount for which each draft was drawn.

On June 7, 1894, the Philadelphia bank drew upon the plaintiff a draft, Number 2,269, payable to Henry F. Thompson, for \$76, and sent it to Thompson at Baltimore by mail, and on the same day sent the plaintiff a letter of advice stating that it had drawn a draft upon the plaintiff, Number 2,269, in favor of Henry F. Thompson, for \$76. This letter was received by the plaintiff on the morning of June 8, 1894, and was at that time delivered to the bookkeeper having charge of the account of the Philadelphia bank, and placed by him upon the clip at his desk. That letter remained continuously before the bookkeeper from the morning of June 8 until it was taken by him from the clip on the afternoon of June 14. It contained a notifi-

cation of all the drafts which had been drawn on June 7, that in question being the first drawn on that day. There were in all eight of such drafts, the numbers running from 2,269 to 2,276, inclusive. On each of the following days on which drafts were drawn, the Philadelphia bank sent to the plaintiff a letter of advice of the drafts drawn on the day the letter was sent. On June 12, advice was given to the plaintiff of the drawing of ten drafts, the serial numbers running from 2,287 to 2,297, inclusive; and by a separate letter notice was given of a draft, Number 2,302, drawn on the same day; and on June 13 the Philadelphia bank advised the plaintiff of its drawing one draft on that day, with the serial number 2,302. These letters were, as usual, received upon the day subsequent to their date.

The plaintiff had, therefore, on the morning of June 13 noticed that draft Number 2,269 had been drawn in favor of Henry F. Thompson for \$76, and that on June 12 drafts had been drawn, numbered 2,287 to 2,297, inclusive, and one numbered 2,302. On the morning of June 13, 1894, a draft drawn by the Philadelphia bank, numbered 2,269, which purported to be dated June 12, 1894, payable to the order of Henry F. Thompson, for \$7,660, was presented to the paying teller for certification. This draft bore the same number and was payable to the order of the same person as the one which the plaintiff had been notified had been drawn on June 7 for \$76. The date, however, was changed to June 12, and the amount changed to \$7,660, instead of \$76. When this draft was presented to the paying teller of the plaintiff bank for certification, he took it to the bookkeeper who had charge of the Philadelphia bank's account, and who had before him upon the clip on his desk the letters of advice from the Philadelphia bank; and holding this draft in front of the bookkeeper so that he could see all parts of it, including the serial number, he said to the bookkeeper: "Is this check all right?" The bookkeeper said it was. Whether or not he examined the letters of advice from the Philadelphia bank at that time, or answered without such examination, does not appear, but he did not make any check on the letter of advice. The paying teller then went back to his desk and certified the draft, entering its amount in his certification book, but omitted to enter in his book, as was his custom, the serial number of the draft, and delivered it to the person presenting it for certification. After this draft had been thus certified, the certification book was delivered to the bookkeeper, and from that he charged up as against the depositor the amount of the draft so certified in the depositor's account. The evidence is that instructions issued by the plaintiff to the paying teller were, always to inquire of the bookkeeper before certifying a check; that it was the duty of the bookkeeper to ascertain whether or not the account was good for the check presented; and that where letters of advice were received, it was the duty of the bookkeeper to consult such letters before informing the paying teller in regard to the check. The bookkeeper testified that when he entered this draft on the afternoon of June 13, he noticed that the paying teller had neglected to enter the serial number in the certification book; that at that time he also knew and had in mind the fact that the plaintiff had not received any letter of advice from the Philadelphia bank that a draft for the amount called for by this certified draft had been drawn. Thus his attention was expressly called to the fact that a check for \$7,660, which had been submitted to him for inspection and had been certified by the teller, when no advice had been received from the Philadelphia bank of the drawing of such a draft, he having before him the letters of advice from the Philadelphia bank of the drafts which it had drawn upon the plaintiff on June 12, the date of the draft in question, together with notice of all drafts drawn prior to that time, with the serial number of all drafts drawn, and notice that a draft with this same number had been drawn to this payee for \$76. He noticed that the teller, in certifying this draft, of which the plaintiff had no advice, had omitted to put in his certification book the number of the draft which was, as testified to, an unusual occurrence.

These facts thus brought to the attention of the bookkeeper on the afternoon of June 13, he then communicated to the general bookkeeper of the bank.

Thus the officers of the bank had notice of these facts, which had been specifically called to their attention on the afternoon of June 13. It also appears that the drafts drawn and certified under these circumstances are almost invariably paid through the New York Clearing-House, and that in the usual course of business that draft would be presented at the clearing-house for payment on the following morning. These facts, relating to this particular draft thus certified, being brought to the attention of the plaintiff's officers, no further inquiry was made by the plaintiff bank concerning it; although it appears that on the next day, in the afternoon, when the Cashier's attention was called to the discrepancy between the draft and the letter of advice, the Philadelphia bank was communicated with by telephone, and within a very few moments information was given to the plaintiff that no such draft had been drawn. If, on the afternoon of June 13, the officers of the bank had communicated by telephone with the plaintiff bank, as they did on the afternoon of June 14, we must assume that no difficulty would have been experienced in obtaining at once the information which they obtained on the afternoon of June 14, viz., that no draft for this amount had been drawn. No such precaution, however, was taken. The officers of the bank simply did nothing.

On June 13, after the draft had been certified, it was deposited with the defendant bank by Thompson, the payee, who had an account in that bank, and the amount was then placed to his credit. He made no effort to draw any part of the money on June 13, and on the morning of June 14, the defendant bank presented this draft, so certified by the plaintiff, to the plaintiff for payment through the clearing-house, and the draft was duly paid by the plaintiff.

The method of payment through the clearing-house is described by the plaintiff's Cashier. He stated that under the rules of the clearing-house, the day after a check or draft is deposited with a member of the clearing-house, that draft or check, together with all others drawn upon the same bank, are sent to the clearing-house, and they are there exchanged for checks or drafts drawn by other banks upon the bank sending in these drafts. That exchange process is done at 10 o'clock in the morning at the clearing-house. "If the total amount of checks drawn by other banks against our bank exceeds the total amount which our bank has drawn against the other banks, then we send the overplus to the clearing-house, and they make the payments—distributed as it may be due to the other banks.

It is a rule of the clearing-house that the debit bank must pay in before half-past one, and credit bank cannot receive its credit until after half-past one, probably 2 o'clock."

On June 14, the plaintiff bank sent to the defendant bank checks and drafts drawn upon it amounting to \$505.72, and the defendant bank sent to the plaintiff bank checks and drafts drawn upon it aggregating \$8,053.88, which included this certified draft in question for \$7,660; and on that day the credit balance of the defendant bank at the clearing-house amounted to upwards of \$18,000, which included the amount of this draft in question. Thus, on the morning of June 14, at 10 o'clock, this draft (which, under the rules of the clearing-house would be then presented, if deposited on the preceding day with a bank which cleared through the clearing-house), was presented at the clearing-house to the representative of the plaintiff bank by the representative of the defendant bank; was accepted by the plaintiff's representative there without objection, and returned to the plaintiff, arriving there, as testified to, from about twenty minutes after to half-past 10 o'clock.

It is the custom of the plaintiff bank, when certified checks are returned from the clearing-house, to have them delivered to the check clerk, and he has charge of them during that day. The check clerk compares these certified checks with the entries

in the certification book which is kept by the paying teller; and if, upon such comparison, they are found correct, they are then cancelled by the bank and placed in a receptacle or drawer provided for certified checks. When this draft in question was received by the check clerk of the plaintiff bank on the morning of June 14 from the clearing-house, it was by him cancelled as paid and placed in that receptacle, and the credit balance due to the defendant bank from the clearing-house was paid by the clearing-house.

There can be no doubt, I think, that when this draft was examined and found correct by the check clerk and by him cancelled, it was then paid. The evidence is that this generally took place some time between 11 and 1 o'clock. The plaintiff, through its officers, had received this draft from the defendant bank and had made the examination which they required as to certified checks to ascertain its correctness by a comparison with the certification book. That being found correct, they had cancelled the draft and placed it in the receptacle in which such drafts were kept. Nothing more remained to be done with it, except to return it to drawer when the account of the Philadelphia bank with the plaintiff was written up. With knowledge of the facts before stated, the plaintiff had paid the draft without comparing it with the letters of advice, or making any examination as to its genuineness, when any comparison with the letters of advice on the morning it was received would have at once disclosed the forgery.

The defendant requested the court to submit to the jury the question whether the payment of this draft by the plaintiff under the circumstances was culpable negligence, so as to preclude the plaintiff from recovering more than the balance of the depositor's account with the defendant bank at the time that notice of the forgery was given to the defendant. The court denied that motion, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff.

We think there was at least a question for the jury to determine whether the bank was culpably negligent in paying this check, and if the jury should find that it was so negligent, under the rule before stated, the plaintiff could not recover the proceeds of this draft which had been actually and in good faith paid out by the defendant before notice of the forgery, relying upon the payment of the draft by the plaintiff. This draft, as before stated, was deposited with the defendant on June 13, after its certification by the plaintiff. Under the rules of the clearing-house, of which both these banks are members, it was delivered to the plaintiff on the morning of June 14, and was received and paid by it. Under the constitution and rules of the clearing-house, in evidence, it is provided that "all checks, drafts, notes, or other items in the exchanges, returned as 'not good' or missent, shall be returned the same day directly to the bank from which they were received." By Rule 1, it is provided that "return of checks, drafts, etc., for informality, not good, missent, guarantee of indorsement or for any other cause, should be made before 8 o'clock of the same day."

On the afternoon of June 14, some time after 2 o'clock, the depositor who had deposited this draft with the defendant appeared with three checks, aggregating \$7,025, for which he demanded cash. The paying teller of the defendant bank examined his account and found that he had made a deposit on the day before to an amount which would make his account good for this \$7,025. He examined the deposit slip with which that deposit was made, and saw that the deposit was of a check certified by the plaintiff bank. That check having been sent to the clearing-house in the morning, and no notice having been received to the contrary, it was assumed to have been paid by the plaintiff bank, and the paying teller paid the check of the depositor, leaving a balance of account to the credit of the depositor of \$660. The teller swears positively that these payments to Thompson were made between 2 and 3 o'clock, after the check had been paid by the plaintiff bank, before

the forgery had been actually discovered by the plaintiff, and before any notice had been given to the defendant of any irregularity in the check.

This brings the case within the illustration stated by Judge Rapallo in *National Bank of Commerce vs. The National Mechanics' Banking Association* (*supra*):

“If the defendant had shown that it had suffered loss in consequence of the mistake committed by the plaintiff, as for instance if, in consequence of the recognition by the plaintiff of the check in question, the defendant had paid out money to its fraudulent depositor, then, clearly, to the extent of the loss thus sustained, the plaintiff should be responsible.”

Here, if the jury should find that it was culpable negligence on the part of the plaintiff, with the facts which had been called to its attention on the afternoon of June 13, to receive the draft through the clearing-house on June 14, without making any examination of the draft or comparing it with the letter of advice from the drawer, to cancel it as paid and hold it until after 2 o'clock; and that the defendant had paid out this money, relying upon the recognition of the draft by the plaintiff, its payment on the morning of June 14 and its retention in the plaintiff's hands without objection; then, to the extent of the loss sustained by the defendant in paying the draft to its fraudulent depositor, the plaintiff would be responsible.

On the afternoon of June 14, some time after 4 o'clock, the bookkeeper of the plaintiff in charge of the account of the Philadelphia bank, having in mind the facts which had been called to his attention the day before, went to the receptacle in which certified checks were kept, and got out this draft. On comparing it with the letters of advice from the Philadelphia bank, he at once noticed that there was a discrepancy in the amount of this draft, and taking the draft and the letter of advice, he brought them to the attention of the Cashier of the plaintiff bank. The Cashier at once communicated with the Philadelphia bank, as before stated, by telephone, and received information which disclosed the forgery. He at once went to the defendant bank, arriving there about 5 o'clock in the afternoon when the principal officers of the bank had left the banking house, and subsequently, in the evening of the same day, he notified the Cashier of the defendant bank. Efforts were made the next morning to arrest the person who had obtained the money from the defendant bank, but without success.

On the morning of June 15 this depositor attempted to cash another check at the defendant bank, and also offered for deposit another draft drawn on another bank in New York. It thus appeared that he was in New York on the morning of June 15, but he subsequently disappeared and no trace of him could be found. Thus, the plaintiff did not discover the forgery until about half-past four o'clock on the afternoon of June 14, although it is apparent that if any examination of this draft had been made at any time before two o'clock and the defendant notified, the money would not have been paid to the forger, and no loss would have been sustained.

Under the rules and constitution of the clearing-house, as before stated, the plaintiff was required to return the draft before three o'clock on the day on which it was presented. The legal situation of the plaintiff bank does not, however, depend upon these rules of the clearing-house. As a matter of fact the draft was not returned before three o'clock of the day upon which it was paid. Whether or not a return before three o'clock would under the rules of the clearing-house have exonerated the plaintiff, it is not necessary for us to determine. It was, we think, at least a question for the jury to determine whether or not, with the knowledge of the facts which had been communicated to the officers of the plaintiff, it was culpable negligence on their part to receive this draft, as they did on the morning of June 14 at about half-past ten o'clock, without examination or verification, and to retain it until after two o'clock; and if the jury should find in the affirmative, and that the defendant made the payment to its depositor relying upon the acceptance and pay-

ment of the draft by the plaintiff, the defendant would be exonerated from liability for anything more than the amount remaining in its hands to the credit of the fraudulent depositor, when notice of the forgery was given to the defendant.

As the application to submit these questions to the jury was denied by the court, the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.

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**NOTE MADE PAYABLE AT A BANK—EFFECT OF PAYMENT MADE TO SUCH BANK.**

Supreme Court of Iowa, May 11, 1898.

**BANK OF MONTREAL vs. INGERSON.**

Payment of the amount due on a promissory note at maturity to the bank designated therein as the place of payment will not discharge the note.

A bank has no right to accept a claim against itself in payment of notes forwarded to it for collection.

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This was an action to recover from a surety the amount due on two promissory notes.

ROBINSON, *J.*: Both notes were by their terms payable at the Union Stock Yards State Bank. The smaller one was payable on June 10, 1893, and the other was payable on the 25th day of the same month. Nearly \$4,000 have been paid on the larger note, but the other one is wholly unpaid.

They were sent to the plaintiff a considerable time before the failure, and, when that occurred, were in its possession. In the evening of the day before the failure, after banking hours, Ingerson and Leeper went to the Sioux City bank, to arrange for the payment of the two notes. Ingerson stated that there was to be a sale of cattle in Omaha the next day, and proposed that about \$1,800 of the proceeds of the sale be placed to the credit of the Sioux City bank in some bank in Omaha, to apply in payment of the Wheeler note, and that the amount required to pay the remainder due on the Wheeler note, and the amount needed to pay the Leeper note, should be charged to his account the next morning.

At that time he had a credit in the Sioux City bank sufficient to make the payments proposed. Mr. Skerry, President of the bank, told him that the notes were in Chicago, but would be sent for, and that he could leave the money required to pay them in the bank; and, when the notes were received, they would be cancelled; that the bank would charge the amount required to pay them to his account, and cancel the notes.

No check was given by Ingerson, but it was agreed that the amount required for the payment of the notes should be charged to his account in the books of the bank the next day. The bank closed, however, before the entries were made.

The Omaha deposit was made as agreed, and has been paid to the plaintiff, and is not in controversy.

It is claimed by the appellee that the effect of his transaction with the Sioux City bank was to pay the remainder due upon the notes.

The plan adopted and pursued respecting the collateral notes sent to the plaintiff was substantially as follows:

The plaintiff received them with knowledge of the fact that they were payable at the Sioux City bank, and would be collected by it, and that some of them would be paid before they were due. It was the custom of the Sioux City bank to send for the notes before or at about the time they matured or were to be paid, and to replace them with other notes, so that the amount of collateral notes held by the plaintiff to secure a certificate of deposit should be kept good. The Sioux City bank collected



all the notes, and sometimes received the amount due on such a note before it was due, and while it was in the possession of the plaintiff. The money so collected was not sent to the plaintiff, but, when necessary to maintain the required amount of collateral notes, new notes were sent to the plaintiff. The collections were always made for the Sioux City bank. Mr. Skerry testifies that, when he arranged with the plaintiff to borrow money of it, he stated to it that the notes must be at his bank for payment; that some of them would be paid before they were due, and in such cases the Sioux City bank "would send other paper, take the money from the farmers, and send it," to the plaintiff.

This is the only evidence which we find in the record which can be claimed to show that the Sioux City bank was authorized to collect notes which belonged to the plaintiff; but when that statement is considered with other evidence, and with the course of dealing of the parties, it does not show that such collections were authorized. It is true that the plaintiff sent to the Sioux City bank collateral notes whenever they were requested; but, when that was done, new notes were sent with the request, in exchange for the notes to be returned, or a sufficient amount of collateral notes remained to secure the certificate of deposit, on account of which the notes returned had been held; hence, when collateral notes were returned, they became the property of the Sioux City bank, and were always collected as its property. It is not shown that the plaintiff ever authorized the Sioux City bank to collect a note which had not been returned to it.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff never made any objections to what the Sioux City bank did, but, as it is not shown that the plaintiff ever had any knowledge that money was collected by the Sioux City bank on notes which it had not received, the omission to make objections, if such collections were in fact ever made, is of no effect. Not only does the evidence not show that the Sioux City bank was in fact authorized to collect notes not in its possession, but it does not show that the plaintiff is estopped to deny that authority to do so was given.

So far as the evidence submitted shows, the authority, if any, which the Sioux City bank had to receive payment for the notes in suit on June 9 and 10, 1893, must be found in the notes. Each of those was, by its terms, payable at the Sioux City bank on a date fixed; not "on or before" that date. The plaintiff was not under obligations to leave either note at the place of payment before the date fixed for payment.

It may be said with some degree of plausibility, in view of the decision in *Mortgage Co. vs. Tibbals*, 68 Iowa, 468, 19 N. W., 319, that the agreement made by the defendant with Skerry would have been effectual to pay the note had the Sioux City bank been authorized to receive payment at the time the agreement was made, and if it then had the money with which to make the payment; but the fact that the notes were made payable at the Sioux City bank did not, in the absence of the notes, under any permissible view of the law, authorize the bank to collect anything on either note before it was due; and it is at least doubtful if the evidence shows that the bank had the money with which to make the payment although the defendant had an ample credit for that purpose.

Conceding to the defendant all that can be claimed from the evidence, it only shows that, on June 9, the Sioux City bank agreed to charge the defendant with an amount necessary to take up the notes, and to cancel the notes, or, in other words, to accept in payment of the notes a certain amount of the claim which Ingerson held against it for deposits he had made.

Not only was the agreement not carried out, but the notes were payable in money only, and the bank had no right to accept in payment of the notes a claim against itself. (*Bank vs. Byrne* [Mich.] 56 N. W. Rep. 355; *Insurance Co. vs. Goble* [Neb.] 70 N. W. Rep. 503.)

The case of *Mortgage Co. vs. Tibballs*, *supra*, recognized that rule, but held that, as the bank in question in that case was paying all its certificates of deposit at the time it accepted one of its certificates in payment, it would have been a vain and unnecessary thing to draw the money on the certificate from the bank, and then pay it back to the bank.

If the Sioux City bank was without money on the 9th and 10th days of June to make the payment required, the transaction which occurred would not have operated as a payment of either note; and, unless the bank was authorized to collect notes before they were received for collection, what was done, even if it be true that at that time the Sioux City bank had the necessary money, would not have had the effect to pay the note due on the 25th day of June.

If, in view of the fact that the transaction of June 9 was after business hours, it should be treated as of the 10th, when one of the notes became due; and, if the Sioux City bank then had the money with which to pay that note, there arises the question: Did the Sioux City bank have authority to collect the note when it was due, although it had not been received for collection?

The defendant, relying upon the case of *Lazier vs. Horan* (55 Iowa, 75, 7 N. W. Rep. 457), insists that the question must be answered in the affirmative. That case does hold that, if a promissory note is made payable at a bank, payment made to the bank on the date of the maturity of the note is effectual as payment on it, although it is not at the time in the possession of the bank.

It is to be noted that the case was decided with but limited time for the examination of the authorities, and that no authority was cited against the conclusion reached, and no adjudicated case exactly in point was cited in support of that conclusion, although reference was made to certain text-books. That case was referred to in *Callanan vs. Williams* (71 Iowa, 365, 32 N. W. 388); and, after citing *Adams vs. Improvement Commission* (44 N. J. Law, 638), this Court said it was not disposed to extend the rule of *Lazier vs. Horan*.

We held in *Englert vs. White* (92 Iowa, 97, 60 N. W. 224) and *Klindt vs. Higgins*, (95 Iowa, 529, 64 N. W. 414) that a person at whose office promissory notes were in terms made payable was not, by that fact, authorized to receive payments on them, although it appeared that he was in the habit of loaning money for others, and collecting from the borrowers and paying to the lenders money on account of loans he made.

It is somewhat difficult to distinguish on principle between the right of a bank at which a note is to be paid to act for the holder of the note in receiving payment and the right of an agent who is engaged in the business of negotiating loans which are made payable at his place of business, and who habitually collects payments made on such loans, to act for those to whom the payments were intended to be made.

In view of the various decisions of this court, and because of the importance of having in all the States uniform rules for the regulation of commercial transactions, we feel justified in re-examining the rule announced in *Lazier vs. Horan*.

The conclusion in that case was based chiefly upon the statement as to the law made in Section 228 of Story on Promissory Notes, as follows:

"If, by such omission or neglect of presentment and demand, he [the maker or acceptor] has sustained any loss or injury—as, if the bill or note were payable at a bank, and the acceptor or maker had funds there at the time which have been lost by the failure of the bank—the acceptor or maker will be exonerated from liability to the extent of the loss or injury so sustained."

It is no doubt true that, under some circumstances, the loss of money deposited in the bank where a bill or note was made payable might fall upon the owner; but, when that is the case, the deposit must have been made, not only for the benefit of

the holder of the paper, but under such circumstances as to make the bank his agent, or to estop him to deny its agency.

The rule is well settled, and was recognized in *Lasier vs. Horan*, that the acceptor of a bill of exchange, or the maker of a promissory note, payable at a bank or other specified place, is not required to present the bill or note at the place designated for payment, in order to recover in an action against the acceptor or maker. (*Armistead vs. Armisteads*, 10 Leigh, 512. See, also, 8 Rand. Com. Paper, § 1117.)

The effect of a failure to make such presentation and demand for payment is to defeat the right of the holder to recover damages and costs in case the acceptor or maker had the money required to discharge the bill or note at the place designated for payment when the instrument was due. But in such a case, in order to avoid liability for damage, interest, and costs, it is necessary for the acceptor or maker, not only to maintain the tender, but to continue it in court. (*Carley vs. Vance*, 17 Mass. 389; *Wolcott vs. Van Santoor*, 17 Johns. 248; *Armistead vs. Armisteads*, 10 Leigh, 512; 3 Rand. Com. Paper, § 1119.)

The case of *Bank vs. Zorn* (14 S. C. 444), is sometimes referred to as sustaining the doctrine that money deposited at the place at which a bill or note is made payable at the time it is due will have the effect to discharge the note. It appears that a note was involved in that case which was by its terms made payable at the office of the payee, who was a cotton factor and commission merchant. The note was transferred by the payee to a bank to be held by it as collateral security, and, under some arrangement between the bank and the payee, was not presented for payment at the place of payment designated in the note. The maker had a balance with the payee at the time the note matured, sufficient to pay it; and, had it been duly presented, it would have been paid. The maker of the note afterwards effected a settlement with the payee, which included the note. That was not delivered at the time, but the payee agreed to procure it, and send it to the maker, but failed to do so.

It was held that the note was discharged, although no specific reason was given for that conclusion. It may well have been based on the peculiar facts of the case, since it appeared that the payee of the note was authorized to make collections of notes which it had deposited as collateral security, and did so, but failed to apply the collections in all cases in payment of the indebtedness for which the collateral notes were held as security. Had that been done, the note there in suit would have been paid.

Some authorities were cited with reference to demand for payment, and something was said on that branch of the case to the effect that if the money was deposited "according to the terms of the note," and was lost because of the failure of the holder to demand payment, the loss would be on him.

Although the case is in principle clearly distinguishable from *Lasier vs. Horan*, yet it tends to support that case. The same is true of something said by one of the three judges who gave opinions in *Rhodes vs. Gent* (5 Barn. and Ald. 244); but the point was not involved in the case.

In *Pulmer vs. Hughes* (1 Blackf. 328), it was held that demand for the payment of a note payable at a specified place was necessary before an action could be maintained upon it against the maker; but the rule stated was contrary to the weight of authority, and was changed in Indiana by statute. (See *Glatt vs. Fortman*, 120 Ind. 384, 22 N. E. 300.)

It was said in *Caldwell vs. Evans* (5 Bush, 380), that "the making of a note payable at a bank does not of itself constitute such bank an agent of the payee to receive the money, but it is a mere designation of a place where both the paper and the funds to take it up will be on the day it is due. Therefore, to make the bank the payee's agent, either the paper must be indorsed to or deposited with it."

The case of *Adams vs. Improvement Commission* (44 N. J. Law, 638), reviews the

authorities at considerable length, and is unusually well considered. The conclusion reached by the court is stated as follows :

"The contract of the maker, acceptor, or obligor is to pay the holder of the paper, and the place for payment is designated simply for the convenience of both parties. \* \* \* If maturing paper be left with the banker for collection, he becomes the agent of the holder to receive payment ; but, unless the banker is made the holder's agent by a deposit of the paper with him for collection, he has no authority to act for the holder. The naming of a bank in a promissory note as the place of payment does not make the banking association an agent for the collection of the note or the receipt of the money. No power, authority, or duty is thereby conferred upon the banker in reference to the note, and the debtor cannot make the banker the agent of the holder by simply depositing with him the funds to pay it with. Unless the banker has been made the agent of the holder by the indorsement of the paper or the deposit of it for collection, any money which the banker receives to apply in payment of it will be deemed to have been taken by him as the agent of the payor."

In *Bank vs. Cannon* (Minn. 48 N. W. 526) it appeared that money due on a note which was payable at a certain bank was deposited in the bank at the maturity of the note, with directions to pay it. The Court said :

"Although the note was by its terms payable at the Bank of Minnesota, the mere depositing the money in that bank, in order that it might be applied in payment of the note, did not constitute a payment of it. In such a case the bank receiving the money is to be regarded as the agent of the person paying it, the holder of the note not having deposited it at the designated place for collection or payment. The law is well settled."

In *Hills vs. Place* (48 N. Y. 520) a question arose as to the payment of a note which was made payable at a specified bank, and it was said :

"The bank was in no sense the plaintiff's agent for the collection of the note or the receipt of the amount due thereon, or otherwise. It was named in the connection in which it was used merely as the place where its business was transacted for the purpose of making payment of the note there, without conferring or intending to confer any power, authority, or duty on the association itself in reference thereto."

The rule of these cases finds abundant support in the authorities. (See *Cheney vs. Libby*, 134 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 498 ; *Ward vs. Smith*, 7 Wall. 447 ; *Gas Co. vs. Pinkerton*, 95 Pa. St. 62 ; *Wood vs. Trust Co.* 41 Ill. 267 ; *Grissom vs. Bank*, 87 Tenn. 350, 10 S. W. 774 ; *Turner vs. Hayden*, 4 Barn. & C. 1 ; *Walton vs. Henderson*, Smith [N. H.] 168 ; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 325, 326 ; 3 Rand. Com. Paper, § 1119 ; Tied. Com. Paper, p. 539, § 310 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 808 ; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 199.) A careful examination of the authorities shows that the case of *Lazier vs. Horan* is almost alone in holding that payment of the amount due on a promissory note to the bank designated therein as the place of payment, at the maturity of the note, will be effectual as a payment of it. The great weight of authority is against that rule, and we are constrained to say that it does not appear to us to be well founded in reason.

The specifying, in a bill or note, of a place for its payment, is for the convenience of the parties to it, and does not alone create an agency in the person who does business at the designated place to receive money for the holder of the paper. It may be necessary to demand payment at the designated place to aid in fixing the liability of the drawer or indorsers. (Bytes, Bills [7th Ed.] 219 ; Tied. Com. Paper, § 310.) But that is not necessary to fix the liability of the acceptor or maker, and, as to him, the paper merely does what it purports to do ; that is, it designates a place where payment may be made, not a person other than the holder to whom it may be made.

The effect of the conclusion we reach is to overrule so much of the case of *Lazier vs. Horan* as is not in harmony with what we have said.

In the case of *Wolford vs. Young* decided at the present term of this court (75 N. W. 349), it was found that the company which transacted business at the place of payment designed in the note was the agent of the holder, and the case is not in conflict with anything we have said in this case. The evidence fails to sustain the judgment of the district court, and it is reversed.

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## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

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Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

INDIANAPOLIS, Ind., February 3, 1899.

SIR: As our statute seems to be silent on the subject, will you please inform me if a note dated on a legal holiday would be a legal transaction, or if it is customary to date any paper of a commercial nature on such a day as referred to above.

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—There is no law which invalidates a note or other contract because made on a holiday. At common law contracts may be made on any day of the year, but by statute in some of the States contracts entered into on Sunday are void, but under those statutes it does not necessarily follow that a note dated on Sunday is illegal; for if it is actually delivered on another day, the mere fact that it bears date as of Sunday does not invalidate it. The Sunday laws are the only exception to the general common law rule above mentioned.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BESSEMER, Ala., January 13, 1899.

SIR: We wish to ask your opinion in the following case. We opened for business on June 30, 1898, and on July 1, 1898, paid our revenue tax. Were we liable for same, and if not can the money be refunded or applied on license due July 1, 1899? We note that the law reads that the amount of such annual tax shall in all cases be computed on the basis of the capital and surplus for the preceding fiscal year; and as we were not in business during 1897, it seems we were not liable for the tax. Your opinion will be appreciated.

PERCY T. WHILDEN, *President.*

*Answer.*—Under the decisions of the Treasury Department a bank was liable to taxation under the revenue law for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1898, even though it did not commence business until after the month of July. This was so decided in the case of a bank which opened for business on August 15, it being held in such case that as the tax could not be computed upon the basis of the capital for the pending fiscal year, it must be based upon the capital employed at the time the bank commenced business. (Decision of Treasury Department No. 19,892.) It is plain, therefore, that a bank which commenced business before July 1 was liable for the tax, though it had not been engaged in business during the whole of the preceding fiscal year.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

DES MOINES, Iowa, January 19, 1899.

SIR: I read with considerable interest your excellent journal, and take to myself the privilege of criticizing it where I think it has fallen into error. On page 88 of your January number you say in effect that there is no legal objection to the taking of an acknowledgment by a notary public who is a stockholder in a bank. The contrary has been squarely held in our State (*Smith vs. Clark*, 69 N. W. 1011.) Reference to the authorities there cited will, I think, convince you that the holding in this State is in accord with the general rule. The holding in the cases cited by you in your answer can be reconciled with the case above cited according to well-established legal rules.

CHAS. L. POWELL.

*Answer.*—Our correspondent is quite correct in his statement of the rule as it exists in Iowa, and the authority he cites is directly in point. But we do not find that

this rule has been established in any other State, and it does not seem to us to be a sound one. It is universally held that a notary is not competent to take the acknowledgment to an instrument where he is himself the grantee or beneficiary, but it does not seem to us that the fact that he is a stockholder in a corporation to which the instrument is made gives him such a direct interest as to disqualify him. The taking of an acknowledgment is not a judicial, but a ministerial, act (*Lynch vs. Livingston*, 6 N. Y. 422; *Remington Paper Co. vs. Dougherty*, 81 N. Y. 474). It has been held that the relationship of a notary to the grantee would not render the acknowledgment void.

We do not see clearly how any solid distinction can be made between the case where a person interested in the corporation takes an acknowledgment, and the case where he protests paper owned by the corporation. The certificate of protest is intended as evidence of the fact of presentment and dishonor, and we see no good reason why, if his interest does not affect his capacity to make a certificate setting forth the facts of presentment, etc., why it should affect his capacity to certify that a certain person who had signed a paper had acknowledged his signature.

Again, the Iowa decision seems objectionable because it permits the record of a conveyance to be impeached by evidence outside thereof. In *Bank of Benson vs. Howe* (45 Minn. 40) the validity of a chattel mortgage made to the bank was assailed upon the ground that the acknowledgment had been taken before a notary who was shown to have been a stockholder of the plaintiff's bank, and its Cashier. The Court said :

"Undoubtedly, the policy of the law forbids that the acknowledgment should be taken before a party to the deed or one who takes an interest under it, whether as grantee, mortgagee, partner, or trustee; and, when such interest appears on the face of the instrument, the record will disclose the infirmity, and third parties can take advantage of it. Taking proof or acknowledgment of the execution of a deed is an act ministerial in its character. It may be done by an agent or attorney, or by a person related to the parties. (*Lynch vs. Livingston*, 6 N. Y. 422.) A bank Cashier may take the acknowledgment of an instrument running to the bank; and, since the corporation is an entirely distinct entity, it is argued that a stockholder should not be deemed to have any such interest in the deed as to invalidate his official act as a notary. The opposing argument is based on grounds of public policy. But the question is not really involved in this case, for the mortgage was valid as between the parties to it, without an acknowledgment; and as to the defendant, a subsequent mortgagee, the record was notice, because an instrument so acknowledged, not disclosing the alleged disqualification of the notary, would be entitled to record and be notice to him, so that he was bound by it. Any other rule would destroy the reliability of the public records, and lead to most mischievous results. The doctrine appears to be well settled."

In the case stated in the previous inquiry, the fact that the director was interested in the bank would not appear upon the record itself, and hence under the decision we have referred to, the acknowledgment could not be attacked as invalid.



WHAT IS IT.—To the subscriber first answering this query correctly a copy of PATTEN'S PRACTICAL BANKING will be presented. Subscribers in the States of North and South Dakota and Minnesota are excluded from the contest. The names of at least ten of the competitors giving the right answer will appear in the next issue of the MAGAZINE.

# STATE BANKS—REPORTS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS.

## CONNECTICUT.

HARTFORD, December 31, 1898.

To His Excellency, Lorrin A. Cooke, Governor:

The Bank Commissioners have the honor to submit their annual report with the annual statements of the Savings banks, State banks and trust companies, showing their condition as of October 1, 1898.

### SAVINGS BANKS.

The number of Savings banks is eighty-nine, the same as last year, no new ones having been organized under the charters recently granted.

The statement below gives the total assets and liabilities as compared with those of October 1, 1897.

ASSETS.	October 1, 1898.	October 1, 1897.	Increase.
Loans on real estate.....	\$64,898,216	\$62,606,801	\$2,291,415
Loans on collateral security.....	7,067,342	7,737,580	*670,238
Loans on personal security only.....	3,119,668	3,317,502	*197,833
Invested in United States bonds.....	2,308,225	2,159,635	148,590
Invested in State, town, city, school district, and corporation bonds and orders.....	43,183,433	42,304,846	878,587
Invested in railroad stocks and bonds.....	38,095,848	32,675,915	3,419,933
Invested in bank stocks.....	6,767,228	6,616,358	150,869
Real estate owned, including banking houses.....	2,921,517	2,771,407	150,109
Miscellaneous assets.....	693,167	591,758	101,409
Cash on hand and in banks.....	6,870,899	5,393,408	1,477,490
<b>Total assets.....</b>	<b>\$173,925,546</b>	<b>\$166,175,213</b>	<b>\$7,750,332</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Deposits.....	\$163,482,498	\$155,969,797	\$7,512,700
Surplus.....	6,812,965	6,500,446	312,518
Interest and profit and loss.....	3,582,050	3,675,913	*93,863
Other liabilities.....	48,032	29,055	18,977
<b>Total liabilities.....</b>	<b>\$173,925,546</b>	<b>\$166,175,213</b>	<b>\$7,750,332</b>
<b>MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS.</b>			
Number depositors having less than \$1,000.....	326,469	320,149	6,320
Amount of such deposits.....	\$63,544,098	\$63,195,479	\$348,618
Depositors having \$1,000 and not over \$2,000.....	33,928	32,313	1,615
Amount of such deposits.....	\$45,709,956	\$42,505,536	\$3,204,420
Depositors having \$2,000 and not over \$10,000.....	15,142	13,964	1,178
Amount of such deposits.....	\$50,351,419	\$46,869,038	\$3,482,380
Depositors having over \$10,000.....	271	235	36
Amount of such deposits.....	\$3,877,025	\$3,399,743	\$477,281
Total number of depositors.....	375,810	366,661	9,149
Total amount of deposits.....	\$163,482,498	\$155,969,797	\$7,512,700
Largest amount due a single depositor.....	54,507	45,646	8,860
Average amount due depositors.....	\$435	\$425	\$9
Number accounts opened during the year.....	52,589	53,624	*1,035
Number accounts closed during the year.....	43,443	43,493	*50
Income received during the year.....	\$8,404,509	\$8,052,334	\$352,175
Dividends declared during the year.....	6,058,548	5,867,273	191,274
Amount deposited, including interest credited.....	36,616,441	36,233,949	382,491
Amount withdrawn during the year.....	29,104,362	29,780,204	*655,811
Amount past-due paper.....	122,397	212,563	*90,165
Amount of paper charged off during the year.....	248,928	74,895	174,032
Expenses, including salaries.....	452,864	444,421	8,442
Amount of assets yielding no income.....	910,184	1,022,169	*111,984
Largest amount loaned to one individual, company, society, or corporation.....	200,000	200,000	.....

\* Decrease.

It will be noticed that there has been a large increase in the amount loaned on real estate as well as an increase in the amount invested in the United States, municipal, and railroad bonds, and bank stocks. The loans on collateral and personal security are \$668,071 less than on October 1, 1897. This class of loans belongs more especially to the business of banks of discount, and we are glad to see them decreasing in the Savings banks. The deposits have increased \$7,512,700, being an increase of \$1,039,458 over the increase of 1897. The net increase in surplus and profit and loss accounts is \$213,654, which is \$39,866 less than the increase was in 1897 over that of 1896.

The total number of depositors has increased 9,149, but of the increase in the amount of deposits only \$348,618 is due to those depositors having less than \$1,000 to their credit, leaving \$7,164,082 as the increase in the deposits of those having \$1,000 and over to their credit. The average amount due each depositor has increased \$3.68. This goes to show that the Savings banks are more and more being used by capitalists as a place to invest their money, where they receive a larger rate of interest than can be obtained elsewhere when it is on call, as it practically is in the Savings banks. We are pleased to note that the amount of past-due paper is \$90,165 less than last year, and also that the amount of assets yielding no income is \$111,964 less than a year ago.

#### DIVIDENDS.

The rate per cent. of dividends paid the past year is shown below :

RATE PER CENT.	Number of banks.	Amount of div- id-nd.	Amount of de- posits with div- dends added.
Four and one extra .....	2	\$11,701	\$243,073
Four.....	*80	5,987,538	160,677,238
Three and one-half.....	3	50,308	1,443,378
Two .....	1	8,999	439,367
None .....	3	.....	679,460
Totals .....	89	\$6,058,548	\$163,482,496

\* Eight discriminate on deposits over a certain amount as allowed by Section 1815 of the General Statutes.

From the foregoing it will be seen that eight banks discriminated in the rate paid deposits over a certain amount and that three banks paid one-half per cent. less than the usual rate.

The order of the court restraining the Willimantic Savings Institute from declaring or paying dividends and from paying more than one-tenth of each deposit, expired November 8, 1896. Before the expiration of the order the commissioners made an examination of the bank finding it perfectly solvent and its condition as shown in its published statement to be substantially correct, based upon a conservative valuation of its assets. Aside from the fear of unreasonable demands from its depositors there appeared no reason why the bank should remain subject to the orders of the court, but after consultation with the directors it was thought best to apply for an order restraining it from paying out more than an additional one-tenth of its deposits and allowing it to declare and pay its regular dividends, which in all probability it will be able to do. The court issued an order to that effect which will expire November 8, 1899. It is hoped before the expiration of this order that the bank will demonstrate its ability to pay regular dividends, and thus allay the fears of its depositors so it can resume business without special protection from the courts. Up to December 21, only 396 of its depositors, a little more than one-sixth of the total number, had availed themselves of the privilege of drawing the second one-tenth of their deposits permitted by the last order. This is a very favorable showing and it points to an early resumption of its regular business.

The order of the court restraining the Colchester Savings Bank from paying out its deposits and declaring dividends expired March 30, 1896. At this time the bank was so far solvent it was concluded that no injustice would be done to allow it to pay out one-tenth of its deposits. Accordingly an order was issued by the court again restraining the bank from paying dividends for one year, but allowing it to pay out one-tenth of its deposits.

Owing to losses made by the Thompson Savings Bank, it was found necessary to apply to the court for an order restraining it from declaring and paying dividends or paying its depositors, and such an order was issued August 27, 1896, for the period of eighteen months from that date. The bank has a good earning capacity, and in that time should receive enough income to offset its bad and doubtful assets and resume its regular business.

In the early part of the present year the Savings banks were being offered as legal investments railroad bonds secured by mortgages on properties not owned by the companies issuing the bonds. In view of this fact, we felt it our duty to submit to counsel the question as



to what constitutes a "first mortgage bond of a railroad company" under the law. We were advised that the only fair and reasonable interpretation of the words is, that "a first mortgage bond of a railroad company is a bond of the corporation secured by a first mortgage (or trust deed) covering some portion (at least) of the real estate owned by the railroad company," the principle being that the bonds are to be issued and the mortgage given by one and the same railroad company, such company being the owner in fee of the property mortgaged to secure the bonds. This interpretation of the law makes it illegal for the banks to hold some bonds that have long been held by them. We deemed it best, however, not to disturb their old holdings of this class of bonds, but to report the fact for such action as is thought best. Since this opinion was received we have refused to recognize as legal any purchases of railroad bonds which are not secured by a first mortgage given upon its own property by the railroad company issuing the bonds.

## STATE BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES.

These are the same in number as one year ago, namely; eight banks and twelve trust companies. In comparison with last year the deposits in the banks have increased \$220,417, and in the trust companies \$485,160. The surplus and profit and loss accounts of the banks have decreased \$15,595, and the same accounts of the trust companies have increased \$49,744. The capital employed by each has not been changed.

Below will be found a statement of their total assets and liabilities.

ASSETS.	State banks.	Trust companies.
Loans and discounts.....	\$5,356,901	\$4,103,173
Overdrafts.....	6,186	28,968
Stocks, bonds and mortgages.....	1,321,261	2,747,562
Due from banks and bankers.....	1,425,769	986,376
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	207,233	392,089
Current expenses.....	20,896	30,126
Specie and currency.....	529,324	400,408
Checks and cash items.....	125,961	70,731
Other assets.....	16,997	49,385
<b>Total assets.....</b>	<b>\$9,611,022</b>	<b>\$8,906,773</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>		
Capital stock.....	\$3,240,000	\$1,245,000
Surplus.....	485,500	403,437
Undivided profits.....	351,654	429,462
Dividends unpaid.....	4,987	1,226
Deposits.....	5,922,325	6,576,327
Due to banks and bankers.....	576,605	129,620
Other liabilities.....	.....	21,669
<b>Total liabilities.....</b>	<b>\$9,611,022</b>	<b>\$8,906,773</b>

Respectfully submitted,

SIDNEY W. CROFUT,  
CHARLES H. NOBLE,  
*Bank Commissioners.*

## MAINE.

BANK EXAMINER'S DEPARTMENT,  
AUGUSTA, December 20, 1896.

To the Honorable Llewellyn Powers, Governor, and the Executive Council of the State of Maine: In compliance with the provisions of statute, I have the honor to present the forty-second annual report of this department for the official year ending December 1, 1896, showing the general condition of all State banking institutions. The results for the year are generally satisfactory, and I am able to report that all these institutions are now in good condition.

The number, classes and assets, of these institutions are as follows:

Savings banks.....	51	\$64,182,542
Trust and banking companies.....	17	9,182,997
Loan and building associations.....	32	3,009,998
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>\$76,375,538</b>

This is an increase of one in the number of trust and banking companies, and a decrease of one in the loan and building associations, leaving the total the same as reported in 1897. There is also an increase of \$3,122,868 in their aggregate assets for the official year.

The depositors in Savings banks and trust and banking companies and the shareholders in loan and building associations, now number 192,625.

During the year they have paid depositors and stockholders \$2,535,863 in interest and dividends, and increased the amount of reserve and undivided profits \$228,243. The average rate of income paid depositors and stockholders in all of these institutions has been 3.55 per cent for the year.

An equal distribution of these assets at the present time would give to each person in the State \$115.53 as against \$110.81 in 1897.

There are eighty-two National banks now doing business in Maine with assets amounting to \$30,909,061, a decrease of \$1,449,071 from 1897. This makes the total number of banking institutions in the State 182, and the entire banking capital \$116,284,620, being an increase of \$1,673,796 during the year.

*Mutual Savings Banks of the United States.*

States.	Number of banks.	Amount of deposits.	Number of depositors.	Average to each depositor.	Average rate of dividend.
Maine .....	51	\$90,853,587 34	169,714	\$368 36	3.53
New Hampshire .....	53	49,493,055 94	196,563	371 69	3.50
Vermont. ....	23	24,584,863 43	76,485	321 43	4.00
Massachusetts .....	187	473,919,084 27	1,394,329	343 35	4.00
Rhode Island .....	29	67,910,921 43	132,042	514 31	4.00
Connecticut. ....	89	155,969,797 95	368,061	425 38	3.95
<b>Total New Eng. States</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>\$832,780,290 36</b>	<b>2,255,794</b>	<b>*\$368 92</b>	<b>*3.83</b>
New York.....	128	\$766,684,916 15	1,805,280	\$424 09	3.46
New Jersey. ....	26	44,883,623 69	170,100	263 87	3.50
Pennsylvania.....	16	82,345,533 46	307,309	267 68	4.00
Delaware.....	3	4,030,153 00	19,326	208 53	4.00
Maryland .....	28	51,810,877 00	161,068	321 69	3.50
<b>Total Eastern States ..</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>\$949,655,103 30</b>	<b>2,463,073</b>	<b>*\$397 28</b>	<b>*3.69</b>
West Virginia .....	1	\$249,333 00	3,737	66 72	4.00
Ohio .....	4	29,960,871 00	87,302	343 07	4.00
Indiana .....	5	4,279,437 09	18,313	233 68	4.50
Wisconsin .....	1	336,767 27	2,068	156 50	4.00
<b>Total other States .....</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>\$34,806,408 36</b>	<b>111,440</b>	<b>*\$199 99</b>	<b>*4.13</b>
<b>Total mutual savings banks of the U. S. ....</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>\$1,817,191,801 02</b>	<b>4,830,307</b>	<b>†\$307 99</b>	<b>‡3.86</b>

\* Average for each group of states.

† Average for all the states.

## MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

The following table contains a compilation of statistics of the mutual Savings banks of the United States. It covers some of the matters of detail considered in this report, and gives an opportunity to compare, in these particulars, our institutions, and the laws governing them, with those of other States. It gives the number of banks; the amount of deposits; the number of depositors; the average to each depositor; the average rate of dividends paid; the rates of State taxation on deposits; the limitation of deposits; and a brief synopsis of the Savings bank investment laws in each of the fifteen States having strictly mutual Savings banks like ours. Other States have *stock* Savings banks, more nearly like our trust companies. This table was compiled from the latest statistics obtainable by this department, and will be found sufficiently accurate for the purposes for which made. In some instances, like Wisconsin, in which it appears from the table that this class of institutions pay no State tax, the depositors are liable to municipal taxation on their individual deposits, as in the National banks and trust companies of this State; in other cases, like New York, the deposits

*Mutual Savings Banks of the United States—Continued.*

Rate of State tax on deposits.	Limit of deposits to depositors.	Mode of investment.
3-4 of 1% ..	†\$2,000 .....	Loans on real estate and collateral security, bank stock, public funds, steam and street railroad and corporation bonds and stock.
3-4 of 1% ..	Unlimited .....	Loans on real estate and collateral security, bank stock, public funds, railroad and corporation bonds and stock.
7-10 of 1% ..	†\$2,000 .....	Loans on real estate and collateral security, public funds, bank stock.
1-2 of 1% ..	\$5,000 a year. [\$1,600 in all]	Loans on real estate and collateral security, public funds, railroad bonds, bank stock.
3-5 of 1% ..	Unlimited .....	Very slight restrictions.
1-4 of 1% ..	\$1,000 a year ...	Loans on real estate and collateral security, public funds, railroad bonds, bank stock.
None.....	\$3,000 .....	Loans on real estate, United States and certain State bonds, municipal bonds of New York State and a few cities.
None.....	\$5,000.....	Loans on real estate and collateral security (limited), public funds, railroad bonds.
None.....	\$5,000 .....	Loans on collateral security and real estate, public funds. (Very slight restrictions).
None.....	\$50 per month, [\$2,000 in all]	Any security.
1-4 of 1%....	\$500 a year.....	Any security.
None.....	Unlimited .....	Loans on real estate, United States and State bonds, municipal bonds of West Virginia.
None.....	\$5,000.....	Any security.
None.....	\$500 a year, [\$5,000 in all]	Loans on real estate, United States and State bonds, municipal bonds of Indiana.
None.....	\$1,000 a year. ..	Loans on real estate and collateral (except railroad), public funds.

† Except widows, orphans, etc.

‡ Except charitable institutions and court orders.

are by law exempt from all taxes. In comparing the volume of business in the several States, it might be better to limit the comparison to the New England States and New York, as the great bulk of the mutual savings deposits of this country are in these States.

#### SAVINGS BANKS.

In 1855, this State by legislative enactment first assumed the responsibility of supervising and regulating the affairs of Savings banks. Prior to that date, they were organized under special charters granted by the Legislature, and their management depended solely upon their individual boards of trustees. There were no general laws regulating their affairs or limiting their investments, and no State department charged with the duty of examining them or making any official report of their condition.

It appears that the total loss to depositors during the eighty years in which these institutions have been in operation has been \$783,001; of this amount \$404,068 has been lost by depositors in the Savings banks that are now doing business, and \$379,023 by those in Savings banks that have been closed. During these eighty years, the banks in this State have been constantly receiving and paying out deposits, but until quite recently no returns have been received giving the amount of these receipts and withdrawals from year to year. A very conservative estimate based upon the percentage now withdrawn annually, would place this amount, including present deposits, above \$300,000,000. Considering that this total loss of \$783,001 is only about two mills on a dollar of the aggregate amount handled; that the loss for all these years does not exceed the present net earnings of the Savings banks for four months; and that it is less than twice the amount of taxes they now pay to the State annually—is it not a most remarkable showing for the Savings banks of Maine? Another instance cannot be found in the history of financial affairs where such large sums of money have been invested with so small a percentage of loss. Individuals could hardly expect to invest and handle their own money for eighty years and during all that time lose only an amount equal to four months' income thereon.

In ten of the twenty banks that have been closed, the affairs were settled without loss to depositors. Of the existing banks, fifteen have reduced their deposits, but five of these have been able to return the full amount of such reduction to the depositors.

The principal part of these losses occurred during the depression of 1875-9, the aggregate loss for those years being \$489,549. The total reduction in Savings bank deposits during the same period was \$11,105,174. The conditions that effected these losses and led to the withdrawal of deposits at that time influenced all kinds of business, investments and values. During this period of depression, depositors in Savings banks, however, suffered much less than other property holders.

#### COMPARATIVE STATEMENT.

The following table shows the condition of our Saving banks on October 20, 1898, and a comparison with that of November 6, 1897.

RESOURCES.	1897.	1898.
United States and District of Columbia bonds.....	\$5,795,450	\$6,007,700
Public funds in Maine.....	962,290	1,106,106
Public funds out of Maine.....	14,167,763	13,415,749
Railroad bonds in Maine.....	4,618,672	4,785,962
Railroad bonds out of Maine.....	11,648,738	13,111,148
Corporation bonds in Maine.....	3,646,393	3,645,022
Corporation bonds out of Maine.....	520,447	548,757
Railroad stock in Maine.....	806,409	708,980
Railroad stock out of Maine.....	498,802	510,373
Corporation stock in Maine.....	420,976	435,759
Corporation stock out of Maine.....	105,071	124,437
National bank stock in Maine.....	2,467,514	2,483,397
National bank stock out of Maine.....	187,975	164,780
Other bank stock in Maine.....	87,830	106,500
Loans on mortgages of real estate.....	7,756,010	7,834,071
Loans on collateral.....	4,449,826	4,101,084
Loans to municipalities.....	349,832	282,264
Loans to corporations.....	1,571,788	1,651,121
Real estate.....	1,009,999	1,094,857
Furniture and fixtures.....	36,379	34,747
Premium account.....	461,112	451,895
Expense account.....	13,974	23,381
Other resources.....	43,169	32,943
Cash.....	1,204,863	1,362,458
Total resources.....	\$62,826,208	\$64,182,542

## LIABILITIES.

Deposits.....	\$59,598,348	\$60,852,557
Reserve fund.....	2,063,709	2,079,261
Special reserve fund.....	36,004	25,044
Profits.....	1,068,801	1,202,613
Other liabilities.....	22,349	22,200
<b>Total liabilities.....</b>	<b>\$62,828,308</b>	<b>\$64,182,542</b>
Number of depositors.....	167,879	169,714
Number of depositors whose balance is less than \$2,000.	163,423	165,013
Amount of same.....	\$48,214,076	\$48,789,088
Number of depositors whose balance is \$2,000 or more.	4,456	4,701
Amount of same.....	\$11,384,272	\$12,063,468
Average rate of dividend (approximate).....	.0867	.0853
Amount of dividends paid.....	\$2,132,369	\$2,145,324
Municipal taxes paid.....	\$18,258	\$18,779
State tax.....	\$381,862	\$394,016

It appears that the number of depositors has increased 1,835, and the amount of deposits, \$1,254,206 during the period covered by this report. The increase in the corresponding items during the year 1897 was 4,764 and \$2,121,412 respectively.

This increase in deposits is \$891,116 less than the amount of dividends credited to depositors, indicating that they have drawn that much more than they have deposited during the year. In other words, the patrons of Savings banks have used, during that time, a portion of their income from past savings, instead of adding to them. In no year since 1892 has the increase in deposits equaled the amount of dividends paid.

The amount of these deposits grows in importance by comparison; it is one-fifth as much as the entire State valuation; nearly equal to the entire personal property valuation in the State; twice the amount of capital invested in our cotton and woolen industries; twice that of the construction accounts of all the railroads in the State; nearly four times the valuation of all our wild lands; and more than five times the amount of all other assessed interest-bearing money in the State.

The amount deposited for the year, including dividends credited, was \$12,061,579; and the withdrawals, \$10,827,370; as against \$12,554,868 and \$10,425,527 respectively in 1897.

The average to each depositor is \$368.56 as against \$355.01 last year—a gain of \$8.55 during that time. The average for each inhabitant of the State would be \$32.05

The aggregate of reserve and undivided profits now amounts to \$3,282,079. The increase of \$112,569 in this item from last year is due to the fact that several large banks pay their semi-annual dividends the first of November. Had this statement been made up to the same date as that of 1897 it would have shown quite a reduction in these accounts.

## INVESTMENTS.

The table at the top of the next page shows the class and amount of all assets now held by the Savings banks, the percentage in each class, and a comparison with those of 1897.

The most notable changes for the year are: an increase of \$302,250 in United States bonds; \$183,816 in municipal bonds in Maine; \$167,290 in railroad bonds in Maine; \$1,462,410 in railroad bonds out of Maine; and a decrease of \$752,013 in municipal bonds out of Maine; and \$348,791 in collateral loans.

It becomes necessary for a Savings bank each year to invest not only the increase in deposits received, but also the large amount that comes from its maturing securities. These amounts taken together are very considerable, and the question of their investment is one that is now giving the trustees of the several institutions much anxiety. There is no immediate prospect of a change in financial conditions, such as would lead us to expect an advance in the rates of interest. The enormous increase in wealth in this country has furnished a surplus of capital even in the most prosperous business time. A few years ago the central West looked to the Savings banks of the East as a market for the larger portion of the securities issued by its municipalities and corporations. To-day the larger portion of these are being absorbed locally, and never reach our Eastern bond market. The life insurance companies, with over a billion dollars of assets, are sharp competitors for the purchase of such securities. As they do not depend solely upon the interest received upon these investments, having a legitimate income from their general business, they are usually successful competitors. The National banks and trust companies, with three billion dollars of assets, find that they have capital in excess of that needed to carry on the commercial business of the country, and are for this reason now purchasing large amounts of securities formerly carried by Savings

Resources	1897.		1898.	
	Amount of each class.	Percentage of each class.	Amount of each class.	Percentage of each class.
U. S. and District of Columbia bonds	\$5,785,450 00	9.22	\$6,097,700 00	9.50
Public funds in Maine	982,290 45	1.56	1,166,106 71	1.82
Public funds out of Maine	14,167,763 55	22.55	13,415,749 85	20.90
Railroad bonds in Maine	4,618,672 67	7.35	4,785,962 83	7.46
Railroad bonds out of Maine	11,648,738 38	18.54	13,111,148 78	20.43
Corporation bonds in Maine	3,646,385 95	5.80	3,645,022 20	5.68
Corporation bonds out of Maine	520,447 87	.83	548,757 87	.86
Railroad stock in Maine	696,409 97	1.11	706,980 72	1.11
Railroad stock out of Maine	493,802 20	.77	516,372 45	.78
Corporation stock in Maine	420,976 50	.67	435,759 84	.68
Corporation stock out of Maine	105,071 37	.17	124,437 37	.20
National bank stock in Maine	2,467,514 00	3.93	2,483,387 00	3.87
National bank stock out of Maine	187,975 00	.29	164,780 03	.26
Other bank stock in Maine	87,850 00	.14	106,500 00	.17
Loans on mortgages of real estate	7,756,010 82	12.34	7,834,071 29	12.21
Loans on collateral	4,449,826 07	7.08	4,101,034 57	6.39
Loans to municipalities	349,832 09	.56	282,364 71	.44
Loans to corporations	1,571,788 29	2.50	1,651,121 34	2.58
Real estate investment	492,308 29	.78	566,662 26	.89
Real estate foreclosure	517,691 15	.83	528,195 73	.83
Furniture and fixtures	36,379 32	.06	34,747 27	.06
Premium account	461,112 17	.74	451,895 76	.70
Expense account	13,974 44	.03	25,381 98	.05
Other resources	43,169 52	.07	32,943 10	.06
Cash	1,294,863 76	2.06	1,362,458 76	2.13
Total	\$62,826,303 83	100.00	\$64,182,542 42	100.00

banks alone. All of these conditions have led, during the past few years, to a material reduction in rates of interest on investment money, and added to the difficulties of safely placing the same.

Experience has taught us that municipal bonds are among the safest for Savings banks to purchase. The extremely low basis upon which these bonds are now selling has undoubtedly led to the marked decrease in this class of investments during the year. This is to be regretted for without doubt they will be found more profitable in the end than the lower grades of bonds. The fixed rate of income from this class may be less, but in the general average the losses on the poorer securities will more than make up for the difference in the rates of interest.

Owing to the improvement in the general condition of financial affairs, and the reduction in the rates of interest, there has been a marked advance in the market value of the securities held by Savings banks, which would make their resources above liabilities considerably in excess of that for 1897. This, however, does not add anything to the assets available for the payment of liabilities, if they continue in business, as they need these investments and must continue to carry them until they mature, when they receive only par therefrom. It is a resource that would be available only in case the bank was to wind up its affairs and pay its depositors before such securities mature.

There have been comparatively few defaults during the year in securities held by Savings banks, and in many cases former difficulties of this kind have been adjusted and the securities are again yielding an income.

Of the investments held by Savings banks, including money on hand and on deposit, \$29,117,960 is invested and held within the State, as against \$28,433,788 last year. Had it not been for the large decrease in collateral loans, this gain in home investments would have been even greater. The decrease in collateral loans has not been occasioned by any change in the policy of the banks, or because the banks did not wish to loan upon this kind of property, but rather because of the less demand for money by this class of borrowers. All kinds of banking institutions are meeting with the same difficulty in making collateral loans, and the reduction in amount of same is not confined to Savings banks.

#### DIVIDENDS.

The following table gives the rates and amounts of dividends paid by the Savings banks during the year, and a comparison with those of 1897:

RATE OF DIVIDENDS.	NUMBER OF BANKS.		AMOUNT OF DIVIDENDS.	
	1897.	1898.	1897.	1898.
4 per cent. paid by.....	23	14	\$1,523,049	\$1,253,853
3 $\frac{3}{4}$ " " .....	2	4	53,008	161,458
3 $\frac{1}{2}$ " " .....	18	26	440,181	586,008
3 $\frac{1}{4}$ " " .....	2	1	33,349	70,713
3 " " .....	6	6	72,180	72,691
	51	51	\$2,132,369	\$2,145,324

The average rate of dividends for the present year is 3.53, while that for the year 1897 was 3.67. The number of banks paying four per cent. is but fourteen as against twenty-three the previous year. Notwithstanding this decrease in the rate, the amount of earnings distributed among depositors has increased \$12,965, owing to the increase in deposits.

As before suggested, interest rates everywhere have been radically reduced during the past few years. Government bonds are now selling on a two and one-half per cent. basis, first-class municipals at from three to three and one-half per cent., and nearly all other securities, proper for the investment of Savings bank funds, at less than four per cent. Savings banks are therefore able to earn an average of less than four per cent. on new investments and loans within the limit of the investment law. Out of these earnings they must first pay a State tax of substantially three-fourths of one per cent.; before declaring dividends they must pass one-half of one per cent., annually, to the reserve fund; and they must meet their general expenses for management, salaries, rents, etc., amounting to nearly one-fourth of one per cent.; they should also set aside enough of these earnings to gradually charge off their present premium accounts, aggregating \$451,895, before their securities mature. If the amount of these different charges is deducted from the gross earnings of about four per cent., the difficulties confronting the banks in the near future in the payment of adequate dividends become apparent. Saving banks cannot be expected to pay depositors more than they earn. The inevitable result, therefore, must be a further reduction in the rate of dividends. This condition of affairs is not confined to our State alone. Everywhere mutual Savings banks are face to face with this serious problem, upon the solution of which largely depends the future success of this class of *quasi* benevolent institutions.

It would be impossible for a Savings bank to invest any large amount of funds at the present time to net more than three per cent. dividends to depositors. That they are now earning and paying more than that rate is due to the fact that a portion of their funds have been invested at better rates of interest than can be obtained. As appears elsewhere, they are also drawing upon their surplus and undivided profits, and are not reducing the premium account sufficiently to take care of the same at the maturity of their securities.

A large portion of the bonds held by Savings banks mature within comparatively few years. In a short time, therefore, every Savings bank in the State must conform to these new conditions by reducing its rate of dividends until they are no more at least than the present earnings of investment money.

In 1880, when the average rate of dividends was 4.52, the Bank Examiner urged a reduction in the rate of taxation on account of the gradual decrease in the rate of dividends. Had the Savings banks paid this average rate during the present year they would have distributed \$800,000 more among their depositors.

This very marked decrease in the amount of earnings and dividends is a matter for most serious consideration.

#### EXPENSES.

In statistical table "B" will be found the amount of annual expenses of the several Savings banks in the State. It includes all salaries paid officers and employees, rents, stationery, and all other expenses except taxes. Special returns were obtained from all the banks giving the items, and a tabulation of these returns shows that the expense of management is made up substantially as follows (cents omitted):

Presidents and trustees.....	\$8,618
Salaries of treasurers and other regular employees.....	100,400
Other labor.....	1,627
Legal services.....	2,089
Rents and expense of banking rooms.....	10,444
Stationery and all other expenses.....	16,053
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$138,874</b>

This makes the average annual cost of management about two mills on each dollar of assets.

There are 835 trustees of Savings banks, including Presidents. The average amount received by each is \$26.52. If we should deduct from this item the salaries paid to the Presidents of some of the larger banks, where those officials give a certain portion of their time to the institutions, it would reduce the average amount paid trustees below ten dollars each. Quite a portion of them receive no compensation whatever, and in no case is the amount paid in any degree adequate compensation for the services performed. The trustees of a Savings bank have the entire authority and responsibility of the management and control of their respective institutions. They receive, however, for their care and responsibility but 1-7500 of one per cent. on the amount of funds they hold in trust. This remarkable showing gives the strongest evidence of the unselfish devotion to their trust of those who manage the Savings banks in our State. With a few exceptions—cases where they actually devote a stated portion of their time to their respective institutions—they receive little or no reward other than that which comes from a consciousness of well-doing.

The cost of management is as small as that in any State of the Union. The trustees avoid every expense possible, and as a rule are more economical in the management of these institutions than in conducting their own business affairs.

#### TAXES.

The amount of the State tax on Savings banks for the present year is \$394,016, being an increase of \$12,153 from that paid in 1897. The purchase of Government bonds, the marked advance in the values of securities during the past six months, and the increase in the amount of investments within the State, make the increase in the amount of tax much less than it otherwise would have been. The Savings banks have also paid \$18,779 in municipal taxes, making the total amount of taxes paid during the year \$412,795.

The State of Maine has properly established and endowed many institutions intended to promote the educational, physical and material welfare of our people. It has cheerfully given of the public funds to support these institutions, that they may carry forward their good work. Originally Savings banks, like these other institutions, were everywhere granted special privileges, and depositors given every encouragement to accumulate their savings therein. The indirect benefits accruing to the public were then deemed sufficient to warrant this policy. As their accumulations grew larger, and the needs for additional revenue increased, attention was naturally turned to these funds, and in some States a portion of the burdens of taxation placed upon them. In this State, the amount of receipts from this source has increased from year to year, until now they have become its largest taxpayer. This fact makes the question of the rate of taxation of Savings bank deposits a question of vital importance to the State.

Results prove that it has been a wise policy on the part of the State to establish these institutions, and encourage the accumulation of deposits therein. These deposits, made up principally as they are of the small savings of those in moderate circumstances in life, are to-day paying more than twice as much in taxes as all other moneys at interest. If it were possible for these institutions to keep up the rate of dividends, and at the same time receive deposits without limitation, the income to the State therefrom, at even a much lower rate of taxation than now, would be materially increased. On the other hand, if depositors should become dissatisfied with the rates of dividends and commence to withdraw their funds, the amount of the Savings bank tax would be diminished without any corresponding increase in the revenues of the State from other sources. A large portion of these funds if withdrawn from Savings banks would not be found by municipal assessors for taxation. An example of what might again happen is found in the history of these institutions during the years 1875-9. During that period, on account of existing conditions, the deposits were reduced from \$32,083,314 to \$20,978,139, producing a corresponding decrease in the amount of taxes received by the State. An examination of the assessors' lists in the various municipalities of the State for that period, shows no increase in the amount of taxes paid upon money at interest. This proves conclusively that the eleven million dollars then withdrawn from Savings banks was not afterwards found for taxation. A proportionate decrease in deposits at the present time would diminish the State revenues about \$140,000, annually. For these reasons, and on account of the conditions suggested under the titles of "Investments" and "Dividends," we are forced to the conclusion that the interests of the State, apart from the interests of its people who are depositors in Savings banks, would be better served by some relief from taxation upon this class of property.

Like an excise tax, this is not paid directly by those who ultimately bear the burden. Many depositors do not realize that they are the ones who really pay this tax to the State. It cannot be expected, therefore, that they will complain of the rate of taxation, but rather



that they will be dissatisfied with the rates of dividends paid. They simply protest against the rates of taxation by ceasing to patronize the Savings banks.

The State as a trustee is morally responsible to the 160,714 depositors for the proper management and safety of their funds in our Savings banks. More than one-half of these depositors are women and minor children. Many of the deposits have their history of toil, patience and self-denial. In many instances these small savings are all that stand between the depositor and want. The bank commissioner of New York, in opposing the taxation of such deposits, pertinently asks: "While out of the abundance of the rich so little is taken, shall the State wrest from the poor a percentage of the mite that is their all?"

#### DEPOSITS.

It has always been understood that Savings banks were established for two purposes; to encourage those in moderate circumstances to set aside the small sums they could spare from their present incomes; and to provide a place for the safe keeping of the funds of those who are themselves for any reason incapable of caring for them. This State by legislative enactment has created and put in operation for these purposes many such institutions. As appears elsewhere in this report, 335 public-spirited business men are at the present time practically giving their services to carry forward this work for the public good.

In nearly all States having Savings banks, these purposes are recognized by legislative provisions, limiting deposits to these two classes. An examination of the table on a preceding page will show the limitation in each of the fifteen States having purely mutual Savings banks. In this State, the law provides that no bank shall receive from any one depositor, directly or indirectly, over \$2,000, dividends included, and that no interest shall be paid to any one depositor for any amount exceeding that sum, except for deposits by widows, orphans, administrators, guardians, executors, charitable institutions or trust funds. It further provides that trustees of Savings banks may refuse deposits at their pleasure. This law does not, however, prevent any individual from depositing \$2,000 in each and every Savings bank in the State, providing the banks will receive his deposits. Doubtless there are instances where individuals with considerable property have taken advantage of this, and have funds deposited in several different Savings banks. Investigation, however, shows that the aggregate amount of such deposits is much less than it is generally believed to be.

The objection generally made by the public to this class of depositors is that these funds thus escape municipal taxation. This does not follow, however, as the individual who deposits in Savings banks for the purpose of evading municipal taxation would find some way of hiding his property from the assessors if it were driven out of the banks. In such cases there would not only be the loss of the municipal taxes that should be levied on such property, but also the loss of the State tax which is paid upon it while in the Savings bank. The assessors in the different municipalities of the State find, for taxation, only about \$11,000,000 of money at interest, showing that a very large percentage of this kind of property escapes the payment of its just portion of the public revenues. The State would receive more revenue if it were possible to collect all of this class of property into the Savings banks, where a tax would be levied upon every dollar of it. Attention is not called to this matter, however, and legislation recommended for further limiting deposits in Savings banks, on the strength of the reasons just assigned.

The reasons are: That the Savings banks cannot profitably invest large sums at the present time; that the enormous amount of their accumulations, and the low rates of interest that investment money commands, make it necessary for their future success that deposits be confined to those classes for which Savings banks were originally created. The trustees of each bank are properly zealous for the success of the particular institution they represent, and are interested to see the amount of its deposits increase from year to year. Every dollar received, however, and invested on the present condition of the market, only hastens the day when dividends will be reduced to such an extent as to discourage the worthy depositor whose privilege it is to patronize this class of banks. The effect will be that the large deposits of those in better circumstances in life will crowd out the smaller savings of the very ones for whom these institutions were created, and thus defeat the original purpose of Savings banks. I would, therefore, recommend an amendment to the present statute, limiting deposits by any one individual to \$2,000 in any and all of the Savings banks of this State; and further providing that in case of violations of this law the depositor shall forfeit all interest on his deposits in excess of that sum. The law, with this penalty attached, would come as near to enforcing itself as any other upon our statute book.

#### PAYMENT OF DEPOSITS.

In this State, we have no provision of law protecting Savings banks in the payment of money on orders presented after the death of the depositor. Such a provision would not only be a protection to the bank, but would enable depositors to obtain funds in time of most

pressing need, and also to make distribution of small funds on deposit without the expense of administration. I would therefore recommend the enactment of a statute authorizing Savings banks to pay orders drawn by depositors, even after the death of the same, providing such orders are presented within thirty days after date, and at any subsequent time, if the bank has not received actual notice of such death.

Our statute provides that money deposited by a minor is the property of and to be paid to the order of the depositor; that it is not the property of the parents; that such depositor may maintain an action in his own name to recover such deposit; and that the receipt of such minor for the deposit is a valid release to the bank. Money is often deposited by parents or others in the name of a minor too young to understand the nature of the transaction. Not infrequently circumstances arise which make it necessary to withdraw money so deposited. Under our present statute this can only be done on the order of the minor, no matter how young he may be. At the same time, the bank is legally bound to pay any minor his deposit whenever it is demanded, without any regard to the propriety of such payment or the age of the child. For the better regulation of this matter, I would recommend the enactment of a statute, providing that money thus deposited may, at the discretion of the trustees, be paid to such minor, or to the person making the deposit, and that such payment shall be valid and discharge the bank from further liability.

#### VERIFICATION OF DEPOSITORS' BOOKS.

All agree that the funds of depositors in Savings banks should be protected by all reasonable safeguards and regulations. Care should be taken, however, not to burden the banks with unnecessary duties or expenses, as the cost ultimately comes out of the earnings from which depositors are paid dividends. As was suggested in 1897, a large portion of the 169,714 depositors' accounts in this State are in institutions where several different employees have access to the books and make entries thereon. In this way they are constantly verifying the work of each other, and it hardly seems necessary to employ other help to again verify such accounts. On the other hand, there are many of the smaller institutions in which the Treasurers have no assistants, and where no other person ever examines or works upon the depositors' books. It seems hardly practicable, however, to make a provision of law for this purpose that would not apply alike to all the Savings banks in the State.

Should any such law be passed the most important things to be determined are: How frequently the verification should be made; by whom made; and how to get in the depositors' books. After careful consideration of all these features of the subject, I would recommend that, if any law is enacted in this State, it provide for a verification of depositors' books every three to five years, under rules prescribed by the respective boards of trustees of the different banks, subject to the approval of the State Bank Examiner. This work will never be satisfactory, however, until some provision is added making it the duty of the depositors to bring in their books for verification, and providing some penalty in the way of forfeiture of dividends if the books are not duly presented. It might not be best, however, to insert such a radical feature in the first instance. One verification might be made, and if found necessary the law might be amended.

#### UNCLAIMED DEPOSITS.

It might be well to make some provision regarding this class of accounts in institutions still continuing in business. It may be deemed advisable, after an effort has been made to find some claimant, to stop further accumulation of dividends. In this way, the individual bank holding the same would receive some advantage therefrom, and at the same time hold the principal fund in trust should any legal owner ever be discovered.

#### TRUST AND BANKING COMPANIES.

The statements of seventeen trust and banking companies are contained in this report, one having been added to the number during the year.

The Mercantile Trust Company of Portland, chartered by the Legislature of 1897, commenced business on the second day of May, 1898. The statement of my examination and the return of the company as of October 29, both show that it has been unusually successful thus far in the volume of business transacted and the amount of its earnings. The well-known business ability of its board of management is a sufficient guarantee of a successful future for this institution.

The Lewiston Trust and Safe Deposit Company, chartered by the Legislature of 1897, was organized July 14, 1897. It transacted no business, beyond the construction of a fine bank building and safety vaults, until the twenty-eighth day of November, 1898, on which date it first commenced a general banking business. On that day, I visited the institution for the purpose of ascertaining if the amount of capital stock required by law had been actually paid in by the stockholders. The examination showed that \$75,000 in all had been subscribed, and

that \$55,000 had been paid in by the stockholders on this subscription. Owing to the fact that it commenced to transact a general banking business only two days before the close of the official year, no examination was made, and no statement of its condition appears in this report; nor is it included among the seventeen trust companies mentioned above.

## COMPARATIVE STATEMENT.

The following table shows the condition of trust and banking companies, October 29, 1898, and a comparison with that of November 6, 1897:

RESOURCES.	1898.	1897.
Demand and time loans.....	\$3,729,116	\$3,341,109
Mortgages of real estate.....	890,964	613,439
Stocks and bonds.....	2,814,393	1,996,593
Trust investments.....	84,290	95,774
Real estate owned.....	153,044	139,553
Due from other banks and bankers.....	2,896	179,048
Expense account.....	15,813	11,197
Furniture and fixtures.....	88,236	84,021
Cash on hand and on deposit.....	1,067,301	539,841
Other resources.....	856,940	813,024
<b>Total resources.....</b>	<b>\$9,182,997</b>	<b>\$7,513,403</b>
LIABILITIES.		
Capital stock.....	\$1,586,400	\$1,386,400
Surplus.....	324,000	291,500
Undivided profits.....	205,065	135,544
Time deposits.....	3,231,108	2,758,107
Demand deposits.....	2,598,188	1,857,392
Certificates of deposit.....	371,820	408,021
Debentures outstanding.....	50,400	58,300
Trust department.....	85,593	95,929
Unpaid dividends.....	790	2,458
Deposits for coupons.....	18,465	4,744
Treasurer's checks outstanding.....	10,799	14,019
Due to other banks and bankers.....	77,358	69,398
Bills payable.....	104,484	38,719
Other liabilities.....	518,562	392,287
<b>Total liabilities.....</b>	<b>\$9,182,997</b>	<b>\$7,513,403</b>

The amount of capital stock is increased \$200,000, by including that of the Mercantile Trust Company, \$100,000, and an increase of \$100,000 in that of the Portland Trust Company.

The depositors in these institutions at the present time number 14,755, and the amount of deposits is \$6,201,118. This is an increase of 1,750 depositors, and \$1,176,997 in deposits during the year.

The amount of interest paid during the year on all deposits was \$125,042, that upon the savings deposits alone being \$101,650. The amount of dividends paid to stockholders was \$91,752, an increase of \$6,000 over that of 1897. The average rate of dividends paid stockholders was 5.78.

## LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS.

In case of insolvency of a trust and banking company, the stockholders are individually liable to the creditors for an amount equal to the amount of their holdings of stock. The statute does not, however, provide any method of enforcing this "double liability," except such as applies to corporations generally. It seems that at the present time stockholders are not liable to such an assessment until the institution has been adjudged insolvent and the assets of the company exhausted. In two instances, trust companies in this State have attempted to take care of an impairment of capital by reducing the amount of their capital stock. It is difficult to understand, however, even if the law authorizes it, how this protects the creditors of the institution or the general public. While it enables the bank to charge off its poor assets, and as a matter of bookkeeping to get a balance of its books, it reduces the resources available for the payment of liabilities, and thereby lessens the chance for the creditors and depositors to get the full amount due them. It is unreasonable that the law ever contemplated such a method of restoring the credit and standing of a banking institution. If it did, then the temptation would certainly be for the stockholders to reduce the capital stock to the smallest amount possible the moment the bank met with serious losses, and thus reduce the amount of their individual liability.

The interests of the stockholders as well as the depositors demand some legislation covering this point. In many instances it might be better to lay an assessment upon the stock without first closing the institution or placing it in the hands of a Receiver. A small assessment of this kind might make the bank solvent and enable it to successfully continue its business. If it were compelled, however, to close its doors, and forced to settle its affairs by insolvency proceedings, the stockholders might lose not only the full amount of their investment, but possibly be subjected to an assessment to pay the creditors.

The National Bank Law has always contained a provision for an assessment of this kind upon the order of the Comptroller of the Currency. No one has ever questioned the wisdom of this provision or the good results of its enforcement.

I recommend the enactment of a statute providing for such an assessment upon the stockholders of trust companies on a decree of the court, made upon application of the officers of the bank, or of the State Bank Examiner, or both. Such a provision could do no harm, and might prevent the closing of some of these institutions, or a sacrifice of their assets for a small impairment of capital, and would at the same time materially improve their credit and standing.

FREMONT E. TIMBERLAKE, *Bank Examiner.*

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## NEW YORK.

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### *To the Legislature:*

At the close of the fiscal year ending September 30, 1898, there were 208 banks of deposit and discount in the State system, of which, however, four had practically ceased to take new business and were in process of closing. During the fiscal year the Clayton Exchange Bank, the Herkimer Bank and the State Bank of Elmira, all State institutions, were converted into National banks; the Elmira City Bank, which was inactive, and the capital of which had never been fully paid in, was dissolved by order of court upon proceedings instituted with the approval of the Superintendent of Banks and the Attorney-General; the Powers Bank of Rochester, whose stock was held almost wholly by a single interest, gave place to a trust company; and the Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Buffalo and the American Exchange Bank of Buffalo went into voluntary liquidation. The banks withdrawing from business and preparing to close were the Long Island of Brooklyn, the Clinton of New York, and the German-American and Lumber Exchange of Tonawanda.

Three new banks came into the State system during the fiscal year, viz.: The Cornwall Bank, the American Exchange Bank of Syracuse and Amsden Brothers, individual bankers, of Rochester.

No bank in the system failed during the year.

The net effect of the changes recited was to decrease the whole number of State banks by four, carrying it seven below the highest point reached since about the period of the enactment of the National Banking Act in 1863. At that time there were 809 State banks engaged in business in New York, while five years later there were but 45. Between 1868 and 1880 the number fluctuated, rising to 84 in 1875 and falling to 68 in 1880, since when the annual increase was unbroken to 1894, when the number reporting was 215. A year later it was two less, in 1896 it was the same as in 1894, and in 1897 it was 212.

## THE STATE AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS.

In creating the National banking system the genius of Secretary Chase aimed, chiefly, to strengthen the public credit. The institutions organized under it were to be a compulsory market for United States bonds, and thus were to be an agency to maintain their price. That a full measure of success should be gained it was requisite that many banks be organized, for assurance of which it was necessary to discriminate against State banks and to offer to the Nationals special advantages and opportunities for profit earning. It is not strange that under this pressure so many State institutions disappeared, but, rather, that any of them could survive.

It is probable not a matter of any considerable importance to the State as an entity or to its business interests whether our banking facilities be under National or State sanction and supervision, so that they are distributed with regard for the general convenience, are ample for accommodation of business needs, and are as assured against suspension or failure as reasonable restrictions and safeguards can make them. While it may be of no moment to any interest except a Savings bank whether, as between a State and a National institution of equal strength, it deposit with the former or the latter, nevertheless sentiment and State pride prompt desire that the list of institutions organized under State law should be large and their condition sound and prosperous. The New York Banking Law was the framework upon which the National Act was built, and to all who have intelligently studied its provis-

ions or have operated under it its sufficiency and advantages are apparent. Not a few of the best of the State banks were at one time in the National system, and abandoned it because experience had convinced them that it was the less desirable and profitable. When the privilege of issuing circulating notes comprehended a source of considerable profit, the contrary was the fact, but now I am aware of hardly any particular wherein the National system holds an advantage which the State does not equally offer.

It is a law in finance as in physics that the larger body exerts the superior force of attraction, and not improbably the fact that there is a greater number of National than of State banks, with a larger aggregate of capital, may explain why the National system has been so often chosen in organizing new banks when at least equal advantages could have been gained by incorporating under the State law. In directing attention to the subject no attempt is made to cover the ground thoroughly, but only to remind the public that the Banking Law of New York, except for minor crudities which I hope soon to see corrected by a careful revision, is one of the best in the world.

The Comptroller of the Currency has courteously supplied me the following information of interest in comparison with the figures before quoted concerning the State banks: On September 20, 1896, the date nearest the close of the fiscal year when a report was made, there were three hundred and twenty-five National banks in operation in New York, with an aggregate capital of \$82,994,940 and a combined surplus and undivided profits of \$63,752,066. During the fiscal year ended September 30, 1896, four National banks were organized in this State, three of them by conversion from the State system, three went into voluntary liquidation, and three were placed in the hands of Receivers. It thus appears that there are about one-half more National than there are State banks in New York, with nearly three times the aggregate of capital, surplus and undivided profits; that while the State banks decreased in number during the year by four, the net decrease in Nationals was two; and that while no State banks failed during the same time, three Nationals were placed in the hands of Receivers. If comparison regarding the last-named feature were to be brought down to the present date, it would show even more favorably for the State banks over the Nationals,

#### TRUST COMPANIES AND BANKS.

Do the figures given justify the conclusion that while nearly every business interest in New York is expanding that of banking is stationary or actually retrogressive? I think not, because, first, capital seeking investment in this field, especially in the larger cities, has of late manifested a pronounced preference for the trust company form of organization; and, second, because there is apparent in this, as in most other lines of business, a strong tendency to consolidate competing interests, or for the larger to absorb the smaller.

During the last two fiscal years more than enough capital has been put into new trust companies in this State to have established sixty banks capitalized at one hundred thousand dollars each. That these companies have been instituted with any expectation that their principal business would be the acceptance and execution of trusts, is not probable. Rather, it is in banking functions, practically discounts, that most of their resources are likely to be employed, and with this partial occupation of the field wherein the banks glean their greatest profits, it is not remarkable that the number of the latter should fall to show a gain.

#### CONSOLIDATION OF BANKS.

Instances of the consolidation of banks, or of the absorption of a languishing institution by one stronger and more prosperous, have been too frequent latterly not to have attracted attention. Usually the results following have been of the best—advantageous to the public by reason of affording it greater security and enabling it to be more certain of obtaining accommodations when wanted, and beneficial to the consolidated bank by the increase of business attracted, by the economy resulting from having to maintain only one management instead of two, and by the removal of an excessive competition. Where such gains are reasonably certain to be realized the policy is, of course, the opposite of objectionable, but there might be danger in testing it too far. The popular disposition toward banks to-day is very different from that of seventy or eighty years ago, when the business was generally regarded with jealousy, apprehension and enmity, and the banks certainly should do nothing that might cause it to change adversely. It is not a negligible factor in the struggle for profits, prosperity and safety, and while the outworn sentiment prevalent in the early years of the century—born of narrowness and ignorance, and blind to the real relation and value of a good bank to the public—is little likely to be ever fully revived, it is desirable that it be not quickened at all. Something akin to it yet lurks in some minds, for even in these days there are victims of misfortune, men possessed of the mean spirit of envy and suspicion, and radicals holding to the heresies of communism who regard banks as agencies of evil, and would strike them down if they could. More than one political campaign in this country has shown, too, something of the unreasoning passion against success and wealth to which men

smarting under disappointment or failure can be stung. It is not wise to challenge such elements too far, nor to pursue courses which might recruit their ranks, and there is wisdom in considering how this can be most surely avoided. Whatever operates to lessen confidence and to withdraw a bank's management from close touch and sympathy with general business, is to the prejudice of banking interests. The tendency from concentration of several banks in one, massing capital inordinately and perhaps engendering an indifference, or even contempt, for the small tradesman and his account, might be to erect a barrier between the institution and all except the richest of its clientele, with possibilities of incalculable harm resulting. Smaller banks are not apt to excite such animosities, for their management, never feeling release from the necessity of striving for success, holds itself approachable, studies to accommodate, and cultivates the idea that the institution and the customer are reciprocally important to each other. Such a relation popularizes the business, thereby strengthening it and advantaging it in every way.

Yet another objection to the building up of gigantic institutions is the weakening of the bond of fellowship between the banks which might result. The great bank, self-reliant in its consciousness of strength, and proud of its importance, would hardly have the interest in its smaller rival or be as ready to support it in an emergency, such as sometimes comes causelessly even to the soundest institutions, as if the two were equals, each realizing that what the one does for the other to-day it may need for itself in the future.

Then, too, if the time should come when the banking business in our great cities should seem to be even an approach to a trust control or monopoly, it would not be well either for the banks or for the public. With command of great power the temptation to assert it is always present, and it is safer from every point of view that, as regards the banks, that power be distributed so that no single mind or any combination of a small number of minds should be able to direct and control it.

Congress is being urged to so amend the National Banking Act as to sanction the establishment of branch banks. In my judgment, there is no occasion for such an authorization, nor do I believe that it would be for the general interest. The effect of its operation would naturally be an invasion by the larger banks of territory now occupied and well served by smaller institutions, and, with insufficient business to sustain both, the smaller would be gradually crowded out.

#### COMPARATIVE CONDITION OF THE BANKS.

Though the remarkable improvement in the condition of the State banks in New York which was shown by their reports in the fiscal year 1896-1897, amounting to an increase of fifty-five millions of dollars in resources, was not duplicated in 1897-1898, the business of the year was nevertheless encouraging and fairly satisfactory. At the lowest point during the year 1897-1898 the resources of these banks were thirty-six millions under the high point for the previous year; but twenty-eight millions of this loss had been recovered in September, with three millions more of it accounted for by the withdrawal of institutions from business. But while a loss in total assets was shown, there was an appreciable increase in the proportion of surplus and undivided profits to capital employed, and this notwithstanding many thousand dollars, representing poor discounts or depreciated securities and furniture and fixtures, had been charged out by my requirement, so that reports should reflect more accurately the actual condition of the banks. With the promise that the future is believed by sagacious financiers to hold for a larger business activity and increased prosperity, the hope seems justified that the current year may bring a further improvement and yield ampler rewards.

#### BANKING LAW AMENDMENTS.

The amendments made to the Banking Law by the Legislature of 1898 are herewith indicated:

Chapter 98 extends to any trust company chartered by special Act prior to May 18, 1892, the provisions of Section 158 of the Banking Law, under which the trust companies organized under the general law are exempt, except in certain specified cases, from giving a bond for or in respect to any trust or when appointed executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, Receiver, committee or depository. But all investments of money received by any such corporation in any of these characters are at its sole risk, its capital stock, property and effects being liable therefor unless the investments are such as the courts recognize as proper when made by an individual acting in a like capacity, or are such as are permitted in and by the instrument or words creating and defining the trust. If the corporation be dissolved the debts of this class due from it have the preference.

Chapter 193 adds to the Banking Law a new article, to be known as Article VI, which provides for the incorporation of building and lot associations for the purpose of accumulating a fund for the purchase of real estate, to pay off incumbrances thereon, to aid the mem-

bers in acquiring a building lot or lots and making improvements thereon, or for all of such purposes, the plan of operation contemplated being for the association to purchase a tract of land which is subdivided into building lots and the subdivisions allotted to the members, by whom they are paid for in installments.

Chapter 236 adds to the list of securities in which Savings banks may legally invest their deposits or the income derived therefrom by authorizing not more than twenty per centum of an institution's total deposits to be invested in railroad bonds which are based upon a first mortgage, or upon a mortgage to retire all prior mortgage debt, provided the railroad corporation issuing the same is a New York corporation having the principal part of its railroad in this State, with a capital stock equal to at least one-half of its total mortgage indebtedness, and has not defaulted in payment of interest and principal and has not failed to pay dividends of not less than four per centum annually, punctually and regularly, upon all of its outstanding capital stock during the preceding five years.

Chapter 333 modifies the form of verification of reports which are required to be made by the institutions under the supervision of the Banking Department, so that the officers need make oath only that they are true and correct in all respects to the best of the affiant's knowledge and belief.

Chapter 348 authorizes a co-operative savings and loan association or a building and loan association to invest its deposits and the income derived therefrom in the same securities in which Savings banks may legally make investments.

Chapter 410 makes it permissible for a bank located in a city of over one million inhabitants, if its certificate of incorporation so provides, to open and keep one or more branch offices in such city for the receipt and payment of deposits and for making loans and discounts, upon condition that the consent in writing of the Superintendent of Banks be first obtained, and that no loans or discounts be made except such as have been previously authorized by the board of directors.

Chapter 556 amends Section 120 of the Banking Law by striking from it the requirement that the borrower pay the cost of an appraisal in case of a loan upon real property by a Savings bank.

#### OTHER INSTITUTIONS.

Reports relative to the institutions other than banks of deposit and discount which are under the supervision of the Superintendent of Banks, viz.: The Savings banks, trust companies and safe deposit companies, savings and loan associations and foreign mortgage companies, will be transmitted to your honorable body at a later date, as provided by law.

#### TOTAL RESOURCES.

The total resources of institutions under the supervision of this Department, as shown by their last reports, are as follows:

Banks of deposit and discount, September 30, 1898.....	\$321,508,088
Savings banks, July 1, 1898.....	889,250,817
Trust companies, July 1, 1898.....	527,064,553
Safe deposit companies, July 1, 1898.....	5,215,836
Foreign mortgage companies, January 1, 1898.....	19,906,139
Building and loan associations, January 1, 1898.....	61,584,719
Total.....	\$1,824,549,630

In comparison with the previous year the gain is \$129,204,670.

#### CLOSED BANKS.

The banks which closed during the fiscal year, with their location, dates of closing and the amount of their capital stock, are as follows:

NAME.	Location.	Date of closing.	Capital.
Exchange Bank.....	Clayton.....	January 1, 1898	\$40,000
Elmira City Bank.....	Elmira.....	March 7, 1898	35,000
Farmers and Mechanics' Bank.....	Buffalo.....	February 15, 1898	200,000
American Exchange Bank.....	Buffalo.....	May 20, 1898	200,000
Herkimer Bank.....	Herkimer.....	July 11, 1898	75,000
State Bank of Elmira.....	Elmira.....	August 16, 1898	100,000
Powers Bank.....	Rochester.....		100,000
Total.....			\$750,000

## CAPITAL.

The amount of capital employed by the State banks of deposit and discount and by individual bankers on September 30, 1898, together with the decrease therein during the year, is as follows:

Amount of capital, September 30, 1897.....	\$30,570,700
Capital of banks organized during the year.....	225,000
	<hr/>
Capital of banks closed or closing.....	750,000
	<hr/>
Reduction of capital stock.....	306,500
	<hr/>
Capital stock September 30, 1898.....	\$29,839,200
Capital stock September 30, 1897.....	30,570,700
	<hr/>
Decrease for the year, net.....	\$731,500

## RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES.

The aggregate resources and liabilities of the State banks of deposit and discount upon the date of their last report during the fiscal year are shown herewith in comparison with their reported condition at the corresponding date in 1897:

	Sept. 15, 1897.	Sept. 30, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>		
Loans and discounts less due from directors.....	\$174,202,642	\$175,937,742
Liability of directors as makers.....	6,412,205	6,950,745
Overdrafts.....	198,828	182,612
Due from trust companies, banks, bankers and brokers.....	34,356,894	28,346,630
Real estate.....	9,565,978	10,076,648
Mortgages owned.....	3,132,322	3,240,990
Stocks and bonds.....	17,925,396	22,961,410
Specie.....	17,607,651	21,383,759
U. S. legal tenders and circulating notes of National banks.....	19,011,543	15,448,741
Cash items.....	45,470,008	35,340,170
Assets not included under any of the above heads...	1,468,469	1,637,977
Add for cents.....	665	668
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$329,272,539	\$321,508,068
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>		
Capital.....	\$30,570,700	\$29,839,200
Surplus fund.....	19,291,544	19,067,498
Undivided profits.....	7,963,495	8,390,171
Due depositors on demand.....	224,349,746	221,970,862
Due to trust companies, banks, bankers and brokers.....	33,121,522	25,073,655
Due to Savings banks.....	11,585,068	15,170,802
Due to Treasurer of the State of New York.....	2,689,068	1,080,968
Amount due not included under any of the above heads.....	680,410	804,634
Add for cents.....	342	331
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$329,272,539	\$321,508,068

## SECURITIES AND CASH HELD IN TRUST.

The appended table shows the securities and cash deposited with the Superintendent of Banks in trust by the several banks, individual bankers and trust companies, and held by him at the close of the fiscal year:

United States 2 per cent. bonds.....	\$103,000	Brooklyn city 4 per cent. bonds....	\$100,000
United States 4 per cent. bonds.....	1,556,000	Buffalo city 3½ per cent. bonds....	20,000
United States 5 per cent. bonds.....	51,000	Niagara Falls city 4 per cent. bonds	20,000
United States 6 per cent. bonds.....	2,000	Rochester city 3½ per cent. bonds	50,000
New York city 2½ per cent. bonds....	485,000	Rochester city 6 per cent. bonds...	30,000
New York city 3 per cent bonds....	1,295,000	Bonds and mortgages.....	50,000
New York city 3½ per cent. bonds..	300,000	Cash.....	378
Brooklyn city 3 per cent. bonds....	320,000		<hr/>
Brooklyn city 3½ per cent. bonds...	350,000		\$4,732,378



## NEW BANKS.

The State banks which organized and began business during the year are:

NAME.	Location.	Date of authorization.	Capital.
Cornwall Bank.....	Cornwall.....	November 10, 1897	\$25,000
American Exchange Bank.....	Syracuse.....	November 30, 1897	200,000
Amsden Brothers, Individual Bankers.....	Rochester.....	February 19, 1898	100,000
Total.....			\$325,000

## REDUCTION OF CAPITAL.

The capital of the following banks was reduced as shown herewith:

German-American Bank, Tonawanda, June 10, 1898.....	\$100,000
Clinton Bank (closing), New York.....	206,500
	<u>\$306,500</u>

## RECOMMENDATIONS.

## TAXATION OF SAVINGS BANKS.

The controverted question of the liability of the surplus of a Savings bank to assessment and taxation came before the Court of Appeals in October, and was decided by that tribunal in favor of the bank. A few days later the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department, handed down a decision in a case involving the construction of the State Tax Law, wherein the point in issue was whether the provision exempting Savings banks from taxation on their deposits carried exemption to the individual depositors as well, and here, also, the decision sustained the view always held by the present Superintendent of Banks. This latter case will presumably be taken to the Court of Appeals, and I hope and expect with the result that the decision will be affirmed, so that what I believe to have been the wise intent of the Legislature may have full and unchallenged effect. And thus the law should be permitted to stand. Political economists are all but unanimous in insisting that an enlightened system of taxation must exempt all personalty, and the tendency seems to be to embody that theory in law, as it has already come to obtain largely in practice through neglect of officials or by evasion by property, probably not more than a tenth of the personalty in the State getting upon the tax-rolls. Without entering upon any discussion of this great problem, it is clearly pertinent to protest that while wealth is permitted to escape taxation to so great an extent, it would not be expedient, seemly or just to concentrate effort in the direction of singling out for subjection to such a tax the one class which, by reason of its helplessness and possession of only small accumulations, is most deserving of the State's forbearance. It would be a discrimination against the provident poor, an oppression of the weak, a penalty laid upon frugality, and a discouragement to those striving against a possible dependence in sickness or age upon public charity. But experience has proven that there are legislators, doubtless because ill-informed, who advocate such taxation. It will be my duty and pleasure to neglect no opportunity to combat all measures looking to such a policy, arguing their impropriety and unfairness. As a help to make the case yet stronger the Banking Law should be so amended as to make the Savings banks still more distinctively and exclusively than they are present the servants and benefactors of the inexperienced, the helpless and those whose savings are too meagre for advantageous independent investment. At the same time the management of the banks should be zealous to promote this condition by eliminating as far as practicable from their accounts those that exceed a legal limit, particularly such as represent the deposits of those who are not only competent to administer their own affairs, but who are not among the class that Savings banks were designed to accommodate, and who deposit for investment only. It is unquestioned that the Savings banks include among their depositors a proportion of this class, though it is small in comparison with the whole number, and that they also hold some large trust accounts. I assume that the agitation which annually recurs in favor of taxing these institutions in some form rests upon this fact rather than upon any desire to reach the widow, the orphan or the wage-worker. But the remedy sought to be applied is not the proper one to employ. It should aim not to include those deserving exemption with those undeserving, but to exclude the latter from this privileged field, leaving it to those who may properly be permitted to occupy it. Every step gained in excluding men of affairs and of wealth as depositors adds strength to the argument for exemption of these institutions from taxation. As a means to this end I recommend such amendments to the Banking Law as will cause prohibitions against the payment of interest

on any sum in excess of three thousand dollars held for the account of any one depositor, or any society, corporation or trust fund in any form; against any individual having more than one account in any one bank; against any one depositor having in any one bank at any time as executor, trustee, guardian, or in trust in any form, more than three thousand dollars in the aggregate; and extending the same limit to society and corporation accounts, as well as to deposits by order of court or arising from judicial sales, the intention being to restrict accounts absolutely to the outside limit of three thousand dollars, regardless of their character, and also to prevent any individual from having in any bank more than two accounts at the most, in which contingency but one could be personal.

The trust companies afford ample facilities for those having large trust funds for deposit, and are more properly than the Savings banks the institutions with which such should be placed, either by choice of the trustee or by direction of the courts. By ridding the Savings banks of the excessive accounts of this class they will be held more closely to the design which is their main justification for being, and thereby will appeal more and more effectively for a continuation of the special consideration and exemptions which it has always been the policy of the State to extend to them.

#### SAVINGS BANKS AS PREFERRED CREDITORS.

A recent decision by Justice Smith, *in re* Chenango Valley Savings Bank against George W. Dunn, as Receiver, etc., *et al.*, demands that Sections 118, 119 and 130 of the Banking Law be amended so as to assure to them the full effect which the Legislature must have intended them to have. The action in question was brought to recover a balance claimed to be owing to the Savings bank by the Merchants' Bank of Binghamton, at the time of the latter's failure, for money deposited. The Banking Law makes the Savings bank a preferred creditor of any bank or trust company which shall become insolvent to an amount not exceeding the sum which it may lawfully deposit therewith, viz.: Not more than twenty-five per centum of the paid-up capital and surplus of any such bank or company. In the case cited the Justice holds that the claim of the Savings bank can be allowed only to the extent of twenty-five per centum of the capital of the failed bank, there having been a considerable nominal, but no actual surplus at the time when the deposit was made. If this decision is to be accepted, or shall be affirmed upon appeal, it follows either that Savings banks should be by law restricted in their deposits with banks and trust companies to twenty-five per centum of capital alone, or that the statute should be so amended as also to apply specifically to a reported surplus. A Savings bank must rely necessarily upon the representation of its depository for information as to its condition, and if it is to be deprived of such reliance it can have no safety in counting upon a surplus in any institution which becomes insolvent. It should have the full protection which the law has hitherto been understood to give, or it should be required to deposit nowhere in excess of twenty-five per centum of its depository's capital.

In this connection it may be appropriate to call the attention of the Legislature, as I did in my last annual report, to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that National banks are not subject to the provision of the law above referred to, and that the deposits of Savings banks therein are not preferred claims.

#### ANNUAL MEETINGS OF UNIFORM DATE.

The uniformity in the date of holding annual meetings which prevails with the National banks it would be proper and profitable to apply to State banks of deposit and discount. The National Banking Act requires annual meetings to be held on such a day of January of each year as is specified therefor in the articles of association of each institution, which, so far as I am informed, are uniform in specifying the second Tuesday in January. In case an election of directors is not made at the time appointed, an election may be held on any subsequent day upon thirty days' notice given by newspaper publication. There are State banks in New York which have not held an election in years, the directors holding over under the provision of law continuing them in office until their successors are elected and have qualified, and vacancies being filled by the remaining directors. Clearly this is all wrong. The stockholders ought to have an opportunity at least as often as once a year to come together without themselves creating the occasion or arranging the meeting. It would bring them into closer touch with the institution, inform them as to its needs and conditions, and at times might energize and improve the management. Annual meetings are seldom held, especially in country places, without some consideration being given to the affairs of the corporation, out of which benefits may come; and, besides, a director is not made less sensitive to the obligations of his trust if now and then he be called upon to refresh his memory as to what they comprehend by subscribing a new oath of office. I accordingly recommend that the Banking Law be amended so as to prescribe that all annual meetings of State banks of deposit and discount shall be held on the second Tuesday of January in each year, and that the directors elected shall thereupon take and subscribe the oath defined in Section 51 of the Banking Law.

## EXAMINATIONS BY BOARDS OF DIRECTORS.

It has recently become the practice of the Comptroller of the Currency to cause National banks in the city of New York to be examined twice a year. While I am not at present prepared to make a recommendation that this practice be applied to State banks, I wish to substantially renew the suggestion made in my reports of one and two years ago, that the obligation be imposed by statute upon the directors of every State bank, compelling them to make an examination of its assets and liabilities at least as often as once in six months. In this way the board of directors would have more definite and certain information regarding the details of the bank, and especially with reference to the class of securities and paper held than could otherwise be obtained, and many of the causes which lead to disaster be ascertained and removed. Most of the troubles which come to banks are through excessive and questionable loans. By the very nature of the circumstances the board of directors are certainly the best judges of matters of this kind, and if possessing the information which these examinations would necessarily give they could easily prevent difficulty in this direction. It should be required that the result of these examinations be reported under oath to the Superintendent of this Department, containing a classification of the bank's assets, showing separately those that are safe, those that are doubtful and those that are bad, and all loans that are excessive.

## CONCLUSION.

Besides the several amendments here suggested, there ought to be a complete revision of the Banking Law, cutting out its ambiguities and reconciling such inconsistencies as it now embodies. But this larger work can wait, while the specific changes of law herewith recommended are more urgent, and should engage legislative attention at the present session. Before another year shall have gone it is hoped that the Superintendent of Banks and the Statutory Revision Commission co-operating, the general revision proposed may be prepared and be ready to lay before your honorable body. Respectfully submitted,

FREDERICK D. KILBURN,  
*Superintendent of Banks.*

ALBANY, N. Y., Jan. 2, 1890.

## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[All books mentioned in the following notices will be supplied at the publishers' lowest rates on application to BRADFORD RHODES & CO., 78 William Street, New York.]

**THE WORK OF A BANK.** By H. T. EASTON, author of "Banks and Banking." London: Effingham Wilson.

As indicated by the title this is a book dealing with the actual workings of a bank; and though designed for banks in Great Britain, it contains much that is applicable to all banking institutions. It presents many practical forms for bank bookkeeping together with much other useful information.

**A HANDBOOK OF BANKRUPTCY LAW.** Embodying the full text of the Act of Congress of 1898, and annotated with references to pertinent decisions under former statutes. By H. CAMPBELL BLACK. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.

This volume contains not only the full text of the bankruptcy law passed at the last session of Congress, but in addition copious notes giving the substance of all the decisions rendered under former Acts of Congress on the same subject which are pertinent and likely to prove of value or importance under the provisions of the new statute. Much litigation will doubtless arise under this law, and as bankers are certain to be at least indirectly concerned in this litigation, they will find this volume of great value in giving a clear idea of what the law actually is and how it is likely to be construed by the courts.

**SAVINGS BANKS AND SAFE SECURITIES.** By JOHN GRANT DATER. New York.

Contains copious statistics of Savings banks in the United States and other countries; also a digest of the laws relating to Savings bank investments, and much other information of value to bankers and investors.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc.**, under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—At a meeting of the directors of the Franklin National Bank, on January 25, a resolution was adopted to submit the question of placing the bank in liquidation to a meeting of the shareholders called for March 1. This action is due to the fact that the bank is located in a district over-supplied with banking facilities, and it has been unable to make any money.

—The quarterly banquet of Group VII, New York State Bankers' Association, was held at the Hotel St. George, Brooklyn, on the evening of January 25. President James M. Brush, of the Bank of Huntington, introduced as the first speaker William R. Willcox, who read a carefully-prepared paper on the new bankruptcy law. Ex-Judge Thomas Young, Vice-President of the Bank of Huntington, followed. In an address he showed the important part that the bankers of the United States, especially those of New York State, had played in the history of the country. John J. Crawford, law editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, spoke on "A Practical View of Bank Taxation." Geo. M. Coffin, formerly Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, and now Vice-President of the Phenix National Bank, New York, made an interesting and valuable address. Ex-Senator Stephen M. Griswold, President of the Union Bank of Brooklyn, in behalf of the group, presented to the representatives of the banks of Huntington and Patchogue handsomely engrossed resolutions of thanks for courtesies in entertaining the group. Bradford Rhodes spoke briefly on the advantages to be derived from organization and association of bankers, both in securing just legislation and in improving banking methods.

—New directors of the National City Bank have been elected as follows: H. O. Havemeyer, Stephen S. Palmer and W. S. Bogert, the latter being chosen temporarily to fill a vacancy James A. Stillman, Walter H. Tappan, Arthur Kavanagh and Horace M. Kilborn were appointed additional Assistant Cashiers.

—William Barbour has been added to the board of directors of the Hanover National Bank

—James W. Alexander and J. H. Hyde, Vice-Presidents of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, are new directors of the Western National Bank.

—The Tradeemen's National Bank, which suspended October 4, and which has been in the hands of a temporary Receiver for some time, recently voted to go into liquidation.

—G. W. McGarrath, Cashier of the Leather Manufacturers' National Bank, has been elected second Vice-President.

—William Dowd recently declined re-election as director of the National Bank of North America owing to impaired health and advancing years. Resolutions were adopted by his associates expressing high appreciation of his services to the bank during his connection with it as a director—a period which dates from 1865.

—The Union Dime Savings Institution, at Broadway and Thirty-second Street, has for some time been using a machine constructed at the suggestion of the President, Charles E. Sprague, intended to prevent mistakes in the entry of receipts or payments of the bank, and to prevent dishonest manipulations of the accounts. This machine, which is used to enter deposits and drafts upon the books of the depositors, makes at the same time a duplicate registration upon a tape, which is locked in the machine and cannot be tampered with, and thus is made a complete record of the day's transactions. An item cannot be entered upon a depositor's book without its being recorded on this tape, a fact that precludes not only unintentional discrepancies, but also falsification of the entries, as well as the suppression of items. It also records by means of an adding machine the total of the bank's transactions, the officers being thereby enabled to determine in a moment the day's receipts or disbursements without figuring them out from the books, which are kept in the usual way, and upon which the machine acts as a check.

—Wm. H. Porter, the new Vice-President of the Chemical National Bank, has been elected a director to succeed the late James A. Roosevelt.

—Isaac Stern, of Messrs. Stern Bros., and Isidor Straus, of Messrs. R. H. Macy & Co., have been elected directors of the Second National Bank.

—Richard B. Ferris, Vice-President of the Bank of New York, N. B. A., retired from that position on January 21. He entered this veteran of the banks as a clerk in 1849 and was gradually advanced to the positions of bookkeeper, teller, Assistant Cashier, Cashier and Vice-President. In recognition of his fifty years of faithful service the directors voted him a bonus of \$1,000 and an annual pension of \$3,500. On the afternoon of January 21, Mr. Ferris entertained the officers, directors and clerks of the bank at the house of his son, Dr. Albert Warren Ferris, 12 East Forty-seventh street. Fifty clerks congratulated their former chief and he was the recipient of a salad bowl, the gift of the officers of the bank, who also attended.

—A. H. Borman has been admitted to partnership in the firm of S. V. White & Co.

—Ex-Gov. Roswell P. Flower succeeds Cord Meyer as Vice-President of the Colonial Trust Co.

—Edwin J. Stalker, formerly chief clerk in the Chase National Bank, is now Assistant Cashier, having been promoted to that position at the annual meeting on January 10. Mr. Stalker entered the bank seventeen years ago as a check clerk and has worked up through all grades to his present position.

—Ex-Mayor Wm. R. Grace and others are organizing the City Trust Co., with \$1,000,000 capital and \$1,000,000 surplus.

—Reports are in circulation to the effect that the Corn Exchange Bank is seeking to acquire control of the Astor Place Bank and the Hudson River Bank.

—A meeting of the Council of Administration of the New York State Bankers' Association was held at the Waldorf-Astoria January 14, representatives being present from every group, with but one exception. There was a general discussion of the subject of bank taxation, and it is probable that some action will be taken in the near future looking to the correction of existing inequalities by appropriate legislation. Selection of the time and place for the next convention was deferred until a later meeting.

—Dealings at the Stock Exchange in recent weeks have been on a scale heretofore unequalled. Total sales have frequently exceeded a million and-a-half of shares. The price of seats in the Exchange has gone up to \$38,000.

—By a recent purchase the Stock Exchange becomes the owner of the building and lot No. 8 Broad street, adjoining the Exchange on the north of the Broad street entrance. This, with other property bought some time ago, will make room for the new building which it is proposed to erect when some existing leases expire.

—The Produce Exchange Trust Co. has chosen Turner A. Beall, President in place of Dr. James H. Parker. Thomas A. McIntyre and Timothy Hogan have been elected Vice-Presidents, the latter to succeed John E. Searles.

—On January 18, Hon. A. B. Hepburn, formerly Vice-President of the National City Bank, entered upon the duties of his new position as Vice-President of the Chase National Bank, to which place he had been elected some time prior.

—Francis L. Hine succeeds James A. Garland, resigned, as Vice-President of the First National Bank; William B. Reed, Assistant Cashier, succeeds Mr. Hine as Cashier. Whiting G. Snow and Charles D. Backus were elected Assistant Cashiers.

—At a meeting of the directors of the Western National Bank, January 10, Valentine P. Snyder, Vice-President, was elected President in place of John E. Searles. James W. Alexander and Marcellus Hartley were elected Vice-Presidents.

—Edwin S. Schenck, heretofore Vice-President and Cashier of the Hamilton Bank, succeeds William S. Gray, resigned, as President. The new President entered the Hamilton Bank as Assistant Cashier shortly after the consolidation with the Bank of Harlem, and had been promoted through the various steps to Cashier and Vice-President. He is well known to all the bank's dealers, and is the youngest bank President in the city of New York.

Frederick B. Schenck, President of the Mercantile National Bank, was unanimously elected Vice-President of the Hamilton. The Mercantile National Bank is the clearing-house agent of the Hamilton.

—John S. Foster is the new President of the Bowery Bank, succeeding F. C. Mayhew.

—Extensive additions to the banking offices of the Riverside Bank have been made lately by fitting up an adjoining building with modern bank furniture and appliances.

## NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—The Federal Trust Co. has applied for incorporation with \$500,000 capital. Assistant U. S. Treasurer Jos. H. O'Neil will be the President. It is said the company will, as a part of its business, make small loans to mechanics and tradesmen after the manner of the Bank of France, which yearly discounts about a million pieces of paper below ten dollars.

—Within a short time seventeen National banks of this city have given up their charters and three new ones have been organized. The capital was reduced by these changes from \$15,400,000 to \$4,500,000.

—The annual dinner of the Bank Cashiers' Association was held at the Copley Square Hotel, January 25. An address was made by F. R. Boocock, Secretary of the National Credit Men's Association, on the subject of "Bank Credits."

—It is said that the indications are that the syndicate which bought up the stock of the banks recently placed in liquidation are likely to experience a slight loss on the investment, though this cannot be known definitely until the liquidations are completed.

—The National Shawmut Bank has taken a lease of additional quarters, which will greatly enlarge its facilities for doing the increased business that will follow its absorption of a number of other banks.

—Wm. B. Dentson, Cashier of the Atlantic National Bank, has been elected President to succeed T. Quincy Browne, resigned.

**Maine Savings Bank Association.**—At its recent annual meeting at Portland officers of the Savings Bank Association were chosen as follows: President, Edward A. Noyes; vice-president, Alpheus G. Rogers; secretary, N. G. Boothby; treasurer, A. A. Montgomery. Executive Committee—Leslie C. Cornish, Augusta; J. L. Crosby, Bangor; Edwin Stone, Biddeford; S. M. Carter, Lewiston; Weston Thompson, Brunswick.

**Norwich, Conn.**—The First National Bank has elected Lewis A. Hyde Vice-President, to succeed Henry W. Tibbits, who continues with the bank as teller and director. For the past half-century Mr. Hyde has been connected with the bank, being Cashier all but four years of that time. The change was made at the suggestion of Mr. Tibbits, who generously proposed to yield his place as Vice-President in order that Mr. Hyde might be relieved of the more arduous duties of Cashier. Franklin S. Jerome, the new Cashier, has been long connected with the bank, and has been Assistant Cashier for some time. He is thoroughly familiar with his new duties and amply competent to fulfill them.

**Lewiston, Me.**—At the annual meeting of the Manufacturers' National Bank, January 10, Hon. J. M. Robbins, President of the bank since its organization in 1875, declined a re-election and was succeeded by Wm. H. Newell. Mr. Robbins was one of the founders of the bank, and he retires at the age of seventy-four years with a reputation for business integrity and financial ability.

## MIDDLE STATES.

**Philadelphia.**—A readjustment of the affairs of the Market Street National Bank has been proposed by Geo. H. Earle, Jr., the new President. He suggests that all assets of a doubtful character be charged against capital and placed in a separate class, realizations thereon to be carried to surplus. Deducting all these items as being worthless—which, of course, is not the case—would give the bank a capital of \$420,000, instead of \$600,000 and the surplus at present reported. To meet the impairment of \$180,000 in the capital as thus estimated it is proposed to reduce the capital by \$100,000 and issue \$80,000 of new stock. Should the plan be carried out, as seems probable, it will greatly strengthen the bank, which despite some errors of management is still declared to be entirely solvent.

**Pittsburg, Pa.**—The German National Bank, which suspended on October 19 last, resumed business on January 25, having fully complied with the conditions imposed by the Comptroller of the Currency. Sufficient funds were provided to pay all deposits on demand, and while a considerable amount was withdrawn, many deposits were also made.

—Reports are current of a proposed consolidation of a number of banks, the plan under consideration contemplating the liquidation of ten banks, consolidating their business with the Tradesmen's National Bank, which will have \$2,000,000 capital and surplus.

**Baltimore, Md.**—The Maryland Fidelity, Trust and Deposit Co., at a meeting of the directors on January 10, authorized the calling of a meeting of the shareholders to take action on a proposition to increase the capital stock from \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000. Gen. Francis V. Greene, of New York, was elected to fill a vacancy on the board of directors.

—Derick Fahnestock, President of the Baltimore Stock Exchange, has been elected Vice-

President of the Western National Bank, to succeed Wm. F. Burns, who resigned because of failing health.

—Theodore Hooper succeeds Gilmore Meredith as Vice-President of the First National Bank, Mr. Meredith declining re-election.

—J. D. Wheeler, Cashier of the Drovers and Mechanics' National Bank, was recently elected a director of the bank in place of Robert Rennert, deceased.

—A proposition to reduce the capital of the Continental National Bank from \$300,000 to \$250,000 will be submitted to the shareholders.

—The Farmers and Planters' Loan and Trust Co. is reported to be organizing with \$2,500,000 capital.

Utica, N. Y.—Since the corner stone of the new Savings Bank of Utica was laid on October 12, work has been progressing favorably. When completed the bank will be one of the handsomest and most substantial in the State.

Cashier Promoted.—After serving as Cashier of the Hummelstown (Pa.) National Bank for thirty years, John J. Nissley was recently elected President to succeed the late Dr. Jacob Shope. Mr. Nissley's son, Paul J. Nissley, was chosen Cashier to succeed his father.

New York Trust Companies.—The total resources of the forty-nine trust companies of New York State at the close of last year were \$579,203,442, an increase of \$95,465,517 as compared with the previous year. For the year ending December 31, 1898, the surplus of these institutions increased \$7,164,665. The companies earned \$4,064,674 more in profits last year than during the preceding year. Total interest, commissions and profits received during the year, \$33,647,739; interest paid, \$8,800,298; expenses, \$3,065,986; dividends declared, \$4,408,500; taxes paid, \$458,537; total deposits, \$424,097,261; bonds and mortgages purchased, \$6,499,574.

Buffalo, N. Y.—The City Bank has gone into the National system, the title now being City National Bank. Its capital will be \$300,000.

Pennsylvania Bankers Meet.—Group III of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association met at Scranton January 26 and elected the following officers: Chairman, Robert E. James, President Emston Trust Co., Easton; secretary and treasurer, C. W. Gunster, Cashier Merchants and Mechanics' Bank, Scranton; executive committee, Wm. H. Peck, Cashier Third National Bank, Scranton; Isaac Post, Cashier First National Bank, Scranton; E. H. Beninger, Secretary and Treasurer Lehigh Valley Trust and Safe Deposit Co., Allentown; C. W. Laycock, Cashier Anthracite Savings Bank, Wilkes-Barre; R. A. Jadwin, Cashier First National Bank, Carbondale. In the evening the visiting bankers were entertained at dinner at the Scranton Club.

—A meeting of Group V was held at Harrisburg, January 18. These officers were chosen; Chairman, Grier Hersh, President York National Bank, York; secretary and treasurer, F. K. Ployer, Cashier Second National Bank, Mechanicsburg; executive committee, J. A. Meyers, President Columbia National Bank, Columbia; P. F. Duncan, Cashier Duncannon National Bank, Duncannon; R. M. Henderson, President Carlisle Deposit Bank, Carlisle; J. B. Paeker, Sunbury; Wm. L. Gorgas, Cashier Harrisburg National Bank, Harrisburg.

—Group VI met at Altoona, January 18, and elected these officers: Chairman, John D. Roberts, Cashier First National Bank, Johnstown; secretary, E. E. Lindemuth, Cashier Clearfield National Bank, Clearfield.

Bank to Close.—Permission has been asked of the New Jersey Legislature to place the New Castle branch of the Farmers' Bank of Delaware in liquidation. It was incorporated in 1807 and is one of four institutions of the same name in which the State holds the majority of the stock.

New State Bank.—The Nassau County Bank has been organized at Mineola, N. Y., the county seat of the new county of Nassau. It will begin business about March 1, having \$25,000 capital and \$25,000 paid-in surplus. Officers are: President, Benjamin D. Hicks; Vice-President, H. M. W. Eastman; Cashier, Thos. W. Albertson. Mr. Hicks is also President of the Roslyn Savings Bank.

#### SOUTHERN STATES.

To Become National Banks.—It is reported that Messrs. Murchison & Co., of Wilmington, N. C., will reorganize as a National bank about March 1.

—The Bank of Commerce, Hattiesburg, Miss., has decided to reorganize as a National bank.

Richmond, Va.—The Richmond Trust and Safe Deposit Co. decided recently to increase its capital from \$300,000 to \$400,000.

Meeting of Texas Bankers.—The third annual convention of the Fourth District of the Texas Bankers' Association was held at Waco, Jan. 18, J. Z. Miller, Sr., of Belton, presiding.

There was an interesting discussion on the liability of banks on bills of lading under existing Acts of the Legislature as construed by the courts. The committee on the foregoing topic considered the decision rendered by the court of civil appeals in the case of *Landa vs. Lattin*, in which it was held that a bank which cashed a draft drawn by the consignor on the consignee of wheat, with a bill of lading attached, and collected the draft before the consignee had opportunity to inspect the wheat, was liable for a breach of warranty as to the quality of the wheat. The bank was held to be the purchaser of the wheat and therefore a successor to the liabilities as well as the rights of the consignor.

A resolution was adopted asking the Legislature to relieve the banks of liability in such cases.

Various topics relating to practical banking were discussed in an interesting and profitable manner. Charles F. Smith, Cashier of the First National Bank, McGregor, presented a plan for clearing country checks, which was very favorably received. He showed that such a plan as proposed would greatly reduce the expense of handling these items without diminishing the profits.

Officers were elected as follows: President, John M. Hefley, President First National Bank, Cameron; secretary, J. W. Butler, Cashier Farmers and Merchants' Bank, Clifton.

—The bankers of the Second District met at San Antonio, January 18. B. W. Klipstein, Cashier First National Bank, Beeville, was elected chairman.

—Over thirty members attended the meeting of the Fifth District at Dallas, January 18. There was a profitable discussion of practical banking affairs. D. E. Waggoner, Cashier of the First National Bank, Ladonia, presided, and E. O. Tenison, Cashier of the City National Bank, Dallas, acted as secretary.

**A Prosperous Georgia Bank.**—At a recent meeting of the board of directors of the Bank of Wrightsville, Ga., a dividend of eight per cent. was declared and eleven per cent. carried to surplus. H. E. Cook is now Vice-President and also a director of this bank, succeeding Dr. J. M. Page, resigned.

**Nashville, Tenn.**—The American National Bank is again occupying its own building, which was seriously damaged by fire some months ago. Every requirement of safety, convenience and elegance has been met in the rebuilt structure.

**Norfolk, Va.**—At a meeting of the board of directors of the Norfolk National Bank on January 18, J. G. Womble having declined a re-election as President, on account of the state of his health and the necessity for giving his private affairs more attention, Caldwell Hardy, the Cashier, was unanimously elected President. Mr. Hardy is a member of the executive council of the American Bankers' Association, and is a banker of long and successful experience, fully capable of directing the affairs of this important institution. The vacancy in the position of Cashier occasioned by Mr. Hardy's advancement will not be filled at present.

#### WESTERN STATES.

**St. Louis, Mo.**—The State Bank and the Commercial Bank have been consolidated, and reorganized as the State National Bank. Both banks are exceptionally strong, and consolidated they will make a formidable corporation, with \$2,400,000 capital and surplus. Mr. Charles Parsons will continue to be President, which is a guaranty of excellent management. The other officers are: W. Nichols, Vice-President; J. H. McLuney, Second Vice-President; Logan Tompkins, Cashier; A. P. Coombe, Assistant Cashier; C. I. Cone, Second Assistant Cashier.

—A meeting of the executive committee of the Missouri Bankers' Association was held here on January 19. After discussing a number of questions of interest to the bankers of the State, a dinner was given at the Planters'. The next annual convention of the association will be held in Kansas City in May.

**Chicago.**—There has been a very noticeable gain in the deposits of Savings Banks in the past year, and the number of new accounts opened last month was larger than at the beginning of any year for a long time past. It is believed that the number of people employed as wage earners is also much greater than in any recent year.

—J. C. Welling was recently elected a director of the Illinois Trust and Savings Bank.

—It is reported that the West Side Bank has been consolidated with the Metropolitan National.

**Decatur, Ill.**—At the recent annual meeting of the Citizens' National Bank, Milton Johnson resigned as President and was succeeded by Henry Shlaudeman, a well-known and successful business man. A considerable increase in deposits is reported during the past year.

**Detroit, Mich.**—At the annual meeting of the Union National Bank the report of business done for the past year showed an increase of \$353,232. The payment of dividends was resumed, and a considerable sum added to surplus and profits.



—The First National Bank has added two Assistant Cashiers to its official staff—A. B. Clark and Frank G. Smith. The latter is but twenty-seven years of age, and is said to be the youngest bank official in the city.

**Colorado's Mineral Production.**—The "Western Miner and Financier," published at Denver, gives the following as the output of the smelters of Colorado in 1898, also comparisons with the two previous years:

	1898.	1897.	1896.
Gold.....	\$25,723,384	\$19,572,137	\$17,512,285
Silver.....	15,899,940	12,142,425	14,787,180
Lead.....	4,394,917	2,062,313	2,887,100
Copper.....	1,831,500	1,131,725	908,590
Total.....	\$47,849,791	\$35,798,600	\$36,095,243

**Louisville, Ky.**—The Louisville Banking Co., a bank widely known throughout the South, has left the State system, after a business of thirty-two years under this form of organization and has gone into the National system under the name of the Louisville National Banking Co., reducing its capital to \$250,000. The reasons for this change were, first, that the charter had run out and a new one could not be had with the same advantages as the old one, and, second, the heavy taxes now imposed on banks in the State of Kentucky and the difficulty of keeping funds profitably employed, made it advisable to reduce the capital.

**Ohio Bank Reorganized.**—The American National Bank, Lima, Ohio, which was mysteriously robbed some time ago, has been reorganized with the following officers: President, Theo. Mayo; Vice-President, Gus Kalb; Cashier, F. A. Holland. Mr. Kalb, who holds \$37,000 of the stock, was formerly Cashier, but resigned recently, as did the former President and Vice-President. Reflections were made upon the officers and their resignations followed. It is generally conceded that the only reason for connecting the officers with the disappearance of the money (\$18,170) was on the theory that it could be explained in no other way, and that there is no substantial ground for believing that they had anything to do with it. The loss has been made good by assessment, and by taking a small sum from undivided earnings, and the bank's capital is unimpaired. Its loans are reported, on good authority, to be widely distributed and well placed.

**Kansas City, Mo.**—It is reported that the Bank of H. S. Mills & Co. has changed its title to the Western Exchange Bank.

—Persons engaged in promoting the organization of the Planters' Bank here were recently placed under arrest at the instance of the State banking authorities on the ground that the bank was being fraudulently organized.

**Muskegon, Mich.**—The four banks here recently gave notice that hereafter they would pay interest at the rate of  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. on deposits remaining for six months.

**Schuyler, Nebr.**—The Banking House of F. Folda reports a considerable increase in deposits during the past year. In the volume of its business the following increase is shown for the years 1896, 1897 and 1898, respectively: \$1,427,939, \$1,898,678 and \$2,111,836.

**Bank Will Reorganize.**—A reorganization of the Citizens' Bank, of Bedford, Ind., is reported. It will become the Citizens' National Bank, the capital remaining \$50,000 as at present.

**To Permit Branch Banks.**—A bill has been introduced into the Minnesota Senate authorizing banks with \$1,000,000 capital and over to establish branches.

**Michigan Banks Consolidate.**—On January 21 the First National Bank and the Bank of Saginaw, Mich., merged their business. Under the consolidation the Bank of Saginaw will have \$200,000 capital and \$107,000 surplus and profits. Hon. A. W. Wright, of Alma, Mich., will be President. The bank will have offices on both the East and West sides of the city.

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—A satisfactory exhibit is made by the first annual report of the American Trust Co., which has total deposits of \$1,075,747. While the institution is managed very conservatively, it has made quite substantial gains in the volume of its business, especially during the past three months.

**Quincy, Ill.**—Geo. F. Jasper, who was for twenty-eight years connected with the First National Bank, and Assistant Cashier of the State Savings, Loan and Trust Co. since the consolidation of these two institutions, was recently elected Cashier of the Quincy National Bank. He is one of the best known and most popular bankers of the city.

**Des Moines, Ia.**—The Bankers' Iowa State Bank has been consolidated with the Des Moines Savings Bank, under the latter title. Capital and officers of this institution will not be changed, with the exception of the addition of some of the State Bank's directors to the board of the consolidated bank.

**A Money-Making Bank.**—At the annual election of the Potter's National Bank, East Liverpool, Ohio, F. D. Kitchel, the Cashier, resigned on account of ill health and R. W. Paterson, Assistant Cashier, was promoted as his successor.

Mr. Kitchel is the pioneer banker of East Liverpool. In 1870 he opened the first bank in the place, and in 1874 he started the First National, and in August, 1881, started the Potter's National. During the seventeen years of his management of the latter institution it has earned on the original capital of \$50,000, free of taxes and expenses, the handsome sum of \$170,000.

**Milwaukee, Wis.**—Geo. W. Strohmeyer succeeds J. D. Insbuch as President of the Milwaukee National Bank, the latter retiring because of advancing years. Mr. Strohmeyer, who was Cashier at the time of his promotion to the presidency, has been with the bank for twenty-six years, having entered its service as bookkeeper. He is now one of the heaviest stockholders of the bank. Wm. F. Filter, for the past five years Assistant Cashier, succeeds Mr. Strohmeyer as Cashier and John F. Strohmeyer becomes Assistant Cashier, also succeeding Mr. Insbuch as a director.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Production of Metals.**—The annual report made by John J. Valentine, President of Messrs. Wells, Fargo & Co., on the production of precious metals for 1898 in the States and Territories west of the Missouri River (including British Columbia and Northwest Territory) shows in the aggregate: "Gold, \$78,461,202; silver, \$39,018,566; copper, \$48,200,648; lead, \$13,844,251; total gross result, \$177,022,666. The value at which the several metals named have been estimated is: Silver, 58 cts. per oz.; copper, 12 cts. per lb.; and lead, \$3.65 per cwt.

The year's combined product of the metals named is the greatest in the history of the countries—United States of America and British Columbia and Northwest Territory—that of gold, \$78,461,202, being above any previous record officially reported; and the world's output of gold for 1898—approximately \$280,000,000—is amazing. The most notable increases have been in South Africa, \$25,000,000; the British Possessions of the Northwest, \$6,000,000; Australasia, \$6,000,000, and the United States of America, \$3,000,000."

**Portland, Ore.**—The city of Portland, Oregon, was on January 17, 1893, approved as a reserve city, under the provisions of the Act of Congress, entitled, "An Act to provide for additional reserve and central reserve cities," approved March 3, 1887.

**Pasadena, Cal.**—Both the National banks held their annual meetings on January 11, and made satisfactory showings of the business done in the past year.

The directors of the Pasadena National passed a vote of thanks to the officers of the bank for their careful and successful management, and re-elected them as a further expression of confidence.

—The report of the First National Bank showed a total of \$31,000,000 of business handled by the institution during the year 1898. This being an increase of \$2,000,000 over the business of 1897. G. D. Patten was elected to fill the vacancy in the directorship made vacant by the death of Major George H. Bonebrake; all the other officers being re-elected.

**Tacoma, Wash.**—At the annual meeting of the stockholders of the Pacific National Bank it was voted to reduce the capital from \$400,000 to \$300,000. W. M. Ladd, of the banking firm of Ladd & Tilton, Portland, Oregon, was elected President.

**Rawlins, Wyo.**—A controlling interest in the First National Bank has been acquired by Cosgriff Bros., and officers chosen as follows: President, Thomas A. Cosgriff; Vice-President, James E. Cosgriff; Cashier, J. M. Rumsey.

—The Rawlins State Bank is a new institution here.

### CANADA.

**Increase of Capital.**—Application has been made by the Merchants' Bank, of Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, for an increase of capital from \$200,000 to \$500,000.

**Montreal.**—A meeting of the depositors of La Banque du Peuple was held here on January 25. The statement of the condition of the failed institution showed that the assets are about \$935,000 less than the liabilities. An agreement was adopted to accept forty-five cents on the dollar for the remainder due depositors.

—The bankers' section of the Montreal Board of Trade met in this city recently. Reports read at the meeting showed a falling off in the number of failures, and a revival of trade in Montreal, the bank clearings for 1898 showing a gain of twenty-one per cent. over 1897.

The clearings in all Canada for 1898 reached the total of \$1,890,019,344 against \$1,174,710,345 in 1897, an increase of \$215,000,000—by far the largest in the history of the country.

## FAILURES, SUSPENSIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS.

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**California.**—The Union Savings Bank, of San Jose, suspended on January 31. Reports state that \$300,000 was loaned to one fruit dealer, and that this amount is poorly secured. It is estimated that the shareholders will have to be assessed about \$30 per share to pay the depositors. The capital of the bank was \$300,000 and the deposits over \$700,000.

**Connecticut.**—Receivers of the banking firm of G. S. Parsons & Co., Waterbury, report liabilities, mostly deposits, amounting to \$275,000, and assets only about \$104,000.

**Illinois.**—Affairs of the National Bank of Illinois, Chicago, which failed some time ago, are reported hopeful for depositors. Seventy per cent. has been paid so far, and there are assets on hand amounting to \$4,364,000 to pay the \$3,371,000 remaining claims.

**Kansas.**—On January 31 the First National Bank, of Russell, suspended; the President, Charles A. Wolcott, is reported missing, and his accounts are said to be short a large amount.

**Missouri.**—The Citizens' State Bank, of Mountain Grove, assigned to E. H. Stewart January 3.

**North Carolina.**—Upon the application of some of its stockholders the Bank of Guilford, at Greensboro, was placed in the hands of J. S. Cox, Receiver, January 4. It is said that the action was taken for the purpose of putting the bank in voluntary liquidation.

**Ohio.**—Stockholders of the First National Bank, of Lisbon, which failed last October, have been assessed \$100 a share.

**Texas.**—The City Bank of Sherman, which assigned some months ago, has paid all its indebtedness, and the remaining assets have been turned over to the officers of the bank.

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**New Counterfeit \$20 Silver Certificate.**—Series 1891, check letter B; J. Fount Tillman, Register; D. N. Morgan, Treasurer; portrait of Manning; small scalloped seal. A poorly executed photo-etched production, printed on two pieces of paper, between which coarse silk threads have been distributed. Its resemblance to the genuine is so remote that a more detailed description of it is deemed unnecessary.

**New Counterfeit \$1 Silver Certificate.**—Series of 1896, check letter C, plate number 34; B. K. Bruce, Register; Ellis H. Roberts, Treasurer; small red seal, No. 41222303. This counterfeit is apparently printed from photo-etched plates on heavy bond paper. No attempt has been made to imitate the silk fiber. The Treasury number has been traced over with blue writing fluid, and readily blurs when dampened, as does the red coloring applied to the seal. The note is badly printed, blotchy, with ink of poor quality, the face of the note being coal black instead of gray black as in the genuine, and the back, light, faded green. All of the fine lines are lost in the printing of the counterfeit. It is calculated to deceive only the most careless handlers of money.

**New Counterfeit \$10 Treasury Note.**—Series of 1891, check letter A, plate number 2; J. Fount Tillman, Register; D. N. Morgan, Treasurer; portrait of Sheridan. This counterfeit is printed from wood-cut plates of crude workmanship, on two pieces of paper, between which silk threads have been distributed, and its general appearance is so bad as not to justify a detailed description. These notes first appeared in Louisiana, and a number of them were captured from one Dave J. Collins, who was arrested at Robeline, La., for circulating them.

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**Increasing Supply of Gold.**—Director of the Mint George E. Roberts has an important article in the February "Forum" on "The Increasing Supply of Gold." Mr. Roberts claims that the combined output of gold and silver (less the amount consumed in the industries and arts) was \$318,567,876 in 1896; whereas in 1900 the output of gold alone will reach \$350,000,000 or \$400,000,000. He asks, Will Mr. Bryan, when he comes into the field in 1900, go on affirming that the supply of money has been cut in two, or will he embrace the opportunity gracefully to drop the subject on the plea that the end he desired is accomplished.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

- 5166—Perkiomen National Bank, East Greenville, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$60,000.  
5167—First National Bank, Mishawaka, Indiana. Capital, \$50,000.  
5168—City National Bank, Greensboro, North Carolina. Capital, \$200,000.  
5169—National Bank of Commerce, Wichita, Kansas. Capital, \$100,000.  
5170—Rochester National Bank, Rochester, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5171—First National Bank, Tulsa, Indian Territory. Capital, \$50,000.  
5172—State National Bank, St. Louis, Missouri. Capital, \$2,000,000.  
5173—Citizens' National Bank, Bedford, Indiana. Capital, \$50,000.  
5174—City National Bank, Buffalo, New York. Capital, \$300,000.  
5175—Uvalde National Bank, Uvalde, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

- First National Bank, Addison, New York; by Lattimer & Winton, *et al.*  
National Bank of Commerce, Hattiesburg, Mississippi; by F. J. Foote, *et al.*  
Citizens' National Bank, Alton, Illinois; by John McGinnis, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Scio, Ohio; by W. L. Hogue, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Rockwell City, Iowa; by E. H. Rich, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALASKA.

SKAGWAY—Canadian Bank of Commerce.

#### ARKANSAS.

HARDY—Sharp County Bank; Pres., Carl D. Foster.

#### CALIFORNIA.

SAN FRANCISCO—Pacific Trust Co.; organizing.

#### CONNECTICUT.

MANCHESTER—Manchester Trust and Safe Deposit Co.

NEW HARTFORD—New Hartford Savings Bank.

SEYMOUR—Seymour Savings Bank.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

ANACOSTIA—Anacostia Bank (successors to A. M. Green & Co.).

#### GEORGIA.

DOULAS—Union Banking Co.; capital, \$18,000; Pres., J. J. Lewis; Cas., C. E. Baker.

#### ILLINOIS.

FULTON—Fulton Bank (successor to T. A. Hardin & Co.); capital, \$20,000; T. B. Ingwerson, Manager.

HINDSBORO—State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Solomon Dorman; Cas., F. T. Hanks.

PROPHETSTOWN—Citizens' Bank; Cas., Chas. J. Warner.

VICTORIA—Bank of Victoria; Pres., O. P. Stoddard; Vice-Pres., Dwyer Ford; Cas., Geo. D. Palmer; Asst. Cas., B. S. Peck.

#### INDIANA.

ALBION—Farmers' Bank (Strauss, Ackerman & Co.); capital, \$50,000.

BEDFORD—Citizens' National Bank (successor to Citizens' Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Alfred C. Voris; Cas., Jos. R. Voris.

DALEVILLE—Cranor's Bank (successor to Farmers and Merchants' Bank); capital, \$10,000; Cas., John M. Cranor.

MILAN—State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., S. B. Knowlton; Cas., E. H. Shockley.

MISHAWAKA—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Martin V. Beiger; Vice-Pres., Jas. A. Roper; Cas., Willis L. Kimball.

NASHVILLE—Joseph Cook.

PENDLETON—Bank of Pendleton; Pres., E. P. Rogers; Cas., Andrew Smith.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

TULSA—First National Bank (successor to Tulsa Banking Co.); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Oliver Bagby; Cas., B. F. Colley.

#### IOWA.

ARION—Bank of Arion (J. L. Maurer).

CHATSWORTH—Akron Savings Bank Co.

PILOT MOUND—Pilot Mound Bank; Pres., Mahlon Head; Cas., J. H. Roberts; Asst. Cas., C. P. Walker.

PLEASANTON—Bank of Pleasanton; Pres., R. Richardson; Cas., Mark M. Shaw.

TRIPOLI—German Savings Bank; capital,

\$10,000; Pres., H. J. Wynhoff; Vice-Pres., W. H. Notadorf; Cas., Theodore Pockels.  
**VAN METER**—Van Meter Bank; organizing.  
**WORTHINGTON**—Bank of Worthington; capital, \$10,000; Pres., W. Lattner; Vice-Pres., S. B. Lattner; Cas., Jos. A. Lattner.  
**YALE**—Yale Savings Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., Charles Yale; Vice-Pres., John W. Foster; Cas., L. M. Swindler.

**KANSAS.**

**IRVING**—Taber's State Bank; Cas., I. S. Taber.  
**MORAN**—Moran State Bank.  
**WICHITA**—National Bank of Commerce (successor to Bank of Commerce); capital, \$100,000; Pres., A. C. Jobes; Vice-Pres., J. H. Black; Cas., C. W. Carey; Asst. Cas., F. A. Russell.

**LOUISIANA.**

**PLAQUEMINE**—People's Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., James E. Dunlap; Vice-Pres., Louis Bluestone; Cas., C. A. Barker, Jr.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—Continental Trust Co.; capital, \$2,000,000; Pres., S. D. Warfield; Vice-Pres., Wm. A. Marburg; Sec. and Treas., F. C. Dryer.—Riordon, Evans & Co., Bankers.—Farmers and Planters' Loan and Trust Co.; organizing; capital, \$2,500,000.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**BOSTON**—Federal Trust Co.; capital, \$500,000; Pres., Jos. H. O'Neill.  
**NORTHAMPTON**—Nonotuck Savings Bank.

**MICHIGAN.**

**COVERT**—Bank of Covert (C. J. Monroe, Sons & Co.).  
**HARBOR SPRINGS**—Harbor Spring Exchange Bank; Pres., J. P. Southard; Cas., A. L. Southard.  
**QUINCY**—Quincy State Savings Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., F. A. Rothlisberger; Vice-Pres., H. W. Whitmore; Cas., M. S. Segur.  
**WALDRON**—Bank of Waldron (Charles Brandes); capital, \$10,000.  
**WHITEHALL**—O'Donald & Morton (successors to Muskegon County Bank).

**MINNESOTA.**

**BEMIDJI**—Merchants' Bank; Pres., J. D. Merlin; Cas., F. W. Rhoda.  
**CAMPBELL**—State Bank.  
**NORTH BRANCH**—Security Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., H. O. Herreid; Cas., F. N. Herreid.  
**SWANVILLE**—Bank of Swanville; capital, \$6,000; Cas., Wm. Siems; Asst. Cas., B. Siems.

**MISSOURI.**

**KANSAS CITY**—Western Exchange Bank (successor to Bank of H. S. Mills).  
**St. LOUIS**—State National Bank (successor to State Bank and Commercial Bank, con-

solidated); capital, \$2,000,000; Pres., Charles Parsons; Vice-Pres., William Nichols; 2d Vice-Pres., J. H. McCluney; Cas., Logan Tompkins; Asst. Cas., A. P. Coombe; 2d Asst. Cas., C. S. Cone.  
**WINIGAN**—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$7,000; Cas., I. B. Campbell.

**NEBRASKA.**

**BEAVER CITY**—First State Bank (successor to First National Bank); capital, \$20,000; Pres., T. M. Davis; Cas., C. E. V. Smith.  
**NEWPORT**—Rock County State Bank; capital, \$5,000.  
**PLATTE CENTER**—Platte County Bank (successor to Farmers and Merchants' Bank); capital, \$10,000; Pres., R. S. Dickinson; Cas., C. M. Gruenther.

**NEW YORK.**

**BUFFALO**—City National Bank (successor to City Bank; capital, \$300,000; Pres., William C. Cornwell; Cas., John R. Boag.  
**CINCINNATUS**—Bank of Cincinnatus; capital, \$25,000; Pres., B. R. Corning; Cas., Geo. A. Haskins.  
**MINOLA**—Nassau County Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., D. B. Hicks; Vice-Pres., H. M. W. Eastman; Cas., Thos. W. Albertson.  
**NEW YORK**—City Trust Co.; capital, \$1,000,000.—Talbot J. Taylor & Co.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**GREENSBORO**—City National Bank (successor to Piedmont Bank); capital, \$100,000; Pres., J. M. Walker; Vice-Pres., S. L. Trogdon; Cas., R. G. Vaughn.  
**ROCKY MOUNT**—Planters' Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., James Craig Braswell; Vice-Pres., J. M. Sherrod; Cas., W. P. Hamilton.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**KINDRED**—Norman State Bank.

**OHIO.**

**CLEVELAND**—Equity Savings and Loan Co.; capital, \$500,000; Pres., N. S. Possons; Vice-Pres., S. R. Badgley, C. H. Stewart and Geo. B. Rogers; Sec., Thomas H. Willmott; Treas., F. W. Robinson.  
**MANCHESTER**—Bank of Manchester; Pres., F. M. Harover; Cas., R. C. Henderson.—Merchants' Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.  
**TOLEDO**—Commercial and Savings Bank.

**OKLAHOMA.**

**BRAMAN**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$5,000.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**AMBLER**—Ambler Bank; Pres., Joseph Haywood; Vice-Pres., David J. Ambler; Cas., John J. Houghton.  
**ROCHESTER**—Rochester National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., James C. Mitchell; Vice-Pres., Wm. J. Mellon; Cas., Joseph C. Campbell.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**FAIRVIEW**—Bank of Fairview; Cas., Theo. Thompson.

## TENNESSEE.

**DAYTON**—Tennessee Valley Bank.  
**NASHVILLE**—Thomas W. Wrenne & Co.; Cas., David P. Wrenne.  
**TIPPONVILLE**—Farmers & Merchants' Bank; capital, \$12,000; Pres., J. T. Burnett; Cas., J. L. Peacock; Asst. Cas., L. Donaldson, Jr.

## TEXAS.

**UVALDE**—Uvalde National Bank; capital,

## CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

## ALABAMA.

**BIRMINGHAM**—Berney National Bank; H. L. Badham, Cas. in place of J. H. Barr; Wm. H. Sims elected director.—Birmingham Trust and Savings Co.; James Bowron elected director.  
**EUFULA**—East Alabama National Bank; G. A. Beauchamp, Cas. in place of J. L. Fitta.  
**FLORENCE**—First National Bank; J. Fred Johnson, Asst. Cas.  
**HUNTSVILLE**—First National Bank; W. H. Echols, Pres. in place of J. R. Stevens; A. S. Fletcher, Vice-Pres. in place of W. H. Echols.  
**MONTGOMERY**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Jno. C. O'Connell.  
**OPELIKA**—First National Bank; capital stock increased from \$75,000 to \$100,000; N. P. Renfro, Pres. in place of F. M. Renfro; F. M. Renfro, Vice-Pres. in place of N. P. Renfro.  
**TUSCALOOSA**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of N. P. Marlowe.

## ARKANSAS.

**PARAGOULD**—Bank of Paragould; W. H. Jones, Pres. in place of C. Wall.  
**PINE BLUFF**—Bank of Pine Bluff; John M. Gracie, Pres.

## CALIFORNIA.

**FRESNO**—Fresno National Bank; C. Allison Telfer, Cas. in place of A. A. Smith; C. A. Murdock, Asst. Cas.  
**OAKLAND**—Union National Bank; Edson F. Adams, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Martin; no Second Vice-Pres.  
**POMONA**—People's Bank; Charles M. Stone, Cas. in place of John H. Dole, deceased.  
**SACRAMENTO**—Farmers and Mechanics' Savings Bank; C. H. Cummings, Cas.  
**SANTA BARBARA**—First National Bank; Henry F. Spencer, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Martin; no Second Vice-Pres.  
**SANTA ROSA**—Savings Bank of Santa Rosa; John P. Overton, Pres.; Chas. A. Hoffer, Cas.; James R. Edwards, Asst. Cas.

## COLORADO.

**BOULDER**—Boulder National Bank; J. S. Switzer, Vice-Pres. in place of H. N. Bradley.  
**COLORADO SPRINGS**—Exchange National Bank; W. K. Barnes elected an additional Vice-Pres.

\$50,000; Pres., W. W. Collier; Cas., W. P. Dermody.

## CANADA.

## ONTARIO.

**HAMILTON**—Imperial Bank of Canada; F. S. Glassco, Mgr.  
**WATFORD**—Merchant's Bank of Canada; F. A. Mann, Mgr.

## QUEBEC.

**LACHUTE**—Bank of Ottawa.

**TRINIDAD**—First National Bank; Frank G. Bloom, Vice-Pres. in place of D. A. Chapell.

## CONNECTICUT.

**DEEP RIVER**—Deep River Savings Bank; Milton Pratt, Pres. in place of Asa E. Shaller, deceased.  
**HARTFORD**—Hartford National Bank; H. W. Stevens, Vice-Pres.—Connecticut River Banking Co.; A. F. Eggleston, W. H. Watrous and E. O. Weeks, elected directors.  
**NEW HAVEN**—Second National Bank; Samuel Hemingway, Pres. in place of A. D. Osborne; A. D. Osborne, Vice-Pres. in place of Samuel Hemingway.  
**NORWICH**—First National Bank; Lewis A. Hyde, Vice-Pres. in place of Henry W. Tibbits; Franklin S. Jerome, Cas. in place of Lewis A. Hyde.—Uncas National Bank; W. N. Blackstone, Pres. in place of J. M. Johnson, deceased; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. N. Blackstone.  
**PAWCATUCK**—Pawcatuck National Bank; Peleg S. Barber, Pres. in place of Peleg Clarke; J. D. Davis, Vice-Pres.  
**PUTNAM**—Thompson National Bank; Albert Putnam, Pres. in place of Geo. H. Nichols; W. H. Putnam, Cas. in place of Charles Arnold.  
**STAFFORD SPRINGS**—First National Bank; E. C. Dennis, Vice-Pres.; R. M. Fisk, Asst. Cas. in place of E. C. Dennis.  
**SUFFIELD**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas.

## DELAWARE.

**SEAFORD**—Sussex National Bank; Newell Ball, Vice-Pres. in place of W. H. Stevens.

## DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

**WASHINGTON**—Citizens' National Bank; C. H. Rudolph, elected director in place of J. M. Wilson.

## FLORIDA.

**PENSACOLA**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. K. Hyer, Jr.

## GEORGIA.

**ATLANTA**—Atlanta National Bank; H. R. Bloodworth, Asst. Cas. in place of B. O. Kennedy, deceased.  
**AUGUSTA**—Planters' Loan and Savings Bank;

Geo. H. Howard and Thomas Philpot elected directors.

**DUBLIN**—Dublin Banking Co. (reorganized as State institution); R. C. Henry, Pres. in place of J. H. Williams.

**ELBERTON**—Bank of Elberton; W. O. Jones, Pres. in place of McAlpine Arnold.

**MCRAE**—Merchants' Bank; B. Olin Pharr, Cas. in place of L. L. Campbell.

**SAVANNAH**—Merchants' National Bank; S. Guckenheimer, Pres. in place of S. P. Hamilton; J. A. G. Carson, Vice-Pres. in place of S. Guckenheimer.

**WRIGHTSVILLE**—Bank of Wrightsville; H. E. Cook, Vice-Pres. in place of J. M. Page, resigned.

**IDAHO.**

**LEWISTON**—Lewiston National Bank; W. F. Kettenbach, Pres. in place of D. M. White; no Asst. Cas.

**WALLACE**—First National Bank; M. J. Flohr, Cas. in place of H. M. Davenport; no Asst. Cas. in place of M. J. Flohr.

**ILLINOIS.**

**AUBORA**—Old Second National Bank; Lee N. Goodwin, Cas. in place of F. B. Watson; no Asst. Cas. G. A. Bowdish, Asst. Cas. in place of Lee N. Goodwin.

**CARMI**—First National Bank; W. G. Boyer, Asst. Cas.

**CHICAGO**—Western State Bank; Andrew Peterson, Pres., deceased.—Bankers National Bank; S. H. Bussey, elected director.—Illinois Trust and Savings Bank; J. C. Welling, elected director in place of J. Ogden Armour.—Royal Trust Co.; Chas. C. Reed, Cas.—West Side Bank; reported consolidated with Metropolitan National Bank.

**DECATUR**—Citizens' National Bank; Henry Shlaudeman, Pres. in place of Milton Johnson.

**DELA VAN**—Tazewell County National Bank; James N. Hall, Vice-Pres. in place of Ira B. Hall; Daniel Crabb, Cas. in place of James N. Hall.

**DIXON**—Dixon National Bank; S. S. Dodge, Vice-Pres.

**EFFINGHAM**—First National Bank; L. Burrell, Pres. in place of Jo. Partridge; Geo. M. Le Crone, Vice-Pres. in place of J. Partridge, Jr.

**FLORA**—First National Bank; Seth T. Hinkley, Vice-Pres. in place of Edward H. Hawkins.

**FREEPORT**—Second National Bank; Alfred H. Wiza, Vice-Pres. in place of M. V. B. Elson.

**HOOPERSTON**—First National Bank; R. H. Le Vin, Asst. Cas. in place of O. P. Chamberlin.

**JERSEYVILLE**—National Bank of Jerseyville; D. J. Murphy, Cas. in place of Edward Cross.

**KANKAKEE**—First National Bank; M. A. Barton, Vice-Pres. in place of H. C. Clarke.

**KEWANEE**—Kewanee National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Ray O. Becker.—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of F. P. Hoffrichter.

**LA GRANGE**—La Grange State Bank; D. D. Dickinson, Pres.; C. L. Sackett, Vice-Pres.; C. W. Northrup, Cas.

**LANARK**—First National Bank; E. C. Franck, Asst. Cas.

**MURPHYSBORO**—City National Bank; P. M. Post, Vice-Pres. in place of J. D. Peters.

**NOKOMIS**—Nokomis National Bank; J. P. Manning, Asst. Cas.

**OLNEY**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Charles Schults.

**PEORIA**—Peoria Savings, Loan and Trust Co.; Benjamin Warren, Jr., elected director in place of H. H. Hammond.

**PERU**—Peru State Bank; A. Hoas, Cas.; Otto J. Lockie, Asst. Cas.

**PONTIAC**—National Bank of Pontiac; O. P. Bourland, Pres. in place of J. E. Morrow, deceased; S. E. Holtzman, Vice-Pres. in place of O. P. Bourland.

**QUINCY**—Quincy National Bank; Geo. F. Jasper, Cas.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Farmers' National Bank; Titus Sudduth, Pres. in place of Ben F. Caldwell; Samuel J. Stolt, Second Vice-Pres. in place of Titus Sudduth.

**STREATOR**—Union National Bank; L. H. Plumb, Pres. in place of L. Swift; S. W. Plumb, Vice-Pres. in place of L. H. Plumb.

**URBANA**—First National Bank; Francis M. Wright, Pres. in place of P. Richards; Andrew F. Fay, Vice-Pres. in place of Francis M. Wright.

#### INDIANA.

**COVINGTON**—Covington Banking Co.; Michael Mayer, Sr., Pres. in place of P. M. Layton, deceased.

**DECATUR**—Decatur National Bank; W. A. Kuebler, Vice-Pres. in place of J. B. Holt-house.

**ELKHART**—Elkhart National Bank; O. C. Hill, Vice-Pres. in place of Walter L. Gilmore.—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. A. Cook.

**EVANSVILLE**—People's Savings Bank; Frank Schwegman, Cas.

**GLENWOOD**—Mills County National Bank; A. D. French, Cas. in place of A. C. Sabin; H. A. French, Asst. Cas. in place of A. D. French.

**GOSHEN**—State Bank; C. W. Miller, Pres. in place of John H. Lesh.

**HUNTINGTON**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of B. Eisenhauer; Charles McGrew, Asst. Cas.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Marion Trust Co.; Jos. T. Elliott, Pres. in place of M. O'Connor—State Bank of Indiana; H. C. G. Bala, Vice-Pres. in place of David A. Coulter.

**LIBERTY**—Union County National Bank; Smith DuBois, Second Asst. Cas.

**SEYMOUR**—First National Bank; J. H. Andrews, Pres. in place of James L. Gardiner; Cyrus E. McCrady, Cas. in place of J. H. Andrews; no Asst. Cas in place of Cyrus E. McCrady.

**TREBE HAUTE**—National State Bank; no Cas. in place of J. R. Cunningham.—Vigo County National Bank; Fred Wagner, Asst. Cas. in place of F. T. Borgstom.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**CLAREMORE**—First National Bank; J. O. Hall, Pres. in place of W. E. Halsell.

**DUNCAN**—Merchants and Planters' Bank; B. B. Burrall, Asst. Cas.

**PURCELL**—Chickasaw National Bank; A. D. Hawk, Pres. in place of R. J. Love; L. C. Wantland, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Downward; J. W. Downward, Cas. in place of A. D. Hawk.

#### IOWA.

**BURLINGTON**—First National Bank; William Carson, Pres. in place of Wm. Carson, Jr., W. S. Schramm, Asst. Cas.

**CEDAR RAPIDS**—Merchants' National Bank; P. C. Frick, Vice-Pres. in place of John W. Henderson.

**CHARTER OAK**—First National Bank; G. N. Sweetser, Pres. in place of H. N. Moore; E. E. Springer, Cas. in place of J. G. Shumaker.

**COUNCIL BLUFFS**—First National Bank; J. D. Edmundson, Pres. in place of Lucius Wells; E. L. Shugart, Vice-Pres. in place of F. T. True; Charles R. Hannan, Cas. in place of James A. Patton; Chas. E. Walters and A. W. Rickman, Asst. Cas.—State Savings Bank; John Clausen, Pres.; John Bennett, Cas.

**CRESTON**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of A. B. Devoe, deceased.

**DAVENPORT**—Davenport National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Louis Haussen, Jr.

**DES MOINES**—Iowa National Bank; E. H. Hunter, Pres. in place of S. A. Robertson.—Bankers' Iowa State Bank and Des Moines Savings Bank; reported consolidated.

**FOREST CITY**—First National Bank; M. Jane Plummer, Vice-Pres. in place of Eugene Secor; R. C. Plummer, Cas. in place of W. O. Hanson; F. L. Wocholz, Asst. Cas. in place of R. C. Plummer.

**INDIANOLA**—First National Bank; E. D. Samson, Vice-Pres.

**KNOXVILLE**—Knoxville National Bank; E. H. Amos, Pres. in place of J. H. Auld.

**MANSION**—Bank of Manson; H. J. Griswold, Pres., deceased.

**OSAGE**—Osage National Bank; J. W. Annis, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of Albert L. Brush.

**SHENANDOAH**—First National Bank; Elbert A. Read, Cas.; J. F. Lake, Asst. Cas.

**SIDNEY**—National Bank of Sidney; J. T. Hodges, Vice-Pres.; C. A. Metelman, Asst. Cas.

**WATERLOO**—First National Bank; Charles O. Balliett, Vice-Pres.; Jno. E. S. Heath, Asst. Cas.

#### KANSAS.

**ABILENE**—Abilene National Bank; J. B. Case, Vice-Pres., in place of C. H. Pattison; no Asst. Cas., in place of E. C. Hollinger.

**ANTHONY**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas.

**ATCHISON**—Atchison National Bank; C. G. Barratt, Cas.; no Asst. Cas., in place of C. G. Barratt.

**BURLINGTON**—Burlington National Bank; D. O. Hopkins, Pres., in place of William Martindale.

**HOWARD**—First National Bank; Jas. A. Stillman, Vice-Pres., in place of T. M. Carter.

**KINGMAN**—First National Bank; H. Billings, Vice-Pres., in place of J. L. Meoroney.

**OSBERLIN**—Oberlin National Bank; no Vice-Pres., in place of Chas. H. Tilden.

**OSBORNE**—Exchange National Bank; no Vice-Pres., in place of E. F. Robinson.

**OTTAWA**—First National Bank; C. H. Estabrook, 2d Vice-Pres.; A. E. Skinner, Asst. Cas., in place of B. C. McQuesten.

**PAOLA**—People's National Bank; M. M. Fulkerson, Asst. Cas., in place of J. J. Lowe, deceased.

**SEDGWICK**—Citizens' Bank; W. M. Congdon, Jr., Pres., in place of W. M. Congdon, deceased.

**SENECA**—National Bank of Seneca; R. M. Emery, Pres., in place of Jacob E. Taylor.

**TROY**—Bank of Troy; Henry L. Boder, Cas., deceased.

#### KENTUCKY.

**DANVILLE**—Farmers' National Bank; corporate existence extended to January 21, 1919.

**LEITCHFIELD**—Grayson County Bank; capital increased to \$10,000; J. A. Bishop, Pres. in place of G. W. Long.

**LEXINGTON**—Lexington Clearing-House; J. P. Shaw, Pres.; J. Waller Rodes, Vice-Pres.—Second National Bank; D. G. Falconer, elected director in place of R. A. Thornton—Third National Bank; no Cas. in place of J. H. Shropshire.

**LONDON**—First National Bank; M. Hope, Vice-Pres., in place of J. W. Bastin.

**LOUISVILLE**—Louisville National Banking Co.; J. E. Sutcliffe, Vice-Pres.—American National Bank; C. C. Mengel, Jr., elected director in place of H. L. Williams.—Louisville City National Bank; Alfred Pirtle, elected director.—Third National Bank; Fred Bender, elected director in place of F. J. Pängst.—Louisville Trust Co.; John C. Russell and J. Ross Todd, no longer directors.—Bank of Louisville; Peyton N. Clarke, Pres., in place of M. Cary Peter.—Union National Bank; L. O. Cox,



Pres., in place of Geo. W. Swearingen; Geo. W. Swearingen, 2d Vice-Pres.; A. R. White, Cas., in place of L. O. Cox; no Asst. Cas., in place of A. R. White.

**MOREHEAD**—Bank of Morehead; L. P. V. Williams, Pres., in place of S. M. Bradley.

**OWENSBORO**—National Deposit Bank; James Weir, Pres., in place of H. B. Phillips; F. T. Gunther, Vice-Pres., in place of Wilfred Carico; C. C. Watkins, Asst. Cas.

**OWENTON**—First National Bank; G. F. Waldrop, Vice-Pres., in place of J. B. Martin.

**RICHMOND**—Richmond National Bank; J. W. Cooke, Asst. Cas.

**WINCHESTER**—Clark County National Bank; T. C. Robinson, Pres., in place of John W. Bean, deceased; D. B. Hampton, Vice-Pres., in place of T. C. Robinson.

#### LOUISIANA.

**BATON ROUGE**—First National Bank; Charles J. Reddy, Pres., in place of William Garig.

**JEAFFRETS**—Bank of Jeanerette; capital increased from \$15,000 to \$30,000.

**NEW ORLEANS**—Union National Bank; Chas. E. Allgeyer, Vice-Pres., in place of W. Mason Smith.

#### MAINE.

**OAKLAND**—Mescalouake National Bank; Geo. W. Goulding, Pres. in place of A. J. Libby; H. W. Greeley, Vice-Pres. in place of W. H. Wheeler.

**PORTLAND**—Chapman National Bank; Adam P. Leighton, elected director in place of Charles J. Chapman, deceased.

#### MARYLAND.

**ABERDEEN**—First National Bank; D. K. Pritchard, Cas. in place of R. Harry Webster.

**BALTIMORE**—Fort Avenue Savings Bank; Wm. J. Fisher, Pres. in place of Michael Cullen, deceased.—Western Nat. Bank; Derick Fahnestock, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. F. Burns, resigned.—First National Bank; Theodore Hooper, Vice-Pres. in place of Gilmor Meredith, resigned.—People's Bank; Geo. Whitelock and Jos. A. McKel-hip, elected directors in place of Benjamin F. Smith and E. A. Griffith.—Third National Bank; Charles J. Taylor and S. B. Medairy, elected directors in place of Robert H. Smith and Louis Young.—Traders' National Bank; J. Hurst Morgan, elected director in place of John K. Shaw.—Merchant's National Bank; Wm. Ingle, Asst. Cas.—National Union Bank; G. Clem Goodrich, Cas. in place of F. C. Dreyer, resigned.

**COCKEYSVILLE**—National Bank of Cockeysville; Hibbard E. Bartleson, Vice-Pres.

**EASTON**—Easton National Bank; C. C. Nickerson, Vice-Pres. in place of E. L. F. Hardcastle.

**FREDERICK**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Noah E. Kramer.—Central National Bank; Robert A. Kemp, Asst. Cas.

**POCOMOKE CITY**—Pocomoke City National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Edgar L. Lloyd.

**ROCKVILLE**—Montgomery County National Bank; G. M. Hunter, Asst. Cas. in place of John F. Byers.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**ADAMS**—Greylock National Bank; A. R. Mole, Vice-Pres. in place of J. K. Anthony.

**BOSTON**—Atlantic National Bank; Wm. B. Denison, Pres. in place of T. Quincy Browne; no Cas. in place of Wm. B. Denison; H. K. Hallett, Asst. Cas.—Colonial National Bank; Otis Shepard and Charles F. Smith, Vice-Pres.—Globe National Bank; Henry A. Tenney, Asst. Cas.—National Security Bank; Charles S. Osgood, Asst. Cas.—North End Savings Bank; Frank E. Burton, Treas. in place of Herbert C. Wells, deceased.

**BROOKLINE**—Brookline National Bank; Reuben S. Swan, Vice-Pres.; Wm. S. Kemp, Cas.

**GLOUCESTER**—Cape Ann National Bank; John L. Stanley, Pres. in place of John E. Somes; N. H. Phillips, Vice-Pres. in place of John L. Stanley.—Gloucester National Bank; Geo. Steele, Vice-Pres. in place of A. L. Burnham.—City National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of James C. Tarr.

**HARWICH**—Cape Cod National Bank; Joseph H. Cummings, Pres. in place of Edward E. Crowell; Emulous Small, Vice-Pres. in place of Levi Eldredge, deceased; Thomas H. Nickerson, Asst. Cas.

**MILLBURY**—Millbury National Bank; Samuel E. Hull, Pres. in place of H. S. Warren, deceased; no Vice-Pres. in place of Samuel E. Hull.

**NATICK**—Natick National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Leonard Winch.

**NEW BEDFORD**—Mechanics' National Bank; E. S. Brown, Cas. in place of E. W. Hervey; N. C. Hathaway, Asst. Cas.—Merchants' National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. F. Kingman.

**NEWBURYPORT**—Mechanics' National Bank; E. P. Dodge, Vice-Pres.—Merchants' National Bank; William Isley, Cas. in place of Albert W. Greenleaf; no Asst. Cas. in place of William Isley.—Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank; Moses H. Fowler, Pres.

**NORTHAMPTON**—Northampton Institution for Savings; S. D. Drury, Treas. in place of Lafayette Maltby, deceased.

**PALMER**—Palmer Savings Bank; H. G. Loomis, Pres.

**PITTSFIELD**—Third National Bank; Geo. H. Tucker, Vice-Pres. in place of Byron Weston.—Agricultural National Bank; W. Murray Crane, Pres. in place of J. L. War-riner.—Pittsfield National Bank; William W. Gamwell, Pres.; Walter F. Hawkins, Vice-Pres.

**READING**—First National Bank; B. L. Mc-Lane, Asst. Cas.

**SOUTH WYMOUTH**—First National Bank; A. B. Vining, Pres. in place of Henry B. Reed; E. B. Nevin, Vice-Pres. in place of A. B. Vining.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Springfield Institution for Savings; John B. Stebbins, Pres., deceased, also director City National Bank.—First National Bank; Peter Murray and Austin E. Smith, elected directors.—Third National Bank; G. A. Wells and A. S. Bryant, elected directors.

**SOUTHBRIDGE**—Southbridge National Bank; Geo. W. Wells, Pres. in place of Jacob Edwards; Calvin A. Paige, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. W. Wells.

**STOCKBRIDGE**—Houeatonic National Bank; D. A. Kimball, Vice-Pres.; W. A. Seymour, Asst. Cas.

**WORCESTER**—City National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. A. Williams.

#### MICHIGAN.

**ALBION**—First Nat. Bank; W. O'Donoghue, Pres. in place of J. C. Foster; Isaac L. Sibley, Vice-Pres. in place of C. W. Dalrymple.

**ALPENA**—Alpena National Bank; William H. Johnson, Vice-Pres. in place of W. L. Churohill.

**DETROIT**—Preston National Bank; I. B. Unger, Cas. in place of H. L. O'Brien; no Asst. Cas. in place of I. B. Unger.—First National Bank; Frank G. Smith elected an additional Asst. Cas.

**MEMPHIS**—Lumbermen's National Bank; S. P. Gibbs, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Wells.

**MILLINGTON**—F. E. Kealey & Co.; sold out to Carson & Ely.

**MUSKEGON**—Muskegon County Bank; H. N. Hovey, Pres. in place of J. W. Moon, deceased.

**SAGINAW**—American Commercial and Savings Bank; Hugo Weesener, Cas. in place of W. G. Emerick.—First National Bank and Bank of Saginaw; consolidated.

**STURGIS**—National Bank of Sturgis; James Thornton, Vice-Pres. in place of Chas. A. Sturgis.

#### MINNESOTA.

**BARNESVILLE**—First National Bank; S. O. Solum, Asst. Cas.

**ELBOW LAKE**—Bank of Elbow Lake; Thor. Thorson, Asst. Cas.

**FARIBAULT**—Citizens' National Bank; F. A. Berry, Vice-Pres. in place of L. R. Weld.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Swedish-American National Bank; no second Vice-Pres.; office discontinued.—Nicollet National Bank; J. F. R. Foss, Pres. in the place of H. W. Brown; A. T. Rand, Vice-Pres. in place of J. F. R. Foss.

**NEW ULM**—Brown County Bank; Fred Pfaender, Cas. in place of F. H. Krook.

**SHAKOPEE**—First National Bank; Theodore Welland, Asst. Cas.

**ST. PAUL**—Union Bank; E. H. Paget, elected director.

**STILLWATER**—Lumbermen's National Bank; no Pres. in place of Isaac Staples, deceased; David Bronson, Vice-Pres. in place of H. F. Hersey.

**SAUK CENTRE**—First National Bank; Wm. O. P. Hinsdale, Vice-Pres.

**TRACY**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of L. J. Hunter.

**WINDOM**—First National Bank; Jno. Hutton, Pres. in place of A. D. Perkins, deceased; J. N. McGregor, Vice-Pres. in place of John Hutton.

**WINONA**—Second National Bank; Wm. H. Laird, Pres. in place of J. A. Prentiss; Samuel L. Prentiss, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Laird; A. W. Laird, Cas. in place of Samuel L. Prentiss; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. W. Laird.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**JACKSON**—Merchants' Bank; F. B. Neal, Asst. Cas.

**WEST POINT**—First National Bank; W. G. White, Vice-Pres. in place of T. M. Moseley.

#### MISSOURI.

**BRUNSWICK**—Chariton Co. Exchange Bank; L. H. Herring, Pres. in place of R. H. Hodge.

**JEFFERSON CITY**—Merchants' Bank; J. S. Lapeley, Pres. in place of M. R. Sinks; M. R. Sinks, Vice-Pres.

**JOPLIN**—Joplin National Bank; W. A. Campbell, Vice-Pres.

**KANSAS CITY**—Stock Yards Bank of Commerce; James A. Patten, Pres.

**ST. LOUIS**—Fourth National Bank; W. H. Dittmann, Vice-Pres.; J. D. Goldman, Second Vice-Pres.—National Bank of Commerce; J. C. Van Blaroom, Vice-Pres. in place of Nathan Cole; B. F. Edwards, Cas. in place of J. C. Van Blaroom; C. L. Merrill, Asst. Cas. in place of B. F. Edwards; no Second Asst. Cas.—Bremen Bank; J. C. Gerichten, elected director.

**UNIONVILLE**—National Bank of Unionville; D. C. Bradley, Vice-Pres. in place of J. A. Bradley.

#### MONTANA.

**HELENA**—American National Bank; N. J. Gould, Asst. Cas.

#### NEBRASKA.

**AUBURN**—Carson National Bank; J. L. Carson, Vice-Pres. in place of J. L. Carson, Jr.

**FALLS CITY**—First National Bank; J. H. Miles, Vice-Pres. in place of P. H. Jussen; P. H. Jussen, Cas. in place of J. H. Miles.

**FREMONT**—First National Bank; H. J. Lee, President in place of E. H. Barnard; Paul Colson, Vice-Pres.—Farmers and Merchants' Nat. Bank; Robert Bridge, Pres. in

- place of Otto Huetts; Arthur Gibson, Vice-Pres. in place of Robert Bridge.
- GREENWOOD**—First National Bank; A. D. Welton, Cas.
- HUMBOLDT**—First National Bank; J. S. Sneathen, Vice-Pres. in place of J. J. Morris.
- LINCOLN**—American Exchange National Bank; H. B. Evans, Asst. Cas.—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of R. C. Moore.—Columbia National Bank; J. H. Westcott, Vice-Pres. in place of F. E. Johnson.
- NEBRASKA CITY**—Merchants' National Bank; James T. Shewell, Asst. Cas.
- OAKLAND**—Wells & Trimborn; Julius Wells, Cas.
- OMAHA**—Union National Bank; J. W. Thomas, elected director in place of A. R. Dufrene.—United States National Bank; W. E. Rhoades, Asst. Cas.
- ORF**—First National Bank; O. R. Paist, Asst. Cas.
- SOUTH OMAHA**—South Omaha National Bank; Harry C. Miller, Asst. Cas.
- YORK**—City National Bank; John R. Pierson, Pres., in place of E. E. Brown; H. M. Childs, Cas., in place of John R. Pierson.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

- DOVER**—Cocbecho National Bank; Harry Hough, Asst. Cas.
- PORRMOUTH**—National Mechanics and Traders' Bank; G. Ralph Lighton, Pres., in place of Washington Freeman, deceased.
- TILTON**—Citizens' National Bank; Frank N. Parsons, Vice-Pres., in place of R. Firth, deceased.

**NEW JERSEY.**

- ASBURY PARK**—Asbury Park and Ocean Grove Bank; Walter W. Davis, Asst. Cas., resigned.
- BRIDGEFORD**—Cumberland National Bank; Daniel Bawn, Vice-Pres.
- HOBOKEN**—First National Bank; Myles Tierney, Vice-Pres.; Frank Hodson, Acting Cas., in place of W. B. Goodspeed, deceased.
- LONG BRANCH**—First National Bank; E. R. Slocum, Jr., Asst. Cas.—Citizens' Bank; Harry B. Sherman, Jr., Cas.; J. Harry Davis, Asst. Cas.
- NEWARK**—Fidelity Trust and Deposit Co.; Uzal H. McCarter, Pres., in place of Thomas T. Kinney, resigned.
- PASSAIC**—Passaic National Bank; D. Carlisle, Pres., in place of John A. Willett; Chas. M. Howe, Vice-Pres.
- PATERSON**—Paterson Savings Institution; Edward T. Bell, Vice-Pres.; Wm. R. Meakle, Asst. Sec.
- TRENTON**—Mechanics' National Bank; William M. Lanning, Pres., in place of S. P. Dunham.

**NEW MEXICO.**

- RATON**—First National Bank; John Jelfs, Vice-Pres.

**NEW YORK.**

- ALBANY**—Albany City National Bank; no Third Vice-Pres. in place of J. H. Brooks; Hugh N. Kirkland, Asst. Cas. in place of Joa. S. House.—Albany City Savings Institution; Selden E. Marvin, Pres., deceased.
- AMITYVILLE**—Bank of Amityville; Chas. O. Ireland, Cas. in place of Joel S. Davis, deceased.
- BINGHAMTON**—Chenango Valley Savings Bank; Henry Marean, Sec. and Treas. in place of John Manier.—First National Bank; Waring S. Weed, Pres.—Strong State Bank; C. M. Strong, Cas.; C. F. Gale, Asst. Cas.
- BROOKLYN**—Nassau National Bank; E. H. L. Lyman, director, deceased; Carl H. De Silver, B. T. Frothingham and Frank Lyman elected directors.—Manufacturers' National Bank; Thomas S. Cooper, elected director in place of F. D. Wurster.—National City Bank; Jno. L. Heins elected director.
- CANTON**—First National Bank; Daniel Innes, Pres.; L. T. McFadden, Cas.
- CASTLETON**—National Bank of Castleton; Le Roy S. Kellogg, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. E. Barringer.
- CATSKILL**—Tanners' National Bank; Frederick Hill, Vice-Pres., deceased.
- CHESTER**—Chester National Bank; J. D. Millspaugh, Pres. in place of Joseph Durland; Joseph Durland, Vice-Pres. in place of H. Tuthill; B. C. Durland, Cas. in place of J. D. Millspaugh; no Asst. Cas. in place of B. C. Durland.
- DUNDEE**—Dundee National Bank; G. S. Shattuck, Pres. in place of James V. Bigelow; C. M. Clark, Cas. in place of G. S. Shattuck.
- ELLENVILLE**—Home National Bank; Geo. F. Andrews, Cas. in place of Geo. H. Smith.
- FRANKLINVILLE**—Farmers' National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of James A. Turnbull.
- HAMBURG**—Bank of Hamburg; Jacob Peffer, Vice-Pres. in place of T. L. Bunting.
- HAMILTON**—National Hamilton Bank; Jno. J. Taylor, Asst. Cas.
- HOLLAND PATENT**—Bank of Holland Patent; William S. Thomas, Asst. Cas., resigned.
- HUDSON**—First National Bank; Alexander R. Benson, Asst. Cas.
- MECHANICVILLE**—Manufacturers' National Bank; Wm. L. Howland, Vice-Pres. in place of John C. Duncan.
- NEWBURGH**—National Bank of Newburgh; James Chadwick, Vice-Pres. in place of Eugene A. Brewster, deceased.
- NEW YORK**—Western National Bank; Valentine P. Snyder, Pres. in place of John E. Searles; James W. Alexander and Marcel

lus Hartley, Vice-Pres. in place of Valentine P. Snyder.—Chemical National Bank; Wm. H. Porter, Vice-Pres.; James L. Parson, Asst. Cas.—First National Bank; F. L. Hine, Vice-Pres. in place of James A. Garland; Wm. B. Reed, Cas. in place of F. L. Hine; W. G. Snow, Asst. Cas. in place of Wm. B. Reed; C. D. Backus, Asst. Cas.—National City Bank; W. H. Tappan, H. M. Kilborn, A. Kavanagh, J. A. Stillman, Asst. Cas.—Hamilton Bank; Edwin S. Schenck, Pres. in place of William S. Gray; F. B. Schenck, Vice-Pres.—Colonial Trust Co.; Roswell P. Flower, Vice-Pres. in place of Cord Meyer.—Seamen's Bank for Savings; Edward H. Lyman, Vice-Pres., deceased.—Produce Exchange Trust Co; Turner A. Beall, Pres. in place of James H. Parker.—Bowery Bank; John S. Foster, Pres. in place of Frank C. Mayhew.—R. L. Day & Co.; Wm. H. Remick, admitted to firm.—Chase National Bank; Edwin J. Stalker, Asst. Cas.—Corn Exchange Bank; David Dows, Jr., director, deceased.—National Union Bank; E. O. Leech, Vice-Pres. in place of G. G. Haven.—Astor National Bank; A. H. Stevens, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles A. Peabody, Jr.; Geo. W. Pancoast, Cas. in place of C. F. Bevins.—Leather Manufacturers' National Bank; G. W. McGarragh, Second Vice-Pres.—Knickerbocker Trust Co.; Frederick G. King, Asst. Sec. in place of J. Henry Townsend, resigned.

**POLAND**—National Bank of Poland; Malcolm A. Blue, Pres., deceased.

**RHINEBECK**—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of Wm. H. Schall.

**ROCHESTER**—Mechanics' Savings Bank; Arthur Lutchford, Sec. and Treas. in place of John H. Rochester.

**ROME**—Farmers' National Bank; corporate existence extended until January 14, 1919.

**SAG HARBOR**—Sag Harbor Savings Bank; James H. Pierson, Pres. in place of Henry P. Hedges, resigned; Edgar Wade, Treas. in place of David P. Vall; Herbert F. Nickerson, Asst. Treas.

**SALEM**—People's National Bank; B. C. Haggart, Cas. in place of R. M. Stevenson.

**SANDY HILL**—People's National Bank; Edward C. Riley, Cas.

**SKANEATELES**—Skaneateles Savings Bank; Willis Platt, First Vice-Pres. in place of W. B. Lawton, deceased; Newell Turner, Second Vice-Pres.

**SOUTHOLD**—Southold Savings Bank; John B. Terry, Pres. in place of Barnabas H. Booth.

**TARRYTOWN**—Westchester County Savings Bank; Isaac Regua, Pres. in place of Benson Ferris, deceased.

**UTICA**—Oneida County Bank; Chas. A. Butler, Pres., in place of John Milton Butler, deceased.

**WATERLOO**—First National Bank; Norman

H. Becker, Vice-Pres., in place of G. W. Williams; H. R. Becker, Cas., in place of A. H. Terwilliger; no Asst. Cas., in place of H. R. Becker.

**WATERTOWN**—Watertown Savings Bank; W. W. Taggart, Pres.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

**JAMESTOWN**—James River National Bank; C. E. Rittenhouse, Vice-Pres., in place of John S. Watson; H. T. Graves, Cas., in place of R. A. Shattuck; no Asst. Cas., in place of H. T. Graves.

#### OHIO.

**BELLFONTAINE**—Bellefontaine Nat. Bank Chas. McLaughlin, Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas., in place of Charles McLaughlin.

**BRYAN**—First National Bank; Will W. Morrison, Pres., in place of Philip Niederaur; Philip Niederaur, Vice-Pres., F. L. Niederaur, Cas., in place of Will W. Morrison; Henry Eaton, Asst. Cas., in place of F. L. Niederaur.

**BUOYBUS**—First National Bank; H. E. Valentine, Cas., in place of J. C. Gormly.

**CARDINGTON**—First National Bank; W. P. Vaughan, Cas., in place of E. J. Vaughan.

**CINCINNATI**—Fifth National Bank; T. J. Davis, Cas.; no Asst. Cas., in place of T. J. Davis.—Third National Bank; Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., elected director in place of L. A. Ault.

**CLEVELAND**—Colonial National Bank; Wm. C. Rudd, Vice-Pres.; U. G. Walker, Geo. E. Collins and J. F. Harper, elected directors.—Cleveland National Bank; F. W. Wardwell, S. H. Tolles and I. N. Topliff, elected directors.—State National Bank; Robert Wallace and Frank A. Arter, elected directors in place of B. F. Powers and Robert Blee.

**COLUMBUS**—East End Savings Bank; David Greene, Vice-Pres., and director, deceased.

**CORTLAND**—First National Bank; Charles R. Dodge, Asst. Cas.

**EAST LIVERPOOL**—Potters' National Bank; N. A. Frederick, Vice-Pres., in place of Jno. N. Taylor; R. W. Patterson, Cas., in place of F. D. Kitchel; no Asst. Cas., in place of R. W. Patterson.

**FELICITY**—First National Bank; Joseph M. Longworth, Vice-Pres., in place of W. P. South.

**LIMA**—American National Bank; Theo. Mayo, Pres. in place of Jos. Goldsmith; R. W. Thrift, Vice-Pres. in place of N. L. Michael; F. A. Holland, Cas. in place of Gus Kalb.

**LORAIN**—Lorain Savings and Banking Co.; E. F. Kaneen, Asst. Sec. and Tr.

**MARIETTA**—Citizens' National Bank; no Pres. in place of A. T. Nye, deceased.

**MASSILLON**—Union National Bank; J. H. Hunt, Pres. in place of Joseph Coleman; Joseph Coleman, Vice-Pres. in place of Edward Kachler, deceased; H. L. McLain,

Cas. in place of J. H. Hunt; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. L. McLain.

MIDDLETOWN—Merchants' National Bank; T. C. Simpson, Vice-Pres., deceased.

NEWARK—Newark Savings Bank; John Moore, Asst. Cas.

PLYMOUTH—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Philip Upp, deceased.

SIDNEY—Citizens' Bank; H. W. Thompson, Pres. in place of J. A. Lamb.

SPRINGFIELD—Springfield National Bank; Jno. Foes, Pres. in place of P. P. Mast, deceased; Charles R. Crain, Vice-Pres. in place of Jno. Foes; W. S. Rabbitta, Cas. in place of F. S. Penfield; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. S. Rabbitta.

TOLEDO—East Side Bank; L. A. Metzger, elected director in place of J. H. Crane.—Union Savings Bank; James Hodge, elected director in place of W. T. Carrington.—Ohio Savings and Trust Co.; Ira W. Shirley, Thomas A. Taylor and E. W. Newton, elected directors.—Ketcham National Bank; S. D. Carr, Pres. in place of E. L. Barber, resigned.—Merchants National Bank; Edwin Jackson, Pres. in place of M. I. Wilcox; N. H. Swayne, Vice-Pres. in place of Edwin Jackson.

WAPAKONETA—People's National Bank; Michael Brown, Vice-Pres. in place of J. H. Doering.

WARREN—First National Bank; capital stock reduced from \$150,000 to \$100,000.—Second National Bank; Washington Hyde, Vice-Pres. in place of A. R. Silliman.

WILMINGTON—Clinton County National Bank; M. R. Denver, Vice-Pres. in place of M. L. Hunt; E. J. Hiatt, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of M. R. Denver.

#### OKLAHOMA TERRITORY.

SHAWNEE—Shawnee National Bank; B. F. Hamilton, Vice-Pres. in place of J. S. Smith; H. L. Quiett, Asst. Cas.—First National Bank; C. M. Cade, Asst. Cas.

#### OREGON.

ARLINGTON—Arlington National Bank; O. D. Sturgess, Asst. Cas.

EUGENE CITY—First National Bank; L. H. Potter, Asst. Cas. in place of P. E. Snodgrass.

HEPPNER—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of S. W. Spencer.

ISLAND CITY—First National Bank; W. J. Church, Asst. Cas.

PORTLAND—First National Bank; H. W. Corbett, Pres. in place of Henry Falling, deceased; no Vice-Pres. in place of H. W. Corbett.

SALEM—Capital National Bank; J. H. Albert, Pres. in place of W. A. Cusick; Joseph H. Albert, Cas. in place of J. H. Albert; no Asst. Cas. in place of Joseph H. Albert.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

BLOSSBURG—Miners' National Bank; F. B.

Smith, Second Vice-Pres.; P. A. Manley Asst. Cas.

BURGETTSTOWN—Burgettstown National Bank; corporate existence extended until January 25, 1919.

CANTON—First National Bank; L. T. McFadden, Cas. in place of Geo. A. Guernsey; no Asst. Cas.

ERIE—Second National Bank; F. M. Wallace, Vice-Pres. in place of F. V. Kepler; C. F. Allis, Second Vice-Pres.

HANOVER—First National Bank; J. D. Zouck, Pres. in place of Vincent O. Bold; H. E. Hoke, Cas.

HAZLETON—First National Bank; H. O. Rodgers, Pres. in place of Alonzo P. Blakealee.

HUMMELSTOWN—Hummelstown National Bank; Jno. J. Nissley, Pres. in place of Jacob Shope, deceased; J. P. Nissley, Cas. in place of Jno. J. Nissley.

LEBANON—First National Bank; R. Dawson Coleman, Pres. in place of Edward R. Coleman; Edward R. Coleman, Vice-Pres. in place of R. Dawson Coleman.—Valley National Bank; Adam Rise, Pres. in place of L. E. Welmer; C. H. Killinger, Vice-Pres.

MEADVILLE—New First National Bank; W. B. Fulton, Asst. Cas.

MIDDLEBURGH—First National Bank; J. R. Kreeger, Asst. Cas.

NEWPORT—First National Bank; S. W. Seibert, Vice-Pres. in place of C. K. Smith.

PARKERSBURG—Parkersburg National Bank; John G. Latta, Pres. in place of Samuel R. Parke, deceased.

PHILADELPHIA—Market Street National Bank; Geo. H. Earle, Jr., Pres. in place of Samuel Y. Heebner.—Central National Bank; Theodore Kitchen, Pres. in place of Geo. M. Troutman; F. L. De Bow, Cas.; Wm. Post, Asst. Cas.; no Second Asst. Cas.—First National Bank; Morton McMichael, Jr., Cas. will hereafter omit Jr. from his signature.—Sixth National Bank; Wm. D. Gardner, Pres. in place of Jonathan May; Wm. S. Emley, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. D. Gardner.

PITTSBURG—United States National Bank; Caleb McCune, Vice-Pres. in place of Jasper M. Potter; William Pickersgill, Jr., director, deceased.—Germania Savings Bank; William Neeb, director, deceased.—German National Bank; resumed business.—Third National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. Sheppard.—First National Bank; Thomas Wightman, Vice-Pres. in place of Alex. Nimick, deceased.

PLYMOUTH—First National Bank; Draper Smith, Vice-Pres., deceased.

READING—Reading Trust Co.; Jos. W. Day, Sec. and Treas.

UNIONTOWN—First National Bank; F. M. Semans, Jr., Asst. Cas.

WATSONTOWN—Watsonstown National Bank;

J. P. Dentler, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Muffley.  
**WEST NEWTON**—Van Dyke, Welmer & Taylor; Robert Taylor, deceased.  
**WAYNESBORO**—Bank of Waynesboro; M. E. Sollenberger, Cas.  
**WILLIAMSPORT**—West Branch National Bank; Allan P. Perley, Pres. in place of Henry C. Parsons, deceased.  
**WILKES-BARRÉ**—Miners' Savings Bank; John Laning, Sec.  
**YORK**—Western National Bank; E. A. Rice, Cas. in place of H. L. Motter.

## RHODE ISLAND.

**PROVIDENCE**—Commercial National Bank; Isaac M. Potter, Pres. in place of Andrew Comstock; James P. Rhodes, Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas Harris, deceased.  
**WESTERLY**—National Phenix Bank; William Hoxsey, Vice-Pres.

## SOUTH CAROLINA.

**EDGEFIELD**—Farmers' Bank; A. E. Padgett, Pres. in place of A. J. Norris; J. L. Caughman, Cas., in place of A. E. Padgett; Holloway Harling, Asst. Cas. in place of J. L. Caughman.

## TENNESSEE.

**CLARKSVILLE**—Clarksville National Bank; M. C. Northington, Vice-Pres.  
**CLEVELAND**—Cleveland National Bank; John H. Craigmiles, Pres., deceased.  
**McMINNVILLE**—National Bank of McMinnville; Jesse Walling, Pres. in place of Wm. H. Magness; H. R. Walling, Cas. in place of Jesse Walling; W. J. Walling, Asst. Cas. in place of H. R. Walling.

## TEXAS.

**AUSTIN**—First National Bank; R. J. Brackenridge, Vice-Pres., in place of J. S. Myrick; W. B. Wartham, Cas. in place of R. J. Brackenridge.  
**BEEVILLE**—Commercial National Bank; Wilhugh Wilkins, Cas.  
**CLUBURNE**—Farmers and Merchants' Nat. Bank; W. K. Williamson, Asst. Cas.—National Bank of Cleburne; C. W. Mertz, Vice-Pres. in place of W. J. Hurley.  
**CLARKSVILLE**—Red River National Bank; L. C. Stiles, Vice-Pres., in place of J. H. Burks.  
**DAINGERFIELD**—National Bank of Daingerfield; J. Y. Bradfield, Pres.; J. Bradfield, Cas.; A. C. Richardson, Asst. Cas.  
**DECATUR**—First National Bank; T. B. Yarbrough, Cas.—Wise County National Bank; C. B. Beard, Asst. Cas.  
**ENNIS**—Ennis National Bank; J. L. Clarke, Asst. Cas.  
**GALVESTON**—Rosenberg's Bank; C. G. Sweet, Cas., in place of W. J. Frederick.  
**GREENVILLE**—First National Bank; J. P. Holmes, 2d Vice-Pres.; J. V. W. Holmes, Cas. in place of W. H. King; E. W. Harrison, Asst. Cas. in place of J. C. Teagarden.—Greenville National Bank

W. A. Williams, Pres.; H. W. Williams, Cas.

**HILLBORO**—Farmers' National Bank; J. S. Casey, Vice-Pres. in place of T. S. Smith; no Cas. in place of John J. Warren; W. M. Williams, Asst. Cas. in place of S. L. Howard.

**HOUSTON**—First National Bank; J. F. Scott, Asst. Cas. in place of W. E. Hertford.

**LADONIA**—First National Bank; W. E. Weldon, Pres. in place of James F. McFarland.

**LONGVIEW**—First National Bank; W. K. Eckman, Cas. in place of J. F. Womack Jr.; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. K. Eckman.

**NAVASOTA**—First National Bank; C. S. Taliaferro, Asst. Cas.

**PARIS**—Paris National Bank; S. H. Hancock, Asst. Cas.

**TAYLOR**—First National Bank; R. J. Eckhardt, Asst. Cas.

**WAXAHACHIE**—Waxahachie National Bank; J. H. Miller, Pres.; R. L. Goodloe, Cas.; Ed. Cunningham, Asst. Cas.

**WEATHERFORD**—Citizens' National Bank; C. A. Milam, Asst. Cas.

## UTAH.

**SALT LAKE CITY**—Bank of Commerce; Samuel C. Park, Cas. in place of S. H. Fields.—Utah National Bank; B. G. Raybould, Cas. in place of Addison B. Jones.—Utah Commercial and Savings Bank; Joseph E. Caine, Cas. in place of James E. Jennings.

## VERMONT.

**BRATTLEBORO**—Brattleboro Savings Bank; Broughton D. Harris, Pres., deceased.

**DANVILLE**—Caledonia National Bank; H. C. Bond, Asst. Cas.

**VERGENNES**—Farmers' National Bank; N. F. Dunshee, Pres. in place of C. W. Read.

## VIRGINIA.

**ABINGDON**—First National Bank; W. G. Preston, Vice-Pres.

**LYNCHBURG**—Lynchburg Trust and Savings Bank; James A. Ford, Vice-Pres., deceased; also director People's National Bank.

**NORFOLK**—Marine Bank; Charles Reid, director, deceased.—Norfolk Nat. Bank; Caldwell Hardy, Pres. in place of J. G. Womble; no Cas.

**RICHMOND**—Virginia Trust Co.; E. D. Christian, director, deceased.

**SALEM**—Farmers' National Bank; James Chalmers, Pres., deceased.

## WASHINGTON.

**COLTON**—First National Bank; M. E. Fitzgerald, Vice-Pres. in place of James Gilkerson.

**DAYTON**—Citizens' National Bank; G. A. Parker, Pres. in place of H. H. Wolfe; Alex Price, Vice-Pres. in place of Andrew Nilsson.

**EVERETT**—First National Bank; Albert Tozer, Vice-Pres., resigned; J. A. Swallow, Cas. in place of A. J. Westland.

**SEATTLE**—Washington National Bank; Edward Nugent, Asst. Cas. in place of Wm. Thaanum.—Dexter Horton & Co.; A. A. Denny, Pres., deceased.

**TACOMA**—National Bank of Commerce; no Vice-Pres. in place of Henry Longstreth.—Pacific National Bank; W. M. Ladd, Pres. in place of Charles P. Masterson.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**WHEELING**—Bank of the Ohio Valley; J. Howard McDonald, Asst. Cas.

**WISCONSIN.**

**BELOIT**—L. C. Hyde & Brittan; L. C. Hyde, deceased.

**MILWAUKEE**—Milwaukee National Bank; Geo. W. Strohmeier, Pres. in place of J.

D. Insbusch; W. F. Filter, Cas. in place of Geo. W. Strohmeier; John F. Strohmeier, Asst. Cas. in place of Wm. F. Filter—First National Bank; Geo. P. Miller, elected director in place of B. K. Miller, deceased.

**WYOMING.**

**RAWLINS**—First National Bank; Thomas A. Cosgriff, Pres. in place of J. W. Hugus; J. E. Cosgriff, Vice-Pres.; J. M. Rumsey, Cas. in place of J. C. Davis.

**CANADA.**

**NORTHWEST TERRITORY.**

**MOOSOMIN**—Union Bank of Canada; A. E. Christie, Manager; F. B. Neeve erroneously reported as Manager in previous issue.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.**

**CALIFORNIA.**

**SAN JOSE**—Union Savings Bank.

**DELAWARE.**

**NEW CASTLE**—Farmers' Bank of Delaware.

**IOWA.**

**BRIDGEWATER**—Adair County Savings Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**KANSAS.**

**RUSSELL**—First National Bank.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**BOSTON**—Hamilton National Bank; in voluntary liquidation Jan 10.—Manufacturers' National Bank; in voluntary liquidation Jan. 9.—Continental National Bank; in voluntary liquidation Jan. 9.

**MICHIGAN.**

**MOUNT PLEASANT**—First National Bank; Geo. Reed, Receiver in place of Charles M. Wilson.

**MISSOURI.**

**MOUNTAIN GROVE**—Citizens' State Bank; assigned to E. H. Stewart.

**KANSAS CITY**—Planters' Bank.

**ST. JOSEPH**—Central Savings Bank.

**ST. LOUIS**—St. Louis National Bank; in voluntary liquidation Jan. 17.

**NEBRASKA.**

**MADISON**—Union Valley Bank.

**NEW YORK.**

**NEW YORK**—Sixth National Bank; in voluntary liquidation Jan. 6.—Tradesmen's National Bank; in voluntary liquidation Jan. 13.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**GREENSBORO**—Bank of Gullford; in hands of J. S. Cox, Receiver, Jan. 4.

**OHIO.**

**PORTSMOUTH**—Farmers' National Bank; Noah J. Dever, Receiver in place of David Armstrong.

**TENNESSEE.**

**ROGERSVILLE**—Rogersville National Bank; in voluntary liquidation January 5.

**TEXAS.**

**GREENVILLE**—City National Bank; in voluntary liquidation December 21, 1898.

**TYLER**—Tyler National Bank; in voluntary liquidation December 31, 1898.

**UTAH.**

**PROVO CITY**—Swasey & Martin.

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$791,647,225	\$797,428,080	\$807,451,124	\$824,493,146
Gold bullion.....	133,423,574	138,502,545	142,074,889	134,186,534
Silver dollars.....	466,836,597	463,238,597	470,244,857	471,780,857
Silver bullion.....	94,875,773	93,359,250	92,192,207	91,228,953
Subsidiary silver.....	76,733,612	76,670,481	76,587,161	76,015,347
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	239,629,136	242,784,803	243,817,870	243,324,226
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,149,626,963</b>	<b>\$2,163,664,752</b>	<b>\$2,179,049,124</b>	<b>\$2,187,710,079</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

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## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

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NEW YORK, February 3, 1898.

THE MAGNITUDE OF TRANSACTIONS AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE last month was the most impressive feature of the business situation. "The public is buying" is heard on every side, and the evidence of it is found in the volume of trading at the Exchange, exceeding anything previously known. Almost daily, since January 9, the sales of stocks have exceeded 1,000,000 shares, reaching on January 28 the unparalleled total of 1,580,000 shares.

For the month of January the sales of stocks aggregated 24,000,000 shares, and of bonds \$142,000,000. The former increased over December 9,000,000 shares, and the latter \$14,000,000.

The change that has taken place in Wall Street may be appreciated by referring to records of previous years. In January, 1898, only about 9,000,000 shares of stock were traded in; in January, 1897, only 3,400,000 shares; in January, 1896, only 4,400,000 shares, and in January, 1895, 3,200,000 shares.

There were naturally under such a headway of buying most remarkable advances in prices, numerous stocks moving up ten per cent., while some of the advances were twenty and thirty per cent. and even more. There were also exceptional advances in bonds.

With the increase in business has come a large advance in the price of Stock Exchange seats. About two years ago a seat in the New York Stock Exchange was sold at about \$16,000, the highest price ever reported being \$34,000, in 1881. Last month \$31,500 was paid for one seat, \$33,000 for another, and later \$37,000 for another.

Memberships in the New York Produce Exchange have also increased in price, certificates selling last month as high as \$215, on January 25, as compared with \$185 earlier in the month. Philadelphia Stock Exchange seats have advanced from \$2,800, the price a year ago, to \$6,500, the latter price being paid on January 17. A seat in the Boston Stock Exchange now commands \$25,000 as compared with \$13,000 a year ago.

These are but surface indications of the activity that now prevails in the business and financial world. Not only are the transactions the largest but the money instruments for conducting business are in the most abundant supply. The banks never before had as great resources as now, both deposits and reserves exceeding all previous records.

The exchanges of the New York Clearing-House have been far in excess of anything before known, and have been growing from week to week. In the first week of the year they were \$1,160,000,000; in the second week \$1,252,000,000, in the third week \$1,409,000,000, and in the fourth week \$1,494,000,000. During the entire year of 1898, until November 19, the exchanges in no week equalled \$1,000,000,000. Business is evidently moving at a rapid pace, but whether it is time to fly cautionary signals does not come within the province of a mere review of happenings.

There have been advances in prices of many commercial products during the month, the most important, perhaps, being a rise of one-half cent in cotton. Advances have been recorded also in grain, provisions, iron, lead and copper.



There has been nothing to disturb the money market during the month, the large disbursements for interest and dividends early in January letting loose a new flood of money seeking investment. Some gold has come from abroad but the movement is unimportant. The rate for money in European centers is tending lower. The Bank of England on January 19 reduced its rate of discount to 3½ per cent. from 4 per cent., the rate maintained since October 13 last. On February 2 the bank again reduced its rate to 3 per cent. The Bank of Germany also made a reduction from 6 to 5 per cent. on January 17.

The iron trade is now furnishing the most emphatic evidence of improvement in the business situation. Following a year of the greatest production of pig iron in this country, the iron industry starts the present year with the largest number of furnaces in blast in nearly three years, 200 as against 188 a year ago with a weekly capacity the largest ever recorded, 243,516 tons, as compared with only 226,608 tons on January 1, 1897, and 112,782 tons on October 1, 1896.

The production of pig iron in the United States last year was the largest in the history of the industry. We show the yield semi-annually and yearly since 1888 :

	First six months.	Last six months.	Year.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
1888.....	3,061,803	3,942,039	7,003,842
1889.....	4,590,513	4,642,190	9,232,703
1890.....	3,368,107	4,911,793	8,279,900
1891.....	4,709,683	4,387,317	9,157,000
1892.....	4,562,918	2,561,584	7,124,502
1893.....	2,717,983	3,939,405	6,657,388
1894.....	4,067,553	5,358,750	9,446,303
1895.....	4,976,236	3,646,891	8,623,127
1896.....	4,408,476	5,249,204	9,657,680
1897.....	5,899,703	5,904,231	11,773,934

Not only was the output of pig iron last year the largest the United States has ever had, but it exceeds the highest total for any country in the world. During the year stocks of iron decreased nearly 460,000 tons, making the consumption 12,233,000 tons, or more than 1,000,000 tons per month.

The completed returns of our foreign trade for the month of December and for the calendar year 1898, show that our estimates last month were modestly conservative. December rolled up the extraordinary total of more than \$137,000,000 for exports, making the year's record nearly \$1,255,000,000, beating the record year 1891 by nearly \$285,000,000, the next record year, 1896, by \$250,000,000, and last year by \$155,000,000. The net imports of merchandise fell a little below \$634,000,000 or nearly \$110,000,000 below 1897. Since 1879 the only years showing so small a volume of imports were 1884 and 1885. With exports larger than ever before and imports smaller than for many years, it follows that the excess of exports over imports must have also been without parallel in the previous history of the country. This excess was \$621,000,000 last year, the previous high records being: 1897, \$357,000,000; 1896, \$324,000,000; 1878, \$305,000,000; and 1879, \$251,500,000, no other year showing an excess of as much as \$200,000,000.

The benefit gained by the farmer from the large increase in exports is evidenced in the fact that more than \$850,000,000 of our exports were the products of the farm, including breadstuffs, cotton, provisions, live animals, tobacco, fruits, etc. The total value of agricultural exports, as reported by the Bureau of Statistics, in each of the past eleven years, was as follows:

CALENDAR YEAR.	Agricultural exports.	CALENDAR YEAR.	Agricultural exports.
1888.....	\$491,381,603	1894.....	\$573,684,895
1889.....	599,507,065	1895.....	545,715,861
1890.....	623,779,597	1896.....	684,955,373
1891.....	730,069,702	1897.....	730,323,514
1892.....	712,539,832	1898.....	851,922,450
1893.....	619,136,633		

The increase in value of the principal classes of domestic products exported is shown in the following table, covering the last seven years:

	<i>Breadstuffs.</i>	<i>Cotton.</i>	<i>Provisions.</i>	<i>Cattle and hogs.</i>	<i>Mineral oils.</i>
1882.....	\$240,248,225	\$216,412,285	\$137,880,809	\$84,759,457	\$42,262,728
1883.....	182,793,364	204,096,181	132,687,109	22,510,585	41,117,814
1884.....	121,123,377	200,277,358	138,600,234	36,795,124	40,488,088
1885.....	121,571,555	186,773,249	129,080,195	25,367,448	56,224,425
1886.....	177,216,068	233,373,619	127,923,472	34,288,003	62,764,278
1887.....	243,803,550	212,523,620	139,490,117	38,735,918	59,057,547
1888.....	306,757,363	232,110,156	163,947,361	32,300,966	52,551,048

These figures are slightly below the actual figures, as they are a preliminary estimate made by the Bureau of Statistics and represent about ninety-eight per cent. of the entire exports. The most noticeable increase is in the value of breadstuffs, which exceeds the total for any previous calendar year. The exports of cotton were exceeded in value only once, in 1886, while the quantity exported was never before equalled.

The exports of manufactures were valued at \$307,924,994 as compared with \$279,616,898 in 1897; of products of mines \$25,851,092 against \$19,792,796 in 1897, and of the forest \$39,030,318 against \$40,834,864.

The final estimate made by the Department of Agriculture of the acreage yield and farm value of the principal crops of the United States in 1898 shows a total value exceeding \$1,600,000,000. We give the figures as follows:

	<i>Acres.</i>	<i>Bushels.</i>	<i>Value.</i>
Wheat.....	44,055,278	675,143,705	\$392,770,320
Corn.....	77,721,781	1,324,184,600	552,023,428
Oats.....	25,777,110	780,005,643	189,405,364
Rye.....	1,643,207	25,657,522	11,876,350
Barley.....	2,583,125	55,792,257	23,061,359
Buckwheat.....	678,332	11,721,327	5,271,462
Potatoes.....	2,557,729	192,306,338	79,574,772
Hay.....	42,780,827	*66,376,920	396,060,647

\*Tons.

The wheat yield is officially estimated at 145,000,000 bushels more than the 1897 crop, and the largest ever recorded. The corn crop was about 21,000,000 bushels larger than in 1897, and 861,000,000 bushels smaller than the bumper crop of 1896. Oats increased 32,000,000 bushels over 1897, but the yield fell below the record made in 1895, 94,000,000 bushels.

The estimated farm value of these three crops for each of the past eight years was as follows:

	<i>Wheat.</i>	<i>Corn.</i>	<i>Oats.</i>
1891.....	\$513,472,711	\$336,439,228	\$232,312,267
1892.....	322,111,881	642,146,630	209,253,611
1893.....	213,171,331	591,625,627	187,576,092
1894.....	225,902,025	554,719,000	214,816,920
1895.....	237,939,000	567,509,000	163,655,000
1896.....	310,602,539	491,006,987	132,485,033
1897.....	428,547,121	501,072,952	147,974,719
1898.....	392,770,320	552,025,428	186,405,364

In each case the values of 1891 were the largest ever recorded.

It is now definitely settled that no currency measure will be enacted by Congress at this session. A caucus of the Republican members of the House of Representatives decided on February 2 to leave the matter to a committee of eleven,

who shall be members of both the present and the next Congress, this committee to report to the Republican caucus at the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress. This will throw legislation into the Presidential year, and it is doubtful if any radical measure will be passed, while so important an election is pending. The delay is considered unfortunate, as the times for the last two years have been propitious for currency reform. Several bills containing many excellent features have been introduced or reported in Congress, but their fate is now determined by the action of the House Republican caucus.

But for the loan of \$200,000,000 placed last year and the increased revenues from the new internal revenue law, the Government finances would now be exciting apprehension. The cash balance in the Treasury was reduced more than \$20,000,000 last month, while the balance was less than \$75,000,000 in excess of the loan placed less than a year ago. While the Government possesses abundant means of raising money, and its credit is very high indeed, there is nothing definitely known as to what will be the entire cost of our new foreign policy, and the future position of the Treasury is not to be gauged by the present state of prosperity.

One important event connected with the national finances occurred last month, the payment of the last of the bonds issued under the Acts of 1862 and 1864, in aid of the Pacific Railroads. Some \$285,000 of the bonds have not yet been presented for payment, but the Government holds itself in readiness to pay them. The Government issued nearly \$65,000,000 of these bonds, and paid more than \$110,000,000 interest on them. The Union Pacific paid its entire indebtedness to the Government, \$27,236,516 principal and \$31,211,711 interest, and the Kansas Pacific paid the principal of its debt, \$6,303,000. The balance now due from the other roads for principal and interest is \$68,000,000. But the Government has paid all of its bonds, and the old "Currency 6s" no longer appear in public debt statements or in the reports of Stock Exchange transactions.

The completed statistics of the National bank returns for December 1 furnish the opportunity for a study of the general condition of business throughout the country. Since September 20 loans have increased nearly \$58,500,000, individual deposits nearly \$194,000,000 and sums due National, State and private banks about \$98,000,000. Compared with a year ago loans have increased about \$132,000,000, individual deposits \$309,000,000 and resources \$484,000,000.

CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

	Capital.	Surplus.	Individual deposits.	Gold.	Silver.	Legal tenders.
Dec. 17, 1896.....	\$647,186,395	\$247,839,567	\$1,639,688,393	\$181,020,260	\$44,520,448	\$153,973,612
Mar. 9, 1897.....	642,424,185	247,130,031	1,669,219,961	188,304,755	45,644,107	186,662,852
May 14, 1897.....	637,002,236	246,736,684	1,728,063,971	190,396,251	45,680,082	174,144,963
July 23, 1897.....	632,153,042	246,403,782	1,770,480,663	193,686,596	47,236,006	172,569,020
Oct. 5, 1897.....	631,496,085	246,345,020	1,853,849,128	195,895,107	43,482,595	149,494,829
Dec. 15, 1897.....	629,655,354	246,416,688	1,916,630,252	207,063,145	45,070,408	158,404,875
Feb. 18, 1898.....	628,960,320	248,484,530	1,962,660,953	222,855,517	48,522,409	169,515,185
May 5, 1898.....	624,471,670	247,695,979	1,999,308,439	267,644,954	49,537,819	143,033,661
July 14, 1898.....	622,016,745	247,935,215	2,023,337,159	284,921,377	50,755,753	135,299,997
Sept. 20, 1898.....	621,517,385	247,555,108	2,031,454,540	250,670,426	43,203,732	126,848,300
Dec. 1, 1898.....	620,516,245	246,666,532	2,225,269,813	281,475,195	47,125,516	136,750,702

The number of National banks was increased by five since September, but is seventeen less than a year ago. The reduction in National bank capital continues, a reduction of \$1,000,000 having occurred since September, making more than \$9,000,000 decrease since December 15, 1897.

While the gains in the principal cities have been large, there have been substantial increases in every section. In the New England States the increase in individual deposits since September 20 is \$20,500,000; in the Eastern States \$124,700,000; in

the Southern States \$16,000,000; in the Middle States \$24,000,000; in the Western States \$5,000,000,000, and in the Pacific States \$3,600,000.

The increased supply of money in the country is reflected in an increase of \$35,000,000 specie since September 20, and of about \$76,500,000 in the past year. There was an increase in legal tenders of about \$9,000,000 since September, but a decrease of \$22,600,000 since December, 1897.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—Rates for call money have ruled at about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 per cent. throughout the month with one or two exceptional advances to 6 per cent. for a short period. Even these rates are somewhat higher than they otherwise would be but for the fact that lenders are asking more than the normal rate for time loans where "industrial" securities are offered as collateral. The demand for time money is only moderate while commercial paper is also scarce.

At the close of the month call money ruled at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 per cent., the average rate being about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Banks and trust companies quote  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. as the minimum. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for thirty to ninety days and 3 per cent. for four to six months. For commercial paper the rates are  $2\frac{3}{4}$  @ 3 per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable, 3 @  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for first-class four to six months single names, and 4 @ 5 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

#### MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.
	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	2-2½	3-4	1½-2	2-2½	2-3	2½-3
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	2½-	3½-4	2-	2½-3½	3-3½	2½-3
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	2½-3	3½-	2-	3-	3-	2½-
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	3½-4	3½-4	2½-3	3-3½	3-	2½-3
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	4-	4-	3-3½	3½-	3½-	3-
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	4-	3¾-4¼	3¼-3¾	3¼-3¾	3-	2¾-3
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	4-5	4-4½	3¾-4¼	3¾-4	3¾-3¾	3-3¾
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5-6	5-6	4½-5	4-5	4-5	4-5

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—Phenomenal conditions are still reflected in the weekly statements of the New York Clearing-House banks. An increase of \$38,600,000 in four weeks on top of the largest total ever reported up to the beginning of the present year, is indicative of exceptional times. While loans increased only about \$8,000,000, that item also is the largest ever recorded, while compared with a year ago loans show a gain of \$100,000,000 and with two years ago of \$237,000,000. Deposits are nearly \$140,000,000 larger than in 1898 and \$298,000,000 more than in 1897. Since January 1 the banks have gained \$23,000,000 specie and \$6,000,000 legal tenders. The former is \$80,000,000 more than last year, while the latter are \$42,000,000 less. The surplus reserve is again increasing rapidly, being more than \$39,000,000 as compared with \$19,000,000 on December 31 last.

#### NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 31...	\$718,308,700	\$169,756,300	\$55,184,100	\$823,087,700	\$19,180,975	\$16,270,600	\$975,080,300
Jan. 7...	713,808,800	173,442,100	56,808,700	826,881,700	23,530,375	15,858,200	1,160,345,600
" 14...	716,846,000	178,184,600	59,029,900	835,805,700	28,263,075	15,608,100	1,251,906,000
" 21...	720,351,600	187,073,100	59,889,100	849,074,100	34,693,675	15,439,300	1,409,245,800
" 28...	726,372,200	196,484,900	61,156,500	861,637,500	39,232,025	14,700,900	1,494,429,900

DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January .....	\$530,785,000	\$33,286,950	\$675,064,200	\$15,788,750	\$823,037,700	\$19,180,975
February .....	563,331,800	59,148,250	722,484,200	35,809,450	861,637,500	39,232,025
March .....	573,769,300	57,520,975	729,214,300	22,729,125		
April .....	569,226,500	47,666,575	682,236,800	35,720,800		
May .....	576,863,900	48,917,625	658,503,300	44,504,675		
June .....	575,600,000	46,616,100	696,006,400	53,704,600		
July .....	604,983,700	41,384,875	750,074,600	62,013,550		
August .....	623,045,000	45,720,150	741,680,100	41,904,475		
September .....	636,396,000	39,517,700	752,389,800	14,990,050		
October .....	619,353,200	15,550,400	702,128,200	15,327,150		
November .....	625,339,000	24,271,800	761,574,200	26,091,550		
December .....	666,378,600	22,122,950	789,525,800	17,097,950		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$861,637,500 on January 28, 1899, loans, \$726,372,200 on January 28, 1899, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

Dates.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Dec. 31.....	\$62,697,700	\$71,318,200	\$3,724,500	\$4,766,100	\$3,943,000	\$4,390,700	\$3,994,750
Jan. 7.....	63,156,200	71,827,900	3,496,500	4,525,100	10,022,100	3,518,100	3,604,825
" 14.....	64,589,300	74,200,800	3,689,800	4,761,800	9,715,600	4,520,500	4,137,000
" 21.....	64,306,900	74,466,800	3,706,700	4,532,600	10,013,700	4,859,000	4,494,300
" 28.....	64,580,100	73,411,600	3,332,200	4,696,000	9,482,200	4,381,700	4,041,200

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following tables :

BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 31.....	\$185,808,000	\$223,420,000	\$18,266,000	\$9,202,000	\$5,468,000	\$109,088,000
Jan. 7.....	184,969,000	229,902,000	18,895,000	8,051,000	5,188,000	147,690,300
" 14.....	185,674,000	232,706,000	19,262,000	8,230,000	5,030,000	140,791,600
" 21.....	186,061,000	233,982,000	19,544,000	8,126,000	4,968,000	141,184,900
" 28.....	191,049,000	236,566,000	19,311,000	7,745,000	4,887,000	137,886,600

PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 31.....	\$122,538,000	\$146,508,000	\$46,855,000	\$6,029,000	\$80,794,700
Jan. 7.....	122,789,000	149,220,000	48,877,000	6,055,000	87,167,300
" 14.....	122,538,000	152,561,000	51,831,000	6,099,000	95,513,100
" 21.....	123,932,000	153,801,000	52,394,000	6,072,000	99,436,000
" 28.....	125,926,000	154,090,000	51,800,000	6,074,000	107,126,000

MONEY RATES ABROAD.—Money rates are tending lower in Europe ; the Bank of Germany reducing its rate of discount from 6 to 5 per cent. on January 17 and the Bank of England its rate from 4 to 3½ per cent. on January 19. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London at the close of the month were 2 @ 2½ per cent. against 3½ per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was 2¼ @ 2½ per cent. against 3 per cent. a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort 4 @ 4½ per cent. against 4½ per cent. a month ago.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Aug. 19.	Sept. 16.	Oct. 14.	Nov. 18.	Dec. 16.	Jan. 11.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	2½	2½	4	4	4	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	1½	1½	3½	3½	3½—7s	2½
6 months bankers' drafts.....	2½	2½	3½—½	3	2½—3	2½
Loans—Day to day.....	1	1½	2½	2½	2½	2
Paris, open market rates.....	1½	1½	2	3	3	3
Berlin, ..	3¼	3½	3½	4½	5½	4½
Hamburg, ..	3¼	3¼	4	5¼	5½	4½
Frankfort, ..	3¼	3½	4	5½	5½	4½
Amsterdam, ..	2¼	2	2	2½	2¼	2¼
Vienna, ..	3½	4	4	4½	4½	4½
St. Petersburg, ..	4½	4	4	5½	5½	5½
Madrid, ..	5	5	5	5	5	5
Copenhagen, ..	3½	3½	4½	5	5	5

EUROPEAN BANKS.—The usual movement of money from the interior has helped to increase the reserves of the Bank of England, which institution now has \$16,000,000 more gold than it held a month ago. The Bank of Germany gained about \$2,500,000 and these are the only important changes reported.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	December 1, 1898.		January 1, 1899.		February 1, 1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£31,189,873		£29,387,811		£29,682,771	
France.....	73,259,836	£48,668,860	72,905,966	£48,308,330	72,934,762	£47,961,696
Germany.....	25,758,000	13,270,000	27,679,000	14,269,000	28,192,000	14,492,000
Austro-Hungary...	35,592,000	12,467,000	35,976,000	12,419,000	36,878,000	12,451,000
Spain.....	11,062,000	6,457,000	11,062,000	7,499,000	11,062,000	8,591,000
Netherlands.....	4,315,000	6,694,000	4,315,000	6,791,000	4,315,000	6,776,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,832,000	1,466,000	3,152,000	1,576,000	3,176,000	1,588,000
Totals.....	£185,108,569	£89,022,860	£184,427,777	£90,847,380	£186,080,533	£91,869,696

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Oct. 12, 1898.	Nov. 16, 1898.	Dec. 14, 1898.	Jan. 11, 1899.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£27,704,575	£27,043,175	£26,940,535	£27,731,439
Public deposits.....	7,176,652	5,804,568	5,788,473	7,930,790
Other deposits.....	36,464,251	35,244,984	35,406,396	41,512,398
Government securities.....	12,901,640	9,904,640	10,989,535	15,192,086
Other securities.....	28,240,396	26,779,448	27,212,662	32,040,707
Reserve of notes and coin.....	20,291,376	22,196,967	20,848,354	20,068,966
Coin and bullion.....	31,185,951	32,439,112	30,988,879	30,930,408
Reserve to liabilities.....	46½%	53½%	60½%	47½%
Bank rate of discount.....	3%	4%	4%	4%
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	3½%	3¼ @ 3½	3½	3½
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	109½	110¼	106½	110¼
Price of silver per ounce.....	27½d.	28d.	27½	27½
Average price of wheat.....	26s. 6d.	26s. 4d.	27s. 6d.	27s. 6d.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—Rates for sterling have advanced during the month although the money market abroad has been working below our local market. There

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Dec. 31.....	4.81¼ @ 4.82	4.84¼ @ 4.84½	4.85 @ 4.85¼	4.81 @ 4.81¼	4.80½ @ 4.81¼
Jan. 7.....	4.81¼ @ 4.82	4.84¼ @ 4.84½	4.85 @ 4.85¼	4.81¼ @ 4.81½	4.80½ @ 4.81¼
" 14.....	4.82¼ @ 4.82½	4.84½ @ 4.84¾	4.85¼ @ 4.85½	4.81¾ @ 4.82	4.81 @ 4.81½
" 21.....	4.82¼ @ 4.83	4.84¾ @ 4.85	4.85¼ @ 4.85½	4.82¼ @ 4.82½	4.81¼ @ 4.82¼
" 28.....	4.82¼ @ 4.83	4.84¾ @ 4.85	4.85¼ @ 4.85½	4.82¼ @ 4.82½	4.81¼ @ 4.82¼

have been shipments of both gold and securities from London to New York during the month. The supply of commercial bills against grain and cotton has been falling off recently.

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.**

	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	January 1.	Feb. 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.81½ — ¾	4.82 — ¼	4.81¼ — ¼	4.81¾ — 2	4.83 — ¼
“ “ Sight.....	4.84 — ¼	4.85½ — ¾	4.84¼ — ½	4.84¼ — ¼	4.85 — ¼
“ “ Cables.....	4.84½ — ¾	4.86½ — ¾	4.84¾ — 5	4.85 — ¼	4.85½ — 6
“ Commercial long.....	4.81 — ¼	4.81½ — ¾	4.80½ — 1	4.81 — ¼	4.82½ — ¾
“ Docu'tary for paym't.....	4.80½ — 1¼	4.81 — 2	4.80¼ — 1¼	4.80½ — 1¼	4.82¼ — 1½
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.21½ — ¼	5.20½ — ¼	5.21¼ — ¼	5.20½ — 1½	5.18½ — 7½
“ Bankers' 60 days.....	5.23¼	5.24½ — 3¾	5.24½	5.23¼	5.21½
“ Bankers' sight.....	5.22½ — 1½	5.21½ — ¼	5.21½	5.21¼	5.18¾ — ½
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.23½ — 2½	5.23½ — 2½	5.24½ — 3¾	5.24½	5.21¼
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94¼ — 8	94¼ — 8	94¼ — 8	94¼ — 8	94½ — 7½
“ Bankers' sight.....	94¾ — 10	94¾ — 10	94¾ — 10	94¾ — 10	94½ — 9½
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.23¼	5.23¼	5.23½ — 2½	5.22½	5.19½ — 8¾
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40 — 1½	40 — 1½	40 — 1½	39½ — 40	40 — 1½
Kronors—Bankers' sight.....	26¾ — 1	26¾ — 1	26¾ — 1	26¾ — 1	26¾ — 1
Italian lire—sight.....	5.62½ — 59½	5.66½ — 2½	5.55 — 50	5.52½ — 50	5.58½ — 53½
Austrian florins sight.....					40½ — 1½

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—Not in more than two years has the coinage of gold in any one month equalled the amount coined in January, the total being \$18,032,000. There were \$1,536,000 silver dollars coined, \$106,000 of fractional silver and \$31,590 minor coin, a total of \$19,705,590.

**COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.**

	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$7,803,420	\$1,964,800	\$3,420,000	\$1,624,000	\$18,032,000	\$1,642,000
February.....	10,152,000	1,519,794	4,085,302	1,167,564		
March.....	13,770,900	1,617,654	5,385,463	1,488,139		
April.....	8,800,400	1,535,000	8,211,400	948,000		
May.....	4,489,950	1,600,000	7,717,500	1,433,000		
June.....	2,100,547	1,856,754	6,903,932	1,432,185		
July.....	377,000	260,000	5,853,900	1,027,834		
August.....	8,756,250	701,436	9,344,200	2,350,000		
September.....	8,762,375	1,050,092	7,385,315	2,178,389		
October.....	3,845,000	2,301,000	5,180,000	3,354,191		
November.....	3,544,000	2,103,000	5,006,700	2,755,251		
December.....	3,626,642	1,977,167	9,492,045	3,275,481		
Year.....	\$76,028,484	\$18,486,697	\$77,985,757	\$23,034,034	\$18,032,000	\$1,642,000

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—For the first time in several months the amount of National bank notes outstanding shows a decrease for the month of \$493,604.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**

	Oct. 31, 1898.	Nov. 30, 1898.	Dec. 31, 1898.	Jan. 31, 1899.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$239,546,281	\$242,702,088	\$243,735,105	\$243,241,501
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	210,579,183	213,928,543	214,015,987	211,041,299
Circulation secured by lawful money....	29,500,625	28,773,495	29,719,118	32,200,202
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Pacific RR. bonds, 6 per cent.....	2,906,000	3,138,000	1,815,000	55,000
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	22,047,750	21,975,750	21,486,750	21,385,000
“ “ 1907, 4 per cent.....	139,436,050	136,586,550	133,972,050	132,048,050
Five per cents. of 1894.....	18,231,900	15,598,900	15,010,400	14,530,400
Four per cents. of 1895.....	23,990,650	21,915,650	20,725,650	20,051,150
Three per cents. of 1898.....	31,006,120	40,136,280	46,933,000	48,409,340
Total.....	\$235,618,470	\$239,349,130	\$239,942,850	\$236,479,840

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 2 per cents. of 1891, \$1,714,500; 4 per cents. of 1907, \$23,955,100; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$7,527,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$10,943,500; 3 per cents. of 1896, \$29,512,320; a total of \$73,652,420.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$82,726.

The notes secured by bonds are reduced \$2,974,688, while the deposit of lawful money to retire circulation was increased \$2,481,145. The retirement of the last of the Pacific Railroad 6 per cent. bonds probably had something to do with the reduction in circulation as the National banks a month ago held \$1,815,000 of these bonds to secure circulation and now have only \$55,000 for this purpose while they had \$1,288,000 to secure public deposits, all of which have been withdrawn.

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion :

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .55	\$ .65	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.75
Mexican dollars.....	.47	.48	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	.43 $\frac{1}{4}$	.43 $\frac{1}{4}$	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.73	4.82
English silver.....	4.82	4.85	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.53	19.60
Five francs.....	.98	.98	Ten guilders.....	3.98	4.00
Twenty francs.....	3.84	3.86			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 59 $\frac{1}{2}$  @ 60 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢. Fine silver (Government assay), 59 $\frac{1}{2}$  @ 60 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢.

SILVER.—The price of silver in London last month moved within the same narrow range that it did in December, the extreme fluctuations being 27 $\frac{1}{2}$  @ 27 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. The closing price of the month was 27 7-16d or  $\frac{1}{4}$ d higher than a month ago.

MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1897, 1898, 1899.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.		MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	28 $\frac{3}{8}$	28 $\frac{1}{8}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	July.....	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{8}$	27		
February	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	28 $\frac{3}{8}$	28 $\frac{1}{8}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	August..	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$		
March....	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{3}{8}$	28	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	Septemb'r	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$		
April....	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{3}{8}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	October..	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$		
May.....	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	Novemb'r	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$		
June.....	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{8}$	27 $\frac{3}{8}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$			Decemb'r	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{8}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$		

FOREIGN TRADE.—The complete statistics of the foreign trade movement for December show that the volume of exports has again exceeded all previous monthly totals, beating the great record of November by \$7,500,000. The total exports were over \$187,000,000, or \$12,000,000 more than in December, 1897. The imports were slightly larger than a year ago, amounting to nearly \$54,000,000, while the excess of exports over imports for the month was nearly \$83,500,000, almost as much as the net exports for the entire year 1893. We imported about \$7,500,000 in gold in December and exported \$2,700,000 silver. For the calendar year the exports of mer-

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF DECEMBER.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1893.....	\$93,591,739	\$49,924,937	Exp., \$43,626,802	Exp., \$1,908,300	Exp., \$4,213,663
1894.....	84,876,846	62,135,431	" 22,741,415	" 9,370,538	" 1,974,370
1895.....	92,529,117	62,201,047	" 30,328,070	" 14,067,888	" 2,694,376
1896.....	117,185,928	58,980,600	" 58,205,266	Imp., 2,369,218	" 3,935,187
1897.....	125,053,961	51,505,933	" 73,547,998	" 2,004,409	" 3,081,744
1898.....	137,247,448	53,821,489	" 83,425,959	" 7,420,244	" 2,719,277
TWELVE MONTHS.					
1893.....	876,148,781	776,248,924	Exp., 99,899,857	Exp., 7,013,431	Exp., 23,013,917
1894.....	825,102,248	678,312,941	" 146,789,307	" 30,628,082	" 29,483,259
1895.....	824,860,186	801,696,347	" 23,190,789	" 70,571,010	" 29,837,739
1896.....	1,005,837,241	881,579,556	" 124,257,685	Imp., 46,474,369	" 33,777,001
1897.....	1,069,709,045	742,595,229	" 327,113,816	Exp., 255,809	" 25,578,990
1898.....	1,254,925,169	633,664,634	" 621,260,535	Imp., 141,841,398	" 24,767,380



chandise reach the unparalleled total of nearly \$1,255,000,000; the imports, the smallest since 1885, were less than \$634,000,000, and the net exports were \$621,000,000, or \$264,000,000 more than for any previous year. The net imports of gold were \$141,800,000, or \$87,000,000 more than for any other year. The net exports of silver fell slightly below \$25,000,000.

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.—The receipts of the Government in January were about \$800,000 larger than in December, while the expenses increased \$9,200,000, a deficit of \$9,847,841 being reported as compared with \$460,014 in the previous month. The deficit for the seven months of the current fiscal year is \$92,867,963.

UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	January, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.	Source.	January, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.
Customs.....	\$17,901,741	\$114,087,581	Civil and mis.....	\$9,814,421	\$80,819,686
Internal revenue....	20,982,057	159,376,396	War.....	18,656,555	164,879,813
Miscellaneous.....	2,801,132	14,322,943	Navy.....	5,226,664	41,622,378
			Indians.....	960,676	6,624,862
Total.....	\$41,774,930	\$287,786,920	Pensions.....	10,967,016	82,476,539
Excess of expenditures.....	\$9,847,841	\$92,867,963	Interest.....	5,507,449	24,681,585
			Total.....	\$51,122,771	\$380,804,803

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1898.			1899.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$37,333,628	\$36,066,711	*\$164,236,796	\$41,774,930	\$51,122,771	\$228,749,075
February.....	28,572,358	26,599,256	167,622,182			
March.....	32,958,750	31,882,444	174,584,116			
April.....	33,012,943	44,314,062	181,238,137			
May.....	30,074,818	47,849,909	171,818,065			
June.....	33,509,313	47,852,281	167,004,410			
July.....	43,847,108	74,263,475	189,444,714			
August.....	41,782,707	56,260,717	217,904,485			
September.....	39,778,070	54,223,931	243,297,543			
October.....	39,630,051	53,962,276	239,885,162			
November.....	38,900,915	49,060,980	241,663,444			
December.....	41,404,793	41,864,807	*246,973,027			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.—The amount of money in circulation was increased nearly \$21,000,000 last month, the gains being derived from the domestic production and imports of gold and from the disbursements by the

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$649,846,727	\$658,986,518	\$667,796,579	\$696,967,400
Silver dollars.....	63,437,255	63,980,338	65,183,553	63,429,088
Subsidiary silver.....	68,878,952	69,997,276	70,687,818	69,083,516
Gold certificates.....	35,338,909	35,280,649	35,200,259	33,039,939
Silver certificates.....	391,177,575	392,818,146	392,331,995	392,337,664
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	96,569,780	95,781,482	94,942,741	93,996,753
United States notes.....	806,801,620	811,738,046	812,415,738	808,643,158
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	20,055,000	20,190,000	20,465,000	23,170,000
National bank notes.....	234,969,984	238,108,059	238,337,729	237,576,019
Total.....	\$1,866,575,782	\$1,896,879,504	\$1,897,801,413	\$1,918,280,557
Population of United States.....	75,059,000	75,194,000	75,380,000	75,465,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$24.87	\$25.09	\$25.19	\$25.42

United States Treasury. The circulation is \$188,000,000 more than it was a year ago, \$142,000,000 of the increase being in gold.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—The net debt less cash in the Treasury shows an increase for January of \$23,500,000, the cash balance in the Treasury being reduced \$20,000,000, while the debt on account of the National bank note redemption fund was increased about \$3,000,000. There are still nearly \$7,000,000 of the new bonds which do not yet appear in the statement.

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
"    "    1897, 4 .....	559,646,900	559,650,000	559,650,200	559,650,400
"    "    "    "    40,980 .....			39,250	38,970
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Loan of 1894, 5 per cent.....	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
"    "    1925, 4 .....	179,890,180	189,027,480	192,846,780	193,192,760
Ten-Twenties of 1898, 3 per cent.....				
Total interest-bearing debt.....	\$1,023,766,960	\$1,036,396,630	\$1,040,215,960	\$1,040,562,060
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,246,870	1,241,630	1,237,200	1,237,150
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes....	346,735,013	346,735,013	346,735,013	346,735,013
National bank note redemption acct..	29,572,380	28,568,029	28,868,814	31,792,008
Fractional currency.....	6,883,974	6,883,974	6,883,974	6,883,229
Total non-interest bearing debt.....	\$383,191,367	\$382,212,017	\$382,487,801	\$385,410,245
Total interest and non-interest debt.	1,411,206,197	1,419,850,277	1,423,940,962	1,427,306,425
Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:				
Gold certificates.....	36,940,149	36,901,049	36,808,999	34,669,999
Silver " .....	398,753,504	399,163,504	399,430,504	399,631,504
Certificates of deposit.....	20,105,000	20,640,000	20,685,000	22,570,000
Treasury notes of 1890 .....	97,833,280	97,192,280	96,523,280	95,982,280
Total certificates and notes.....	\$553,631,933	\$553,897,833	\$553,447,783	\$552,853,783
Aggregate debt.....	1,964,837,130	1,973,748,110	1,977,388,745	1,980,063,208
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	933,249,397	926,117,182	940,431,351	911,969,026
Demand liabilities.....	633,011,122	633,740,382	635,666,656	637,384,351
Balance.....	\$300,238,275	\$292,376,790	\$294,764,695	\$274,584,675
Gold reserve.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	200,238,275	182,376,790	194,764,695	174,584,675
Total.....	\$300,238,275	\$292,376,790	\$294,764,695	\$274,584,675
Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.	1,110,966,922	1,127,473,487	1,129,176,286	1,152,624,750

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.—Nearly \$20,000,000 of gold was withdrawn from the United States Treasury last month, but there was an increase of \$3,000,000 in silver and of as much more in Treasury, United States and National bank notes. The reduction of \$2,000,000 in gold certificates outstanding made the loss in net money in the Treasury \$12,000,000.

## MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Nov. 1, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$141,800,498	\$138,441,547	\$139,654,545	\$127,505,746
Gold bullion.....	133,423,574	138,502,545	142,074,789	134,180,534
Silver Dollars.....	403,399,342	404,258,354	405,061,304	408,351,769
Silver bullion.....	94,615,773	93,350,250	92,102,207	91,223,953
Subsidiary silver.....	7,854,380	6,673,205	5,959,243	6,931,831
United States notes.....	40,379,996	34,944,970	34,265,278	37,037,858
National bank notes.....	4,659,172	4,675,744	5,480,141	5,748,207
Total.....	\$823,192,415	\$820,855,525	\$824,687,707	\$810,990,896
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	543,141,264	544,070,277	542,939,995	541,541,376
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$283,051,151	\$276,785,248	\$281,747,712	\$269,449,522

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of January, and the highest and lowest during the year 1899, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1898:

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				JANUARY, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.	
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	19 $\frac{3}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 23	18 —Jan. 7	24 $\frac{3}{4}$	18	22 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	52 $\frac{3}{4}$	22 $\frac{3}{8}$	65 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 23	50 $\frac{5}{8}$ —Jan. 7	65 $\frac{3}{4}$	50 $\frac{5}{8}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Baltimore & Ohio.....	72 $\frac{3}{4}$	12 $\frac{3}{8}$	74 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 26	66 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	72 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Bay State Gas.....	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{5}{8}$	9 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 10	8 —Jan. 16	9 $\frac{3}{4}$	8	7 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	78 $\frac{3}{4}$	35	96 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 14	77 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 8	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{3}{4}$	92 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Canadian Pacific.....	90 $\frac{1}{4}$	72	87 —Jan. 30	84 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 20	87	84 $\frac{3}{8}$	86 $\frac{1}{4}$		
Canada Southern.....	58	44 $\frac{1}{4}$	70 —Jan. 23	54 —Jan. 5	70	54	56 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Central of New Jersey.....	99	53 $\frac{3}{4}$	106 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 24	97 —Jan. 8	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	102		
Central Pacific.....	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	52 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 31	41 —Jan. 5	52 $\frac{3}{8}$	41	51		
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cttis.....	26 $\frac{3}{8}$	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 —Jan. 26	24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 5	31	26	26 $\frac{3}{8}$		
Chicago & Alton.....	17 $\frac{3}{4}$	150	172 —Jan. 31	168 —Jan. 11	172	168	170		
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	125 $\frac{1}{4}$	85 $\frac{3}{8}$	141 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 23	124 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	141 $\frac{1}{2}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	136		
Chicago & E. Illinois.....	66	49	68 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 31	58 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 4	68 $\frac{1}{2}$	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	68		
"    preferred.....	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	118 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 14	112 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 8	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago, Great Western.....	11	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 23	15 —Jan. 20	11	10	11		
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville.....	18	7	10 —Jan. 27	7 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 6	18	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	38 $\frac{3}{4}$	23	37 —Jan. 27	31 —Jan. 4	37	31	35		
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	128 $\frac{1}{4}$	83 $\frac{1}{4}$	130 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 26	120 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	130 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	128 $\frac{1}{4}$		
"    preferred.....	166 $\frac{1}{2}$	140	168 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 20	160 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 8	168 $\frac{1}{2}$	160 $\frac{1}{2}$	167 $\frac{1}{4}$		
Chicago & Northwestern.....	143 $\frac{3}{4}$	118 $\frac{1}{4}$	152 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 23	141 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 4	152 $\frac{1}{2}$	141 $\frac{1}{2}$	148		
"    preferred.....	191 $\frac{1}{2}$	168	191 —Jan. 31	188 —Jan. 19	191	188	191		
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.....	114 $\frac{3}{8}$	80	122 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 27	118 —Jan. 7	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	118	119		
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.....	94	65	100 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 19	81 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 5	100 $\frac{1}{4}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	96 $\frac{3}{4}$		
"    preferred.....	170	148	173 —Jan. 21	170 —Jan. 16	173	170	172 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago Terminal Transfer.....	9 $\frac{3}{8}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 31	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	12 $\frac{3}{8}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{3}{4}$	40 —Jan. 16	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	40	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	36 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.....	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	61 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 25	42 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 4	61 $\frac{3}{4}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	58 $\frac{3}{4}$		
"    preferred.....	97	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 26	96 —Jan. 21	102 $\frac{3}{4}$	96	100		
Cleveland Lorain & Wheeling.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{4}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 26	12 —Jan. 31	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	12		
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.....	32 $\frac{3}{8}$	17	37 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 9	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	37 $\frac{3}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.....	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 —Jan. 3	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	4	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	12 $\frac{3}{4}$	15 —Jan. 4	7 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 26	15	7 $\frac{3}{8}$	8 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Consolidated Gas Co.....	206 $\frac{1}{2}$	164	204 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 31	189 —Jan. 12	204 $\frac{1}{4}$	189	201 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.....	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	117 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 24	106 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 8	117 $\frac{3}{8}$	106 $\frac{1}{4}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Delaware, Lack. & Western.....	159	140	163 —Jan. 23	157 —Jan. 7	163	157	158		
Denver & Rio Grande.....	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 23	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	71 $\frac{3}{4}$	40	73 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 26	68 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 11	73 $\frac{3}{4}$	68 $\frac{1}{4}$	72 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	195	119	199 —Jan. 20	190 —Jan. 4	199	190	198 $\frac{3}{4}$		
"    1st pref.....	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 19	13 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 6	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{3}{4}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    2d pref.....	43 $\frac{3}{4}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	42 —Jan. 24	37 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 5	42	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{3}{4}$		
"    preferred.....	21 $\frac{3}{8}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 30	19 —Jan. 4	22 $\frac{1}{4}$	19	22 $\frac{1}{4}$		
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	41 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	37 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 19	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	37 $\frac{3}{4}$	38		
Express Adams.....	180	97 $\frac{1}{4}$	190 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 26	168 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 16	190 $\frac{3}{4}$	168 $\frac{1}{2}$	199		
"    American.....	153	116	145 —Jan. 9	138 —Jan. 21	145	138	144 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    United States.....	58 $\frac{3}{4}$	38	60 —Jan. 11	53 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 5	60	53 $\frac{3}{8}$	57		
"    Wells, Fargo.....	131 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	129 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 16	125 —Jan. 10	129 $\frac{1}{4}$	125	125		
Great Northern, preferred.....	180	122	176 —Jan. 31	142 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	176	142 $\frac{1}{2}$	175		
Illinois Central.....	115 $\frac{3}{4}$	96	122 —Jan. 23	114 —Jan. 6	122	114	116 $\frac{3}{4}$		
Iowa Central.....	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	13 —Jan. 10	10 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 4	13	10 $\frac{3}{4}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	49 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 31	42 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	49 $\frac{1}{4}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	48 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Kansas City, Pitts. & Gulf.....	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	18 —Jan. 6	12 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 19	18	12 $\frac{3}{8}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Laclede Gas.....	54 $\frac{3}{8}$	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	57 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 9	52 —Jan. 4	57 $\frac{1}{4}$	52	54 $\frac{3}{8}$		
Lake Erie & Western.....	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	22 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 27	15 —Jan. 16	22 $\frac{1}{4}$	15	19 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	83	53	75 —Jan. 27	60 —Jan. 15	75	60	67		
Lake Shore.....	215	170 $\frac{3}{4}$	208 —Jan. 24	196 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 5	208	196 $\frac{1}{4}$	206		
Long Island.....	59 $\frac{1}{2}$	40	77 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 31	56 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 5	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{1}{4}$	77		
Louisville & Nashville.....	65 $\frac{1}{4}$	44	69 —Jan. 27	64 —Jan. 3	69	64	66 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Manhattan consol.....	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	90	118 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 20	97 —Jan. 4	118 $\frac{1}{4}$	97	114		
Metropolitan Street.....	194 $\frac{1}{4}$	125 $\frac{1}{4}$	220 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 26	187 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 11	220 $\frac{1}{4}$	187 $\frac{1}{4}$	217		
Michigan Central.....	118	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	116 —Jan. 24	112 —Jan. 13	118	112	114 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	38 $\frac{3}{4}$	24	45 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 31	35 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 6	45 $\frac{3}{4}$	35 $\frac{1}{4}$	44 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    1st pref.....	100	84	99 —Jan. 16	97 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 9	99	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    2d pref.....	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	46	79 —Jan. 19	73 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 10	79	73 $\frac{1}{4}$	78 $\frac{3}{8}$		
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.....	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	10	15 —Jan. 10	13 —Jan. 25	15	13	14 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	41	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	40 $\frac{3}{8}$ —Jan. 5	36 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Jan. 24	40 $\frac{3}{8}$	36 $\frac{3}{4}$	39		

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ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				JANUARY, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	461 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	497 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 24	437 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 17	497 $\frac{1}{2}$	437 $\frac{1}{2}$	473 $\frac{1}{2}$
Mobile & Ohio.....	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	24	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 31	32	—Jan. 3	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	32	40
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River..	124 $\frac{3}{4}$	105	141	—Jan. 23	121 $\frac{1}{4}$	—Jan. 3	141	121 $\frac{3}{4}$	134
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis....	155 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	199 $\frac{1}{4}$	—Jan. 23	14	—Jan. 5	199 $\frac{1}{4}$	14	16
1st preferred.....	76	65	79	—Jan. 23	73	—Jan. 9	79	73	75
2d preferred.....	40 $\frac{1}{4}$	28	41	—Jan. 23	34	—Jan. 5	41	34	30 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.	201	178 $\frac{1}{4}$	204	—Jan. 31	199	—Jan. 19	204	199	204
N. Y., Ontario & Western....	191 $\frac{1}{2}$	133 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	—Jan. 23	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 3	25	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$
Norfolk & Western.....	199 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	201 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 24	171 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	201 $\frac{1}{2}$	171 $\frac{1}{2}$	19
preferred.....	637 $\frac{1}{2}$	421 $\frac{1}{2}$	701 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 30	613 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	701 $\frac{1}{2}$	613 $\frac{1}{2}$	69
North American Co.....	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	—Jan. 24	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	9	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.	441 $\frac{1}{2}$	19	531 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 30	423 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	531 $\frac{1}{2}$	423 $\frac{1}{2}$	523 $\frac{1}{2}$
pref tr. receipts.....	797 $\frac{1}{2}$	567 $\frac{1}{2}$	811 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 23	673 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	811 $\frac{1}{2}$	763 $\frac{1}{2}$	801 $\frac{1}{2}$
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	611 $\frac{1}{2}$	351 $\frac{1}{2}$	52	—Jan. 23	481 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 9	52	481 $\frac{1}{2}$	50
preferred.....	78	651 $\frac{1}{2}$	763 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 23	71	—Jan. 5	763 $\frac{1}{2}$	71	76
Oregon Short Line.....	43	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	48	—Jan. 23	42	—Jan. 5	48	42	44 $\frac{1}{2}$
Pacific Mail.....	46	21	55	—Jan. 30	431 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 4	55	431 $\frac{1}{2}$	531 $\frac{1}{2}$
Pennsylvania R. R.....	1231 $\frac{1}{2}$	1109 $\frac{1}{2}$	142	—Jan. 23	1221 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	142	1221 $\frac{1}{2}$	1321 $\frac{1}{2}$
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	112	861 $\frac{1}{2}$	1183 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 28	1091 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 23	1183 $\frac{1}{2}$	1091 $\frac{1}{2}$	1151 $\frac{1}{2}$
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis..	637 $\frac{1}{2}$	387 $\frac{1}{2}$	88	—Jan. 23	64	—Jan. 3	88	64	74
preferred.....	841 $\frac{1}{2}$	57	93	—Jan. 23	84	—Jan. 3	93	84	87
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	216	132	1647 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 4	156	—Jan. 21	1647 $\frac{1}{2}$	156	159
Reading Voting Tr. cts.....	235 $\frac{1}{2}$	151 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	—Jan. 24	205 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	25	205 $\frac{1}{2}$	238 $\frac{1}{2}$
1st preferred.....	543 $\frac{1}{2}$	36	66	—Jan. 23	513 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	66	513 $\frac{1}{2}$	613 $\frac{1}{2}$
2d preferred.....	29	173 $\frac{1}{2}$	349 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 23	261 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	349 $\frac{1}{2}$	261 $\frac{1}{2}$	313 $\frac{1}{2}$
Rome, Wat. Ogdens' g.....	1281 $\frac{1}{2}$	1161 $\frac{1}{2}$	1301 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 26	130	—Jan. 10	1301 $\frac{1}{2}$	130	1301 $\frac{1}{2}$
St. Louis & San Francisco....	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	143 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 30	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	143 $\frac{1}{2}$	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	133 $\frac{1}{2}$
1st preferred.....	70	521 $\frac{1}{2}$	751 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 26	66	—Jan. 9	751 $\frac{1}{2}$	66	733 $\frac{1}{2}$
2d preferred.....	35	221 $\frac{1}{2}$	447 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 31	331 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	447 $\frac{1}{2}$	331 $\frac{1}{2}$	433 $\frac{1}{2}$
St. Louis & Southwestern....	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	—Jan. 30	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 4	12	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	18	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	291 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 30	17	—Jan. 3	291 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	263 $\frac{1}{2}$
Southern Pacific Co.....	35	12	44	—Jan. 31	33	—Jan. 7	44	33	421 $\frac{1}{2}$
Southern Railway.....	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	14	—Jan. 16	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	14	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	133 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	433 $\frac{1}{2}$	235 $\frac{1}{2}$	513 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 31	407 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 4	513 $\frac{1}{2}$	407 $\frac{1}{2}$	507 $\frac{1}{2}$
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	383 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	481 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 27	36	—Jan. 9	481 $\frac{1}{2}$	36	447 $\frac{1}{2}$
Texas & Pacific.....	201 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	195 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 3	171 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	195 $\frac{1}{2}$	171 $\frac{1}{2}$	198 $\frac{1}{2}$
Union Pacific.....	443 $\frac{1}{2}$	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	50	—Jan. 21	417 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	50	417 $\frac{1}{2}$	463 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	743 $\frac{1}{2}$	457 $\frac{1}{2}$	841 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 23	727 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	841 $\frac{1}{2}$	727 $\frac{1}{2}$	793 $\frac{1}{2}$
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf...	133 $\frac{1}{2}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	141 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 3	141 $\frac{1}{2}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	131 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wabash R. R.....	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 24	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	241 $\frac{1}{2}$	141 $\frac{1}{2}$	245 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 23	221 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	245 $\frac{1}{2}$	221 $\frac{1}{2}$	233 $\frac{1}{2}$
Western Union.....	957 $\frac{1}{2}$	821 $\frac{1}{2}$	981 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 24	931 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 3	981 $\frac{1}{2}$	931 $\frac{1}{2}$	96
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	—Jan. 30	12	—Jan. 31	13	12	123 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	303 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	37	—Jan. 30	341 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 31	37	341 $\frac{1}{2}$	341 $\frac{1}{2}$
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:									
American Co. Oil Co.....	393 $\frac{1}{2}$	151 $\frac{1}{2}$	38	—Jan. 31	341 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 9	38	341 $\frac{1}{2}$	371 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	903 $\frac{1}{2}$	66	91	—Jan. 31	881 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	91	881 $\frac{1}{2}$	903 $\frac{1}{2}$
American Spirits Mfg Co.....	153 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	—Jan. 3	13	—Jan. 16	15	13	133 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	413 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	40	—Jan. 3	351 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 21	40	351 $\frac{1}{2}$	371 $\frac{1}{2}$
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	1467 $\frac{1}{2}$	1071 $\frac{1}{2}$	137 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 30	1231 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 4	137 $\frac{1}{2}$	1231 $\frac{1}{2}$	1333 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	116	103	114	—Jan. 30	110	—Jan. 16	114	110	113
American Tobacco Co.....	1533 $\frac{1}{2}$	833 $\frac{1}{2}$	1493 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	143	—Jan. 3	1493 $\frac{1}{2}$	143	147
preferred.....	1351 $\frac{1}{2}$	1121 $\frac{1}{2}$	140	—Jan. 14	132	—Jan. 4	140	132	138
Consolidated Ice Co.....	52	271 $\frac{1}{2}$	501 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 30	441 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 9	501 $\frac{1}{2}$	441 $\frac{1}{2}$	497 $\frac{1}{2}$
Federal Steel Co.....	52	29	553 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 16	513 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 13	553 $\frac{1}{2}$	513 $\frac{1}{2}$	523 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	851 $\frac{1}{2}$	693 $\frac{1}{2}$	891 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 30	823 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	891 $\frac{1}{2}$	823 $\frac{1}{2}$	873 $\frac{1}{2}$
General Electric Co.....	97	76	1127 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 27	951 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 3	1127 $\frac{1}{2}$	951 $\frac{1}{2}$	111
International Paper Co.....	67	48	681 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 23	61	—Jan. 12	681 $\frac{1}{2}$	61	651 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	95	85	95	—Jan. 5	93	—Jan. 11	95	93	931 $\frac{1}{2}$
National Lead Co.....	395 $\frac{1}{2}$	261 $\frac{1}{2}$	401 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 20	371 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 11	401 $\frac{1}{2}$	371 $\frac{1}{2}$	377 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	1141 $\frac{1}{2}$	99	115	—Jan. 21	1111 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 13	115	1111 $\frac{1}{2}$	1131 $\frac{1}{2}$
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	—Jan. 10	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 3	12	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{2}$
U. S. Leather Co.....	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	—Jan. 23	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 6	8	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	75 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	751 $\frac{1}{2}$	533 $\frac{1}{2}$	75	—Jan. 20	71	—Jan. 6	75	71	731 $\frac{1}{2}$
U. S. Rubber Co.....	481 $\frac{1}{2}$	141 $\frac{1}{2}$	531 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 27	425 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 5	531 $\frac{1}{2}$	425 $\frac{1}{2}$	52
preferred.....	1131 $\frac{1}{2}$	60	120	—Jan. 9	111	—Jan. 3	120	111	1171 $\frac{1}{2}$

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	100	Jan. 20, '99	100	98½	40,000
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1995	7,000,000	Q J	89½	Jan. 31, '99	89½	88	192,000
<b>Atch. Top. &amp; S. F.</b>								
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1905	124,000,000	A & O	101½	Jan. 31, '99	108½	99½	7,150,000
{ " registered.....			A & O	102	Jan. 30, '99	102½	100	120,000
{ " adjustment, g. 4's.....	1905	51,728,000	NOV	83	Jan. 31, '99	86½	78	8,435,500
{ " registered.....			NOV					
{ " Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	750,000	J & J					
{ " Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S					
{ Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.....	1904	1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99	110	108	4,000
{ Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,238,000	J & J	100½	Jan. 19, '99	100½	100½	7,000
<b>B. &amp; O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.).....</b>	1919	3,000,000	A & O	116	Jan. 18, '99	116	116	5,000
{ Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				112	Oct. 19, '98			
{ " g. 5's.....	1885-1925			115	Oct. 5, '98			
{ " coupons off.....								
{ " registered.....		10,000,000	F & A	120	Jan. 18, '99	120	120	1,000
{ Speyer & Co. eng. of dep.								
{ Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				120½	Jan. 18, '99	120½	120	17,000
{ con. g. 5's.....	1908			118½	Sept. 7, '98			
{ " registered.....		11,988,000	F & A	116	Aug. 22, '98			
{ J. P. M. & Co. cfs. dep't.....				114½	July 20, '98			
{ Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				118½	Oct. 29, '98			
{ bonds of loan of 1888 ext.		1,161,000	A & O	120	Nov. 18, '98			
{ to 1935 at 4½ Tr. Co. cfs.								
{ sterling 6½ loan of 1872 due		£1,921,800	M & S					
{ 1902 Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ sterling 6½ loan of 1874 due		£1,990,600	M & N					
{ 1910 Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ 4½ term. bonds.....	1894	8,500,000	J & D					
{ Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ sterling 4½ loan of 1888		£2,400,000	A & O					
{ (Philadelphia Branch)								
{ ster. 5½ loan of 1877 due		£1,382,200	J & D					
{ 1927 (B. & O. & Chic.) Tr.								
{ Co. cfs.....								
{ Balti. Belt. 1st g. 5's int. gtd.....	1900	6,000,000	M & N	105	Dec. 14, '98			
{ W. Virginia & Pitta. 1st g. 5's.....	1900	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '98			
{ Monongahela River 1st g. 5's.....	1919	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92			
{ Cen. Ohio. Beorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1900	2,500,000	M & S	109	Jan. 16, '99	109	108½	14,000
{ Colo. & Cin. Mid'd 1st ext 4½'s.....	1909	2,000,000	J & J	85	Jan. 19, '99	85	85	1,000
{ Ak. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. int. g. 5's.....	1900	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '98			
{ coupons off.....				105	Aug. 9, '98			
{ Tr. Co. cfs. of dep.....				115	Jan. 19, '99	115	115	18,000
{ Pittsb. & Connellsville 1st g. 4's.....	1946	2,536,000	J & J	107½	July 23, '98			
{ Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....								
{ 1st 7½ bds 1898 Tr. Co. cfs.		1,419,000	J & J					
{ con. 6½ bonds Tr. Co. cfs.		1,815,000	J & J					
{ B & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s.....	1900	10,687,000	J & J	107½	Jan. 12, '99	107½	107½	10,000
{ Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ coupons off.....								
{ S'w'n Ry 1st con g 4½'s.....	1908	10,511,000	J & J	94	Jan. 27, '99	94	93½	18,000
{ Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ coupons off.....								
{ 1st inc. g. 5's, series A.....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	82½	Jan. 11, '99	82½	82½	6,000
{ Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ 1st inc. g. 5's, series B.....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	12	Jan. 30, '99	12½	10½	122,000
{ Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	105	Nov. 30, '98			
{ Ohio & Miss. 1st con. 4's.....	1947	2,615,000	J & J	112	Jan. 30, '99	112	108½	150,000
{ 2d con. 7's.....	1911	2,952,000	A & O	130¼	Jan. 31, '99	130¼	128	833,000
{ 1st Spr'gfield div. 7's.....	1905	1,984,000	M & N	108	Jan. 31, '99	108	108½	178,000
{ 1st gen. 5's.....	1932	405,000	J & D	98	Apr. 2, '92			
<b>Brooklyn E. Tr. Co. cfs 1st g. 6's.....</b>	1924	3,464,000		108½	Jan. 27, '99	108½	94½	365,000
{ Tr. Co. cfs. 2d g. 5's.....	1915	1,246,000						
{ all instal. paid.....				86	June 27, '98			
{ Sena. & B. B. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 5's.....	1942	1,357,000		99½	Jan. 16, '99	100	98	30,000
{ all instal. paid.....								
{ Union Ele. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 6's.....	1907	6,124,000		108	Jan. 31, '99	108½	94½	611,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest price and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due	Amount	Int't Paid	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's...1945		6,625,000	A & O	109	Jan. 31, '99	110½	108	112,000
Bklyn City R. R. 1st con. 5's 1916 1941		4,373,000	J & J	117½	Dec. 14, '98			
Bklyn Qu. Co. & Sur. 1st con. gtd g. 5's.....1941		2,255,000	M & N	107	Jan. 31, '99	108	105½	249,000
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4's.....1938		3,000,000	J & J	74	Sept. 1, '98			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....1937		4,407,000	M & S	109¼	Jan. 18, '99	109¼	107½	8,000
deb. 6's.....1947		1,000,000	J & J					
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....1921		1,300,000	F & A	127	Mar. 2, '98			
cons. 1st 6's.....1922		3,920,000	J & D	128	Jan. 20, '99	128	128	1,000
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....1943		650,000	J & J	121¼	May 28, '98			
Buff. & St. Mary's S'w'n 1st g. 5s.....1927		1,000,000	F & A	102½	Jan. 30, '99	102½	102½	5,000
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's, 1913 registered.....		1,211,500	A & O	100	Feb. 27, '98			
			A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's, 1906 con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....1984 registered.....		6,500,000	J & D	108¼	Jan. 21, '98	108½	107	71,500
		6,425,000	A & O	112½	Jan. 27, '99	112½	111	24,000
			A & O	97	Feb. 9, '98			
Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's, g. 1927		150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's, 1920 1st 5's.....1921		825,000	A & O	105¼	Nov. 25, '98			
1,905,000			A & O	106	Jan. 6, '99	106	105	5,000
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's, 1908 2d mortg. 5's.....1913 registered.....		13,920,000	J & J	110¼	Jan. 31, '99	110¼	108½	114,000
		5,100,000	M & S	111¼	Jan. 30, '99	111¼	110½	11,000
			M & S	106¼	May 22, '98			
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's, 1948		2,500,000	J & D	95½	Jan. 31, '99	95½	91½	85,000
Cent. R. & Bkq. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's, 1937		4,880,000	M & N	95	Jan. 18, '99	95	95	1,000
Central R'y of Georgia, 1st g. 5's, 1945 registered \$1,000 & \$5,000		7,000,000	F & A	118	Dec. 22, '98			
			F & A					
con. g. 5's.....1945		16,500,000	M & N	92¼	Jan. 31, '99	93¼	92	2,418,000
con. g. 5's, reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000			M & N					
1st pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	39¼	Jan. 31, '99	40¼	39¼	225,000
2d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	18	Jan. 28, '99	18	11½	100,500
3d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	6½	Dec. 8, '98			
Macon & Nor. Div. 1st g. 5's.....1946		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 23, '98			
Mobile div. 1st g. 5's.....1946		1,000,000	J & J	99	July 6, '98			
Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5s, 1947		413,000	J & J	86¼	Sept. 6, '98			
Central Railroad of New Jersey, 1st consolidated 7's.....1899 convertible 7's.....1902 deb. 6's.....1908 gen. g. 5's.....1897 registered.....		3,836,000	Q J	101½	Jan. 9, '99	101½	101½	10,000
		1,167,000	M & N	112	Jan. 11, '99	112	112	5,000
		466,000	M & N	110	July 21, '98			
		43,924,000	J & J	115¼	Jan. 31, '99	115¼	113¼	449,500
			Q J	114¼	Jan. 31, '99	114¼	112¼	79,000
Lehigh & W. B. con. assd. 7's.....1900 mortgage 5's.....1912		5,384,000	Q M	100	Jan. 24, '99	100	99¼	50,000
		2,691,000	M & N	90	Jan. 25, '99	90	87½	16,000
Am. Dock & Improv't Co. 5's, 1921		4,987,000	J & J	116¼	Dec. 5, '98			
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's, 1920		1,082,000	J & J					
N. J. Southern Int. gtd 6's.....1899		411,000	J & J	104	Nov. 13, '98			
Gen. P. ex g. 5's Speyer & Co. cfs, A, 1898 B C D.....1899 E.....1898 F G H I, 1901		2,995,000		103	Oct. 20, '98			
		3,383,000		103	Feb. 18, '98			
		3,997,000	J & J	101¼	May 5, '98			
		15,508,000		104	Jan. 12, '99	104	103	3,000
San Joaquin br. g. 6's.....1900 gtd. g. 5's.....1839 Speyer & Co. eng. cfs.....1900 land grant g. 5's.....1900 Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's, 1918		6,080,000	A & O	102¼	Oct. 12, '98			
		4,279,000	A & O	84½	Sept. 16, '98			
		8,004,000	A & O	102	Mar. 19, '98			
		2,294,000	J & J	101¼	Dec. 6, '97			
		4,358,000	J & J	103	Jan. 19, '99	103	103	1,000
Western Pacific bonds 6's.....1899 North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's, gtd.....1907 gtd. g. 5's.....1838		2,735,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97			
		3,984,000	A & O	105½	Dec. 19, '98			
		4,800,000	A & O	106¾	Dec. 13, '98			
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's.....1838		1,500,000	J & J					
Ches. & Ohio 6's, g. Series A.....1906 Mortgage gold 6's.....1911 1st con. g. 5's.....1939 registered.....		2,000,000	A & O	119½	Jan. 18, '99	119½	119	3,000
		2,000,000	A & O	119	Nov. 14, '98			
		25,858,000	M & N	119	Jan. 31, '99	119¼	117½	230,000
			M & N	118¼	Jan. 16, '99	116¼	116¼	13,000
		23,728,000	M & S	95½	Jan. 31, '99	96½	90½	2,106,000
			M & S	82½	Jan. 18, '99	82½	82½	5,000
		6,000,000	J & J	105½	Jan. 30, '99	105½	105	37,000
		1,000,000	J & J	97	Dec. 2, '98			
		650,000	J & J	95½	May 27, '98			
		400,000	M & S	98	Dec. 21, '93			
		3,007,000	M & S	103	Jan. 31, '99	103	103	7,000
Chicago & Alton's king fund 6's, 1903		1,722,000	J & J	110¼	Dec. 16, '98			
Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's.....1900 2d 7's.....1900		1,785,000	F & A	107¼	Jan. 6, '99	107¼	107¼	3,000
		300,000	M & N	107	July 20, '98			
Miss. Riv. Edge 1st s. 7'd g. 6's.....1912		512,000	A & O	105¼	Oct. 30, '95			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		28,924,000	J & J	115	Jan. 31, '99	115	114 $\frac{3}{8}$	162,000
" 5's, sinking fund..... 1901		2,315,000	A & O	101 $\frac{3}{4}$	Nov. 7, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 5's, debentures..... 1913		9,000,000	M & N	111	Jan. 31, '99	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	111	5,000
" convertible 5's..... 1903		10,859,500	M & S	137 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 31, '99	140 $\frac{1}{4}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	384,500
" (Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's, 1919		2,818,000	A & O	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 4's..... 1919		9,050,000	A & O	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Denver div. 4's..... 1922		5,856,000	F & A	102	Oct. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 4's..... 1921		3,150,000	M & S	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 26, '99	101	100 $\frac{3}{8}$	4,000
" Chic. & Iowa div. 5's..... 1905		2,320,000	F & A	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Nebraska extensi'n 4's, 1927		26,110,000	M & N	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 26, '99	108	105 $\frac{3}{4}$	181,000
" registered.....			M & N	97	May 9, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's, 1911		8,000,000	M & S	123	Jan. 25, '99	123	123	5,000
" Chic. Burl. & Northern, 1st 5's, 1926		8,241,000	A & O	107 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 25, '99	107 $\frac{3}{4}$	107 $\frac{3}{4}$	5,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	115	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds.....			J & D	112	Apr. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st con. 6's, gold..... 1934			A & O	134	Jan. 23, '99	134	134	10,000
" gen. con. 1st 5's..... 1937			M & N	110 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 30, '99	112	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	79,000
" registered.....		9,767,000	M & N	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			M & N	103	Nov. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's..... 1936		4,626,000	J & J	105	Sept. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville								
" (Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	115	Jan. 18, '99	115	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	7,000
" Chic. Ind. & Louisv. ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,177,000	J & J	92 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 20, '99	92 $\frac{3}{4}$	92	7,000
" refunding g. 6's..... 1947		4,700,000	J & J	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 27, '99	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	104	30,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
" Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's \$ g. R.d. 1902		2,723,500	J & J	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 19, '99	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	160 $\frac{3}{4}$	6,000
" 1st 7's £..... 1902			J & J	120	Feb. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
" 1st m. Iowa & D. 7's..... 1899		147,000	J & J	182	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st m. C. & M. 7's..... 1903		1,892,000	J & J	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 17, '97	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	160 $\frac{1}{2}$	16,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's, 1905		9,803,000	J & J	163	Jan. 24, '99	163	160	43,000
" 1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		3,099,000	J & J	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 19, '99	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	161	5,000
" 1st 6's, Southw'n div., 1909		4,000,000	J & J	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 31, '99	121	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	6,000
" 1st 5's, La. C. & Dav..... 1919		2,500,000	J & J	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st So. Min. div. 6's..... 1910		7,432,000	J & J	121	Jan. 31, '99	121	118 $\frac{3}{4}$	36,000
" 1st H'st & Dk. div. 7's, 1910		5,680,000	J & J	129	Jan. 19, '99	129	129	2,000
" 5's..... 1910		990,000	J & J	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Chic. & Pac. div. 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	122	Dec. 29, '98	121 $\frac{3}{4}$	118 $\frac{3}{4}$	37,000
" 1st Chic. & P. W. 5's, 1921		25,340,000	J & J	121	Jan. 23, '99	122	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	32,000
" Chic. & M. R. div. 5's, 1926		3,083,000	J & J	121 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Mineral Point div. 5's, 1910		2,840,000	J & J	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	Apr. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's, 1921		1,360,000	J & J	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Wis. & Min. div. 5's, 1921		4,755,000	J & J	118	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" terminal 5's..... 1914		4,748,000	J & J	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Far. & So. 6's assu..... 1924		1,250,000	J & J	127 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
" cont. si'k. f'd 5's..... 1916		610,000	J & J	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	July 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
" Dakota & Gt. S. 5's..... 1916		2,856,000	J & J	114	Dec. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
" g. m. g. 4's, series A..... 1989		23,676,000	J & J	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 31, '99	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	45,000
" registered.....			Q	J	105 $\frac{1}{2}$	Feb. 19, '98	.....	.....
" Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's, 1910		2,155,000	J & D	121	Dec. 27, '98	126	126	5,000
" 1st convt. 6's..... 1913		5,092,000	J & D	126	Jan. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's. 1915		12,771,000	Q F	144 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 28, '99	145	144	32,000
" coupon gold 7's..... 1902		10,438,000	J & D	113	Jan. 31, '99	113	113	53,000
" registered d. gold 7's 1902			J & D	113	Jan. 13, '99	113	113	2,000
" sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929		6,019,000	A & O	116	Jan. 6, '99	116	116	1,000
" registered.....			A & O	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	Oct. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 5's..... 1879-1929		7,197,000	A & O	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 26, '99	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	14,000
" registered.....			A & O	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
" debenture 5's..... 1933		9,800,000	M & N	123	Jan. 30, '99	123	122	3,000
" registered.....			M & N	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 25 year debent. 6's..... 1909		5,900,000	M & N	110	Jan. 5, '99	110	110	9,000
" registered.....			M & N	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mar. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 30 year debent. 6's..... 1921		10,000,000	A & O	116	Dec. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95	.....	.....	.....
" extension 4's..... 1886-1926		18,632,000	F A 15	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 24, '99	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,000
" registered.....			F A 15	103	June 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
" gen. g. 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's..... 1987		7,198,000	M & N	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 31, '99	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	84,000
" registered.....			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's. 1901		455,000	J & J	107 $\frac{1}{4}$	May 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's. 1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84	.....	.....	.....
Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's. 1900		1,094,000	A & O	108	Oct. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's. 1907		1,592,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's. 1905		1,600,000	M & S	117	Jan. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's. 1909		1,600,000	M & S	111	Jan. 5, '99	111	111	3,000
Northern Illinois 1st 5's. 1910		1,500,000	M & S	105	Apr. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mil., Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's, 1921		5,000,000	M & N	140 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 18, '99	140 $\frac{1}{2}$	140 $\frac{1}{2}$	39,000
" con. deb. 5's..... 1907		436,000	F & A	105 $\frac{1}{2}$	Feb. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
ext. & imp't. s.f.d g. 5's 1920		4,148,000	F & A	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Michigan div. 1st 6's. 1924		1,261,000	J & J	188	Dec. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ashland div. 1st 6's. 1925		1,000,000	M & S	142 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 24, '99	142 $\frac{1}{2}$	142 $\frac{1}{2}$	3,000
Income. ....		500,000	M & N	118	Apr. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup. 1917		12,100,000	J & J	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 20, '99	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	131 $\frac{1}{2}$	18,000
registered. .... 1917			J & J	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 27, '99	132 $\frac{1}{2}$	132 $\frac{1}{2}$	5,000
gen. g. 4's. .... 1928		47,971,000	J & J	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 31, '99	108	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,567,000
registered. ....			J & J	104	Sept. 21, '97	.....	.....	.....
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's. 1905		1,300,000	J & J	98	Jan. 9, '99	98	98	5,000
1st 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's. .... 1905		1,200,000	J & J	80	Nov. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
extension 4's. ....		672,000	J & J	88	Mar. 15, '97	.....	.....	.....
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's. 1923		2,750,000	A & O	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 12, '99	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	12,000
small bond. .... 1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1920		12,768,000	J & D	136 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 25, '99	136 $\frac{1}{2}$	136	6,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		2,650,000	M & N	136 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 31, '99	136 $\frac{1}{2}$	136 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,000
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1920		800,000	J & J	125	May 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	134	Jan. 13, '99	134	134	3,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's. 1947		12,000,000	J & J	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 13, '99	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	464,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		878,000	M & N	106	June 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen'l mortg. g. 6's. .... 1922		9,868,000	Q M	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1921		5,753,000	J & D	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mar. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
coupons off. ....						.....	.....	.....
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's. 1905		986,000	A & O	119	Oct. 26, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's. .... 1937		2,000,000	J & J	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mar. 13, '97	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 18, '99	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,000
City Sub. R'y. Balto. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,430,000	J & D	105 $\frac{1}{2}$	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Clev., A. K'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1920		730,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st 5's for. 1917		1,907,000	.....	78	Jan. 31, '99	78	70 $\frac{1}{2}$	154,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1923		7,574,000	J & D	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 31, '99	96	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,532,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1920		5,000,000	J & J	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1920		9,750,000	M & N	108	Jan. 30, '99	108	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	63,000
registered. ....				90	Mar. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,085,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	87	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1921		4,000,000	J & J	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 3, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1926		7,685,000	Q F	104	Jan. 27, '99	104	102	12,000
registered. ....				95	Nov. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
con. 6's. .... 1920		731,000	M & N	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	June 30, '93	.....	.....	.....
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's 1923		2,571,000	J & J	114	Oct. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
Ind. Bloom. & W. 1st prd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	Feb. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
Ohio, Ind. & W. 1st prd. 5's. 1928		500,000	Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	87	Jan. 31, '99	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	83	762,000
income 4's. .... 1920		4,000,000	A	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 30, '99	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	553,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	102	Jan. 26, '99	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	4,000
consol mortg. 7's. .... 1914			J & D	137 $\frac{1}{2}$	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
sink fund 7's. .... 1914		3,991,000	J & D	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
gen. consol 6's. .... 1924		3,205,000	J & J	132 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	Oct. 16, '97	.....	.....	.....
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's 1923		4,300,000	A & O	107	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1928		2,936,000	J & J	121	Sept. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....			Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. Midd R'y. 1st g. 2-3-4's. .... 1947		6,250,000	J & J	67	Jan. 30, '99	69	66	371,000
1st g. 4's. .... 1947		1,011,000	J & J	75	Jan. 30, '99	76	74	216,000
Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. .... 1881		8,000,000	.....	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 31, '99	80	78	1,701,000
gen. mort. g. 6's. .... 1904		2,000,000	J & D	32	Jan. 9, '99	34	32	3,000
gen. Hen g. 4's. .... 1926		852,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered, \$5,000. ....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,087,000	M & S	124	Nov. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,966,000	A & O	126	July 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. .... 1914		5,000,000	M & N	144	Jan. 26, '99	144	144	1,000
bonds, 7's. .... 1900		281,000	J & J	109	Nov. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
7's. .... 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 25, '99	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	13,000
1st c. gtd 7's. .... 1915		12,151,000	J & D	148	Jan. 20, '99	143	143	8,000
registered. ....			J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,000,000	J & J	137	Sept. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
const. 5's. .... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 17, '97	.....	.....	.....
Warren 2d 7's. .... 1900		750,000	A & O	108	Aug. 1, '96	.....	.....	.....



BOND SALES.

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NAME	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's...1917		5,000,000	M & S	146	Sept. 18, '98			
reg. ....1917			M & S	143	May 4, '98			
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's...1906		8,000,000	A & O	122	Dec. 6, '98			
registered.....1906			A & O	122½	Feb. 12, '94			
6's.....1906		7,000,000	A & O	117½	Jan. 19, '98	117½	117½	8,000
registered.....1906			A & O	117½	Jan. 27, '98	117½	117½	6,000
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's...1921		2,000,000	M & N	151	Jan. 31, '98	151	151	1,000
1st r 7's.....1921			M & N	141	May 6, '98			
Denver Cen. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's.1903		730,000	A & O	98	Jan. 24, '98	92	90	8,000
Denver T'way Co. con. g. 6's...1910		1,219,000	J & J					
Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's.1911		918,000	J & J					
Denver & Rio Grande 1st g. 7's...1900		1,984,500	M & N	108½	Jan. 17, '98	108½	108½	8,000
1st con. g. 4's.....1926		23,650,000	J & J	101	Jan. 31, '98	101½	100½	362,500
con. g. 4½'s.....1926		4,348,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 19, '98	104½	103½	30,000
impt. m. g. 5's.....1923		8,103,500	J & D	104½	Jan. 23, '98	104½	102½	222,500
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's.1917		623,000	M & N	102	Oct. 26, '98			
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s.....1906		900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '96			
g. 4s.....1906		1,260,000	J & D					
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....1907		6,734,000	A & O	110	Jan. 31, '98	110	107½	100,000
registered.....1907			A & O	101½	July 23, '98			
2d l m 6s.....1916		2,000,000	J & J					
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.1923		800,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 11, '98			
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's...1907		4,000,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 19, '98	111½	111½	6,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's.1941		7,417,000	M & N	106½	Jan. 27, '98	106½	104½	96,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.....1907		2,482,000	M & S	117	Jan. 6, '98	117	117	10,000
2d extended 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & N	119½	Aug. 2, '98			
3d extended 4½'s.....1923		4,618,000	M & S	112	Nov. 11, '98			
4th extended 5's.....1920		2,926,000	A & O	121	Jan. 20, '98	121	121	7,000
5th extended 4's.....1923		709,500	J & D	104½	June 8, '98			
1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		3,699,500	M & S	145½	Jan. 28, '98	145½	145	26,000
1st cons. fund c. 7's.....1920		3,705,977	M & S	143	Dec. 30, '98			
Long Dock consol. 6's.....1903		7,500,000	A & O	139	Sept. 20, '98			
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's...1916		2,380,000	J & D	140	Jan. 26, '98	140	140	10,000
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's.1908		1,500,000	J&J					
small.....1908			J&J					
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's...1908		2,900,000	A & O	103	Nov. 2, '98			
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's...1902		12,000,000	M & N	114	Jan. 27, '98	114	111½	59,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.		1,100,000	M&N					
1st g currency 6's.....1922								
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.		3,306,000	J&J	103	Aug. 31, '98			
Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913								
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's...1945		1,452,000	M&N	109	Oct. 27, '98			
small.....1945								
Erie R. R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds.1906		30,000,000	J&J	93½	Jan. 31, '98	95	92½	1,982,000
registered.....1906			J&J					
gen. lien 3-4s.....1906		30,927,000	J&J	74½	Jan. 31, '98	77	72½	3,003,000
registered.....1906			J&J					
N. Y. Sus. & W. 1st refdg. g. 5's.1937		3,750,000	J & J	109	Jan. 31, '98	109	107	26,000
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		453,000	F & A	92½	Aug. 25, '98			
gen. g. 5's.....1940		2,548,000	F & A	99	Jan. 31, '98	99	95	315,000
term. 1st g. 5's.....1943		2,000,000	M & N	111	Oct. 6, '98			
registered.....\$5,000 each			M & N					
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g 5's.1942		3,000,000	J & D	102	Jan. 31, '98	102½	99½	209,000
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's...1910		3,500,000	A & O	122	Dec. 21, '98			
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1933		500,000	F & A	85	Nov. 10, '97			
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.1921		3,000,000	J & J	121½	Jan. 16, '98	121½	121½	3,000
1st General g 5's.....1942		2,223,000	A & O	102	Jan. 31, '98	102	100½	208,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93			
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's...1960		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91			
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's...1926		1,591,000	J & J	102½	Jan. 21, '98	103½	100	74,000
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's...1920		3,999,000	A & O	122½	Jan. 30, '98	122½	121	51,000
1st con. gold 5's.....1939		2,600,000	M & N	101½	Jan. 31, '98	101½	100½	227,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's...1939		3,983,000	A & O	101½	Jan. 25, '98	102	100	92,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's...1913		3,000,000	J & J	103	Aug. 14, '96			
1st land grant ex. g 5's...1960		423,000	J & J					
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96			
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98			
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctf. dep. 1st 6's.1921		3,176,000		87	Jan. 31, '98	87	85	421,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.1923		2,863,000	J & J	62½	Jan. 30, '98	63½	62½	40,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s.1913		2,000,000	A & O	101	Jan. 31, '98	101½	99½	57,000
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's...1945		2,230,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12, '88			
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's...1927		5,380,000	J & J	100	Jan. 31, '98	100	100	8,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Houston E. & W. Tex. 1st g 5's. 1888		2,700,000	M & N	100	Jan. 31, '99	102	97½	181,000
Illinois Central, total out-standing.....	\$18,950,000							
1st g. 4's.....	1894-1951	1,500,000	J & J	112½	Nov. 30, '98			
registered.....			J & J	112½	Nov. 23, '98			
1st gold 3½'s.....	1961	2,499,000	J & J	105	Jan. 30, '99	105	103½	8,000
registered.....			J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98			
1st g 3s sterl. 2,500,000. 1961		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 18, '96			
registered.....			M & S					
collat. trust gold 4's. 1952		15,000,000	M & N	106½	Jan. 31, '99	107	105½	53,000
regist'd.....			M & N	104½	Jan. 30, '99	104½	104½	5,000
col. t. g. 4½ L. N. O. & Tex. 1953		24,679,000	J & J	103½	Jan. 31, '99	104	102	230,000
registered.....			J & J					
col. trust 2-10 g. 4's. 1904		4,806,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 28, '98			
registered.....			J & J					
West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1951		5,425,000	F & A	108	Nov. 23, '98			
registered.....			F & A					
Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1953		14,320,000	J & J	94½	Jan. 31, '99	95	93½	188,000
registered.....			J & J					
St. Louis div. g. 3's. 1961		4,939,000	J & J	88	Jan. 30, '99	88	81	73,000
registered.....			J & J					
g. 3½'s.....	1951	6,321,000	J & J	94½	Jan. 31, '99	94½	94	77,500
registered.....			J & J					
Calro Bridge 4's g. ....	1950	3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '95			
registered.....			J & D					
Middle div. registered 5's.....	1921	600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '95			
Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s. 1951		2,000,000	J & J					
registered.....			J & J					
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's.....	1951	16,555,000	J D 15	126	Jan. 31, '99	126	120	7,000
gold 5's, registered.....	1951		J D 15	123	Sept. 12, '97			
g. 3½'s.....	1951	1,352,000	J D 15					
registered.....			J D 15					
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		3,500,000	J & D	104½	Dec. 27, '98			
registered.....			J & D					
Belleville & Carott 1st 6's.....	1923	485,000	J & D	115	June 22, '98			
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1951		550,000	M & S	93	Dec. 2, '97			
Carbondale & Shaw'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		250,000	M & S	90	Nov. 22, '98			
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....	1935	1,824,000	J & J	103	Jan. 12, '99	103	102½	11,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st ref'd g. 5's. 1948		2,500,000	A & O	106	Jan. 24, '99	106	104½	30,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st. 6's, gold. 1919		7,954,000	M & N	125	Jan. 31, '99	125	124½	8,000
2d g. 5's.....	1906	6,583,000	M & S	94½	Jan. 31, '99	95	93	86,500
3d g. 4's.....	1921	2,720,500	M & S	82	Jan. 25, '99	82	80	55,500
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....	1938	6,572,000	J & D	109½	Jan. 25, '99	110	107	32,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1929	3,000,000	A & O					
Kan. C. Pitt. & Gulf 1st & col. g. 5's 1923		22,578,000	A & O	72½	Jan. 31, '99	75½	64½	2,237,500
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's. 1925		3,177,000	J & J	70	Jan. 31, '99	77	65	350,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A. 1929		1,979,000	M & S	59	Jan. 28, '99	74½	59	412,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....	1937	7,250,000	J & J	118	Jan. 26, '99	118	116½	34,000
2d mtge. g. 5's.....	1941	3,625,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 25, '99	104½	103½	102,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's....	1945	2,500,000	A & O	100	Jan. 31, '99	102	100	47,000
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's.....	1997	5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98			
registered.....			M & N					
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s. 1940		15,000,000	J & J	106	Jan. 31, '99	106½	105½	23,000
registered.....			J & J					
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1941		10,000,000	A & O	113½	Jan. 19, '99	113½	113	46,000
registered.....			A & O					
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1933		10,280,000	J & J	109½	July 1, '97			
registered.....	1933		J & J	92½	Mar. 22, '98			
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's.....	1945	2,000,000	M & S	91½	Jan. 27, '96	91½	91½	2,000
registered.....			M & S					
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's 1914		750,000	A & O					
g. 5's.....	1914	1,350,000	A & O	101	Sept. 16, '97			
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. cdfs. for 1st g. 5's.....	1937	3,145,000	Q J	85	Jan. 20, '99	85	85	4,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....	1881	3,610,000	Q J	122	Jan. 26, '99	122	120	6,000
1st con. g. 4's.....	1931	1,121,000	Q J					
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & D	99½	Jan. 31, '99	99½	98	41,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....	1922	1,500,000	M & S	100½	Jan. 31, '99	101	99	92,000
g. 4's.....	1932	325,000	J & D	91	Sept. 27, '97			
deb. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & D	100	May 26, '97			

BOND SALES.

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				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's. 1927		984,000	M & S	100	Jan. 17 '99	100	100	7,000
• 2d m. inc. 1927		1,000,000	S	106½	July 9 '97	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's. 1925		1,728,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31 '99	107	107	1,000
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's. 1911		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• 1st 5's. 1911		750,000	M & S	107½	July 16 '96	.....	.....	.....
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn'd 5's. 1932		1,075,000	QJAN	108½	June 17 '95	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. g'd 5's. 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's. 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
• 1st con. TrCo.ct. gold 5's. 1909		8,594,000	J & J	50	Jan. 31 '99	50	50	95,000
• Gen. mtg. g. 4's. 1943		2,492,000	M & S	5	Dec. 23 '98	.....	.....	.....
Louis. & Nash. Cecilian brch. 7's. 1907		490,000	M & S	106	Nov. 11 '97	.....	.....	.....
• N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's. 1930		5,000,000	J & J	129½	Jan. 19 '99	129½	129½	2,000
• 2d 6's. 1930		1,000,000	J & J	117	Dec. 18 '98	.....	.....	.....
• E., Hend. & N. 1st 6's. 1919		1,980,000	J & D	117	Nov. 22 '98	.....	.....	.....
• general mort. 6's. 1930		10,058,000	J & D	119	Jan. 30 '99	119	117½	4,000
• Pensacola div. 6's. 1920		580,000	M & S	108½	Sept. 24 '97	.....	.....	.....
• St. Louis div. 1st 6's. 1921		8,500,000	M & S	125	Dec. 7 '97	.....	.....	.....
• 2d 3's. 1920		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 26 '95	.....	.....	.....
• Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's. 1900		1,900,000	J & J	107	Nov. 17 '98	.....	.....	.....
• So. & N. Ala. sl'g fd. 6s. 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30 '98	.....	.....	.....
• con. gtd. g. 5's. 1936		8,873,000	F & A	109	Jan. 28 '99	109	109	1,000
• gold 5's. 1937		1,764,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 31 '99	108½	107½	12,000
• Unified gold 4's. 1940		14,994,000	J & J	98½	Jan. 30 '99	98½	95½	680,000
• registered. 1940			J & J	88	Feb. 27 '93	.....	.....	.....
• Pen. & At. 1st 6's. g. 4's. 1921		2,753,000	F & A	112	Jan. 27 '99	112	111	15,000
• collateral trust g. 5's. 1931		5,129,000	M & N	106¾	Jan. 17 '99	106¾	108	20,000
• L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
• 1st. g. 4's. 1945		4,000,000	M & S	109½	July 18 '98	.....	.....	.....
• N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's. 1937		2,096,000	F & A	109¼	Jan. 27 '99	109¼	107¾	55,000
• Kentucky Cent. g. 4's. 1937		6,742,000	J & J	92	Jan. 27 '99	92	91	8,000
• L. & N. Louv. Cin. & Lex. g. 4½'s. 1931		8,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18 '98	.....	.....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		8,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,800,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19 '98	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's. 1990		24,065,000	A & O	105¼	Jan. 31 '99	106	95	8,128,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's. 1908		10,818,000	J & J	117	Jan. 31 '99	117	116	40,000
• 2d 6's. 1909		4,000,000	M & N	102½	Jan. 30 '99	102½	102¼	13,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's. 1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Metro. St. Ry. gen. col. tr. g. 5's. 1997		12,500,000	F & A	124	Jan. 31 '99	124	118¼	590,000
• B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1997		7,650,000	J & D	125¼	Jan. 30 '99	125¼	122	37,000
• registered			J & D	112½	May 29 '93	.....	.....	.....
• Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1933		3,000,000	M & S	126	Jan. 31 '98	127	123¾	41,000
• registered			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1933		5,000,000	M & S	126½	Jan. 24 '99	126½	124¾	15,000
• registered			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Central.								
• con. mtge. 4's. 1911		59,011,000	J & J	68¾	Jan. 4 '99	68¾	68¾	5,000
• 1st con. inc. 3's. 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20 '98	.....	.....	.....
• 2d 3's. 1939		11,310,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30 '98	.....	.....	.....
• equip. & collat. g. 5's. 1917		950,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's. 1942		4,635,000	M & S	86¼	Jan. 30 '99	86¼	84¼	496,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's. 1927		11,418,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6 '95	.....	.....	.....
• 2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	15	Dec. 7 '98	.....	.....	.....
• March 1, 1899, stamped 1½ paid								
• 2d inc. 6's "B" 1917		12,265,000	A	6½	Dec. 7 '98	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's. 1910		1,813,000	J & D	97	Feb. 11 '97	.....	.....	.....
• registered			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's. 1933		6,103,000	F & A	101¼	Nov. 3 '98	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	146	Jan. 12 '99	146	145	2,000
• 1st con. g. 5's. 1934		5,000,000	M & N	112	Jan. 28 '99	112	110¼	14,000
• Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. 1909		1,015,000	J & D	125	Jan. 27 '99	125	125	8,000
• Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. 1910		636,000	J & D	127	Jan. 27 '99	127	127	6,000
• Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. 1921		1,382,000	J & A	128	Dec. 12 '98	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936								
• stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.		3,206,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26 '87	.....	.....	.....

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				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apl. 2, '95	....	....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	....	....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1888		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	....	....	.....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,050,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '95	....	....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,718,000	J & D	98½	Jan. 31, '99	95	91¾	1,650,000
2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	89½	Jan. 31, '99	71	67½	6,071,000
1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & S	82	Jan. 23, '99	90	82	88,000
of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	87½	Jan. 31, '99	90	86	168,000
Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1890		2,500,000	F & A	82	Jan. 31, '99	82	75¼	525,000
Del. & Waco 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	85	Jan. 21, '99	88½	85	28,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		558,000	M & N	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Tebo. & Neosho 1st 7's. .... 1908		187,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Mo Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	105	Jan. 27, '99	105	101¾	84,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	114½	Jan. 31, '99	114½	108¾	1,063,000
3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	115½	Jan. 13, '99	115½	115¼	1,000
trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	95	Jan. 30, '99	95	91½	207,000
registered.			F & A	96½	Jan. 31, '99	95	88	687,000
1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	.....	.....	....	....	.....
registered.			M & S	107½	Jan. 6, '99	107½	107½	1,000
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1898		7,000,000	F & A	111½	Jan. 19, '99	111½	111¼	8,000
2d extended g. 5's. .... 1898		2,573,000	M & S	750,000	.....	....	....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J	108	Dec. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		4,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 31, '99	107½	106½	49,000
St. L. & I'rn. Mt. 1st ex. 4½'s. .... 1897		6,000,000	J & D	106	Jan. 31, '99	106	105¾	77,000
2d. ext. g. 5's. .... 1946		2,500,000	A & O	110½	Jan. 31, '99	111½	105	2,768,000
Ark'nssas b'nch ext 5's. 1895		18,274,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 31, '99	111½	110	12,000
g. con. R. R. & 1. gr. 5's. 1931		6,945,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
stamped gtd gold 5's. .... 1931			J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Mob. & Birm. prior lien. g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
small.		226,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
small.		500,000	.....	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	126	Jan. 30, '99	126	125	17,000
1st extension 6's. .... 1827		974,000	J & D	118½	Jan. 19, '99	118½	118¼	2,000
gen. g. 4's. .... 1898		9,347,000	Q J	86	Jan. 31, '99	86	82½	488,000
Montg'ry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 31, '99	108	106	41,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1831		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	132¼	Jan. 30, '99	132¼	132	36,000
2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	105½	Nov. 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1828		6,213,000	A & O	108	Jan. 19, '99	108	108	23,000
1st 6's T. & P. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
1st 6's McM. M. W. & Al. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		22,487,000	J & J	117½	Jan. 31, '99	117½	114½	74,000
1st registered. .... 1903			J & J	117½	Jan. 30, '99	117½	114½	35,000
debenture 5's. .... 1904		5,775,000	M & S	113¼	Jan. 30, '99	113¼	110¾	22,000
debenture 5's reg. .... 1904			M & S	113¼	Jan. 23, '99	113¼	113¼	10,000
reg. debent. 5's. .... 1889-1904		815,000	M & S	108½	Feb. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
debenture g. 4's. 1890-1905		8,205,000	J & D	104	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.			J & D	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1906		4,397,000	M & N	106½	Jan. 24, '99	106½	105½	38,000
registered.			M & N	104½	June 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
g. mortgage 3½'s. .... 1897		27,601,000	J & J	112	Jan. 31, '99	112	110½	89,000
registered.			J & J	108	Nov. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		18,349,000	F & A	101½	Jan. 31, '99	102	98	586,000
registered.			F & A	93	Nov. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		90,848,000	F & A	101¾	Jan. 31, '99	102½	99¼	1,612,000
registered.			F & A	99¼	Jan. 10, '99	99¼	98	7,000
Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	108	Jan. 12, '99	108	108	4,000
7's registered. .... 1900			M & N	106¼	Jan. 27, '99	106¼	106¼	5,000
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1866		1,650,000	F & A	108	May 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
reg. certificates.			F & A	.....	.....	....	....	.....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	112¾	Jan. 30, '99	113	110¼	458,000
registered.			J & J	113	Jan. 28, '99	113	109¾	284,500

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's.....1986		5,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			J & J	108	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 5's.....1986		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, } 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940 }		770,000	J & J	95	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds series B. ....		33,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's.....1922		9,061,000	A & O	131½	Jan. 31, '99	122	130	82,000
" coup. g. bond currency.....			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		180,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		375,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	107	Aug. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1991		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
Carthage & Adiron 1st gtd g. 4's. 1981		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1988		4,000,000	A & O	103	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		1,200,000	A & O	122½	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1908		924,000	F & A	121	Apr. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....1899		998,000	A & O	102¼	Jan. 23, '99	102¼	102¼	2,000
" con. co. 1st 7's.....1900		.....	J & J	105¼	Jan. 21, '99	105¼	105¼	2,000
" con. 1st registered.....1900		9,163,000	Q J	105¼	Jan. 18, '99	105¼	105¼	12,000
" con. co. 2d 7's.....1903		.....	J & D	116¼	Jan. 31, '99	116¼	116¼	6,000
" con. 2d registered.....1908		8,726,000	J & D	116¼	Jan. 5, '99	116¼	116¼	10,000
" g 3½'s.....1907		28,166,000	J & D	107¼	Jan. 25, '99	107¼	108	208,000
" registered.....		.....	J & D	108	Jan. 5, '99	108	108	5,000
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	108¼	Dec. 1, '97	.....	.....	.....
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd 5's.....1988		840,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....1984		1,500,000	J & J	121	Oct. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Con. 1st con. 7's.....1902		8,000,000	M & N	113	Jan. 25, '99	112	111½	7,000
" 1st con. 5's.....1902		2,000,000	M & N	104¼	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 6's.....1909		1,500,000	M & S	123	Feb. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
" coup. 5's.....1931		3,576,000	M & S	121¼	June 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
" reg. 5's.....1931		.....	M	121	Dec. 6, '97	.....	.....	.....
" mtgt. 4's.....1940		2,600,000	Q J	108	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 4's reg.....		.....	J & J	108	Jan. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's.....1989		478,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1987		19,425,000	A & O	107½	Jan. 31, '99	108	108	185,000
" registered.....			A & O	104	Nov. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1903		2,000,000	J & D	104¼	Oct. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
" con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	174	Jan. 31, '99	174	178	45,000
" small certifs.....\$100		1,420,000	.....	173	Jan. 31, '99	174	172	2,700
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's.....1937		2,838,000	M & N	129¼	Aug. 26, '97	.....	.....	.....
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		575,000	M & N	115¼	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1905		6,000,000	J & J	120	Jan. 31, '99	120½	120	19,000
" 1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	114¼	Jan. 20, '99	114¼	114	16,000
N. Y., Ontario & Wn con. 1st g. 5's. 1989		5,600,000	J & D	106¼	Jan. 30, '99	106¼	106	52,500
" Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1922		8,375,000	M & S	105½	Jan. 30, '99	105½	104½	186,000
" Registered.....\$5,000 only.		.....	M & S	101¼	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m. R.R. & L.G.S.F.g.c. 6's. 1921		5,815,000	J & J	116	Jan. 31, '99	116	114½	17,000
" registered.....			J & J	117	Oct. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
" St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's.....1923		7,985,000	F & A	131¼	Dec. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered certificates.....			Q F	130	Sept. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. Ry prior in ry. & 1d. g. 4's. 1907		87,770,000	Q J	103½	Jan. 31, '99	103½	101½	3,180,500
" registered.....			Q J	100¾	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. lien g. 3's.....2047		56,000,000	Q F	69¾	Jan. 31, '99	70	68¾	2,386,000
" registered.....			Q F	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948		1,538,000	QMCH	90	Jan. 27, '99	90	90	2,000
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1923		3,871,000	J & J	115	Jan. 26, '99	116	112	78,000
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's....1941		750,000	M & N	102	June 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1881		7,283,000	M & N	127	Dec. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
" New River 1st 6's.....1922		2,000,000	A & O	128	Nov. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
" imp'ment & ext. 6's.....1894		5,000,000	F & A	117¼	Aug. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Sci'o Val & N.E. 1st g. 4's. 1989		5,000,000	J & N	97¼	Jan. 31, '99	97¼	96¼	91,000
" C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g 5's. 1922		600,000	J & J	101	Feb. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.**

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'st Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s. 1906		22,923,000	A & O	92½	Jan. 31, '99	92½	88½	1,107,500
" registered.....			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds.....			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's..... 1936		2,000,000	J & D	102¼	Jan. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. mortg. g 6's..... 1937		2,428,000	A & O	85	Dec. 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern gen g 4's..... 1921		1,381,000	M & N	9	Sept. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. eng. Trust Co. certs..... 1921		1,417,000	.....	8¼	Sept. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's..... 1901		2,376,000	J & J	81	Jan. 20, '99	81	80	10,000
Oregon Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's..... 1909		691,000	J & J	113¼	Jan. 10, '99	113¼	113¼	2,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		19,481,000	J & D	103	Jan. 30, '90	103½	100½	864,000
Oregon Short Line 1st g. 6's..... 1922		13,651,000	F & A	132	Jan. 31, '99	132	129¼	109,000
{ Utah & Northern 1st 7's..... 1908		4,993,000	J & J	121	June 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 5's..... 1926		1,877,000	J & J	102	May 24, '94	.....	.....	.....
{ Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946		10,337,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 31, '99	111½	108	319,500
" non-cum. inc. A 5's..... 1946		7,185,000	SEPT.	89¼	Jan. 31, '99	89¼	85	401,500
" non-cum. inc. B. & col. trust		14,341,000	OCT.	73	Jan. 31, '99	74¾	65½	1,235,000
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's..... 1946		4,446,000	J & D	106½	Jan. 28, '99	106½	105	158,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s.... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" s. f. subsidy g 6's..... 1910		1,732,000	M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
{ Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s. 1st..... 1921		19,467,000	J & J	116½	Jan. 3, '99	116½	116½	1,000
" reg..... 1921		.....	J & J	110	July 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gtd. 3½ coi. tr. reg. cts. 1937		5,000,000	M & S	102	Nov. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s		10,000,000	A & O	114¼	Jan. 5, '99	114¼	114¼	1,000
" Series A..... 1940		10,000,000	A & O	111½	Oct. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series B..... 1942		2,000,000	M & N	113	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series C..... 1942		4,883,000	M & N	107	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series D gtd. 4's..... 1945		6,863,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 6, '99	107½	107½	1,000
{ Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's. 1900		2,917,000	F & A	109¼	Apr. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 1st reg. 7's..... 1900		2,917,000	J & J	138¾	Jan. 6, '99	138¾	138¾	2,000
{ Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912		2,546,000	J & J	141	Nov. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 7's..... 1912		2,000,000	A & O	126	Aug. 26, '95	.....	.....	.....
" 3d 7's..... 1912		1,506,000	A & O	113	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932		1,310,000	A & O	110	May 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		3,000,000	M & N	107	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's. 1900		1,699,000	J & J	113	Apr. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
" gen. gtd. g. 4½'s Ser. A. 1942		1,699,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Series B..... 1942		2,250,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3½'s Ser. B. 1940		1,118,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Series C. 1940		4,447,000	J & J	107	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½ g 1941		5,389,000	M & S	102	Nov. 10, '97	.....	.....	.....
" Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's. 1942		1,400,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's... 1923		1,675,000	.....	108	May 12, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ con. sterling gold 6 per cent. 1905		22,762,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. currency, 6's registered... 1905		4,718,000	QM 15	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. gold 5 per cent..... 1919		4,998,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered..... 1943		3,000,000	Qmch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ con. gold 4 per cent..... 1943		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Cleve. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s..... 1935		1,250,000	M & N	111	July 8, '97	.....	.....	.....
" U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's..... 1944		5,646,000	M & S	115½	Feb. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Del. R. RR. & Bge Co 1st gtd g. 4's. 1936		1,300,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Sunbury & Lewiston 1st g. 4's..... 1936		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peo., Dec. & Ev. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920		1,140,000	J & J	99	Jan. 6, '99	99	99	6,000
{ Ev. div. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920		1,433,000	M & S	97	Jan. 28, '99	97	94¼	11,000
" Tr. Co. ctf. 2d mort 5's. 1926		1,851,000	M & N	20	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st instal. paid.....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's.... 1921		1,495,000	Q F	120	May 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ 2d m 4½'s..... 1921		1,499,000	M & N	90	Sept. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pine Creek Railway 6's..... 1932		3,500,000	J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93	.....	.....	.....

BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1922		1,440,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A, 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's, 1932		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 6's. 1934		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's, 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	Oct. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's, 1940		8,000,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. 5's. 1943		408,000	J & J	98	July 14, '97	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's, 1917		4,700,000	J & J	98½	Jan. 31, '99	98½	98	354,000
J. P. M. & Co., cts.,		5,000,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Y. & Ash. 1st cons. 5's, 1927		1,582,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. 1997		62,456,000	J & J	88½	Jan. 31, '98	89	85½	8,828,000
registered.		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. 1939		15,200,000	J & J	94½	Jan. 31, '99	94½	91	508,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's, 1939		1,850,000	J & D	104½	Jan. 24, '99	104½	104½	2,000
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 2-4, 1940		4,510,000	J & J	76	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's, 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.342. 1947		3,500,000	J & J	84	Jan. 27, '99	84	83	18,000
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's, Class A, 1906		500,000	M & N	114	Jan. 5, '99	114	114	5,000
2d g. 6's, Class B. 1906		2,709,500	M & N	114	Jan. 9, '99	114	114	1,000
2d g. 6's, Class C. 1906		2,400,000	M & N	114½	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 6's P. C. & O. 1919		1,023,000	F & A	118	May 25, '92	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 6's. 1931		7,807,000	J & J	123½	Jan. 30, '99	124	122	182,000
gen. g. 5's. 1931		12,298,000	J & J	108½	Jan. 31, '99	108½	107	476,000
1st Trust g. 5's. 1937		1,099,000	A & O	100	Nov. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's, 1910		304,000	A & O	105	Oct. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1996		6,388,000	J & D	87	Jan. 31, '99	87½	82	595,000
South'n div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		1,500,000	A & O	98	Jan. 12, '99	98½	98	10,000
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. cts., 1989		20,000,000	M & N	91	Jan. 31, '99	92½	84½	5,306,000
2d g. 4's inc. Bd. cts., 1989		8,000,000	J & J	55½	Jan. 31, '99	55½	40½	8,826,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con.g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J15	90	Nov. 8, '27	.....	.....	.....
gtd. gold 5's. 1937		1,138,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. 1913		1,000,000	F & A	122½	Jan. 19, '99	122½	122½	6,000
2d 5's. 1917		2,000,000	A & O	113½	Jan. 24, '99	115	118½	26,000
1st con. g. 4's. 1988		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	124	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Dakota ext'n 6's. 1910		5,676,000	M & N	125½	Jan. 24, '99	125½	124½	16,000
1st con. 6's. 1933		13,844,000	J & J	138½	Jan. 18, '99	138½	138½	6,000
1st con. 6's, registered. ....		.....	J & J	120	Aug. 19, '95	.....	.....	.....
1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s. ....		.....	J & J	113½	Jan. 25, '99	113½	112½	40,000
1st cons. 6's register'd. ....		21,983,000	J & J	106	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,806,000	J & D	105½	Jan. 27, '99	105½	104½	12,000
registered. ....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	104	104	5,000
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's. 1922		2,150,000	J & J	127½	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	132	Jan. 26, '99	132	132	8,000
1st 6's, registered. ....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st g. g. 5's. 1937		2,700,000	J & J	113½	Jan. 24, '99	113½	113½	1,000
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 25, '98	111½	111½	1,000
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastn. R'y Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's, 1908		3,825,000	J & D	113	Aug. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's, 1947		4,940,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's, 1919		3,872,000	A & O	100½	Oct. 20, '97	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. 1934		4,056,000	A & O	106½	Aug. 2, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's. 1934		1,780,000	A & O	104½	Oct. 18, '97	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. 1928		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold, 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's, 1919		5,250,000	M & N	104	Jan. 30, '99	106	102½	106,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Southern Pacific Co.								
{ Gal. Harris'gh & S. A. 1st g 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	99½	Dec. 9, '98			
" 2d g 7's. 1905		1,000,000	J & D	102	Dec. 3, '98			
" Mex. & P. div 1st g 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	103½	Jan. 31, '99	103½	100½	435,000
Houst. & T C 1st Waco & N 7's. 1903		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92			
" 1st g 5's int. gtd. 1937		7,107,000	J & J	110½	Jan. 24, '99	111	110½	36,000
" con. g 6's int. gtd. 1912		3,455,000	A & O	112	Dec. 9, '98			
" gen. g 4's int. gtd. 1921		4,297,000	A & O	89	Jan. 31, '99	89½	87¾	247,000
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's. 1920		1,494,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 17, '98			
" 1st 7's. 1918		5,000,000	A & O	139	Jan. 21, '99	139	139	7,000
" 1,442,500			A & O					
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's. 1927		18,842,000	J & J	100½	Jan. 24, '99	100¾	97	409,000
San Ant. & Aran Passist'gtd g 4's. 1943		18,886,000	J & J	79½	Jan. 31, '99	81	77½	2,457,000
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's. 1905		1,620,000	F & A	116	Dec. 14, '98			
" Sabine div. 1st g 6's. 1912		2,575,000	M & S	106¾	Nov. 17, '97			
" con. g 5's. 1943		1,620,000	J & J	104¾	Jan. 31, '99	104¾	102	374,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	112	Jan. 21, '99	112	109¼	61,000
{ South. Pac. of Cal. 1st g 6's. 1905-12		30,577,500	A & O	118½	Dec. 17, '98			
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's. 1937		6,696,000	M & N	102½	Jan. 31, '99			
" stamped. 1905-1937		12,788,000		107½	Jan. 25, '99	107½	106	197,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. 1941		1,920,000	J & J	95¾	Jan. 31, '99	96	90	363,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1937		5,500,000	J & J					
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. 1911		4,180,000	J & J	113½	Nov. 23, '98			
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's. 1994		27,850,000	J & J	106	Jan. 31, '99	106½	103¼	1,410,000
" registered.			J & J	98	Oct. 31, '98			
" Memph. div. 1st g 4-4½ 5's. 1996		5,983,000	J & J	107½	Jan. 4, '99	107½	107½	6,000
" registered.			J & J					
East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. 1938		4,500,000	M & S	102¾	Nov. 21, '98			
" registered.			M & S					
Alabama Central, 1st 6's. 1918		1,000,000	J & J	112¼	Aug. 17, '97			
Atl. & Char. Air Line, income. 1900		750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95			
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. 1916		2,000,000	J & J	118	Sept. 30, '98			
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. 1900		3,123,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 16, '99	104½	104½	10,000
" divisional g 5's. 1930		3,106,000	J & J	116½	Jan. 24, '99	116½	114½	15,000
" con. 1st g 5's. 1956		12,770,000	M & N	115½	Jan. 31, '99	116	115	48,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. 1922		5,660,000	J & J	124	Jan. 28, '99	124	124	13,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. 1925		2,000,000	J & J	119	Jan. 14, '99	119	119	14,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. 1915		5,597,000	J & J	123	Jan. 31, '99	123½	123	14,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's. 1909		818,000	M & S	101	Nov. 2, '97			
" deb. 5's stamped. 1927		3,368,000	A & O	104½	Dec. 16, '98			
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S					
" ser. B 6's. 1911		1,900,000	M & S					
" small. 1916		1,100,000	M & S					
" ser. C 6's. 1916		1,100,000	M & S					
" small. 1921		950,000	M & S					
" ser. D 4-5's. 1921		950,000	M & S					
" small. 1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99	109	109	5,000
" ser. E 5's. 1931		1,310,000	M & S					
" ser. F 5's. 1931		2,392,000	M & S					
Virginia Midland gen. 5's. 1936		2,466,000	M & N	110½	Jan. 25, '98	110½	110	13,000
" gen. 5's. gtd. stamped. 1926		2,466,000	M & N	110	Dec. 29, '98			
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. 1924		1,025,000	F & A	94	Jan. 31, '99	94	94	2,000
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. 1914		2,531,000	J & J	118¼	Dec. 1, '98			
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g 6's. 1939		2,812,000	J & J					
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4½'s. 1943		500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. 1939		7,000,000	A & O	109	Oct. 12, '98			
" 1st con. g. 5's. 1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	111½	Dec. 28, '98			
" St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g 5's. 1930		3,500,000	A & O	103	Oct. 27, '98			
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. 1914		444,000	Q JAN	105½	Dec. 18, '95			
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. 1905		3,346,000	M & S	105¼	Dec. 27, '98			
" fm. Texarkana to Ft. W'th. 2090		21,216,000	J & D	110¼	Jan. 31, '99	110¼	109½	259,000
" 1st gold 5's. 2000		23,227,000	MAR.	49	Jan. 31, '99	49	45½	5,746,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	125½	Jan. 14, '99	125½	125½	2,000



BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's....1905		3,000,000	J & J	108	Jan. 27, '99	106½	104	19,000
{ 1st M. g 5's West. div....1935		2,500,000	A & O	102	Dec. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ gen. g. 5's.....1905		1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Kanaw & M. 1st g. 4's.1900		2,340,000	A & O	85	Jan. 31, '99	85	80	35,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....1917		4,000,000	J & D	79	Jan. 28, '99	79	78	57,000
Tol., St.L.&K.C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's.1916		8,284,000	M & N	101½	Jan. 31, '99	101½	98	517,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....1923		1,852,000	J & D	99¾	Jan. 30, '99	100¾	99¾	29,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g.5's.1945		4,287,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Pacific R. R. & ld gt g 4s.1947		90,000,000	J & J	104¾	Jan. 31, '99	106¾	102¾	8,143,000
{ registered.....		.....	J & J	99¼	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Pac. Tr. Co. cta. g. 4½s.1918		2,000,000	M & N	67¼	Jan. 24, '99	68	67¼	21,000
{ U.P. Den.&GT.Co.cf.lstc.g.5's.1939		15,288,000	J & D	90	Jan. 30, '99	92½	87¾	1,164,000
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's....1909		31,664,000	M & N	115½	Jan. 31, '99	115½	113	848,000
{ 2d mortgage gold 5's.1909		14,000,000	F & A	99½	Jan. 31, '99	100	94	1,012,000
{ debent. mtg series A.....1909		3,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ series B.....1909		25,740,000	J & J	89¾	Jan. 31, '99	89¾	83½	3,390,000
{ 1st g.5's Det.& Chi.ex.1940		3,430,000	J & J	108	Jan. 31, '99	108	105½	21,000
{ St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chaas. B.		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ 1st 6's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	109¾	Jan. 6, '99	109¾	109¾	5,000
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's....1907		10,000,000	J & J	110¼	Jan. 25, '99	110¼	109½	25,000
{ gen g. 3-4's.....1943		9,789,000	A & O	57¾	Jan. 31, '99	57¾	54	362,000
{ Inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	16½	Jan. 31, '99	16½	14¾	48,000
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's. 1923		3,969,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ 40 years con. g. 5's.....1923		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's.1911		3,260,000	J & J	113	Jan. 6, '99	113	113	2,000
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's.1923		1,018,000	A & O	105	Jan. 9, '99	105	104	8,000
{ Trust Co. certificates.....		1,982,000	.....	104¼	Dec. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's.1923		1,500,000	J & J	100	Sept. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ exten. and imp. g. 5's....1930		1,624,000	F & A	92¼	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Wisconsin Cent.Co. 1st trust g.5's.1937		1,967,000	J & J	84	Nov. 16, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ eng. Trust Co. certificates.....		10,013,000	.....	61¾	Jan. 31, '99	68	68	913,000
{ income mortgage 5's....1937		7,775,000	A & O	7	Nov. 1, '98	.....	.....	.....

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	YEAR 1898.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Hgh.	Low.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered..... Opt'l		25,364,100	Q M	907½	991¼	997½	991¼	23,000
{ 2's registered.....1898		.....	Q F	107½	106½	107½	106½	123,500
{ 2's coupon.....1898		.....	Q F	108	106¾	108	106¾	971,000
{ 3's small bonds reg.....1898		192,846,780	Q F	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ 3's small bonds coupon.....1898		.....	Q F	107½	106½	107½	106½	12,300
{ 4's registered.....1907		559,650,200	J A J&O	112½	111½	112½	111½	187,500
{ 4's coupon.....1907		.....	J A J&O	113	112½	113	112½	94,500
{ 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	129	128½	129	128½	15,000
{ 4's coupon.....1925		.....	Q F	129½	129	129½	129	412,500
{ 5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	113¾	112¾	113¾	112¾	108,000
{ 5's coupon.....1904		.....	Q F	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ 4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee)1899		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
District of Columbia 3-6's.....1924		14,063,800	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ small bonds.....		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ registered.....		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ funding 5's.....1899		800,400	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ small.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'st Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's.1948		12,000,000	M & S	106½	Jan. 30, '99	106¼	104½	46,500
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 5's.1900		3,068,000	Q F	108	Jan. 28, '99	108¾	108	29,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's.1915		2,000,000	M & S	86	Jan. 31, '99	86¾	85½	89,000
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's.1942		1,000,000	J & J					
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's.1945		17,500,000	F & A	92¼	Jan. 31, '99	92½	89½	92,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's.1915		10,000,000	J & J	109½	Feb. 9, '97			
non-conv. inc. 5's.1907		2,575,000	J & J					
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's.1900		2,954,000	F & A	100¼	Nov. 14, '98			
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's.1909		700,000	J & J	81	Feb. 11, '97			
Coupon off.1919		1,043,000	M & N	103	Dec. 1, '98			
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's.1919		2,021,000	F & A	89	Jan. 31, '99	90½	87	528,000
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's.1943		10,595,600	Q & J	103¾	Nov. 10, '98			
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's.2397.			Q & J	104	Feb. 16, '98			
registered.1919			A & O					
Det. Mack. & Mar. ld. gtd. 3½ S A.1911		3,021,000	A & O	22½	Jan. 27, '99	24	21	306,000
Erie Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. g s fd 5's.1926		1,960,000	J & J	110	Jan. 31, '99	110	110	3,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's.1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's.1926		1,090,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's.1931		1,705,000	M & S	111	Aug. 23, '97			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's.1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's.1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99	99	99	4,000
non-conv. deb. 5's.1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's.1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95			
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's.1918		8,408,000	F & A					
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's.1926		1,975,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98			
2d g. 5's.1926		1,000,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97			
Knick'r'ker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g 5's.1926		2,000,000	A & O	100	Jan. 30, '99	100	100	12,000
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's.1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97			
Manh. Bch H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's.1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95			
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's.1918		2,000,000	M & N	103¼	Jan. 5, '92			
registered.1919		2,000,000	M & N	98	Dec. 2, '98			
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g 5's.1942		3,089,000	J & J	104	Jan. 28, '99	104	103	194,000
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g 6's.1920		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's.1890-1960		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g 5's conv.1920		443,000	F & A	92¼	May 5, '96			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g 6's.1910								
Peoria Water Co. g 6's.1889-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g 6's.1920		590,000	M & N	106¾	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g 6's.1940		2,000,000	J & J	113	Apr. 4, '98			
Roeh & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's.1946		1,100,000	M & N					
St. Louis Term. Cupples Station. & Property Co. 1st g 4½'s 5-20.1917		2,000,000	J & D					
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g 6's.1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's.1906		4,975,000	M & S					
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's.1946		2,912,000	F & A	90	Jan. 31, '99	90¼	84½	521,000
inc. g. 5's.1946		7,500,000				81½	23½	3,558,000
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's.1912		400,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 6's.1917		1,244,000	A & O	106½	Jan. 31, '99	106½	103	122,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's.1917		3,399,000	J & J	109	Jan. 31, '99	110	101	274,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 6's.1922		1,000,000	J & J	84	May 2, '95			
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 6's.1910		2,428,000	F & A	105	Jan. 31, '99	105	96	321,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g. s. fd deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	117	Jan. 9, '99	117	116¾	36,000
C. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col tr. bonds.								
Series B 5's.1899-1914		1,000,000	M & N					
C 5's.1900-1915		1,000,000	A & O					
D 4½'s.1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J					
E 4's.1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D					
F 4's.1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S					
G 4's.1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A					
H 4's.1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N					
Small bonds.1918		1,000,000						

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's...1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		8,680,000	M & N	108	Nov. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    7's, registered.....1900			M & N	105	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    debenture, 7's.....1884-1900			M & N	105½	July 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    registered.....1900			M & N	104½	Nov. 12, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    col. trust cur. 5's.....1888		8,502,000	J & J	115½	Jan. 27, '99	115½	112¾	49,000
Mutual Union Tel. a. rd. 6's.....1911		1,957,000	J & J	111	Nov. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Northwestern Telegraph 7's...1904		1,250,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.1919		846,000	J & J	68	Dec. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.1947		1,150,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bost. Un. Gas 1st cifs s'k f'd g. 5's.1889		7,000,000	J & J	91½	Oct. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Br'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.1945		13,280,000	M & N	117½	Jan. 26, '99	118½	116¾	31,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1922		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,313,000	J & J	96½	Jan. 28, '99	97½	95½	435,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's....1918		1,049,000	F & A	94	Aug. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's.1910		4,312,000	M & S	111½	Jan. 23, '99	111½	111¼	31,000
"    1st con. g. 5's.....1925		2,156,000	J & J	122	Jan. 25, '99	122	120½	21,000
"    Brooklyn 1st g. 5's.....1940		1,500,000	A & O	110½	Feb. 4, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    registered.....1940			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1922		2,500,000	M & S	102	Feb. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's...1922		6,000,000	J & D	112½	Jan. 27, '99	112½	109	50,000
Grand Rapids Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....1915		1,225,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '95	.....	.....	.....
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's.1922		3,750,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.1919		10,000,000	Q F	106¾	Jan. 28, '99	106¾	107	51,000
"    small bonds.....1919				97½	Nov. 1, '95	.....	.....	.....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 6's.1904		2,100,000	M & N	117½	Nov. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	105½	Dec. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. g. 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	124	Jan. 31, '99	124	124	11,000
"    refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	108	Dec. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    refunding registered.....1947			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chic. Gas L't & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's.1937		10,000,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 31, '99	111½	111½	100,000
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1938		4,346,000	J & D	107½	Jan. 30, '99	109	107½	20,000
Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd. g. 6's.1905		2,000,000	J & J	105½	Oct. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1947		5,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 25, '99	107	105	151,000
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's....1933		3,805,500	M & N	101	Mar. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....

BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

Blue. Col. Malcolm A. Blue, President of the National Bank of Poland, N. Y., since 1882, died January 14.

Boder.—Henry L. Boder, Cashier of the Bank of Troy, Kansas, died January 16.

Butler.—John M. Butler, President of the Oneida County Bank, Utica, N. Y., died January 27. He was born July 9, 1827. After some experience in manufacturing he entered the Oneida County Bank in 1853, becoming Cashier in 1855. He held this position for thirty-two years and was then elected President—holding this office at the time of his death.

Chalmers.—James Chalmers, President of the Farmers' National Bank, Salem, Va., for the past twelve years, died January 24. Mr. Chalmers was born in Scotland in 1820, but came to America in his early youth.

Craigsmiles.—John H. Craigsmiles, President of the Cleveland (Tenn.) National Bank, died January 7.

**Cullen.**—Michael Cullen, President of the Fort Avenue Savings Bank, Baltimore, died January 11. He was born in Ireland seventy-seven years ago, and had been connected with the bank for about twenty years.

**Denny.**—Hon. A. A. Denny, the founder of the city of Seattle, Wash., a leading capitalist and President of the well-known banking firm of Dexter Horton & Co., Seattle, died January 9. He was born in Indiana in 1822, and went to the Pacific Coast in 1861. His career was a busy one, embracing an active participation in all the business and commercial affairs of his city and State. He was frequently honored with important offices, and as a banker his reputation was very high.

**Endicott.**—William Endicott, President of the Beverly (Mass.) Savings Bank from 1867 to 1897, died January 8. He was born in Beverly March 11, 1799, and was almost 100 years of age at the time of his death. He was of distinguished ancestry, and during his long life held many positions of trust and honor.

**Ford.**—James A. Ford, a prominent and wealthy resident of Lynchburg, Va., a director of the People's National Bank and Vice-President of the Lynchburg Trust and Savings Bank, died January 9.

**Greene.**—David Greene, Vice-President of the East End Savings Bank Co., Columbus, O., died in New York city January 14.

**Griswold.**—Henry J. Griswold, President of the Bank of Manson, Ia., died at Los Angeles, Cal., January 16.

**Harris.**—B. D. Harris, President of the Brattleboro (Vt.) Savings Bank, and one of its incorporators, died January 19.

**Hill.**—Frederick Hill, Vice-President of the Tanners' National Bank, Catskill, N. Y., and who was Cashier of the bank for sixty-five years, died January 21, aged eighty-eight years. From 1850 until 1892 he was treasurer of Greene county.

**Kennedy.**—Belton O. Kennedy, until quite recently Assistant Cashier of the Atlanta (Ga.) National Bank, died January 17. He had been connected with the bank for twelve years and was held in high esteem by its officers.

**Lyman.**—Edward H. L. Lyman, for thirty years Vice-President of the Seamen's Bank for Savings, New York city, and a director of the Nassau National Bank, Brooklyn, died January 20, aged about eighty years.

**Marvin.**—Gen. Selden E. Marvin, President of the Albany (N. Y.) City Savings Institution, died January 19. He was long identified with banking and was prominently and honorably connected with important stations in military, civic and business life. He was born at Jamestown, N. Y., in 1835.

**Mellon.**—Thomas A. Mellon, of T. Mellon & Sons' Bank, Pittsburg, Pa., died January 23.

**Morris.**—Jonathan Flynt Morris, formerly President of the Charter Oak National Bank, Hartford, Ct., died January 20, aged seventy-six years. He was the first Cashier of the bank and was its President for fourteen years, resigning in 1893.

**Nye.**—A. T. Nye, President of the Citizens' National Bank, Marietta, Ohio, died January 9, aged sixty-seven years.

**Parke.**—Samuel B. Parke, President of the Parkesburg (Pa.) National Bank, died January 12. He established the banking firm of Parke, Smith & Co., in 1860, which was merged into the Parkesburg National Bank in 1880, of which Mr. Parke has been President from its organization.

**Peterson.**—Andrew Peterson, until recently President of the Western State Bank, of Chicago, died January 19. He was for many years Danish Consul at Chicago, and had been knighted for his services.

**Randall.**—Elias P. Randall, died at Mystic, Ct., January 11, aged seventy-eight years. He was engaged in banking there for a long time, and was formerly Cashier of the First National Bank of Mystic, now in liquidation.


**Shaller.**—Asa R. Shaller, President of the Deep River (Ct.) Savings Bank, died January 16, aged eighty-eight years. He represented the town in the General Assembly in 1875.

**Smith.**—Draper Smith, for twenty years Vice-President of the First National Bank, Plymouth, Pa., and formerly President of the bank, died January 5, aged eighty-three years.

**Stebbins.**—John B. Stebbins, President of the Springfield (Mass.) Institution for Savings, and a director of the City National Bank, died January 13, aged eighty-one years. He was largely interested in manufacturing, but gave close attention to the bank, and was influential in assisting to make it one of the very strong Savings banks of the State.

**Taylor.**—Robert Taylor, President of the banking firm of Van Dyke, Weimer & Taylor West Newton, Pa., died January 11.





*For the Bankers Magazine*  
*J. H. Page*

THE

# BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE COMPANY, NEW YORK.


1891.

NEW YORK, 1891.

MARCH, 1891.

No. 1.

THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY as a result of the war has been warmly and justly opposed by those who regard the preservation of the Union as a definite end, and the loss of any part of it as a great evil. So strong is the general conviction of honor that a country is often condemned simply because it is weak and therefore entirely independent of its merits. The "national" general advertisement class in a nation invites in a proportionately, although because of the amount of adventure which is its distinguishing quality, the more the less carries for more influence, and weight than the more numerous composing it would seem to warrant. In the same nation this class is larger than it is in others. In the United States an advertisement spirit has been fostered and cultivated. The same spirit does not have much to do with, and therefore more likely to be, success in the future. Every nation will continue to develop on the lines of its greatest strength. Nor will this development be effected without aid, but by the people themselves, although it may be aided or hindered. The United States started out under a written Constitution which is supposed to embody even on principles which must always be followed, and which the nation's growth cannot pass. These principles, however, have been regarded as subject to interpretation and construction. In this interpretation and construction there have been wide differences. Even on the wise men of the nation different views, and these differences are likely to continue. It is hardly to be doubted that if the constitutionality of the permanent acquisition of the Philippines were referred to the Supreme Court to-day that our law would find nothing in the document forbidding such acquisition. Expansion of territory as such is nowhere forbidden in any of the articles or sections, and the precedents of the century during which the Constitution has been in force all favor the acquisition of new territory and the absorption of new peoples.



For the Bankers Magazine,  
J. D. Day



THE

# BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTY-THIRD YEAR.

MARCH, 1899.

VOLUME LVIII, No. 3.

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THE ACQUIREMENT OF TERRITORY as a result of the recent war is still being bitterly opposed by those who regard the present action of the Government as a departure from the line of national policy heretofore prevailing. So strong is the general conservatism of humanity that a novelty is often condemned simply because it is new and strange, entirely independent of its merits. The enterprising and adventurous class in a nation is always in a minority, although because of the spirit of adventure which is its distinguishing mark it nevertheless carries far more influence and weight than the mere numbers composing it would seem to warrant. In some nations this class is larger than it is in others. In the United States an adventurous spirit has been fostered and cultivated. The successes of the past have made it bold and therefore more likely to be successful in the future. Every nation will continue to develop on the lines of its greatest energies. Nor will this development be effectually hindered by any preconceived ideas, although it may be modified and retarded. The United States started out under a written Constitution which is supposed to embody certain principles which must always be a barrier beyond which the nation's growth cannot pass. These principles, however, have been regarded as subject to interpretation and construction. In this interpretation and construction there have been wide differences between the wise men of the nation at different times, and these differences are likely to continue. It is hardly to be doubted that if the constitutionality of the permanent acquisition of the Philippine Islands were referred to the Supreme Court to-day that court would find nothing in the document forbidding such acquisition. Expansion of territory as such is nowhere forbidden in any of the articles or sections, and the precedents of the century during which the Constitution has been in force all of them favor the acquisition of new territory and the absorption of new peoples.

The opposition manifested to the ratification of the treaty with Spain, by which the Philippine Islands came under the sovereignty of the United States, seems to be based on the dangers to this country from the attempt to govern a people who, it is claimed, will not be treated with the same liberality as white men. The main argument used is that, as there has been failure to secure to the ex-slaves of the South and their descendants equal civil rights with white citizens, therefore, it will be found impossible to accord to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands a fair and equitable government. It seems to be lost sight of that any government whatever furnished by the United States, even if the inhabitants of the islands were not accorded in practice full political rights, would be a vast improvement on the government of the Spaniards or any the Filipinos could themselves institute. It is a strange position to take that because it might, owing to race prejudice, prove impossible to secure ignorant races the benefits both social and political of the highest form of free self-government, that they should not receive from the United States the benefits that flow from the maintenance of order and social protection. Mere political rights do not supply the greatest happiness to the governed, unless they are capable of using them.

There is little doubt that the United States can establish in the Philippine Islands a government under which the great majority of the population will enjoy the possibilities of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to as great an extent as the majority of the people in the United States now enjoy them. In other words, the minority who may suffer from imperfections of government in the islands will be no greater proportionately than the minority who suffer from the imperfect administration of the laws of the United States.

On the whole the possibilities of good to the Filipinos under the sovereignty of the United States, in whatever form it may be exercised, are much greater than the possibilities of evil. To the people of the United States themselves the danger of such expansion as is the result of the acquisition of a few islands in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is slight indeed. If there is danger in the expansion of the trade and power of the country throughout the unexploited parts of the world, this danger would be the same whether Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands were acquired or not. It is the result of the adventurous and enterprising spirit of the American people, cultivated and encouraged for over a century. It has been exercised constantly. When in 1811 the boundaries of the country became too small for it, these boundaries were enlarged by purchases from France and Spain. Again becoming too small, they were enlarged by the annexation of Texas, and other territory secured by conquest and purchase from Mexico. They were again extended

by the purchase of Alaska. In the acquisition of the Philippines, of Cuba and Porto Rico, there is nothing new or unprecedented, and to them as to all other acquired territory there will probably be given as good government as exists in the United States. There is no reason for alarm because our neighbor is to be treated only as well as ourselves.

The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands see any foreign sovereignty through eyes blinded by their experience of Spanish domination. Their antipathy, if it is as great as is represented, will no doubt rapidly disappear in the light of a short experience of American rule.

While much of the opposition to the ratification of the treaty with Spain may be ascribed to that spirit which takes honest offence at any proposition which does not present an ideal absence of all objectionable points, much of it had its origin in a desire to attain political advantage. Knowing that the ratification of the treaty was deemed of great importance by the Administration, that fact was necessarily used as a handle to advance other measures in which Senators had an interest. If the treaty had not been ratified and if new negotiations with Spain had been rendered necessary, the consequences to the country and to its securities might have been serious. Foreigners do not understand the complicated and involved way in which our dealings with foreign nations are carried on, and the difficulties which the ratification of a treaty may encounter.

There is no doubt that the settlement of the question and the final taking over of the acquired territory will have an excellent effect on business.

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THE VIEWS OF ECONOMISTS regarding currency reform were set forth at length in the report of the committee of professors of political economy appointed by the American Economic Association, printed in the February MAGAZINE. Their opinions agree most surprisingly with the conclusions of the commission appointed by the Indianapolis Monetary Conference. They do not go quite so far as does the commission in pronouncing the gold standard as the best possible standard, but they say that it is now the standard practically in use, and that as such it should be relieved from every element which threatens its security.

It is this element of uncertainty as to the present standard which can and should be eliminated.

After the standard of value is made secure, the next reform necessary is elasticity of the currency. On this point the committee say that "if a bank currency is to be elastic, the assets which are

required as a security for that circulation must be such as a bank ordinarily has in its possession; since in a stringency, when expansion is needed, the bank already has its resources locked up, and consequently cannot without great difficulty get hold of new assets. But Government bonds are not a kind of assets which banks will or usually ought to have on hand in considerable amounts."

There is no difficulty in agreeing with the conclusion of the committee that bank circulation ought to be elastic, and that to attain this result it should be based on the general assets, that is the general credit foundation of the bank; but why this is so, as stated by the committee, seems to be both illogical and incorrect. The circulation, these eminent professors say, should be based on the assets which are ordinarily in possession of the bank, because in a stringency when expansion is needed its resources are already locked up and it cannot get new ones. This is confusing. When a bank's assets are locked up they would seem to be unavailable to the bank as security for circulation, whether available to buy bonds or not. But on the other hand the bonds on which they do issue circulation are locked up in the Treasurer's office, and equally unavailable to form a basis for any additional circulation. As a matter of fact, the form in which a bank's assets happen to be, that is, if it have any real assets, has nothing to do with the issue of circulation in times of stringency. The resources of a bank are the basis of its credit, and the permission to issue circulation without bond security is merely an additional resource, which may be used at any time but more particularly in times of stringency. Thus the typical National bank, during the panic of 1893, was short of coin or currency to meet demands made by its depositors. Its resources were loans and other forms of debt owing to it which were not due or could not be immediately turned into cash. If the bank had had the additional resource of issuing even twenty-five per cent. of its capital in its promissory notes, without special security, the depositors would, in the majority of cases, have been easily satisfied. These notes would have paid off a part of the liabilities, and the security previously held for these liabilities would become security for the notes.

The great bulk of bank resources or assets are no more locked up in times of stringency than they are at any time. The portion of them which normally is liquidating from day to day by automatic process ceases to turn into cash, and as the demands go on the reserves are exhausted, and the bank, unless it procure cash or some substitute, must suspend. The issue of circulation at such a time enables the bank to bridge over the period until the automatic liquidation of the debts due to it is resumed, and this period is shortened by the exercise of the privilege.

THE BANKERS OF THE COUNTRY are generally spoken of as if they were a class by themselves, moving unanimously and unitedly in the direction of an interest common to them all. The demagogue who holds up the banker to the contumely of his audience sets up a man of straw, an effigy which has about as much resemblance to the real thing as the skeleton in an anatomical museum does to a living man. The bugaboo which these people display and label a banker, is a compound of Shylock and MACHIAVELLI with a slight dash of old Nick himself. They depict the banking community as a sort of Mafia, bound by secret oaths and grips, and with a combined design upon the purses of the public, regardless of their welfare.

Through such misrepresentations a large part of the public manifest a latent hostility to all legislation that seeks to improve financial conditions within the country or to better the credit of the nation abroad.

But the bankers are not the only class towards which an under-current of antagonism seems to prevail. The same feeling exists to some extent towards lawyers, doctors and ministers of the gospel, and may perhaps be ascribed to the spirit of envy which is always manifested by ignorance towards intelligence and by poverty towards wealth.

In the case of the legal and other professions, however, the manifestations of this spirit are compelled to confine themselves to attempts to ridicule and belittle. They do not go so far as to interfere with political rights or to restrict merited privileges. Lawyers and doctors are never accused of combining to oppress and injure other classes of their fellow citizens. Bankers, however, from the fact that they are dealers in money and because they stand as representatives of the wealth of the nation, offer a more tangible mark and are charged with conspiring to increase their profits by mysterious manipulations of the streams of wealth of which they are the conduits. Being the guardians of credit, they measure and indicate it, in the same manner as the thermometer measures the degrees of heat or the barometer shows the pressure of the atmosphere. The accusations usually made against them of influencing malignly the conditions of the money market are as ridiculous as would be charges against the thermometer for causing the unseasonable cold or heat it registers, or the barometer for causing the storms it foretells. The money market responds to conditions as difficult to be foretold as the weather. Bankers have made these conditions a special study and they are experts in the same sense as the man who makes weather reports is an expert. They can no more control the money market than the weather prognosticator can control the elements, and they are even more liable to be mistaken in their predictions.

If they were as is charged in perfect touch with each other all over the country, and unhampered by legal conditions which they have little power to change, they might to some extent prevent many of the storms which now prove disastrous in the financial world and the effects of which are felt with more or less severity by all the people.

But the bankers of the country are far from agreeing among themselves upon a course of policy to be adhered to by all. Their interests are far from being united. There is as much or more competition among bankers than among business and professional men of any other class. There is as much jealousy and rivalry.

The system of local banks which prevails in the United States makes every bank the champion of the locality where it does business. It is jealous of capital that would come from the outside. Among the banks in the same locality there is always as much rivalry as there is between the grocers and the merchants. In the money centers where banks are numerous, and there are several lines of financial business, there is a marked tendency to specialization. One bank will deal almost exclusively with local customers, and its deposits will be largely individual. Another will find its chief function in acting as correspondent of outside banks, and its deposits will be chiefly those of these corporations; others deal almost exclusively in stocks and bonds, and place new issues of these securities on the market. The large city bank, the banks in the intermediate towns, and the banks in smaller towns and villages, all have different interests to look out for, and each seeks to use the other as far as possible to further its own profit.

Instead of influencing the conditions of the money market, banks are the first to feel and suffer from them, and every change from stringency to ease which affects their customers and the public first affects the bank.

In some of the large cities where clearing-houses exist, the banks have used the clearing-house tie to ameliorate the conditions which tended to panic and disaster. They did this to protect customers and in fact did save them from far worse consequences than those that otherwise might have ensued.

The debits and credits which appear upon the balance sheet of a bank to the understanding mind at once reveal the fact that the vast bulk of the resources are the property of the bank's creditors, and that if a complete liquidation of a solvent bank were made, at any date, that nothing would be left but waste paper. But by the ignorant all these entries of capital stock and deposits on the one side, and loans upon the other, are regarded as duplex wealth, belonging to an actual entity called a bank, and in some way held to the detriment of those who find it difficult to get money.

Instead of being united in regard to legislation which would benefit the banking community, the bankers of the country hold very many different opinions as to what is best to be done. As already stated, there are many lines of financial business, and legislation which would be beneficial to one class of banks would raise apprehensions on the part of others. There are National banks, State banks, private banks, Savings banks and trust companies. Much of the hesitation on the part of Congressmen manifested in their attitude toward banking legislation arises from secret information they receive from their local bankers and financiers. Congress can only legislate for National banks directly, but can also affect all other classes of financial institutions indirectly by taxation or by privileges granted to the National banks. Any change in the laws in regard to National banks at once touches the profits of these rival institutions, and the difficulty is that no one can tell in advance just what this effect will be.

In all business it is a maxim of conservatism to let well enough alone, and all the solvent and prosperous banks now doing business are very doubtful whether changes in the Federal banking laws will affect them favorably or unfavorably. They are undoubtedly averse to change even to a better system, for even in such a change there is danger of at least temporary loss or increase of expenses. There is no doubt that if all the banks in the country were agreed upon any new law and exerted themselves for its enactment, that Congress would act with alacrity. But even if there is some apparent outward agreement, it will be found that there is an undercurrent of indifference and even opposition among banks which manifests itself to Congressmen and renders them uncertain what to do.

All bankers, no doubt, recognize the fact that for the protection of the public and for the protection of bankers against each other, some legislative control of the banking business is necessary ; but for all this the ideal state for banking capital is one free from any laws other than those which control the ordinary citizen in the management of his business. Every special law restricting powers or defining privileges reduces by a certain extent the possibility of profit from capital employed. These restricted powers and specially granted privileges are a constant reminder of the richer fields of profit they are forbidden to enter. The existence of so many kinds of banks in the United States is the proof of a constant struggle for greater freedom. Each financial institution, National, State, private or Savings bank or trust company, has selected the field it occupies according to the ideas of those who have contributed or control its capital. Each to a greater or less extent looks upon banks of a similar class as competitors, and upon banks of different class as rivals

whose privileges are the objects of jealousy. It is not strange then that Congressmen who, no doubt, are kept well informed of all these diverse and jarring interests, are extremely diffident as to making changes, which may arouse powerful resentment in their own districts. The apparent indifference of Congressmen towards any reform of the laws governing the National banks, and the opposition manifested by many of them, is proof of the divisions of opinion that exist among bankers, and shows conclusively that any united combination among them, such as is charged by those who endeavor to stir up popular prejudice, has no existence in fact.

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THE RESTRICTION ON NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION contained in Section nine of the Act of July 12, 1882, which prevents a bank which has deposited legal-tender notes to retire its circulation in whole or in part from again increasing its circulation until six months from the date of the deposit of legal-tender notes, is a most vexatious and unnecessary limitation of the note-issuing functions.

The theory of the retirement and reissue of circulation is that the banks will be guided therein by the necessities of business, retire when there is a redundancy and reissue when there is a renewed demand. This is the only elasticity provided for under the laws as they now stand, and yet the section referred to restricts this until it is a mere mockery.

Not content with restricting the free handling of its own circulation by the individual bank, the section goes further and restricts the retirement of circulation by all the National banks to three millions of dollars in any one month. The redundancy may be ten millions, but only three could by any possibility be retired.

This scheme of securing elasticity by the retirement and reissue of circulating notes, even if it were freed from the restrictions of Section nine, is by no means an ideal one especially in the case of a circulation based on bonded security. Experience has shown that while in the ordinary state of the bond market, where the prices of bonds allow a living profit on circulation, that there will be some response to a stringent money market in the increase of their circulation by National banks. But the circulation once issued there is, even when a plethora of cash takes the place of stringency, no response at all in the way of retirement unless the prices of bonds rise so that the banks holding them may derive a profit from their sale. In other words, the elasticity or rise and fall in the volume of the National bank note at present depends much more directly on the price of bonds than on the business demand for money. But on the other hand the demand for money and the price of bonds are so connected that it is impossible



to deny that the condition of the money market influences the rise and fall of the bank currency. Causes that depress the price of bonds tend to increase the bank currency and those that augment the price of bonds tend to decrease the bank currency.

Formerly, when the legal-tender notes deposited for the redemption of National bank notes were held as a separate trust fund, only to be diminished by the actual redemption of the notes, there was, when National bank notes were retired by the deposit of legal-tender notes, an actual diminution of the outstanding volume of the paper currency of the country. But since the legal-tender notes so deposited are no longer held separately but become part of the general cash of the Treasury, the fund becoming merely a portion of the Government debt, there is not of necessity any immediate reduction in the volume of the paper currency. Formerly, if a bank deposited \$100,000 in legal-tender notes to retire an equal amount of its circulation, the aggregate volume of legal-tender notes and bank notes would be immediately and permanently reduced by the locking up of \$100,000 legal-tender notes, which could not be reissued until an equal amount of National bank notes had been presented for redemption. Since the National bank redemption fund has been made a part of the general Treasury cash, a large part or even the whole of the \$100,000 legal-tenders might be immediately paid out or at least paid out before the National bank notes were presented for redemption.

It is not to be disputed that such elasticity as the National bank circulation may derive from retirement and reissue responds in a very slight and sluggish manner to the business wants of the country, and that it is further "cribbed, cabined and confined" by the restrictions of law and regulations of the Treasury Department. But if the National bank circulation had the currency field to itself, and there were no legal-tenders or Treasury notes or silver certificates, it is possible that the price of bonds and the demands of trade and commerce for more or less notes would work more in harmony and produce more regular effects. Under such an assumption the bank notes being the only paper currency, and redeemable in coin only, it is probable that there would never be the great accumulation of currency at the money centres which now encourages speculation and causes an abnormal rise in the price of all securities. On the other hand the sudden change from an abnormal confidence to the equally unfounded condition of distrust would not be so likely to occur. The result would be a steadier and perhaps lower level in the price of bonds, so that the influence of the bond market in causing retirements and reissues of circulation would be much lessened.

It is probable that the apparent lack of elasticity with which the National banking system of circulation is charged is due to the com-

petition which this circulation has to encounter in the Government paper notes. It is hardly to be expected that the natural fluctuations of a little over two hundred millions of National bank currency can have much effect on an aggregate of over one billion of paper currency of which \$800,000,000 are notes the volume of which is absolutely unchangeable. All the elasticity, small as it is, possessed by the paper currency of the country is due to the National bank note. If these notes had the whole field, which they have never had since the organization of the system, there would be less complaint of a currency even if it is based on bonds. If, however, by the proper changes of the law the National bank-note currency could be increased and the Government note currency diminished so that each might form about one-half of the aggregate, then a reasonable power of contraction and expansion of the bank notes would probably give all the elasticity required by the whole mass of paper money. Possibly the removal of the restrictions on the reissue of notes after retirement and the three million monthly limit would be all that would be required. But if it did not answer the purpose there are other devices which might cause a more rapid redemption and reissue of the notes than now take place. But it is almost certain that if the paper circulating medium of the country consisted solely of bank notes redeemable in gold coin and if the burden of maintaining specie payments were thrown upon the banks, no matter whether the notes were based on bonds or not, there would be a constant and rapid redemption going on. Each bank to keep up its own gold reserve would send in the notes of all other banks that might come into its possession for redemption. No bank under a rapid system of redemption would ever be tempted to issue more circulation than was actually required by legitimate business, because it would know that it would within a known period be returned for redemption in gold.

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AMONG THE STATE BANKS of a former period it was the custom to issue circulating notes redeemable at par at the main office of the bank, and then to establish redemption agencies at the more important places of the country, where the notes would be redeemed at a slight discount.

The bank established by GEORGE SMITH in the early days in Wisconsin made its notes redeemable at par at the counter of the bank, but had established agencies in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Buffalo and Chicago, where it also redeemed its notes at a discount. These notes passing into the hands of the public were freely accepted throughout the United States, and the discount paid for their redemption in the more accessible places was held to be less a hardship than

the expense of sending the notes to the home office where they would be redeemed at par.

There is one main reason for the redemption of the note of a solvent bank in the hands of the public, and that is the desire of the form of money in which it is redeemable. Before the resumption of specie payments, when National bank notes were redeemable in legal-tender notes, the only motive in presenting a bank note for redemption was the advantage possessed by legal-tender notes for purposes of reserve. The banks were until 1874 required to keep a reserve on their circulating notes equal to that required on deposits, and with the larger reserves there was a greater demand for legal-tender notes. But even with this requirement of legal-tender notes there was not sufficient inducement to present the bank notes for redemption, and they stayed out of circulation so long and became so torn and dirty that the National bank-note circulation became a nuisance and a disgrace.

The Act of June 20, 1874, reduced the reserve required to be kept by the banks on their circulation to a five per cent. redemption fund to be kept in the hands of the Treasurer of the United States. By doing this it still further reduced the demand for legal-tender notes for reserve purposes, but as a compensation and to effect the purification of the bank currency, this law required all Assistant Treasurers of the United States and all banks designated as depositories of public money to gather up all notes that were worn, defaced, mutilated, or otherwise unfit for circulation, and forward them to the Treasurer for redemption. The cost of the transportation and assortment of the notes was also placed on the banks.

It is evident, therefore, that such redemption of National bank notes as occurred before the resumption of specie payments by the Government was of a most perfunctory and inactive kind, except when stimulated by the demand for legal tenders to retire circulation in order to withdraw bonds to realize premiums or to take advantage of refunding operations. The gradual rise in market value of United States bonds was an inducement to the banks to retire their circulation, and take their bonds and sell them and either to reduce their circulation permanently or to increase it again by the substitution of cheaper bonds. The struggle among so many banks to realize premiums caused a great demand for legal-tender notes to deposit to retire circulation. These could be procured by presenting National bank notes for redemption, and while the great refunding operations of the Government were going on during the years just preceding and following the resumption of specie payments, the redemption of National bank notes was very active and kept up a constant flow of legal tenders from the Treasury to the banks and from the banks to the Treasury. This whirl of notes in exchange between the Treasury

and the banks attracted the attention of Congress in 1881, and instead of recognizing that such a movement could not be otherwise than healthful in the otherwise stagnant condition of the paper currency, Congress proceeded in the Act of July 12, 1882, to put restrictions and checks upon this process. Of course this exchange of bank notes for legal tenders and legal tenders for bank notes did not change the volume of the currency in response to business demand, as a more effective system of redemption might do, but it was a great deal better than nothing, and no doubt saved the country from the effects of what would otherwise have been idle money. After specie payments were resumed, in 1879, there was some increase in the presentation of bank notes for redemption, in order to obtain legal-tender notes with which to procure gold, and this demand has continued from time to time since according to the demand for gold.

There seems to be at the present time hardly any motive for presenting the note of a solvent National bank for redemption similar to that which caused the redemption of the notes of State banks in the period before the Civil War. There is so little doubt of the absolute safety of these notes in the mind of the ordinary holder that he would never think of sending them to the bank for redemption. Under the State bank systems, there was a sufficient element of uncertainty to keep a continual current of the notes flowing to their several sources of issue. Where no provision was legally made for the systematic redemption of the notes of the various State banks, the matter was often taken up by banks in the money centres where the notes most accumulated and the notes were sorted and sent back to the issuing bank, a small charge being made for the service. Such was the operation of what was known as the Suffolk banking system of redemptions of the notes of the New England banks.

If the National banking and other monetary laws should ever be so amended as to give bank notes such a preponderance in the currency field as to render it worth while, there is no doubt that a system of redemptions can be easily put in practice which would immediately place all redundant bank notes which might put in an appearance at the financial centers in process of redemption. Even if no provisions of law directed how this was to be done, it is plain that private enterprise could easily compass this end, just as formerly it was satisfactorily accomplished by the Suffolk Bank, that is if there was any sufficient motive for it.

It is, however, credible in the case of the State bank circulation of former years, that if the notes of all the banks had been as secure as to ultimate redemption as the National bank notes of to-day, the difficulty of securing a reduction of their amount by redemptions would have been as great as it is to secure elasticity in the National

bank notes. When a paper note is made absolutely certain of being convertible into gold at all times and places, it becomes practically as good as gold and as little likely to be changed for any other form of money. It is the element of doubt in some form that forces redemption of money. Not always doubt of ultimate redemption, but of the convenience of the time and place.

Some method of forced redemption would be necessary with a National bank note so well secured and protected that it would circulate in any part of the country. This might be accomplished by requiring every bank to send in for redemption notes of other banks, in a certain proportion of their receipts, just as the Assistant Treasurers and designated depositories are now required by law to send in mutilated, defaced and dirty notes that come into their possession.

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THE PACIFIC RAILWAY DEBT to the United States is in a fair way to final adjustment, the Government having made an arrangement with the Central Pacific and the Western Pacific Railways, by which it will receive in installments the amounts due for principal and interest of the subsidy bonds originally issued to the roads by the United States in aid of their construction. In the early part of 1898 the amounts due from the Union Pacific were paid in full and the principal of the amount due from the Kansas Pacific. The amounts due from the Central and Western Pacific Railways aggregate \$58,812,715.48, and this sum has been funded by agreement with a commission representing the Government, consisting of the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General, to be paid in ten years, one-twentieth being payable semi-annually, three per cent. interest being paid upon the amounts remaining due from time to time. It is reported that the four notes representing the first four installments have been sold by the Government, realizing about twelve millions to the Treasury. In the present prosperous state of the roads involved there is no doubt of their capacity to meet the remainder of the debt when it becomes due or even to anticipate its payment.

When the construction of the Pacific roads was first authorized by Congress it was admitted on all hands that they could not be completed without Government aid. In the existing condition of the country the undertaking was beyond the reach of private capital. The roads were, however, a political necessity if the union of interests between the Pacific and Atlantic coasts was to be preserved. The lines for a great part of their length passed through an undeveloped and apparently barren country, where there was no population and but little prospect of any. It was necessary that the Government

should furnish the money for the construction of the greater part of the roads. The subsidy bonds issued in aid of construction were made to run thirty years from the date of issue, the interest to be paid by the United States, and not to be reimbursed by the railways until the maturity of the bonds. These bonds were known as currency sixes, and the last of them have been paid to the holders by the Government. The United States was to receive five per cent. of the net earnings of the roads in payment of the bonds.

In 1897 there was due to the United States from the Union Pacific Road \$58,448,223, and from the Kansas Pacific about \$13,000,000. In 1898, as has been mentioned, a satisfactory settlement was made with these two roads.

The recent settlement with the Central and Western Pacific roads practically terminates the long course of difficulty, agitation and trouble which has marked the history of the relations of the United States Government with the roads.

These roads, from the date of their completion, have been the subject of bitter political attack on account of the subsidies in bonds granted by the Government, which have now either been repaid or are in process of liquidation, and the land grants which were given in addition to the subsidies. But it is certain that when these grants were made the public generally looked upon the building of the Pacific roads as improbable of fulfillment, and the projectors of the roads were thought to be visionaries. In the light now possessed of the capabilities and resources of the territory through which these roads passed, and the great development of the Atlantic and Pacific sections of the country connected by them, it is easy to underrate the prophetic ability of the public in 1862 and 1863, when Congress granted the charters.

The people to-day, however, preserve something of the same attitude of mind toward projected enterprises of a similar character, such as the Nicaragua Canal. Their reluctance to approve this great undertaking may not be altogether due to disbelief in its feasibility, but to the possibility of unlimited demands for Government assistance in the form of appropriations when the work is once begun, and the ever-present fear of ultimate failure inspired by the Panama fiasco.

There are always good arguments on the side of doubt and uncertainty. If it had not been for the building of the Pacific roads, not only would the development of the country have been greatly delayed, but it would probably have proceeded on very different lines. Without these bonds of connection between the two great halves of the country, the Rocky Mountains instead of being the backbone of one nation might have been the boundary line of two.

## THE SAFETY-FUND SYSTEM.

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The safety or guarantee fund for the redemption of the notes of such banks as shall become insolvent, in case the assets of the banks do not produce enough to pay the notes, is a device that is now much referred to in all the proposed measures for the amendment of the present banking law. It is a device which the late Jno. Jay Knox, in his report as Comptroller of the Currency for the year 1876, states to have been suggested by a practice prevailing among the Hong merchants in China. These merchants were commonly men of large property, famed for integrity in their transactions, were limited in number and were the only merchants allowed by the Chinese Government to trade with foreigners. They were called Hong or security merchants because it was the custom among them for all the members of the Hong to guaranty or endorse each single member. If one failed the others contributed to meet his liabilities, in this manner keeping the credit of each of the whole number inviolable. Like gunpowder and the printing press the germ of the safety fund seems to have come from China.

The idea appears to be particularly well adapted for sustaining the credit of a large number of independent banks working under a general law either State or National. It does not interfere with the individuality of each institution, and yet in an effective manner gives the support of all to each one. The element of weakness in the system of independent banks, which seems to be much more congenial to American customs, habits of thought and political institutions than single banks of great capital and numerous branches, is their lack of mutual support in times of financial strain. The Hong merchants were each independent in their particular line of business, and in that respect were not associated; their only bond of connection was the special privilege possessed by all to trade with foreigners.

The safety fund or guarantee, as applied to a banking system or number of banks working independently under the same general law, consists in this country of an annual tax or contribution levied by the State of a certain percentage either on capital or circulation, the proceeds of which are held by the State as a fund. When any bank which has contributed to this fund fails and is put in process of liquidation, any deficiency in its assets to meet the liabilities for which the fund was a guarantee is paid out of the fund. The principle is that experience has shown that out of a large number of banks transacting business, the great majority will remain solvent, and only a comparatively small number will fail. The burden of contributing to the safety fund is therefore very easily borne by the business of the contributing members.

The principle of the safety fund was only once carried into practical operation, and that was under the safety-fund law, which was enacted by the Legislature of New York in 1829, when Martin Van Buren was Governor. A number of banks held special charters from the State which were to expire in that year, and the law was passed to continue their existence under

new conditions. It is important to understand that the law authorized these banks to issue circulating notes to the extent of double their capital. When it is remembered that National banks are, in this respect, restricted to ninety per cent. of their capital, and that none of the new propositions for currency reform grants over sixty per cent. free circulation, it will be seen how large was the privilege granted to the safety-fund banks of using their credit in issuing notes to the extent of 200 per cent. of capital.

Another difference of great importance between these banks and our present National banks must be noticed in the manner of printing and issuing the bank notes. A National bank to-day pays for the plates from which its notes are printed, but it never has possession of them.\* The plates are prepared under the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency and kept in his custody. Notes are printed under his supervision, and only sent to the bank in the precise quantity allowed by law. It is, therefore, impossible for a National bank ever to be guilty of an over-issue of notes. There was no such provision of law to restrict the issues of the New York safety-fund banks. Each bank had this matter under its own entire control. It conceived its own designs, purchased and held its own plates, and there was nothing whatever to check it in printing any quantity of notes it chose. As the sequel showed some of the banks choosing to disregard the legal restriction of their issues to 200 per cent. of the capital, went much further and issued notes as their necessities seemed to require. It is important to note this defect of legal check on issues, as herein lay one of the causes of the break-down of the system which subsequently occurred.

The safety-fund feature of the Act was that every bank whose charter was renewed, and every bank which afterwards received a charter, should contribute to a common fund annually a sum equal to one-half of one per cent. of its capital stock, the fund to be held by the Treasurer of the State. These payments were to be continued until each corporation had contributed to the fund an amount equal to three per cent. of its capital stock. The fund was made liable not only to the payment of the circulating notes, but also to the payment of the other debts of any bank contributing to the fund which became insolvent.

The contributions to the fund began in 1831, but there seems to have been no pains taken by the State authorities to enforce the payment of the contributions. In 1841 and 1842 eleven banks failed with an aggregate capital of \$3,150,000. Three per cent. on the capital of these banks would have been \$97,500, but it was found that their total contributions were only \$86,274, or about \$8,000 short of the legal amount. The total amount of claims against them was \$2,558,933, of which \$1,548,588 was for circulation and \$1,010,375 for other debts. The total capital of the safety-fund banks did not exceed \$30,000,000, and if the full contribution had been paid and kept up it would only have amounted to \$900,000, wholly inadequate to pay the debts of the eleven banks that failed or even their liabilities on account of circulating notes alone. The chief part of the liabilities for circulating notes was due to over-issues on the part of one or two of the banks. The contributions to the fund would have paid the liabilities for circulation if there had been no over-issues. These banks failed in 1841 and 1842. The whole fund then existing was immediately absorbed, and the solvent banks were called upon to continue their contributions, and by 1848 the whole amount contributed to the



fund was \$1,876,063. The contributions coming in slowly and the creditors of the failed banks being impatient, the State issued bonds to pay them and reimbursed itself for the bonds as further contributions from the solvent banks came in. The eleven banks that failed comprised about one-eighth of the whole number of banks contributing to the fund.

The failure, for such it must be called, of the safety-fund system as tried in New York State, was due, first, to the comparatively small number of institutions concerned in it. The fear of making the contributions too burdensome caused the tax for maintaining the fund to be fixed at too small an amount. Again it was limited to cease when the whole amount of the contributions of a bank equalled three per cent. of its capital. If there had been no such limit, but if the law had required the banks to pay one-half of one per cent. every year, the fund at the date of the failure of the eleven banks would have been sufficient to pay the circulating notes of these banks. If the tax had been a continuing tax of eight-tenths of one per cent. on capital annually, it would have paid all their liabilities.

The number of banks in the safety-fund system was comparatively small, the percentage of failures due to loose supervision was very large. The amount of tax collected was smaller than it should have been and the limit of the cessation of the tax was too narrow. There had been no previous experience on which to predicate what the requirements of the fund might perhaps be. But although the New York safety-fund system did not prove a success, it is easy to see from the history of its operations that the failure was due not to defect in the principle, but to faults in the manner in which it was applied.

With this experience as a guide it ought not to be difficult to make the safety-fund system as safe in practice as it is sound in theory. That it is susceptible of practical application under a law permitting more liberty to banks in the issue of their notes is capable of actual demonstration. The Comptroller's reports have shown what tax would be required to secure the circulation of failed banks, if bond security should be abolished.

In the case of the National banking system, there is a mass of complete statistics covering thirty years from which can be formed a very accurate judgment of the number of failures likely to occur under such governmental supervision as is exercised by the Comptroller of the Currency. The probable losses by such failures can also be predicted to nearly a certainty. Because of the large number of banks in the National system the burden of making the necessary contribution to the sinking fund would bear very lightly on each bank, while the restrictions in the method of printing and issuing notes would make over-issues, such as those made by the New York safety-fund banks, impossible.

The Canadian banks now contribute to a safety fund for the protection of the circulation of all, but there have been no failures of any importance to test its capacity.

The only other question is if a safety-fund system shall be adopted for the National system whether the contributions shall be made to protect liabilities for deposits as well as for circulating notes. Without discussing this point, it is sufficient to say that if the statistics of failures of National banks and the results of their liquidation are any criterion, an annual tax of one-half of one per cent. on capital would probably create a fund large enough to pay all losses both on account of circulating notes and deposits.

## \* THE ORIGINS OF MONEY.

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The development of the delicate mechanism of exchange now represented by gold and silver coins of uniform weight and fineness, bank notes, checks, and foreign bills of exchange payable in coin thousands of miles from where they are drawn, has been the result of an evolution, many of whose steps can be traced upon the pages of history, and by the enduring testimony of coins and monuments. Metallic money of some sort has been found in use by the States of most advanced civilization since the dawn of authentic history, but the traditions and literary records of earlier times among these peoples and actual conditions among peoples slightly civilized have illustrated the progress from the simple barter of goods for goods, up to the use of cattle, shells and furs, to the use of metals by weight, and from the use of the heavier and less valuable metals, copper, brass and iron, to the adoption of silver and gold. All exchanges are assimilated by some authors to barter, since money is only the intermediary which settles balances, but there is a material difference between modern barter, carried on by refined processes of credit, and the primitive method of exchanging a single consumable commodity on the spot for another commodity. Modern barter, and even much of that whose history comes down to us from primitive peoples, was carried on in terms of money. Money is in such cases the common denominator or measure of value, even where it is not the medium of exchange.

There was an obvious advantage in barter in the conduct of commerce between different peoples in ancient times, as there is in the foreign commerce of to-day, in the fact that it permitted a vessel to go both ways with a full cargo, instead of going loaded in one direction and returning with nothing but a quantity of gold or silver. Even to-day, in the language of M. Babelon, "The African caravans, those ships of the desert, which bring to the ports of the sea-coast the natural products of the interior, return equally loaded, not with pieces of gold, but with the merchandise which they have received from Europeans in exchange for that which they have delivered." † The commerce of the Phœnicians was substantially of this sort of barter. Taking out from Tyre and Sidon stuffs of purple, glass and jewels, they brought back in exchange the natural products of Africa, Spain and Gaul, and sometimes slaves captured in war. Exchanges were necessary, almost from the most primitive times. Under the walls of Troy the Greeks bought wine from Lemnos, paying for it with copper or iron, with hides and cattle. The great fairs of antiquity and the middle ages permitted large exchanges of goods by barter, with the intervention of only limited amounts of money. The Hanseatic League established *comptoirs* or magazines all over Northern Europe in the fourteenth century, where great quantities of goods were stored for exchange. At Novogorod, in Russia, it was forbidden by the

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\* Continued from the February MAGAZINE, p. 194.

† "*Les Origines de la Monnaie*," p. 17. Paris, 1897. For many of the facts here presented, and especially for the order of evolution of money, the author is greatly indebted to this admirable little book.

laws of the League to pay money for balances, but they must all be settled by the delivery of Hanseatic goods.\*

The Greeks of the Homeric times gradually tended to cattle as their standard of value. Prices and charges were fixed in cattle among them, as among nearly all peoples leading a pastoral life. A woman slave who was a good worker was worth four oxen. Comparing the arms of Glaukos to those of Diomedes, Homer says that the first were worth a hundred oxen and the others only nine. Parents who sold their daughters to their husbands received a certain number of heads of cattle. The laws of Draco fixed fines and rewards in oxen. For killing a wolf, one received an ox or a sheep. From this general adoption of cattle as the unit of exchange came the names of the first Greek money. † The word for cattle became synonymous with money, and in the times of Æschylus, it was a proverb, regarding the man whose silence was bought with money, that he had "an ox upon his tongue." The Greek peoples were not the only ones where the name of cattle or the herd became by extension the term for money. The Sanscrit word *roupa*, the basis of the modern rupee of India, is derived from the word for herd (carried into French as *troupeau*; English, *troop*.) At Rome, also, in the early days of the monarchy, cattle were the standard of value, and one ox was equal to ten lambs. For small offences fines were imposed of two sheep, while in graver cases the maximum might rise to thirty oxen.

The evidence of etymology goes far to sustain the contention of Professor Ridgeway, that the ox or cow was the unit of value in all primitive pastoral societies. ‡ The Latin word *pecus*, meaning cattle, became the equivalent of money, and the root of the word *pecunia*, from which is derived the English word *pecuniary*. Among the Romans the counting of cattle by the head, and the fact that herds were synonymous with riches, laid the basis of our use of the word *capital*. In Germany the laws of the barbarians made cattle the money standard, and the word signifying a herd (in German, *Vieh*), became the basis of the Anglo-Saxon word *fee*, in the sense of a salary. In Ireland payments were made by horned beasts, and a woman slave was estimated to be worth three cows. Even in the countries where cattle had lost much of their original value in use, the ox or cow continued to occupy a peculiar position, indicating that it had once been the chief representative of wealth. In Egypt, says Professor Ridgeway, "their ancient esteem for the cow as one of their chief means of subsistence survived only in religious observances. So, too, in modern India the reverence for the sacred cow amongst a people who regard as an abomination the eating of beef, is a survival from the time when in a more Northern clime cattle formed the principal wealth of their forefathers." The use of the cow unit was so well established among the ancient Hindoos that separate values

\*Blanqui, "*Histoire d'Economie Politique*," I, p. 205. Roscher declares that in Rhokand until the end of the eighteenth century, as the result of barter, the cities "presented the appearance of a fair the whole year round."—"Principles of Political Economy." I, p. 340.

†Professor Ridgeway maintains that the Attic "talent" was the equivalent in value of an ox, whence the identification of the talent with oxen in the laws of Draco and the interchangeable use of the terms ox and talent for the monetary unit.—"The Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards," pp. 6-9. Cambridge, 1892.

‡"The Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards," pp. 47-53. Substantially the same view is taken by F. Lenormant, one of the highest authorities on the subject.—"*La Monnaie dans l'Antiquité*," I, p. 74.

were put upon calves and heifers of different ages, but these values all had fixed relations to each other. The use of cattle and sheep as the medium of exchange was the natural result of two of the essential requirements of money—that there should be a common denominator by which all values might be measured, and that there should be a medium of such general acceptability that it should be exchangeable against all commodities.

Other objects of exchange were employed among people who had not large pastoral wealth and who were compelled to live by hunting and fishing. Some of these forms of money have come down to our time and illustrate another principle of monetary science—that mere convention, with the limitation of the quantity, contributes something to the value of the monetary unit. In Iceland an edict rendered as late as 1413 established a schedule of prices in dried fish, twenty horse-shoes being worth twenty fish; a pair of woman's socks, three fish; a half pound of lard, five fish.\* Furs and skins fulfilled the mission of money around Hudson's Bay during the years of the predominance of the Hudson Bay Company, and among the natives the same word, *raha*, signified at once a skin and money. In Russia skins were used in the Middle Ages for money and the word, *kung*, money, means marten. "By degrees," says Prof. Roscher, "it came to pass that instead of whole skins, only two 'snouts' were given or other pieces of leather about a square inch in size, which were probably stamped by the Government and redeemed in whole skins at the Government magazines."† The Mongolian conquerors would not recognize this symbolic money and it became valueless.

Tobacco was the standard of value in Virginia in the early days of the colony, and even down to a recent time squares of pressed tea have been the unit of value in China. The Indians of the United States and Canada employed *wampum*, which was made by the combination of two shells, gathered upon certain shores of the Gulf of Mexico. The black or violet had double the value of white shells. This wampum money was adopted even by the white colonists as token money and served as a legal tender in Canada and other provinces until 1670. It was often used by general consent after that date and the Indians did not give it up until early in the present century. A severe shock was given to the security of the monetary system when some European manufacturers set to work to counterfeit wampum by bits of glass, which even among the Indians quickly depressed its purchasing power. Salt has been often employed as money and is still a favorite currency in Central Africa. It is carried by the caravans into the interior, increasing in value according to the distance from the sea. Four heavy bars, of the length of the arm and hand, two hands in breadth and a hand a half in thickness, make the load of an ass. In Timbuctoo it requires nearly a dozen of these bars to buy a slave, but in other sections three bars are sufficient. Slaves are also employed as money in Africa, but often as a standard, or money of account, rather than as the actual medium of exchange. This conventional value of the slave in the Soudan is about 100 francs (\$20), and when a cavalier says that a horse cost him three slaves, he is quite as likely to refer to the slave as a standard as to imply an actual transfer of slaves. ‡

\* Babelon, p. 8.

† "Principles of Political Economy," I, p. 363.

‡ A. de Foville in "l'Economiste Français," August 27, 1898, p. 278.

## SUCCESSIVE STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY.

Seven steps may be traced in the evolution of money. First, there was simple barter; second, there was the adoption of a common denominator in the form of a single article, like an ox or a sheep; third, there was the employment of metal in the form of bars or utensils; fourth, there was the use of metal by actual weight; fifth, there was the use of certain pieces of metal by tale, or number; sixth, there was the imprint of the private mark of some merchant or coiner highly respected for his honesty; seventh, there was the certification of the value of the money by the State. There was not in any of these processes the assumption of the right of the State to create money by its stamp in contravention of its actual value in exchange as fixed by the evolution of society. The contention that the coining of money was from the beginning a regal power, inherent from the nature of things in political sovereignty, is not sustained by the evidence of history. The delegation to the State of the power to issue coins of uniform weight and fineness, bearing the official guarantee of these facts, is the product of the same evolution which has placed in the hands of the State the control over the water supply, and certain processes of sanitation—the convenience of the community, under the system of the sub-division of labor, for obtaining a guarantee of certainty, uniformity, and security.

The article used as money in each community has been an article adapted to its degree of civilization and highly prized as a commodity. Such articles have not often been chosen by chance, but have conformed to the monetary conditions of the time. A correspondent of the French Colonial Union, which began in 1898 the collection of examples of the primitive money of Africa, wrote that the monetary types employed there combined almost always these three conditions: (1) The product invested with the money function exists in abundance on the market; (2) it is of current consumption and its value is preserved by the relative equilibrium of production and consumption; and (3) it is capable of minute subdivision, at least to the point of adaptation to the smallest transactions.\* Gold in powder or grains is the medium of exchange in certain privileged regions, but it is too costly a medium for the miserable tribes of interior Africa. They use cowries, or shells, of which it requires 20,000 to equal the value of 20 francs (\$4). The use of pieces of bullion and utensils of metal for money was the third stage in monetary development, coming after barter and the use of more destructible natural products, like domestic animals and grain. Says M. Babelon:

"The choice of the standard merchandise varied according to the places and manner of living and was dictated only by considerations of convenience and facility of employment. This principle, revealed by observation, received a no less rigid application in societies which had passed the first degrees of material culture and in whose midst the division of labor had already led to the creation of different bodies of trades. As soon as industry was sufficiently developed, alongside pastoral and agricultural life, for the working of the metals to be known and their employment in the making of utensils, tools, arms and ornaments, it was very quickly remarked what advantages they offered, whether worked or not, as the intermediary of transactions and a convenient merchandise standard."<sup>†</sup>

One of the reasons for the transition from cattle and agricultural products to the metals as the medium of exchange was the development of international

\* A. de Foville in "l'Economiste Francais," August 27, 1898, p. 277.

† "Les Origines de la Monnaie," p. 33.

trade. Such articles as oxen and grain, which passed very well in domestic exchanges, were not easy of transportation and were not always acceptable to foreign traders. The Greeks might among themselves use cattle to advantage as a standard of value, but when they undertook to buy of the Phœnicians, they found them a less acceptable medium. The metals came into play as a convenient merchandise for exchange against the manufactures of Tyre, even before they were directly used as money. Tin, copper, silver, and gold were recognized as of high value as soon as the means of working them were discovered, and perhaps of higher value at Tyre, where manufacturing processes were well advanced, than among the pastoral tribes of the Greek peninsula. The indestructible character of the metals, their capacity of being divided into any desired fractions without impairing their value, their ease of transportation, and their manifold uses in a partially developed and military society, might naturally have suggested their employment as a medium of exchange, even if the theory of money had not presented itself to philosophical minds. The use of the metals as a medium of exchange, therefore, followed naturally the use of other merchandise, without leading directly to the birth of money in the distinctive sense of coined pieces of metal of uniform size and bearing a stamp of weight and fineness. The metals worked up readily into knives, spears, rings, cooking utensils and jewels, which were in themselves objects of general desire, without destroying the value of the metals if converted back into bullion. Among the Homeric Greeks boilers of various sizes and tripods were often used in exchanges and as presents. Some of the ancient laws of Greece prescribed fines in kettles and required the payment of as many as fifty or a hundred. They were evidently collected as the symbol of riches, as cattle and sheep had formerly been. The owning of them was an evidence that one had a great crowd of clients who had to be nourished at his table.

In Egypt in ancient times the metals were cast into crude rings and bolts, which were known as *tabnou*. These *tabnou* came to be partially marked off in advance into regular lengths, so that they could be broken off to meet the varying demands of exchange. The Egyptians followed the weight system in determining the value of their money, and their monuments bear many illustrations of the money changer or the merchant weighing out the rings and bolts of money metal and cruder pieces which had not been thus marked. The weights put in one side of the balance testified to the evolution of money from the herd, for they were cast in the figures of oxen, heads of oxen, deer and other animals. The *tabnou* weighed from ninety to ninety-eight grams and was the standard for most Egyptian transactions. The great inscription of the Temple of Karnak recounts that Thotmes III received from the Chetas of Syria 301 *tabnous* of silver in eight rings, every ring weighing about 3,612 grams and worth thirty-seven or thirty-eight *tabnous*.\*

"The merchant weighs and measures the grain" was a well-known Assyrian text, which indicated that weight was the standard by which the value of money was determined in Assyria. The Bible is full of expressions showing that money passed by weight. The shekel itself was originally a measure of weight.† When Abraham purchased a tomb for Machpelah, he

\* Lenormant, "*La Monnaie dans l'Antiquité*," I, p. 103.

† "And thy meat which thou shalt eat shall be by weight, twenty shekels a day."—Ezekiel, iv, 10.

“weighed to Ephron” 400 shekels of silver, “current money with the merchant.”\* This was a recognition both of the weight and fineness of the metal. Large amounts, expressed in gold and silver talents and sometimes in talents of lead, copper and and iron, were in heavy bricks. Metals cast into jewels were were often delivered by weight in money payments, as Rebecca received a ring of gold of the weight of half a shekel and two bracelets of the weight of ten shekels. The rings of gold given to Job by his friends were the sort of rings in use as money.† Often the precious metals circulated in the form of dust or powder, kept in purses. When the brothers of Jacob bought grain in Egypt they carried sums of silver in purses hidden in the depths of their sacks. Among the Phœnicians the metals circulated in the form of bars and rings. Much of the metal which they gathered in every corner of the Mediterranean Sea was made up into bracelets, which proved an acceptable medium of exchange among the tribes of the West. There were public officials in Egypt and among the Hebrews, specially charged with testing the accuracy of the scales in which money was weighed.‡ The Greeks and Romans had public weighers, those of Rome being called *libripentes*.

Long after the use of coined money had become general in the Greek world, bars of iron were still employed at Sparta by authority of tradition and the laws of Lykurgos. This money remained in circulation until the Medic wars (about 450 B. C.) and among the fables circulated in regard to it was the statement that it was unfit for any other use and rendered brittle by heating red-hot from the fire and dipping in vinegar. The pieces were heavy bars of the weight of a *mina* of Ægina.‡ In Rome also heavy bars of bronze were used as money alongside of the more precious metals. When Epaminondas died at Thebes, he was so poor that there was found in his house nothing but an old bar of iron. Coined money had long superseded such a medium of exchange at Thebes and this could only have been a souvenir of the early days of Greece. It was not unusual to hang up in the temples these relics of the early times. Pheidon, King of Argos, who was credited in Greece with the invention of money, withdrew from circulation the old bars of iron and consecrated a certain number as a votive offering in the sanctuary of Here and Argos. In the time of Aristotle these ancient relics might still be seen, clothed with a religious character, like the bars which King Periklytos deposited in the Temple of Delphi after the establishment of coined silver money in Tenedos.

The Chinese in the early years of the present century used gold and silver only by weight. It was never coined, but passed as merchandise, whose

\* Genesis, xiii, 16.

† Professor Ridgeway denies that “ring money” was “a true currency, circulating like the stamped money of later times.” He says that “The true view seems to be that these rings, whether employed by the ancient Egyptians, or the prehistoric inhabitants of Mycenæ, the Kelts or Teutons, were nothing more than ornaments and passed in the ordinary way of barter, having a recognized distinct relation to other forms of property such as cattle and slaves.” — “The Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards,” 35. But the researches of M. Lenormant and M. Babelon seem to show that such rings were used as a medium of exchange and specially marked for the purpose; V. Babelon, 52, seq.

‡ Babelon, page 66.

§ It is not to be inferred that gold and silver were unknown in Sparta or they were not highly esteemed. The historians tell of generals and chiefs bought with gold and citizens who were famous for their riches of gold and silver, and even certain fines were fixed in gold and silver; but the metals passed by weight and bars of iron were the legal money of domestic circulation. V. Theureau, “*Les Systemes Monétaires*,” p. 19.

weight and fineness must be tested at each exchange. Even to the present time in China, there is no legal money except that of copper, alloyed with tin. The tael, which is the Chinese monetary unit, weighs about fifty-eight grams, but its weight varies slightly according to the place where it is issued. The bankers put their personal mark upon bullion issued by them or passing through their hands. Says M. Babelon:\*

"Sometimes this individual imprint, a simple indication of origin or place of production, inspires sufficient confidence to dispense with the verification by touchstone of the character of the alloy. The facility with which the public and the merchants accept the bullion which comes from a particular banking or commercial house depends upon the honorable fame of the house, but no one is obliged to extend such confidence. Public authority never intervenes, either to force an individual to accept any particular bullion or to guarantee the weight or alloy."

The monetary history of Japan differs from that of China. One finds there bars of gold and silver as well as copper, bearing the stamp of either the central Government or the governments of provinces; but even up to 1870, when Japan adopted a definite monetary system, bars of silver and gold stamped by individual merchants and bankers were often employed as a medium of exchange along with rice and other commodities.

The Russian rouble was originally a lengthened bar of silver. The medium of exchange in the middle ages, for local and small transactions, consisted of furs and foreign coins, but pieces of silver weighing half a pound, a quarter and an eighth of a pound were used in large transactions. This money was cast into oblong bars without any stamp or inscription, but of the value of a rouble.

Even after governmental coinage was adopted, it often bore the marks of private bankers, as an indication that the banker gave the guarantee of his stamp to the work of the Government mint. These stamps continued to be imprinted upon coins as late as the year 400 B. C., indicating that certain clients were more faithful to the credit of some great house than that of the Government. Private coinage was resumed on an extensive scale in the middle ages, when centralized government had disappeared. Twelve hundred monetary types of Merovingian Gaul have been preserved, struck in more than eight hundred localities, and among them royal and ecclesiastical types are the exception. Students who did not penetrate to the truth of this problem undertook to account for this varied coinage by the wide dissemination of Government mints, and expressed surprise at the appearance of the names of so many individuals in place of that of the Roman Emperor, attesting the weight and fineness of gold and silver money. The fact that there were private mints as well as public is suggested by the distinctive title of the mint at Limoges—*publica fiscalis monetæ officina*. The churches and the monasteries also struck money with the products of their revenues and put upon it the name of their religious establishments.† Cities and villages

\* "Les Origines de la Monnaie," p. 40. M. Lenormant suggests that the necessity for a conventional coin is greater for small amounts than for large, which can be settled by weighing gold and silver.—"Monnaie et médailles," p. 13.

† Mr. Del Mar declares that "The baronial and ecclesiastical mints of the middle ages, when not authorized by the German Empire, or by the princes of the Western States, were baronial or ecclesiastical only in name; they were really robbers' dens." "History of Monetary Systems," p. 6; but however this may have been, private coinage was a natural step in the evolution of money.



followed suit. This varied coinage naturally introduced confusion into exchanges and nearly all contracts stipulated that they should be fulfilled in money of full weight and fineness. St. Louis endeavored, as several of his predecessors had done, to substitute purely official coinage for that of the seigneurs—a measure which, in the language of M. Blanqui, “might have had favorable results if the kings had not abused it to artificially multiply their resources by fraudulent alterations.” \*

The first coinage was either by individuals or by small communities. It was intended only to give the stamp of weight and fineness to the metal and not to give to it a fictitious value by law. The system of counting money by weight and by tale, with the questions raised regarding the honesty of the weights, naturally led to the desire for a stamp which should place the mark of finality upon a given piece. The first coins in both Athens and Rome bore the mark of the origin of the medium of exchange in cattle and other familiar objects by bearing the figures of these animals upon their face.† The very language used regarding the money paid by Abraham, “current money with the merchant,” shows that it was the mercantile community, and not the Government, which determined the standard. The first Greek money of gold was small stamped pieces of bullion. These were of globular, oval and other forms, as they were left by the imprint of the hammer. Many of them were of different alloys, some containing just enough gold to give a yellowish color to the silver, and bearing all the marks of private mintage. Monograms and private symbols borrowed from the animal and vegetable kingdoms were the marks of special mints, the property of merchants or bankers, and were often accompanied by entire phrases, such as “I am the seal of Thersis—take care not to injure me.” ‡

Private coinage has reappeared on a considerable scale in modern times where the machinery of official coinage has been insufficient or defective. “For a long time,” Mr. Jevons declares, “the copper currency of England consisted mainly of tradesmen’s tokens, which were issued very light in weight and excessive in number.” § The coinage of tokens in Ireland and the North American colonies was farmed out by a decree of George I in 1722, to Mr. Wood, an iron founder of Wolverhampton, who claimed to have discovered an alloy suitable for coins, consisting of copper, zinc, and a small proportion of silver. The amount of the Irish coinage was limited to £105,000, but this did not prevent a violent attack upon the system, which discredited the coins and compelled the Government to buy back the privilege by a pension of £3,000 a year to Mr. Wood for fourteen years. Private coinage of a less objectionable character was carried on in North America from colonial times down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The Chalmers shilling, coined in 1783 by a goldsmith of Annapolis, was famous in the early history of Maryland. A private mint was established in 1830 by Mr. Templeton Reid of Georgia, in which \$10 gold pieces were coined which were found by the United States assayer to contain gold to the value of \$10.06.

\* “*Histoire de l’Économie Politique*,” I, p. 224.

† Theureau, p. 23. In a similar manner, silver coins of the shape of shells were used in the north of Burmah. Ridgeway, p. 22.

‡ The private character of this mintage has been disputed in some quarters, but appears to be well sustained by M. Babelon, “*Les Origines de la Monnaie*,” Ch. III.

§ “Money and the Mechanism of Exchange,” p. 85.

A mint was established in 1831 by Mr. Christopher Bechtler of Rutherfordton, N. C., which coined gold up to 1840 to the amount of \$2,241,840.\* The assayers of the United States mint reported in 1851 that twenty-seven different kinds of gold coins, issued from fifteen private mints, had been received and assayed at Philadelphia. California bristled with private mints after the gold discoveries, issuing fine gold coins bearing the names of the makers and passing without objection in exchange.

These modern instances of private coinage illustrate the true character of metallic money as an article of exchange value, bearing stamps which merely certify to its weight and fineness. If it has been found wise to delegate the power of stamping money to the State, it is for the same reason that other powers have been delegated to the State which might have been left open for the individual members of the community—the advantages of uniformity and public convenience. The power of stamping money, therefore, is no essentially royal or official prerogative, and confers no more right to affix a false stamp or to attempt to create money out of things without value than the power delegated to the State to regulate measures of weight and bulk confers the right to fasten the name of pound upon the ounce or the title of quart upon the pint. The essential feature of the evolution, which, in comparatively modern times has transferred to the State the exclusive control of coinage is the subdivision of labor—the delegation to a public officer of the function of weighing and testing money which, under the systems of payments in bullion and even of private coinage, had to be performed by each person for himself. The private coins of the Merovingian mints and of California mining companies, if they were not money in the modern legal sense, were, at least, a medium of exchange of a character which made them the last step in the process of evolution before the birth of governmental money. In all the successive steps of the evolution of money thus far traversed, the essential fact stands out that the article sought as a medium of exchange was also a thing of value in itself. In the language of Professor Ridgeway, “when in a certain community one particular kind of commodity is of general use and generally available, this comes to form the unit in which all values are expressed.”† The article may be suitable for food or the processes of production, or only for ornament, but it has almost always been a thing which men sought for independently of its monetary use. It has been, in the words of M. Babelon, “a real equivalent,” and justifies his conclusion, that “metallic money, the ordinary instrument of exchanges, is of value only for the quantity of precious metal which it contains.”‡

#### COINAGE OF MONEY BY STATE AUTHORITY.

We now stand at the threshold of the use of coined metal, bearing the official certification of its weight and fineness by the stamp of an authority

\* These and other curious facts may be found in the paper, “Curiosities of American Coinage,” by Mr. A. E. Outerbridge, Jr., in the Bulletin of the Free Museum of Science and Art of the University of Pennsylvania, June, 1896, p. 201.

† “The Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards,” p. 11

‡ “*Les Origines de la Monnaie*,” p. 187. That the precious metals owe their value in exchange to the metal, and not in any essential degree to the stamp, is demonstrated by the fact that gold bars are used as often as coin in international trade, and when coins are used they are subjected to careful tests of weight.—Block, “*Les Progrès de la Science Economique*,” II, p. 38.

known to all men and trusted by all. The extension of commercial relations and the uncertainty and frauds which attended the delivery of the precious metals by weight and bearing private marks led to the desire for a medium bearing its own certificate of weight, fineness and value which could be passed freely from hand to hand. Then came what M. Lenormant has described\* as "that fertile innovation, true invention of genius, which transformed this cash equivalent, still so imperfect, into money." But it has already been seen that the creation of money was an evolution, not a sudden inspiration. The State was appealed to, as in many cases in the modern world, to perform a function capable of being performed after a fashion by individuals, but best performed in a manner to ensure uniformity, security and convenience to all members of the community.†

The regulation of money by the State had several advantages. It put a stop at once to the frauds practiced by the goldsmiths and private coiners, who presumed upon the general acceptability of money and the ignorance of many who received it to gradually reduce the amount of pure metal in the coin. In the Greek cities of Asia Minor the private coinage was mainly of electrum, which was a mixture of gold and silver. The proportions of the two metals in the electrum coins varied within the widest limits. Some, almost as yellow as pure gold, contained ninety-five per cent. of that metal. In others, there was scarcely five per cent. of gold against ninety-five per cent. of silver. Specimens have even been found where the proportion of gold was only two per cent., yet differing little in color from those containing sixty per cent. of the yellow metal.‡ Even plated coins, with an interior of lead, were worked off upon the ignorance of the people. Cræsus put an end to these abuses by the demonetization of electrum and the issue of pieces of pure gold or silver. The corruptions of the coinage had finally become such that coined money was no longer an available instrument of exchange or standard of value. Public authority was invoked to cure this evil and to provide a stamp which would give the coin the respect of all citizens, would make the minting of the standard metal a common right instead of the privilege of a few, and would make the value of the coin the equivalent of what it purported to be.

The honor of the invention of money was claimed in ancient times for the Lydians and for Pheidon of Argos.‡ The development of money coined by the State from the use of metals by weight and by private coinage is generally set for the seventh century B. C. The claims of the Lydians and of Pheidon of Argos were so well sustained, even within a few centuries of that time, that the lexicographer Pollux, who drew his data from the best sources, including many authors who are now lost, and used it in the most

\* "Monnaies et Médailles," p. 18.

† Professor Leroy-Beaulieu questions whether, in view of the inconveniences of the interference of the State in coining money, by means of fraudulent debasements and over-issues of paper, "it would not have been better that individuals or free associations should have been charged, under authority which the public would have recognized, with the duty of striking and certifying money."—"Traité d'Economie Politique," III, p. 124.

‡ Babelon, p. 155.

§ There were other Greek claimants, among them being the people of Naxos, Kyme, Phœkia, and Miletos.—Babelon, p. 186. Mr. Del Mar endeavors to carry the origin of money much further back than the seventh century, but he does not appear to distinguish between official coined money and its cruder forerunners.—"History of Monetary Systems," p. 88, seq.

careful manner, declared that it was very difficult to settle the question to whom belonged the real credit. The difficulty of the problem has not diminished with the lapse of more than twenty centuries, but some additional light has been thrown upon its solution by comparisons of the coins and ancient monuments. M. Lenormant reaches the conclusion that the stamping of money took place independently in both countries, but that in Lydia it was gold money and in Ægina, where Pheidon was supposed to have executed the first coinage, it was silver money.\* The money of Ægina was in the shape of a turtle, the pieces weighing a little less than twelve grams, and differed only from the oval bars of bullion previously used by some rough stamping. The Lydian money was of a similar shape, but less elongated, and was made in part of electrum.

A fact which leads M. Lenormant to conclude that the Lydian money has slightly the advantage in antiquity is that the pieces fulfill less completely than the coins of Ægina the conditions which go to make money. Indeed, to the unskilled observer, the roughly marked and irregularly formed coins thus singled out to denote the birth of money present no striking difference from the pieces of bullion bearing private marks which had preceded them and some of the slightly improved pieces which followed them. The distinctive step in monetary science which they denote is the stamp of the State rather than the individual, giving a certain assurance of the uniformity and purity of the metal. The stamps were sunk deeply into the metal, instead of standing out upon its surface, and were simply the forms of animals and not the distinctive wording which is found on modern coins. "The invention of the matrix, giving a type in relief," says M. Lenormant, "constituted a capital step which yet remained to be accomplished and which would constitute a new period in the history of money."† The coins of Ægina, although irregular in form, conformed to this new condition of progress and this is one of the reasons why he throws the weight of his opinion in favor of the greater antiquity of the Lydian coins of electrum bearing the sunken stamp.

Money having thus been born, even in its primitive form, its convenience caused its rapid introduction into all the countries coming in touch with Asia Minor or the Greek Islands, and from them into countries still farther removed. From Lydia the use of money spread among the Greek cities which dotted the West coast of Asia Minor and from there crossed the sea to the coasts of Thrace and Macedonia. Ægina was in the seventh century the emporium of Greek commerce, where the ships of the Orient and of the Greek Islands met in a sort of international market.‡ It was a part of the logic of events that the use of money should have its birth there, and that from Ægina it should traverse all parts of the Greek peninsula. Its propagation was so rapid that by the middle of the sixth century B. C. there was not a country where the Greeks were established in which money was not used. When the Persians pursued their conquering march over Asia, they learned from the Lydians the use of money and began the coinage of the gold Daric, one of the most beautiful of the early coins. The use of money spread more slowly in the interior provinces of the new Persian Empire and the precious metals still circulated by weight, as in the days of the

\* "La Monnaie dans l'Antiquité," I, p. 126.

† "Monnaies et Médailles," p. 21.

‡ Babeion, p. 212.

ascendency of Nineveh and Babylon. Money proved especially convenient for carrying on the great military enterprises of the Achaemenid kings, and the product of the royal mints was poured out in gold for the army and in silver for the fleet. The use of coined money became general in Phœnicia in the times of the Medic wars and was employed in Egypt by the Greek and Phœnician merchants of Memphis and Naukratis. Already the importance of the money function had impressed the Persian King, and the satrap Aryandes of Egypt was punished with death by Darius apparently for assuming the authority to stamp coins.

The Greek traders and colonists who peopled Southern Italy introduced the use of money at an early date into the Peninsula and imitations of Greek coins were made by the Etruscans. The Roman legends claimed an independent invention of money by one of their early kings. The *aes signatum*, of bronze or copper, stamped at first with simple lines, was ascribed to Numa or Servius Tullius, and was perhaps of independent origin, but government coinage of gold or silver money was probably introduced from Greece or her imitators in Sicily or Etruria.\* It was not until the century following the combat between the Etruscan and the Syracusan fleet under Hiero the First (about 475 B. C.), that a well ordered coinage of gold and silver, accompanied by the use of the *as* as subsidiary money, was adopted in Etruria. This system, in its turn, had an influence upon the monetary art of the Greeks of Kumæ and Sicily.† Greek colonies carried the use of money to the Euxine and in later times in the Valley of the Danube there were quantities of early Greek money, consisting largely of pieces coined under Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Massalia (now Marseilles) was the medium for the introduction of coined money into Gaul, and through the Greek colonies in the North of Spain it spread among the more civilized tribes of that peninsula.‡ The Carthaginians were slow in adopting the use of coined money, which they finally took from Sicily rather than from their mother country of Phœnicia. The first Carthaginian coins were struck in Sicily after Sicilian models to serve for military purposes in the Island, but in course of time the use of money spread to the parent city on the African coast. The conquests of Alexander carried the use of money beyond the Persian Gulf and into India. There are no traces of coined money in these countries before Alexander and the money afterwards coined bears indisputable marks of Hellenic origin. The monarchies which were set up upon the ruins of the Empire of Alexander carried the use of money into Arabia and Parthia. In the third century B. C. the use of money was already universal among the civilized nations and followed the Roman eagles in the conquest and civilization of

\* M. Babelon declares that the *role* of Servius Tullius was to put the currency and weight system upon a definitive legal basis.—“*Les Origines de la Monnaie*,” p. 191. It was about 450 B. C. that the Decemvirs, in the Twelve Tables, fixed contributions in metallic money. M. Theureau adheres to the view, repudiated by most numismatists, that gold was not coined at Rome until 288 B. C., after the defeat of Pyrrhus and five years before the first Punic war.—“*Les Systemes Monétaires*,” p. 30.

† Lenormant, “*Monnaies et Médailles*,” p. 24.

‡ Prof. Ridgeway supports the view that the Gauls learned of gold money through the Greek colonies and refutes the rather surprising contention of Schrader (“*Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples*,” p. 255) that their first knowledge of it was obtained at the time of the sacking of Rome in 390 B. C. The Gauls, on the contrary, had already obtained so definite a knowledge of the use and value of gold that Brennus stipulated that the ransom of Rome should be paid in gold.—“*The Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards*,” p. 62.

distant parts of Gaul, Germany, Britain and the provinces of Noricum, Pannonia and Dalmatia.

We have thus seen the medium of commercial transactions develop from the primitive barter of one object against another, through the use of cattle as the standard, to the use of the precious metals, and finally the complete evolution of coined money bearing the stamp of the State. At every stage of this process, the article chosen as the medium of exchange has borne the stamp of high value in exchange and has been either a standard article of consumption or one of the objects most sought after by all men. Money has been at once not only the sign and symbol of value, but has contained value in itself so far as value is intrinsic in any object. The narrative of the attempts to create money out of articles which have no value, to employ the name of recognized units of value for the debasement of the coinage, and to appeal to the power of the State to force the acceptance of that which was not in itself desired, will be told hereafter. The function of the State in the beginning was to give the stamp of honesty, weight and purity to the metals which had before been transferred by weight or by the guarantee of individuals. This function would never have been effective in creating money if it had been abused at its birth.\* It was because of the credit which was given to the metal by the Government stamp when it certified to the truth that it became possible to abuse this credit in later centuries to certify to falsehood. Up to the first employment of money coined by the State, the process of evolution is well described by M. Babelon, who has studied so profoundly the origins of the medium of exchange: †

"From the moment that the standard or measure of value became at the same time a real equivalent, it is natural that all peoples in the progress of their civilization should have sought a standard which was a more and more perfect equivalent. It has been without scientific calculation, directed only by the commercial necessity of giving in payments the exact value of objects and by the innate instinct of progress, that they have abandoned defective standards for the adoption of others less special and more convenient. Step by step this research, everywhere pursued, has led all by different routes to the same result—the adoption of gold and silver. After exchanges in natural products came cattle-money, then utensil-money, then iron, copper, gold, and silver counted by weight; finally, money of copper or iron, which in the last resort yielded its place to money of silver or gold. Such was the gradual and progressive march followed in the entire Greek world and in ancient Italy by the standard, the equivalent of all things which are sold or bought."

CHARLES A. CONANT.

(To be continued.)

\* "This essential point has not been emphasized enough—that if, in the beginning, the imprint had not been scrupulously honest, it would not have created money."—Block, II, p. 86.

† "*Les Origines de la Monnaie*," p. 230.

TO STUDY CURRENCY REFORM.—On February 14 Representative Grosvenor, of Ohio, Chairman of the Republican caucus, announced the appointment of the following committee to consider and report to the Republican caucus at the beginning of the next session of Congress a plan for reforming the banking and currency of the country: Messrs. D. B. Henderson, of Iowa; Sereno E. Payne, of New York; John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania; W. S. Kerr, of Ohio; R. B. Hawley, of Texas; W. C. Lovering, of Massachusetts; Jesse Overstreet, of Indiana; Charles Curtis, of Kansas; Eugene F. Loud, of California; Joseph W. Babcock, of Wisconsin, and Page Morris, of Minnesota.

No member of the Banking and Currency Committee or the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures is a member of this committee.

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

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### Movement of Capital in Europe.

The superabundance of loanable capital, which was for a long time a feature of the European money markets, seems to have been arrested during the last few months, and it was even suggested by certain speakers at the meeting of the *Société d'Economie Politique* in Paris on January 5 that higher discount rates and stiffer interest rates would be enduring features of the money market. The gold reserves of the great banks have been subjected to considerable strain since the beginning of the autumn and high discount rates have prevailed in spite of the reduction by the Bank by England from four to three and a half per cent. on January 19 and to three per cent. on February 2. The gold supply has only a slight relation to the supply and demand for capital, but the pressure upon the gold reserves has apparently been the evidence of the large demands for capital and has reacted upon discount rates. It is declared by the London "Economist," in the issue of January 14, that "In spite of the efforts made during the past year by the banks of England, France, and Germany to protect or increase their stocks of gold, these all stood at a lower figure at the end of the year than they did at the beginning." With regard to the effect of the gold supply upon prices, the "Economist" says:

"In view of the large and steadily increasing additions that were being made to the world's gold supplies, there were those who a year or two ago expressed themselves as apprehensive of the result which these would have upon prices of commodities. Just as the bimetalists ascribed the fall in prices since 1870 to a gold scarcity, so there were some who were inclined to believe that the great increase of production would lead to a glut of gold and a consequent rapid rise in gold prices. But without entering into the question as to whether or not prices have been influenced by the enormous quantities of new gold that have been poured forth, it is certain that no evidence of the apprehended glut is yet visible."

One of the evidences of an increased demand for capital, at least for industrial purposes, is afforded by the decline in the high prices of Government bonds which was noted during the period of low rates for money. An indication of the hardening of interest rates in Austria-Hungary is afforded by the request of a mortgage credit company, noted in "*l'Economiste Européen*" of January 20, for authority to convert its three and a half per cent. bonds into four per cents. Although offered by an establishment of high standing, the three and a half per cent. obligations could not be unloaded. Issues for public works in Austria-Hungary have also been made at four per cent., in view of the discovery that three and a half per cent. bonds would not float at a favorable rate.

The preference in Germany seems to lie distinctly in the direction of industrial securities. The recent offer of 22,000,000 crowns (\$9,000,000) of four and a half per cent. bonds for Bosnia and Herzegovina, issued at the same time in both Austria and Germany, was several times covered, but the approaching issue of a new Prussian loan is exciting some anxiety at Berlin.

The subject is thus discussed by the Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist," in the issue of January 14:

"In view of the forthcoming issue of new Imperial three per cents. and of Prussian consols, of the same denomination, no little concern is caused by the continued weakness of these funds. The banks that took up the last issues of these funds have had very disappointing experiences with them, and are still loaded up with large amounts of them. In former years there was always a rush of Government officials to put their small savings into consols; but now the enticements of a vast number of industrial shares, offering much better returns, have been too great to resist. Especially since the beginning of the new year has this changed attitude of small investors been visible in market tendencies. Prussian consols and Imperial loans, buoyed up in former years through the large interest payments made at the beginning of the year, and then seeking investment at once in perfectly safe stocks, have fallen this year; whereas industrial shares have been very strong. There is a feeling, therefore, that the German market offers rather dismal prospects for the new issues. Accordingly, when it was reported here that the Prussian Finance Minister had made inquiries in London as to the possibility of placing a part of the loans on the English market, this step was looked upon as the most natural thing to do, although Herr von Miquel denied the correctness of the report."

**Banking Centralization in Europe.** The tendency to the consolidation of the control of the money market in the hands of a single great bank is having an influence upon the legislation of two of the few European countries where independent banks of issue are still permitted. The Swiss Federal Council has submitted to the Chambers a project for a new State bank in Switzerland, whose principal provisions have recently appeared in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE. The Chambers have not yet acted and some time may be required to put into actual operation the plan of Federal control of banking, which first assumed definite shape in the amendment of the Federal Constitution in 1891. The existing system of competing banks does not seem to give entire satisfaction, and a recent circular of one of the leading financial houses, quoted in "*l'Economiste Européen*" of January 20 says:

"As to ourselves, both spectators and victims of the existing situation, we desire an early solution, for a country like ours cannot see perpetuated, without harm, a state of things which sometimes obliges our banks to refuse bills, cash and drafts. Our actual credit circulation is about 220,000,000 francs, but we are persuaded that even with a less circulation, if it were centralized, there would be such an economy of force that the circulation would acquire a much greater fluidity and elasticity. A central bank would operate like a great balance, compensated by the movement in all our markets, whose exact situation would be known to it every evening. The thirty-four existing banks, if converted into simple branches, would no longer have occasion to fear the surprises against which they seek to guard themselves by their reserves of notes and their surplus cash beyond the legal forty per cent. These bills and crowns, now uselessly held prisoners, might then be given wing. The reciprocal relations of branch to branch being centered every evening at the central bank, transfers by draft would be greatly facilitated, for drafts could be given from Basle or Berne to Geneva, when it was known that there were available funds at Zurich or some other branch, when they are often refused at present simply from ignorance. Our exchange, of which the check upon Paris is the reflection, has never been so bad as at present. We have witnessed this month a rate of 100.75 francs and in 1897 it touched 100.73 francs. The characteristic of this year has been not only this extreme rate, but rather the persistence and duration of high rates, from which is unhappily drawn the conclusion that the normal rate has risen."

A new set of regulations regarding banks of issue took effect in Sweden on January 1, 1899. Their principal object is to place the control of the money



market under the National Bank. Hereafter the State Bank will alone be authorized to issue notes and the authority of issue heretofore granted to the private banks will terminate with the close of the year 1903. Those banks which voluntarily renounce the note-issuing privilege, however, will enjoy until the close of 1903 the benefits of a special credit at a reduced discount rate at the State Bank. Thus far, according to "*L'Economiste Européen*" of January 13, only one institution, the *Westerbottens Enskilda Bank*, has enjoyed a similar privilege. Another paragraph of the new decree increases from 45,000,000 crowns (\$12,000,000) to 100,000,000 crowns (\$26,800,000) the limit of circulation of the State Bank without metallic cover. The charter of the State Bank permits circulation beyond the fixed limit when entirely covered by a metallic reserve or foreign bills of exchange. The metallic reserve is required in future to be held exclusively in gold and to be not less than 25,000,000 crowns. The increased note issue is required to be protected by a supply of foreign Government bonds which are easily convertible, Swedish obligations quoted on the international exchanges, or bills payable in Sweden or abroad. In case the increased issue exceeds 60,000,000 crowns, the Bank is required to provide a new metallic reserve representing thirty per cent. of the excess.

"The Concentration of Banking Business in Germany" is the title of an article in the "*Journal des Economistes*" for January, by M. André E. Sayous, the author of a valuable volume on the German Bourse laws. M. Sayous refers to the many consolidations during the past year, which have wiped out private banking houses of long and honorable records, converting some into stock companies and consolidating others with the big joint-stock banks—and endeavors to find the explanation to some extent in particular reasons. He declares that private banking is not yet extinguished in Germany, in spite of the fact that the fate of the bankers in the smaller cities has not become more enviable during the last few years. The competition of the great provincial banks, he says, is intense, and the Berlin banking houses have agents who honeycomb the entire Empire in the effort to attract manufacturers and merchants of moderate importance, who are usually the best clients of private bankers. The system of the free deposit of securities at the Imperial Bank has also taken from the local bankers along with a part of their commissions a part also of the profits arising from the issues which they make on their own account or manage for others. The concentration of stock exchange transactions at Berlin has had a marked effect, in obliging the bankers in centers of secondary importance to take part in industrial and commercial development by special methods, replacing direct issues of securities, which have become rarer and more difficult outside the capital, by the opening of credits and other means. The mere saving in revenue stamps by the large houses, when they are able to compensate buying and selling orders against each other, is an item which tells against the small banks. The situation, in the opinion of M. Sayous, is not nearly so bad for the small banks as in France, and private bankers still exist in sufficient numbers and with sufficient wealth. "The earth is not, as in France, covered only with the dead and dying." The effort to place the shares of new banks is also losing some of its headway. "The decline in the quotations of the shares of the *Deutsche Bank* and the *Disconto Gesellschaft* during the last few months seems to show a certain fatigue on the part of the public. When capitalists

are scarcely able any longer to place banking shares, the extension of the great banks will be arrested."

Another indication of the effort to bring political unity into the banking system, if not financial consolidation, is afforded by the bill pending in the German Reichstag for bringing the mortgage banks under Imperial law. The need for a uniform national law covering the mortgage banks has been felt for some years. The subject is so complicated, however, and the laws are so different in the different States, that it has been with extreme difficulty and much delay that a measure has been constructed. Indeed, the bill, after having first been published nearly a year ago, has had to undergo a thorough reconstruction; and it is not to be wondered at that many competent critics are not yet satisfied with it, and that various attempts will apparently be made in the Reichstag to amend it. The development of mortgage banking in Germany is thus summed up by the London "Economist" of February 11:

"The mortgage banks have of late years, along with the enormous growth of the large cities, played a larger and larger rôle in the economic life of Germany. There are now forty of these institutions, and, with one exception, they have all been organized within the past thirty-six years. Notwithstanding their brief existence they had already, at the end of 1897, the immense sum of £280,000,000 of their obligations, the so-called *Pfandbriefe*, in circulation. Of this sum fully seven-eighths was based upon real property in the cities, the credit of the country districts being provided chiefly through the *Landschaften*. The mortgage banks are the channels of real estate credit in the cities, taking mortgages on houses and building plots, and supplying themselves with funds for this purpose by selling their *Pfandbriefe*, which are in turn secured by those mortgages.

It is in connection with these *Pfandbriefe* that one point of dissatisfaction with the new bill has arisen. Under the existing Prussian law the *Pfandbriefe* of the *Landschaften* are recognized by the Probate Courts as a safe investment of the moneys of wards, but the obligations of the mortgage banks are not thus favored, and the financial press is quite unanimous in the opinion that the new law should make this change. There is a rather sharp controversy on the subject. The agrarians oppose the change, since the urban *Pfandbriefe* would, in that case, enter into more active competition with those of the *Landschaften*, which have already fallen considerably in price owing to an untimely conversion to a three per cent. interest basis several years ago."

The subject of strengthening the reserve of the Bank of England has been seriously discussed recently at several bank meetings, which are referred to in the London "Economist" of January 21. Thus, at the meeting of the Union Bank of London, the Governor, Mr. F. O. Schuster, urged the desirability of bankers generally not only keeping larger reserves themselves, but also making every effort to assist the Bank of England to keep a larger stock of gold. But at the meeting of the London and Yorkshire Bank a week later, the chairman, Mr. B. C. Vernon-Wentworth, took a somewhat different view. While agreeing with Mr. Schuster that larger reserves ought to be kept, he complained that the Bank of England uses in competition with bankers the balances that they have deposited with it. "We bankers," he said, "are asked to support the Bank of England in its endeavors to strengthen the gold reserve of the country, but if our reserves are to be traded with by the custodian of them, may we not as well trade with them ourselves, and at least have the consequent profit to strengthen our position?" The "Economist," in discussing these propositions, says:

**The London Bank Reserves.**

" Now we at once admit that if the reserves of the bankers were held intact instead of being traded with in part by the Bank of England, the position would be stronger than it now is. But if the bankers desire this they must arrange to keep these balances themselves, either each holding its own cash reserve or joining together to maintain a common reserve, or they must pay the Bank of England to do the work for them. Surely those who know what the business of banking is cannot expect that the Bank of England would not only undertake the gratuitous custody of millions of bankers' money, no portion of which it is to be permitted to use, but also transact gratuitously for the banks all the business in connection with their clearing-house operations for which their balances at the Bank are utilized. Then, again, if the banks are to hold their own reserves, they must be prepared to keep materially larger reserves than they now do, because the Bank of England would not then feel under the same obligation as it now recognizes to come to the aid of the market in times of great pressure. And, further, if the bankers' balances are withdrawn from the Bank, that, instead of diminishing its competition with them, would be more likely to increase it. The Bank would then seek to attract private deposits to fill up the gap. That, with its great prestige, it would find no difficulty in doing if it offered, like the other banks, to pay interest on deposits, and with the money thus obtained it would compete with the others more freely than under present conditions it feels justified, or is justified, in doing. There is very much indeed to be said in favor of action by the banks to insure that their cash reserves shall be kept whole, but do not let them run away with the erroneous idea that this can be done without cost to themselves. And unless and until the present system is altered, Mr. Schuster's advice to them to seek to strengthen the hands of the Bank of England in its endeavors to maintain habitually a larger stock of gold remains sound."

#### Land Credit in Italy.

The separation of land credit from commercial banking in Italy has resulted in the rapid development of the new society, the *Credito Fondiario*, and the relief of the National Bank from some of the pressure to which it has been subjected. A review of land credit in Italy by M. Pierre des Essars, in "*L'Economiste Européen*" of January 20, points out the disastrous effects of the law of June 14, 1866, which authorized the Bank of Naples and several other institutions to undertake mortgage loans. The privilege was extended later to the Bank of Sicily and by a law of February 22, 1885, to any banking institution having a capital of 10,000,000 lire (\$2,000,000). Such corporations might issue mortgage obligations to the amount of ten times their paid-up capital. The National Bank profited by the new law to create a land credit department, to which was assigned a capital of 25,000,000 lire taken from the reserve. The Bank had the advantage of possessing numerous branches and an organization which permitted it to begin its operations without delay. Requests for loans were received in the first year amounting to 272,901,000 lire (\$54,000,000), upon which loans were made to the amount of 61,898,500 lire and applications were under consideration at the end of the year amounting to 146,717,500 lire. The Bank issued four per cent. bonds, which were sold at rates varying between 475 and 500 lire, with an average of 494 lire. The clients of the older land credit corporations, however, wishing to profit by the low rates offered by the National Bank, endeavored to repay their loans and bought back the bonds of the old banks upon the market. Their price rose while that of the obligations of the National Bank fell, with the result that the latter could only be placed with difficulty. The National Bank made very trifling profits and soon found its assets seriously locked up in its land credit operations. The Bank of Naples in the meantime had locked up 35,000,000 lire in mortgage loans, and the National Bank found its burden of this character a heavy one when the bank scandals

of 1892 developed. An important legal question was raised, whether the entire assets of the Bank were pledged against its land credit obligations and, if so, what was left for note holders. The law of 1893, reorganizing the banking system, forbade banks of issue to make mortgage loans and required those already made to be liquidated within a fixed time.

An Act of 1891, created at Rome a new mortgage credit society, called *Instituto Italiano di Credito Fondiario* with a capital of 100,000,000 lire (\$20,000,000), for which the National Bank, other leading Italian banks and some of the German and Swiss banks, provided the capital. The bonds issued were for four and a half per cent., payable in fifty years, and loans are made to the amount of only fifty per cent. of the value of the property. The loans were made for several years from the capital, and amounted at the end of 1894 to 40,600,000 lire. The obligations for four and four and a half per cent. were then issued, which had risen in amount to 36,328,500 lire on December 31, 1897. The bank has realized a fair profit, which amounted to 1,917,185 lire (\$380,000) for 1897, and the shares have been quoted at 520 lire upon a par value of 500 lire.

The French people have testified their willingness to support the Government in a vigorous colonial policy by their large subscriptions to the Indo-Chinese three and a half per cent. loan, for which subscriptions were closed on January 14. The loan was not offered, as usual, with the guarantee of the home Government, but only with that of the colonial establishment of Indo-China, with the purpose of familiarizing investors with colonial loans. The rate at which the loan was offered was only 450 francs for a share of the nominal value of 500 francs. This made the investment an exceedingly favorable one, from the European standpoint of low interest rates, if it could be regarded as secure, since the return upon the investment would be 3.89 per cent., free of all internal taxes. The Government, moreover, renounced the right of calling any part of the loan before May 1, 1909. The result of this appeal to the French public for an amount of 50,000,000 francs, for the construction of railways in Indo-China under the supervision of the French Government, was a subscription equal to thirty-six times the amount asked. The total amount subscribed for was about 1,800,000,000 francs (\$360,000,000), and the number of applications for a single bond of 500 francs was 120,000, when only 110,000 bonds were offered. The method pursued by Secretary Gage, in awarding the popular loan in the United States in 1898, will be followed to the extent that the smaller subscribers will receive a larger proportion of their bids than the large subscribers. The latter will receive only two per cent. of their subscription. The Paris correspondent of the London "Economist," commenting upon the loan in the issue of January 21, says :

"The subscription was in reality a patriotic manifestation in favor of a vigorous colonial policy, accentuated by recent events, and of confidence in the future of Indo-China, as the loan has not the usual guarantee of the home Government. The conditions of the issue did not contain the usual clause that lists of subscriptions would not be accepted, and advantage was no doubt taken of the opportunity to demand a great number of bonds on the same paper under fictitious names, as the bonds on which a deposit of fifty francs only had to be made commanded beforehand a premium of ten francs, and it has

been the practice to consider applications for a single bond as irreducible. Subscribers, however, who had counted on that system being followed will be disappointed. As it was impossible to give a whole bond to each applicant, the allotment has been made at the rate of one fifth of a bond for subscriptions for one to four, two-fifths for five to nine, increasing to a whole bond for demands for forty-one to seventy-four, and two per cent. above the latter number. As no fractions of bonds will be issued, arrangements will be made for grouping the certificates to make up the number required for a whole bond."

**A Predicted Rise in Silver.**

An arrest of the downward tendency of silver bullion and a probable rise in price in future are predicted by M. Alfred Neymarck in a recent number of "*le Rentier*." He assigns the following reasons for believing that there may be a slightly increased demand for silver.

"1. The use and industrial needs for silver have increased in the degree that the metal has become less dear.

2. Subsidiary silver money scarcely meets the needs of several of our departments and of other countries, like Belgium, Italy and Switzerland.

3. The monetary supplies of silver in the great banks are declining.

4. The annual production of this metal, although having attained in 1897 the high total of 5,000,000 fine kilograms, shows a tendency to decrease, for the actual value of silver depreciated by one-half seems to correspond not only to the free play of supply and demand, but also to the return upon bullion in the larger portion of the producing countries; consequently, the proprietors of silver mines, in view of the cost of extraction, the amount required for wages and the low price of the metal, have less and less interest in extracting it and throwing it into circulation."

M. Neymarck cites figures from mint reports and other sources to sustain his position, and declares that from 1879 to the end of 1896 the industrial consumption of silver reached an average of from 100,000 to 150,000 kilograms, while in 1897 the consumption, according to official statistics, will exceed 200,000 kilograms (\$8,000,000.)

**The Russian Monetary Reform.**

A review of the energetic steps by which the Government of Russia recently planted the country upon the gold basis, by M. Fan-Jung in the "*Revue d'Economie Politique*" for December, also throws some light upon the actual operation of the reform. It seems that the Russian people generally prefer paper currency to gold, now that its parity with gold is beyond question. M. Fan-Jung says :

"A special Act (May 8 and November 6, 1895) authorized individuals to conclude binding engagements in gold and public depositories to receive gold from them. The Bank of Russia was authorized to conduct operations with individuals in gold and to buy and sell the metal. It receives deposits and delivers receipt payable at sight in the same metal. The regulations of 1897 established free coinage of the yellow metal. In spite of all these facilities, the coins circulate little and return most frequently to the Bank. It will certainly be necessary, in order to cancel the small denominations of notes, to withdraw them by force from the circulation. In any case it will be a work of time and a long period will elapse before the peasant and workingman, accustomed by the usage of more than a century to the handling of bills, will have adopted the little discs of gold. The silver circulation is less disturbing to the Minister of Finance. The Russians are accustomed to the white pieces, for they once formed the basis of the monetary system. The role to which

they are destined makes them a subsidiary money necessary for small exchanges and, as such, likely to be absorbed by the force of events by the people."

The demonetization of silver as full legal-tender money was decreed by the ukase of April 8, 1898, and its circulation will not be permitted to exceed three roubles (\$1.56) per head. The legal-tender power of the silver coins is limited to twenty-five roubles (\$13) between individuals, but is without limit when the silver coins are offered in payment of public dues. M. Fan-Jung sums up thus the results which are expected to follow the full establishment of the gold standard :

"These provisions crown the reform, which has been carried out in conception and execution in a manner which does honor to the Ministry of Finance. Every operation has been conducted with an admirable firmness, from the regulation of the quotations for the rouble up to the adoption of the new monetary system upon the monometallic basis. Moreover, the application of this comprehensive programme has led Russia to an economic transformation, produced in great part by foreign capital. This has already crossed the frontier under the guarantees which the beginning of the reform afforded. Now that the new monetary unit is definitely established, that the similarity of standards is complete between the Empire and other States, the inactive capital of foreign States will be attracted towards the great Slavic country by the numerous openings which the latter is able to assure. This current of money will be the cause of a new activity in affairs, a new industrial development. International transactions will become more certain, the placement of securities of the internal debt will be more easily effected. Russia, although still a new country, will be able to profit by all the advantages of old organization without having to submit to its inconveniences."

#### The Bank of France in 1898.

The annual meeting of the shareholders of the Bank of France took place on January 26, with M. Pallain, the new Governor, in the chair. The annual report showed that the whole volume of productive operations during the calendar year 1898 was 16,568,579,000 francs (\$3,250,000,000), an increase of 1,260,454,000 francs over 1897. The discounts afforded 667,248,000 francs of this increase and advances upon securities 168,804,500 francs. The aggregate discounts of the year were 11,032,083,200 francs and the advances upon securities 1,380,615,900 francs. The increase in discounts resulted, according to the report, entirely from the activity of business, since in 1898, with the exception of the Greek loan involving an insignificant amount, there were no great financial operations. The reduction of the limit for discounts in the new charter has resulted in an increase of bills from five to ten francs (\$1 to \$2) from 22,910 in 1897 to 190,020 in 1898. The Bank has been investigating the subject of discounting agricultural warrants and has given instructions to the branches for the admission of such paper, with the view of reconciling the interests of agriculture with the security of banking operations. The advances upon securities for small amounts have been increasing, and up to the close of 1898 6,814 borrowers had asked advances below 500 francs (\$100).

The rapidity and volume of transfers of funds through the bank is indicated by receipts on current account of 59,367,000,000 francs (\$11,500,000,000) and payments of 59,429,000,000 francs. The report declares that "The drafts, which have served almost entirely for this enormous movement, permit the compensation of debts and credits by simple writing, without any movement of specie and bills, and the amounts are nearly those of the London and New York clearing houses." These operations were conducted upon current accounts amounting on the average to 490,700,000 francs during 1898.

The Bank opened twenty-one branches during the past year in conformity with the requirements of the law of November 17, 1897. It is proposed to establish ten more, with thirty new auxiliary bureaus and sixty new agencies. The close of 1898 found 261 banking offices open.

The earnings of the Bank in 1898 were 44,924,423 francs, from which fell to be deducted 14,328,362 francs for administrative expenses and 5,834,578 francs for general charges and taxes, leaving a net profit of 24,761,482 francs (\$4,800,000) from which 20,911,458 francs were distributed in a dividend of 110 francs per share.

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The projected law for extending the charter of the Bank of Belgium is now under discussion in that country. The new charter will run for thirty years from January 1, 1899. Few changes will be made in the existing rules governing the Bank except that the words "of Belgium" will hereafter be a part of the official title of the National Bank. A quarter of the profits will hereafter be turned into the public Treasury when the profits exceed four per cent. upon the capital, instead of when they exceed six per cent. as under the existing charter. The old tax of a quarter of one per cent. will be continued upon the circulation in excess of 275,000,000 francs. The limit of the discount rate above which all profits shall be covered into the Treasury has also been reduced from five to three and a half per cent., so that the entire excess of the discount rate above three and a half per cent. will be turned into the Treasury. The amount which the Bank shall pay for the use of public moneys has been increased from 175,000 francs per year to 230,000 francs per year. These are the chief changes in the old charter and will probably be accepted by the Bank and by the Chambers. The character of the Bank and the services it renders the public were very thoroughly discussed when the charter was last renewed in 1872 and the Bank has fewer opponents on socialistic and agrarian grounds than the Bank of France or the Imperial Bank of Germany.

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The discussion of the renewal of the charter of the Imperial Bank of Germany began in the Reichstag on February 3. The proposals of the Government bill for extending the charter, with an increase of the capital of the Bank from 120,000,000 marks to 150,000,000 marks (\$37,000,000), and an increase of the limit of untaxed circulation to 400,000,000 marks, were set forth in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE for February.

An important provision has been added to the bill, which is somewhat new in monopoly banking, that the State banks of issue in Germany shall not henceforth be allowed to discount below the rate of the Imperial Bank. These banks have heretofore given accommodation at a rate sufficiently below that of the Imperial Bank to obtain a large share of the commercial paper on the market. They have thus been able to utilize about eighty-eight per cent. of the quota of non-taxable uncovered notes assigned to them by law, and have actually been able to keep a larger amount of uncovered notes in circulation than the Imperial Bank itself, although the contingent of the latter is 292,117,000 marks against only 81,600,000 marks for the former.

The burden of maintaining the elasticity of the currency and of regulating the international gold movement has devolved entirely upon the central institution. Not only have the private banks been a hindrance to the Imperial Bank in regulating the circulation and the money rate, but they have always protected their ready cash by rediscounting their paper at the Imperial Bank.

It was believed at first that the new proposition would not encounter great hostility from leading financiers, but it has developed that the State banks propose to make a serious fight against surrendering the control of their discount rates to the Imperial Bank. The Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist," in the issue of February 4, says :

"The Chambers of Commerce in a number of South German cities are up in arms against this clause of the bill. The Chambers of Commerce at Darmstadt, Mannheim and Heilbronn took action against this provision last week, and yesterday similar action was announced from Frankfort and Karlsruhe. The Saxon Bank of Dresden, too, has sent a communication to the Berlin "*Boersen Zeitung*," in which it says that if the provision in question becomes law it will seriously consider the expediency of surrendering its privilege of issuing notes. The Bavarian Note Bank having indicated its purpose to offer no resistance to the change of the law, the Saxon Bank points out with some bitterness that the Munich institution fares much better in the matter of the non taxable note contingent assigned to it under the existing law than the Saxon Bank, as it has assigned to it £1,600,000 in uncovered notes upon a capital of only £375,000, whereas the Saxon Bank, with a capital of £1,500,000, may issue only £366,500 of uncovered non-taxable notes.

In the Reichstag, too, the opposition to the change in question has already begun to show its head. Yesterday a number of members of that body, Conservatives, National Liberals and Centrists of agrarian and bimetallist tendencies, held a conference to discuss plans for the coming debates. While no proposition was voted upon, it is reported that a plan was discussed for amending the bill in the direction of a still greater nationalization of the Bank by having the Empire take the £1,750,000 of new capital provided for. In spite, however, of opposition within and without the Reichstag, it is considered certain that the bill will become law in the form in which it has been brought in. It meets with the complete approval of such impartial and competent experts as Ludwig Bamberg, the leading champion of the original banking law of 1875."

A statement of the condition of the Bank of Russia at the beginning of each month during 1898 is presented in the "*Bulletin Russe de Statistique*" for December, 1898, which shows in a striking manner the security of the note issues. The notes in circulation were more than covered throughout the year by the gold in the custody of the Bank, and were reduced by the amount of more than 210,000,000 roubles (≈109,000,000) during 1898. The note circulation, which was 1,061,900,000 roubles upon the average during 1893, and was not reduced materially during 1894 and 1895, fell to 862,200,000 roubles on March 1, 1897, against gold holdings at that time of 833,200,000 roubles (≈433,000,000). The volume of outstanding notes first fell below the gold reserve in October, 1897, and the notes were reduced on January 1, 1898, to 901,200,000 roubles against a reserve of 994,900,000 roubles. The Government endeavored all through 1898 to withdraw notes by forcing gold into general circulation, with the result that on January 1, 1899, the outstanding notes were only 662,100,000 roubles against a gold reserve of 845,800,000 roubles (≈440,000,000), or an excess of reserve above outstanding notes of 183,700,000 roubles (≈95,000,000).



The changes in the current accounts kept at the Bank of Russia and the total of loans and discounts at the beginning of each year in representative years appears in the following table :

JANUARY 1.	Current accounts in roubles.	Loans and discounts in roubles.
1880.....	91,900,000	264,100,000
1882.....	93,800,000	217,800,000
1884.....	98,800,000	248,400,000
1886.....	128,400,000	187,100,000
1888.....	87,600,000	259,400,000
1890.....	57,600,000	256,000,000
1892.....	83,000,000	214,400,000
1894.....	129,000,000	293,900,000
1895.....	105,700,000	357,500,000
1896.....	99,500,000	407,100,000
1898.....	146,500,000	273,700,000
1899.....	102,500,000	265,900,000

The absence of material growth in the business of the Bank of State since 1880 is due largely to the fact that many private banks and discount companies have been established in the interval and that the Bank of State, like the National Banks of England, France and Germany, has become in a large measure the keeper of the ultimate reserve of the country and has assumed the function of issue to the exclusion of a large commercial business.

The Bank of Japan.

The pressure for currency in Japan during the last few years has resulted in the presentation of a bill to the Diet, proposing to raise the limit of authorized circulation not subject to tax from 85,000,000 yen to 120,000,000 yen (\$60,000,000). Several leading Japanese economists have been questioned on the subject and have made conflicting replies. Mr. Shibusawa Eichi, President of the First National Bank, expressed opposition to the measure upon the ground that the Bank of England had not obtained an increase of the limit since 1844 and that neither the growth of population nor of foreign commerce in Japan justified an increase. Prof. Kanai of the Imperial University also opposed the measure, but Mr. Takahashi of the Specie Bank of Yokohama believes that the figures of the circulation and reserve in recent years are a strong argument for increasing the limit. The paper currency in circulation has varied since 1884 from 180,000,000 to 240,000,000 yen and the specie reserve of the Bank of Japan from 50,000,000 to 80,000,000 yen. Prof. Foxwell of the Imperial University also favors an increase of the limit.

The Government has followed up the bill raising the limit by another measure, proposing that a portion of the profits of the increased circulation go to the Government. The Treasury is hereafter to receive six per cent. of the net profits on the paid-up capital, after the shareholders have been provided with a dividend of four per cent. The Bank will also pay to the Government a third of the amount remaining after it shall have made the minimum application of its profits on account of its reserves. One-tenth of the excess profits is carried to the reserves, so that the payments to the Government actually amount to three-tenths of the net profits remaining after the payment of the minimum dividend and the other taxes.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

—The Russian Savings banks continue to show a monthly increase in net deposits and in number of accounts. The number of accounts on September 1, 1898, was 2,675,536, with deposits of 508,512,000 roubles; accounts on October 1, 2,691,309, with deposits of 510,494,000 roubles; and accounts on November 1, 2,712,235, with deposits of 513,546,000 roubles (\$217,000,000).

—The Italian Savings banks showed a loss in deposits during October. The amount to the credit of depositors fell from 551,623,363 lire on September 30 to 549,954,701 lire (\$105,000,000) on November 1. There was, however, an increase in the number of accounts during October amounting to 12,624. The new accounts opened were 26,615, those closed, 13,991. C. A. C.

## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[All books mentioned in the following notices will be supplied at the publishers' lowest rates on application to BRADFORD RHODES & CO., 78 William Street, New York.]

**THINGS TAXABLE.** By E. M. LONGCOPE. Houston, Texas. Price, 50 cents.

This is a pamphlet of seventy-two pages, containing the stamp taxes under schedule A of the War Revenue Act, also a digest of the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It contains in addition a separate list of other exemptions, the rulings of the Commissioner and the sections of the law applicable to banking and commercial paper, and bankers and brokers.

The arrangement is alphabetical, and the compilation has been made with a view to rendering the book serviceable and accurate. Mr. Longcope is a banker of more than twenty years' experience, and the results achieved show him to be otherwise well qualified to prepare a condensation of this important Act.

**MONEY AND BIMETALLISM.** A Study of the Uses and Operations of Money and Credit; with a Critical Analysis of the Theories of Bimetallism and a Study of Symmetallism, and of the Tabular Standard of Value. By HENRY A. MILLER. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

This is a careful examination of the nature and use of metallic money. The author deals at length with the standard of value, the quantity theory, credits, bimetalism, the clearing-house, etc.

An interesting chapter of the book relates to the Lowe-Scrope Tabular Standard of Value. The volume contains many strong arguments calculated to reinforce the position of those who believe in the gold standard.

**A Dictionary of the Bible, Dealing with its Language, Literature and Contents, Including the Biblical Theology.** Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, M. A., D. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

At a time when the grounds of religious belief are being put to the test of the most searching investigation and criticism the appearance of a work of the above character will be welcomed by biblical scholars.

Volume I, containing nearly 900 pages, is now ready, and other volumes are to follow shortly. The exposition of the various biblical words and terms is so copious that the scope of the volumes is hardly sufficiently indicated by the word Dictionary. It is encyclopedic in its fulness, and each of the articles, except where the definition is unimportant, is signed by some eminent exegetical scholar.

The biblical student will find in this Dictionary a powerful aid to the intelligent study of the Holy Scriptures. It is an inexhaustible mine of trustworthy information on all subjects directly or collaterally related to sacred literature.

## \* BANK NOTES AND LEGAL-TENDER PAPER.

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Whatever may be the truth as to the order of creation and the story of our earth, whether they were the result of an imperial mandate under whose influence they stood forth, or whether developed by a slow evolutionary movement reaching over a period of unrecorded time, it is certain that since man came upon the scene his development in knowledge, industry and art has been along the line of a slow, upward movement. In his beginning as a tiller of the soil he knew nothing better as a tool than the crooked stick lying conveniently at his hand. By gradual steps, reaching over thousands of years, he achieved for himself the modern plow. His first means of transportation were his own shoulders, or, preferably, the back of his wife. He soon learned that he could haul his burdens upon a fallen branch of a tree or an uncouth sled dragged across the bare ground. He discovered later that two sections of a tree trunk connected together by an axle reduced friction and made transportation easier, and by steps infinitely slow and painful, he at last realized the giant locomotive, the steel rails and the iron bridge spanning great rivers. He first knew that he could ride upon a floating log; he then learned that this same log, if hollowed out, was increased in buoyancy and could be made to carry a greater burden, and through the long and weary centuries he gained advantage, step by step, until we see under his control the ten-thousand-ton steamship of to-day. In his relations to his fellows and society we can readily trace a similar movement.

In the early time personal injuries were redressed or avenged by personal retaliation. Later, the tribe undertook to redress the injury of its member by asserting the power of the united whole. The feudal system was a step in the upward movement, and at last we see the judicial tribunal, well-organized States, written laws and constitutions.

In trade and commerce the story is equally interesting and instructive. Beginning in a raw barter, article for article, there followed later on, by a purely natural process, the development of a crude money which became the intermediary in trade. By the refinement of choice, slowly asserting itself, one article after another serving as this common medium of exchange gave place to another of higher and better form, until at last, over all the habitable globe, silver and gold became the acceptable common medium of exchange. The banker was a later comer in this long-developing movement. He began as a mere changer of money on the border lands between alien tribes or at the boundaries between different States and peoples. The growth of commerce, the universal desire of men to exchange with each other the products of their respective industry, more settled and less barbaric conditions, the increased power of productivity, and the improved means of intercommunication, developed commerce and gave to the banker a higher mission than he had hitherto exercised. He became an intermediary for the payment of money at distant points. He developed economizing instruments known as bills of exchange, and in the process of time he became the trusted depository of the money of those who did not require it for any present use, and who sought for it a place of convenient safety. The growth of credit marked the period where man was far ad-

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\* Address of Hon. Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, delivered at the Convention of the Virginia Bankers' Association, Richmond, February 22.

vanced in his moral and intellectual development, and it would be interesting to stop for a moment, if I could, to consider this powerful influence, the influence of credit, in the world's industrial activities. In the fullness of time the banker became the great intermediary in this field of credit. With his character established—accredited as the possessor of capital—his guarantee to the undertakings of other men became effective to make these undertakings exchangeable for the products of industry, or by a direct credit upon his books, available to those in whom he was satisfied to put his trust, and by the issue of his own notes, which sometimes circulated far, his usefulness as a factor in commerce and trade was enormously enhanced. In all this field to which I have made reference, legislation followed the action of the individual. It never preceded him. It never invented or created. The operation of law was along the line of regulation or restriction. In many particulars the regulation of law worked beneficent ends, by establishing a system of weights and measures, by establishing coinage, fixing weight and fineness to specific quantities of money metal, and giving names to represent each specific coin, like the name dollar, pound, franc. It rendered a great service. It did not, however, thus alter, amend, or rescind; it merely established in convenient form what had hitherto existed in a less convenient form. In coining 25.8 grains of gold into a round disc and in denominating it a dollar, it merely gave one word, "dollar," to take the place of several words, to wit, "25.8 grains of gold, .9 fine." So when it stamps upon this coin the word dollar it uses the form of expression which translated means: This is 25.8 grains of gold. It did not affect, nor did it intend to affect, the exchangeable equivalent of what it thus put into convenient form. Strange proneness of the human mind to impute to the names of things the virtues and qualities of the things themselves. Rheumatism is the name for certain pains experienced by the human species. These aches and pains are the expression of ulterior conditions, but we take the name given to the symptoms and we conceive, or are apt to conceive, of rheumatism as a thing in and of itself, invading the system as an adventurous burglar invades one's chamber. It is this conception which makes rude men everywhere seek to "drive out disease," thus personified, by the use of tom-toms, or charms, or the medicine-man. It is an illusion that still haunts the minds of most of us. So the simple impute to the word dollar a dynamic power. They think the law can create it. The fiat establishing 25.8 grains of gold to be a dollar is regarded as the effective thing, and they innocently dream that an authority high enough, say as the Government, can by a similar fiat make another thing equally effective as a dollar. They are lost and confused by names. They are unable to see that back of the name must exist the substance.

I have spoken of the operation of the law as being either in the line of regulation or definition, or in the line of restriction or prohibition. In all the fields of industry, and commerce, and social development it has of necessity followed and regulated, it has never been able to create. The locomotive of to-day is the last product of human ingenuity, operating in the individual mind, perfecting its work over a generation or more of increasing knowledge and skill. Waiting for law, there would never have been a locomotive, a steamship or a wagon. Now that these are here, law may well regulate against dangers and abuses. It may properly require that the boilers of the steamship and the locomotive shall be constructed of a kind and quality of material which the best engineering knowledge can approve as safe.

In the field of banking, to which you stand related, the individual initiative has been the only efficient creator. The banker has now become a factor in commerce and exchange, whether foreign or domestic, scarcely less important than the steamship or the railroad. By simple devices, slowly elaborated, such as checks, drafts, bills of exchange, accounts of deposit and the issue of notes, the enormous work of the world's exchanges are in the most part effected. How few realize that every

year there passes and repasses in our own country, from seller to buyer, more than fifty thousand millions of dollars in value without the use of money at all, and that out of all the enormous total of sixty or seventy thousand millions of dollars of trade and exchange in our own country, money itself figures only in the proportion of possibly one to ten. The banking machinery does the larger part of the world's exchanges. Now it is evident that a mechanism able to accomplish such an enormous result is charged with great power. As in the case of the locomotive and the steamship, law may wisely come in and guard against a reckless use of that power, but it is clear in this case as in the other that restriction and prohibition should be result of the highest experience and the greatest wisdom. Through liberty, wisely regulated by law, society has advanced, and all the great achievements of invention realized. It is as true of commerce and banking as it is in the mechanical arts and the physical sciences. Liberty gives life—unwise repression destroys.

#### EVOLUTION OF OUR BANKING SYSTEM.

I desire now to make particular application of these thoughts to our experience in this country, as that experience relates to banking and currency. Under that evolutionary tendency to which I have referred, and in the exercise of a large liberty, the banking system of the United States has made a history not different in its nature from that of our mechanical appliances. Beginning in crude development, stimulated by new requirements, corrected by larger knowledge and experience, the system of banking was tending towards perfection. The laws of different States, which thirty seven years ago were the only laws relating to banking, varied from each other in their wisdom, and the business, as practically carried on, illustrated in the various localities the wise or unwise character of those laws. I must stop here a moment to emphasize, in the briefest terms, the function of the banker. By most he is regarded as a dealer in money merely. He is such only to a very limited extent. He is essentially a dealer in credits. His business is to give his moneyed obligations, well established and widely known as they are, or ought to be, in exchange for the moneyed obligations of his customers and dealers. The credit and financial ability of the average dealer are known only to a very narrow group. They can and do make their position known to the banker, and by securing his credit instruments in exchange for their own they obtain power to acquire tools, instruments of production or articles of trade. This is true whether the bankers' obligations they thus acquire be checks, drafts, or credit on his books against which they may draw, or his notes of hand of convenient size, generally known as currency.

Now, it is obvious that, with due regard to the public safety, the larger degree of liberty there be to the dealer and the banker in their mutual operations in this field of credit, the better will the public interests be served. The bank note issued by the banker, for reasons which will appear a little later on, is oftentimes the only instrument of which the dealer can make use, and under free conditions it would be usefully availed of. That this liberty of action could be wisely and safely employed was fully demonstrated in the years anterior to the Civil War. Slightly varying in non-essentials, the systems in vogue in New England, in Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, and several other States, offered the most perfect machinery of domestic exchange. The action of the national Government by which, in 1863, it repressed with a crushing tax that part of the banking machinery represented by bank-note issues, cut from under the business public, especially in those sections where capital was scarce, a most important aid to industry and productivity. Whether this arbitrary action was justifiable on the grounds of public need, whether, as has been claimed, the repression of the bank note and the infusion of the greenback into the avenues of our daily commerce was necessary to save the nation's life, is a question not yet fully answered. If that question be settled in the affirmative, however, no one

dare set up the claim that the perpetuation of the greenback is now essential to the perpetuity of the national life. The repressive legislation referred to destroyed an instrument of commerce of the most useful kind, an instrument everywhere available to character and capacity as industrial needs required. It substituted a credit instrument not thus responsive. I cannot follow, into all its details, the injurious influence of this artificial medium.

If the issue of the greenbacks could have been avoided, their utterance was a most expensive makeshift, for it is clearly discernible that, through their depreciation in the world's standard money, they piled up the principal of the interest bearing debt not less than a thousand millions of dollars. This is bad enough, but it is not the worst. A poor machine, when a better can be had, often accounts for the whole difference between ruinous loss and desirable profit. A railroad man, whose line is just earning enough to pay its actual cost of operation, recently said to me: "If I could throw into the scrap pile forty of my locomotives and have the means to buy and put in their place an equal number of the newer types, I could earn a dividend out of my increased power of transportation."

#### HOW BANKS ARE HAMPERED IN USING THEIR CREDIT.

I assert that the greenback is a weak and ineffective device if we compare it with the bank note in its usefulness to production and exchange. The truth of this can be best apprehended, perhaps, by an illustration. A banker, if you please at some western point where the pioneer is fighting a hard battle with climate and soil, is visited by some one or other of the agents of production or exchange that have found their homes in his locality. The banker has some capital. He has a good credit. The sanctions of the law are over him, and the inhibitions of the law are calculated to keep him in a path of safety. Within the lines of these proper inhibitions he, like all other men, ought to have perfect liberty. Visited, as I have just said, by some member of the community who desires a loan, the banker finds two ways by which the needs of his customer can be met; the one is by loaning him money, that is to say, actual capital in the form of money; the other is by loaning to his customer the use of his, the banker's credit; and, as I have already explained, this is the more important field of the banker's operations. If the banker has money in hand he can supply his customer's need. If his supply of money on hand be only adequate to form a proper reserve against his own outstanding liabilities, money he cannot lend. His credit, however, he may extend. He can give to the proposed borrower a credit upon his books against which the borrower might check; but, unfortunately, the borrower must make use of the credit at outside points where his credit is not known, and where his checks upon the banker would not be received. He desires to buy wheat, or cattle, or lumber, or employ labor, so that, in the case I have just supposed, as he cannot borrow the money of the banker, who has not the money to spare, and as he cannot avail himself of the banker's credit because of the disability just pointed out, his purpose is defeated and his enterprise to the community is by so much lost. There was one form of credit which the banker, except for the law, could have extended to him, namely, the banker's own notes in denominations of convenient size, which would be acceptable in exchange to dealers and laborers, even at points quite remote. Do you ask why does not the banker lend his greenbacks since there are plenty of greenbacks in circulation? The answer is that the greenbacks are no more available to the banker for such a purpose than silver or gold, since he can acquire neither except through buying them in the market or borrowing them at the market price, if perchance there be any place in the market where he could borrow them to reloan again to his own customers. Do you ask why he could not obtain, if he were a National banker, his own notes under the law as it is and lend them to his proposed borrower? The answer is plain enough. It is because if he sought to do this he

would have to invest about about one hundred and twenty dollars of his capital in the bonds of the United States and put them up as security to his own notes for only one hundred dollars. This kind of impoverishment he could not endure. Every dollar he thus invested would tend to weaken his ability to serve the public need where he lived. Besides it would be an empty and useless performance. If he was possessed of one hundred and twenty dollars in capital, with that he could buy in the market one hundred and twenty dollars in silver or gold or greenbacks, and thus have one hundred and twenty dollars to lend, while, as we have seen, if he took the only route by which he can now issue his own notes, he would only have one hundred dollars to lend. It is at this point that the money question as it relates to the currency is to be considered.

The present system paralyzes one of the instruments of credit, the most useful in those regions of country where the mechanism of exchange, such as checks and drafts and bills of exchange, are not available for the current uses of productivity and commerce. It is urged in behalf of the Government issues of paper money that it is a saving of interest to the people. That is to say that the Government having \$346,000,000 of its notes outstanding drawing no interest, against which it carries only a reserve balance of \$100,000,000 in gold, thus saves the interest on the difference of \$246,000,000. The interest on \$246,000,000 at three per cent. is \$7,380,000, and if no other considerations were to be taken into view, this saving to the people is to be desired, but it must not be forgotten that the Government in its broadest definition is the people, and if we save on one hand the interest on \$246,000,000 by the repression of a natural instrument of credit like the bank note, we may lose, through the destruction of this better instrument, economical values and advantages far in excess of the seven millions or more supposed to be economized. Congressman Walker, Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency in the House of Representative, whose power of analysis on these important questions is of the first order, figures up that by reason of a higher rate of interest under our present system occasioned by the repression of bank note issues the people are taxed, in the payment of such higher interest, a sum equal to more than seventy millions per annum, and I have not yet seen anybody able to refute his proposition.

#### HOW THE LEGAL-TENDER NOTES FOSTER SPECULATION.

There is another side to this question which, if time permitted, I would like to follow up. The Government note, in addition to the evils just pointed out, works a positive and direct injury in another direction. Being in itself a legal tender, it becomes effective at the great centers as a stimulant to speculations in securities. Under the law a dollar of gold becomes lawful reserve for four dollars of deposits. Under the law also the greenback, being a legal tender as much as gold, is clothed with the same power in its relation to deposits. But there is a radical difference between gold and the greenbacks. The one is money, the other is a promise to pay money, and the promise to pay becomes as effective in its stimulus to an expansion of loans in the great money centers as gold itself is. I have just said that both form a legal reserve for deposits in the relation of one to four, but it must be remembered that deposits can be built up through loaning even as they can be by the deposit in the bank of money itself. If you deposit in one bank in New York one hundred thousand dollars in cash, the deposits of that bank are increased one hundred thousand dollars. If I, visiting another bank, obtain a loan against my note in a similar sum and have it passed to my credit, the books of that bank also show an increase of one hundred thousand dollars in deposits. Thus the appearance in the money centers of the legal-tender Government paper money operates to stimulate lending upon stocks, or bonds, or local securities of every kind. The money of the country, whether gold or greenbacks, tends toward the centers in those periods when the

country cannot make full use of it. Absorbed in the centers in the way I have just described, when the country wants its money again, the whole structure of the centre is shaken, semi-panic sets in, the great wants of the interior of the country for the moving of crops are not supplied. But I cannot follow the subject further. The question is, What are you going to do about it. The first element in the answer is, be patient about it, try to understand fully the real facts of the case yourself, endeavor to show the people with whom you come in contact that it is their question, and thus correct popular misconceptions. The banker is interested in it as the railroad man is interested in having good bridges, good rails, good locomotives, but the people are also interested. With good road-bed, safe bridges, and powerful locomotives, the cost of transportation can be cheapened to the people. With the facilities for the issue of proper instruments of credit, in which bank notes are included, the banker will no doubt find his power of usefulness increased, but as in the case of the railroad, its effect will be lower terms of interest to the people and the availability to them of instruments of exchange which they cannot now control. Holding these views as I do, I cannot discover that I have any personal interest in their dissemination. Some who oppose the ideas here enunciated, charge me with speaking from the banker's standpoint. As a banker I have never had any personal interest in the question, because as a bank officer I have never signed a note to circulate as money. The reason for not doing so was the fact, already described, that it was an unprofitable tie-up of capital, and in the large center, where my life as a banker has been passed, all the credit facilities needed by the community were substantially supplied through book accounts, checks, drafts, and bills of exchange.

That a reform will come I have no doubt. The evolutionary movement to which all the improvements in society can be traced was violently interrupted by the intervention of Government paper money, and the prohibition of bank-note issues. That we will eventually return to a larger liberty on the part of the individual, acting alone or associated with others, is, I think, certain. This reform, however, will come slowly. The dissemination of the knowledge of the truth must precede it, and each in his place may help it forward, not by words of heat and passion, but by calm and patient testimony to the truth.

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**CONSOLIDATION OF BANKS.**—There is a notable tendency toward bank consolidation in several of the larger cities of the country. As these banks have found it impossible to make money with so much competition, they have decided to unite and thus dispense with unnecessary machinery. Such a movement is perfectly legitimate, of course, and in some respects it will benefit not only the banks that have merged their business, but outside ones as well.

There are some features of these consolidations, however, that are objectionable. In the first place, a sudden and considerable reduction in the volume of banking capital is likely to derange business, and it also weakens the security which depositors now have. As money accumulates and bank deposits increase, a falling off in banking capital follows as a natural result of the increase of loanable funds supplied by the deposits, and where this reduction is gradual it may not work any harm. But by the consolidation of a number of banks, each having large capital, into a single institution, without a proportionate increase of capital, a violent change is effected.

The amalgamation of competing banks, by dispensing with unnecessary machinery, will make it possible for the investors in bank stock to get a fair return on their investment, and within certain limits it is beneficial, but it is not desirable that this absorption should be so far extended as to interfere with our present system of independent competing banks, nor is this probable. It is so easy to organize competing banks that the business is not likely to be monopolized by the big institutions.



## THE BANKRUPTCY LAW.

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The law of bankruptcy is purely statutory in its origin and development. History tells us that the first enactments upon this subject contained no features of voluntary bankruptcy. As early as 1305, in the reign of Edward First, laws were passed in England offering special remedies to creditors against debtors, and in 1542, in the reign of Henry Eighth, bankruptcy proceedings were entered for the purpose of aiding in the collection of debts. Under these earlier laws the interest of the creditor only seems to have been served, for it was not until 1705 that provision was made for the discharge of the debtors upon their appearing and answering truthfully all questions propounded to them. In 1825 the law was made still broader in its scope, and the voluntary feature was for the first time introduced, so that in England from that time to the present the benefits of bankruptcy were to be equally at the service of debtor and creditor.

Recognizing the propriety and expediency of bankruptcy legislation, the framers of our Constitution provided that Congress should have power to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. The theory upon which such a law should be passed was well set forth by Mr. Madison in the "Federalist," wherein he declared :

"That whenever an unfortunate debtor is unable to pay his debts in full, it is not just that one or a few of his creditors should be paid in full and the others receive nothing, but that his estate should be divided ratably among his creditors, and that if the debtor is unfortunate, and honestly so, and delivers all his property to his creditors, it is only proper that he should be enabled to begin life anew freed from the burden of his old debts. This is not done with any disregard for contract debts, which are held sacred by the Constitution, but it is justified on the theory that every member of society is needed, and that if the person who is hopelessly weighted down by debt is freed from his burden, he may retrieve his reputation and become a valuable member of society."

### FORMER LAWS RELATING TO BANKRUPTCY.

The first bankruptcy law after the adoption of the Constitution was passed in the year 1800 and remained in force less than three years. It provided only for voluntary bankruptcy.

Our second bankruptcy law was passed in 1841 following the panic of 1837, which caused such widespread financial disaster throughout the country, its passage being demanded by the great army of debtors at that time. It provided for both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy, but it proved to be in many respects such an unpopular law that it was repealed by the same Congress that enacted it.

From 1841 until 1867 we had no national bankruptcy law, but in the latter year a law was passed to meet the conditions that followed the destruction of property occasioned by our Civil War and to relieve distressed debtors who had been financially overwhelmed by the results of that conflict. This law was repealed in 1878, and for twenty years there has been no general law on the subject.

### PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE NEW ACT.

Last summer Congress again passed a bankruptcy law, which has now been in operation only a few months. Time enough has not yet elapsed for judicial construction of its provisions. No attempt will, therefore, be made to set forth in this paper a complete exposition of the law or the rules of procedure under the same,

but rather it will be my purpose to mention some of the salient features of the enactment.

From what has already been said it will be understood that the two main objects to be accomplished by this law are :

First, an equitable distribution of the assets of the insolvent's estate among his creditors ; and

Second, the discharge of the insolvent from his obligations.

The term insolvency as it appears in the present law is not used in its restricted sense. The old definition of insolvency was the inability of a person to pay debts in the ordinary course of business as is usually done by persons carrying on trade. This was the definition and rule applied under the old bankruptcy law, and this is the definition and rule applied in most cases under the State insolvency laws. This view of insolvency is departed from in the present bankruptcy law, and under its provisions a person is only insolvent when all his property, exclusive of what he has disposed of or concealed to defraud his creditors, at a fair valuation shall not equal the amount of his debts. He may be in default on his notes and commercial paper, or any other obligations, still, if he can come into court and show that his property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of what he may have attempted to dispose of, is equal in value to his debts, then he is not insolvent and cannot be forced into bankruptcy against his will.

Bearing in mind, then, the meaning of the term insolvency as used in the new bankrupt law, let us see who can voluntarily or involuntarily become bankrupts.

#### WHO MAY BE ADJUDGED BANKRUPTS.

Any person who owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act as a voluntary bankrupt. This is a broad provision and can easily be made use of. Under the involuntary features of the bill those who convey, transfer, conceal, remove or permit to be concealed or removed any part of their property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, may be declared bankrupts if they are insolvent, and an equal disposition of the property among all the creditors may be had. Those who make general assignments under State laws may be adjudged bankrupts and the assignments so made are superseded by the bankrupt law. Those debtors who, while insolvent, transfer property with intent to prefer one creditor over another or to suffer one creditor to obtain preference over another by legal proceedings and do not discharge such preference at least five days before sale or disposition of the property affected by it, may be adjudged bankrupts. Corporations cannot become voluntary bankrupts. Banks, both National and State, are left to be wound up under the provisions of the law creating them and cannot be adjudged involuntary bankrupts. Private bankers come under the operation of the law. It should also be pointed out that while certain corporations may be adjudged involuntary bankrupts, others cannot be. The great railroad, transportation and insurance companies are left to be dealt with as heretofore ; but corporations engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing or mercantile pursuits and owing debts to the amount of \$1,000, are subject to the provisions of the law. Those who are engaged in farming or tillage of the soil or wage earners, while entitled to the benefits of the Act as voluntary bankrupts, are not subject to the involuntary features. It was thought that the credit given to this class is largely local, and that the remedies of the creditors under the State laws are adequate.

Now, much has been said against the involuntary features of the bankruptcy law. It has been stated that here has been given an opportunity for the creditor to unjustly force a struggling debtor into bankruptcy, but an examination of the grounds for involuntary bankruptcy do not seem to disclose any reason for such

fear. It will be perceived that in respect to the last two grounds, namely, where a man has made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors and where a man has admitted in writing his insolvency and his willingness to be put into bankruptcy on that ground, that these grounds are practically voluntary. If he has made an assignment, it is certainly a voluntary act on his part, and practically a confession of insolvency. By changing the method of liquidation from an assigned estate to bankruptcy, the debtor gets the benefit of his discharge and the creditors are not subject to the annoyances and delays of a friendly assignee. If he has stated in writing that he is insolvent and willing to be put into insolvency, it is certainly a voluntary act on his part.

So that really there are only three grounds for involuntary bankruptcy, and two of these, namely, a transfer of property to defraud his creditors, and a transfer of property to preferred creditors, are wholly at the option and under the control of the bankrupt. The only other ground remaining is what is called a preference in legal proceedings. That is, if the man is insolvent and his creditors proceed against him by attachment and through such process seek to take his property, in that case if he is not able to discharge these proceedings before final sale on execution he can be put into bankruptcy. It should be observed in respect to this ground considered in connection with other provisions of the law, to which reference will be made, that the attaching creditor can easily be deprived of his preference. If bankruptcy proceedings are instituted within four months his attachment can be set aside and the property attached goes into the general estate of the bankrupt for distribution among his creditors. Hence, while this might seem a hardship to those opposed to involuntary bankruptcy on this ground, yet there is on the other hand a protection in it against the attaching creditor, for he will be slow to move when he knows that the other creditors can put the debtor into bankruptcy and thereby vacate the attachment. It would seem, therefore, that the grounds of involuntary bankruptcy are really reduced to those cases where the bankrupt has committed a fraud or has given a preference. It need hardly be argued that he who commits a fraud against his creditors carries himself beyond the pale that entitles him to protection. While, on the other hand, opinions upon the right and expediency of preference will not always agree.

#### FORM OF PROCEDURE UNDER THE ACT.

We will now glance for a moment at the actual steps to be taken by creditors to force a debtor into bankruptcy.

A petition praying that a debtor may be adjudged a bankrupt must be made by three persons having provable claims, aggregating over \$500, unless the creditors are less than twelve in number, in which case one creditor whose claim equals such an amount may file the petition. It is important to bear in mind in this connection that a petition may be filed against a person who is insolvent and who has committed any of the acts of bankruptcy within four months after the commission of the act. The charges and allegations contained in the petition of the moving creditors shall come before the court in the same way as other issues, and the persons against whom an involuntary bankruptcy petition has been filed shall be entitled to a trial by jury on all questions pertaining to his solvency. This question of solvency having been settled, either the petition is dismissed or the debtor is adjudged bankrupt as prayed for in the petition. If the debtor is adjudged a bankrupt, then the court shall cause a meeting of the creditors to be had in not less than ten nor more than thirty days after such adjudication at the county seat of the county where the bankrupt does business. At this meeting the creditors shall elect one or three trustees who shall have control over the bankrupt's estate and shall practically exercise the same powers as have heretofore been exercised by an assignee in the case of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.

The duties of bankrupts are carefully prescribed and set forth, and among other things the bankrupt must make full schedules of his property, creditors and indebtedness, and attend for examination whenever required. Provision is made for the arrest and detention of a bankrupt when it is proven that he is about to leave the jurisdiction of the court or to avoid examination or defeat bankruptcy proceedings. Heavy penalties are imposed for concealing any of the property belonging to a bankrupt's estate or for in any way conniving to defeat the operation of the law. A very salutary provision is the one wherein it is provided that any one who shall extort or attempt to extort any money or property from any person as a consideration for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceedings shall, upon conviction of the offense, be punished by imprisonment.

While this subject was pending in Congress much was said concerning the placing of so much power in the Federal courts. Bankruptcy legislation being national the courts of bankruptcy must needs be the United States courts, but the proceedings are simple, easily understood and the costs in connection therewith will be made smaller than usually attend the settlement of insolvent estates under the State laws. Referees, trustees and depositories are to give bonds, and generally throughout the law precaution is taken to secure the preservation and distribution of the estate among the creditors and at the least possible cost. An objectionable feature of former bankruptcy laws which made it necessary for any one interested in the estate to appear before some branch of the Federal court, holding its sessions perhaps a long distance away, has been eliminated in the present law. The jurisdiction of the State courts to try controversies between the trustee of the bankrupt estate representing the creditors and parties claiming adverse interests, is not in any way interfered with. Suits may be brought by the trustee in the same courts where the bankrupt might have brought them except for the misfortune of his bankruptcy, unless the defendant consents that the action be brought elsewhere. Original jurisdiction at law and in equity in the administration of the bankruptcy Act is to be exercised by the United States courts, but all suits between the trustee of the bankrupt estate and adverse claimants concerning property rights may be brought in the State courts in the same manner and to the same extent as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted.

The Act also provides for the settlement between the bankrupt and his creditors. After filing of the petition in bankruptcy, either voluntarily by the debtor or by his creditors, a settlement may be reached as between the debtor and his creditors and be confirmed by the courts so that it will be binding upon all parties. A proposed settlement will not be considered by the court until after the debtor has been examined in open court or at a meeting of his creditors; until he has filed a schedule of his property and a list of his creditors; until after the debtor has obtained the written acceptance of the proposed settlement by a majority in number of the creditors whose claims have been allowed, including those who hold claims in excess of one-half of the amount of all claims which have been proven, and until after the debtor has deposited in court or in such place as may be designated by the judge the consideration to be paid to the creditors and the money necessary to pay all prior claims together with the costs of the proceedings.

All these requirements, which are conditions precedent to the consideration of the proposition for settlement, having been complied with, the time and place for the convenience of all parties shall be fixed upon and a hearing had, at which time, after having heard all the parties, if the judge shall be satisfied that the confirmation of the composition will be for the interests of all parties and that all proceedings have been in good faith, the composition shall be confirmed. After such confirmation and settlement between the debtor and his creditors the court will cause the consideration deposited to be distributed among the creditors, and the case will

be dismissed. The friends of the law confidently anticipate that under these provisions allowing a composition with creditors there will be a greater number of cases compromised quickly and with trivial costs than will be administered under the other provisions of the law.

#### EXEMPTIONS GRANTED BY THE LAW.

A word as to the exemptions under the law. Provision is made that the Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions prescribed by the State laws in force at the time of filing the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for six months preceding. It is contended by some that this provision is contrary to the constitutional provision that a bankruptcy law must be uniform, inasmuch as the exemptions in various States differ in nature and amount. But opposed to this it may be said that the last bankruptcy law recognized the validity of the exemptions provided for in the State laws and notwithstanding this provision the bankruptcy Act was held to be constitutional by the courts.

We come now to the discussion of one of the most important features of the law, the question of preferences. Under its provisions liens of any kind to secure pre-existing debts given within four months prior to the filing of the petition are to be set aside and declared void if the party proceeded against is adjudged a bankrupt. Creditors who have secured preferences within four months must surrender their liens before they can prove their claims, and a preference is deemed to have been given if a debtor has transferred property as security or in payment, or has suffered or procured a judgment to be entered against himself, and the effect of the enforcement of such transfer or judgment, would be to allow one creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debts than another creditor. This in no way interferes with the ordinary business of loaning money and taking collateral security for the same. The provision of the law just referred to may be said to apply entirely to security given for old or for pre-existing debts. Liens given or accepted for debt and not in contemplation of or fraud of this Act and for a present consideration, are not affected by this law. The only exceptions to the rule as laid down against preferences and the equality of all debtors is that the expenses of administration, taxes, wages of workmen and servants earned within three months previous to the filing of the petition in sums not exceeding \$300 for each person, allowances to debtors under the State laws, must first come out of the insolvent's estate.

The prevention of preferences ought to be of great advantage to the majority of creditors. Under this law the small creditor and the large are placed on the level plane of equality. Heretofore many of the largest wholesale establishments of the country, themselves having legal departments with adequate machinery for the collection of debts promptly, have been able by the fear inspired because of their superior position to induce hard-pressed debtors to give them preferences. Threatened attachment has oftentimes been the inducement which has led to preferences, and great injustice has frequently resulted to other creditors. At the first suggestion or rumor that a debtor was in financial straits almost every creditor deemed it necessary to rush in with an attachment or other process in order not to be outdone by more vigilant creditors. The debtor was at once overwhelmed by suits at law. His estate became the prey of sheriffs and lawyers in the wild scramble among creditors to see who should be paid in full and who should get nothing. It is likely that many debtors will now avoid bankruptcy who but for the present law would have been obliged to give up under the pressure of some importunate creditor. If a debtor now finds himself embarrassed without actually being insolvent he may have no fear in calling his creditors together and explaining his position to them and asking such indulgence as his circumstances may justify. No creditor could take advantage of such confidence by securing an attachment, since it would

avail him nothing and any preferential lien so obtained would be promptly declared void.

#### LAW PLACES CREDITORS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING.

In the past a debtor has not dared to give the slightest intimation of temporary embarrassment without first having given a general assignment or other disposition of his property so as to be beyond the attack of the more vigilant of his creditors. Under the present law the insolvent debtor who can refrain from making fraudulent conveyances or giving or allowing preferences may avoid bankruptcy indefinitely. The law as it stands seeks to secure equality among the creditors of an insolvent bankrupt, and thus will end, or ought to end, the practice of borrowing large sums of money or of purchasing large amounts of property on credit and of turning it over to one or two favored friends or relatives in payment of old debts, real or imaginary, to the exclusion of honest creditors.

The law is not designed to be a collection law or a substitute for State laws providing for the collection of debts. It may operate in this way in many cases but such is not the purpose or object of a uniform bankrupt law. The main purposes to be served, as has been before stated, are to secure a fair and equitable distribution of the insolvent debtor's property among all his creditors without preference except in certain cases already enumerated, and further to enable honest debtors to commence life anew. Those debtors who have dealt fraudulently or dishonestly cannot be discharged; and while the property of dishonest debtors should be ratably divided among his creditors, it is nevertheless in the interest of justice that no one should be relieved from his debts which were fraudulently created or were the results of criminal acts. Unlike the old law discharges are granted to bankrupts without regard to dividends or lack of them from the estate and without the assent of any of his creditors. The bankrupt's own misconduct is the only ground for refusing a discharge.

It is not my purpose to enter upon a discussion of the wisdom or expediency of bankruptcy legislation. The law is upon the statute books and it is fair to say that it seems to be free from the principal objections urged against the former enactments on this subject. The great increase of commerce between widely-separated sections of our country made possible by the ease of modern communication by telephone and telegraph, and the rapid transportation by rail and water, have made a general law affecting commercial transactions necessary. State laws are so diverse that they do not adequately meet the present conditions.

The law as passed is not perfect, but under its provisions the honest debtor when insolvent is able to turn over all his assets for division among his creditors and the creditor is able to compel the dishonest and insolvent debtor to surrender his assets for equitable division. It is a law which prevents the selfish, merciless creditor from driving a debtor to the wall impelled by selfish motives to get ahead of his brother creditors and without regard to the business life of the debtor, and finally it is a law which will insure the greatest safety and stability of business enterprises and will make more secure the confidence and credit which must exist in the business world.

WILLIAM R. WILLCOX.

NEW YORK.

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COMMENDATION FROM ABROAD.—The December and January numbers of our contemporary, the *AMERICAN BANKERS' MAGAZINE* are decidedly good specimens of banking journalism. The *MAGAZINE* is doing a good work in America in keeping the question of currency reform well to the front, and we are glad to note in its prospectus for the new volume that it definitely announces the active continuance of this policy in the future.—*Bankers' Magazine* (London).

## ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE TRADE DOLLAR.

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There is a very general impression at the present day that the original conception of the curious silver coin, known as the trade dollar, occurred towards the close of the prolonged debates in Congress over the amendments to the bill revising the laws relative to the mints and coinage of the United States, submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury in April, 1870, and passed on February 12, 1873. This is the Act subsequently called by a certain free silver faction "the crime of '73," and it is usually stated that the congressional representatives from the Pacific Coast were the authors of this "eleventh-hour inspiration" of a trade dollar.

It is the purpose of this paper to endeavor to show from the documentary history of the Coinage Act of 1873 that this view is erroneous, and that, in point of fact, the commercial dollar, subsequently called for brevity the trade dollar, originated with the formulators of this Act, and was specifically proposed and recommended in the report accompanying the first draft of the Act "in the event of any silver dollar being perpetuated in the Act."

The Senate miscellaneous document No. 132 of the Forty-first Congress, second session, contains a letter of the Hon. George S. Boutwell, Secretary of the Treasury, to the Hon. John Sherman, Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate, which commences as follows :

"TREASURY DEPARTMENT, April 26, 1870.

SIR:—I have the honor to transmit herewith 'A bill revising the laws relative to the mint, assay offices, and coinage of the United States', and accompanying report. The bill has been prepared under the supervision of John Jay Knox, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency," etc., etc.

It is unnecessary to give the letter in full. The report of John Jay Knox (of same date) transmitted with the bill, says :

"The coinage of the silver dollar piece, the history of which is here given, is discontinued in the proposed bill. It is by law the dollar unit, and assuming the value of gold to be fifteen and one-half times that of silver—being about the mean ratio for the past six years—is worth in gold a premium of about three per cent. (its value being \$1.0312), and intrinsically more than seven per cent. premium in our other silver coins, its value thus being \$1.0742. The present laws consequently authorize both a gold and a silver dollar unit, differing from each other in intrinsic value. The present gold dollar is made the dollar unit in the proposed bill, and the silver dollar piece is discontinued; if, however, such a coin is authorized, it should be issued only as a *commercial dollar*, not as a unit of account, and of the exact value of the Mexican dollar, which is the favorite for circulation in China and Japan and other Oriental countries."

The rough draft of the bill as originally presented says :

"Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That of the silver coins, the weight of the dollar shall be 384 grains; (now 412½ grains), the weight of the half-dollar piece, or fifty cents, shall be 192 grains, and that the quarter-dollar, dime and half-dime, shall be respectively, one-half, one-fifth, one-tenth of the weight of said half-dollar. That the silver coin issued in conformity with the above section shall be a legal tender in payment of debts for all sums not exceeding five dollars, except duties on imports."

This is the form in which the bill was transmitted to the different mints and assay offices, to the First Comptroller, First Auditor, and to some thirty other gentlemen versed in metallurgical and numismatic subjects, for such criticisms and suggestions as their experience might dictate. It will be observed that it was here proposed to continue the silver dollar, reduced in weight from 412½ grains to 384

grains, as a subsidiary coin on an equality with the other minor silver coins which have only limited legal tender.

After receiving the criticisms of the officers of the mints, assay offices, other Government officers, and experts in numismatics, several modifications were made, and the bill as amended at this stage of the proceedings contains no reference to any silver dollar; this coin was simply dropped from the bill altogether. It is unnecessary, and would occupy too much space, to review in detail the arguments pro and con in relation to the proposed light-weight silver dollar; suffice it to say that it was clearly shown that such a dollar would be as useless as was the old silver dollar weighing  $412\frac{1}{2}$  grains, of which only about eight millions had been coined in eighty years' existence of the mint.

The bill as finally amended and approved, becoming a law on February 12, 1873, says:

"Sec. 15. That the silver coins of the United States shall be a trade dollar, a half-dollar or fifty-cent piece, a quarter-dollar, or twenty-five cent piece, a dime, or ten-cent piece; and the weight of the trade dollar shall be four hundred and twenty grains troy; the weight of the half-dollar shall be twelve grams (grammes) and one-half of a gram (gramme); the quarter-dollar and the dime shall be respectively one-half and one-fifth of the weight of said half-dollar; and said coins shall be a legal tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding five dollars in any one payment."

It will thus be seen that the trade dollar created by this Act was exactly the same as the "commercial dollar" proposed by John Jay Knox in his report of April 25, 1870, which accompanied the first draft of the bill submitted to the Senate Finance Committee. The word "trade" was substituted for the word "commercial" at the suggestion of the assayer of the Philadelphia Mint, for brevity and for technical reasons in making the dies.

The real reason for dropping the  $412\frac{1}{2}$  grain dollar from the Act of 1873 is evident from the foregoing statements.

This old silver dollar was too valuable as compared with the United States gold dollar and not valuable enough as compared with the Mexican silver dollar, this coin being the universal medium of exchange in China and other Oriental countries.

The sole and legitimate purpose of creating this trade dollar was to make an outlet for the rapidly increasing silver product of the Western mines. This output increased from \$12,000,000 (coining value) in 1869, when the bill was first formulated, to \$35,750,000 in 1873, the year in which the law was enacted.

The Director of the Mint, in his annual report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1873, says:

"The trade dollar of silver authorized by the Coinage Act is designed expressly for export, and has no fixed value as compared with gold. \* \* \* Having been made a legal-tender in limited amounts, it may eventually, if the price of silver relative to gold falls sufficiently, to some extent enter into home circulation, but its export value will always be in excess of that of the subsidiary silver coin, its bullion value or quantity of pure metal being about eight and a half per cent. in excess."

This shows that the possibility of a speculation arising in this coinage was perceived at or about the time the bill was passed; the price of silver began to fall before the bill became a law, and inside of two years there was a margin of profit to silver owners in depositing bars in the mint, having the silver coined into trade dollars (an operation requiring three days) and putting them into circulation at home at par.

In 1877 over thirteen million trade dollars were coined for owners of silver; no trade dollars were struck for Government account. The charge of one and a quarter cents for coining trade dollars was supposed to be sufficient to just cover the cost of minting, but the Government nevertheless suffered large loss through the issuing of these coins as will be presently shown.



The writer has in his possession a copy of a memorandum of the late Wm. E. Du Bois, formerly Chief Assayer of the Philadelphia Mint, dated Oct. 9, 1877, the original of which is in the assay office of the Mint, and is as follows :

“THE TRADE DOLLAR AS A CURRENCY.

The joint resolution of Congress No. 17, approved July 22, 1876, provides :

[Sec. 2] ‘The trade dollar shall not hereafter be a legal tender, and the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to limit, from time to time, the coinage thereof to such an amount as he may deem sufficient to meet the export demand for the same.’

Those dollars, however, are quite abundant in currency, at least in this city and New York, and we are coining large quantities of them; in September alone 404,000 pieces, and over 350,000 are now waited for (Oct. 9).

They afford a good profit to brokers and others who get them coined. \* \* \* This coinage, however, if used for currency, is greatly to the loss of the United States Treasury.

Two half-dollars are worth about 87½ cents paper; by which we would have a profit of 12½ cents per dollar. If we had given out halves, instead of the above 750,000 whole dollars, we should have made, say, in two months, about \$90,000 profit for the Government.”

The Philadelphia Mint became glutted with deposits of silver in the form of pigs weighing a thousand ounces or over for coinage into trade dollars, “and after trade dollars could no longer be procured to be placed in domestic circulation, money dealers and speculators imported Mexican silver dollars to a large extent, and placed them in circulation at par in the same manner as had previously been done with the trade dollar. On these coins being offered on deposit or in payment at the banks and savings institutions by persons who had taken them at par, they were refused.” This statement would scarcely be credited at the present day unless the authority should be given; it is proper therefore to say that the words within quotation marks are taken verbatim from the Annual Report of the Director of the Mint for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1878 (page 12).

The total number of trade dollars coined was 35,965,924.

After the coinage of trade dollars was withdrawn the Secretary of State instituted an investigation of the extent of their export to China, the only country in which an effort was made to introduce these coins in trade. A request was forwarded to the American Legation at Peking that reports should be obtained from the American consuls residing at the principal ports in China upon this subject.

The American Minister forwarded several such replies from consuls, some of which are actually amusing in their tenor. The consul at Hankow, for example, said: “The Chinese are very notional about dollars, and while the ‘sun’ (Mexican) dollar is taken without question, the ‘scale’ (trade) dollar is at a heavy discount. \* \* \* Intelligent compradores assert that if the trade dollar were introduced the Mandarins would order it to be ‘boiled, chop, chop,’ that is, condemn it to be smelted. I have no doubt such would be the case.”

The consul at Ningpo stated that the trade dollar had not been introduced to any extent whatever. The Vice Consul-General at the important port of Shanghai said that as there was no prospect of inducing the natives to accept the coin “those parcels of trade dollars which have been received here have been reshipped.”

The consul at Tien-Tsin reported that the trade dollar was not known at that port, and the consul at New-Chwang stated that “a few trade dollars had been sold at a premium as curiosities, but they could only be passed at a discount in general business.”

The facts here given prove that the idea of the trade dollar originated with the formulators of the law of 1873 and that it failed utterly to fulfil the original legitimate purpose for which it was created, but served to enrich a number of silver owners through the employment of the United States mint in coining, at a nominal charge, over thirty-five million trade dollars, most of which were put into circula-

tion in the Eastern States at par, in competition with subsidiary silver coins issued for Government account, at a profit to silver owners.

The Act creating the trade dollar was the entering wedge which enabled the silver interests in Congress to pass the Bland Bill in 1878 over the President's veto, and resulted in the compulsory purchase by the Government of 291,272,000 fine ounces of silver, at a cost of \$306,279,000, for coining into Bland dollars, an average cost of \$1.06 per ounce, to which must be added the cost of coining and storing in the Treasury vaults nearly four hundred million Bland dollars that have never passed into circulation. This of course does not include the silver purchased under the Sherman Act of July 14, 1890, which amounted in four years to 168,674,683 fine ounces and cost \$155,931,002, an average of ninety-two cents per ounce.

ALEXANDER E. OUTERBRIDGE, JR.

PHILADELPHIA.

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The Puzzle Signature.

On page 258 of the MAGAZINE for February, a "blind" signature was published accompanied by an offer of a copy of PRACTICAL BANKING to the subscriber first correctly deciphering it. Below will be found the telegram giving the first correct answer, also an acknowledgment in *facsimile* of receipt of the book.

Bradford Rhodes & Co., 78 William St., New York:

Answer to query, What is it? in February Magazine is Anthony Stonehouse.

SALEM, N. Y., Feb. 12, 1899.

CHAS. A. BEATTIE, Cashier.

The above telegram was received at the MAGAZINE office at 12.07 P. M. February 12.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SALEM

Salem, Wash. Co., N. Y., February 21st, 1899.

Messrs. Bradford Rhodes & Co.,

78 William Street,

New York City.

Gentlemen:-

I have received the copy of "Patten's Practical Banking" and your letter of the 15th inst. advising me that I had given the first correct solution of the puzzle signature in the February Journal, and wish to thank you for the book, which I am enjoying very much, and your promptness in forwarding same.

Yours truly,

 Cashier.

There were many other correct answers, the one coming next to Mr. Beattie in point of time being that of A. S. Ballard, Cashier of the Commercial Bank, Washington Court House, Ohio. Mr. Ballard had never seen the signature before.

Out of something over seven hundred telegrams and letters received, it is impossible to present but a few of those among the earliest received. Some of those who first gave the right name, besides the two already mentioned, were:

T. E. Schanck, Cashier People's National Bank, New Brunswick, N. J.; W. J. Jamieson, Buffalo, N. Y.; W. L. Burckett, Chief Clerk, Fourth National Bank, N. Y.; C. E. Cole, Cashier First National Bank, Haverhill, Mass.; A. W. Ehrman, Assistant Cashier Commercial National Bank, Detroit, Mich.; First National Bank, Negaunee, Mich.; Will R. Myers, Geo. D. Harter Bank, Canton, Ohio, and Clarence J. Parkes, of the same bank; G. P. Taylor, Treasurer Savings Bank of Newport, R. I.; Perley K. Bugbee, Cashier-Dartmouth Nat. Bank, Hanover, N. H.

Among some of the names guessed were: Anthony F. Appleton, Anthony Stoughton, Anthony Stoneham, Anthony S. Washburn, Anthony Stephens, Anthony L. Houghton, Pt. Anthony W. Anthony, Anthony L. Tollefson, Anthony Thompson, etc.

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL POINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.

### BOOKS AND RECORDS OF THE BANK.

*The Minute Book.*—In the natural course of events this is the first book that would be considered. Before the completion of the organization stockholders' meetings have to be held to consider many questions, a complete record of which should be kept by the secretary of the meetings, and these should be transcribed upon the minute book, and signed by the chairman and approved by the secretary.

After the organization of the bank stockholders' meetings are held at least once a year, oftener if called for. Their proceedings should also be completely transcribed on the minute book. All the action relating to their constitution and by-laws, and a complete transcribing of the same, should also appear upon the minute book. Also all action of the board of directors regarding any business of the bank, the loans, the disposition of any property, the making or authorizing of any contract, the election of any of the officers, or the engagement of any of the employees with the amount of salary to be paid them, and the amount of bonds to be given, should be stated on the minutes. It will thus be seen that the minute book is one of the most important books in the bank.

A bank is a corporation or stock company. Its shareholders all have a voice in its affairs. They are the ones who decide who shall manage it, that is, who shall be the directors, for the directors are in reality the managers. The responsibility therefore devolves upon the directors, who are the agents of the stockholders, and upon the appointees of these directors. It is a human frailty to forget, and even if it was not, the action of either the majority of the stockholders, or of the directors, could hardly be held binding, legally, unless properly recorded and signed by the proper officers. So that the minute book becomes the record of the will of the stockholders and directors of the bank.

In large banks two minute books are sometimes kept, one for stockholders' meetings, and the other for directors' meetings, but in the majority of banks one minute book will suffice. No special form of book is used, simply a plain record book such as is usually carried in stock by all blank book manufacturers.

In all stockholders' meetings where an election of directors is held, a chairman, a secretary, and two tellers are appointed. The tellers should be sworn in by a notary that their action may be legal. The ballot having been taken and counted, the tellers attest the count and note the number of shares voted and for whom. All this should be entered in full in the minutes, also the result.

At the directors' meetings for the annual election of officers, a chairman and secretary are appointed, and when the President, Vice-President, and Cashier are elected the President takes the chair, if present, and the Cashier takes the secretary's place.

The minutes of the directors' meetings are kept by the Cashier, and it is often customary for these to be taken originally upon blank paper and then copied in the minute book at some convenient time. Notes are taken in a similar way of the stockholders' meetings.

\* Continued from the February number, page 213. This series of articles commenced in the MAGAZINE for August, 1898, page 249.

Sometimes the Cashier secures the services of some one of the clerks who is a neat penman to transcribe the minutes from the memoranda to the minute book. Wherever this is done it will be found a wise plan to retain the original memoranda, filing them away in large envelopes properly endorsed with the date of the meeting. I mention this because I have seen, in more than one instance, the minute book of a bank, written up in this way, refused admission in court as evidence of certain transactions, that were necessary to be shown, because they were not the original entries, nor in the handwriting of the Cashier, or of any one who was present at the meeting, and the original memoranda had been destroyed.

At directors' meetings in which paper for discount is presented, it is advisable that a description of each note presented (by name of discounter and amount) be noted in the minutes. I know this is not often done, and some claim it would be too much work, but in banks where much paper is handled this can be easily overcome by having the paper entered in the offering book (a description of which will be given later on), and as the paper is passed upon by the board, having it properly checked off on the book, the record as shown on the offering book then being signed by the members of the board present. This course has often saved much trouble, besides placing the responsibility for the loans upon the directors present. In the minute book the record should show the aggregate amount of loans passed by the board, "as shown by the offering book."

In small banks the loans passed by the board can easily be recorded in detail in the minute book.

The names of the members of the board present at each meeting should always be noted in the minutes, also the names of those presenting any motions.

The report of the examining committee upon the examination of the bank's affairs should be written in full upon separate sheets of paper, writing on only one side, be signed by each member of the committee, and be pasted in the minute book under its proper date, as an original document, and should be accompanied by the action of the board upon the matter.

#### STOCK CERTIFICATE BOOK.

After the subscriptions to the stock have been received, the subscribers are expected to pay for their stock in installments, fifty per cent. being the first payment, the subsequent payments being made in monthly installments of ten per cent. each until the whole is paid. When the payment of the first installment is completed a certificate noting the same is sent to the Comptroller of the Currency, which was mentioned, and the form given, in the October, 1898, number of this MAGAZINE. At the completion of the payments of each of the five subsequent installments a certificate must be sent to the Comptroller of the Currency stating the fact. The form here given is the one generally used:

#### CERTIFICATE OF PAYMENT OF CAPITAL STOCK,

\_\_\_\_\_ BANK, \_\_\_\_\_, 189—.  
 SIR: It is hereby certified that \_\_\_\_\_ installment, amounting to \_\_\_\_\_ dollars (\$\_\_\_\_\_), has been paid in on account of the capital stock of the \_\_\_\_\_, making the total amount paid in on the capital stock of this bank \$\_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Cashier.

To the COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY  
 Washington, D. C.

STATE OF \_\_\_\_\_,  
 County of \_\_\_\_\_, ss:

Subscribed and sworn to, before the undersigned \_\_\_\_\_ of the said county, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 189—.


N. B.—Banks are requested not to report the payment of any one installment twice, except as included in total amount paid in.

In reference to the legal method of enforcing the payment of subscriptions to capital stock, see Section 5141 Revised Statutes.

SHARES \$100 EACH

313 NUMBER

100 SHARES



THE MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK OF CENTRE CITY

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA.

This is to Certify, that James L. Billings is entitled to  
 One hundred \_\_\_\_\_ Shares of the Capital Stock of  
**THE MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK OF CENTRE CITY**  
*Transferable, only, on the Books of said Bank, in Person  
 or by Attorney, on surrender of this Certificate.*

In Witness Whereof, we, the undersigned, set our hands and  
 affixed the seal of the said Bank at Centre City, Pa.  
 this 7<sup>th</sup> day of June A.D. 1898.

*A. H. Brown* Cashier *J. H. Bess* President

W. F. BERRY'S SOLE CO. PA. A.

CAPITAL \$100,000

FORM OF STOCK CERTIFICATE.

Receipts should be given each subscriber for their various payments, these receipts to be returned to the bank after the final payment, and upon the issuing of the stock certificates. But on no account should any certificate of stock be issued until the shareholder has fully paid for the shares to which he had subscribed.

During the following five months of the existence of the Merchants' National Bank of Centre City the Cashier sent to each shareholder monthly a notice, or call, for a ten per cent. installment upon the capital stock. These being each and all fully paid in, and the proper certificate sent to the Comptroller regarding them, the bank was now prepared to issue the certificate of stock.

Applications were made to several well-known manufacturers of bank and corporation stationery for samples of stock certificates and a neat form selected, which is shown on the preceding page.

A form of power of attorney for the sale or transfer of the stock was printed on the back of the certificate as follows :

**KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,** That.....the undersigned, for value received, do hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint .....to be.....true and lawful attorney for.....and in.....name.....and behalf to sell, assign and transfer unto.....or any other person or persons,.....Shares in the Capital Stock of

**THE MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK OF CENTRE CITY, PA.**

And further, one or more persons under.....to substitute with like power.

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF,**.....have hereunto set.....hand.....and seal this.....day of.....18....

Witness present,

.....

.....

.....  
SEAL.....

The certificates of stock should always be bound in a book form, one on a page. They should be numbered consecutively by the manufacturer, and the stub, which should be made to contain a very complete record, should be numbered correspondingly, also by the manufacturer.

I have seen institutions where the certificates were loose a record being made in a book of the issue of any. This is a careless and unsafe practice and has been a temptation to over-issue stock, in cases that I know of.

It is extremely necessary that a very careful record be kept of the issue of certificates of stock, and as many transfers of stock will take place it becomes also necessary that a careful record be kept of them.

The first record in the issuing of a certificate is made upon the stub of the certificate book. This stub should be roomy and should contain spaces for the number (as mentioned above), next the number of shares, then the date of issue, and last the name of the shareholder. These should occupy the upper one-third of the stub, next below should be a space upon which the shareholder should receipt for his certificate. If he lives at a distance and the certificate has to be sent to him a receipt should be enclosed for signature, together with a stamped and directed envelope for returning the receipt, and this receipt should be pasted into the space provided.

When a stockholder disposes of his stock or any portion of it, such transfers to

be legal should be made upon the books of the bank, as is stated in the form for the face of the certificate, and he should sign his name on the back opposite the "seal" and have some one sign as a witness to his signature under the words "Witness present."

When the transfer of the stock is on account of its being used as security for a loan, it can either be endorsed in blank on the back as mentioned or a blank form of assignment or transfer may be filled out and attached to it.

Any actual transfers of ownership of the stock should be noted on the stub, and the last one-third of the stub is generally used for that purpose.

A good form for a stub of a certificate of stock book which is used by some of the best banks is shown on this page.

In filling out a certificate of stock the name of the shareholder should be written very plainly, and it is best to write the Christian name in full, as many instances have occurred of men, and women, too, of the same name with the same initials. The amount of the shares in the body of the certificate should be written out in full.

After the certificate is filled out, and signed by the proper officers, the last act and the one which gives it its legal value is the affixing the seal of the bank. This is usually placed in the blank space left for it in the lower left-hand corner.

The record on the stub should be a counterpart of that made on the certificate.

BANK EXAMINER.

(To be continued.)

*Certificate*

No. 313

One hundred Shares

June 7<sup>th</sup> A.D. 1894

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*Issued to*

James L. Billings

*Received the above Certificate*

J. L. Billings

*Surrendered* \_\_\_\_\_ A.D. 18 -

*Reissued to* \_\_\_\_\_

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No. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Shares

\_\_\_\_\_ A.D. 18 -

STUB OF STOCK CERTIFICATE.

The record on the stub should be a counterpart of that made on the certificate.

BANK EXAMINER.

(To be continued.)

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**EASY MONEY IN THE WEST.**—A recent special dispatch to the New York "Evening Post" from Chicago says: "Monetary and trade conditions throughout the West, Northwest, and Southwest have never been so good. Even in the 'boom days' of the early eighties business was not up to the present aggregate, and money was not as plentiful. Reports made by merchants from all over the West show that collections are the best ever known, and trade conditions could not well be better, taking the country over. \* \* \*

Farm loans, which in the past have gone begging at high rates of interest, are now being made at 4½ to 5 per cent. Real estate loans on the most desirable property have been made at 3½ per cent. here. Reports from bankers in other leading interior cities show that rates are equally low.

Chicago banks hold sixty-three per cent. more money in deposits than on March 9, 1897. Their cash resources are forty-five per cent. larger, surplus and undivided profits have been increased twelve per cent., and their loans are fifty per cent. in excess of that date."

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### *ACTION TO RECOVER DEPOSIT—WHAT IS A SUFFICIENT DEMAND.*

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, February, 1899.

JOHN DELAHUNTY, AS RECEIVER, vs. THE CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK.

The contract between a bank and its depositor is that it is entitled to retain the deposit until a suitable request is made for its return.

When, however, the bank, by refusal, by an appropriation of the money, or any other act, shows that the bank would not honor such demand if made, no demand is necessary before the bringing of an action.

Whilst the notification of his appointment of the Receiver of a depositor, coupled with a request to "send" the deposit to him, may have imposed no duty upon the bank to comply with the request, the form of demand should have been objected to at the time, and the bank waived any objection to such form by a notification to the Receiver from the bank's attorneys, that the bank itself was a creditor of the depositor to an amount far exceeding these moneys mentioned in the letter of the Receiver.

No further or more formal demand was necessary, in view of the stand taken by the bank, before the Receiver could maintain his action against the bank to recover the deposit.

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Appeal from judgment dismissing complaint after a trial at trial term.

The plaintiff, as Receiver, sued to recover a balance of account in favor of the firm of William Campbell & Co., who were depositors with the defendant. The answer, besides setting up an affirmative defense, admits that a certain balance in favor of the said firm existed at the date alleged, but denies the demand and refusal to pay. On the trial, the only question passed upon was, whether a sufficient demand had been made before the commencement of the action. Upon that question the plaintiff offered the following letter, the receipt of which was admitted by the defendant:

"New York, May 12, 1897, Central National Bank of New York: Gentlemen—I have been appointed Receiver of the late firm of William Campbell & Co., which has on deposit with you the sum of \$1,133.08. Will you please send me that amount, and let me know what papers you require for vouchers, showing my appointment, and I will prepare and send them to you. Yours truly, John Delahunty, Receiver."

The answer to this letter by the defendant's counsel is as follows:

"New York, May 13, 1897, John Delahunty, Esq.: Dear Sir—The Central National Bank of New York has referred to us your letter of yesterday, requesting us to attend to it. You are probably not aware that the bank is itself a creditor of Campbell & Co. to an amount far exceeding these moneys mentioned in your letter to it. Yours truly, Duer, Strong & Jarvis."



After the admission of these letters and an attempt to introduce some other evidence on the subject of demand—which, because immaterial, was excluded and need not be considered—the plaintiff rested. Thereupon, the defendant moved for a non-suit on the ground that no sufficient evidence of demand and refusal had been given; which motion was granted and the plaintiff excepted. And it is from the judgment thereafter entered that this appeal is taken.

O'BRIEN, J.: It must be regarded as settled that as to moneys deposited in bank, before the same can be recovered in a suit, it is a condition precedent that a demand should be made therefor. This flows from the relation between a depositor and the bank, and from the promise which the law implies that the deposit will be returned after demand. The contract, therefore, is that the bank is entitled to retain the deposit until some suitable request is made for its return.

The authorities are far from uniform as to the precise nature of the demand, some using the expression that a demand in some form is necessary, leaving its sufficiency to be determined by the facts appearing in each case. Where, however, the bank by refusal, or by an appropriation of the money or any other act showing an indisposition to honor a demand, the cases hold that under such circumstances a demand is unnecessary. So, too, "if when a demand is made, a specific objection is made as a reason for not complying with the demand, all other objections, which if made might be readily obviated, are waived. And where the demand is not made of the proper person, or in the proper manner, or is made by the wrong person, objection should be taken at the time" (Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 1st Ed., Vol. V, p. 528g.)

The question, therefore, turns upon whether the letter of the Receiver was a proper demand; and, if not, whether the answer thereto can be construed as of a nature to justify the failure to make further demand.

There can be no doubt that the Receiver wanted and requested of the bank a return of the deposit; and, while the requirement that it should be sent to the Receiver's office was one that the bank was not obliged to comply with, it was an objection which should have been taken at the time. The Receiver made his request in the form outlined in his letter; and if it was the intent or purpose of the bank, before honoring the demand or paying the money, to insist that the Receiver should draw his check in the usual way against the account, and, either personally or through some other medium, present it with evidence of his authority, it seems but reasonable that it should then have taken that objection and so notified the Receiver. It did not, however, take the objection that the Receiver had no right to ask the bank to send the money to him; but instead of meeting the request as made, the bank turned the Receiver's letter over to its attorneys. We are thus brought to a consideration whether or not such action on the part of the bank, coupled with the subsequent letter of the attorneys, was a refusal.

That the bank did not intend to comply is reasonably to be inferred, because the letter received was turned over to its attorneys, who, subsequently, on its behalf, answered it, and in such answer, instead of making any point about the manner of the demand or the place where the money was to be paid, or to the failure to show authority or warrant to receive it, the attorney stated that the Receiver was "probably not aware that the bank is itself a creditor of Campbell & Co. to an amount far exceeding these moneys mentioned in your letter to it."

There is certainly nothing in this letter from which the inference can be drawn that the bank intended to comply with the request, or that if the Receiver went to the bank it would pay the money. On the contrary, we think the Receiver had a right to conclude that the position taken by the bank was that it was entitled to appropriate the deposit in payment of an indebtedness due them from Campbell & Co., and that this attitude rendered useless or obviated the necessity of any further

or more formal demand. The Receiver, therefore, having waited about six months without hearing further from the bank, and being thus strengthened in the first impression, produced by the receipt of the attorneys' letter, commenced this action.

The reply of the attorneys fully justifies the inference that, under claim of right, the bank intended to retain the moneys and apply them to its own indebtedness. If such was not the intention, the language was so evasive and so well calculated to produce that impression that fault cannot be found with the Receiver if he was thus misled.

While, therefore, it may not be that the Receiver's letter, taken by itself, was a sufficient demand, yet when coupled with the bank's action and the language of the attorneys' letter in which the bank's position was defined, we think it was error for the trial justice to hold that any further or more formal demand was necessary before suit. The right suggested in the letter of the attorneys, and alleged in the answer, to appropriate these moneys to the bank's indebtedness, might or might not have been sustained upon the trial, but that question is not presented upon this appeal, the non-suit being placed on the ground that the failure of the plaintiff to show a demand in any form or a sufficient refusal on the part of the bank.

We think the ruling made was incorrect, and that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with cost to the appellant to abide the event.

VAN BRUNT, P.J., BARRETT and PATTERSON, J.J., concur.; RUMSEY, J., dissents.

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#### NOTICE OF PROTEST—WHEN SUFFICIENT.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, January 26, 1899.

RUDD, *et al.* vs. DEPOSIT BANK.

A notice of dishonor is sufficient, if on the whole it so designates or distinguishes the paper as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the party notified what paper is intended.\*

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This was an action to recover upon certain bills of exchange. The indorser set up as a defense that the notice of dishonor was insufficient. The notice as to one of the bills was in the following form :

"Davless County, City of Owensboro, February 6, 1896. Please take notice that a bill of exchange for \$1,000, drawn by W. M. Rudd on R. W. Slack, agent of the Rudd estate, in favor of John Murphy, or order, dated December 5, 1895, payable sixty days after date, at Owensboro, Ky., indorsed by John Murphy, was this day protested by the undersigned notary public for non-payment. The holder thereof looks to you for payment. To John Murphy. Gus T. Brannon, Notary Public."

The notice on the other bills was in the same form, except as to dates and amounts.

BURNHAM, J. (omitting part of the opinion) : The last ground of complaint relied on by appellant Murphy is that the notice of protest was not sufficiently definite to identify the note protested. It is not necessary for a notice to give all the essential parts of the paper dishonored, or to describe it in every respect accurately. The rule, stated generally, may be said to be that "a notice is sufficient if, on the whole, it so designates or distinguishes the paper as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the party notified what paper was intended." (See 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 417, and the authorities there cited.)

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\*By the Negotiable Instruments Law it is provided that "The notice may be in writing or merely oral, and may be given in any terms which sufficiently identify the instrument, and indicate that it has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment."

The requirements of the law are considered as satisfied by any description which, under all the circumstance of the case, so designates the bill or note as to leave no doubt in the mind of the party, as a reasonable man, what bill or note was intended. (See Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 974.)

Chit. Bills, 290, says: "There are two requisites to a good notice, viz. a description of the bill, and an intimation that it has been dishonored."

In *Mills vs. Bank* (11 Wheat. 487) the Court says: "The objection to the notice is that it does not state that payment was demanded at the bank when the note became due. It is not necessary that the notice should contain such a formal allegation. It is sufficient that it states the non-payment of the note, and that the holder looks to the indorser for indemnity."

In the case of *Young vs. Bennett* (7 Bush, 478) this Court said: "It is not required that the notice of the dishonor of a bill should be set out in any particular form, nor is the party giving it confined to specific language."

It seems to us that the protest and notice of dishonor in each case is a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. For the reasons indicated, the judgments in both cases are affirmed.

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**FORGED ENDORSEMENT—ACTION BY DRAWEE BANK TO RECOVER—  
LIABILITY OF INDORSER.**

Supreme Court of Iowa, January 25, 1893.

**FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN vs. MARSHALLTOWN STATE BANK.**

A drawee bank which has paid a check upon a forged indorsement can not recover the amount so paid from the collecting bank where the latter has not been guilty of any negligence.

The negligence of the bank which first received the check cannot be imputed to another bank presenting the same for payment.

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One F. M. Smith, having in his possession a check drawn on plaintiff bank, payable to the order of Smith & Hauser, and purporting to be signed by one J. R. Bradbury, indorsed the payee's name thereon, and presented it to the Citizens' Bank of Union, and obtained of this bank the cash therefor. This last-named bank indorsed the check as follow: "Pay F. A. Balch, Cashier, or order; Citizens' Bank, Union, Iowa; C. E. Lawrence, Cashier,"—and forwarded it to the Marshalltown State Bank, of which Balch was Cashier, and received credit for the amount thereof on the books of the last-named bank. The transaction was concluded by the Marshalltown State Bank indorsing the check, and presenting it to plaintiff bank, which cashed it. Bradbury, the purported drawer of the check, was a depositor in the last-named bank. A few days after the check was paid, plaintiff discovered that the signature of the drawer was forged, and thereafter this action was begun, to recover the amount paid. A jury was waived by the parties, and the case tried to the court. From a judgment in defendant's favor, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

**WATERMAN, J.:** A few facts in addition to those stated above are shown by the record, and something is claimed for them by the parties. We shall set them out, although, in our view of the case, they do not affect the conclusion at which we arrive.

One Hauser was engaged in business near Union, and Smith, whose misdeed gives rise to this contention, was stopping with him. Shortly prior to the transaction complained of, Hauser sold some live stock to Bradbury, and Smith, who collected the money therefor, took from Bradbury a check, payable to the order of Smith & Hauser. This check Smith indorsed in the name of Smith & Hauser, and cashed at the Bank of Union. There was in fact no such firm as Smith & Hauser. The

testimony shows that the check we are now speaking of was made by Bradbury, payable to the firm, at Smith's request, and that Hauser knew nothing of this fact, or of Smith's indorsement of the paper.

Some of the text writers on negotiable paper lay down the rule that, when a bank upon which a check is drawn pays it upon the forged signature of the drawer, the money can be recovered as paid under a mistake of fact. (Story Prom. Notes, §§ 379, 529; 2 Pars. Notes & B. 80.) Others, while recognizing a different rule, incline to the opinion that the one just stated is the most equitable. (2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. c. 48, § 18.)

But, whatever the text writers may think, along line of authority sustains the proposition that, as between the drawee and a good-faith holder of a check, the drawee bank is to be deemed the place of final settlement, where all prior mistakes and forgeries shall be corrected and settled at once for all; and if overlooked and payment is made, it must be deemed final. There can be no recovery over. (*Price vs. Neal*, 8 Burrows, 1855; *Redington vs. Woods*, 45 Cal. 406; *Bank vs. Ricker*, 71 Ill. 439; *First Nat. Bank of Chicago vs. Northwestern Nat. Bank*, 152 Ill. 296, 88 N. E. 739; *Deposit Bank of Georgetown vs. Fayette Nat. Bank*, 90 Ky. 10, 18 S. W. 389; *Commercial and Farmers' Nat. Bank of Baltimore vs. First Nat. Bank of Baltimore*, 30 Md. 11; *Star Fire Ins. Co. vs. New Hampshire Nat. Bank*, 60 N. H. 442; *Bank vs. Peyton* [Tex. Civ. App.], 89 S. W. 223; *St. Albans Bank vs. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank*, 10 Vt. 141; *National Park Bank of New York vs. Ninth Nat. Bank*, 46 N. Y. 77; *Bank vs. Boutell* [Minn.], 62 N. W. 327. See, further, 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1071.)

This doctrine is founded by some courts upon the thought that the drawee bank is conclusively presumed to know the signatures of its depositors. This, however, may be too narrow a basis. It may be well that such a rule is demanded by the necessities of business in these times, when the currency of the commercial world is composed so largely of checks and drafts. Whether it is the better rule or the one most consonant with reason and justice is no longer an open question. The discussion seems to have been foreclosed by the overwhelming weight of authority. The rule, however, has one qualification, introduced by some cases, and which we feel inclined to adopt. When the holder of the check has been negligent in not making due inquiry, if the circumstances were such as to demand an inquiry, when he took the check, the drawee may recover. (Tied. Com. Paper, § 399; *First Nat. Bank of Orleans vs. State Bank of Alma* [Neb.], 86 N. W. 289; *First Nat. Bank of Danvers vs. First Nat. Bank of Salem*, 151 Mass. 280, 24 N. E. 44.)

The appellant seeks to bring its case within this exception. But the only negligence charged here is against the Bank of Union, which first cashed the check, and put it in circulation. Clearly, the negligence, if any, of that bank, cannot be imputed to the defendant. If the plaintiff had desired to take advantage of this qualification of the rule, its action under the facts here shown, should have been against the bank which first gave currency to the paper. That was the course taken in the Nebraska case cited above.

Plaintiff claims, further, some right from the fact, as it asserts, that the indorsement of Smith & Hauser was forged. The signing of a fictitious name may be a forgery. (*People vs. Warner* [Mich.], 62 N. W. 405.)

We concede the general proposition contended for by appellant that an indorsement of negotiable paper is a guaranty of the genuineness of all prior indorsements, though we must add that this rule has no applicability under the facts of this case. If, by reason of this forged indorsement, plaintiff has been led to pay this check to one not the owner of it, no doubt it could recover from any prior indorser upon whose guaranty it had a right to rely. (*Levy vs. Bank* [Neb.], 43 N. W. 354.)

But how has plaintiff been injured by this so-called "forgery" of an indorse-

ment? The party to whom it paid the money was entitled to it, if the payment was to be made at all. If the indorsement had been genuine, it could not have recovered from Smith & Hauser on the ground that they were indorsers; for, as we have seen, as between all good-faith parties to the check, its payment by the drawee is final. If Smith, who actually made this indorsement, did so in bad faith, and with knowledge of the forgery, he is still liable to the bank, not on his indorsement, but because of his fraud. The drawee ordinarily has no recourse upon indorsers. If an indorsement is forged, yet, if the money is paid to the party entitled to it, the drawee has no reason to complain, and no right of action over. That is the case here. Plaintiff is liable to no one else for the amount of the check. It is in no worse situation than it would have been had the signature of Smith & Hauser been genuine. Affirmed.

COLLECTIONS—DRAFT WITH BILL OF LADING ATTACHED—DUTY OF  
COLLECTING BANK.

Supreme Court of Florida, November 5, 1898.

OXFORD LAKE LINE vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PENSACOLA.

In the absence of special instructions, if a time bill of exchange with bill of lading attached be sent to an agent for collection, there is an implied obligation upon the agent to hold the bill of lading until the bill of exchange is either accepted or paid, according to circumstances; and he cannot deliver the bill of lading without requiring the one or the other.

This was an action to recover, among other things, the value of a draft for \$1,650, which had been drawn by the Oxford Lake Line upon the Pensacola Terminal Company, for \$1,650, dated July 8, 1892, and payable thirty days after date. To this draft there was attached a bill of lading on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company for a dummy engine and two coaches. At the time of sending the bill of lading and draft, the plaintiff instructed the defendant not to deliver the bill of lading to the drawee of the draft without its acceptance of the draft. Notwithstanding this, the bill of lading was delivered to the Pensacola Terminal Company, and the draft to the drawer without acceptance.

CARTER, J. (omitting part of the opinion): I. We think the plaintiff's replication to the first plea presented a complete answer thereto. In the absence of any special instructions, if a time bill of exchange with bill of lading attached be sent to an agent for collection, there is an implied obligation upon the agent to hold the bill of lading until the bill of exchange is either accepted or paid, according to circumstances. He cannot deliver without requiring the one or the other. (*Commercial Bank of Manitoba vs. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co.* 160 Ill. 401, 43 N. E. 756; *Bank vs. Cummings*, 89 Tenn. 609, 18 S. W. 115; *National Bank of Commerce of Boston vs. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Memphis*, 91 U. S. 92; *Dows vs. Bank*, 91 U. S. 618; *Schoregge vs. Gordon*, 29 Minn. 367, 13 N. W. 194; Port. Bills, Lad. § 523 *et seq.*; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1734b.)

In this case, however, there were special instructions. Two bills—one at sight, the other at thirty days—were sent to defendant for collection and remittance, with instructions to procure acceptance of the time bill, and to “deliver attached documents (the bill of lading) only on payment of drafts.”

If there is any ambiguity about these instructions, it consists in an uncertainty as to whether the bill of lading was to be delivered upon payment of the sight draft and acceptance of the other, or upon payment of both. There certainly was no authority given thereby to deliver the bill of lading upon payment of the sight draft only.

It is unquestionably true, as contended by defendant in error, that where the instructions to an agent are couched in such uncertain terms as to be reasonably

susceptible of two different meanings, and the agent in good faith and without negligence adopts one of them, the principal cannot be heard to assert, either as against the agent or as against third persons who have in good faith and without negligence relied upon the same construction, that he intended the authority to be executed in accordance with the other interpretation. (Mechem, Ag. § 315.)

But, because an agent's instruction will admit of different interpretations, he is not thereby authorized to disregard them entirely, and substitute his own judgment in the place thereof. If he acts at all in such cases, he must follow one of the interpretations reasonably derivable from the uncertain terms of the instructions.

In this case defendant did neither; but, on the contrary, substituted its own ideas of what was proper under the circumstances, thereby acting directly antagonistic to its instructions.

The replication was a good answer to the first plea, and the demurrer should have been overruled.

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**VERBAL DIRECTION TO PAY NOTE—PAYMENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF INSOLVENCY.**

Supreme Court of Alabama, October 29, 1898.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CAMBRIDGE, ILL., vs. HALL.

A verbal instruction by a depositor to a Cashier to apply his money on deposit in a certain way is a sufficient authority therefor.

A verbal direction by a depositor to apply his deposit to the payment of his note is sufficient; and it is not necessary that a check should be drawn.

Where payment is made by a National bank out of its funds after, or in contemplation of, insolvency, the transaction is void, though the person for whose benefit the payment is made is ignorant of the bank's financial condition.

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This was an action by the First National Bank, of Cambridge, Ill., against John W. Hall and H. P. Wisdom upon a promissory note for \$1,000. The defendants pleaded payment.

COLEMAN, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The pleadings show that John W. Hall and H. P. Wisdom, the defendants and makers of the note, composed the partnership of Hall & Wisdom, to whom the note was made payable, and by whom it was indorsed in blank; that the note was payable at the Florence National Bank on June 22, where the note was on that day for collection for account of plaintiff; that on that day, and prior, there was on deposit in the bank, to the credit of the partnership of Hall & Wisdom, more than sufficient to pay said note, and the Cashier had been advised that the money was deposited for the purpose of paying the note, and instructed to so appropriate it, and there was a sufficient amount of cash in the bank at the time for this purpose; that Hall, a member of the firm, on the morning of the 22d, after banking hours, in the bank, tendered the Cashier a check on the funds on deposit in payment of the note, and was advised by the Cashier that a check was unnecessary, and that the note had already been charged to defendants, and exhibited to him the note canceled and stamped "Paid."

We are of opinion that these facts constitute a payment in money, and do not raise the question argued, that an agent has no authority to receive a check in payment of a debt or anything else than money.

It is true that the plea does not aver, as a fact, that the note at the time had been charged to defendants, nor that the amount had been credited to plaintiff, or was ever remitted or credited to plaintiff's account; nor, in our opinion, could defendants be held responsible if these proper entries were never made by the officers of the bank.

Suppose, under the facts, after canceling and stamping the note "Paid," it had been handed to defendants instead of sticking it on the canceling spindle, for future entry by the proper officer, could there be any doubt of a valid payment? To hold otherwise would require the parties to go through the needless process of having the money counted out to defendants, and the defendants then handing back to the Cashier the money, with instructions to apply it to the note.

A verbal instruction by a depositor to a Cashier to apply his money on deposit in a certain way, is sufficient authority. A check might furnish more complete and satisfactory evidence of the authority, but a check is not necessary to confer the authority. If no money had, in fact, been deposited to meet the note, and defendants, on the morning of the maturity of the note, had gone to the bank with the money, and paid it over to the Cashier in payment, and the note had been surrendered to him, stamped "Paid," there could be no controversy as to the question of payment, whether such entry was ever made on the books of the bank or not.

Can there be any difference in principle when a depositor who has money in bank to meet his note, and has so informed the Cashier, and instructed him to apply it to the debt, and on the day it falls due tenders to the Cashier a check on the funds which are then in bank subject to check, to pay the debt, and is informed that the check is unnecessary, and that the note has been paid, and exhibits the note stamped "Paid," and hanging on the canceling spindle to be entered by the bookkeeper?

We think not, and it can make no difference, in legal effect, that during the same day, and before the proper entries are made, the bank suspends payment and is closed. The latter proposition, however, is involved in the replication, to which we will briefly refer.

Section 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States reads as follows :

"All transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt owing to any National banking association, or of deposits to its credit; all assignments of mortgages, sureties on real estate, or of judgments or decrees in its favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable thing for its use, or for the use of any of its shareholders or creditors; and all payments of money to either, made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof, made with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner prescribed by this chapter, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to another, except in payment of its circulating notes, shall be utterly null and void; and no attachment, injunction or execution, shall be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in any State, county, or municipal court."

It is the opinion of the court that the facts set up in the plea under consideration, independent of the statute just cited, show a payment of the note, but that the statute is prohibitory and peremptory, and that a legal payment could not be made out of moneys deposited to his general credit, after insolvency of the bank, or in contemplation of insolvency, and that there was no legal payment of the note.

It is the opinion of the court that Hall's ignorance of the financial condition of the bank, or that it contemplated insolvency, made no difference as to the legality and invalidity of the intended payment. (*Bank vs. Butler*, 129 U. S. 223.)

The court, therefore, holds that the replication presented a complete answer to the plea, and that the trial court improperly sustained the demurrer.

The writer is of opinion that if Hall, in ignorance of the condition of the bank, in the usual course of business, deposited the money in the bank to his credit, and on Saturday preceding the Monday gave instructions to the Cashier to so apply it, and he further deposited other money on the morning of the closing of the bank, and went to the bank while it was doing business as usual to pay the note, and was informed by the Cashier that the money had been so applied, and exhibited the note

canceled and stamped "Paid," and it was subsequently so entered up under the directions of the Receiver, and the note surrendered to Hall, that the payment was valid, at least as to the plaintiff, whatever may be the rights of the Receiver in the premises. The effect of the payment by Hall thus made to the Florence National Bank, authorized by plaintiff to collect for plaintiff, was to transfer the deposit from the credit of Hall & Wisdom to the credit of the plaintiff, to whose credit in law it stood when the bank closed its doors, as much so as if the credit had been formally entered at the time.

Under the view taken by the court, the case must be reversed and remanded. Reversed and remanded.

COLEMAN, *J.*, dissenting. BRICKELL, *C. J.*, concurring with COLEMAN, *J.*

NOTE—CONSIDERATION—ACTION BY RECEIVER—DEFENSES.

Supreme Court of Minnesota, January 17, 1899.

ATWATER vs. STROMBERG.

*Held*, on the facts stated in an action brought by the Receiver of a National bank upon a promissory note executed and delivered by defendant to such bank, when it was a going concern, in consideration of the issuance and delivery to defendant by the bank of its certificate for certain stock shares therein, that there was no want of consideration for the execution and delivery of the note.

And after the bank has become insolvent, and the rights of creditors have become vested, such defendant cannot set up a defense to an action by the Receiver on the note a secret agreement with the President of the bank that he should have the option of surrendering the stock when the note matured, and having it returned. (Syllabus by the Court.)

COLLINS, *J.*: Action upon a promissory note for \$700 executed and delivered by defendant to a National bank when it was a going concern. Before the note matured, the bank suspended business, and plaintiff was thereupon appointed its Receiver by the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States. At the time of the execution and delivery of the note the bank issued and delivered to defendant its certificate for seven shares of its capital stock, of the par value of \$100 each. Concededly, there was no other consideration for the note. Concurrently, and as part of the same transaction, the President of the bank signed and delivered to the defendant a writing in which, after reciting that defendant had purchased the stock shares for which he had given his note, it was stated that, when the note fell due, defendant, at his election, could exchange the stock shares therefor. The court also found that at the same time the bank President stated to defendant that the note was solely for the accommodation of the bank, and that he would never be called upon to pay it. On the facts as found, judgment for plaintiff Receiver was ordered, and the appeal is from an order denying a new trial.

Assuming the law to be, as stated in *Scott vs. Armstrong* (148 U. S. 499), that the Receiver "took the assets of the bank as a mere trustee for creditors, and not for value and without notice, and, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, subject to all claims and defenses that might have been interposed as against the insolvent corporation before the liens of the United States and of the general creditors attached," it does not follow that plaintiff cannot recover.

That part of the writing which gave defendant an option to exchange his stock shares for the note was in direct conflict with the provisions of Section 5201, Rev. St. U. S., which prohibits the taking or acquiring of its own stock shares by a National bank, except as it may become necessary in order to prevent loss upon a previously contracted indebtedness.

Again, when the certificate of stock shares was delivered to defendant, and he



became a stockholder, he knew that credit would be given to the bank upon the faith of that stock, as the law provides. When the corporation became insolvent the rights of the creditors became fixed as to all stockholders. The risk that this might happen, defendant necessarily assumed when he took the stock. (See *Dunn vs. Bank*, 59 Minn. 231, 61 N. W. 27; *Olson vs. Same*, 67 Minn. 267, 69 N. W. 904.)

If defendant can now be allowed to evade the payment of his note given for the stock shares, he might with equal propriety be permitted to deny that he became a stockholder, and thus perpetrate a fraud upon creditors.

The stockholders of a corporation cannot directly or indirectly release themselves or discharge their liability as such by means of agreements with one another or with the corporation. Yet by the writing relied upon by defendant this was the very thing attempted, and, if such a transaction could be tolerated, every stockholder in a bank could protect himself from liability or loss through the medium of a like secret agreement. The statute forbids this, and it is clearly against public policy.

Finally, this case, on principle, cannot be distinguished from that of *This Plaintiff vs. Smith* (Minn.) 76 N. W. 253, and is controlled by it. The facts there more distinctly demonstrated the necessity of holding stockholders in a financial institution to a strict rule, but otherwise the cases are alike. Order affirmed.

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#### NEGLECT OF NOTARY—BANK NOT LIABLE FOR.

Supreme Court of Iowa, February 6, 1899.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MANNING vs. GERMAN BANK OF CARROLL COUNTY.

A collecting bank is not responsible for the negligence of a notary public to whom it has delivered paper for protest.

This rule applies though the notary is also an officer of the bank.

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The plaintiff purchased of Farneman a draft endorsed by him, drawn by the Bank of Kirkman, November 7, 1892, on the First National Bank of Carroll on November 8, and sent it for collection to the Valley National Bank of Des Moines, which, on the following day, forwarded it to the defendant for collection. It was received and presented to the drawee for payment before 10 o'clock on November 10, and payment refused. The draft was at once placed in the hands of W. A. Artz, a notary public, and also Assistant Cashier of the defendant bank, with instructions to protest for non-payment. He made no inquiry of the residence of Farneman, who was engaged in the chicken business at Carroll, but a short distance from the bank, but inclosed notice to him with those to other indorsers to the Valley National Bank of Des Moines. The plaintiff was denied recovery in an action against Farneman. (See *Bank vs. Farneman*, 93 Iowa, 163.)

This action was for the amount of the draft and the expenses and costs incurred in that case. Trial to court, and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

LADD, J.: That the draft was sent to the defendant bank for collection, and was presented to the drawee for payment, in apt time, admits of no doubt. (*Hamlin vs. Simpson* [Iowa], 74 N. W. 906.)

The exercise of prudence in the selection of a notary public is not questioned. The very gist of the action is that the defendant is chargeable with the negligence of that officer in failing to learn of Farneman's residence, and notify him of the dishonor of the draft. But a notary is a public officer, appointed by the chief magistrate of the State, is under bond for the faithful performance of his duties as such, and keeps a public record of his acts, certified copies of which may be received in evidence. (Code, § 873 *et seq.*)

He is not a mere agent of the bank, but a public officer sworn to properly dis-

charge his duties to the public. As such officer, the bank may not control his acts, nor dictate in what manner he shall perform his duties. If guilty of malfeasance in the performance of an official act, he, and not the bank, is responsible.

That this notary was also an employe of the bank can make no difference. When acting as such officer, he was not discharging his duties as servant. The positions were distinct, and his acts in the capacity of an officer of the State had no connection with the services he owed to the bank.

Again, the defendant was a mere agent for the collection of the draft, and, owing to its dishonor, deposited it with a notary for protest. "A sub-agent is accountable, ordinarily, only to his superior agent, when employed without the assent or direction of the principal. But, if he be employed with the express or implied assent of the principal, the superior agent will not be responsible for his acts. There is, in such a case, a privity between the sub-agent and the principal, who must, therefore, seek a remedy directly against the sub-agent for his negligence or misconduct." (*Gualich vs Bank*, 56 Iowa, 435, 9 N. W. 828.)

In making such collections it is usual to employ a notary, and, in forwarding the draft, there was an implied direction to do so, if necessary. (See *Mount vs. Bank*, 37 Iowa, 457.)

If the defendant exercised prudence in making the selection, its responsibility ended. This is all it could have done had the draft been its own, and surely it will not be held to a higher degree of care when acting for others. (*Baldwin vs. Bank*, 1 La. Ann. 13; *Bank vs. Howell*, 8 Md. 580; *Hyde vs. Bank*, 17 La. 560; *Tiernam vs. Bank*, 7 How. [Miss.] 648; *Bellemire vs. Bank*, 4 Whart. 105; *Britton vs. Nicolls*, 104 U. S. 766; *Warren Bank vs. Suffolk Bank*, 10 Cush. 582; *Stacy vs. Bank*, 12 Wis. 629; *May vs. Jones*, 88 Ga. 308, 14 S. E. 552; *Agricultural Bank vs. Commercial Bank*, 7 Smedes & M. 592; *Bank vs. Butler*, 41 Ohio St. 519; *Mechem, Ag.* § 514.)

While there is a conflict in opinion, the rule announced is sustained by the weight of authority and the better reason. (See collection of cases in 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 808, and note to *Isham vs. Post* [N. Y. App.] 38 Am. St. Rep. 775, 35 N. E. 1084); also *Allen vs. Bank* (22 Wend. 215).

The distinction between a foreign and an inland bill of exchange should not be overlooked. To charge the makers and indorsers, the former must be protected. Not so with the latter. All that is required is a demand, and, on refusal to pay, notice of dishonor, in order to fix liability of the indorsers of an inland bill; and these may be made and given by the holder, or any one acting in his behalf.

By the law merchant, giving notice of dishonor is no part of a notary's official duty, and when he does so he is merely acting as agent of the holder. (*Swoyze vs. Britton*, 17 Kan. 625; *Allen vs. Bank*, 22 Wend. 215; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 960.) But it is customary for him, in protesting a bill, to give the proper notice of dishonor. (Prof. Not. §§ 142, 143.) And in many of the States the law merchant is so modified that he is required to give notice. Formerly his certificate might not be received as proof of the protest of an inland bill. (*Case vs. Heffner*, 10 Ohio, 180.)

By Section 378 of the Code, "every notary public is required to keep a true record of all notices given or sent by him, with the time and manner in which the same were given or sent and the names of all the parties to whom the same were given or sent, with a copy of the instrument in relation to which the notice is served and of the notice itself."

Section 379 requires his record and official papers to be filed with the clerk of the court upon his death, resignation, or removal, and provides for certified copies. Very evidently this is for the purpose of perpetuating proof of the notice as well as of the demand and protest.

Section 8054 permits a notary "to inform the indorser or any party to be charged, if in the same town or township, by notice deposited in the nearest post office to

the parties to be charged, on the day of the demand, and no other notice shall be necessary to charge such party."

The advantage in having an inland bill protested by a notary, and notice given by him, is that the evidence is thus perpetuated; and notice to indorsers living in the same town or township may be given by mail, instead of personally.

These statutes clearly recognize giving notice as a part of the notary's official duty. Indeed, the term "protest" is ordinarily used as including the entire proceeding necessary to charge indorsers. Notaries are nearly always resorted to for this work, and the owner of the draft may assume to have intended this course to be pursued. As said in *Tiernam vs. Bank*: "No agent could have been selected with more propriety for the performance of this duty than one whose profession and office were calculated to fit him peculiarly for the discharge. They are almost universally resorted to for the purpose. We can not perceive, therefore, that the bank was wanting either in the degree of skill or diligence which is required under such circumstances to exempt an agent from liability." (*Baldwin vs. Bank*, 1 La. Ann. 13; *Hyde vs. Bank*, 17 La. 560; *Swedes vs. Bank*, 20 Johns. 384; *Bellemire vs. Bank*, 4 Whart. 105, 1 Miles, 173; *Bank vs. Howell*, supra; *Fisher vs. Bank*, 7 Blackf. 610; *Turner vs. Rogers*, 8 Ind. 139.) *Bank vs. Ober* (Kan. Sup.) 8 Pac. 324, is based on the finding that the statutes of Kansas do not authorize the notary to give notice.

Our conclusion rests on statutes allowing a notary, as such, to perform this duty. Surely, the bank acted prudently in intrusting to a public officer the doing of that which was incumbent on him as an officer of the law to do. Affirmed.

#### COMMERCIAL PAPER—PLACE OF PRESENTMENT—DILIGENCE REQUIRED.

Supreme Court of Iowa, January 31, 1896.

##### TREASE vs. HAGGIN.

Where no place of payment is specified in a promissory note, it should be presented at the maker's residence or place of business; and presentment at a former place of business is not sufficient.

If the maker's place of business or residence is not known, the holder must exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the same.

This was an action to charge the defendant as the indorser of a promissory note. Judgment below was in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

LADD, J. (omitting part of the opinion): This note, though payable at Union, Iowa, is not made payable at any particular place. Therefore, to charge the defendant on his indorsement, the plaintiff must show that on one of the days of grace he caused demand of payment to be legally made upon the makers of the note, or facts which will excuse such demand; that payment was not made; and that notice thereof was duly given to the makers and indorser of the note.

Defendant insists that the formalities necessary to make a legal protest were not observed. The notary's certificate shows that demand was made "to Alexander's Meat Market, Munns West's former place of business, and at the Citizens' Bank;" but, as the note was not payable at either place, these demands were insufficient. There was no demand made upon either of the makers of the note, and the contention is whether sufficient facts are shown to excuse the plaintiff from causing such demand to be made.

Defendant's counsel quote from Tied. Com. Paper, § 814, as follows:

"If the place of business cannot be found, or the maker or acceptor has no place for the transaction of financial matters, demand must be made at the residence; and, where the place of business has been abandoned, it will not be enough to make presentation at the old place of business. If the holder does not know where to

find the maker or acceptor, he must make the most diligent inquiry before dishonoring the paper by protest for non-payment; and he must pursue the inquiry as long as he does not obtain some definite information as to the whereabouts of the maker or acceptor."

Mr. Rodwell, to whom the making of demand was intrusted, testifies that he had resided in Union for twenty-two or twenty-three years; that he knew the Wests; that he understood that they had formerly been in business in that meat market, but that he did not know where their place of business or residence was when he made the protest. He made no inquiry whatever as to their whereabouts, but assumed that it was sufficient that he make demand at said market and bank. It is quite probable that inquiry would have disclosed to him the place of business and residence of these parties, but he made none, and, for aught that appears, they were then residents of Union.

Surely, there was not such diligence exercised as will excuse the making of demand, and therefore the judgment is reversed.

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*NATIONAL BANK—PURCHASE OF NOTES.*

Supreme Court of the United States, January 23, 1899.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GRAND FORKS vs. ANDERSON.

Where a National bank has itself purchased notes which the owner had authorized it to sell to a third party, it is liable for their value as for a conversion, even though it had not the power to act as the owner's agent for the sale thereof.

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In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action at law brought by Anderson against the First National Bank of Grand Forks, N. D., in the district court for the First Judicial District of North Dakota, to recover the balance of the value of certain notes belonging to Anderson, which he alleged the bank had converted.

The notes amounted to \$7,000, secured by mortgage, and had been indorsed, and the mortgage assigned to the bank as collateral security for a loan of \$2,000, and Anderson had authorized the bank to sell the notes to a third party, take up the loan, and remit the balance. But, instead of doing this, the bank, according to Anderson, had undertaken to purchase the notes itself, and had not accounted for their value.

The cause was tried four times, and four times carried to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. (4 N. D. 132, 59 N. W. 1029; 5 N. D. 80, 64 N. W. 114; 5 N. D. 451, 67 N. W. 821; 6 N. D. 497, 72 N. W. 916.) On the fourth appeal a judgment in favor of Anderson was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and this writ of error to revise it was allowed, which defendant in error now moves to dismiss, or, if that motion is not sustained, that the judgment be affirmed.

By exceptions to the admission of certain testimony taken on the trial, and by the assignment of errors in the Supreme Court, plaintiff in error raised the point that, under the statutes of the United States in respect of National banks, it was not within its power to become the agent of defendant in error to sell the notes in question to a third person, and not within the power of its Cashier, who conducted the transaction, to bind the bank by such contract of agency.

On the third appeal (5 N. D. 451, 67 N. W. 821), the Supreme Court ruled that "when a National bank holds notes of its debtor as collateral to his indebtedness to the bank, it may lawfully act as agent for him in the sale of such notes to a third person, such agency being merely incidental to the exercise of its conceded power to collect the claim out of such collateral notes;" but, further, that, even though the act of agency were *ultra vires*, yet, if the bank, instead of selling the notes to a

third person, had, without the owner's knowledge, sold them to itself, it would be guilty of conversion, and could be held responsible therefor. As to the Cashier, the court held that, on the pleadings and facts in the case, his act was the act of the bank.

The Supreme Court, in its opinion on the fourth appeal (6 N. D. 497, 509, 72 N. W. 916), among other things, said: "The question of *ultra vires* has been already discussed in a previous opinion. (See 5 N. D. 451, 67 N. W. 821.) We have nothing to add on that point.

The recent decision of the Federal Supreme Court cited by counsel for appellant (*Bank vs. Kennedy*, 167 U. S. 862) does not appear to us to call for any change of our former ruling on this question. What we said in our opinion on the third appeal, on the subject of the authority of the Cashier to bind the defendant by creating the relation of principal and agent between plaintiff and defendant, is still applicable to the case on the record now before us. In its answer and the brief of its counsel, the defendant admits that the writing of the letters referred to was its act, and not the act of an unauthorized agent. By its own pleading and admissions, it has precluded itself from raising the point that the Cashier had no power to bind it, by agreeing that the bank would act as agent for the plaintiff."

The argument urged in support of the motion to dismiss is, principally, that the judgment of the State Supreme Court rested on two grounds, one of which, broad enough in itself to sustain the judgment, involved no Federal question.

This contention is so far justified as to give color to the motion, although, under our decision in *Bank vs. Townsend* (189 U. S. 67), we must decline to sustain it, while, at the same time, that case affords sufficient authority, if authority were needed, for an affirmation of the judgment.

There, bonds had been sold and delivered to a National bank at a certain price, under an agreement that the bank would, on demand, replace them at that or a less price, and the bank had refused compliance. In an action against the bank, its defense was, in part, that, by reason of want of authority to make the alleged agreement and purchase, it could not be held liable for the bonds, on any ground whatever. It was decided, however, that the National Banking Act did not give a National bank an absolute right to retain bonds coming into its possession by purchase under a contract which it was without legal authority to make, and that, although the bank was not bound to surrender possession of them until reimbursed to the full amount due to it, and might hold them as security for the return of the consideration paid, yet that, when such amount was returned, or tendered back to it, and the return of the bonds demanded, its authority to retain them no longer existed, and, from the time of such demand and its refusal to surrender the bonds to the vendor or owner, it became liable for their value, on grounds of implied contract, apart from the original agreement under which it obtained them.

Here, the bank was found to have itself purchased notes which the owner had authorized it to sell to a third party, and, on general principles of law, it was held liable for their value as for a conversion, even though it was not within its powers to sell them as the owner's agent.

We are of opinion that the Supreme Court of North Dakota committed no error in the disposition of any Federal question, and its judgment is affirmed.

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**NATIONAL BANK—LEVY OF EXECUTION ON ASSETS.**

United States Circuit Court, S. D. New York, October 31, 1898.

KIMBALL vs. DUNN.

The tangible assets of a National bank are not exempt from levy under execution upon final judgment until a Receiver is appointed.

A bank examiner in charge of a bank is not a temporary Receiver.

This was a suit in equity by William H. Kimball, as examiner in charge of a National bank, against Thomas J. Dunn and others, to enjoin the levying of an execution on the property of the bank. The cause was heard on a motion for a preliminary injunction.

LACOMBE, *Circuit Judge*: The statutes provide for the appointment of a Receiver of a National bank. (Rev. St. U. S. §5234.) But it appears that in the cause at bar no Receiver has yet been appointed. I am unable to assent to the proposition that because the Comptroller of the Currency, in conformity to the provision of Section 5240, has appointed plaintiff as a suitable person to make an examination of the affairs of the bank, plaintiff thereby became a temporary Receiver. Until the Comptroller decides to put the bank into the hands of a Receiver, under Section 5234, there is nothing in the statutes to support the contention that its tangible assets are exempt from levy under execution upon final judgment. Section 5242, by its terms, applies apparently only to "attachment, injunction, and execution \* \* \* before final judgment." Motion denied.

**PROMISSORY NOTES—STRANGERS PLACING THEIR NAMES ON.**

Court of Appeals of Colorado, December 2, 1898.

BYERS vs. FRITCH.

Strangers to negotiable paper, who place their names on the back thereof before delivery, become liable as joint makers.\*

This was an action against William N. Byers and others, as co-makers of a note originally made by the Denver Hardware Company to the plaintiff, and indorsed by defendants before delivery.

BISSELL, *J.* (omitting other parts of the opinion): Although it is suggested by the defendant's counsel that he is unadvised that the question has been settled by the appellate courts, it has been our opinion ever since the case of *Good vs. Martin* was decided by the supreme court of the territory in 1873, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1877, that the liability and status of strangers to negotiable paper, who put their names on the back of it prior to its delivery to the payee, or to a *bona fide* holder, was not an open question. As we understand it, that case decides that thereby they in law assume the position of joint makers, subject to all the responsibilities attaching to that position, and, under the Code, may be sued either jointly or severally with the co-maker. (*Good vs. Martin*, 2 Colo. 218; *Id.*, 95 U. S. 90.)

**NATIONAL BANKS—JURISDICTION.**

Supreme Court of Vermont, October 2, 1898.

HAZEN, *et al.* vs. LYNDONVILLE NATIONAL BANK.

For jurisdictional purposes a National bank is to be regarded as a citizen of the State where it is located.

This was a bill in equity against the Lyndonville National Bank and others.

THOMPSON, *J.* (omitting part of the opinion): At the time of the bringing of this suit, the individual defendants were the officers of the defendant the Lyndonville

\* This rule has been changed by the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provides:

"Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in accordance with the following rules:

1. If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties.

2. If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer.

3. If he signs for the accommodation of the payee, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee."

National Bank, and were such officers to and including the time of the sale of the notes to McMillan; and during all that time they and the orators were, and now are, resident citizens of Vermont. The Lyndonville National Bank is a National bank, located and doing business at Lyndonville in this State, and, for the purposes of this suit, is to be considered a citizen of Vermont. (25 Stat. 433; *Petri vs. Bank*, 142 U. S. 644, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325.)

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SPANISH FORK, Utah, February 11, 1899.

SIR: Kindly publish answer to the following three questions:

(1) A and B are partners in business; A endorses papers for C. Does this indorsement hold B in common with A?

(2) Can A take benefit of bankruptcy law while the partnership continues without B going into bankruptcy also?

(3) Is an involuntary bankrupt as well as voluntary bankrupt discharged from his debts after his estate has been divided among his creditors?

*Answer.*—(1) No. The indorsement is binding on A individually, and not upon the firm; and a judgment obtained upon such an indorsement would not be enforceable against the individual property of B, or against his interest in the firm's assets. In equity, however, it could be enforced against the assets of the firm, if the indorsement was made for the benefit of the firm. (2) If the firm itself is solvent, A could go into bankruptcy without B doing so. But the bankruptcy would terminate the partnership; and his interest in the firm's assets (after the payment of the firm's creditors) would be taken for distribution among his creditors. (3) Yes.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

—, Ohio, February 14, 1899.

SIR: I am a bookkeeper in the — Bank. Can I as a notary public protest paper which this bank may have, according to law?

BOOKKEEPER.

*Answer.*—It has been held in a number of cases that a Cashier may protest paper for his bank, even though the paper belongs to the bank (*Nelson vs. First National Bank*, 69 Fed. Rep. 798; *Dykman vs. Northridge*, 1 App. Div. [N. Y.] 26), and although he is also a stockholder in the bank (*Moreland's Assignee vs. Citizens' Savings Bank* [Ky.] 30 S. W. Rep. 19). There appears to be no reason therefore, why a bookkeeper of the bank may not act as its notary. The fact that the notary is an officer or employee of the bank does not render the bank liable for his negligent performance of his duties as notary. (See *First National Bank, of Manning, vs. German Bank, of Carroll County*, reported in this number of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.)

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

DOVER PLAINS, N. Y., February 17, 1899.

SIR: Will you kindly inform me if the renewal of a note which falls due on Sunday is valid by having the said renewal dated on Sunday, so as to have the dates run consecutively, or if said renewal should bear the date of the Saturday preceding or the Monday following?

R. P. KETCHAM, Cashier.

*Answer.*—The making and delivery of a promissory notes does not appear to be within the Sunday laws of this State; and hence it is within the rule of the common law that contracts made on Sunday are valid. But even in those States where contracts of this kind are void when made on Sunday, it is held that if the note is delivered on some other day, the fact that it is dated on Sunday does not invalidate it. (*Stacy vs. Kemp*, 92 Mass. 166; *Hill vs. Dunham*, 7 Gray, 543; *Hilton vs. Houghton*, 85 Me. 143; *Lovejoy vs. Whipple*, 18 Vt. 379; *Clough vs. Davis*, 9 N. H. 500.) Under this rule, if the renewal actually takes place on Saturday or Monday, it is immaterial that the note is dated on Sunday.

\* HON. LYMAN J. GAGE.

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, was born in DeRuyter, Madison county, N. Y., June 28, 1836. He is descended from Thomas Gage, who came to Yarmouth, Cape Cod, from England, about 1640. Descendants of the latter settled in Dutchess and Madison counties, New York. The father of Lyman J. Gage lived for a time in Rome, Oneida county, New York, where he engaged in commercial business. His son received a common-school education in his native county, Madison, and upon the removal of his father to Oneida county, he had for a short time the advantages of Rome Academy.

Upon the removal of his father to Chicago in 1855, he entered, in a subordinate position, a banking institution of that city. He rose rapidly through the various grades until in 1868 he became Cashier of the First National Bank of Chicago, and, in 1882 its President, as in fact, he had been its manager for many years. The growth of this remarkable financial concern is a part of the life of Mr. Gage. Under his guidance it not only survived several trying periods in the history of the growing city, but it came to be a leading and at times the most powerful bank in the United States. It was one of the institutions to survive the crises of the fire of 1871, and the panic, no less destructive of values, of 1878. In those days of wrecks it stood as an example to other banks, and by its moral influence sustained several which would otherwise have gone to the wall.

Mr. Gage has been prominently identified with the municipal growth of Chicago. The growth of that city from sixty thousand to nearly two millions of people gave full employment to his energies, both in relation to the many social and economic problems incidental to such development, and to the enormous expansion of business affairs of the bank to which he was related. He has always avoided politics, and although actively participating in municipal affairs, would never consent to take public office until he became Secretary of the Treasury.

There is scarcely any stage of development in the city's growth where his influence has not been felt. He was the first President of the Civic Federation of Chicago, a large organization composed of citizens representing all classes and creeds. He was Chairman of the Finance Committee which succeeded in raising by voluntary subscriptions between five and six millions of dollars, looking to the holding of the World's Columbian Exposition at Chicago. Upon the organization of the board of forty-five directors of that exposition, he was unanimously chosen President, and by his energy, patience, skill and tact, carried the undertaking over the most trying period of its history.

He organized the Chicago Clearing-House Association, was its President for a number of years, and always a member of the Executive Committee. He has three times been President of the American Bankers' Association, and President of the Commercial Club of Chicago, a strong organization, limited in number to sixty, and composed only of representative business men. In Chicago he organized the Economic Conferences, and was their leading spirit. At these conferences were

\* A portrait of Secretary Gage, engraved from a recent photograph especially for the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, is presented in this number as a title illustration.



brought together all classes of citizens to discuss in a friendly manner each other's wrongs, and together consider the remedy.

He has contributed much by his pen to the public causes in which he has been interested. When in the early seventies the growth of the greenback movement became pronounced, he was active in organizing an Honest Money League, which began a campaign of education against the rapidly spreading movement for a permanent paper currency. As a writer his style is noted for its simplicity. He is convincing because he writes with full knowledge of his subjects.

His addresses and official reports are characterized by clear analysis and lucid statement of the truth. Sincerity and candor are evident in all his utterances. The address delivered before the recent meeting of the Virginia Bankers' Association, which will be found elsewhere in this issue, illustrates the clearness of his perception of the fundamental principles of currency and banking, and presents the subject of banking reform in a light that must command the consideration of all thoughtful men. His knowledge of men and affairs and thorough familiarity with the question, gained by long study and large experience, give an especial value to whatever he may say. That his suggestions, if given legal effect, would promote the welfare of the people and bring a greater measure of prosperity to business and industry of every kind, can not be doubted. When our currency and banking laws are remodelled in the light of wisdom and experience, as they will be when the present heated controversy and attendant prejudices shall give place to patient consideration and enlightened judgment, the views advanced by Secretary Gage will unquestionably prevail.

Mr. Gage has been at the head of the Treasury Department for two years, his term covering a period of unusual responsibility owing to the large disbursements on account of the war. That he has met the requirements of his high office even political opponents can not deny.

On all matters affecting the public credit or concerning the stability of our monetary standard his views are openly declared. His record in business life and as a public official forms a basis for the confidence his countrymen have in his integrity and ability. That trust is well bestowed. The Treasury could be in no safer hands.

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SOME FINANCIAL OPINIONS.—Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency in the last Congress, made a speech in the House on February 14, his subject being "United States Treasury and Banking and Currency Problems." In the course of his remarks he said :

"Our free banking law, allowing any five reputable citizens anywhere to form a bank by getting together the required capital, will never be abandoned, nor need it be.

A system individual as to each bank, but united into one solid structure for all purposes where union is necessary, will give us a banking and currency system much superior to the banking and currency system of France, as our institutions are on a more solid foundation.

All human experience proves :

First. That it is not possible to have a sound banking and currency system in this country, as there never has been in any other, while it is not complete in itself. It must be wholly separated from any organic connection with the Government Treasury, as is that of France, Germany, England, and every other first-class country, the United States alone excepted.

Second. That it is not possible to maintain the parity between paper money and gold where a multitude of independent banks exist, excepting by restricting the legal-tender coin to gold alone, as in England.

Third. That where there are two or more kinds of legal-tender money, each differing widely from the others in intrinsic values as paper, silver, and gold, it is impossible to maintain parity without making a union of all banks sufficiently solid to make each one and all equally responsible for maintaining the parity of all moneys in circulation and practically making all banks act together as one for maintaining parity, as in France, Germany, etc.

Nearly every government has tried the banking and currency experiment the United States is now trying, and everyone trying it has miserably failed.

Up to 1863 it was the fashion to pronounce the financial and banking system of the United States the best the sun ever shone upon. To-day there is scarcely a man in the country who has any interest in questions pertaining to economics, if there is even one, who is not demanding its immediate reform."

## NEW YORK'S YOUNGEST BANK PRESIDENT.

Without at all discounting the value of experience and with no disposition to question the commonly-accepted belief that sound judgment is developed as the years of life go by, it may be said that the wisdom and conservatism requisite to successful bank management are to-day possessed by many young men. This is especially so in New York city, where in numerous instances the active management of important banks has been placed in the hands of young men and almost always with good results. They have rarely proved deficient in the exercise of discretionary powers, and have added new energy when placed in active control.

A bank like a manufacturer will use the machinery best suited to produce results, and if the requirements of modern business life call for those who are active and vigorous, it need not excite surprise or alarm. It is fortunate that there are so many young men of proper training to assume the responsibilities of bank management.

Nothing here said is designed to uphold the unceremonious thrusting aside of old and faithful officers and employees. The requirements of justice should be observed by a bank in dealing with its employees as well as with its customers.

The youngest bank President in New York, alluded to at the head of this sketch, was advanced to the chief executive position through the regular steps of Assistant Cashier, Cashier and Vice-President.

At a meeting of the board of directors of Hamilton Bank of New York City, held January 12, Edwin S. Schenck, who has been Vice-President and Cashier, was unanimously elected President, to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement of William S. Gray, who resigned to give personal attention to his private business interests.

Mr. Schenck is of Dutch descent, and traces his ancestry back, on his mother's side, to the ninth century, through Madame Brett, who received a grant of land in a part of which is located the village of Fishkill, N. Y., and, on his father's side, to the year 1225. His great great grandfather, Johannes Schenck, came to New York from Holland in 1683.

Mr. Schenck is the youngest bank President in New York, and belongs to a family of bankers. His father, Oscar Schenck, was a banker, and his three brothers are, or have been, bankers. One, Frederick B. Schenck, is President of the Mercantile National Bank; another, Henry A. Schenck, is comptroller of the Bowery Savings Bank, and another, Charles N. Schenck, was for many years a clerk in the Chemical National Bank, and now is confidential man with the estate of Robert and Ogden Goelet.

Edwin S. Schenck was born in Brooklyn in 1867, and graduated from the public schools at the age of fifteen. He then engaged in various business enterprises, and in 1892, soon after the consolidation of the Hamilton Bank and the Bank of Harlem, he entered the institution as Assistant Cashier, being rapidly promoted to the positions of Cashier and Vice-President. Mr. Schenck has been a member of the Harlem Club for a number of years, and was recently elected the treasurer of the club.

The Hamilton Bank is located in the uptown district, on 125th street, and its business is chiefly local. It has \$200,000 capital, \$85,000 surplus and profits and about \$1,500,000 deposits. The bank is a designated depository of New York State and city. Officers are: President, Edwin S. Schenck; Vice-President, Frederick B. Schenck (also President of the Mercantile National Bank); Cashier, Jesse C. Joy. Its board of directors comprise many well known business men and capitalists.

Since he is of good banking stock, and having had no inconsiderable training in bank work and management, the patrons of the bank will be justified in expecting the new President to keep the bank upon a high plane of management.



*Edmund*

is a credit of your discerning the value of a well-managed institution. It is a credit to your good judgment, which is the sound foundation of every business. It is a credit to your sagacity, which is the vital force of every enterprise. It is a credit to your courage, which is the lifeblood of every venture. It is a credit to your wisdom, which is the crown of every achievement. It is a credit to your integrity, which is the cornerstone of every edifice. It is a credit to your industry, which is the engine of every progress. It is a credit to your perseverance, which is the key to every success. It is a credit to your faith, which is the anchor of every hope. It is a credit to your love, which is the light of every path. It is a credit to your respect, which is the oil of every wheel. It is a credit to your kindness, which is the glue of every bond. It is a credit to your justice, which is the scale of every balance. It is a credit to your truth, which is the sword of every right. It is a credit to your honor, which is the shield of every virtue. It is a credit to your glory, which is the crown of every kingdom. It is a credit to your power, which is the scepter of every empire. It is a credit to your wisdom, which is the crown of every achievement.

Mr. Schenck is a well-known banker. He has been successful in his career, and has a reputation for his sound judgment and his sagacity. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Hamilton Bank of New York for many years, and has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Hamilton Bank of New York for many years. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Hamilton Bank of New York for many years, and has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Hamilton Bank of New York for many years.

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
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Mr. Schenck is the youngest bank President in New York, and he is a well-known banker. His father, Oscar Schenck, was a banker, and his father's father, Oscar Schenck, was a banker. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Hamilton Bank of New York for many years, and has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Hamilton Bank of New York for many years.

Mr. Schenck was born in Brooklyn in 1861, and graduated from the University of the City of New York in 1881. He then engaged in various business enterprises, and in 1892, soon after the consolidation of the Hamilton Bank, and the Bank of New York, he entered the institution as Assistant Cashier, being rapidly promoted to the positions of Cashier and Vice-President. Mr. Schenck has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Hamilton Bank for a number of years, and was recently elected to the office of President.

The Hamilton Bank is located in the upper part of the City of New York, and its business is greatly increased. It has a capital of \$5,000,000, and a surplus of \$1,500,000. The bank is a depository of the State of New York, and is a member of the Federal Reserve System. Its officers are: President, Elmer S. Schenck; Vice-President, Charles Schenck; also President of the Mercantile National Bank, Charles Schenck.

Its board of directors comprise many well-known business men, and its officers are all men of good banking stock, and having had no inconsiderable experience in the banking business. The patrons of the bank will be justified in expecting a new President to keep the bank upon a high plane of management.



*E. Schenck*



100



*Isaac Newton Seligman*



## NEWTON HILL

NEW YORK, 1911.

Newton Hill is a prominent figure in the financial and industrial circles of New York City. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the City of New York, and has held various positions of trust and responsibility in the city's government and business community. His work has been instrumental in the development of the city's infrastructure and the promotion of its economic growth. He is also a member of several prominent clubs and societies, and is highly respected for his leadership and integrity.

Newton Hill was born in New York City on September 15, 1854. He is the son of a prominent family and received a liberal education at the City University of New York. He studied law and was admitted to the bar in 1878. He has since been engaged in various business and financial enterprises, and has been successful in many of his ventures. He is also a member of the New York State Bar Association and the New York State Chamber of Commerce. He is a member of the City of New York Board of Directors, and has served in various capacities in the city's government. He is also a member of several prominent clubs and societies, and is highly respected for his leadership and integrity.

Mr. Hill has been successful in many of his ventures, and has been instrumental in the development of the city's infrastructure and the promotion of its economic growth. He is also a member of several prominent clubs and societies, and is highly respected for his leadership and integrity.

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Mr. Hill is a member of the Board of Directors of the City of New York, and has held various positions of trust and responsibility in the city's government and business community. His work has been instrumental in the development of the city's infrastructure and the promotion of its economic growth. He is also a member of several prominent clubs and societies, and is highly respected for his leadership and integrity.



*Leve Norton Kellogg*

## ISAAC NEWTON SELIGMAN.

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The private banking firms in New York city include some of the largest banking houses in the country. Their operations extend beyond the range of ordinary commercial banking, and embrace fiscal transactions of the largest magnitude. They are chiefly instrumental in placing the great Government loans, in reorganizing railway corporations and promoting the inauguration of new enterprises requiring vast amounts of capital. No estimate of the city's financial power would be complete that failed to take these private bankers into account, for they constitute one of the most important elements of that power. Numbered among them are many names that stand for financial capacity the world over. The firm to which the subject of this sketch belongs may be justly assigned to that rank. Few names are more widely known or more highly regarded in the financial world than that of Seligman.

Isaac Newton Seligman, now recognized as the head of the firm of J. & W. Seligman & Co., New York city, was born on Staten Island, Richmond county, N. Y. (now a part of New York city), in 1856. His father was Joseph Seligman, founder of the firm; his mother's maiden name was Babette Steinhart. He was educated at Columbia Grammar School, in New York city, and at Columbia College, from which he graduated with honors in 1876. To his scholastic acquirements Mr. Seligman added prowess in athletic sports, having been a member of the winning crew at the Saratoga boat races in 1874.

Mr. Seligman's connection with the firm dates from 1878, and on the death of his father, in 1881, he became the active and prominent member.

As before mentioned, the firm is one of the foremost of those identified with American and international banking, being the fiscal agents of the United States Navy and State Departments, and in connection with the Rothschilds in Europe have been influential in placing all the important Government loans here and abroad.

The firm has branches throughout the world, its representatives being Messrs. Seligman Brothers, London; Seligman, Frères et Cie, Paris; Seligman & Stettinheimer, Frankfort; Alsberg, Goldberg & Co., Amsterdam; Anglo-Californian Bank, Ltd., San Francisco.

To enumerate even some of the more prominent fiscal operations of the firm would require space beyond the limits of this sketch. One of the last important ones, however, may be mentioned. This was the successful negotiations for launching the American Steel and Wire Company, having \$90,000,000 capital stock. The securities are now selling at about par for the preferred shares and sixty for the common. Considering that the common shares were given as a bonus to the preferred stock subscribers, the profit on the syndicate has been phenomenal.

Besides his banking connections Mr. Seligman is prominently identified with many other business and philanthropic enterprises, and holds a number of positions of trust. He is a director in numerous railway companies, trustee of the Munich Fire Insurance Co., chairman of the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Reorganization Committee, trustee of new United Hebrew Charity, Academy of Design, etc., etc.; a director of Gen. Grant Tomb Committee, member of the Committee of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, a director of the City and

Suburban Homes Co., an organization formed for the purpose of providing suitable dwelling-houses at moderate rentals.

Gov. Morton appointed Mr. Seligman a trustee of the Manhattan State Hospital, having charge of all the insane in Greater New York; was appointed by President Low a trustee of Columbia University Memorial Hall; appointed by Gen. Horace Porter as chief of staff at President McKinley's inaugural. He is a member of the University Club, Lotos Club, Arts Club, Botanical Gardens, Sound Money League, and the Finance Committee of the Republican National Committee, Trustee of the New York Oratorio Society, Trustee of the Soldiers and Sailors' Home Protective Association, and a member of the New York Historical Society.

Mr. Seligman was married in 1883 to Guta Loeb, daughter of Solomon Loeb, of the banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. They have two children, Joseph L. and Margaret V. Seligman.

Prof. E. R. L. Seligman, who occupies the chair of political economy in Columbia University, New York city, is the younger brother of Mr. Isaac N. Seligman.

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**TO CONSIDER CURRENCY REFORM.**—Though the Fifty-fifth Congress, which expired by limitation on March 4, did not take any action on the various plans proposed for reforming the currency and banking system of the country, a joint committee representing both the Senate and House was appointed to study the question during the recess and report to Congress when it again assembles. Every section of the country is represented on the Committee of Sixteen, the personnel of which is as follows: Representatives Henderson, of Iowa; Dalzell, of Pennsylvania; Payne, of New York; Overstreet, of Indiana; Curtis, of Kansas; Lovering, of Massachusetts; Morris, of Minnesota; Loud, of California; Babcock, of Wisconsin; Hawley, of Texas, and Kerr, of Ohio; and Senators Allison, of Iowa; Aldrich, of Rhode Island; Platt, of Connecticut; Wolcott, of Colorado; Burrows, of Michigan, and Platt, of New York.

The Senate will be represented by the Republican members of the Finance Committee, and the House by a special committee appointed by the Republican caucus. It is apparent, therefore, that the question of currency legislation is to be taken up by the party at present in power.

It is said that the committee will earnestly consider the question and endeavor to agree in reporting some conservative measure to Congress. There is a general belief that if the party leaders agree upon a bill it can easily be passed.

The need of some kind of currency reform is becoming recognized in Congress, but the difficulty has been to secure concentration on some particular measure. It is the belief that the present committee will be able to take up the subject free from the bias which has hitherto characterized some of the attempts to secure legislation, and which has resulted in a general disagreement. In view of the many important matters likely to engage the next session, it is thought that Congress may be called together in October, and to be prepared for this event the committee will begin its sessions in a short time and not adjourn until its work is finished.

It is asserted by those who have observed the course of opinion on the subject that the measure proposed by Mr. Hill, of Connecticut, and explained in the February *MAGAZINE*, may be made the basis of the committee's recommendations.

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**A Great Magazine.**—THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE AND RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING is full of banking and commercial reports of value. It is a great magazine.—*Salt Lake City (Utah) Tribune.*

**One of the Best.**—J. A. Sutton, teller in the Berlin Heights (Ohio) Banking Co., writes: "Enclosed find certified check to your order. I consider THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE one of the best bankers' publications published."





Thos. G. Watty

## THOMAS L. WATT.

The great and rapid development of that part of New York City lying to the north of Central Park has, perhaps, been recorded in the history of modern times. Considered within this growth a number of banks have arisen and many of these outposts of their business has become of such magnitude as to attract the attention of the downtown banks, many of which are acquiring control of uptown banks for the purpose of controlling them as branches of as closely affiliated institutions. A continued northward march of business has been going on for many years, and is likely to be arrested or even with the deflection of a considerable part of the population eastward consequent upon the construction of more buildings to the eastward.

There are few more interesting studies in the business world than those that apply to the money to be concentrated in a certain particular municipality, and especially in a certain business. Each trade has its own special localities, and there is a certain amount of frequent change, but the concentration is a well preserved characteristic of the locality. The banking business has ceased to be a general one, and has become a local one, and the vicinity of Wall Street may be expected to continue to be for many years the seat of the banking business—especially of those banks that do not seem to get out of town business. But keeping in mind the ordinary disposition of the city to pull nearly every class of business in New York, it would not be altogether safe to predict that in the course of time, perhaps in the near future, Wall Street will be the seat of the money power, may exist only in memory and in history. But there are many banks in various districts of the city doing a large and profitable business, chiefly local, but, perhaps, subject to so much competition as the larger banks have to encounter. That the better institutions are alive to the possibilities of this banking field is indicated by their recent activity in obtaining a foothold there.

The Mount Morris Bank, at 125th Street and Park Avenue, is one of the prominent banks uptown, its President, being the subject of this sketch, and the success of the bank has been largely promoted by his wealth, energy, and capacity for energetic administration. Before his election as President Mr. Watt had demonstrated his ability and fitness to conduct the affairs of the bank, and his successful administration has justified the wisdom of his selection to the position. Mr. Watt's ancestors were among the earliest white settlers of Manhattan Island, and he occupies a prominent social position. He is fitted for the office he occupies by his education and training, and his natural temperament. He is capable of executing the business requisite to proper bank management without sacrificing the requirements of courtesy.

Recently a large interest in the Mount Morris Bank was acquired by the National Park Bank, one of the very large banks of the country, and one possessing an exceptionally strong board of directors. This will not involve any material change in the management. Mr. Watt will continue as President, and with exception to Mount and his associates will hold as heretofore a large interest in the bank. In acquiring an interest in a bank uptown the National Park is pursuing a policy which is becoming a marked feature of present banking developments in New York. Its effect will be, in this case, to add to the prestige of the Mount Morris Bank.

Devoted primarily to his bank, Mr. Watt is fond of recreation, is an enthusiastic gamester, and a successful and expert exhibitor of Shetland ponies, having won many prizes and awards for his bays at the Horse Show.

The Mount Morris Bank has \$250,000 capital, \$150,000 surplus and profits and about \$2,000,000 deposits. Although the bank is situated in an important and busy district of the city, these figures do not, of course, compare in magnitude with the city banks doing a large out-of-town business, but they are of no mean proportions, and under the capable and energetic management of President Watt they may be expected to grow steadily with the accession of new interests as already noted and the further development of the northern part of the city.



Thos. G. Watty,



## THOMAS L. WATT.

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The great and rapid development of that part of New York city lying to the north of Central Park has, perhaps, had no parallel in the history of modern cities. Coincident with this growth a number of banks have arisen and have flourished, and of late their business has become of such magnitude as to attract the attention of the downtown banks, many of which are acquiring control of uptown banks for the purpose of conducting them as branches or as closely-affiliated institutions. A continued northward march of business has been going on for many years, nor is it likely to be arrested even with the deflection of a considerable part of the population eastward consequent upon the construction of more bridges across the East River.

There are few more interesting studies in the business life of New York than the tendency to concentration in a certain quarter manifested by almost every kind of business. Each trade has its own special locality, and though the location may be frequently changed, the concentration is always preserved. With its traditional conservatism the banking business has refused to be dislodged from its ancient situation, and the vicinity of Wall Street may be expected to continue for many years the seat of the banking business—especially of those banks that do both a local and out-of-town business. But keeping in mind the migratory disposition hitherto shown by nearly every class of business in New York, it would not be altogether rash to predict that in the course of time, perhaps in the near future, Wall Street as the seat of the "money power" may exist only in memory and in history. But there are many banks in various districts of the city doing a large and profitable business, chiefly local, not, perhaps, subject to so much competition as the larger banks have to encounter. That the latter institutions are alive to the possibilities of this banking field is indicated by their recent activity in obtaining a foothold there.

The Mount Morris Bank, at 125th street and Park avenue, is one of the prominent banks uptown, its President being the subject of this sketch, and the success of the bank has been largely promoted by his wealth, energy and capacity for financial administration. Before his election as President Mr. Watt had demonstrated his ability and fitness to conduct the affairs of the bank, and his successful management has justified the wisdom of his election to the position. Mr. Watt's ancestors were among the earliest white settlers of Manhattan Island, and he maintains a distinguished social position. He is fitted for the office he occupies by his birth, education and training, and his natural temperament. He is capable of exercising the firmness requisite to proper bank management without sacrificing the requirements of courtesy.

Recently a large interest in the Mount Morris Bank was acquired by the National Park Bank, one of the very large banks of the country, and one possessing an exceptionally strong board of directors. This will not involve any material change in the management: Mr. Watt will continue as President, and with ex-Governor Morton and his associates will hold as heretofore a large interest in the bank. In acquiring an interest in a bank uptown the National Park is pursuing a policy which is becoming a marked feature of present banking developments in New York. Its effect will be, in this case, to add to the prestige of the Mount Morris Bank.

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## HENRY SELIGMAN.

The distinguished banking firm of which the above-named gentleman is a leading and active member is referred to elsewhere in this number of the *MAGAZINE*. What is said there need not be repeated here; besides, the standing of the house is so well known, both in the United States and abroad, that no extended history is necessary to establish a reputation that is already beyond question.

It is not amiss, however, again to allude to the important assistance the firm lent to the Government in sustaining the public credit at a time when such assistance was greatly needed. Nations as well as corporations and individuals often find it advisable to avail themselves of the services of banking firms of large capacity for effecting financial transactions of great magnitude, and the Messrs. J. & W. Seligman & Co. belong to a class of houses which are having a strong influence in raising New York to the dignity of one of the great money centers of the world.

Henry Seligman, son of Jesse Seligman and Henrietta (Hellman) Seligman, is a native of California, having been born at San Francisco, March 31, 1857. He was educated at Charlier Institute and the New York University, graduating from the latter institution in June, 1875. In the same year he went to San Francisco and entered the Anglo-Californian Bank. Circumstances of birth or of fortune did not secure for him any favored position, but like many other young men who to-day occupy a high station in the banking world, he began at the foot of the ladder. In five years he worked his way up from office boy to Assistant Cashier; at the end of this time, in 1875, he located in New York, entering the firm of J. & W. Seligman & Co., and since then he has had a very active share in the management of the extensive business, especially since the death of his father.

In addition to his banking interests Mr. Seligman is chairman of the executive committee of the United States Smelting and Refining Co. and also a director. He is likewise a director in the following well-known corporations: American Steel and Wire Co., Syracuse Gas Co., Buffalo Gas Co., Cramp Ship and Engine Co., and the Welsbach Commercial Co.


These vast business affairs naturally call for close attention, but they are not allowed to exclude Mr. Seligman from participating fully in the social enjoyments of life. He belongs to a number of the leading social organizations of the city, including the Lotos Club, Lawyers' Club, Criterion Club, Country Club, Hollywood Golf Club, and the Zeta Psi College Society. Doubtless his social ties will be increased and strengthened by his recent marriage to Mrs. Addie Walter Seligman, an event which took place on March 11.

By his birth and education and the thorough practical financial knowledge gained in twenty-two years of active service in the banking business, Mr. Henry Seligman is adequately equipped to assist in maintaining and increasing the reputation for financial skill and probity which has been the especial pride of the house through its long and prosperous career.

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**POPULAR IN THE SOUTH.**—Wm. Powell, Cashier of the Bank of Culloden, Ga., writes: "I inclose draft for \$5. Could not think of running a bank without the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*."

**LIKES THE *MAGAZINE*.**—J. F. Johnson, President of the Bank of Greenville, Ala., in ordering a copy of *PATTEN'S PRACTICAL BANKING* recently, writes as follows: "We like the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* very much."



Henry Seligman






*Henry Seligman*







*William R. Weeks.*



## WILLIAM RAYMOND WEEKS.

of the most desirable conditions for Cuba and Porto Rico. It is the most important business enterprise of the present generation. I war for a number of years past a number of opportunities for explaining the riches and poverty of the territories. Most of the ground available for agriculture is known of the actualities and possibilities. It is the opportunity for successful business enterprise.

It is the opportunity for the interested in agriculture and for the people who will resume their usual vocations, it is the opportunity for all the nations needed to reconstruct the markets of a continually augmenting population. It is the opportunity for all these various projects, as well as for the property are it is. Political departments are the opportunity for outside capital. Whatever may be the result, it may be secured with safety and ease. It is the opportunity for an end. Not only will the political functions of government by a people, but every kind of business and the most important business of civilization.

It is the opportunity for American capital to be used to secure the business of the United States and to be used to secure the business of the United States and to be used to secure the business of the United States. It is the opportunity for the relations between the two countries to be very close, besides, the island is so near to our shores that it can hardly be considered as foreign.

It is the opportunity for the people from war to be secured by the development of the country consequent upon the reconstruction of the country, almost makes Cuba a new bank of account. It is the opportunity for the banking business to be very large and to perform ordinary banking functions, but which are prominent in the special circumstances in which the business interests of the country are concerned.

It is the opportunity for the bank of Cuba was organized to meet this demand. It is an institution that is similar to that of the Credit Foncier of Paris, being a bank of the kind of Germany and that of the Mexican Mortgage Bank. There is a bank of the kind of Cuba, and for this reason, though the banking business is a conservative plan, it is likely to be very large and to be very profitable. The Cuban sugar and tobacco planters will need help after the war. They will require money, and credit to buy over a machinery and to buy the necessary during the cultivation of their crops and before they can be marketed. American merchants and manufacturers will want the money and credit to be in a position to know when to credit, and will hesitate to do so. The bank will thus be able to be of service to both the Cuban merchants and the American merchants and manufacturers, and it will be in a position to make financial reports; it will under



*William R. Weeks.*

## WILLIAM RAYMOND WEEKS.

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The restoration of stable conditions in Cuba and Porto Rico will naturally lead to an early rehabilitation of important business enterprises which have been languishing under the influences of war for a number of years past, and the establishment of many new corporations for exploiting the rich resources of those islands may be looked for in the near future. Much of the natural wealth is as yet undeveloped, but enough is known of the actualities and possibilities of the country to warrant the belief that the opportunities for successful business undertakings are of the most favorable character.

With the return of peace those interested in agriculture, mining, manufacturing and commercial pursuits will resume their usual vocations, thus creating a constantly increasing demand for all the materials needed to repair the ravages of war and to supply the wants of a continually augmenting population. More energy will be manifested in the prosecution of all these various projects, as the security to life and the protection to property are increased. Political distraction has heretofore hindered the investment of outside capital. Whatever may be the future government decided upon for Cuba, it may be asserted with safety that the days of periodical revolutions there are at an end. Not only will a large inflow of capital result from the exercise of the functions of government by a power having the confidence and support of the people, but every kind of business will feel the impulse of a newer and more strenuous civilization.

It was to be expected that American capitalists would be quick to see the advantage of locating banks in Cuba. Bankers in the United States have been reluctant, as a rule, to extend their operations into foreign countries; but even should the American occupation terminate soon, the relations between the two countries are likely to continue to be very close; besides, the island is so near to our shores that, in a commercial sense, it can hardly be considered as foreign.

The transfer of the activity of the people from war to more peaceful pursuits and the great development of the country consequent upon the change in political conditions (for the transformation almost makes Cuba a new land of untouched resources) will undoubtedly call for largely increased banking facilities, and for such institutions as not only perform ordinary banking functions but which are prepared to meet the special circumstances in which the business interests of the country are now placed.

The Bank of Cuba was organized to meet this demand. It is an institution that will operate on a plan similar to that of the Credit Foncier of Paris, doing a large business in France and Germany, and that of the Mexican Mortgage Bank. There is great need of such an institution in Cuba, and for this reason, though the business is to be conducted on a most conservative plan, it is likely to be very large and remunerative. The Cuban sugar and tobacco planters will need help after the ravages of the war. They will require money, and credit to buy oxen and machinery, and furnish supplies necessary during the cultivation of their crops and before they are ready for market. American merchants and manufacturers will want this trade, but they will not be in a position to know whom to credit, and will hesitate to extend such credit. The bank will thus be able to be of service to both the Cuban planters and merchants and the American merchants and manufacturers, acting as Bradstreet's does in this country in making financial reports; it will under-

write credits, and will also issue letters of credit to planters and growers of sugar and tobacco, when properly secured. In this way the bank expects to act as commission merchant for the sale of the crops of the planters to whom it will issue letters of credit and receive commissions for making sales. Although the sugar crop for this year will show an increase of probably 100,000 tons, it will take another year for material gains to be made, as sugar planting is done on a large scale, requiring expensive machinery, involving an outlay of from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000 for machinery for grinding the cane and converting it into sugar. The next three years, however, will witness a remarkable development throughout Cuba, and afford unusual opportunity for making money in many lines of industry.

The location of the bank in Havana is in the heart of the city, on Central Park, from which the principal streets of the city radiate in every direction.

In founding an American bank in Cuba an essential requisite to success was to secure the co-operation of some one of high financial standing, and possessed of a thorough knowledge of the especial requirements of the Cuban people at the present time. This fact was kept in mind by those influential in the organization of the new Bank of Cuba. The Havana representative of the bank is Senor Pablo Deaver-nine, a very wealthy Cuban land-owner. His financial standing is sufficiently indicated by the fact that he was recently named by the Cuban Assembly to represent it as Minister of Finance in General Brooke's Cabinet.

The New York interests of the bank are in the hands of William R. Weeks, well known as a financial and corporation lawyer and organizer of business enterprises on a non-speculative basis. His prominence in these fields of activity, as well as his identification with what promises to become an important banking institution, lend interest to a record of the salient points of his career.

William Raymond Weeks was born in Newark, N. J., August 4, 1848, tracing his ancestry on the paternal side from the family of Wrey de la Wyke, who held an honored place in English history from the time of the Norman Conquest, his ancestor, Geprge Weekes, coming to America in 1637, and on the maternal side from Joris Janse Rapalje, a French Huguenot, who came from Holland in 1623, and from Adriaen Ryerse, founder of the Adriance family, who came here in 1646. His later ancestors on both sides were in the Patriot army of the Revolution.

Mr. Weeks was educated in the public schools of Newark, and was graduated at Newark Academy, of which he is now a trustee. During the Civil War he became a member of the New Jersey Militia, and also of the Union League. He studied law in his father's office, and in 1870 was admitted to practice in New Jersey, as an attorney, and in 1876 as a counsellor. In 1895 he was admitted to practice in New York, and in 1897 in West Virginia. He is also admitted to practice in the United States courts.

His experience in all kinds of litigation, civil and criminal, has been extensive, and he has served as counsel in some notable criminal cases. His attention has chiefly been devoted to civil law, however, and especially to corporation, real estate, mining and probate law. In these last-named branches he has come to be recognized as a leader of the bar, and as a high authority. He maintains a fine suite of offices in New York city, and another in Newark, and divides his time between the two, spending the greater portion of every day in New York, where he is well known as a financial lawyer.

Mr. Weeks devotes his leisure time to literary work, and especially to historical writings and research. He has written a number of historical and other works, among which may be mentioned a History of the First Endowment of the College of New Jersey, a Bibliography of New Jersey, a Monograph on The Jerseys in America before 1700, and a paper on The Manhattans, controverting the theory that

the island on which New York city was founded was the original and only Manhattan.

Mr. Weeks is a member of the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Lawyers' Club, the Twilight Club, the Dunlap Society, the Society of American Authors, the American Numismatic and Archæological Society, of which he was Historiographer for some years, the American Historical Association, the New Jersey Historical Society, the Sons of the American Revolution, the Order of the Founders and Patriots of America, of which he is Attorney-General, Society of the War of 1812, and the Revolutionary Memorial Society of New Jersey. He is conspicuously associated with the Alumni of Newark Academy, and is Historian of that organization.

In 1888 he organized a volunteer fire department at Bloomfield, N. J., where he then lived, served the following year as a member of the Legislative Committee of the New Jersey State Firemen's Association, became its first State Counsel in 1884 and held the office four years, drafting and remodeling the State fire laws. He compiled and published a compendium of these laws, with a series of forms.

Besides his law practice Mr. Weeks has other important business interests. He is manager and executor of many estates, running into the millions of real and personal property. He was one of the founders and is a trustee of The Bank of Cuba, and has organized numerous other financial, mining and manufacturing corporations. He was appointed by the late Edwin Lister, President of Listers Agricultural Chemical Works, of Newark, the sole executor of his will and life trustee of his controlling interest in the Company, of which he was recently elected President.

Mr. Weeks was married on August 4, 1869, to Miss Irene Le Massena, a great-granddaughter of Bonaparte's greatest Marshal, André Massena, Prince of Essling, by whom he has two daughters, Nina Margaret and Renée Hutchinson.

**DEATH OF LORD HERSCHELL.**—Baron Farrer Herschell, one of the commissioners from Great Britain on the High Joint Commission recently in session at Washington to adjust differences between the United States and Canada, died at Washington on March 1.

Lord Herschell was one of the most acute students of financial problems and one of the clearest writers on the subject in the world, independently of his other political activities. The remarkable statement of the merits of the gold and silver controversy which appeared in the report of the Royal Gold and Silver Commission in 1888 was attributed chiefly to his pen, and the same was true of the report of the Indian Currency Commission, which was made public in the spring of 1893, and was the basis of the action of the British Government in suspending free coinage in India, which contributed to the silver panic in this country. The report of the Gold and Silver Commission contained one or two admissions regarding the effect of the supply of the precious metals upon prices, which gave considerable comfort to the silver extremists.

The intention of these passages was the subject of some discussion between Lord Herschell and Governor Dingley just before the death of the latter, and the brilliant Englishman assured Governor Dingley that it was never intended to indicate acceptance of the quantitative theory of money in its bald form, but simply that a very great change in the quantity of the precious metals in use as money might react in some degree upon the state of credit and the prices of commodities.

Lord Herschell was a firm friend of the gold standard, and believed that it should be adopted as the standard of advanced civilized States.

## SOME PATENTED BANK NOTES, CHECKS AND DRAFTS.

There are nearly two hundred patents to be found in the class entitled "Checks, Bank Notes and Bonds" in the United States Patent Office. These patents have all been granted by the Government since 1836. It is to be doubted if there is a single class of patents containing anywhere near the same number which can show the same ingenuity, or involve a greater outlay of invention than the class referred to. Almost every conceivable idea which has for its purpose the manufacture of paper




FIG. 1.

which will render the alteration of the check impossible, has been resorted to. A check blank or bank note, having the part upon which the value is to be written slitted or roughened, or printed in different colors, watermarked, covered with insoluble sizing, and many other unique ideas have been resorted to by the inventors in this class.

Many years ago a Massachusetts inventor took out a patent for a bank note, which is shown in Fig. 1, reproduced from the inventor's original drawing.

In order that the value of the note may be ascertained at a glance, and that it may not be altered to a higher denomination, the center of the bill is provided with a column of figures running from 1 to 100, in the proper denominations. A series of lines, either plain or waved, run from the upper corners to the particular figure denominating the value of the note. In this way the inventor expected to prevent the alteration of the face value of the note. Whether the invention ever went into extended use or not is a question. However, the idea is ingenious and worthy of success.

Coupon bonds have received some attention from the inventors in this class. Semi-annual coupon bonds have been printed in different colors for each payment, in order that a glance may determine when the last coupon has been detached. Negotiable paper has been patented having photographs both of the maker of the paper and the party to whom the same was payable. Just how the photographs were to be secured and how applied for general use, the inventor did not clearly state.

Fig. 2 shows a check or money order of peculiar formation patented many years ago. The inventor says: "My invention has for its object to provide a check or money order, bank note or draft which shall draw interest from the date of its issue, and thereby secure to the operative or other holder all the advantages of the Savings-bank deposit, without the disadvantage attending the placing of money in an established or ordinary Savings bank. It is designed for use more especially by large firms or corporations in paying their employees for the purpose of enabling the latter to receive interest upon their wages or salaries in small amounts from the date of payment. To this end, the invention consists in a check, money order, or bank note payable upon presentation or demand and provided with interest coupons payable when the interest upon which has accrued, the whole being properly secured and the security expressed upon the instrument."

FIG. 2.



An ingenious means for preventing the alteration of bonds or notes is shown in Fig. 3. This invention consists in printing upon a bond or instrument the ordinary numerals to indicate the face value of the paper immediately upon a coating of transparent or semi-transparent sizing. The ink to be used in printing the numerals is described as being of an oily character which is quite difficult of removal, and which cannot be altered without some evidence being shown by the removal of the sizing.

A New Jersey lady secured a patent a few years ago for the seal shown in Fig. 4.

The invention is described and shown as a seal consisting of a paper ring having a serrated outer edge and made of thick paper or card-board. Securely attached to one face of this ring is a thin paper cover which is transparent or semi-transparent, and contains upon it the denomination of the check. This seal is designed to be se-




FIG. 3.

cured at the corner of the check immediately over the figures which also denote the denomination of the instrument. To alter such a check it becomes necessary to remove the seal and to alter the figures, which would be almost impossible, and to otherwise alter the value-line.

If there is any demand for unalterable check or bond paper, it would seem that a glance through the class referred to would reveal many ideas which would be of




FIG. 4.

interest to those in want of such an invention. Many of the inventions are extremely complex, and while they are ingenious, the method and use of them is so involved as to render the inventions almost useless for their purpose. The simpler ones would seem to be sufficiently effective, or at least would require considerably more invention on the part of the person who desired to alter the bills than it did the inventors to conceive them.

EMMET P. DUNYEA.

WASHINGTON, D. C.



## VIRGINIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

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The sixth annual convention of the Virginia Bankers' Association met at Richmond, February 22, a large attendance being present. President W. M. Hill called the convention to order, and Judge Geo. L. Christian, President of the Richmond Clearing-House Association, delivered the address of welcome, Alexander Hamilton, of Petersburg, responding. Hon. Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, was then introduced and delivered an address, which is printed in full in another part of this issue.

At the afternoon session a brief address was made by Alvah Trowbridge, Vice-President of the National Bank of North America, New York.

President Hill submitted his annual report which, after outlining the history of the past year, suggested the following subjects, which he thought might, with advantage, be discussed and acted upon at this or some future meeting :

1. Ought not the State of Virginia to pass a law to prevent persons from doing business under the title of a bank unless regularly chartered ?

2. Would it not be desirable for this State to have the October reports of all the State banks published in book form, and a copy sent to every bank in the State ?

3. Should the bankers of this State adopt uniform stationery for collections, remittances, checks, drafts, etc. ?

4. Is it desirable to have mutual Savings banks in Virginia, such as are in existence in some of the other States, for instance, fifteen States have 642 such banks, with 4,000,000 depositors, and \$1,800,000,000 deposits ?

5. Is there any remedy for the heavy taxes assessed against banks ?

6. Is it not wise for all banks to require uniform statements from borrowers, such, for instance, as those recommended by the National Association of Credit Men ?

7. What can we do to increase the usefulness of this association ?

On motion, the President's report, with its various recommendations, was referred with instructions to report at the next annual meeting.

The report of the Nominating Committee was presented and adopted as follows :  
President—Mann S. Quarles, Richmond.

Vice-Presidents—G. W. Moore, Jr., Lynchburg ; W. M. Habliston, Richmond ; J. B. Fishburne, Roanoke ; J. R. Jopling, Danville ; C. D. Fishburne, Charlottesville ; J. A. Willett, Newport News ; Henry L. Schmelz, Hampton ; Colonel Walter H. Taylor, Norfolk ; Rufus A. Ayres, Big Stone Gap.

Secretary and Treasurer—H. A. Williams.

Executive Committee—G. J. Seay, Petersburg ; J. H. Patteson, Manchester ; J. H. Schoolfield, Danville ; J. L. Billsoly, Portsmouth ; J. M. Robertson, Charlottesville ; J. N. Boyd, Richmond ; J. P. Branch, Richmond ; E. S. Reid, Chatham ; W. G. Venable, Farmville.

Committee on Banking and Jurisprudence—L. R. Watts, J. M. White, Alexander Hamilton, A. A. Phlegar, G. A. Schmelz, J. S. Ellett, C. M. Blackford, R. W. Burke, Virginius Newton.

Finance Committee—R. H. Smith, John B. Purcell, R. Lancaster Williams.

Secretary and Mrs. Gage were entertained at dinner by John P. Branch, President of the Merchants' National Bank, of Richmond. Later he was a guest at supper given at the Westmoreland Club by the Richmond Clearing-House Association, the delegates and visitors to the convention also being guests.

## SPECIAL TAX ON BANKS.

### OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN REGARD TO UNDIVIDED PROFITS.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 7, 1899.

The appended opinion of the honorable Attorney-General is hereby promulgated for the information and guidance of internal revenue officers and other persons interested. Any rulings of this office conflicting therewith are modified to conform thereto.

G. W. WILSON, *Acting Commissioner.*

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 4, 1899.

*The Secretary of the Treasury:*

SIR: In your letter of October 1, 1898, which I have the honor to acknowledge, you submit the following questions for my opinion:

(1) Are the undivided profits of a National bank to be excluded in all cases from the capital and surplus in estimating the amount of special tax required to be paid by the bank under Section two of the war-revenue Act.

(2) Are the undivided profits of a State bank to be excluded in all cases from the capital and surplus in estimating the amount of special tax required to be paid by the bank under that section?

(3) Are the undivided profits of private banks or bankers to be excluded in all cases from the capital and surplus in estimating the amount of special tax required to be paid by the bank or bankers under that section?

(4) What is the construction that should be given to the following language in paragraph 1 of that section, namely, "the amount of such annual tax shall in all cases be computed on the basis of the capital and surplus for the preceding fiscal year?"

The provision of law under which these questions arise is the following portion of Section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1898:

"SEC. 2. That from and after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, special taxes shall be, and hereby are, imposed annually as follows, that is to say:

One. Bankers using or employing a capital not exceeding the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars shall pay fifty dollars; when using or employing a capital exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, for every additional thousand dollars in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars, two dollars, and in estimating capital surplus shall be included. The amount of such annual tax shall in all cases be computed on the basis of the capital and surplus for the preceding fiscal year." \* \* \*

I think that I can more readily answer the first three questions by giving my opinion as to what should be included for taxation than by undertaking to determine what should be excluded.

The purpose of the law is, undoubtedly, to levy an annual tax upon the business of banks and bankers, and in order to make uniformity, to apply the tax to the amount of capital employed, together with such surplus funds of the bank as are used in carrying on the business, and which, combined with the capital, constitute the basis of banking operations.

The National Banking Act provides for the maintenance by National banks of what is called a "surplus," which is required to be set apart by the directors of the bank from the net profits until it shall reach an amount equal to twenty per cent. of the capital stock. This surplus thus constituted becomes by law, in effect, a part of the bank's capital, and this twenty per cent. is the minimum amount of surplus to be maintained by a National bank. I do not conceive, however, that the amount of the capital with this surplus added would make the limit to which the taxing power is authorized to go in every instance in estimating the amount upon which the bank should be assessed. I understand the term "surplus" as applied to banks to have a broader meaning, and it should be construed to include, not only that set apart as the minimum surplus, but also such amount as has been set apart by a vote of the directors, or other authorized action of the bank, to strengthen the capital, and is thus held out

by the bank in its dealings with the public as a part of its banking capital. The capital of a bank, together with the surplus so set apart and used in conjunction therewith as the basis of its business transactions and its banking operations, constitutes the security upon which customers rely and which induces the public to deal with it.

I may present the matter more clearly by an illustration as follows:

A National bank with a capital stock of \$200,000 is required by law to set apart from its net profits, and to maintain, a surplus of \$40,000. The lowest estimate for taxation under the war-revenue Act upon such bank would be upon \$240,000. But if this bank, by the action of its directors, should set apart \$100,000 more of the bank's funds to be used as a part of its banking capital, this latter amount would have to be added to the amount for taxation.

The same principle would apply to State and other banks, and, whilst there may be no State laws requiring the maintenance of a surplus on the part of State banks, yet such banks are taxable upon the amount of their capital, together with such additional surplus or funds belonging to them as may be set apart either by law or by the action of the bank authorities, and used in carrying on the general business of the bank.

The undivided profits of a bank are not surplus, and cannot be estimated under the law in question as a part of the bank surplus. Mr. Justice Swain, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in *Rubber Company vs. Goodyear* (9 Wall. 788) says:

"Profit is the gain made upon any business or investment when both the receipts and payments are taken into account."

This is the generally accepted definition of the term "profits."

So, then, if profits are to be made the basis of taxation, it might be necessary to settle the affairs of a bank before the amount subject to taxation could be ascertained. The solvency of its loans, the shrinkage of securities, depreciation in values, and all other losses would have to be taken into account before the estimate as to profits could be made.

The undivided profits of a bank signify the amount of money on hand, out of which dividends may be declared, and such profits may be in the bank to-day, and, by action of the directors, distributed among the stockholders to-morrow, and thus cease to be within the control of the bank at all. It certainly could not have been the purpose of Congress to levy an annual tax upon funds of this character.

And, then, so far as the taxation under the war-revenue Act is concerned, it is not important whether a bank has any profits or not. It is, as before stated, the capital of the bank and other funds belonging to it, which, by law or the action of the bank authorities, assume the character of capital, and which the bank uses in carrying on its business, that the law has in view as a subject of taxation.

I think I have sufficiently answered the first three questions.

In the fourth question it is desired that I construe that part of the Act which says:

"The amount of such annual tax shall in all cases be computed on the basis of the capital and surplus for the preceding fiscal year."

I think that I am safe in assuming that the term "fiscal year" used in this Act was intended to refer to the fiscal year which is established by the laws of the United States (Sec. 237, Rev. Stat.), which is as follows:

"The fiscal year of the Treasury of the United States, in all matters of accounts, receipts, expenditures, estimates and appropriations, \* \* \* shall commence on the first day of July in each year."

And further, Section 8146, Revised Statutes, under Title XXXV, Internal Revenue, provides:

"In adjusting the accounts of collectors, accruing after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, and in the payment of their compensation for services, the fiscal year of the Treasury shall be observed."

I would advise, therefore, that the tax should be computed on the basis of the capital and surplus for the fiscal year preceding the time at which the assessment is made—that is, the assessment should be on the capital and surplus in use by the bank for the year ending June 30 next before the tax is assessed. This method would secure more uniformity and would apply the fiscal year provided by the laws of the United States to all banking establishments which are subject to taxation under this law.

As to the amount upon which a bank should be assessed for taxation during the year, in some instances this might vary. There might be a reduction or an increase of capital or surplus, or both, during the fiscal year, which is to furnish the basis for estimating the tax—that is, a bank with a capital of \$100,000 might decrease its capital to \$50,000, or increase it to \$200,000 during the year, and changes of like nature might occur as to the surplus. In such cases, of course, some fair ascertainment of the average capital and surplus employed during the year will have to be made in order to arrive at the amount liable to assessment.

Very respectfully,

JAS. E. BOYD, *Assistant Attorney-General.*

Approved: JOHN W. GRIGGS, *Attorney-General.*

## CLAIMS FOR REFUNDING.

In transmitting the foregoing opinion to the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, the Commissioner wrote as follows:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 25, 1890.

*Messrs. Bradford Rhodes & Co., No. 78 William street, New York :*

GENTLEMEN:—In reply to your request for a copy of the opinion of the Attorney-General, recently rendered in regard to the taxation of undivided profits of banks, I inclose herewith a copy of Treasury Decisions of February 9, 1890; the opinion referred to will be found on pages 287-290.

Claims for the refunding of the special tax paid on undivided profits, forwarded through the Collector of the district in which the taxes were paid, will be considered by this office. These claims may be made on Form 46, which will be supplied by the Collectors; but Collectors have been instructed to receive and forward claims made on unofficial printed forms, which may be better adapted to this class of cases.

Respectfully yours,

N. B. SCOTT, *Commissioner.*

**To Solve the Money Question.**—To insure this elastic quality in the issue of paper money it must not be legal tender, but must always be subject to redemption either when doubt arises or demand for its use diminishes. This can never be safely accomplished through Government issues, but only through non-legal-tender bank issues. The principles underlying good banking existed in the first and second Banks of the United States, and in the Suffolk Bank of Boston. They exist to a high degree in the banking systems of Canada and of Scotland, and to a considerable degree in the Bank of England.

Under these systems the banks have the right to issue paper money against the capital and assets of the bank, including the deposits. In order to secure the community against inflation and the depression of the notes thus issued, the banks must ever stand ready to redeem these notes in gold whenever presented. Moreover, in order to give the maximum security to this, the banks must not be individual, segregated from each other, standing isolated and alone, but must be co-ordinated, and the notes of the banks in a common district be redeemed through some selected strong bank as the redemption center. All the banks receiving the notes of any other bank should be able to send them every day to the redemption center, which immediately calls upon the bank issuing the notes to redeem them, and thus the test is applied to the ability of the bank to redeem its notes every day. The first failure to redeem a note closes the bank, and puts all its assets and deposits in the hands of a receiver, and they are held to redeem the notes of the bank. Moreover, the capital of all the joint banks in the district should be held to the security of the notes of each of such banks, as under the branch bank system. In this way all the banking capital of the community is really behind every note that is issued, and is a better security for the notes than any Government pledge could ever be under any circumstances; because it is impossible for all the banks to fail at once, unless the Nation collapses.—*Gunton's Magazine.*

**The Wrong Sort of Economy.**—Banks can not be properly conducted in these times unless they keep thoroughly posted in regard to what is going on in the banking and financial world. To attempt to manage a bank without the BANKERS' MAGAZINE is like trying to navigate the ocean without chart or compass. Occasionally a banker is found who seems to regard the MAGAZINE as a luxury that may be dispensed with, but a little experience convinces him of the error of his way. The following letter from the Cashier of the Citizens' National Bank, Faribault, Minn., is a case in point:

*Bradford Rhodes & Co., New York :*

GENTLEMEN:—I enclose my draft for \$5 to pay for subscription to the BANKERS' MAGAZINE for one year from November 1, 1898.

I discontinued our subscription a few months ago, but found that *I was trying to economize in the wrong place.*

Yours truly,

GEO. PEASE, *Cashier.*

**THE BEST BANKERS' PUBLICATION.**—Howard C. Park, Cashier of the Merchants and Manufacturers' National Bank, Columbus, Ohio, writes: "Please send us a copy of your last number. We have loaned our copy so often we have lost track of it. We consider it the best bankers' publication."

# STATE BANKS—REPORTS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS.

## STATE OF NEW YORK.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS, RELATIVE TO SAVINGS BANKS,  
TRUST COMPANIES, SAFE DEPOSIT COMPANIES, AND MISCELLANEOUS CORPORATIONS.

BANKING DEPARTMENT, ALBANY,  
February 28, 1899.

### To the Legislature:

The excess of assets over liabilities of the safe deposit companies of the State on January 1, 1899, was larger by a hundred and sixty thousand dollars than at the corresponding date in 1898, which is more than twice the gain made by these institutions during the previous year; the resources of the trust companies, exclusive of those which came into existence during the year, increased over eighty millions, and the new institutions added fifteen and a half millions; and the Savings banks' deposits were augmented by forty-nine and a half millions. These figures are eloquent of the good management and prosperity which the institutions in question enjoy, and of the improvement which the year has witnessed in business and in the condition of the people.

The number of Savings banks in New York on the morning of January 1, 1899, was one hundred and thirty, which is a reduction of one since the date of my last report, the Carthage Savings Bank in Jefferson county having made a loss of a deposit with a failed National bank and been placed in the hands of a Receiver, though if the field it occupied had been larger its loss was not so serious but that it might have made a recovery. But there was not enough business to sustain it at the best, and therefore prudence counseled that it be closed. The State Savings Bank of Troy has paid in full all of its depositors but one, and expects to make the remaining payment within a few weeks and go into liquidation. The officers of the Fulton County Savings Bank have indicated to this Department their intention to close, the business of the bank being insufficient to justify its continued existence. The Washington Savings Bank in New York has not begun business, but must do so not later than April 22 next, or not at all, since a delay beyond that date will cause a forfeiture of its rights and privileges as a corporation. The number of Savings banks in the Borough of Manhattan is twenty-seven, in the Borough of Brooklyn sixteen, in the Borough of Queens four, and in the Borough of Richmond two, making the total number in Greater New York forty-nine.

The aggregate deposits in all of the Savings banks of the State January 1, 1899, was \$814,144,307, and the total resources of the same institutions \$923,420,861, making their surplus \$109,276,554. The increase in the amount due depositors during the year was \$49,459,451, in total resources \$53,669,617, and in surplus \$4,470,460. Of the gain in deposits \$20,527,560 was made in the period from January to July, and \$28,931,891 in the six months from July to January. The total gain in deposits was almost identical with that made in 1897, but in each of the two items, resources and surplus, the increase was about four millions less during the past year than was made the preceding year, which indicates a distribution of dividends by the banks to the depositors in 1899 more nearly approximating their earnings than was made in 1897. The number of open accounts increased 60,373, to a total of 1,965,853. In 1897 the increase in the number of open accounts was 68,312. This apparently superior showing in 1897 opens an interesting field for speculative consideration of its cause. A number of factors probably entered into it, of which I prefer to think that the growing efforts of Savings banks' officers to rid their institutions of accounts which it is not their proper function to carry was not the least potential. Excessive deposits made only for investment by men competent to care for their own interests give the most reasonable cause for criticism of the Savings bank system, affording those who would impose unreasonable exactions upon the banks an excuse for their attitude, and I am glad to be in possession of assurances and evidence that Savings banks' officers are awakening to it and manifesting a disposition to overcome it as far as possible. Deposits in excess of a legal limit are being driven out by many banks, restrictions are enforced to discourage investment deposits by men of affairs, and effort is becoming steadily more general and determined to make the banks as exclusively as is practicable the servants and agents of the classes for whose benefit they were chartered, and on whose account the special exemptions and privileges which they enjoy were enacted. Other influences operating to prevent a larger gain in the number of depositors undoubtedly were the

improved conditions in business, which induced the employment of capital in productive works, and the unprecedented speculative fever which has taken hold upon the American people, as the Stock Exchange record during the past year, and particularly during recent months, testifies. How much has been withdrawn from the safety which the Savings banks assure to put into the hazard of Wall Street no statistics are available for estimating, but it certainly has been considerable. Whatever it may be, the intrinsic probabilities point to the conclusion that it represents not the savings of the poor or the trust funds upon which the widow and the orphan depend, but the deposits of the classes which it is better that the banks should not hold.

#### RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF SAVINGS BANKS.

The following table, compiled from the reports made to the Banking Department as of the morning of January 1, 1899, shows the condition of the Savings banks on the date given (cents omitted):

RESOURCES.		
Bonds and mortgages.....		\$380,952,027
Stock and bond investments, viz.:		
United States.....	\$96,687,250	
District of Columbia.....	5,351,800	
New York State.....	483,000	
Bonds of other States.....	56,128,684	
Bonds of cities in other States.....	63,533,080	
Bonds of cities in this State.....	137,801,742	
Bonds of counties in this State.....	21,818,183	
Bonds of towns in this State.....	8,356,644	
Bonds of villages in this State.....	9,040,882	
Bonds of school districts in this State.....	3,186,174	
Railroad mortgage bonds.....	8,851,000	
Total par value of stocks and bonds.....	\$412,090,843	
Amount of stocks and bonds at cost.....	445,643,097	
Estimated market value of stocks and bonds.....		\$453,162,546
Loans upon pledge of securities.....		562,300
Banking houses and lots, estimated market value.....		11,745,769
Other real estate at estimated market value.....		3,249,570
Cash on deposit in banks and trust companies.....		54,891,734
Cash on hand.....		8,570,770
Collectible interest.....		9,632,452
Other assets.....		593,629
Total resources.....		\$923,420,861
LIABILITIES.		
Amount due depositors.....		\$316,144,367
Other liabilities.....		379,871
Surplus.....		106,896,623
Total liabilities.....		\$823,420,861
STATISTICS.		
Number of open accounts.....		1,965,658
Number of accounts opened or reopened during the year.....		347,866
Number of accounts closed during the year.....		237,028
Total number of deposits received during the year.....		1,518,909
Total number of payments to depositors during the year.....		2,172,573
Amount deposited during the year, not including interest credited....		\$329,474,378
Amount withdrawn during the year.....		207,811,445
Amount of interest credited and paid during the year.....		27,907,311
Salaries paid for the year.....		1,709,586
Expenses other than salaries for the year.....		809,889

#### IN LIQUIDATION.

Since the date of my last report the deposits undistributed by two of the four Savings banks in the State which have been inactive for several years, viz.: the Central Savings Bank of Troy and the Mechanics' Savings Bank of Brooklyn, have been paid over to the Superintendent of Banks to be held in trust for their rightful owners. The whole amount thus paid

over is but \$379.11, and I need not add that it would afford me gratification to locate those to whom the funds belong and make payment to them accordingly. The affairs of the Hope Savings Bank of Albany and the Manufacturers' Savings Bank of Troy remain unchanged from last year.

## CLOSED AND FAILED SAVINGS BANKS.

The several Savings banks which have closed voluntarily, and such of those which have failed whose receiverships have closed, with the rate per cent. of dividends declared in each, the amounts of unclaimed dividends deposited with the Superintendent of Banks, and the sums paid therefrom by him to those entitled to receive the same, to January 1, 1899, together with the unclaimed deposits of one closed trust company, are shown herewith:

NAME.	Rate per cent. of dividends declared.	Unclaimed dividends deposited with Superintendent.	Unclaimed dividends paid by Superintendent.
Abingdon Square Savings Bank.....	48	\$930.37	\$475.82
Bond Street Savings Bank.....	86 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	21,132.88	8,869.96
Bowling Green Savings Bank.....	35	3,994.29	19.56
Buffalo Trust Company.....	.....	378.98	.....
Central Park Savings Bank.....	30	1,497.76	523.00
Central Savings Bank, Troy*.....	100	49.72	.....
Chautauqua County Savings Bank*.....	100	2.24	.....
Clairmont Savings Bank.....	15	501.90	17.98
Clinton Savings Bank.....	68.169	831.91	81.14
Coxsackie Savings Institution*.....	100	258.32	19.60
Eleventh Ward Savings Bank*.....	100	1,833.19	140.82
Equitable Savings Institution*.....	100	150.49	.....
German Sav. Bank of the Town of Morrisania.	41 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	3,656.86	1,488.39
German Uptown Savings Bank.....	64	5,598.70	1,116.84
Haverstraw Savings Bank.....	75	596.04	327.21
Mechanics' Savings Bank, Brooklyn*.....	100	329.39	.....
Mechanics and Traders' Savings Institution...	71	14,315.91	7,002.81
Morrisania Savings Bank*.....	100	842.74	670.88
Mutual Benefit Savings Bank.....	64	7,554.86	3,584.86
New Amsterdam Savings Bank.....	77	429.79	9.20
Newtown Savings Bank*.....	100	1.40	.....
Oriental Savings Bank.....	60 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	2,255.50	291.07
Park Savings Bank, Brooklyn*.....	100	329.44	.....
People's Savings Bank.....	48 <sup>7</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	5,530.96	2,980.01
Port Jervis Savings Bank*.....	100	251.97	248.13
Saratoga Savings Bank.....	88	437.88	1.82
Security Savings Bank.....	61 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	1,865.72	618.41
Sixpenny Savings Bank.....	85.55	39,319.89	12,186.98
Third Avenue Savings Bank.....	19	895.15	46.53
Trades Savings Bank.....	15	547.32	3.72
Union Savings Bank, Saratoga Springs.....	68	180.89	36.17
Totals.....	.....	\$116,502.46	\$40,760.91

\* Closed voluntarily.

The interest earned by these funds during the year 1898 amounted to \$2,822.99.

Many inquiries reach the Superintendent of Banks in the course of a year concerning these dividends, and occasionally a case is made warranting a payment to a depositor from them. The amount so paid during the year 1898 was \$236.07. It should be understood that any depositor in any of the institutions named who has not already received the dividends his due from them can obtain them without cost or trouble beyond making inquiry of the Superintendent of Banks and giving reasonable proof of his identity.

## THE POSTAL SAVINGS BANK SCHEME.

The postal Savings bank project pending in Congress has apparently made but little progress, if any, during the year, perhaps because it has been overshadowed by matters of more absorbing interest and greater urgency, but perhaps, also, it is to be hoped, because it fails to approve itself to the general judgment. Though some of the considerations urged in advocacy of the plan appeal persuadingly even to minds which are constrained upon the whole to condemn it, its weakness and the difficulties that would inevitably be experienced in a practical administration of it, make adoption of it quite inadvisable. By those who know how wretchedly the average crossroads postmaster prepares his reports the single objection of inexperience and inefficiency on the part of those who would receive the deposits and account for them to the Washington authorities, is regarded as fatal to the scheme. The

sentiment in support of it seems to come mainly from the West, where complaint is most insistent of an insufficient supply of money.

#### INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANKING DEPARTMENT.

The total amount of resources of each of the classes of institutions below mentioned, subject to the supervision of this Department on the first day of January in each of the last ten years, is shown by the following tabulation, cents omitted:

#### Total Resources.

DATE.	Savings banks.	Banks of deposit and discount.	Trust companies.	Safe deposit companies.
1890, January 1 .....	\$644,927,526	* \$241,754,288	\$265,547,586	\$7,056,946
1891, January 1 .....	607,895,396	233,639,051	280,693,768	\$3,864,942
1892, January 1 .....	675,937,634	271,930,689	300,765,575	\$4,970,117
1893, January 1 .....	719,454,632	283,459,929	336,707,779	\$5,045,787
1894, January 1 .....	704,535,118	†271,496,822	341,406,011	\$5,026,769
1895, January 1 .....	736,863,596	284,911,651	365,419,729	\$5,102,699
1896, January 1 .....	739,078,530	285,407,997	362,630,045	\$4,517,999
1897, January 1 .....	812,173,632	280,991,855	396,742,947	\$4,677,325
1898, January 1 .....	868,761,244	324,766,619	483,799,925	\$5,116,862
1899, January 1 .....	923,420,861	355,485,972	519,206,442	\$5,197,997

\* Report January 11, 1890.

† November 23, 1893. The other reports called in December.

‡ The Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Company and Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Company are not included, as they are given under the head of trust companies.

The total gain in resources of these four classes of institutions during the year 1898 is thus seen to have been \$179,936,122.29.

#### TRUST COMPANIES.

There were forty-nine trust companies engaged in business in this State on January 1, 1899, and at least one or two more were then in course of organization and still others in contemplation. The increase during the past two years in the number of these institutions and in the volume of their business has been extraordinary, no less than ten new companies having been authorized by me in this period. The aggregate capital and paid-in surplus of these ten companies is \$8,590,000. Those authorized during the last calendar year are: The Fifth Avenue Trust Company, the Produce Exchange Trust Company and the Standard Trust Company, all in the city of New York; the Fidelity Trust Company in the city of Rochester, and the Westchester Trust Company in the city of Yonkers. (The City Trust Company of New York, capitalized at a million dollars, with a subscribed surplus of an equal amount, was authorized February 20, 1899.) The smallest capital employed by any of the five is two hundred thousand dollars, and it is in my judgment that it would be salutary if the law were changed to make this sum instead of one hundred thousand dollars the minimum at which such a company could be capitalized. The privileges and powers which such institutions possess were never designed originally to be vested in companies other than those of very large resources, and it is not wise to depart far from that view now or in the future. Trust undertakings require that the companies assuming them possess abundant strength, making remote any possibility of loss to the interests involved, and surely a capital of two hundred thousand dollars is none too large to exact with reference to this aim. If it is merely or principally for the purpose of transacting practically a discount business that such organizations are effected, they should more properly derive their powers under the banking provisions of the law. I am by no means suggesting that any even of the smallest trust companies are unsound or weak, but only that in the prosecution of a distinctively banking business the statutory requirements applicable to banks ought to control instead of those prescribed for trust companies. Justice alike to the banks and to the public would seem to counsel this.

From January 1, 1897, to January 1, 1898, the resources of the State trust companies increased nearly eighty-six millions of dollars, and in the year ending December 31, 1898, there was a further gain of ninety-five and a half millions. At this rate but a few years would be required for these organizations to outstrip even the Savings banks in the aggregate of their resources. The interest, profits and commissions earned by the trust companies during the year were \$23,647,750, and their expenses \$3,800,293 for interest on deposits, \$3,685,936 for general expense, and \$455,557 for taxes. The dividends declared by them were \$4,401,500, and nearly six millions, exclusive of new subscribed surplus, was added to their surplus account.

A list of the trust companies in active business on the first day of January, 1899, including the two which are safe deposit companies also, with the capital of each, is here appended:



NAME AND LOCATION.	Capital January 1, 1899.
American Deposit and Loan Company, New York city.....	\$500,000
Atlantic Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Binghamton Trust Company, Binghamton.....	300,000
Brooklyn Trust Company, Brooklyn.....	1,000,000
Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Company, Buffalo.....	200,000
Central Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Chautauqua County Trust Company, Jamestown.....	150,000
Colonial Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Columbus Trust Company, Newburgh.....	100,000
Continental Trust Company, New York city.....	500,000
Delaware Loan and Trust Company, Walton.....	100,000
Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Fidelity Trust and Guaranty Company of Buffalo, Buffalo.....	500,000
Fidelity Trust Company, Rochester.....	200,000
Fifth Avenue Trust Company, New York city.....	500,000
Franklin Trust Company, Brooklyn.....	1,000,000
Glens Falls Trust Company, Glens Falls.....	100,000
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, New York city.....	2,000,000
Hamilton Trust Company, Brooklyn.....	500,000
Holland Trust Company, New York city.....	500,000
Ithaca Trust Company, Ithaca.....	100,000
Kings County Trust Company, Brooklyn.....	500,000
Knickerbocker Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Long Island Loan and Trust Company, Brooklyn.....	500,000
Manhattan Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Manufacturers' Trust Company, Brooklyn.....	500,000
Mercantile Trust Company, New York city.....	2,000,000
Metropolitan Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Nassau Trust Company of the City of Brooklyn, Brooklyn.....	500,000
New York Life Insurance and Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
New York Security and Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
North American Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Orange County Trust and Safe Deposit Company, Middletown.....	100,000
People's Trust Company, Brooklyn.....	1,000,000
Produce Exchange Trust Company, New York city.....	500,000
Real Estate Trust Company, New York city.....	500,000
Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Company, Rochester.....	200,000
Security Trust Company of Rochester, Rochester.....	200,000
Standard Trust Company, New York city.....	500,000
The State Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Title Guaranty and Trust Company, New York city.....	2,500,000
Trust and Deposit Company of Onondaga, Syracuse.....	100,000
Union Trust Company of Jamestown, Jamestown.....	100,000
Union Trust Company, New York city.....	1,000,000
Union Trust Company, Rochester.....	200,000
United States Mortgage and Trust Company, New York city.....	2,000,000
United States Trust Company, New York city.....	2,000,000
Washington Trust Company, New York city.....	500,000
Westchester Trust Company, Yonkers.....	200,000
Total.....	\$34,850,000

There has been no change during the year in the capital of the companies previously organized, except that the Chautauqua County Trust Company has reduced its capital from \$300,000 to \$150,000.

#### RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUST COMPANIES.

A summary of the reports of trust companies, made to this Department as of January 1, 1899, is contrasted in the following table with the showing made by the corresponding reports as of January 1, 1898 (cents omitted):

RESOURCES.	1898.	1899.
Bonds and mortgages.....	\$32,634,995	\$34,855,023
Stock investments.....	113,525,797	136,561,086
Loaned on collaterals.....	230,581,708	233,402,321
Loaned on personal securities, including bills purchased.	31,183,231	29,930,375
Overdrafts.....	25,044	20,907
Due from bankers and brokers.....	568,935	1,999,230
Real estate.....	3,780,130	9,322,440
Cash on deposit in banks or other moneyed institutions.	47,202,030	63,254,338
Cash on hand.....	7,832,420	8,430,227
Other assets.....	11,435,570	11,378,905
Total resources.....	\$483,730,925	\$579,205,442

LIABILITIES.		
Capital stock paid in, in cash.....	*\$33,000,000	\$34,850,000
Surplus fund.....	47,491,701	54,558,386
Undivided profits.....	7,813,229	7,845,993
Deposits in trust.....	185,069,004	197,064,740
General deposits.....	198,220,020	200,519,500
Other liabilities.....	12,106,270	14,768,858
<b>Total liabilities.....</b>	<b>\$483,739,925</b>	<b>\$579,205,442</b>

SUPPLEMENTARY.		
Debts guaranteed and liability thereon.....	.....	\$27,000
Interest, commissions and profits received during the year.....	\$19,583,085	23,647,750
Interest paid and credited to depositors during the year.....	7,568,462	8,800,296
Expenses for the year.....	3,202,240	3,065,986
Dividends on capital declared for the year.....	4,354,553	4,401,500
Taxes paid during the year.....	312,786	455,567
Deposits made by order of court for the year.....	2,472,394	3,080,586
Total of deposits upon which interest is allowed at this date.....	851,031,687	424,097,281
Amount of bonds and mortgages purchased.....	4,380,087	8,490,574

\* Glens Falls Trust Company not included.

#### SECURITIES DEPOSITED.

The securities held in trust by the Superintendent under the law for the protection of depositors with and creditors of the several trust companies on January 1, 1899, are shown in the following table :

	Jan. 1, 1899.
United States two per cent. bonds.....	\$83,000
United States four per cent. bonds.....	1,268,000
United States five per cent. bonds.....	20,000
New York city two and one-half per cent. bonds.....	600,000
New York city three per cent. bonds.....	1,195,000
New York city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	300,000
Brooklyn city three per cent. bonds.....	320,000
Brooklyn city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	350,000
Brooklyn city four per cent. bonds.....	100,000
Buffalo city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	20,000
Rochester city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	50,000
Rochester city six per cent. bonds.....	30,000
Niagara Falls city four per cent. bonds.....	20,000
Bonds and mortgages.....	50,000
Cash.....	878
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,536,378</b>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

I know of but a single measure of affirmative legislation needed by the State Savings banks systems, or from which benefit would be likely to accrue. Anything beyond that at this time would be more likely to prove harmful than helpful. The measure in question, introduced in the Assembly by Mr. McEwan, was so fully discussed in that part of my report which was transmitted to the Legislature at the opening of its session that only its substance and purpose need be restated. It strikes out from one section of the banking law an implication which is inconsistent with the unqualified prohibition contained in a subsequent section against any trustee or officer of a Savings bank becoming indebted to such bank or in any way an obligor for moneys loaned by or borrowed of such corporation, and leaves the restriction imposed by the latter section clear and absolute. The bill further provides that the aggregate amount of deposits in any one bank, to the credit of any individual, including those deposited to his own and another's credit, shall not at any time exceed three thousand dollars; and also that the aggregate amount of all deposits in any one Savings bank to the credit of any person, corporation or society in trust for any person or persons, or as executor, administrator, guardian or agent, or in any other fiduciary character, shall not exceed at any time the same limit unless such deposits were made prior to May 1, 1899. The aim of these provisions is to prevent the Savings banks being used solely for investment purposes, and to preserve them as distinctively the agents and servants of those whose means are so small as not to afford opportunity for advantageous independent investment, and whose inexperience makes them unfit to undertake the care of their own funds. For larger trusts the trust companies afford every facility that any interest may require, and to these recep-

tion and care of large sums more properly belong than to the Savings banks. The desire of the Superintendent of Banks, and of a large proportion at least of the Savings banks officers, is to hold these institutions as exclusively as may be to the service of the wage-earner and the provident poor, so that their resources shall not represent in any considerable degree any other interest, nor be exposed to attack upon the ground that they are investments made by the rich in order to escape burdens which other disposition of them might impose. The enactment of the bill referred to will, I believe, contribute very materially to accomplish this end, and I, therefore, earnestly commend it to the Legislature's favorable consideration.

The recommendation regarding personal loan associations, heretofore suggested in this report, and also urged at length in the text accompanying my report relative to banks of discount and deposit, is here repeated and emphasized. Every consideration of justice toward the poor and of restraint upon merciless rapacity demands that the powers of these associations be curtailed. They are, moreover, about the only institutions given by law any relation to the Banking Department that pay nothing toward its maintenance. Their earnings are such as not to require this exemption, and I respectfully protest that it should not be permitted to continue.

The Savings banks carry nearly a hundred million dollars of the debt of the United States and nearly two hundred million dollars of the bonds issued by the State of New York and its various subdivisions. What the existence of this market for these securities means in the way of establishing a premium for them and enabling them to be floated at low rates of interest, it is of course impossible to measure with accuracy. But unquestionably the benefit is considerable, and affords an appreciable return to the public for the exemptions which the Savings banks possess under the law.

Than the bonds in question there is and can be no safer line of investment, and safety—the undoubted, absolute certainty of the return upon call to each depositor, with dividends, of every dollar placed with the Savings banks—is of the essence of the system, its fundamental requisite, its chief and crowning claim upon the confidence and regard of the public. This character no measure of doubtful wisdom or of selfish seeking should be permitted to assail or cloud. These banks have in keeping the savings of the helpless, a sacred trust to the faithful discharge of which the State is bound almost equally with the banks. It cannot, then, in honor sanction by law any investment which business prudence would reject or even hesitate to approve. One bill, now pending in the Legislature, fails to meet these high requirements. It would open for Savings banks investment the bonds of all such railroads (including street railroads) in ten States as had earned and paid dividends on their stock for a stated period, and as met other specified requirements, none of which, it is to be observed, includes any provision that they shall have punctually and regularly paid their creditors. Under the existing law not even the bonds of the proudest State in the Union could be bought or held by a Savings bank if it had defaulted in interest or principal within ten years. Yet it is proposed that this privilege, which is denied to States, of marketing with a Savings bank a perhaps dishonored bond, shall be afforded to railroad corporations. It is to be noted also that the bill would make the bonds of street railroad companies a legal investment for the Savings banks. When it is understood that street railroads, in many instances at least, represent little or no expenditure beyond that derived from the sale of bonds, the reckless and hazardous nature of the proposition must be instantly apparent and admitted.

The annual report of the State Board of Tax Commissioners, transmitted to the Legislature February 7, 1899, recurs to the subject of the taxation of Savings banks deposits, and definitely recommends, unless the abolition of all taxation of personalty is to be made the policy of the State, that a tax upon them be prescribed by statute, proceeding seriously to argue that two million dollars annually could be collected without any one paying it! While this eager crusade is undertaken to marshal taxpayers on personalty from those so favored by fortune that they have actually amassed savings averaging four hundred dollars each, I have searched the report with care, but vainly, for the slightest suggestion that effort be made to bring any other personalty now exempted from taxation, or that is any way escaping such burden, to the payment of tribute to the tax gatherer, and am amazed that this Board should single out this one interest and seek to have two million dollars per annum wrested from it when the Comptroller of the State declares that study and observation convince him that not more than three per cent. of the personal property in the State is assessed. The Board of Tax Commissioners has no word to say upon the question of bringing brewing companies under those provisions of the Corporation Tax Law that apply to electric lighting, gas and water companies, so that they should contribute half a million more yearly to the public treasury; no intimation that private bankers ought to be required to pay some fee annually in the nature of a license tax; and ignores entirely the question of declaring franchises real property, in order that compensation for privileges by reason of which splendid profits are realized may be rendered to the public. It is not the province of the Superintendent of Banks to propose tax legislation, and I desire expressly to disclaim any intention to be understood as even in-

directly indorsing or condemning a single one of the ideas here listed. They are cited solely to emphasize the inconsistency of the attitude of the State Board of Tax Commissioners in assailing the policy of tax immunity for the Savings banks while disregarding the exemptions which so many other interests enjoy. With the demand for mortgage loans diminishing, with the quotations for high-class bonds appreciating continually, with the interest rate at which bonds are floated going steadily downward, and with many banks compelled already by these factors to reduce their rates of dividends to depositors, it must, I think, be plain to any fairly considerate man or body that the present is a most untimely occasion to press a proposition for the taxation of the savings of the poor and the trust funds of the widow and the orphan simply because mingled with these moneys are deposits of the well to do. These latter none would drive out of the banks more quickly than I, and the influence of the State Savings Banks' Association is actively exerted in the same direction. But to tax all indiscriminately would be rank injustice, an oppression to those who most need and best deserve the State's forbearance and protection, and injurious to the Savings banks system to a degree that I dread to contemplate.

I cannot bring this report to a close without referring to the persistently mistaken popular belief that there are deposits held by the Savings banks aggregating untold millions which have been abandoned and accrue to the banks' benefit. The banks and this Department recognize no account as unclaimed or abandoned. If an account be not increased by deposits or diminished by withdrawals for a period of twenty-two years, then interest ceases to be credited on it--in a word, it becomes "dormant." But it still and forever remains subject to the order of the depositor or his heirs, and whenever claim is made to it it is the practice of most of the banks to write up interest on it from the day the deposit was made to that of its withdrawal. A few weeks ago inquiry was received at the Banking Department concerning an account opened with a New York city Savings bank in 1824, and never afterward disturbed. Though three-quarters of a century had gone the deposit had been neither forgotten nor abandoned. The claimant established with reasonable certainty her right to information in the case, communication was opened between her and the bank, and I doubt not that ere this she is in possession of the funds, with interest, which her father deposited so long ago. Scores of similar cases, though not quite as striking, are shown by the records of the Department, and I am confident in the belief that the sums held by the Savings banks of New York which will never be called for are but small. According to sure information in my possession, the whole amount of accounts exceeding five dollars each which had stood undisturbed for twenty years in 1894 was less than a million and a half dollars, and it is undoubted that if the reckoning had been made as to twenty-two years instead of as to twenty, the aggregate would have been considerably less. The bank officers do not desire these accounts, and generally work systematically to discover their owners and induce them to keep them active. The suggestion that the State confiscate them is as unreasonable as it would be to propose that it seize any other property. A statute so directing would probably be in violation of the law of contracts, and be held by the courts to be unconstitutional. Agitation concerning them, proposing to require publication of them, or to touch them in any way, can do no good and might do great harm. They are no more properly subject to State interference than a thousand other matters which are the affairs of individuals only, and it is merely because their character and all the facts regarding them are so widely misunderstood that attention is so persistently directed to them. In this connection it is worth while to add that the trustees and officers of a Savings bank cannot borrow from it, derive any profits from its operations, nor deal with it in any way except to perform its work, transact its business, and be fairly compensated for specific services rendered.

The administrative expenses of the one hundred and twenty-nine Savings banks in the State during the year 1898 were \$2,519,476. These figures include salaries, rent, repairs on bank buildings, light, fuel, appraisal fees, taxes on real estate and all other expenses. Though the number of accounts carried by the banks have increased more than sixty thousand, and investments to be managed are nearly fifty millions greater than they were in 1897, this cost has grown by less than seventy-five thousand dollars. Its total is considerably more than one million under the amount of general expenses reported for the same period by the fifty trust companies, the sum of whose resources is more than a third less. It is under \$2.73 for each thousand dollars of the interests cared for, whereas in 1896 this cost was \$2.97 and in 1897 \$2.81 per thousand dollars. Except that much of the service of the Savings banks' trustees is philanthropic and gratuitous, such a showing would be impossible. To the men who render it I am glad of opportunity to pay tribute of admiration and profound respect. No vigilance and no effort of which I am capable will be spared to further and guard the grand work they are doing, and I am not permitted to doubt that the course of your honorable body will be upon like lines and with identical purposes.

Respectfully submitted,

FREDERICK D. KILBURN, *Superintendent of Banks.*

## WISCONSIN.

To Hon. Edward Scofield, Governor of Wisconsin:

SIR:—In compliance with law I herewith respectfully submit the seventh semi-annual report of this department exhibiting the financial condition of the several State, private and Savings banks of Wisconsin, at the close of business on December 1, 1898, from reports made to this office.

*Changes since last report, May 5, 1898.*

NAME OF BANKS.	Location.	Capital.
<i>New State banks.</i>		
State Bank.....	Kiel.....	\$25,000
Commercial State Bank.....	Neillsville.....	25,000
<i>New private banks.</i>		
Bank of Iron River.....	Iron River.....	10,000
Union Bank.....	Winneconne.....	None.
Bank of La Farge.....	La Farge.....	4,600
Bank of Union Grove.....	Union Grove.....	None.
Bank of Lake Nebagamon.....	Lake Nebagamon.....	10,000
<b>CEASED BUSINESS.</b>		
<i>State banks.</i>		
Bank of Kewaunee.....	Kewaunee.....	25,000
Bank of Iron River.....	Iron River.....	25,000
<i>Private banks.</i>		
V. E. Huntzicker.....	Neillsville.....	20,000
Bank of Mellen.....	Mellen.....	1,929
Bank of Melrose.....	Melrose.....	12,984
Bank of Winneconne.....	Winneconne.....	10,000
<i>Changed to State bank.</i>		
Bank of Algoma.....	Algoma.....	25,000

Aggregate resources and liabilities of the State, private and Savings banks on the date of this report are as follows (cents omitted):

RESOURCES.		LIABILITIES.	
Loans and discounts.....	\$31,409,181	Capital stock.....	\$7,944,418
Unpaid capital.....	619,150	Surplus fund.....	1,600,077
Overdrafts.....	689,681	Undivided profits.....	1,218,980
Banking house.....	1,066,066	Due depositors on demand.....	24,617,019
Other real estate.....	1,361,737	Due depositors on time.....	18,104,135
Furniture and fixtures.....	290,623	Due to banks and bankers.....	1,103,732
Bonds, stocks and securities.....	4,222,940	Dividends unpaid.....	1,195
Cash items.....	140,414	Certified checks.....	19,149
Checks on other banks.....	407,782	Cashier's checks outstanding.....	65,509
Due from banks and bankers.....	10,621,640	Bills rediscounted.....	61,245
United States and National currency on hand.....	1,935,847	Bills payable.....	112,873
Gold coin.....	1,537,344	Other liabilities.....	179,908
Silver and subsidiary coin.....	293,839		
Loss and expense account.....	271,119		
Revenue stamps.....	15,250		
Other resources.....	140,171		
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$55,023,810</b>	<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$55,023,810</b>

By comparing the number and condition of the banks reporting on November 6, 1897, which reports were shown in my December report of that year, the following increase is shown:

*Number of banks.*

	Nov. 6, 1897.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Increase.
State banks.....	130	133	3
Private banks.....	110	114	4
Savings banks.....	1	1	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>7</b>

INCREASE IN	State banks.	Private banks.	Savings banks.	Totals.
Resources.....	\$4,468,020	\$1,881,450	\$85,299	\$6,434,769
Loans and discounts.....	3,242,601	988,589	87,006	4,318,196
Capital.....	40,000	*2,971	None.	42,971
Surplus and profits.....	25,141	*80,785	9,481	136,407
Deposits.....	6,343,153	1,906,453	81,807	8,331,414
Available cash.....	1,052,694	694,250	19,942	1,766,887

\* Decrease.

It will be seen from the above table that the aggregate increase in resources is \$6,434,769; loans and discounts, \$4,318,196; deposits, \$8,331,414; and available cash, \$1,766,887. The increase in the items, resources, loans and discounts, and deposits, is by far the largest which has been made in any previous equal length of time in the history of the State.

I have at all times strongly urged upon bank officials the necessity for charging off all bad or worthless paper. The decrease of surplus and profits, amounting to the sum of \$136,407, notwithstanding the large increase in the volume of business, is evidence that this policy is being followed.

The aggregate cash reserve carried is now 33  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., a slight decrease since the making of my June report; such decrease being the practical result of the large increase in loans and discounts.

The following comparative table shows the volume of business at each of the dates named, commencing with the first report made by this office on December 9, 1896:

Comparative table.

	Nov. 16, 1896.	Nov. 21, 1896.	Nov. 6, 1897.	Dec. 1, 1898.
State banks.....	125	130	130	133
Private banks.....	107	109	110	114
Savings banks.....	1	1	1	1
Total.....	233	240	241	248
<b>RESOURCES.</b>				
Loans and discounts.....	\$28,062,796	\$25,905,481	\$27,141,604	\$31,409,181
Unpaid capital.....	675,014	671,017	678,500	649,150
Overdrafts.....	443,294	396,305	511,456	689,681
Banking house furniture and fixtures.....	1,355,016	1,385,502	1,324,510	1,356,709
Other real estate.....	1,447,042	1,471,614	1,362,827	1,361,737
Bonds, stocks and securities.....	2,273,120	2,109,625	2,209,693	4,222,940
Cash items.....	107,973	69,557	77,782	140,414
Checks on other banks.....	451,749	394,473	890,983	407,782
Due from banks and bankers.....	5,385,934	5,454,488	9,180,424	10,621,940
United States and National currency.....	1,310,571	1,672,407	1,895,779	1,935,847
Gold coin.....	1,472,853	1,487,988	1,329,853	1,537,944
Silver and subsidiary coin.....	210,510	224,843	245,242	293,536
Loss and expense account.....	267,817	228,688	214,561	271,119
Other resources.....	138,773	107,733	120,379	155,421
Total.....	\$43,601,829	\$41,532,711	\$46,593,540	\$55,023,310
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>				
Capital.....	\$7,918,063	\$8,076,753	\$7,907,384	\$7,944,413
Surplus and profit.....	3,049,673	2,957,243	2,866,229	2,814,067
Due depositors on demand.....	18,063,159	17,262,318	20,262,046	24,617,019
Due depositors on time.....	13,164,908	12,049,084	13,818,166	18,104,135
Due to banks and bankers.....	498,568	415,824	806,443	1,103,782
Dividends unpaid.....	.....	.....	.....	1,195
Certified checks.....	.....	.....	.....	19,149
Cashier's checks outstanding.....	.....	.....	.....	65,509
Bills rediscounted.....	257,277	179,205	84,439	61,245
Bills payable.....	237,812	190,214	156,099	112,878
Other liabilities.....	422,365	402,067	128,790	179,908
Total.....	\$43,601,829	\$41,532,711	\$46,593,540	\$55,023,310

It will be seen from this table that the volume of business transacted has shown a marked increase, except in the year 1896, the aggregate being \$11,421,481. The decrease in that year was caused by the business depression which prevailed and the agitation of the currency question previous to the Presidential election.

Through the courtesy of Hon. Charles G. Dawes, Comptroller of the Currency, I arranged for calling for the final reports for the current year upon the same date as that upon which

reports from National banks were called, and by circular letter requested the National banks of this State to forward a copy of their published report to this office. I am pleased to state that I received a willing response to this request, and have embodied in this report tabular statements showing the financial condition of these several institutions. These reports indicate that these banks are in excellent condition, and should be a source of just pride to those who have them in charge and to the people of the whole State.

## GROWTH OF STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS.

With the purpose of showing the marked and substantial growth of the State and private banks of this State and the corresponding growth of the resources of these institutions during the three last decades, a condensed abstract of items of deposits, loans and discounts, capital and resources is given herewith:

	July, 1869.	July, 1874.	July, 1879.	July, 1884.
Number of banks.....	18	18	94	190
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,333,653	\$4,751,072	\$8,553,105	\$17,548,033
Resources.....	4,373,073	10,133,861	16,385,910	29,560,839
Capital.....	425,000	892,688	2,539,492	3,499,360
Deposits.....	2,878,112	6,618,781	10,782,862	21,863,664

	July, 1890.	Nov., 1895.	Dec., 1898.
Number of banks.....	196	223	248
Loans and discounts.....	\$31,846,178	\$28,062,796	\$31,409,181
Resources.....	49,601,502	43,601,829	55,023,810
Capital.....	5,792,408	7,918,063	7,944,418
Deposits.....	38,033,474	32,228,072	42,721,155

This abstract is compiled from the reports of the State Treasurer and from statistics on file in this office. From this it is shown that these institutions have steadily increased in number and importance, from a total of thirteen banks in 1869, with an aggregate capital of \$425,000, deposits of \$2,878,112 and total resources of \$4,373,073, to a total of 248 banks under State supervision in 1898, with an aggregate capital of \$7,944,418, deposits of \$42,721,155 and resources \$55,023,810.

With the advent of the National bank system of 1863, the profit derived from the issue of circulating notes and the prohibitive restrictions of the ten per cent. tax on State bank circulation, caused many State banks to cease doing business, so that in 1869, as shown above, there were but thirteen banks doing business, which was the lowest point reached during that era. As the profit on National bank circulation decreased, and the demand for greater banking facilities increased, there was a corresponding increase in the number of State and private banks. Another reason for this increase is doubtless found in the fact that State and private banks can be organized with less capital than National banks, and in towns and cities where a sufficient amount of capital to organize National banks is not available or cannot be profitably invested in this class of business. A further reason is to be found in the absence of some of the restrictions which hamper the operations of National banks, particularly as regards loans on real estate; and while the aggregate amount invested by the promoters of these institutions is far smaller than that invested by the promoters of National banks, these smaller institutions supply a want which under existing laws the National banks cannot in any way satisfy. It may well be doubted, however, that the sharp competition to secure patronage which is caused by the multiplication of the number of competitive banks in some of the smaller cities and towns is conducive to their stability, or to their desirability as a source of profit.

As a matter of general interest and for the purpose of showing the distribution of the facilities that are offered by the banking institutions of the State, I have taken the pains to ascertain the number of cities and towns in which they are at present located. I find there are 206 cities and towns in the State in which banks are located. That the seventy-eight National banks are located in fifty-one cities; that there are 188 cities and towns which have State and private banks or both; 154 which have State or private banks only; and seventeen which have National banks only. It will thus be seen that over seventy-five per cent. of the towns of the State are afforded banking facilities through the agency of State and private banks alone.

Upon the stability of these institutions, the safety of the funds of depositors and the success of the business interests of the State in a large measure depends. In view of this

fact, notwithstanding the recent defeat of the "Banking Act," the importance of a general revision of the banking law at as early a date as practicable cannot be too strongly urged.

The provisions of the Act referred to which failed to meet popular approval, and which subjected it to criticism, were, in the main, of minor importance. Most, if not all, of the criticisms which were directed against the measure can be fully satisfied without any way impairing its most important features, and I respectfully suggest a further effort to secure the enactment of a carefully formulated revision of the banking law at the coming session of the Legislature, to be again submitted to a vote of the people.

In this connection I would further suggest the advisability of an amendment to the constitution providing that a two-thirds or three-fourths vote of the members of the Legislature may enact laws for the regulation and control of the business of banking, without the necessity of submitting such acts to a vote of the people. As the result of an investigation of the methods in force, controlling such legislation in other States, I find that in nearly all States of the Union banking laws are enacted either by a majority vote of their respective Legislatures or by a two-thirds vote of all the members elect. Among the former, I find the States of Pennsylvania, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas and Nebraska; and among the latter the States of New York and Michigan. The National banking law is also altered or amended by a majority vote of the National Congress. Frequent changes in the banking laws are not desirable, yet, taking into consideration the well-known conservatism of the citizens of our State, it would seem reasonably safe to permit any Legislature which its voters may elect to enact laws of this character without fear of jeopardizing either banking interests or the interests of the people.

The examination of banks, which is now being made, shows a steady improvement in their financial condition, and where, in individual instances, it becomes necessary to require the adoption of more systematic and business-like methods in the keeping of accounts, and the charging off of bad or worthless paper, etc., these demands are as a rule cheerfully complied with.

The constantly increasing number of banking institutions (now numbering 248), and the additional labor involved in the supervision of the building and loan associations (now numbering fifty-three), which were by Act of the Legislature of 1897 placed under the supervision of this office, renders the present force inadequate to efficiently perform the duties required. The labor involved is double that which is required of National bank examiners, or of examiners in other States where supervision of State banks prevails, and, I will add, is far less expensive than that of any other State in the Union where like duties are required. I would, therefore, suggest that the chief clerk be empowered to make examinations of banks at such times as the clerical work in the office will permit. This would be of material aid in the making of examinations and would be accomplished with but little if any additional cost to the State.

Respectfully submitted,

MADISON, Wis., Dec. 12.

EDWARD I. KIDD, *Bank Examiner.*

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#### Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.

**Massachusetts.**—At a meeting of the shareholders of the National Exchange Bank, Salem, on February 28, it was decided to go into liquidation on June 1. The bank is one of the oldest business institutions in the city. It was established as a State bank in 1823 and became a National bank in 1865. Too many banks and poor business caused the decision to liquidate.

**Minnesota.**—The Bank of Kimball was reported closed on February 6, having been discontinued owing to the fact that the place did not afford business enough to support a bank.

**Missouri.**—On finding the Bank of Pineville in a failing condition, on February 9, the Secretary of State ordered it closed by an examiner.

**Nebraska.**—The Packers' Savings Bank, of South Omaha, is reported to have paid its depositors and quit business.

**New York—BUFFALO.**—On February 25 the Ellicott Square Bank closed and went into voluntary liquidation. The bank was organized in 1891 and had \$300,000 capital; as business had been unprofitable for some time, it was decided to liquidate. An arrangement was made with the Buffalo Commercial Bank to take over its business and pay depositors.

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PLEASED WITH THE BOOK.—In remitting for a copy of PATTEN'S PRACTICAL BANKING, Thos. W. Wells, manager of the Citizens' Bank, of Sonora, Cal., says: "We are very much pleased with the book; please accept our thanks for sending same so promptly."



## OPEN LETTERS FROM BANKERS.

### AN INTERCHANGE OF OPINION BY READERS OF THE MAGAZINE.

#### WHY GOLD DOES NOT CIRCULATE.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—Recently I happened to be at the Mint and I found that there was great activity in gold coining, all the ingots being for double eagles. I then wrote to the Director of the Mint asking for a statement of the gold coinage for the calendar year ended Dec. 31, 1898, and received from him promptly the following:

DENOMINATIONS.	Value.
Double eagles.....	\$54,912,900
Eagles.....	12,357,970
Half-eagles.....	10,154,475
Quarter-eagles.....	60,412
Total gold.....	\$77,985,757

This shows that more than two-thirds of the value of gold coined during the year went into \$20 pieces. I have noticed editorials from New York papers and others on the "troublesome gold," and I am more than ever satisfied that the troubles are chiefly due to the fact that our gold coin cannot get into general circulation throughout the country because it is not in a suitable form for circulation.

If there is any fallacy in this argument, which was first brought out in the brief article in the July issue of your MAGAZINE, I would be glad to have it pointed out, as I am contemplating a further exposition of the subject from the standpoint of a student of political economy, not of practical banking.

I can easily understand that bank Cashiers prefer to handle notes only, as it is less trouble, and also that double eagles, and even eagles, *will flow back as fast as they are put out*, but I think the farmers and people generally throughout the country are now able to absorb many million dollars in gold, if issued in half-eagles or quarter-eagles, and I am sure that the educational value would be no small matter. I know this from actual contact with and examination of many laborers.

Notwithstanding the fact that our gold has increased so enormously since I first agitated this question, I have not received any gold in change, although I have distributed some in wages and other payments, having obtained \$5 pieces from bank for this purpose.

I do not wish to father a "fad," or waste time or thought on any impracticable scheme or false theory. If, therefore, you can point to any flaw in the argument as presented in your MAGAZINE, I would take it as a favor if you would do so. I learned, among other things of lesser interest to me, that there are about three times the number of employees in the Mint to-day that there were in 1861, when the coinage of gold was much greater.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 27.

A. E. OUTERBRIDGE, JR.

*Answer.*—The desirability of having gold coin brought into actual circulation, at least to a greater extent than now prevails, has been frequently pointed out by the MAGAZINE. Russia is endeavoring to carry out this policy, as referred to in the Report of the Minister of Finance on page 367 of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE for March, 1898.

Gold coins of a denomination of \$2.50, \$5 and \$10 would certainly be preferable to the dirty bills now in circulation. Besides, it would be beneficial from an economic standpoint to have gold thus brought into use.

If the Government, instead of coining gold in large denominations suitable for export and hoarding, would coin the denominations above mentioned, and put the coin in circulation, it would go a long ways toward curing the free silver folly. Many people who never see any gold (not even in the form of certificates) except in the figures published by the bank and Government reports, have come to regard its existence as mythical.

SAVINGS BANKS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK.—Statement of their condition by counties January 1, 1890.  
Compiled from the official reports.

County.	No. of Banks.	Total Resources.	Due Depositors.	Other Liabilities.	Surplus.	Open Accounts.	Accounts opened during year 1898.	Accounts closed during year 1898.	Deposits during year 1898, not including interest.	Amount withdrawn during year 1898.	Amount of interest credited and paid for year 1898.	Salaries and expenses for year 1898.
Albany.....	9	\$53,780,146	\$49,091,178	\$87,099	\$4,691,868	76,489	15,382	11,437	\$14,458,519	\$11,907,124	\$1,781,418	\$123,451
Bronx.....	2	2,660,176	2,553,374	.....	244,112	16,280	3,079	2,291	1,576,898	1,476,675	76,507	20,736
Cayuga.....	2	4,817,369	4,383,155	.....	549,214	15,116	3,258	2,387	2,191,572	1,795,284	134,022	20,658
Chester.....	1	2,416,635	2,111,132	38	2,552	1,013	398	168	70,404	41,079	1,701	1,576
Columbia.....	1	2,783,821	2,455,865	.....	327,447	7,065	1,257	1,146	617,028	628,348	79,342	10,071
Cortland.....	1	1,697,825	1,413,089	380	192,488	6,290	1,583	1,146	708,522	588,523	48,711	6,248
Dutchess.....	1	13,418,450	12,028,006	380	1,373,325	28,367	3,200	2,648	2,440,856	2,063,549	438,633	30,371
Essex.....	1	46,683,354	40,734,173	.....	5,949,360	63,374	18,745	15,571	14,482,781	12,629,032	1,465,821	177,821
Fulton.....	4	1,566,648	45,573	8,359	3,015	387	199	199	15,650	34,176	4,588	4,097
Greene.....	1	1,532,116	1,346,300	38	205,693	4,011	754	597	374,988	307,553	41,980	4,067
Hamilton.....	2	3,384,123	3,268,873	.....	315,249	13,559	2,748	1,601	1,435,049	988,667	106,878	12,621
Jefferson.....	1	151,116,857	131,359,451	44,647	19,711,747	303,935	51,264	43,970	35,930,305	32,984,397	4,574,707	346,967
Kings.....	16	1,090,598	971,104	2,466	1,117,727	4,305	16,065	11,702	1,391,497	1,310,126	31,479	4,253
Madison.....	1	36,947,822	32,860,360	135,109	3,835,782	70,669	16,065	11,471	11,454,611	11,094,554	1,096,554	124,479
Montgomery.....	4	1,323,273	1,256,985	.....	66,707	6,090	1,394	1,313	713,032	494,431	1,096,554	3,901
New York.....	27	497,882,989	439,839,394	2,103	58,044,321	947,711	174,314	150,068	112,851,296	103,522,743	14,729,549	1,219,968
Ontario.....	2	2,194,100	2,015,747	.....	178,059	6,606	2,010	1,363	3,372,369	2,988,640	47,250	10,975
Niagara.....	3	11,148,563	9,238,015	358	1,873,678	28,462	4,853	3,897	2,066,168	1,841,365	892,304	30,148
Oneida.....	3	26,699,699	24,238,057	11,320	2,346,721	59,451	13,581	9,974	9,368,692	8,411,365	304,822	119,235
Oranget.....	3	11,548,044	10,067,944	.....	1,481,069	27,771	3,415	2,563	2,149,344	1,971,500	357,623	55,739
Orange.....	6	3,613,696	3,256,377	261	317,887	10,442	2,639	2,349	1,454,479	1,314,896	107,363	19,490
Putnam.....	1	345,259	3,8,232	.....	37,027	1,353	197	177	78,000	78,000	19,632	1,712
Queens.....	5	5,060,722	4,496,920	50	565,751	17,953	4,496	3,515	1,798,441	1,459,007	151,469	23,062
Rensselaer.....	2	8,702,849	7,238,386	62,959	1,391,642	17,984	3,258	2,894	1,684,360	1,535,184	233,140	29,072
Richmond.....	2	1,672,708	1,512,444	.....	160,263	6,743	1,355	894	735,776	640,443	46,439	12,306
Schenectady.....	2	2,385,529	2,234,354	126	151,819	8,747	3,349	1,349	943,513	747,807	68,982	6,331
Seneca.....	1	280,077	233,539	.....	16,237	1,504	409	315	193,702	169,548	20,132	1,964
Suffolk.....	4	6,283,653	5,337,636	.....	746,116	13,108	1,788	1,074	1,245,022	1,091,658	201,223	29,194
Tompkins.....	1	1,541,680	1,309,490	15	233,344	6,185	1,074	773	1,245,022	1,091,658	201,223	29,194
Ulster.....	1	7,998,765	7,260,972	.....	737,793	3,770	2,940	2,940	1,893,634	1,784,822	242,321	32,467
Westchester.....	16	14,358,562	13,104,940	56	1,231,547	42,172	7,036	5,425	4,013,012	3,540,526	455,084	69,259
Totals, January 1, 1890.....	130	\$623,420,861	\$816,144,367	\$370,871	\$106,896,623	1,895,653	347,866	297,928	\$229,474,378	\$207,811,445	\$27,067,311	\$2,519,479

# BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

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This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

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## NEW YORK CITY.

—The City Trust Company opened for business at 36 Wall street on March 1. with \$1,000,000 capital and \$1,000,000 surplus. Its officers are: President, James Ross Curran; First Vice-President, John D. Crimmins; Second Vice-President, Geo. R. Sheldon; Assistant Secretaries, Arthur Terry and Walter W. Lee.

—An approaching event of importance is the centenary of the Manhattan Company, that institution having received its charter on April 2, 1790. The bank will appropriately celebrate the event.

—John G. Jenkins, ex-Governor Flower and other prominent capitalists are reported to be organizing the Williamsburg Trust Co. in the Borough of Brooklyn. Capital will be \$500,000, and the paid-in surplus probably \$250,000.

—The Franklin National Bank, which has been considering the advisability of going into liquidation, may decide to continue in business with increased capital.

—At a meeting of the board of directors of the National Bank of the Republic on March 1, Orlando H. Harriman was appointed Second Assistant Cashier. Mr. Harriman has been discount clerk of the bank and has been in its employ a number of years.

—A special meeting of the board of trustees of the State Trust Co. was held February 20 at which Walter S. Johnston was elected President, and Wm. A. Nash and Henry H. Cook, Vice-Presidents.

—At a meeting of the board of directors of the National Citizens' Bank, February 17, Ewald Fleitmann, a director, was unanimously elected Vice-President.

—Charles H. Roberts succeeds H. N. Whitney as President of the Schermerhorn Bank, Brooklyn, the latter resigning to devote his attention to the banking and brokerage firm of Kissam, Whitney & Co., of which he is a member. The new President was for eight years Cashier of the Empire State Bank, New York, which went into liquidation after the destruction of its banking house by fire in 1896. It paid all claims and returned stockholders a considerable advance on their investment, the liquidation being effected in four months.

—As a result of the merging of the Hudson River and Astor Place banks with the Corn Exchange, the stock of the latter will be increased from \$1,000,000 to \$1,400,000, of this amount \$365,000 will be used for consolidation purposes. The \$200,000 stock of the Hudson River will be exchanged for \$160,000 Corn Exchange stock, and the \$250,000 capital of the Astor Place will be exchanged for \$235,000 stock in the Corn Exchange.

—An interest in the Mount Morris Bank, at Park avenue and 125th street, has been secured by the National Park Bank, and a number of the latter bank's directors have been added to the board of the Mount Morris Bank. President Thomas L. Watt and the other officers of the Mount Morris Bank will remain in charge of its business.

—The propriety of imposing graduated charges for the collection of country checks is under consideration by the clearing-house with a probability of some definite action being taken.

—Jacob H. Schiff, of the banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., has been elected a director of the National City Bank.

—William C. Whitney, P. A. B. Widener, Edward H. Clarke and H. H. Vreeland were recently elected trustees of the State Trust Co., succeeding Geo. W. White, Percival Knauth and Charles L. Tiffany.

—The Mutual Bank has removed from Eighth avenue and Thirty-fourth street to the quarters formerly occupied by the Sixth National Bank at Broadway and Thirty-third street.

—Henry S. Kerr, of Messrs. Redmond, Kerr & Co., has been elected a trustee of the Continental Trust Co., to fill a vacancy.

—Recent reports are to the effect that the gold in the clearing-house vaults exceeds the limits of storage room originally provided, and that another vault will have to be built to accommodate the overflow.

—A representative of Messrs. J. M. Ceballos & Co. and Muller, Schall & Co., of New York, has filed an application with Governor-General Henry for permission to establish an American bank at San Juan, Porto Rico. The General has approved the application.

—It is reported that a branch of the Hamilton Bank will probably be established in the neighborhood of Amsterdam avenue and 148th street.

—A meeting of the clearing-house association, called to consider amendments to the constitution in regard to charges for collecting checks on out-of-town banks, was held on March 9. The amendments provide for the fixing of a rate for collecting country checks by members of the clearing-house and non-member banks which clear through them. The rates are to be set by the clearing-house committee, but shall not be changed in any three months by such committee, except with the consent of the association. At the expiration of any three months the rates may be changed by the committee.

The rates as proposed are from one-tenth to one-quarter of one per cent., according to the location of the banks on which the checks are drawn. There are exceptions in favor of Boston, Providence, Albany, Troy, Jersey City, Newark, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. For these places the charging of rates is to be discretionary. The rules in regard to these charges will be enforced with rigor. The penalty for the first violation is a fine of \$5,000, and for the second expulsion from the association.

It was agreed that, in accordance with the rules, the amendments lie over until March 13.

At the meeting authority was given to the clearing-house committee to provide such new vaults for gold deposits as may be necessary.

#### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—The Third National will have a meeting of its shareholders on April 5 to take action on a proposition to reduce the capital from \$2,000,000 to \$1,500,000, returning \$500,000 in cash to the shareholders. This action is due to the increasing burden of taxation and the continued low rates of interest.

—Leland, Towle & Co. have dissolved by mutual consent and have been succeeded by Arthur S. Leland & Co., the partners being Arthur S. Leland and William A. Brawley.

—A bill re-establishing days of grace on sight drafts has been passed by the Legislature over the Governor's veto.

—The bill reducing the minimum capital of trust companies from \$200,000 to \$100,000 has been rejected by the Legislature.

—From statistics recently compiled it appears that the total resources of all the banks in the city are about \$579,000,000—a gain of \$106,000,000 as compared with four years ago. In this time there has been a decrease of nine in the number of National banks, but their resources have gained \$4,257,000 in the period named. The resources of the several classes of banks are distributed as follows: Forty-six National banks, \$307,795,180; eighteen Savings banks, \$163,191,909; fourteen trust companies, \$108,996,025.

—In the plan for establishing a clearing-house for country checks, still under consideration, it is proposed that each New England bank shall designate some bank in Boston that will receive in the so-called country clearing-house, all cash items upon that bank. That Boston bank will then forward to such country banks all items that have been received in the clearing-house each day, and two days later, when advice of payment of such items shall have been received, actual payment shall be made through the clearing-house to the proper parties. In some instances such payment shall be deferred for four days.

—The usual annual reception and banquet of the Boston Bank Officers' Association took place at Copley Hall, February 8, over four hundred members being present.

**New Savings Bank.**—The Mascoma Savings Bank is being organized at Lebanon, N. H.

**Bank to Reorganize.**—The Comptroller of the Currency has given permission to the Hampshire County National Bank, Northampton, Mass., to reorganize and resume business. A plan of reorganization has been adopted, and the early return of the bank to a solvent condition is expected.

## MIDDLE STATES.

**Baltimore, Md.**—Negotiations are reported to be in progress for the consolidation of the People's Bank, the Traders' National and Continental National Bank, the new institution to have \$1,000,000 capital. The Citizens' National also may be asked to come into the combination.

—Incorporators of the Home Trust Co. have formed a temporary organization with \$100,000 capital.

—Stockholders of the Fidelity and Deposit Co. have voted to increase the capital stock from \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000. The par value of the stock to be \$50 a share, but to be sold at \$135. This will permit of the addition of \$850,000 to the surplus, making that fund \$1,850,000, which with the capital and reserve and profits will give the company a working capital of over \$4,000,000.

—The National Mechanics' Bank has purchased the stock of the National Farmers and Planters' Bank, amounting to \$800,000, paying \$55 a share, par value being \$25. Included in the transfer is the building of the latter bank.

—Edgar K. Legg and others have incorporated the Union Savings Bank.

**Change in Cashiers.**—After serving for upwards of thirty-five years as Cashier of the First National Bank, Reading, Pa., John R. Kaucher presented his resignation on February 4, which was accepted, and Joseph W. Richards, Assistant Cashier, was elected to succeed him. The new Cashier has been connected with the bank for thirty years.

**New Cashier Elected.**—At a recent meeting of the directors of the Miners and Merchants' Bank, of Lonaconing, Md., J. Wilmer Garland resigned as Cashier for the purpose of accepting a position with the United States Trust Co., of Baltimore, and Hugh Scott, a well-known and successful business man, was chosen as his successor.

**Syracuse, N. Y.**—The German-American Trust and Deposit Co. is being organized with \$200,000 capital stock.

—Anthony Lamb, Cashier of the Commercial Bank, is now Manager of the clearing-house association.

**Newburgh, N. Y.**—Shareholders of the Highland National Bank have ratified the proposition to reduce the capital stock from \$300,000 to \$200,000.

At the election held on February 13 Harry A. Bartlett was elected President to succeed Augustus Denniston. Mr. Bartlett has been for some years Secretary of the Columbus Trust Co., and was for eight years a clerk in the National Bank of Newburgh.

**Elected Cashier.**—At a recent meeting of the directors of the First National Bank, of Phillipsburg, Pa., Frank K. Lukenbach, teller of the bank from the time of its incorporation, was elected Cashier and also a director. His business qualifications for the position are good and his personal character such as to win friends for the bank. John E. Fryberger succeeds Mr. Lukenbach as teller.

**New State Bank.**—The McKechnie Bank, Canandaigua, N. Y., commenced business as a State discount and deposit bank on March 1; capital, \$100,000.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—The Manufacturers and Traders' Bank is negotiating for a site on which it will put up a fine bank building.

**Pittsburg, Pa.**—The regular meeting of Group 8 of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association was held on February 21, at Hotel Schenley. The meeting was called to order at 6.30 P. M. by C. F. Dean, chairman of the group. Eighty-two of the one hundred and forty-seven members were present, thirty-six city and forty-six country banks being represented. The various reports from the secretary and treasurer were submitted and after all the routine business was finished an election for officers to serve for the ensuing year was held with the following result, viz.: Chairman—A. C. Knox, Pittsburg National Bank of Commerce, Pittsburg; vice-chairman—S. S. Graham, Second National Bank, Brownsville; secretary—R. J. Stoney, Jr., R. J. Stoney, Jr., Banker, Pittsburg; treasurer—F. R. Arnold, First National Bank, Clarion. Executive committee: chairman—H. H. Bowman, Uniontown; C. C. Harrison, Somerset; W. W. Ramsey, Pittsburg; Samuel McElroy, Pittsburg; Paul Craft, Blairsville.

It was decided to hold the summer meeting of the Group at Uniontown.

After the meeting a dinner was tendered by the group to its members and friends, many ladies being present as guests. The dinner was presided over by W. R. Thompson. The retiring chairman, Mr. C. F. Dean, made a short address which was followed by addresses by Chancellor W. J. Holland, of the Western University of Pennsylvania, on "Finances and Education;" J. B. Finley on "The Country Banker;" Charles McKnight, "Nothing out of Nothing;" J. A. Langfitt, Esq., on "The Relation of the Law to Banking."

The meeting was the largest ever held by the group and was in many ways the most successful, particularly in a social way.

Utica, N. Y.—At a meeting of the directors of the Oneida County Bank recently, Charles A. Butler was elected President to succeed the late J. M. Butler. Charles B. Rogers was elected Vice-President and Frank A. Bosworth, Cashier. Appropriate resolutions were passed in regard to the deceased President of the bank.

#### SOUTHERN STATES.

**New Southern Banks.**—The Bank of Adairsville, Ga., is being organized. Ground has been purchased on which to erect a new building.

—Subscriptions are being received to the stock of a new National bank at Sherman, Tex.

—A charter was recently granted to the Bank of Suffolk, Va.; capital, \$50,000.

**Arkansas Bankers' Association.**—This association will hold its ninth annual convention at Little Rock April 20 and 21. The officers are: President, S. S. Faulkner, Helena; secretary, M. H. Johnson, Little Rock; treasurer, W. H. Lee, Dardanelle.

#### WESTERN STATES.

St. Joseph, Mo.—O. J. Albrecht, Manager of the St. Joseph Clearing-House Association, reports that the total bank clearings of this city for 1898 were \$126,429,713 and the average weekly clearings \$2,885,467. The average weekly increase was 86.1 per cent., leading the entire list of clearing-house cities in this respect. For the present year a highly satisfactory rate of gain is also shown.

This is an indication of increased business activity in that fertile portion of the great Missouri Valley, and the banks are to be congratulated on the surprisingly favorable showing contained in the figures reported by Mr. Albrecht.

Sioux City, Iowa.—It is reported that the First National Bank has been practically absorbed by the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, which has purchased a controlling interest in the bank. The officers of the First National Bank will be: President, James F. Toy; Vice-President, A. Groninger; Cashier, T. A. Black.

Chicago.—The Merchants' Loan and Trust Bank practically has concluded arrangements by which Marshall Field will erect a new building for its occupancy at the northwest corner of Clark and Adams streets. The negotiations looking to this settlement of the question where the bank should remove when its lease at Washington and Dearborn streets expires in May, 1900, have been under way for some time, but only recently was the proposition of Mr. Field practically accepted. Mr. Field is himself a director in the bank. His proposition provides for the construction of a high-class office building to be finished May 1, 1900, or as soon thereafter as it can be with safety. It will be called the Merchants' Loan and Trust Company Building, and will be adapted particularly to the bank's needs. The bank will occupy the entire banking floor and the basement. It is announced that on going into the new building the bank will open safety deposit vaults, which will be an addition to its present business.

Des Moines, Iowa.—The Capital City State Bank, it is reported, will put up a new bank and office building the coming summer.

—A statement of the condition of the 178 Savings and 206 State banks, recently made public in the report of the Auditor of State, shows a gain of \$11,941,036 in the deposits of these institutions in the past year. The total deposits are about \$65,000,000.

**To Insure Bank Deposits.**—A bill has been introduced in the Nebraska Legislature requiring all State banks to lodge five per cent. of their deposits with the State Treasurer as a guaranty fund to secure depositors.

Louisville, Ky.—It is reported that the Farmers and Drovers' Bank will be reorganized as a National bank soon and that James S. Escott, for the past eight years a National bank examiner, will become President.

**Bankruptcy Law Upheld.**—At St. Louis, Mo., on February 16, Judges Thayer, Sanborn and Caldwell of the United States Court of Appeals rendered an important opinion sustaining the Bankruptcy law. The opinion upholds the Federal Bankruptcy Act and establishes its precedence over State legislation. The case was one involving the validity of an assignment made under State law.

**Negotiable Instruments Law.**—The general law relating to negotiable instruments, already in force in a number of the leading commercial States, was recently passed by the Legislature of North Dakota.

#### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Negotiable Instruments Law.**—The general law on this subject was passed at the last session of the Oregon Legislature and will go into effect May 19.

**Tacoma, Wash.**—The Pacific National Bank has decided to reduce its capital from \$400,000 to \$200,000. W. M. Ladd, of Ladd & Tilton, Portland, has been elected President in place of Chas. P. Masterson, who becomes Vice-President.

**A Noted Forger Dead.**—Austin Bidwell, who with his brother got a large sum from the Bank of England some years ago on forged securities, died at Butte, Mont., March 7.

The Bidwells were among the noted bank forgers of the present century. They undoubtedly obtained large sums from the Bank of England on forged bills of exchange—the amounts having been estimated to run up into millions of dollars. In drawing up one of these forged bills they neglected to date it. The omission was not discovered until after the bill had been paid, when it was sent to the firm by whom it was supposedly drawn with a request that the date be filled in. This led to the discovery of the forgery, and the forgers were afterwards convicted and served about twenty years each in prison. Their sentence was for life, but they were finally released and returned to this country a few years ago.

### CANADA.

**Montreal.**—Mr. George Hague, for twenty-two years General Manager of the Merchants' Bank of Canada, has been relieved of some of the more arduous responsibilities incident to his position which he has so long and honorably filled. Mr. Thos. Fysha, an able Canadian financier, and joint General Manager of the bank, taking over a large share of the work heretofore devolving upon Mr. Hague, the latter still retaining his office, however.

**New Branch Opened.**—A branch of the Bank of British North America has been opened at Midland, Ontario.

**Managers of Branches.**—J. M. Kains has been appointed Manager of the South Edmonton, Alberta, branch of the Imperial Bank of Canada.

—W. Farrell is Manager of the new office of the Bank of Hamilton at Vancouver, B. C.

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**Important Bank Ruling.**—A decision has been made regarding the reopening of the Hampshire County National Bank of Northampton, Mass., which involves an important legal question.

It was recently decided that a bank which had suspended payments should be placed in the hands of a Receiver at once in order to secure the equal distribution of the assets, because the assets would be liable to judgments on behalf of individual creditors if they were simply in the hands of a bank examiner. The question then arose whether the Comptroller of the Currency had authority to release a bank from the hands of a Receiver when it was restored to solvency, in view of the fact that the Revised Statutes seemed to contemplate only the appointment of an agent for winding up the affairs of a bank. The Hampshire County National Bank and the German National Bank of Pittsburg, Pa., were among those which desired to resume business and to be discharged from the hands of a Receiver. Comptroller Dawes took legal counsel in the matter, and was advised that the restoration of a solvent bank to the performance of its full functions was entirely within his authority.

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**Supreme Court Decision.**—On February 20 the United States Supreme Court announced an opinion in two cases involving the right of a secured creditor of a failed National bank to prove his claim for the full amount and receive dividends on it, irrespective of the amount received from the sale of his collateral, save only that in no case shall the amount received by him be more than the amount of his claim. They came from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, upon the appeal of J. B. Merrill, Receiver of the First National Bank of Palatka, Fla., from the judgment of that court in favor of the National Bank of Jacksonville. The latter was a creditor of the failed bank for \$18,104, holding collateral security which yielded \$4,498. The Jacksonville bank contended that it was entitled to dividends on the whole amount of its claim, until their total, with the amount realized from the security, was equal to the whole sum. The Receiver, however, took the ground that it was entitled to dividends only on the net amount of its claim. The Jacksonville bank sued Receiver Merrill, and its claim was adjudged to be good, both in the Circuit Court and in the Court of Appeals. Their judgment was affirmed by that of the Supreme Court. Justices Harlan, Gray, White and McKenna dissented.

Justice White, for his colleagues, said that the judgment of the court gave a secured creditor a preference after insolvency that he did not possess before, and that in support of it the court quoted an obsolete principle of the British law. By the judgment of the court, he said, an equitable *pro rata* distribution of the assets of the bank, which the law of Congress ordered, was prevented from being made.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

- 5176—National Bank of Commerce, Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5177—First National Bank, Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5178—First National Bank, Addison, New York. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5179—Frost National Bank, San Antonio, Texas. Capital, \$350,000.
- 5180—Commercial National Bank, Columbus, Nebraska. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5181—Border National Bank, Eagle Pass, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5182—Murchison National Bank, Wilmington, North Carolina. Capital, \$200,000.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

- Red Lion National Bank of York County, Red Lion, Pa.; by C. S. La Motte, *et al.*
- Bedford National Bank, Bedford, Ind.; by Thomas O. Daggy, *et al.*
- Ocala National Bank, Ocala, Fla.; by R. A. Burford, *et al.*
- Eldorado National Bank, Eldorado, Kans.; by J. P. Campbell, *et al.*
- Sherman National Bank, Sherman, Texas; by W. R. Brents, *et al.*
- Athens National Bank, Athens, Pennsylvania; by L. W. Eighmey, *et al.*
- Grayson National Bank, Sherman, Texas; by J. P. Withers, *et al.*
- Mechanics' National Bank, Millville, N. J.; by Harry O. Newcomb, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

**MONTGOMERY**—Union Savings Bank & Trust Co. (Organizing).

**VINEMONT**—People's Bank.

#### ARIZONA.

**KINGMAN**—Bank of Kingman; H. H. Watkins, Mgr.

#### CALIFORNIA.

**SAN RAFAEL**—Marin County Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., Charles Martin; Cas. and Sec., S. H. Cheda.

#### CONNECTICUT.

**CANTON**—Valley Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**COLLINSVILLE**—Canton Trust Co.

#### GEORGIA.

**ADAIRSVILLE**—Bank of Adairsville; capital, \$20,000; Pres., R. L. McCalby.

**VILLA RICA**—Bank of Villa Rica; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. B. Candler; Cas., S. O. Fielder.

#### IDAHO.

**MOSCOW**—Spokane & Eastern Trust Co.

#### ILLINOIS.

**ANNA**—Bank of Anna; Pres., D. W. Karraker; Cas., Jno. B. Jackson.

**CHICAGO**—Zion City Bank.

**KIRKWOOD**—State Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**METAMORA**—State Bank; capital, \$25,000.

#### INDIANA.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Title Guaranty Trust Co.; capital, \$150,000.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**CADDO**—Farmers & Merchants' Bank; Pres.,

L. B. Smith; Vice-Pres., H. M. Dunlap; Cas., Fred L. Davis.

**COMANCHE**—Bank of Comanche; capital, \$10,000; Pres., B. E. Massey; Cas., C. W. Brown.

#### IOWA.

**ALTA VISTA**—Henry Kiene; capital, \$10,000; Cas., Otto M. Lorenz.

**DELHI**—Delhi Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Thomas Simons; Cas., G. W. Klockenteger.

**DELMAR**—People's Savings Bank; Pres., F. P. Goodjohn; Vice-Pres., C. C. Davies; Cas., J. C. Spencer.

**EAGLE GROVE**—Security Savings Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. H. Howell; Vice-Pres., S. H. Williamson; Cas., J. P. Clark.

**EVERLY**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank.

**LAMONI**—Farmers' Bank.

**SANBORN**—Sanborn Savings Bank (successor to First National Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. W. Johnson; Cas., J. H. Daly.

**SHEFFIELD**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. F. Johnston; Cas., G. A. Johnston.

#### KANSAS.

**BUFFALO**—State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. H. Gunby; Cas., J. F. Gunby.

**CARBONDALE**—Carbondale State Bank (successor to Commercial Bank); capital, \$10,000; Pres., M. F. Southwick; Vice-Pres., C. W. Snyder; Cas., P. W. Robison.

**GOODLAND**—Union State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., William Ennis; Cas., C. F. Weber.



**KENTUCKY.****MAYFIELD**—Exchange Bank.**MARYLAND.****BALTIMORE**—Union Savings Bank.**BEL AIR**—Smith, Rouse & Webster.**MICHIGAN.****CHARLEVOIX**—Charlevoix County Bank (successor to Charlevoix Savings Bank); Pres., Jno. Nichols; Cas., A. Butters.**MINNESOTA.****DETROIT**—First State Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., Jeff. H. Irish; Cas., A. G. Wedge, Jr.  
**LAKEFIELD**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., F. W. Thompson; Vice-Pres., N. J. Scott; Cas., J. W. Daubney.**SAUK RAPIDS**—Benton County Bank; Pres., Andrew Jacobson; Cas., Frank Windblade.**WALNUT GROVE**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital, \$5,000; R. R. Freeman, Cas. and owner.**MISSISSIPPI.****HATTIESBURG**—National Bank of Commerce (successor to Bank of Commerce); capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. P. Carter; Cas., F. W. Foote.—**FIRST NATIONAL BANK**; capital, \$50,000; Pres., John F. Champenois; Cas., E. B. Scanlon.**HOLLY SPRINGS**—Merchants and Farmers' Bank; capital, \$50,000.**MISSOURI.****ORONOGO**—State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., H. C. Lisch; Vice-Pres., Wm. G. Gunning; Cas., John Wilson.**NEBRASKA.****COLUMBUS**—Commercial National Bank (successor to Commercial Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., C. H. Sheldon; Cas., Daniel Schram; Asst. Cas., Frank Rorer.**NEWPORT**—Rock County State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., C. M. Thompson; Cas., B. V. Thompson.**NEW HAMPSHIRE.****GRANITE**—Granite Savings Bank; Pres., W. F. French; Treas., A. L. Keyes.**LEBANON**—Mascoma Savings Bank.**NASHUA**—Citizens' Institution for Savings.**NEW YORK.****ADDISON**—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Solomon V. Lattimer; Cas., Burton G. Winton.**BROOKLYN**—Williamsburg Trust Co.; capital, \$500,000.**CANANDAIGUA**—McKeehnie Bank (successor to McKeehnie & Co.); capital, \$100,000; Pres., O. S. Bacon; Vice-Pres., F. A. McKeehnie; Cas., Frank E. Howe; Asst. Cas., Peter P. Turner.**HAMMONDSPORT**—A. G. Pratt & Co.; Pres., Lyman Aulls; Vice-Pres., Sanford Bedell; Cas., Aaron G. Pratt.**HORNELLSVILLE**—Hornellsville Trust and Safe Deposit Co.; Pres., Wm. Richardson; Vice-Pres., M. A. Smith.**SYRACUSE**—German-American Trust and Deposit Co.**TROY**—Kennedy, Wilbur & Co. (successors to Weatherly & Wilbur).**NORTH CAROLINA.****FAYETTEVILLE**—Bank of Cumberland.**GOLDSBORO**—Commercial and Savings Bank.**RALEIGH**—Raleigh Banking and Trust Co.**SALISBURY**—North Carolina Trust Co.**WADESBORO**—Bank of Wadesboro.**WILMINGTON**—Murchison National Bank (successor to Murchison & Co.); capital, \$200,000; Pres., H. C. McQueen; Cas., J. V. Grainger.**NORTH DAKOTA.****GRAND FORKS**—C. C. Gowran & Co.**GLEN ULLIN**—German State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Jno. F. Robinson; Cas., W. T. Moore.**KINDRED**—Norman State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., John Rustad; Vice-Pres., Max H. Strehlow; Cas., K. O. Abrahamsen.**NEW SALEM**—New Salem State Bank.**WILLISTON**—Williams County State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Chas. H. Davidson, Jr.; Cas., W. H. Denny.**OHIO.****LA GRANGE**—People's Bank.**OKLAHOMA TERRITORY.****PERRY**—Noble County Bank; capital, \$12,000; Pres., Seth Parmenter; Vice-Pres., E. D. Nims; Cas., L. C. Parmenter.**PENNSYLVANIA.****RED LION**—Red Lion National Bank of York County; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. H. Taylor; Cas., J. A. Gillen.**SOUTH CAROLINA.****RIDGEWAY**—Bank of Ridgeway; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. H. Ruff; Vice-Pres., I. C. Thomas; Cas., N. W. Palmer.**WALTERBORO**—Colleton Banking Co.; capital, \$10,000; Pres., John F. Lucas; Cas., R. C. Fraser, Jr.**TENNESSEE.****GREENFIELD**—Greenfield Bank (successor to Weakley County Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., A. D. Kent; Cas., R. L. Goolshy.**HUMBOLDT**—Humboldt Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. H. Thomas; Vice-Pres., G. W. Bailey; Cas., E. L. Fox.**TEXAS.****EAGLE PASS**—Border National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. A. Bonnet; Cas., S. P. Simpson.**EASTLAND**—Eastland County Bank (successor to Eastland National Bank); capital, \$100,000; Pres., Ed. S. Hughes; Vice-Pres., Henry James; Cas., J. M. Cunningham.**MERKEL**—Bank of Merkel (successor to Stefena, Lowdon & Co.); capital, \$25,000.**ROSEBUD**—Rosebud Bank (Geo. W. Riddle).**SAN ANTONIO**—Frost National Bank (successor to T. C. Frost & Co.); capital, \$250,000; Pres., Thomas C. Frost; Cas., Josiah T. Woodhull.

WHARTON—G. C. Gifford & Co.; P. R. Murray, Cashier.

#### VIRGINIA.

CHRISTIANSBURG—People's Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., J. W. Shelton; Cas., W. J. Hall.

FLOYD—People's Bank of Floyd Co.; capital, \$12,500; Pres., P. G. Lester; Vice-Pres., V. M. Sowder; Cas. S. R. Brame.

SUFFOLK—Bank of Suffolk; capital, \$30,000; Pres., James L. McLemore; Cas., A. Woolford.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

RAVENSWOOD—Jackson County Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Selden Hutchinson; Cas., G. W. Park; Asst. Cas., J. B. Morgan.

#### WISCONSIN.

CUBA—Farmers' Bank (successor to Dickeysville Savings and Loan Co.); capital, \$6,000.

HANCOCK—Bank of Hancock; \$10,000.

#### CUBA.

HAVANA—Merchants' Bank of Canada; F. J. Sherman, Mgr.

#### CANADA.

##### BRITISH COLUMBIA.

ATLIN CITY—Canadian Bank of Commerce.

##### MANITOBA.

SELKIRK—F. E. Stevens.

TREHERNE—J. T. Reid & Co. (successors to R. S. Alexander).

WINKLER—Bank of Hamilton.

#### CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

##### ALABAMA.

BIRMINGHAM—First National Bank; T. M. Bradley and J. H. Barr, Asst. Cashiers.

EUFULA—East Alabama National Bank; T. G. Gulse, Vice-Pres.

JACKSONVILLE—Tredegar National Bank; Geo. P. Ide, Cas. in place of Geo. H. Rowan, Actg. Cas.

MOBILE—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of L. Lowenstein, deceased.

##### ARKANSAS.

FAYETTEVILLE—Bank of Fayetteville; capital reduced to \$40,000.

##### CALIFORNIA.

FRESNO—First National Bank; T. C. White, Vice-Pres. in place of E. Kennedy.

HAYWARDS—Bank of Haywards; J. E. Crooks, Cas., deceased.

LEMOORE—Bank of Lemoore; R. E. McKenna, Sec. and Cas.; G. Merz, Asst. Cas.

LOS ANGELES—National Bank of California; Jno. M. C. Marble, Pres. in place of S. C. Hubbell; J. E. Fishburn and John E. Marble, Vice-Presidents.—State Loan and Trust Co.; name reported changed to State Bank and Trust Co.

PALO ALTO—Bank of Palo Alto; B. Parkinson, Pres., deceased.

SAN JOSE—First National Bank; J. D. Grant, Vice-Pres. in place of Jas. D. Phelan.—Union Bank; Thomas Rea, Pres. in place

#### NORTHWEST TERRITORY.

WAPPELLA—R. A. Pease & Co.

#### ONTARIO.

ATWOOD—J. D. Scott; D. L. Scott, Mgr.  
DRAYTON—J. Skerritt; H. T. Northgrave, Mgr.

HANOVER—Merchants' Bank of Canada (successor to McNally & Adams).

HUNTSVILLE—Dominion Bank of Canada.

INWOOD—Gordon & Douglas.

LANARK—Bank of Ottawa; Duncan McNamara, Mgr.

MARKDALE—Merchants' Bank of Canada; W. A. Burrows, Mgr.

MIDLAND—Canadian Bank of Commerce.

PALMERSTON—Bank of Hamilton.

PARKDALE—Merchants' Bank of Canada; Phillip Dykes, Mgr.

SCHOMBERG—Jos. Hollingshead.

STURGEON FALLS—Traders' Bank of Canada; L. P. Snyder, Mgr.

TAVISTOCK—Western Bank of Canada; Chas. J. Fox, Mgr.

VANKLEEK HILL—Bank of Ottawa.

#### QUEBEC.

RIMOUSKI—La Banque Nationale.

SHERBROOKE—Frank Thompson & Co.; capital, \$25,000.

ST. GEORGE—Quebec Bank; L. de G. Grand, Mgr.

of H. W. Wright; Antone Friant, Cas. resigned.

SAN FRANCISCO—Crocker-Woolworth National Bank; W. Gregg, Jr., Asst. Cas.

#### COLORADO.

GLENWOOD SPRINGS—First National Bank; J. H. Fesler, Vice-Pres. in place of C. W. Parks; C. W. Parks, Cas. in place of J. H. Fesler.

GREELEY—First National Bank; R. F. Graham, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Mayher.

#### CONNECTICUT.

HARTFORD—Phoenix National Bank; H. H. White no longer Asst. Cas.

MIDDLETOWN—Middlesex County National Bank; capital stock reduced from \$350,000 to \$175,000.

NEW BRITAIN—New Britain National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. B. Boardman.—Mechanics' National Bank; H. B. Boardman, Asst. Cas.

NEW LONDON—National Whaling Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of E. P. Beckwith.

WESTPORT—First National Bank; no Pres. in place of Horace Staples.

#### DELAWARE.

DOVER—First National Bank; John Hunt, Actg. Pres.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

WASHINGTON—Citizens' National Bank; N.

H. Shea, Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas Somerville.—National Metropolitan Bank; Geo. H. B. White, Cas., deceased.—West End National Bank; Walter R. Wilcox, Vice-Pres.

## FLORIDA.

ST. AUGUSTINE—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of Geo. W. Dismukes; Reginald White, Asst. Cas.

## GEORGIA.

AMERICUS—People's National Bank; H. C. Mitchell, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. C. Mitchell.

ATLANTA—Capital City Bank; Charles A. Collier, Cas.; Jacob Haas, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles A. Collier.

COLUMBUS—Fourth National Bank; capital stock reduced to \$100,000.

ROME—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres.

## IDAHO.

KENDRICK—First National Bank; F. N. Gilbert, Pres. in place of A. T. Gilbert.

POCATELLO—First National Bank; D. W. Standrod, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. Y. Wallace; Orrin Caldwell, Asst. Cas.

## ILLINOIS.

BEMENT—First National Bank; Wm. T. Bower, Vice-Pres.; W. A. Steel, Cas. in place of Wm. T. Bower.

CANTON—Canton National Bank; H. B. Heald, Asst. Cas.

CHICAGO—Bank of Nova Scotia; W. H. Davies, Asst. Mgr. in place of J. A. McLeod.

DECATUR—Citizens' National Bank; H. Schlaudeman, Pres. in place of Milton Johnson; Milton Johnson, Cas. in place of J. N. Baker, Acting Cas.

DIXON—City National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Crawford.

HARRISBURG—First National Bank; C. S. Wills, Cas., instead of C. T. Willis, as erroneously reported by Comptroller of the Currency.—City National Bank; W. V. Choisser, Pres. instead of W. B. Choisser, as erroneously reported by Comptroller of the Currency; P. H. Galaner, Asst. Cas.

NAPERVILLE—First National Bank; R. N. Ballou, Asst. Cas.

PEORIA—Peoria Savings, Loan and Trust Co.; Ira D. Buck, Vice-Pres. and Mgr.

PERU—Peru National Bank; J. J. Linnig, Asst. Cas.

PONTIAC—Livingston County National Bank; D. C. Eylar, Pres.; J. M. Lyon, Cas. in place of D. C. Eylar; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. M. Lyon.

SPRINGFIELD—First National Bank; F. E. Tracy, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. Pasfield; Jas. A. Easley, Second Asst. Cas.

## INDIANA.

ANDERSON—National Exchange Bank; C. W. Prather, Vice-Pres. in place of B. W. Scott; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Stansberry, Jr.

AUBURN—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas.  
BEDFORD—Citizens' National Bank; H. M. Voris, Asst. Cas.

DANVILLE—First National Bank; Mord Carter, Pres. in place of J. L. McConn; W. C. Osborn, Cas. in place of Mord Carter.

DUNKIRK—First National Bank; John W. Webster, Jr., Asst. Cas.

INDIANAPOLIS—Indiana National Bank; M. W. Malott, Asst. Cas.—Fletcher National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of A. M. Fletcher.

KOKOMO—Citizens' National Bank; Frank McCarty, Asst. Cas.

LEBANON—First National Bank; J. A. Coons, Asst. Cas.

MADISON—First National Bank; P. S. Pogue, Asst. Cas.

VINCENNES—Second National Bank; G. W. Donaldson, Pres. in place of George Fendrich; W. J. Freeman, Cas. in place of G. W. Donaldson; J. T. Boyd, Asst. Cas. in place of W. J. Freeman.

## INDIAN TERRITORY.

ARDMORE—City National Bank; J. A. Bivens, Vice-Pres. in place of H. F. Potts.

CHECOTAH—First National Bank; J. W. Sanders, Vice-Pres.

MUSCOGEE—First National Bank; B. A. Randle, Cas. in place of C. H. Warth; P. M. Ford, Asst. Cas.

PURCELL—Purcell National Bank; S. F. Williams, Vice-Pres. in place of Howard Ross.

## IOWA.

ALBIA—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of Tom Lockman; Roy T. Alford, Asst. Cas.

ALGONA—First National Bank; C. A. Palmer, Asst. Cas. in place of C. D. Smith.

BEDFORD—Bedford National Bank; F. E. Walker, Vice-Pres.; no Cas. in place of Ed. E. Cass; Charles B. Baily, Asst. Cas.

BRITT—First National Bank; Lewis Larson, Pres. in place of P. M. Joice; E. F. Larson, Cas. in place of Lewis Larson; no Asst. Cas. in place of E. F. Larson.

CARROLL—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of L. E. Bangs.

CEDAR FALLS—Cedar Falls National Bank; C. H. Rodenbach, Vice-Pres. in place of J. J. Tolerton.

CENTERVILLE—Centerville National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Guy A. Gilchrist.

CLARINDA—Clarinda National Bank; H. L. Cokenower, Vice-Pres. in place of H. E. Farslow.

COLUMBUS JUNCTION—Louisa County National Bank; E. R. Lacey, Cas. in place of W. A. Colton; Fred M. Colton, Asst. Cas. in place of E. R. Lacey.

DAVENPORT—Citizens' National Bank; F. C. Kroeger, Asst. Cas. in place of Adolph Priester.

DES MOINES—Des Moines National Bank; no Second Vice-Pres. in place of C. B. Atkins.

—Valley National Bank; N. W. Johnson, Pres. in place of J. J. Town.

**EAGLE GROVE**—Merchants' National Bank; J. Fitzmaurice, Pres. in place of W. C. Halsey; Thomas Collins, Vice-Pres. in place of J. P. Clark; E. C. Platt, Cas. in place of J. H. Howell; no Asst. Cas. in place of E. C. Platt.

**ELDORA**—First National Bank; D. E. Byam, Vice-Pres.

**ESTHERVILLE**—First National Bank; Webb Vincent, Vice-Pres.; W. A. Streator, Asst. Cas.

**FOREST CITY**—Forest City National Bank; C. A. Isaacs and W. O. Hanson, Asst. Cas.

**KNOXVILLE**—Marion County National Bank; Charles Perry, Vice-Pres. in place of L. O. Donley.

**LA PORTE CITY**—First National Bank; G. E. Stubbins, Asst. Cas.

**MANCHESTER**—First National Bank; R. R. Robinson, Vice-Pres. in place of H. C. Hablerle; no Second Vice-Pres.

**MANNING**—First National Bank; R. G. Sutherland, Asst. Cas.

**MARENGO**—First National Bank; J. J. Clements, Vice-Pres. in place of James H. Feenan.

**MONTEZUMA**—First National Bank; Thomas Harris, Pres. in place of John Hall; A. F. Rayburn, Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas Harris.

**ODEBOLT**—First National Bank; A. L. Hees, Asst. Cas. in place of W. Mengis.

**OSAGE**—Farmers' National Bank; E. E. Prime, Cas. in place of F. W. Annis; no Asst. Cas. in place of K. J. Johnson.

**PANORA**—Guthrie County National Bank; M. M. Reynolds, Pres. in place of Geo. H. Moore; W. C. Spurgin, Cas. in place of M. M. Reynolds; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. C. Spurgin.

**STORM LAKE**—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of A. H. Waitt.

**STUART**—First National Bank; Jacob F. Blackman, Asst. Cas.

**WAVERLY**—First National Bank; W. D. Lashbrook, Vice-Pres.

#### KANSAS.

**BELOIT**—First National Bank; A. T. Rogers, Vice-Pres. in place of B. S. Bracken; C. J. Brown, Asst. Cas.

**CONCORDIA**—First National Bank; H. C. Womes, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. H. Palmer.

**EL DORADO**—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; Geo. Ellis, Vice-Pres. in place of A. E. Nuttle.

**ELLINWOOD**—Bank of Ellinwood; H. M. Bockemühle, Pres., deceased.

**GARDEN CITY**—First National Bank; Frederick Cole, Pres. in place of Andrew Sabine.

**GALENA**—Galena National Bank; W. E. Stice, Cas., deceased.

**GIRARD**—First National Bank; J. E. Ray-

mond, Pres. in place of H. P. Grund; W. C. McMillan, Vice-Pres. in place of D. Corning.

**HOLTON**—National Bank of Holton; Max Sarvach, Vice-Pres. in place of Moses Sarvach; M. P. Seltzer, Asst. Cas. in place of J. R. Linscott.

**HOWARD**—First National Bank; A. T. Ayres, Vice-Pres. in place of James A. Stillman, deceased.

**LEAVENWORTH**—First National Bank; O. B. Taylor, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Fogler; no 2d Vice-Pres.

**MADISON**—Madison Bank; reported deceased.

**MANHATTAN**—First National Bank; Geo. H. Helder, Cas. in place of M. J. Franklin; no Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. H. Helder.

**MORAN**—Moran State Bank; D. A. Bollinger, Pres.; Amy J. Bollinger, Cashier.

**OSBORNE**—Exchange National Bank; E. F. Robinson, Vice-Pres.

**PHILLIPSBURG**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of R. Rogers.

#### KENTUCKY.

**CLAY CITY**—Clay City National Bank; Chas. Scott, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles Hendrie.

**COVINGTON**—First National Bank; no second Vice-Pres. in place of J. B. Jones.

**HOPKINSVILLE**—Bank of Hopkinsville; capital reduced to \$100,000.

**LEBANON**—Farmers' National Bank; R. A. Burton, Pres., deceased.

**LEXINGTON**—Lexington City National Bank; J. W. Stoll, Cas. in place of James M. Graves, deceased; Geo. H. Harting, Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Stoll.

**LOUISVILLE**—Farmers and Drivers' Bank; W. J. Thomas, Pres. *pro tem.* in place of Wm. R. S. Veich, resigned.

**MIDDLESBORO**—Manufacturers' Bank; J. V. Vair, Cas. in place of W. J. Kinnaird.

**SOMERSET**—First National Bank; Joe H. Gibson, Cas. in place of J. A. McGee.

**STANFORD**—Lincoln County National Bank; J. S. Owsley, Sr., Vice-Pres.; W. M. Bright, Asst. Cas.

#### LOUISIANA.

**LAKE CHARLES**—Calcasieu National Bank; Geo. Horridge, Vice-Pres.

**SHREVEPORT**—Commercial National Bank; S. M. Watson, Cas. in place of James H. Ross; no Asst. Cas. in place of S. M. Watson.

#### MAINE.

**AUBURN**—First National Bank; Jeremiah Dingley, Pres., deceased.

**BATH**—Lincoln National Bank; J. C. Ledyard, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles E. Patten.

**GARDNER**—Merchants' National Bank; Fred-eric Danforth, Vice-Pres.

**LEWISTON**—Manufacturers' National Bank; Wm. H. Newell, Pres. in place of John M.

Robbins; Lothrop L. Black, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. H. Newell.

**PORTLAND**—Canal National Bank; E. D. Noyes, Cas. in place of Geo. C. Peters.—Maine Savings Bank; William G. Davis, Pres.—Chapman National Bank; Seth L. Larrabee, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles J. Chapman.

**ROCKLAND**—Lime Rock National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of C. H. Berry.

**WATERVILLE**—Merchants' National Bank; L. H. Soper, Vice-Pres. in place of E. F. Webb.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Third National Bank; N. B. Medairy, Asst. Cas.—Hopkins Place Savings Bank; Benjamin F. Smith, Pres., deceased.—Clifton Savings Bank; Alexander W. MacDonald, Vice-Pres. in place of John F. Otto, deceased.—Fidelity and Deposit Co.; capital stock increased to \$1,500,000.

**CHESTERTOWN**—Chestertown National Bank; Richard D. Hynson, Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas W. Ellason.

**CUMBERLAND**—Third National Bank; corporate existence extended until Feb. 26, 1919.

**FREDERICK**—Frederick County National Bank; A. LeRoy McCardell, Asst. Cas.

**LONA CONING**—Miners and Merchants' Bank; Hugh Scott, Cas. in place of J. Wilmer Garland.

**SALISBURY**—Salisbury National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. Cleveland White.

**PRINCESS ANNE**—People's Bank of Somerset County; Robert F. Maddox, Asst. Cas. in place of Milton S. Lankford.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**ADAMS**—Greylock National Bank; Frank Coenen, Cas., resigned.

**BOSTON**—Blackstone National Bank; J. Adams, Pres. in place of E. Boynton; H. W. Asbrand, Cas. in place of J. Adams; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. W. Asbrand.—Eliot National Bank; Francis Harrington, Second Vice-Pres.; Geo. W. Grant, Cas. in place of Francis Harrington; Wm. J. Mandell, Asst. Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. W. Grant.—Broadway National Bank; Frederic H. Curtiss, Cas. in place of J. B. Kellock; no Asst. Cas. in place of Frederic H. Curtiss.—Central National Bank; B. B. Perkins, Vice-Pres.; J. Adams Brown, Cas. in place of C. H. Frye.—National Hamilton Bank; Rufus F. Greeley, Vice-Pres.—National Bank of the Commonwealth; Harrison Gardner, director, deceased.—Leland, Towle & Co.; succeeded by Arthur S. Leland & Co.

**LOWELL**—Prescott National Bank; Daniel Gage, Pres. in place of Chas. H. Coburn; no Vice-Pres. in place of A. A. Coburn.

**NEW BEDFORD**—Mechanics' National Bank; E. W. Hervey, Cas. in place of E. S. Brown.

**SALEM**—National Exchange Bank; H. P. Moulton, Pres. in place of Charles Odell.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Springfield Instn. for Savings; Henry S. Lee, Pres. in place of Jno. B. Stebbins, deceased.—Hampden Savings Bank; Charles L. Gardner, Pres.

**TURNER'S FALLS**—Crocker National Bank; capital stock reduced from \$300,000 to \$100,000.

**WILLIAMSTOWN**—Williamstown National Bank; Charles S. Cole, Vice-Pres. in place of A. L. Perry.

**YARMOUTH PORT**—First National Bank; William J. Davis, Cas., deceased.

#### MICHIGAN.

**BUCHANAN**—First National Bank; Jno. W. Bristle, Vice-Pres. in place of E. W. Sanders.

**CHARLOTTE**—First National Bank; Fred. S. Belober and Fred. H. Pollard, Asst. Cas.

**DETROIT**—First National Bank; John T. Shaw, Vice-Pres. in place of L. E. Clark; A. W. Clark and Frank G. Smith, Asst. Cas.

**ESCANABA**—First National Bank; W. W. Oliver, Vice-Pres.

**MARQUETTE**—First National Bank; C. L. Brainerd, Second Asst. Cas.

**JACKSON**—People's National Bank; G. V. Dearing, Asst. Cas. in place of A. M. McGee.

**MINOMINEE**—Lumbermen's National Bank; S. P. Gibbs, Vice-Pres. in place of John W. Webb.

**NILES**—Citizens' National Bank; W. P. Wills, Asst. Cas.

**REED CITY**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of J. M. Reed.

**SAGINAW**—Bank of Saginaw and American Commercial and Savings Bank; consolidated under former title.

#### MINNESOTA.

**ALEXANDRIA**—First National Bank; C. H. Raiter, Vice-Pres., P. O. Unumb, Asst. Cas.

**ANOKA**—Anoka National Bank; A. D. Howard, Asst. Cas.

**BALATON**—Bank of Balaton; sold to H. O. Garlock & Co.

**BRECKENRIDGE**—First National Bank; J. L. Matthews, Asst. Cas.

**LITTLE FALLS**—German-American National Bank; E. S. Richie, Asst. Cas. in place of S. A. Siverts.

**MANKATO**—National Citizens' Bank; H. E. Swan, Asst. Cas. in place of W. C. Henlein.

**MARSHALL**—Lyon County National Bank; C. B. Tyler, Pres. in place of M. Sullivan; John G. Scheetz, Cas. in place of F. W. Sickler.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Northwestern National Bank; J. W. Raymond, Pres. in place of Geo. A. Pillsbury; Anthony Kelley, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Raymond.

**MOORHEAD**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of James A. Flynn.—Moorhead National Bank; J. Malloy, Jr., Asst. Cas.

**ROCHESTER**—First National Bank; Burt W.

Eaton, Vice-Pres. in place of Walter Hurlbut; Geo. B. Doty, Cas. in place of Walter Hurlbut; no Second Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. B. Doty.—Union National Bank; T. H. Titus, Cas., deceased.  
**SHAKOPEE**—First National Bank; C. Theo. Welland, Asst. Cas.  
**ST. PAUL**—Second National Bank; C. F. Mahler, Vice-Pres. in place of A. M. P. Cowley; C. H. Bulkley, Asst. Cas.

**MISSISSIPPI.**

**GREENVILLE**—First National Bank; A. B. Nance, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. B. Nance.—R. S. Jacobs Banking Co.; Richard S. Jacobs, Pres., deceased.

**MISSOURI.**

**CAMERON**—First National Bank; Ben F. Wood, Asst. Cas.  
**HARDIN**—Bank of Hardin; capital increased to \$40,000.  
**JOPLIN**—First National Bank; Chas. Schifendecker, Pres. in place of S. C. Henderson.  
**KANSAS CITY**—Union National Bank; W. H. Seeger, Second Vice-Pres.—Bank of Grand Avenue; Louis A. Lambert, Pres., deceased.  
**LAMAR**—First National Bank; E. Albright, Vice-Pres. in place of A. C. Burnett; B. C. Avery, Cas. in place of E. Albright.  
**PLATTSBURG**—First National Bank; James H. Walker, Asst. Cas.  
**SEDALIA**—Third National Bank; W. A. Latimer, Asst. Cas. in place of W. H. Van Wagner.  
**ST. LOUIS**—Merchants' Laclede National Bank; R. F. Sturgeon, Asst. Cas. in place of W. H. Graham; D. A. Phillips, Second Asst. Cas. in place of R. F. Sturgeon.  
**WARRENSBURG**—People's National Bank; O. L. Houts, Vice-Pres.

**MONTANA.**

**BILLINGS**—Yellowstone National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of S. G. Reynolds.—First National Bank; S. F. Morse, Cas.; S. G. Reynolds, Asst. Cas. in place of S. F. Morse.  
**BUTTE**—Silver Bow National Bank; J. H. Vivian, Vice-Pres. in place of S. Marchesseau.  
**FORT BENTON**—Stockmen's National Bank; John D. Carroll, Vice-Pres. in place of Daniel Brereton.  
**HELENA**—Montana National Bank; W. H. Dickinson, Asst. Cas.

**NEBRASKA.**

**BLUE HILL**—First National Bank; C. F. Gund, Cas. in place of Henry Koehler; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. F. Gund.  
**COLUMBUS**—First National Bank; J. F. Berny and A. R. Miller, Asst. Cashiers.  
**MADISON**—First National Bank; Ed. Fricke, Asst. Cas.  
**NELSON**—First National Bank; A. J. Minor,

Pres. in place of A. H. Bowman; Wm. D. Voight, Vice-Pres. in place of A. J. Minor; C. C. Dudley, Asst. Cas.

**OMAHA**—Omaha National Bank; no Vice-Pres.  
**ORD**—Ord State Bank; F. A. Bohac, Cas.  
**PAWNEE CITY**—Farmers' National Bank; John Steinauer, Pres. in place of A. B. Edee; A. C. Dwinnell, Vice-Pres. in place of John Steinauer.  
**SEWARD**—Jones National Bank; W. C. Tshue, Asst. Cas.  
**STROMSBURG**—Stromsburg Bank; John Buckley, Pres.; L. H. Headstrom, Vice-Pres.; Ira Banta, Cas.  
**SUTTON**—Sutton National Bank; no Cas. in place of F. C. Matteson, deceased; P. F. Nuss, Asst. Cas.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**MILFORD**—Souhegan National Bank; H. J. Nichols, Asst. Cas.  
**NASHUA**—Second National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. L. Clough.  
**PORTSMOUTH**—National Merchants and Traders' Bank; capital reduced to \$100,000.  
**WINCHESTER**—Winchester National Bank; J. Grace Alexander, Asst. Cas.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**ATLANTIC CITY**—Atlantic City National Bank; Jos. H. Borton, Vice-Pres. in place of Joe. A. Barstow.  
**DOVER**—People's National Bank; Theo. F. King, Vice-Pres.  
**EAST ORANGE**—East Orange National Bank; O. E. Condit, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles A. Groves.  
**FREEHOLD**—Freehold Banking Co.; C. E. Hall, Pres.  
**JERSEY CITY**—Greenville Banking and Trust Co.; Henry Lembeck, Pres. in place of S. L. Harvey.  
**MATAWAN**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; Wm. H. Hendrickson, Pres., deceased.

**NEW YORK.**

**ALBANY**—Albany City Savings Institution; John E. Walker, Pres. in place of Selden E. Marvin, deceased.  
**AMSTERDAM**—Amsterdam City National Bank; Lewis E. Harroner, Second Vice-Pres. in place of Davis W. Shuler.  
**ARCADE**—Citizens' Bank; J. H. Smith, Cas.  
**BINGHAMTON**—First National Bank; F. B. Newell, Vice-Pres. in place of W. S. Weed.  
**BROOKLYN**—German-American Bank; Jas. C. Brower, Pres., deceased.—Schermerhorn Bank; Charles H. Roberts, Pres. in place of Henry N. Whitney.  
**BUFFALO**—City National Bank; P. H. Griffin, Vice-Pres.; James G. Berry, Asst. Cas.—People's Bank; L. F. Gray and Charles R. Huntley, elected directors.  
**CAMBRIDGE**—Cambridge Valley National Bank; James Law, Vice-Pres. in place of Thos. C. Gifford.

CLAYTON—National Exchange Bank; no Asst. Cas.

DE RUYTER—Individual Banking Co.; title changed to De Ruyter Banking Co.

FRANKLINVILLE—E. M. Adams, Vice-Pres. in place of J. R. Holden.

FREDONIA—Fredonia National Bank; H. W. Thompson, Vice-Pres. in place of O. W. Johnson, deceased.

GLENS FALLS—First National Bank; Wm. McEchron, Pres. in place of J. Lapham; Byron Lapham, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. McEchron.

GLOVERSVILLE—Fulton County National Bank; F. S. Sexton, Asst. Cas.

HAMMONDSPORT—Bank of Hammondsport; W. W. Brundage, Cas.; F. J. Werle, Asst. Cas.

HERKIMER—Herkimer National Bank; Robert Earl, Vice-Pres.; Robert Earl, Asst. Cas.

MALONE—People's National Bank; N. M. Marshall, Pres. in place of H. E. King; F. W. Lawrence, Vice-Pres. in place of N. M. Marshall.

NEWBURGH—Highland National Bank; capital stock reduced from \$300,000 to \$200,000; H. A. Bartlett, Pres. in place of Augustus Denniston.

NEW YORK—Lincoln National Bank; no Second Vice-Pres. in place of James D. Layng.—Bank of New York, N. B. A.; Jno. L. Biker, Vice-Pres. in place of R. B. Ferris; no Second Vice-Pres.—National City Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of A. B. Hepburn.—National Citizens' Bank; E. Feitmann, Vice-Pres.—National Bank of the Republic; Orlando H. Harriman, Second Asst. Cas.—Continental Trust Co.; Henry S. Kerr, elected director.—State Trust Co.; Walter S. Johnston; Pres.; Wm. A. Nash and Henry H. Cook, Vice-Pres.—Mutual Bank; removed to Broadway and Thirty-third street.—Double-day & Magoun; succeeded by Magoun Bros. & Co.—National Broadway Bank; no Second Vice-Pres.—City Trust Company; capital, \$1,000,000; surplus, \$1,000,000; James Roes Curran, Pres.; John D. Crimmins, First Vice-Pres.; Geo. R. Sheldon, Second Vice-Pres.; Arthur Terry and Walter W. Lee, Asst. Secretaries.

OLEAN—Exchange National Bank; N. V. V. Franchot, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. V. Forman.

PENN YAN—Baldwin's Bank; Silas Kinne, Cas.

PLATTSBURG—Vilas National Bank; H. A. Newton, Pres.; Wm. Howcroft, Cas. in place of H. A. Newton.

POLAND—National Bank of Poland; W. A. Brayton, Pres.; D. P. Jarvis, Vice-Pres. in place W. A. Brayton.

RHINEBECK—First National Bank; Wm. H. Judson, Cas. in place of Wm. H. Schall; Edwin Marquardt, Asst. Cas.

ROCHESTER—Mechanics' Savings Bank; Arthur Luetchford, Sec. and Treas., in place of John H. Rochester, resigned.

SALEM—People's National Bank; B. C. Haggert, Cas. in place of R. M. Stevenson.

SANDY HILL—National Bank of Sandy Hill; Grenville M. Ingalsbe, Vice-Pres. in place of John W. Wait.—People's National Bank; C. R. Paris, Vice-Pres. in place of John Gallagher.

SCHENEVUS—Schenevus National Bank; John Graney, Pres. in place of S. B. Wilson; M. E. Baldwin, Vice-Pres. in place of John Graney.

SYRACUSE—Syracuse Clearing-House Assn., Anthony Lamb, Mgr.

TONAWANDA—First National Bank; J. H. Rumbold, Vice-Pres. in place of John L. Nice; L. S. De Graff, Second Vice-Pres.

TROY—Manufacturers' National Bank; F. E. Howe, Cas. in place of S. O. Gleason; no Asst. Cas. in place of F. E. Howe.

WARSAW—Wyoming County National Bank; H. A. Humphrey, Vice-Pres. in place of S. D. Lewis.

WEST WINFIELD—First National Bank; C. D. Wheeler, Pres. in place of Alonzo Wood; F. E. Wood, Vice-Pres. in place of C. D. Wheeler.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

ASHEVILLE—Blue Ridge National Bank; E. Sluder, Asst. Cas.

BREVARD—Brevard Banking Co.; T. D. England, Pres.

DURHAM—First National Bank; L. A. Carr, Vice-Pres.

HICKORY—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. H. Crowell.

HIGH POINT—Commercial National Bank; C. M. Hauser, Asst. Cas.

NEW BERNE—National Bank of New Berne; no Vice-Pres.

WINSTON—Wachovia National Bank corporate existence extended until March 3, 1919.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

GRAFTON—First National Bank; J. Flekke, Vice-Pres. in place of J. Tombs.

GRAND FORKS—First National Bank; Chas. E. Rand, Vice-Pres.

MAYVILLE—First National Bank; J. P. Haber, Pres. in place of G. S. Albee; F. W. Ames, Vice-Pres. in place of J. P. Haber.

WHAPETON—Citizens' National Bank; W. A. Coulthord, Asst. Cas.

#### OHIO.

BUYRUS—First National Bank; E. R. Kearsley, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. C. Gormly; H. E. Valentine, Cas.—Second National Bank; W. Hauck, Asst. Cas. in place of Edwin G. Beal.

CINCINNATI—National Lafayette Bank; R. A. Holden, Jr., elected director in place of R. A. Holden, resigned.

COLUMBUS—Ohio National Bank; Alex. W.

Krumm, Second Vice-Pres.—New First National Bank; P. A. DeLong, Asst. Cas.

CONNEAUT—First National Bank; C. M. Traver, Vice-Pres. in place of H. C. Maynard.

DAYTON—Dayton National Bank; R. S. Wilcock, Asst. Cas.

GENEVA—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of S. Seymour, deceased.

GERMANTOWN—First National Bank; Chas. F. Huber, Pres. in place of Jos. W. Shank; John A. Shank, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles F. Huber; Phil. Hemp, Asst. Cas.

HICKSVILLE—First National Bank; Enoch Farmer, Vice-Pres. in place of James Casebeer.

IRONTON—Citizens' National Bank; Geo. N. Gray, Pres. in place of Wm. M. Kerr.

KINSMAN—Kinsman Banking Co.; G. H. Griswold, Cas. in place of W. W. Davis, deceased.

LIMA—First National Bank; H. L. Brice, Vice-Pres. in place of C. S. Brice.

MEDINA—Medina County National Bank; W. H. Albro, Vice-Pres.

MIDDLETOWN—Merchants' National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of T. C. Simpson.—First National Bank; capital reduced to \$100,000.

OTTAWA—Bank of Ottawa; T. H. Kahle, Vice-Pres., deceased.

RIPLEY—Citizens' National Bank; W. A. Gilliland, Vice-Pres. in place of J. C. Leggett; H. G. Maddox, Asst. Cas.

SANDUSKY—Moss National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of A. C. Moss.

SPRINGFIELD—First National Bank; C. A. Phelps, Vice-Pres. in place of Ross Mitchell; A. R. Cobaugh, Cas. in place of C. A. Phelps.

TOLEDO—Second National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of E. P. Hubbell.—Commercial and Savings Bank; P. McCrory, Pres.; A. Chesebrough Vice-Pres.; C. D. Close, Cas.—Ketcham National Bank; title changed to National Bank of Commerce; S. D. Carr, Pres. in place of E. L. Barber; A. M. Chesebrough, Vice-Pres. in place of S. D. Carr; George W. Walbridge, Asst. Cas.

WELLINGTON—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. Cushion, Jr.; E. C. Cushion, Asst. Cas.

**OKLAHOMA.**

EL RENO—First National Bank; J. A. La Brayer, Cas. in place of B. B. Burrell.

GEARY—Bank of Geary; Willard Johnston, Pres.; Robert Reed, Vice-Pres.; John H. Dillon, Cas.

GUTHRIE—Capital National Bank; Fred. C. Dolcater, Asst. Cas. in place of C. M. Bosworth.

WOODWARD—Gerlach Bank; capital increased to \$25,000; L. H. Patton, Asst. Cas.

**OREGON.**

INDEPENDENCE—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. W. Collins.

PENDLETON—First National Bank; M. Baruh, Vice-Pres. in place of W. F. Matlack.

PRINCEVILLE—First National Bank; R. F. Allen, Pres.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

ALLEGHENY—First National Bank; Charles F. Nevin, Vice-Pres. in place of Edward Groetzinger.

ATHENS—Farmers' National Bank; F. T. Page, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. T. Krenbuck.

BELLE VERNON—First National Bank; Jos. A. Cook, Vice-Pres. in place of M. G. Finley.

BLOOMSBURG—First National Bank; C. R. Buckalew, Vice-Pres. in place of A. Z. Sechoch.

CATASAUQUA—National Bank of Catawauqua; O. F. Fatzager, Pres. in place of F. M. Horn; F. M. Horn, Cas. in place of Charles R. Horn, resigned.

CHESTER—Delaware County Trust, Safe Deposit and Title Insurance Co.; Henry C. Howard, Pres., resigned.—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Beece L. Thomas.

CLAYSVILLE—First National Bank; James R. Woodburn, Pres. in place of John Thompson; J. B. Biggins, Vice-Pres. in place of James R. Woodburn.

CONNELLSVILLE—Yough National Bank; Geo. T. Griffin, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. T. Griffin.

ELIZABETH—First National Bank; Joseph Lytle, Vice-Pres.

EMLENTON—First National Bank; J. W. Rowland, Vice-Pres.

HANOVER—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. D. Carver.

KANE—First National Bank; W. S. Calderwood, Cas. in place of C. H. Kemp; Fred W. Beece, Asst. Cas. in place of W. S. Calderwood.

MEDIA—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. E. Hoopes.

MIFFLINTOWN—Juniata Valley National Bank; J. Holmes Irwin, Asst. Cas.

MOUNT CARMEL—First National Bank; Voris Auten, Pres. in place of E. C. Tier.

MUNCY—Citizens' National Bank; Henry V. Peterman, Pres., deceased.

NAZARETH—Nazareth National Bank; F. H. Schmidt, Asst. Cas.

NEW BETHLEHEM—Citizens' National Bank; C. T. Craig, Asst. Cas.

PHILADELPHIA—First National Bank; Morton McMichael, Vice-Pres. and Cas.—Corn Exchange National Bank; Benjamin Gibbons, Vice-Pres.—Market Street National Bank; James F. Sullivan, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. D. McCreary; Geo. D. McCreary, 2d Vice-Pres.—Union Trust Co.; Wm. J. Clark, Sec. and Treas. in place of R. S. Edwards, deceased.

PHILLIPSBURG—First National Bank; Frank K. Lukenbach, Cas.



**PHOENIXVILLE**—Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank; E. L. Buckwalter, Vice-Pres. in place of Mahlon Miller.

**PITTSBURG**—People's National Bank; A. E. W. Painter, Pres. in place of John W. Chalfant, deceased; T. P. Day, Vice-Pres. in place of A. E. W. Painter.—Liberty National Bank; Ira F. Brainard, Pres. in place of E. H. Myers.—Fort Pitt National Bank; corporate existence extended until Feb. 23, 1919.

**PLYMOUTH**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Draper Smith.

**READING**—First National Bank; Nathaniel Ferguson, Vice-Pres.; J. W. Richards, Cas. in place of John R. Kaucher; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Richards.

**SCOTSDALE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. H. Loucks.

**TAMAQUA**—First National Bank; Charles J. J. Carter, Pres. in place of E. J. Fry, deceased; W. Calloway, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles J. J. Carter.

**TROY**—First National Bank; D. D. Brace, Vice-Pres. in place of Israel A. Pierce.

**UNION CITY**—National Bank of Union City; John Cafilich, Vice-Pres. in place of F. E. McLean.

**WASHINGTON**—Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank; Jas. I. Brownson, Jr., Pres. in place of James I. Brownson; G. M. Cameron, Vice-Pres.; A. C. Warne, Cas. in place of W. L. Whiting.

**WILLIAMSPORT**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Peirson.

**YORK**—York National Bank; J. J. Friok, Cas. in place of W. H. Griffith.

#### RHODE ISLAND

**NEWPORT**—National Bank of Rhode Island; T. P. Peckham, Vice-Pres.—Savings Bank of Newport; Chas. E. Hammett, Jr., Pres.; Thos. A. Lawton, Vice-Pres.—National Exchange Bank; P. G. Case, Vice-Pres.

**WOONSOCKET**—Citizens' National Bank; L. C. Lincoln, Cas. in place of H. H. Smith.—First National Bank; L. L. Chilson, Pres. in place of J. E. Cole; B. Warfield, Vice-Pres. in place of L. L. Chilson.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA

**CHARLESTON**—Dime Savings Bank; W. H. Lafar, Cas. in place of J. J. Sullivan, deceased.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA

**DEADWOOD**—American National Bank; Ben Baer, Vice-Pres. in place of John Treber; Wm. Selbie, Cas. in place of Ben Baer; J. E. Ford, Asst. Cas.

**HURON**—First National Bank; F. W. Coler, Vice-Pres. in place of W. N. Coler, Jr.

**RAPID CITY**—First National Bank; Peter Duhamel, Vice-Pres. in place of C. Gardner.

**SIOUX FALLS**—Minnehaha National Bank; B. H. Re Qua, Asst. Cas.

#### TENNESSEE

**CHATTANOOGA**—Chattanooga National

Bank; J. T. Lupton, Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas L. Cate.

**CLEVELAND**—Cleveland National Bank; J. E. Johnston, Pres. in place of J. H. Craig-miles; W. P. Lang, Cas. in place of J. E. Johnston; Frank J. Harle, Asst. Cas. in place of W. P. Lang.

**GREENEVILLE**—Greene County Bank; W. H. Armitage, Pres. in place of W. H. O'Keefe; S. R. Earnest, Cas.

**JACKSON**—Second National Bank; Will D. Nelson, Asst. Cas.

**JONESBORO**—First National Bank; Charles C. McPherson, Asst. Cas.

**KNOXVILLE**—Knoxville Banking Co.; W. H. Gass, Pres.; T. M. Johnston, Cas.; W. O. Whittle, Asst. Cas.

**MEMPHIS**—Continental National Bank; Louis Woods, Vice-Pres. in place of J. S. Menken; no Second Vice-Pres. in place of Louis Woods.—National Bank of Commerce; O. H. P. Piper, Vice-Pres.

**NASHVILLE**—American National Bank; A. H. Robinson, Vice-Pres. in place of John M. Lea.

**UNION CITY**—First National Bank; Lexie S. Parks, Pres. in place of Seid Waddell; J. S. Roberts, Vice-Pres. in place of B. F. Beckman; Harris Parks, Cas. in place of Lexie S. Parks; E. V. Caldwell, Asst. Cas. in place of Harris Parks.

#### TEXAS

**ARANSAS PASS**—First National Bank; J. M. Hoopes, Pres.; Charles G. Johnson, Vice-Pres. in place of E. A. Stevens.

**AUSTIN**—City National Bank; Jasper Wooldridge, Cas.; A. W. Wilkerson, Asst. Cas. in place of Jasper Wooldridge.

**ATLANTA**—First National Bank; M. Jacobs, Pres. in place of A. C. Smith; J. T. Chamblee, Vice-Pres. in place of T. S. Spell.

**BEAUMONT**—First National Bank; Chas. H. Stroeck, Asst. Cas.

**BEEVILLE**—Commercial National Bank; Cyrus P. Lucas, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Cook; Wilhugh Wilkins, Cas. in place of W. M. Smith; no Asst. Cas. in place of Wilhugh Wilkins.

**BELTON**—Belton National Bank; W. W. James, Asst. Cas.

**BROWNSVILLE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. G. Fernandez.

**COMMERCE**—Commerce National Bank; P. A. Norris, Vice-Pres.; B. L. Thompson, Cas. in place of P. A. Norris.

**COMANCHE**—First National Bank; A. G. Adams, Jr., Asst. Cas. in place of F. J. Dunkerly.—Comanche National Bank; L. B. Russell, Jr., Asst. Cas. in place of T. H. Oberthier.

**DAINGERFIELD**—National Bank of Daingerfield; J. Y. Bradfield, Pres. in place of J. M. Moore; J. Bradfield, Cas. in place of J. Y. Bradfield; A. C. Richardson, Asst. Cas. in place of J. Bradfield.

**DALLAS**—National Exchange Bank; W. H. Gaston, Vice-Pres. in place of Joseph Huey.

**DECATUR**—First National Bank; J. Ullman, Vice-Pres. in place of T. B. Yarbrough; T. B. Yarbrough, Cas. in place of Ben. F. Allen.

**DENISON**—State National Bank; A. F. Platter, Vice-Pres. in place of Alex Rennie.

**DENTON**—Denton County National Bank; J. L. Blewett, Asst. Cas. in place of W. W. Wright.

**DETROIT**—First National Bank; C. M. Kerr, Asst. Cas. in place of J. A. Caton.

**EAGLE PASS**—Simpeon National Bank; no Cas. in place of S. P. Simpson, Jr.

**FORNEY**—National Bank of Forney; J. K. Brooks, Vice-Pres. in place of D. G. McKellar.

**FORT WORTH**—Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank; D. W. Humphreys, Vice-Pres. in place of H. W. Williams; B. H. Martin, Asst. Cas.

**GALVESTON**—Galveston National Bank; L. R. Bergeron, 2d Vice-Pres.

**GREENVILLE**—First National Bank; J. P. Holmes, Pres. in place of J. L. Lovejoy; J. L. Lovejoy, Vice-Pres. in place of J. P. Holmes; —Greenville National Bank; W. A. Williams, Pres. in place of A. Cameron; H. W. Williams, Cas. in place of W. A. Williams; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. W. Williams; no 2d Asst. Cas.

**GROESBECK**—Groesbeck National Bank; C. R. Bond, Asst. Cas.

**HONEY GROVE**—Planters' National Bank; Sam Primm, 2d Asst. Cas.

**HOUSTON**—Planters and Mechanics' National Bank; J. H. Burnett, Pres. in place of T. J. Boyles; T. J. Boyles, Vice-Pres. in place of H. Prince; J. O. H. Kirby, 2d Vice-Pres.

**HUBBARD**—First National Bank; E. L. Condon, 2d Vice-Pres.

**LAMPASAS**—First National Bank; E. J. Marshall, Vice-Pres. in place of W. F. Barnes.

**MARSHALL**—Marshall National Bank; W. L. Martin, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. L. Martin.

**MERIDIAN**—First National Bank; J. W. Rudasill, Pres. in place of G. W. Parker; C. W. Tidwell, Cas. in place of J. W. Rudasill.

**NAVASOTA**—First National Bank; C. S. Tallafarro, Asst. Cas. in place of Walter L. Scott.

**QUANAH**—Quanah National Bank; G. W. Deahl, Vice-Pres. in place of H. Prince; J. E. Ledbetter, Cas. in place of J. H. P. Jones; no Asst. Cas.

**SEGUIN**—First National Bank; Edgar L. Gerhard, Cas. in place of Walter L. Johnson.

**SULPHUR SPRINGS**—City National Bank; W. F. Skillman, Cas. in place of R. M. Womack; W. W. Jones, Asst. Cas. in place of S. L. Rogers.

**TAYLOR**—First National Bank; Robert J. Eckhardt, Asst. Cas. in place of Francis Horace Welch.—Taylor National Bank; G. M. Booth, Asst. Cas.

**UVALDE**—Uvalde National Bank (successor to Collier & Co.); J. F. Simpson, Vice-Pres.; F. J. Rheiner, Asst. Cas.

**VELASCO**—Velasco National Bank; M. R. Hoskins, Pres. in place of W. W. Hoskins; S. H. Hudgins, Vice-Pres. in place of M. M. Miller; W. W. Hoskins, Cas. in place of J. M. Moore; R. M. Walcott, Asst. Cas.

**WACO**—First National Bank; no 2d Vice-Pres. in place of William Cameron, deceased.

**WAXAHACHIE**—Waxahachie National Bank; J. H. Miller, Pres. in place of G. H. Cunningham; G. H. Cunningham, Vice-Pres. in place of J. J. Metcalfe; R. L. Goodloe, Cas. in place of J. H. Miller; E. F. Cunningham, Asst. Cas. in place of R. L. Goodloe.

**WEATHEFORD**—Citizens' National Bank; J. R. Couts, Pres. in place of Asa N. Grant; Charles Berthold and R. W. Kindel, Vice-Pres.; C. A. Milam, Asst. Cas.

**WILLS POINT**—First National Bank; C. J. Montague, Asst. Cas. in place of W. H. Howell.

**WOLFE CITY**—Wolfe City National Bank; C. L. Parrott, Pres. in place of M. H. Turner; D. E. Taylor, Vice-Pres. in place of C. L. Parrott.

#### UTAH.

**LOGAN**—First National Bank; J. E. Shepard, Asst. Cas. in place of Thos. Oldham.

**PARK CITY**—First National Bank; W. V. Rice, Pres. in place of John J. Daly; W. W. Armstrong, Cas. in place of Sam. J. Kenyon, deceased; J. H. Deming, Asst. Cas., resigned.

**PROVO**—First National Bank; Reed Smoot, Vice-Pres. in place of S. S. Jones; Hermon S. Martin, Cas. in place of D. A. Swan.

**SALT LAKE CITY**—Commercial National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of G. F. Downey.

#### VERMONT.

**LYNDON**—National Bank of Lyndon; C. L. Mattocks, Asst. Cas.

**LYNDONVILLE**—Lyndonville National Bank; W. E. Riley, Asst. Cas.

**RUTLAND**—Baxter National Bank; A. W. Hyde, Second Vice-Pres.

**MONTPELIER**—Montpelier Saving Bank & Trust Co.; Homer W. Heaton, Pres., deceased.

**SPRINGFIELD**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of G. L. Closson, Jr.

#### VIRGINIA.

**ALEXANDRIA**—First National Bank; Edward L. Daingerfield, Vice-Pres. in place of J. F. Muir.

**BOYDTON**—Bank of Mecklenburg; C. J. Faulkner, Pres. in place of Geo. B. Finch.

**LEESBURG**—Loudoun National Bank; A. Dibrell, Asst. Cas.

**LEXINGTON**—First National Bank; J. R. Moore, Vice-Pres. in place of O. D. Batchelor.

**NORFOLK**—Norfolk National Bank; C.

Hardy, Pres. in place of J. G. Womble; no Cas. in place of C. Hardy.

**NEWPORT NEWS**—First National Bank; Arthur Lee; Asst. Cas.

**SALEM**—Farmers' National Bank; F. H. Chalmers, Pres. in place of Jas. Chalmers, deceased; J. C. Langhorne, Vice-Pres. in place of F. H. Chalmers.

#### WASHINGTON.

**COLFAX**—First National Bank; W. M. Taylor, Asst. Cas. in place of M. W. Kincaid.—Second National Bank; A. F. McClaine, Vice-Pres.; Charles E. Scribner, Cas.

**DAVENPORT**—Big Bend National Bank; C. C. May, Pres. in place of N. Fred Essig; F. H. Luce, Vice-Pres. in place of D. M. Drumbeller; A. F. Lambert; Cas. in place of C. C. May; no Asst. Cas.

**DAYTON**—Columbia National Bank; C. J. Broughton, Vice-Pres. in place of D. C. Guernsey; no Asst. Cas. in place of F. W. Guernsey.

**EVERETT**—Everett National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. C. Butler.

**SEATTLE**—First National Bank; James D. Hoge, Jr., Pres. in place of Maurice McMicker; Maurice McMicker, Vice-Pres.; R. F. Parkhurst, Asst. Cas.—Dexter Horton & Co.; Arthur A. Denny, Pres., deceased.

**SPOKANE**—Fidelity National Bank; A. W. Lindsay, Asst. Cas.—Old National Bank; Chas. H. Brown, Asst. Cas.

**TACOMA**—Pacific National Bank; capital reduced to \$200,000; W. M. Ladd, Pres. in place of Charles P. Masterson; Charles P. Masterson, Vice-Pres. in place of L. R. Manning.

**WALLA WALLA**—First National Bank; Allen H. Reynolds, Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas. in place of G. T. Buckland.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

**CHARLESTON**—Citizens' National Bank; J. A. McGuffin, Vice-Pres. in place of Neil Robinson.

**HUNTINGTON**—First National Bank; M. J. Ferguson, Second Asst. Cas.

**MARTINSBURG**—National Bank of Martinsburg; Wm. W. Hill, Asst. Cas. in place of John H. Doll.

**MORGANTOWN**—Second National Bank; W. C. McGrew, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. B. Morris.

### BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.

#### GEORGIA.

**CORDELE**—First National Bank; in hands of W. H. S. Burgwyn, Receiver, March 4.

#### ILLINOIS.

**WENONA**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation, March 1.

#### KANSAS.

**LEON**—Leon Exchange Bank.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**SALEM**—National Exchange Bank; voted to liquidate June 1.

#### MINNESOTA.

**KIMBALL**—Bank of Kimball.

#### MISSOURI.

**PINEVILLE**—Bank of Pineville.

#### NEBRASKA.

**SOUTH OMAHA**—Packers' Savings Bank.

**WHEELING**—National Exchange Bank; John Frew, Vice-Pres.; W. B. Irvine, Asst. Cas.

#### WISCONSIN.

**APPLETON**—Commercial National Bank; C. S. Dickinson, Cas. in place of H. G. Freeman.

**BEAVER DAM**—German National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Theo. G. Huth, deceased.

**GREEN BAY**—McCartney National Bank of Fort Howard; Geo. A. Richardson, Asst. Cas.—Citizens' National Bank; Mitchell James, Vice-Pres. in place of James H. Elmore.

**KAUKAUNA**—First National Bank; Alex. McNaughton, Vice-Pres. in place of M. A. Hunt.

**MILWAUKEE**—Wisconsin National Bank; Charles E. Arnold, and Herman F. Wolf, Asst. Cashiers.

**MINERAL POINT**—First National Bank; R. J. Penhallegon, Pres. in place of John H. Vivian.

**SUPERIOR**—Northwestern National Bank; F. R. Crumpton, Vice-Pres. in place of James Ferguson.—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of S. H. Clough; no Cas.

**STEVENS POINT**—Citizens' National Bank; W. W. Spraggon, Pres. in place of R. C. Russell.

**WAUSAU**—First National Bank; John Ringle, Asst. Cas. in place of R. E. Farther.

**WHITEWATER**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of E. M. Johnson; F. M. Blackman, Asst. Cas. in place of I. N. Wheeler.

#### WYOMING.

**BUFFALO**—First National Bank; T. P. Hill, Asst. Cas.

**DOUGLAS**—First National Bank; J. De F. Richards, Asst. Cas.

**RAWLINS**—First National Bank; James M. Rumsey, Jr., Cas. in place of John C. Davis; no Asst. Cas. in place of James M. Rumsey, Jr.

#### CANADA.

#### QUEBEC.

**MONTREAL**—Merchants' Bank of Halifax; Arthur Brock, Mgr. in place of E. L. Pease; F. J. Sherman, Asst. Mgr.

#### NEW YORK.

**BUFFALO**—Ellicott Square Bank; business transferred to Buffalo Commercial Bank.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

**BUFFALO**—American Exchange State Bank; in hands of S. G. More, Receiver.

**GRAND FORKS**—Merchants' National Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

**CLEARFIELD**—First National Bank; Benjamin M. Nead, Receiver in place of Benjamin J. Haywood, deceased.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

**WALTERBORO**—Walterboro Loan and Savings Bank.

#### TEXAS.

**CLEBURNE**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**EASTLAND**—Eastland National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 1.

## NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

By the courtesy of the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** has been favored with the complete returns of the National banks in all the reserve cities, at the date of the call on February 4, 1899. These are published below in conjunction with the two preceding statements of September 20, 1898, and December 1, 1898. In this form the figures become much more valuable by reason of the comparison. In this complete shape the returns of National banks in the reserve cities are published in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** exclusively.

### NEW YORK CITY.

RESOURCES.	Sept. 20, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
Loans and discounts.....	\$441,708,565	\$493,284,116	\$544,320,829
Overdrafts.....	118,691	106,544	263,138
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	17,970,000	19,588,503	17,645,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	44,993,700	44,275,240	34,893,960
U. S. bonds on hand.....	2,370,370	4,376,310	2,142,310
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	8,635,962	4,290,871	3,450,636
Stocks, securities, etc.....	56,511,022	55,937,153	57,202,062
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	14,567,454	14,717,304	14,710,771
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,911,838	1,982,983	1,906,906
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	32,732,042	33,487,153	37,331,984
Due from State banks and bankers.....	5,562,866	7,566,799	7,140,232
Due from approved reserve agents.....			
Checks and other cash items.....	3,063,869	3,896,400	2,527,788
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	64,946,267	184,675,062	37,205,631
Bills of other National banks.....	1,021,659	1,001,931	1,218,299
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	63,835	68,799	57,378
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	16,151,731	15,299,474	19,421,651
Gold Treasury certificates.....	6,831,860	6,378,600	6,571,510
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	85,920,000	115,295,000	143,324,000
Silver dollars.....	190,612	104,437	102,086
Silver Treasury certificates.....	4,995,114	5,307,901	7,073,153
Silver fractional coin.....	475,868	574,031	496,888
Legal-tender notes.....	31,265,585	32,664,555	32,723,221
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	6,950,000	7,100,000	7,710,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	792,900	872,132	782,137
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,013,137	933,343	905,231
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$845,791,464</b>	<b>\$1,008,574,634</b>	<b>\$980,959,232</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$48,700,000	\$48,700,000	\$47,600,000
Surplus fund.....	43,041,000	43,041,000	43,225,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	18,706,331	18,515,968	18,339,324
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	15,410,537	17,138,550	15,009,367
State bank notes outstanding.....	16,556	16,556	16,543
Due to other National banks.....	199,310,191	243,598,647	289,976,300
Due to State banks and bankers.....	92,418,782	103,391,312	117,579,951
Dividends unpaid.....	115,900	103,533	124,469
Individual deposits.....	367,750,334	475,038,264	369,391,530
U. S. deposits.....	40,360,072	44,022,166	34,099,439
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	314,368	372,619	281,839
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....	200,000	150,000	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	19,449,390	14,456,018	15,335,457
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$845,791,464</b>	<b>\$1,008,574,634</b>	<b>\$980,959,232</b>
Average reserve held.....	25.77 p. c.	26.81 p. c.	28.77 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$152,780,770	\$182,723,998	\$217,411,509

	ALBANY, N. Y.			BALTIMORE, MD.			BOSTON, MASS.		
	Sept. 30, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$8,650,460	\$7,166,059	\$8,905,116	\$84,440,086	\$85,280,604	\$83,168,700	\$168,938,082	\$174,179,397	\$178,085,009
Overdrafts.....	6,400	3,435	4,188	43,459	29,114	30,184	7,101,921	6,387,725	5,128,181
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	350,000	350,000	400,000	2,698,500	2,698,500	2,697,980	7,019,000	6,987,000	6,971,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	150,000	281,100	281,100	1,823,200	2,682,900	2,682,900	4,919,000	4,919,000	4,919,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	158,000	143,600	1,000	164,040	5,240	1,119,480	1,844,500	1,844,500	1,844,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	38,988	37,250	37,250	332,939	382,758	418,247	331,439	331,439	386,111
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,068,122	901,250	638,950	2,150,843	2,395,081	2,459,587	8,100,887	8,100,887	8,284,788
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	206,257	220,522	220,522	2,935,623	2,935,623	2,917,511	2,961,527	2,961,527	2,950,044
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	80,571	122,192	108,494	217,522	217,522	217,522	18,448,544	18,448,544	204,449
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,239,681	1,698,452	1,400,315	2,788,588	3,038,172	3,047,021	16,108,186	16,108,186	16,044,969
Due from State banks and bankers.....	598,572	871,530	1,001,314	488,619	498,472	477,021	84,119,273	84,119,273	84,828,109
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,130,972	3,440,883	3,004,477	5,071,770	4,867,400	6,117,088	8,885,666	8,885,666	6,948,573
Checks and other cash items.....	68,452	61,883	198,417	114,581	157,400	108,925	388,568	388,568	464,665
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	105,875	124,000	189,587	1,864,981	1,864,981	1,864,981	12,622,778	12,622,778	6,983,865
Bills of other National banks.....	61,153	63,526	65,394	176,867	176,867	221,785	1,064,669	1,064,669	1,302,944
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,225	1,430	2,115	12,035	21,662	21,662	19,468	19,468	30,244
*Federal money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	549,372	549,489	528,876	1,084,771	1,083,180	1,354,740	4,908,814	4,881,981	4,983,781
Gold Treasury certificates.....	380,750	380,750	380,750	452,720	453,280	309,060	1,583,720	1,583,720	1,482,800
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	17,566	17,566	25,846	293,000	491,000	1,303,000	8,765,000	8,695,000	11,979,000
Silver dollars.....	31,618	27,477	25,846	82,286	72,009	95,745	63,088	64,613	61,283
Silver Treasury certificates.....	19,589	24,580	25,676	1,176,170	1,181,118	1,147,451	2,083,919	2,079,088	1,961,144
Silver fractional coin.....	367,810	379,761	419,282	99,801	95,677	98,116	129,688	162,688	166,118
Legal-tender notes.....	15,760	15,760	16,764	1,027,069	1,261,411	1,242,180	5,679,766	5,679,766	5,954,500
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	810,000	1,473,000	2,185,000	250,000	250,000	980,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	1,000	.....	121,432	181,176	151,971	816,946	806,822	250,859
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,242,701</b>	<b>\$16,864,186</b>	<b>\$16,846,263</b>	<b>\$59,760,296</b>	<b>\$63,847,572</b>	<b>\$67,384,246</b>	<b>\$276,810,573</b>	<b>\$304,094,370</b>	<b>\$309,710,016</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$13,243,280	\$13,243,280	\$12,698,280	\$48,150,000	\$49,650,000	\$39,840,750
Surplus fund.....	1,860,000	1,372,000	1,372,000	5,195,876	5,195,876	5,295,525	14,422,876	14,411,275	13,870,985
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	191,486	214,687	222,570	1,136,253	1,314,081	1,050,527	6,345,246	4,985,866	4,412,159
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	301,760	301,040	316,560	2,394,160	2,598,200	2,844,280	6,250,302	6,114,022	5,130,645
State bank notes outstanding.....	.....	.....	.....	4,504	4,904	1,723	.....	.....	.....
Due to other National banks.....	3,776,564	4,865,104	5,214,766	7,049,508	7,463,311	8,790,097	48,244,244	51,020,954	53,280,955
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,705,770	1,940,654	1,941,589	2,146,280	2,498,654	2,688,306	21,715,616	24,818,747	20,418,747
Dividends unpaid.....	561	767	23,317	95,986	85,871	81,769	30,890	30,890	30,907
Individual deposits.....	7,297,254	6,321,511	5,960,705	29,873,361	23,724,070	30,973,952	148,298,249	148,455,576	148,455,576
U. S. deposits.....	1,42,718	251,884	245,676	1,376,507	2,455,267	2,560,484	3,705,200	3,705,200	3,398,414
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	4,768	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	8,282,168	8,282,168	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	21,788	21,788	21,788	100,000	295,000	150,000	504,747	504,747	542,975
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	141,560	146,385	299,358	272,955	164,469	162,868
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,242,701</b>	<b>\$16,864,186</b>	<b>\$16,846,263</b>	<b>\$59,760,296</b>	<b>\$63,847,572</b>	<b>\$67,384,246</b>	<b>\$276,810,573</b>	<b>\$304,094,370</b>	<b>\$309,710,016</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$1,661,000	\$1,341,165	\$1,341,165	\$8,844,296	\$8,844,296	\$8,844,296	\$32,810,573	\$32,810,573	\$32,810,016
*Total lawful money reserve.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

	BROOKLYN, N. Y.			CHICAGO, ILL.			CINCINNATI, OHIO.		
	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,965,603	\$11,323,477	\$11,569,175	\$105,967,207	\$100,465,723	\$114,934,069	\$23,064,837	\$23,387,242	\$23,155,278
Overdrafts.....	1,022	642,000	554	233,751	252,065	207,587	13,854	8,437	11,790
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	200,000	642,000	1,630,000	1,057,000	1,350,000	4,961,500	4,781,500	4,781,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	843,000	1,043,000	1,163,000	2,447,500	2,483,000	2,483,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	9,000	9,000	9,000	449,190	401,130	511,570	1,453,330	1,732,330	1,732,330
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	29,500	29,500	24,370	79,747	93,114	90,015	904,984	904,984	904,984
Stocks.....	2,575,828	2,410,006	2,115,077	9,000,764	10,107,381	11,548,295	5,646,067	5,201,107	6,078,940
Securities, etc.....	601,804	601,804	601,804	796,084	796,144	796,074	508,182	508,182	600,874
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	98,151	98,151	75,851	796,144	712,340	796,144	208,358	168,362	160,181
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	77,078	167,368	69,154	723,241	712,340	712,340	3,773,246	3,873,734	4,281,115
Due from National banks and bankers.....	167,368	193,546	94,050	32,870,823	32,870,823	35,370,519	3,773,246	3,873,734	4,281,115
Due from State banks and bankers.....	2,418,856	2,418,856	2,418,856	7,046,091	10,068,074	10,068,074	5,827,783	6,485,401	8,570,156
Due from approved reserve agents.....	73,419	108,342	2,078,940	1,919,653	251,110	207,462	6,200,278	6,485,401	190,173
Checks and other cash items.....	173,700	173,700	188,000	1,919,653	251,110	207,462	208,774	108,190	190,173
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	908,245	2,249,497	563,682	6,273,981	9,398,204	5,229,857	353,362	273,794	734,547
Bills of other National Banks.....	151,714	110,130	110,911	1,264,188	1,832,236	2,185,366	477,622	448,072	457,556
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	8,516	10,944	16,548	22,543	27,548	35,305	6,094	4,387	5,582
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	702,244	676,149	633,125	17,403,484	18,305,487	19,043,600	1,268,278	1,463,718	1,419,313
Gold Treasury certificates.....	173,700	173,700	188,000	8,139,970	2,791,880	2,815,050	207,300	208,150	209,060
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	640,000	380,000	380,000						
Silver dollars.....	19,000	36,425	18,500	196,102	250,856	270,659	60,374	63,495	61,591
Silver Treasury certificates.....	636,387	643,693	901,720	2,451,853	2,608,243	3,013,647	604,916	660,881	611,697
Silver fractional coin.....	53,995	64,110	67,553	192,263	271,689	284,047	24,281	27,189	30,049
Legal-tender notes.....	866,554	970,755	898,597	15,219,615	17,309,000	16,333,245	2,112,293	2,401,494	2,462,083
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	28,980	28,980	28,980	1,280,000	1,430,000	2,170,000	610,000	570,000	560,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	1,050	12,500	5,000	71,100	81,000	58,500	214,027	224,187	212,817
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....				282,658	63,050	62,020	2,458	1,408	17,910
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,965,955</b>	<b>\$23,359,324</b>	<b>\$21,795,414</b>	<b>\$202,064,229</b>	<b>\$219,468,984</b>	<b>\$230,024,318</b>	<b>\$56,024,877</b>	<b>\$57,652,785</b>	<b>\$61,994,480</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$19,450,000	\$18,450,000	\$18,450,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000
Surplus fund.....	2,300,000	2,300,000	2,300,000	9,374,800	9,359,800	9,347,800	2,715,000	2,755,000	2,755,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	4,926,332	4,926,332	4,926,332	2,818,197	2,545,340	2,302,061	1,150,847	931,797	1,063,290
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	660,860	677,800	670,620	1,029,255	1,215,875	797,625	4,262,735	4,575,935	3,888,955
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	1,846	55,009,006	60,401,941	60,401,941	60,090,972	5,515,712	12,673,606
Due to other National banks.....	316,436	419,908	298,639	30,166,462	33,517,381	35,732,443	4,880,848	4,828,327	5,246,151
Due to State banks and bankers.....	447,800	380,808	380,840	7,438	6,369	11,614	1,917	6,529	5,679
Dividends unpaid.....	1,056	428	662	84,006,658	92,682,717	93,265,987	22,980,235	22,980,235	24,919,510
Individual deposits.....	16,859,226	17,694,658	16,306,617	627,054	949,814	1,068,911	2,377,415	2,081,066	2,063,916
U. S. deposits.....	174,728	178,976	183,538	80,771	84,648	69,623	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	25,276	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	20,651	20,651	36,138	.....	13,000	.....	981,100	.....	1,076,600
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,965,955</b>	<b>\$23,359,324</b>	<b>\$21,795,414</b>	<b>\$202,064,229</b>	<b>\$219,468,984</b>	<b>\$230,024,318</b>	<b>\$56,024,877</b>	<b>\$57,652,785</b>	<b>\$61,994,480</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$23,064,837	\$23,155,278	\$23,155,278	\$201,024,318	\$201,024,318	\$201,024,318	\$67,652,785	\$67,652,785	\$67,652,785
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$6,011,751	\$6,844,138	\$6,468,666	\$60,326,286	\$63,067,315	\$64,830,456	\$4,067,318	\$4,511,367	\$4,364,533

	CLEVELAND, OHIO.			DES MOINES, IOWA.			DETROIT, MICH.		
	Sept. 30, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$30,757,784	\$30,984,715	\$3,217,478	\$3,818,118	\$3,841,188	\$14,711,665	\$14,997,141	\$14,997,141	\$18,984,086
Overdrafts.....	30,335	63,811	23,318	28,861	23,407	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,580,000	1,690,000	848,000	867,000	867,000	700,000	700,000	700,000	700,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	60,000	60,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	154,200	154,200	154,200	154,200
U. S. bonds on hand.....	717,300	711,500	796,500	821,400	821,400	228,154	228,154	228,154	228,154
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	84,007	86,185	101,068	101,068	101,068	398,410	398,410	398,410	398,410
Stocks, securities, etc.....	849,962	884,290	1,410,297	1,454,971	1,454,971	301,688	301,688	301,688	301,688
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	506,293	517,942	527,689	527,689	527,689	882,168	882,168	882,168	882,168
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	210,713	210,991	210,991	210,991	210,991	1,200,605	1,200,605	1,200,605	1,200,605
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,786,673	3,550,328	3,982,475	3,982,475	3,982,475	483,304	483,304	483,304	483,304
Due from State banks and bankers.....	839,824	1,194,197	1,348,678	1,348,678	1,348,678	66,987	66,987	66,987	66,987
Due from approved reserve agents.....	6,533,816	6,903,369	11,277,174	664,087	664,087	1,107,972	1,107,972	1,107,972	1,107,972
Checks and other cash items.....	184,205	180,410	285,721	11,468	11,468	23,825	23,825	23,825	23,825
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	278,380	421,680	480,342	73,083	73,083	298,594	298,594	298,594	298,594
Bills of other National banks.....	161,205	238,019	187,085	38,583	38,583	142,987	142,987	142,987	142,987
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	4,963	4,410	6,560	1,119	1,119	1,209	1,209	1,209	1,209
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	1,684,215	1,659,322	1,698,963	117,885	117,885	91,485	1,405,587	1,405,587	1,224,684
Gold Treasury certificates.....	265,470	267,770	264,150	5,870	5,870	6,000	20,000	20,000	21,500
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	102,121	108,767	141,447	8,614	8,614	18,355	109,158	118,932	136,326
Silver dollars.....	205,050	237,450	182,947	12,075	12,075	11,487	105,060	148,809	145,042
Silver Treasury certificates.....	31,611	45,568	41,238	6,267	6,267	5,317	87,811	88,984	74,820
Silver fractional coin.....	1,470,002	1,765,000	1,654,240	198,616	198,616	268,231	699,711	712,771	869,418
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	70,660	73,460	73,460	15,455	15,455	16,515	63,000	63,000	63,000
Five per cent redemption fund with Treas.....	20,000	20,500	20,500	60,000	60,000	1,700	8,448	15,908	20,847
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....									
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$49,324,727</b>	<b>\$51,596,096</b>	<b>\$57,332,156</b>	<b>\$61,098,747</b>	<b>\$61,098,747</b>	<b>\$61,620,079</b>	<b>\$58,998,562</b>	<b>\$58,741,531</b>	<b>\$57,763,887</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$9,400,000	\$9,651,750	\$9,765,250	\$9,600,000	\$9,600,000	\$9,600,000	\$9,300,000	\$9,300,000	\$9,300,000
Surplus fund.....	2,161,500	2,184,500	2,184,500	2,215,000	2,215,000	2,215,000	2,215,000	2,215,000	2,215,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	645,212	505,799	570,236	65,966	65,966	34,670	302,563	302,563	302,563
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	1,498,350	1,438,580	1,460,160	1,480,987	1,480,987	313,143	1,169,080	1,122,170	1,184,500
Due to other National banks.....	5,308,303	5,278,335	6,120,597	1,014,680	1,014,680	1,295,091	2,981,741	3,523,690	3,523,690
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,113,725	3,145,917	4,138,947	1,903,877	1,903,877	1,511,641	1,677,519	1,677,519	1,677,519
Dividends unpaid.....	1,672	3,973	2,649	4,743	4,743	6,988	53	53	406
Individual deposits.....	393,417,863	285,522,419	382,147,124	1,668,408	1,668,408	2,119,165	11,249,457	10,940,595	11,476,975
U. S. deposits.....	38,242	43,082	160,233	100,000	100,000	296,467	372,143	372,143	684,932
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	23,689	16,094	12,885	23	23	62,514	65,299	65,299	81,188
Notes and bills rediscounted.....									
Bills payable.....									
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	806,188	764,726	761,143						
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$49,324,727</b>	<b>\$51,596,096</b>	<b>\$57,332,156</b>	<b>\$61,098,747</b>	<b>\$61,098,747</b>	<b>\$61,620,079</b>	<b>\$58,998,562</b>	<b>\$58,741,531</b>	<b>\$57,763,887</b>
Average reserve held.....	33,414 p. c.	34,590 p. c.	41,700 p. c.	23,700 p. c.	23,700 p. c.	31,250 p. c.	32,280 p. c.	32,280 p. c.	35,010 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,698,460	\$4,068,905	\$3,938,065	\$347,377	\$347,377	\$390,395	\$2,377,318	\$2,377,318	\$2,461,985

	HOUSTON, TEXAS.			KANSAS CITY, MO.			LINCOLN, NEB.		
	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,555,738	\$2,187,149	\$2,078,509	\$18,878,818	\$18,500,208	\$17,912,197	\$2,012,566	\$2,087,782	\$1,444,919
Overdrafts.....	238,175	384,664	123,572	211,227	188,333	230,422	13,673	14,680	10,989
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	280,100	280,100	280,100	87,000	625,000	683,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	287,200	232,950	198,300	38,000	40,160	28,160
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	65,846	45,478	52,513	5,500	5,500	5,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	22,514	22,083	22,683	1,362,946	1,352,054	1,351,164	91,091	91,556	112,311
Stocks, securities, etc.....	32,514	28,176	61,588	18,001	13,000	12,500	8,645	8,645	98,645
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	123,544	123,436	123,436	18,001	13,000	12,500	8,645	8,645	98,645
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	121,989	120,271	120,271	885,227	489,863	449,662	119,038	116,236	116,236
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	313,304	750,490	773,110	1,364,813	1,364,813	1,364,813	172,110	172,110	510,688
Due from State banks and bankers.....	72,206	70,201	128,458	2,043,488	2,197,028	2,088,126	118,908	67,978	116,888
Due from approved reserve agents.....	422,236	1,045,180	1,088,906	4,401,672	4,728,010	4,727,649	247,611	196,669	368,574
Checks and other cash items.....	11,214	78,537	98,114	21,842	21,842	31,178	21,663	19,643	8,180
Exchanges for clearing-houses.....	11,214	78,537	98,114	576,138	731,888	827,581	13,540	24,688	14,880
Bills of other National banks.....	33,589	87,312	84,811	168,811	208,760	207,462	7,272	6,489	4,972
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,190	1,468	1,857	6,865	6,156	6,091	2,764	2,388	1,897
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	305,688	280,436	285,226	933,477	1,019,590	1,091,932	99,990	115,903	99,618
Gold Treasury certificates.....	189,270	187,680	189,690	25,009	25,000	25,000	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	9,087	69,654	75,971	98,889	199,256	153,048	16,063	18,502	10,613
Silver Treasury.....	142,367	198,958	228,179	422,683	606,368	680,466	28,122	14,066	8,348
Silver fractional coin.....	12,247	10,146	13,962	37,089	38,441	44,622	13,915	11,965	7,407
Legal-tender notes.....	1,283,218	667,147	684,163	961,132	876,100	747,122	88,034	108,004	6,760
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	11,250	11,250	11,250	13,500	28,000	28,250	6,760	6,760	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	23,504	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$6,208,725</b>	<b>\$4,621,803</b>	<b>\$4,662,140</b>	<b>\$28,570,168</b>	<b>\$24,000,845</b>	<b>\$27,608,060</b>	<b>\$3,411,867</b>	<b>\$3,287,220</b>	<b>\$3,191,401</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$900,000	\$700,000	\$550,000
Surplus fund.....	577,300	577,300	607,300	608,000	618,000	631,000	15,000	15,000	68,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	102,888	198,287	78,224	235,188	414,982	464,978	4,807	14,870	14,728
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	200,500	200,070	198,080	201,450	580,000	598,000	134,300	135,000	128,000
Due to other National banks.....	584,704	946,571	952,143	7,459,153	8,500,016	9,349,844	237,489	237,787	238,581
Due to State banks and bankers.....	233,271	232,064	238,479	8,088,143	7,468,218	8,880,638	497,772	386,156	468,084
Dividends unpaid.....	4,029	4,239	6,623	3,484	3,484	3,484	.....	.....	.....
Individual deposits.....	3,845,132	3,238,151	3,411,141	18,484,082	14,668,191	14,668,191	1,663,307	1,737,180	1,008,162
U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	228,680	573,774	682,170	57,000	57,113	57,000
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	15,781	29,387	31,710	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$6,208,725</b>	<b>\$4,621,803</b>	<b>\$4,662,140</b>	<b>\$28,570,168</b>	<b>\$24,000,845</b>	<b>\$27,608,060</b>	<b>\$3,411,867</b>	<b>\$3,287,220</b>	<b>\$3,191,401</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>\$1,994,088</b>	<b>\$1,843,503</b>	<b>\$1,843,503</b>	<b>\$3,466,130</b>	<b>\$3,764,795</b>	<b>\$3,749,160</b>	<b>\$246,108</b>	<b>\$263,681</b>	<b>\$132,988</b>
* Total lawful money reserve.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....



U. S NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

Table with columns for Reserve City, Date, and various financial metrics. Cities include Louisville, KY; Milwaukee, Wis.; Minneapolis, Minn.; and Reserve Cities. Metrics include Loans and discounts, Overdrafts, U. S. bonds to secure circulation, U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits, U. S. bonds on hand, Premiums on U. S. bonds, Stocks, securities, etc., Banking house, furniture and fixtures, Other real estate and mortgages owned, Due from National banks (not reserve agents), Due from State banks and bankers, Due from approved reserve agents, Checks and other cash items, Exchanges for clearing-house, Bills of other National banks, Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents, Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.: Gold coin, Gold Treasury certificates, Gold clearing-house certificates, Silver dollars, Silver Treasury certificates, Silver fractional coin, Legal-tender notes, U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders, Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas., Due from U. S. Treasurer, Total, Capital stock paid in, Surplus fund, Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid, National bank notes issued, less am't on hand, Due to other National banks, Due to State banks and bankers, Dividends unpaid, Individual deposits, U. S. deposits, Deposits of U. S. rediscounting officers, Notes and bills disbursed, Bills payable, Liabilities other than those above stated, Average reserve held, Total lawful money reserve.

RESOURCES.	NEW ORLEANS, LA.		OMAHA, NEB.		PHILADELPHIA, PA.	
	Sept. 20, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Sept. 20, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Sept. 20, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,762,048	\$12,274,512	\$11,078,209	\$9,786,541	\$11,501,560	\$100,110,745
Overdrafts.....	800,271	1,154,067	128,149	138,068	122,077	1,218,486
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	320,000	300,000	975,000	975,000	1,075,000	6,962,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	320,000	300,000	975,000	975,000	900,000	7,273,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	41,270	128,550	605,320	623,100	177,020	3,326,000
Premiums U. S. bonds.....	84,450	1,940,466	98,068	102,300	498,122	647,100
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,027,258	1,064,374	688,961	665,176	102,204	960,273
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	623,337	623,337	688,961	688,961	688,961	13,963,969
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	125,529	152,170	832,291	819,111	818,541	3,972,206
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	447,667	439,185	417,860	417,860	410,649	9,179,199
Due from State banks and bankers.....	410,415	962,387	1,033,622	1,033,622	1,005,144	9,801,005
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,657,366	1,672,919	822,408	822,408	811,048	8,968,102
Checks and other cash items.....	10,565	128,063	3,910,711	3,910,711	4,017,726	16,180,565
Exchanges to clearing-house.....	546,317	1,459,625	175,064	175,064	1,432,258	8,968,102
Bills of other National banks.....	77,055	1,077,012	868,734	868,734	1,142,381	28,761,000
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	13,130	13,118	182,742	182,742	110,155	1,529,400
Gold coin.....	1,119,222	1,053,612	10,673	10,673	11,056	7,815,561
Gold Treasury certificates.....	106,060	123,730	949,680	949,680	1,161,228	418,017
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	63,082	72,675	88,960	88,960	86,010	60,646
Silver dollars.....	527,350	662,635	169,297	169,297	116,742	2,005,711
Silver Treasury certificates.....	53,867	63,638	297,976	297,976	143,659	159,230
Silver fractional coin.....	1,121,787	960,191	171,811	171,811	116,742	10,000,000
Legal-tender notes.....	225,000	186,000	689,528	689,528	3,275,485	8,765,000
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tenders.....	27,980	27,980	43,469	43,469	84,897	275,189
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	2,000	10,000	23,625	23,625	361,248	4,197,452
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	2,000	10,000	43,469	43,469	48,175	229,625
Total.....	\$22,264,270	\$24,948,779	\$23,373,874	\$23,468,681	\$24,390,061	\$312,961,374
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$19,655,000
Surplus fund.....	2,355,000	2,355,000	942,600	942,600	982,600	14,460,000
Undiv. profits less expenses and taxes paid.....	801,420	449,070	157,724	157,724	173,012	2,688,936
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	511,665	513,545	671,241	671,241	683,510	2,761,000
Due to other National banks.....	9,069,473	1,077,878	4,318,115	4,318,115	4,998,190	6,310,665
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,069,869	1,339,752	3,948,563	3,948,563	3,068,104	28,622,960
Dividends unpaid.....	12,124	9,008	17,293	17,293	16,923	9,207,686
Individual deposits.....	14,223,176	15,650,783	9,158,626	9,158,626	30,085	62,115
U. S. deposits.....	286,817	291,508	9,748,048	9,748,048	9,850,684	121,066,366
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	100,168	151,855	530,265	530,265	516,935	4,072,567
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	100,000	450,000	282,380	282,380	2,766,065	4,180,063
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	811
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Total.....	\$22,264,270	\$24,948,779	\$23,373,874	\$23,468,681	\$24,390,061	\$312,961,374
Average reserve hold.....	\$1,174 p. c.	\$1,174 p. c.	\$1,174 p. c.	\$1,174 p. c.	\$1,174 p. c.	\$1,174 p. c.
Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,819,688	\$4,014,181	\$4,068,680	\$4,068,680	\$4,068,680	\$40,087,400

ST. JOSEPH, MO.

Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
\$2,904,279	\$2,940,959	\$3,012,764
31,968	4,608	9,849
810,000	801,000	810,000
80,000	80,000	100,000
66,000	89,100	.....
14,400	14,900	14,900
72,000	72,000	72,000
812,840	812,840	810,085
229,284	193,865	113,447
168,865	804,869	1,403,780
1,216,565	23,768	29,863
60,175	143,486	167,150
88,071	14,265	10,285
7,980	11,889	798
13,775	.....	.....
506	.....	.....
89,747	88,763	85,375
10,960	12,440	10,880
11,575	16,686	17,578
75,963	102,337	93,239
4,337	6,918	5,456
205,461	194,079	193,071
.....	.....	.....
6,780	9,450	9,450
880	1,000	.....
\$4,813,989	\$4,463,333	\$4,577,245

PORTLAND, ORE.

Feb. 4, 1899.
\$2,687,997
90,687
683,000
400,000
501,630
767,330
88,287
2,486,949
93,123
211,188
223,749
83,016
683,266
10,865
88,071
7,980
1,619
1,156,450
.....
11,558
9,832
20,509
12,040
.....
28,125
38,614
\$9,723,073

PITTSBURGH, PA.

Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
\$50,068,066	\$47,762,648	\$50,164,215
70,470	49,915	75,228
5,665,250	5,845,250	5,845,250
700,000	1,060,500	400,000
869,760	860,800	767,330
753,445	760,542	765,024
4,652,137	4,478,634	6,006,024
3,652,261	3,210,066	3,208,214
631,036	468,301	525,500
2,867,781	3,078,443	4,962,249
9,474,738	397,959	339,560
6,477,480	7,928,507	12,695,969
423,833	187,135	241,709
2,903,530	2,915,732	1,953,194
297,638	312,477	371,539
17,710	13,631	13,917
3,445,240	3,173,206	3,298,230
434,610	413,760	.....
133,836	132,630	277,421
1,014,997	1,235,412	1,467,464
1,07,729	110,506	104,100
2,663,135	3,231,269	3,631,147
254,220	252,331	240,511
43,133	43,022	49,955
\$38,163,175	\$37,750,657	\$37,895,007

RESOURCES.

Loans and discounts.....	\$11,890,000
Overdrafts.....	9,112,000
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	2,083,985
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	5,124,400
U. S. bonds on hand.....	4,713,230
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	11,560,730
Stocks, securities, etc.....	3,660,237
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	63,097
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	53,940,720
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	48,191,951
Due from State banks and bankers.....	841,629
Due from approved reserve agents.....	143,130
Checks and other cash items.....	107,415
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	.....
Bills of other National banks.....	.....
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	.....
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	.....
Gold coin.....	1,665
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	.....
Silver Treasury certificates.....	.....
Silver fractional coin.....	.....
Legal-tender notes.....	.....
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....
Total.....	\$37,895,007

LIABILITIES.

Capital stock paid in.....	\$12,050,000
Surplus fund.....	9,640,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	2,083,985
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	4,713,230
Due to other National banks.....	11,560,730
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,660,237
Dividends unpaid.....	63,097
Individual deposits.....	53,940,720
U. S. deposits.....	48,191,951
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	841,629
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	143,130
Bills payable.....	107,415
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....
Total.....	\$37,895,007
Average reserve held.....	31.30 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,435,674

ST. JOSEPH, MO.

Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
\$2,904,279	\$2,940,959	\$3,012,764
31,968	4,608	9,849
810,000	801,000	810,000
80,000	80,000	100,000
66,000	89,100	.....
14,400	14,900	14,900
72,000	72,000	72,000
812,840	812,840	810,085
229,284	193,865	113,447
168,865	804,869	1,403,780
1,216,565	23,768	29,863
60,175	143,486	167,150
88,071	14,265	10,285
7,980	11,889	798
13,775	.....	.....
506	.....	.....
89,747	88,763	85,375
10,960	12,440	10,880
11,575	16,686	17,578
75,963	102,337	93,239
4,337	6,918	5,456
205,461	194,079	193,071
.....	.....	.....
6,780	9,450	9,450
880	1,000	.....
\$4,813,989	\$4,463,333	\$4,577,245

RESOURCES.

Loans and discounts.....	\$1,100,000
Overdrafts.....	198,000
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	683,639
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	4,713,230
U. S. bonds on hand.....	1,060,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	765,024
Stocks, securities, etc.....	63,097
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	53,940,720
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	48,191,951
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	841,629
Due from State banks and bankers.....	143,130
Due from approved reserve agents.....	107,415
Checks and other cash items.....	.....
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	.....
Bills of other National banks.....	.....
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	.....
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	.....
Gold coin.....	1,665
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	.....
Silver Treasury certificates.....	.....
Silver fractional coin.....	.....
Legal-tender notes.....	.....
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....
Total.....	\$9,723,073

ST. LOUIS, MO. ST. PAUL, MINN. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.
\$84,712,725	\$33,633,882	\$40,740,590	\$9,715,805	\$9,578,965	\$18,494,035
31,770	113,254	4,141	3,161	67,715	155,108,590
3,810,000	3,730,000	282,000	282,000	700,000	700,000
980,000	1,480,000	475,000	475,000	380,000	380,000
80,000	19,440	138,500	142,500	770,440	1,370,000
208,468	178,929	153,462	3,300	188,741	281,578
2,825,185	8,046,047	4,507,138	1,773,166	1,689,282	2,184,738
923,100	917,000	700,000	698,758	385,131	1,508,469
247,327	242,984	138,575	126,211	128,927	114,900
5,974,122	13,584,908	1,062,891	1,242,891	418,157	365,859
346,081	1,374,405	243,554	391,790	2,494,724	2,582,207
138,450	97,624	8,408,665	4,283,714	7,098,240	1,619,314
1,110,353	1,615,240	71,000	140,417	1,698,801	18,708
160,751	298,584	288,459	382,819	587,237	484,682
3,000	2,768	3,482	112,741	7,640	12,955
2,648,647	2,828,085	8,711,417	1,749,977	1,929,987	7,044,790
230,160	281,640	461,980	10,000	845,000	845,000
42,810	45,522	110,870	81,702	39,011	56,059
983,502	1,708,649	210,704	181,722	28,146	10,914
2,322,876	19,714	44,112	47,189	99,370	94,749
1,350,000	2,678,086	648,480	403,422	7,374	18,167
121,860	1,780,000	11,388	11,388	31,486	31,486
1,000	14,000	20,281	45,368	1,600	443,511
\$58,646,840	\$66,272,469	\$88,111,885	\$30,690,970	\$21,768,741	\$22,224,053
			\$29,897,427	\$22,004,721	\$31,495,486

Capital stock paid in.....	\$8,400,000	\$8,400,000	\$8,800,000	\$8,800,000	\$8,800,000
Surplus fund.....	1,728,000	1,784,500	667,000	667,000	2,850,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	668,281	863,840	817,668	590,456	548,946
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	2,469,285	3,389,265	201,500	90,000	294,525
Due to other National banks.....	18,438,571	17,319,984	2,591,161	2,582,688	1,194,016
Due to State banks and bankers.....	8,528,063	8,299,502	11,754,860	2,346,600	4,740,118
Dividends unpaid.....	4,501	42,349	2,802	3,380	8,397,948
Individual deposits.....	22,184,700	24,862,562	10,482,375	11,404,000	10,610
U. S. deposits.....	963,220	1,339,500	87,101	165,399	870,764
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	3,224	7,290	.....	.....	607,061
Total.....	\$58,646,840	\$66,272,469	\$88,111,885	\$30,690,970	\$21,768,741
Average reserve held.....	20,64 P. C.	23,162 P. C.	25,366 P. C.	26,14 P. C.	27,58 P. C.
Total lawful money reserve.....	\$7,082,595	\$8,549,498	\$12,860,554	\$4,673,149	\$3,489,881
			\$3,489,881	\$7,440,729	\$7,082,595

LIA BILITIES.

Gold coin.....	8,711,417	1,749,977	10,000	1,000	1,929,987
Gold Treasury certificates.....	230,160	281,640	461,980	1,000	845,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	42,810	45,522	110,870	81,702	39,011
Silver dollars.....	983,502	1,708,649	210,704	181,722	28,146
Silver Treasury certificates.....	2,322,876	19,714	44,112	47,189	99,370
Silver fractional coin.....	1,350,000	2,678,086	648,480	403,422	7,374
Legal-tender notes.....	121,860	1,780,000	11,388	11,388	31,486
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	1,000	14,000	20,281	45,368	1,600
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....					
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....					

\* Total lawful money reserve.....



# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

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## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

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NEW YORK, March 2, 1900.

SPECULATION MODERATED ITS PACE LAST MONTH as compared with the furious trading that was witnessed at the New York Stock Exchange in January. Still, sales were very large, the aggregate for the month being 15,984,886 shares of stock and \$91,518,720 of bonds. These would have been considered very large totals not very long ago. Prices of securities have generally been strong, but the spirit of discrimination is beginning to manifest itself, and while some securities advance others take a downward course. While many people are taking a conservative view, however, the conditions that make for prosperity still exist and are increasing rather than diminishing.

The future of the money market is receiving more attention than formerly, for a squeeze in money it is believed would force out a number of recent buyers at top figures and possibly cause a temporary decline in prices. As bearing on the question of money the Government finances are again becoming a matter of concern. There have been rumors that the Government would make another bond issue, but this seems to have had no other warrant than a remark made in Congress during debate that the Government could not continue its present rate of expenditure without making some provisions for raising money.

There is little doubt now that the Government will have to spend great sums of money for a long time to come. The United States has another war upon its hands and while the Filipinos must prove impotent against our forces, still wars with barbarians usually are found to be very expensive. Coincident with the news of the outbreak at Manila, the Senate ratified the treaty of peace with Spain by a vote so close, however, that it is evident the Administration must have been doubtful of the result until the vote was counted.

With the payment of the \$20,000,000 promised to Spain and the expense of subjugating the Filipinos running on for some time, perhaps, there is little prospect of the surplus in the Treasury being increased, while it may happen that a drain of the Treasury resources and a demand for gold may occur just in time to inject the currency question into another Presidential campaign. If that question could be settled this spring so as to allow a full year to elapse before the great political parties got in line for their quadrennial contest, a decided menace to prosperity would be removed.

We have referred to the interest taken in the money market, but no permanent advance on rates for money is apprehended. In fact, the tendency of the rate of interest is to decline, recognition of which is given in a bill recently introduced in the New York Legislature to reduce the legal rate of interest to five per cent. The proposition is a vicious one and only harms those whom it is intended to benefit.

That the security and not the law makes the rate of interest is apparent to any one acquainted with the subject. Take the rates that are now ruling, for instance. Anyone with good Stock Exchange collateral to put up can borrow money at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on condition that he will return it whenever called upon to do so. That is the cheapest kind of loan. If he wants to keep the money say for two or three months he must pay three per cent., or for four to six months  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. putting

up the same collateral. If he wants to run in a small lot of stocks not first-class, he has to pay one to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. more. But suppose he wants to raise money on a note with a good endorser, he usually has to pay a little more than if he was putting up first-class collateral, although just now he can get it for the same rate, but if he is trying to borrow on his own paper with no endorsement he must pay  $8\frac{3}{4}$ @4 per cent. if his credit is of the very best; if it is only what is called good he pays 4@5 per cent., and as his credit descends the scale the interest and commissions he has to pay are awful to contemplate, and no law yet ever made it easier for a man to borrow.

The proposed legislation, however, recognizes an existing condition. Rates of interest have declined permanently. Insurance companies are disturbed because of the fact that they have been calculating on getting four per cent. interest and now doubt if they can much longer count on getting over three per cent.

As an illustration of the tendency of the interest rate, the readjustment plan of the Central Pacific Railroad just announced is timely. This company proposes issuing \$100,000,000 four per cent. bonds and \$25,000,000  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. bonds. The bonds issued by the Government to aid this company, and which only recently fell due, carried six per cent. interest. Another case in point is that of the city of Topeka, Kans., which has just succeeded in placing an issue of bonds on a  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. basis, while all the other bonds of that municipality now outstanding bear five and six per cent.

Money is cheap almost everywhere now. A Victorian Government 8 per cent. stock issue amounting to £1,600,000 was placed in London last month at a slight premium over the issue price of ninety-five. This issue is to replace a four per cent. loan.

A new three per cent. perpetual loan of 200,000,000 marks, \$47,600,000, issued by the German Government, was subscribed more than twenty times over, the total subscriptions being 4,500,000,000 marks, by Germany alone, although at one time it was expected that part of the loan would be taken in London and part in New York. The price paid for the loan by subscribers was 92.

The January statement of the Bureau of Statistics shows that the exports of merchandise continue to be of exceptionally large volume, the total value being \$108,426,674, while the imports were only \$50,827,714, making an excess of exports of \$57,598,960 comparing with \$42,597,865 last year. In the seven months ended January 31 the total exports were \$749,549,338 and the next exports \$382,296,540, figures never before equalled. The Bureau of Statistics calls particular attention to the remarkable increase in exports of manufactures which in ten years equalled 181 per cent., while the increase in all other exports was only 51 per cent. The Bureau favors us with the following table showing the exports of manufactures and total exports in the seven months ending February 1 of each fiscal year from 1889 to 1899:

SEVEN MONTHS ENDING FEB. 1,	Exports of manufactures.	Total exports.
1889.....	\$78,751,433	\$454,197,622
1890.....	89,077,820	540,634,133
1891.....	97,138,066	547,726,350
1892.....	96,096,466	651,263,531
1893.....	88,278,110	526,941,376
1894.....	111,006,089	573,651,520
1895.....	104,607,101	501,902,934
1896.....	126,802,682	524,964,990
1897.....	153,832,682	655,177,127
1898.....	159,541,049	718,367,407
1899.....	182,336,503	749,549,338

The continued increase in activity in general business in the United States must sooner or later exert an influence upon rates for money which will cause them to

advance temporarily. While our foreign trade continues to show such large balances of exports, however, we are in a position to call for gold from abroad. Purchases of American securities in London have checked gold imports during the past month, but anything like tight money would cause another large movement of gold in this direction.

The announcement that a settlement had been effected with the Government in the matter of the Central Pacific debt was one of the most significant events of the month. The Government is to receive in full the entire amount of the debt and interest, a total of \$58,812,715, which includes the debt of the Western Pacific road. This will make a total of \$123,563,989 which the Government will have received from the Pacific roads. A few years ago nobody, not even those who were engaged in pressing the companies hardest, would have believed it possible that the Government would realize even one-half that sum. And if we were to refer to the debates in Congress at the time the Pacific Railroads were chartered, we should find that in the opinion of many members of Congress there was no likelihood that the Government would ever receive a cent of the money it loaned to the roads. Had not there been so great an improvement in the times in the last two years, there is no question that the Pacific Railroads would have been unable to make so liberal a settlement with the Government.

The compilation of gross and net earnings of the railroads for the year 1898 made by the "Financial Chronicle" gives a clearer insight into the extensiveness of the improvement in general business than could be obtained from almost any other grouping of statistics. The "Chronicle" has the returns from 132 roads with an aggregate mileage of 144,518 miles. The gross earnings in 1898 were \$1,180,005,798, an increase of \$67,587,893 over 1897 or 6.08 per cent; the net earnings were \$372,991,544, an increase of \$21,994,655 or 6.27 per cent., while the increase in mileage was only .97 per cent. As these gains follow an increase of \$55,000,000 in gross earnings and of nearly \$36,000,000 in net earnings in 1897, the results are very encouraging. The yearly gains and losses in gross and net earnings for the last six years were as follows:

	<i>Gross earnings.</i>	<i>Net earnings.</i>
1898.....	Decrease, \$16,520,098	Decrease, \$10,429,642
1894.....	" 122,972,194	" 40,323,008
1895.....	Increase, 61,740,688	Increase, 26,451,609
1896.....	Decrease, 906,962	Decrease, 5,303,358
1897.....	Increase, 55,221,018	Increase, 26,919,219
1898.....	" 67,587,893	" 21,994,655

The losses of 1893 and 1894 have been more than made good by the gains of 1895, 1897 and 1898. It is satisfactory to note that so far in 1899 the gains have continued. The gross earnings in January on a mileage of 97,859 increased \$2,942,463 or 7.10 per cent. over January last year when the gain was \$6,000,000 or 16½ per cent.

The growth of the financial institutions of New York in recent years is attracting attention and is also developing some important problems. The weekly statements of the New York Clearing-House banks show that those institutions in the matter of loans, deposits and cash reserves have reached a magnitude absolutely unapproached in any previous period of their history. Prior to 1894 the loans of those banks never reached \$500,000,000, now they are within \$28,500,000 of \$800,000,000. Prior to 1892 deposits never equalled \$500,000,000, and not until 1897 did they reach \$600,000,000. Now they are \$10,500,000 in excess of \$900,000,000.

The banks are carrying more than three times the reserves they held twenty years ago. They have nearly \$203,000,000 of specie, while until last year they never before had as much as \$130,000,000, and rarely held as much as \$100,000,000. The scarcity of legal tenders as compared with specie has made the legal-tender reserve



smaller than has usually been held in recent years, but still the amount, \$61,156,500, is greater than was held at any time in the fourteen years from 1878 to 1891 inclusive.

On February 18 the banks held a total cash reserve of \$258,666,900 (it has been slightly reduced since), which exceeds the largest amount ever before held. Prior to 1893 the banks never held as much as \$200,000,000 at any one time, while in 1885 when the accumulation of idle capital in the banks following the bank panic of 1884 was the greatest ever known up to that time, the reserve never quite reached \$162,000,000.

It may be found interesting to study the growth of our local banks—those holding a membership in the clearing-house association. We, therefore, present the following statement, showing the largest amounts reported in each year since 1878 for loans, deposits, specie, legal tenders, total reserve, surplus reserve and circulation :

	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Reserve.	Surplus.	Circulation.
1878 ...	\$248,634,300	\$223,432,700	\$39,687,500	\$53,610,100	\$79,545,500	\$24,232,475	\$20,141,600
1879 ...	278,098,100	254,770,700	54,771,000	57,655,100	77,307,500	17,877,300	23,782,900
1880 ...	324,970,000	307,796,700	70,822,100	22,547,400	91,630,900	18,471,275	23,812,900
1881 ...	352,856,300	352,658,800	81,946,900	18,633,800	99,005,600	16,738,575	20,226,400
1882 ...	338,415,400	322,863,200	69,764,100	28,905,500	90,980,900	10,896,600	20,209,000
1883 ...	331,701,900	327,329,700	64,817,200	27,337,500	91,140,600	10,007,575	17,537,600
1884 ...	351,087,200	363,544,400	83,170,500	38,948,400	124,991,000	42,297,450	14,708,700
1885 ...	344,380,800	391,804,900	116,346,200	45,198,100	161,544,300	64,724,100	11,388,800
1886 ...	359,685,300	396,080,800	160,212,700	45,089,000	133,645,100	36,156,425	9,979,800
1887 ...	370,917,500	392,771,200	163,631,800	28,417,800	118,038,900	22,298,450	8,388,700
1888 ...	397,243,200	421,884,300	94,281,300	39,743,200	132,282,900	28,463,700	8,039,900
1889 ...	423,405,000	445,797,500	90,536,000	46,184,800	126,817,700	20,014,800	4,893,100
1890 ...	414,574,000	431,599,600	90,056,200	32,728,100	121,565,600	15,081,650	3,781,600
1891 ...	429,255,400	455,306,300	96,392,500	54,145,800	133,208,600	24,089,775	5,631,700
1892 ...	496,584,000	543,063,100	113,132,600	64,735,600	164,048,800	36,020,900	5,794,100
1893 ...	464,910,200	508,487,800	108,316,400	101,108,200	207,424,600	80,815,150	14,956,800
1894 ...	507,733,500	595,104,900	129,558,900	130,487,500	249,575,100	111,623,000	13,044,400
1895 ...	522,698,900	577,223,300	119,883,900	82,263,900	186,040,800	45,880,450	14,452,600
1896 ...	467,673,300	525,637,200	77,500,900	92,727,400	164,172,200	40,182,425	20,521,100
1897 ...	610,608,300	675,189,900	104,734,700	120,294,600	202,998,000	59,148,250	19,600,100
1898 ...	718,308,700	823,087,700	183,070,200	104,150,300	249,532,200	62,204,250	18,431,200
1899 ...	771,574,900	910,573,600	202,658,300	61,156,500	258,666,900	39,232,025	15,858,200

Besides these institutions there are a number of banks in New York, Brooklyn, Jersey City, Hoboken and Staten Island having deposits of about \$75,000,000. These banks clear through some bank which is a member of the clearing-house.

The trust companies have also experienced a wonderful growth. The report of the bank Superintendent shows that the trust companies in New York State now have resources aggregating \$579,205,442 and deposits of \$487,184,258. Last year the resources increased \$95,000,000 and the deposits \$33,000,000.

In the case of individual banking institutions the growth has been so extraordinary that it is possible a spirit of rivalry may have been created which will revolutionize to some extent the banking system of the city.

The law enacted by the New York Legislature last year authorizing State banks to establish branches opens the door for the larger banks to seek control of smaller institutions. Arrangements have practically been completed for merging the Hudson River Bank, which has about \$1,500,000 deposits and the Astor Place Bank which has about \$3,000,000 deposits, with the Corn Exchange Bank. The stockholders of the first named two banks will vote on the question this month.

The National Park Bank, which, a few months ago, obtained control of the Plaza Bank, whose deposits amount to about \$2,000,000, is understood now to have got control of the Mount Morris Bank, an uptown institution also, with about \$2,000,000 deposits. These banks are to be operated under the direction of the Park Bank.

—With these evidences of a tendency to consolidation of interests there come indf-

cations of a disposition to introduce more economical methods in banking. The banks generally have been considering how they can avoid the losses which they suffer under the present system of collecting checks, and particularly in making collections for country banks. It is evident that the banking business is to be conducted on a narrower margin of profit than formerly, and the necessity of stopping leaks forcibly impresses itself upon the minds of leading bankers.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—Rates for money in the local market have become firmer and lenders are becoming more discriminating. The demand for time money is good and the offerings are liberal. The supply of commercial paper is increasing, but the demand is good and keeps the supply limited. At the close of the month call money ruled at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 per cent., the average rate being about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Banks and trust companies quote  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. as the minimum, many loaning at 3 per cent. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at 3 per cent. for sixty to ninety days and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for four to six months. For commercial paper the rates are 3 per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable,  $3\frac{1}{4}$  @ 4 per cent. for first-class four to six months single names, and 4 @ 5 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	3 — 4	$1\frac{1}{2}$ —2	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$	2 — 3	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	2 —	$2\frac{1}{2}$ — $2\frac{3}{4}$	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —	3 —	3 —	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	3 —	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	4 —	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	3 —	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	$2\frac{3}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{3}{4}$	3 —	$2\frac{3}{4}$ —3	3 —
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{3}{4}$	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5 — 6	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	4 — 5	4 — 5	4 — 5	4 — 5

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—The banks in the New York Clearing-House Association continue to make new records, and on February 25 for the first time in their history their aggregate deposits exceeded \$900,000,000, while the loans are approach-

NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Jan. 28....	\$726,372,300	\$193,484,900	\$61,156,500	\$861,637,500	\$39,232,025	\$14,700,900	\$1,494,429,900
Feb. 4....	741,526,600	197,207,800	60,250,500	880,022,500	37,452,675	14,601,600	1,526,481,300
" 11....	750,043,300	196,501,300	59,025,300	888,059,100	35,511,825	14,558,600	1,183,486,000
" 18....	758,611,000	202,185,300	58,531,800	897,172,300	34,373,825	14,512,300	905,777,900
" 25....	771,674,900	202,658,300	55,320,000	910,573,600	30,384,900	14,516,300	1,173,261,500

NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

Dates.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Jan. 28....	\$64,580,100	\$73,411,600	\$3,832,200	\$4,698,000	\$9,482,200	\$4,381,700	\$4,041,200
Feb. 4....	64,452,000	73,642,300	3,480,800	4,572,800	9,356,900	4,769,800	3,769,750
" 11....	64,842,400	74,318,300	3,880,900	4,344,600	9,551,700	4,930,700	4,101,675
" 18....	65,226,400	73,769,000	3,558,100	4,231,700	9,361,900	4,749,200	3,458,650
" 25....	65,599,200	74,390,900	3,733,400	4,381,300	9,527,000	4,831,400	3,855,375

ing \$90,000,000. During the four weeks of February the deposits increased nearly \$49,000,000 and the loans more than \$45,000,000. These are exceptional gains rarely equalled in a similar period. There was little change in the aggregate reserve, as the gain of \$9,000,000 in specie was partly offset by the decrease of about \$8,000,000 in legal tenders. The surplus reserve declined about \$9,000,000, but is still in excess of \$30,000,000.

DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January .....	\$580,785,000	\$23,286,950	\$575,064,200	\$15,788,750	\$823,087,700*	\$19,180,975
February .....	563,281,800	50,148,250	723,484,200	35,809,450	861,687,500	39,232,025
March .....	573,769,200	57,580,975	729,214,300	22,729,125	910,578,600	30,384,900
April .....	569,226,500	47,666,575	682,226,800	35,720,800		
May .....	576,863,900	48,917,625	658,506,300	44,504,675		
June .....	575,600,000	46,616,100	696,006,400	53,704,600		
July .....	604,983,700	41,384,875	750,074,600	62,013,550		
August .....	633,045,000	45,720,150	741,680,100	41,904,475		
September .....	626,996,000	39,517,700	752,386,800	14,900,060		
October .....	619,363,200	15,550,400	702,123,200	15,327,150		
November .....	625,339,000	24,271,800	761,574,200	26,091,550		
December .....	666,278,600	22,122,950	789,525,800	17,067,950		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$910,573,600 on February 25, 1899, loans, \$771,674,900 on February 25, 1899, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following tables :

BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Jan. 28.....	\$191,049,000	\$228,568,000	\$19,311,000	\$7,745,000	\$4,887,000	\$137,388,600
Feb. 4.....	195,271,000	245,590,000	19,087,000	7,673,000	4,902,000	158,012,000
" 11.....	198,095,000	238,226,000	19,259,000	7,584,000	4,981,000	130,190,400
" 18.....	198,838,000	236,842,000	18,961,000	7,345,000	4,978,000	113,878,100
" 25.....	197,368,000	240,164,000	19,023,000	7,255,000	5,063,000	123,983,500

PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Jan. 26.....	\$125,926,000	\$154,060,000	\$51,800,000	\$6,074,000	\$107,126,000
Feb. 4.....	127,564,000	157,397,000	53,065,000	6,077,000	100,426,800
" 11.....	123,868,000	155,741,000	51,041,000	6,047,000	98,013,500
" 18.....	123,975,000	154,923,000	50,142,000	6,049,000	72,106,800
" 25.....	120,418,000	157,591,000	50,444,000	6,049,000	88,456,400

EUROPEAN BANKS.—The Bank of England gained about \$7,000,000 gold last month, the Bank of France \$1,000,000 and the Bank of Germany nearly \$5,000,000.

GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 1, 1899.		February 1, 1899.		March 1, 1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£29,387,311		£23,682,771		£34,062,851	
France.....	72,906,966	£48,308,320	72,334,762	£47,961,696	73,014,109	£47,980,189
Germany.....	27,679,000	14,256,000	23,132,000	14,492,000	29,083,000	14,381,000
Austro-Hungary.....	35,976,000	12,419,000	35,873,000	12,431,000	35,789,000	12,471,000
Spain.....	11,062,000	7,496,000	11,062,000	8,591,000	11,166,000	9,205,000
Netherlands.....	4,315,000	6,791,000	4,315,000	6,776,000	4,313,000	6,832,000
Nat. Belgium.....	3,152,000	1,576,000	3,178,000	1,588,000	3,173,000	1,587,000
Totals.....	£184,427,777	£90,947,320	£188,080,533	£91,859,696	£190,590,990	£91,816,199

The first-named bank holds about the same as it did a year ago, but the Bank of France has lost \$20,000,000, Germany \$16,000,000 and Russia \$35,000,000.

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—The Bank of England reduced its rate of discount from 3½ to 3 per cent. on February 3, and the Bank of Germany on February 21 reduced its rate to 4½ per cent. from 5 per cent. made on January 17. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London at the close of the month were 2¾ per cent. against 2 @ 2½ per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was 2¾ per cent. against 2¾ @ 2½ per cent. a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort 3¾ per cent. against 4 @ 4½ per cent. a month ago.

**MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.**

	Sept. 16.	Oct. 14.	Nov. 18.	Dec. 16.	Jan. 11.	Feb. 18.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	2½	4	4	4	4	3
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	1½	3½	3¼	3½	2½	2¼
6 months bankers' drafts.....	2½	3¼	3	2½	2½	1½
Loans—Day to day.....	1½	2½	2½	2½	2	2½
Paris, open market rates.....	1½	2	3	3	3	3½
Berlin, ..	3½	3½	4½	5½	4½	3½
Hamburg, ..	3¼	4	5¼	5½	4½	3½
Frankfort, ..	3½	4	5½	5½	4½	2½
Amsterdam, ..	2	2	2½	2½	2½	4½
Vienna, ..	4	4	4½	4½	4½	6
St. Petersburg, ..	4	4	5½	5½	5½	4
Madrid, ..	5	5	5	5	5	4½
Copenhagen, ..	3½	4½	5	5	5	

**BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.**

	Nov. 16, 1898.	Dec. 14, 1898.	Jan. 11, 1899.	Feb. 8, 1899.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£27,043,175	£26,940,525	£27,721,420	£26,484,785
Public deposits.....	5,804,566	5,788,473	7,690,780	11,283,618
Other deposits.....	35,244,964	35,406,396	41,512,323	40,303,312
Government securities.....	9,904,840	10,939,535	15,192,026	13,333,438
Other securities.....	26,779,448	27,212,862	32,040,707	32,650,286
Reserve of notes and coin.....	22,195,967	20,848,254	20,054,968	23,715,219
Coin and bullion.....	32,439,112	30,938,879	30,939,408	33,400,084
Reserve to liabilities.....	53½	50½	40½	45½
Bank rate of discount.....	4½	4½	4½	3½
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	3¼ @ 3½	3½	2½	2½
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	110¼	108½	110¼	111½
Price of silver per ounce.....	28d.	27½	27½	27½d.
Average price of wheat.....	38s. 4d.	27s. 6d.	27s. 0d.	26s. 6d.

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—Rates for sterling were very strong and steadily advanced throughout the month. On the one hand there was a good demand for remittances for stocks purchased in London for New York account, and on the other hands commercial bills were very scarce.

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.**

	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	January 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.82 — ¼	4.81½ — ¼	4.81½ — 2	4.82 — ¼	4.84½ — ¼
"    "    Sight.....	4.85½ — ¼	4.84½ — ¼	4.84½ — ¼	4.85 — ¼	4.86½ — ¼
"    "    Cables.....	4.86½ — ¼	4.84½ — ¼	4.85 — ¼	4.85½ — 6	4.87 — ¼
"    "    Commercial long.....	4.81 — ¼	4.80½ — 1	4.81 — ¼	4.82½ — ¼	4.83½ — 4
"    "    Docu'tary for paym't.....	4.81 — 2	4.80½ — 1½	4.80½ — 1½	4.82½ — ¼	4.83 — 4
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.23½	5.21½	5.20½	5.18½	5.16½ — 15
"    Bankers' 60 days.....	5.24½ — 3½	5.24½	5.23½ — 1½	5.21½ — 7½	5.20 — 17½
"    "    Bankers' sight.....	5.21½ — ¼	5.21½	5.21½	5.18½ — ¾	5.17½ — 15
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.23½ — 2½	5.24½ — 3½	5.24½	5.21½ — ¾	5.20 — 20
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94½ — 11	94½ — 94½	94½ — 11	94½ — 96	94½ — ¾
"    "    Bankers' sight.....	94½ — 11	94½ — 11	94½ — 11	94½ — 96	95½ — 11
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.23½	5.23½ — 22½	5.22½	5.19½ — 6½	5.18½ — 11
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40 — ¼	40 — ¼	39½ — 40	40 — 7½	40 — 7½
Kronor—Bankers' sight.....	28½ — 11	28½ — 7½	28½ — 11	28½ — 7½	28½ — 7½
Italian lire—sight.....	5.66½ — 2½	5.55 — 50	5.52½ — 50	5.58½ — 53½	5.55 — 2½
Austrian florins sight.....				40½ — 7½	40½ — 7½

RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Jan. 28.....	4.82½ @ 4.83	4.84½ @ 4.85	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.82½ @ 4.82½	4.81½ @ 4.82½
Feb. 4.....	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.86 @ 4.86½	4.83 @ 4.83½	4.82½ @ 4.83
" 11.....	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.83 @ 4.83½	4.82½ @ 4.83½
" 18.....	4.84 @ 4.84½	4.86 @ 4.86½	4.86½ @ 4.87	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.82½ @ 4.83½
" 25.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.83 @ 4.84

GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.—The mints continue to coin a very large amount of gold, \$14,848,800 having been coined in February, making nearly \$33,000,000 in two months. The coinage of silver in February was \$1,598,000 of which \$1,512,000 was silver dollars. The minor coinage amounted to \$33,870.

COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$7,803,420	\$1,964,800	\$3,420,000	\$1,624,000	\$18,082,000	\$1,642,000
February.....	10,152,000	1,519,794	4,085,302	1,167,564	14,848,800	1,598,000
March.....	13,770,900	1,617,654	5,385,463	1,488,139		
April.....	8,900,400	1,535,000	8,211,400	948,000		
May.....	4,489,950	1,600,000	7,717,500	1,433,000		
June.....	2,100,547	1,856,754	6,908,932	1,432,185		
July.....	377,000	290,000	5,853,900	1,027,834		
August.....	8,758,250	701,436	9,344,200	2,350,000		
September.....	8,762,375	1,050,062	7,385,315	2,178,389		
October.....	3,845,000	2,301,000	5,180,000	3,354,191		
November.....	3,544,000	2,108,000	5,008,700	2,755,251		
December.....	3,628,642	1,977,167	9,492,045	3,275,481		
Year.....	\$76,028,464	\$18,486,697	\$77,985,757	\$23,084,084	\$32,880,800	\$3,240,000

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion :

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .55	\$ .70	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.76
Mexican dollars.....	47¼	49¼	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	42½	43½	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.82
English silver.....	4.82	4.86	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.70
Five francs.....	.98	.98	Ten guilders.....	3.98	4.00
Twenty francs.....	3.84	3.87			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 27½ d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 50% @ 60% c. Fine silver (Government assay), 59% @ 60% c.

SILVER.—Not in many months have the fluctuations in the price of silver in London been as narrow as during February. The price never rose above 27½ nor fell below 27¼, the closing price being 27¼ or 1-16 less than that of January.

MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1897, 1898, 1899.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.		MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	29¼	29¼	26¾	26¼	27½	27¼	July.....	27¼	26¾	27¼	27		
February	29¼	29¼	26¼	25½	27½	27½	August..	26¼	25¾	27¼	27¼		
March....	29½	28½	26½	25			Septemb'r	27¼	26¾	28¼	27¼		
April.....	28¼	28¼	26¼	25¼			October..	27¼	25¾	28¼	27¼		
May.....	28½	27½	26¾	25¾			Novemb'r	27¼	26¾	28¼	27¼		
June.....	27¾	27¼	27½	26¼			Decemb'r	27¾	25¼	27½	27¼		

FOREIGN TRADE.—The exports of merchandise in January were \$22,000,000 less than in December, but still exceeded \$115,000,000, a figure reached in no previous January. It is only within the last year that an export movement of \$100,000,000 in a month has been anything but extraordinary, and January added more than \$15,000,000 to that sum. Imports of merchandise show a substantial gain both over December last and over January a year ago. The total is nearly \$58,500,000 and, excepting March last year, no other month has equalled that record since June, 1897. The net exports of merchandise for the month were \$57,043,689, while we imported \$3,785,577 net of gold and exported net \$2,767,182 of silver. For the seven months ended January 31 the net exports of merchandise were \$382,296,540, and of silver \$14,485,705, while we imported \$50,994,794 gold.

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF JANUARY.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1894.....	\$35,940,226	\$52,499,947	Exp., 538,440,279	Exp., 8578,790	Exp., \$3,980,848
1895.....	81,229,984	67,547,900	" 18,682,064	" 24,905,595	" 2,117,788
1896.....	86,970,026	68,647,600	" 18,322,428	" 24,576	" 2,497,490
1897.....	93,951,833	51,854,018	" 42,597,865	Imp., 500,951	" 1,870,111
1898.....	108,426,674	50,587,714	" 57,598,980	" 3,834,751	" 1,768,869
1899.....	115,515,954	58,472,315	" 57,043,689	" 3,735,577	" 2,767,182
<b>ELEVEN MONTHS.</b>					
1894.....	573,651,520	371,551,368	Exp., 202,100,157	Imp., 54,371,674	Exp., 21,965,565
1895.....	501,902,984	407,917,685	" 96,985,299	Exp., 44,256,239	" 15,658,555
1896.....	524,964,969	478,718,717	" 46,248,252	" 61,868,559	" 18,791,884
1897.....	655,177,127	363,278,017	" 291,899,110	Imp., 64,022,319	" 19,677,088
1898.....	718,367,407	340,616,580	" 377,750,877	" 22,449,230	" 14,283,859
1899.....	749,472,465	367,175,925	" 382,296,540	" 50,994,794	" 14,485,705

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.—There was another small decrease in National bank circulation last month, \$389,134, but the total is still \$18,155,835 more than it was a year ago. The circulation based on Government bonds increased \$113,718, although the bonds deposited to secure circulation were reduced \$404,150. The lawful money on deposit to retire circulation decreased \$452,852, and is nearly \$2,000,000 less than it was a year ago.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Nov. 30, 1898.	Dec. 31, 1898.	Jan. 31, 1899.	Feb. 28, 1899.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$242,702,088	\$248,735,105	\$243,241,501	\$243,902,387
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	218,328,543	214,015,967	211,041,399	211,155,017
Circulation secured by lawful money....	28,773,495	29,719,118	32,200,202	31,747,351
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Pacific R.R. bonds, 6 per cent.....	3,188,000	1,815,000	55,000	.....
Funded loan of 1891, 3 per cent.....	21,975,750	21,486,750	21,895,900	21,512,550
1907, 4 per cent.....	136,586,550	138,972,050	132,048,050	130,976,650
Five per cents. of 1894.....	15,596,900	15,010,400	14,530,400	14,620,400
Four per cents. of 1895.....	21,915,650	20,725,650	20,051,150	19,608,650
Three per cents. of 1898.....	40,136,230	40,933,000	48,409,340	49,387,440
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$239,849,130</b>	<b>\$239,942,850</b>	<b>\$236,479,840</b>	<b>\$236,075,000</b>

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 2 per cents of 1891, \$1,614,500; 4 per cents of 1907, \$24,200,100; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$7,887,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$10,618,500; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$29,467,320; a total of \$78,877,420.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$62,715.

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.—There was a deficit in Treasury receipts last month of about \$6,000,000, the smallest since March last, except in December, 1898. The expenditures for war and navy were the smallest since April, 1898, and were \$4,300,000 less than in January and \$23,700,000 less than in July, 1898. There is little change in revenue except what is accounted for by the decrease in number of days in February.

UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	February, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.	Source.	February, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.
Customs.....	\$18,921,572	\$180,876,651	Civil and mis.....	\$6,299,421	\$66,619,057
Internal revenue....	19,242,900	178,638,458	War.....	15,132,098	180,011,911
Miscellaneous.....	1,815,400	15,908,088	Navy.....	4,490,216	46,052,594
Total.....	\$37,979,832	\$325,414,187	Indians.....	1,084,874	7,709,725
Excess of expenditures.....	\$5,939,597	\$99,109,545	Pensions.....	12,791,422	85,263,061
			Interest.....	4,180,828	28,862,418
			Total.....	\$42,918,929	\$424,583,732

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1898.			1899.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$37,368,628	\$36,006,711	*\$164,286,798	\$41,774,980	\$51,122,771	*\$228,749,075
February.....	28,572,268	26,599,256	167,623,132	37,979,832	43,918,929	*230,418,206
March.....	32,953,750	31,832,444	174,584,116			
April.....	33,012,948	44,314,062	181,238,137			
May.....	30,074,518	47,849,909	171,818,065			
June.....	33,509,313	47,862,281	167,004,410			
July.....	43,847,108	74,263,475	189,444,714			
August.....	41,782,707	56,290,717	217,904,426			
September.....	39,773,070	54,223,321	243,297,543			
October.....	39,680,051	53,932,276	239,885,162			
November.....	38,900,915	49,090,930	241,663,444			
December.....	41,404,798	41,864,807	246,529,176			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.—The volume of circulation still increases very rapidly, the gain last month being nearly \$10,600,000, making \$31,500,000 since January 1. The total is now more than \$202,000,000 in excess of what it was a year ago, and \$145,000,000 of the increase for the year was in gold. About \$5,000,000 of the increase in February was also in gold, \$4,000,000 in silver certificates and \$1,700,000 in bank notes, while there was a decrease of \$1,800,000 in United States notes.

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$658,986,513	\$667,796,579	\$690,987,400	\$702,905,269
Silver dollars.....	63,980,333	65,183,558	63,429,088	63,135,375
Subsidiary silver.....	69,997,276	70,627,518	66,033,516	69,143,844
Gold certificates.....	35,280,649	35,200,259	35,039,999	32,966,589
Silver certificates.....	362,818,146	362,351,995	362,337,884	395,400,705
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	95,781,432	94,942,741	93,993,753	94,204,459
United States notes.....	311,736,046	312,415,738	309,643,158	308,905,386
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872.....	20,190,000	20,465,000	22,170,000	23,105,000
National bank notes.....	238,109,059	238,337,729	237,576,019	239,275,723
Total.....	\$1,893,879,504	\$1,897,301,412	\$1,918,280,557	\$1,928,842,612
Population of United States.....	75,194,000	75,330,000	75,465,000	75,601,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$25.09	\$25.19	\$25.42	\$25.51

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—The net debt of the United States, less cash in the Treasury, was increased about \$5,300,000 last month, although there was little change in the principal of the debt, the decrease in cash in the Treasury causing the increase in the net debt. Very few of the new 3 per cent. bonds were issued last month and about \$6,600,000 are still unissued.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
"    "    1907, 4	569,650,000	569,650,200	569,650,400	569,650,400
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	39,250	39,100	38,970	38,970
Loan of 1894, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
"    "    1925, 4	162,815,400	162,815,400	162,815,400	162,815,400
Ten-Twenties of 1896, 3 per cent.....	189,027,490	192,846,780	193,192,760	193,366,000
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$1,066,896,690</b>	<b>\$1,040,215,980</b>	<b>\$1,040,562,080</b>	<b>\$1,040,735,270</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,241,630	1,237,200	1,237,150	1,231,670
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,735,013	346,735,013	346,735,013	346,735,013
National bank note redemption acct..	28,593,029	28,868,814	31,732,003	31,422,722
Fractional currency.....	6,863,974	6,863,974	6,863,229	6,863,229
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$382,212,017</b>	<b>\$382,467,801</b>	<b>\$385,410,245</b>	<b>\$385,040,964</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,419,850,277</b>	<b>1,423,940,983</b>	<b>1,427,309,425</b>	<b>1,427,007,904</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	86,901,049	86,908,999	84,869,999	84,592,729
Silver.....	399,163,504	399,430,504	399,631,504	402,289,504
Certificates of deposit.....	20,640,000	20,635,000	22,570,000	23,135,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	97,198,280	96,523,280	95,962,280	95,511,280
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$553,897,833</b>	<b>\$553,447,783</b>	<b>\$552,853,788</b>	<b>\$555,528,518</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>1,973,748,110</b>	<b>1,977,388,766</b>	<b>1,980,063,208</b>	<b>1,982,536,417</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	926,117,182	990,481,851	911,969,028	908,350,971
Demand liabilities.....	633,740,362	635,666,656	687,384,351	689,247,458
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$292,376,790</b>	<b>\$294,764,695</b>	<b>\$274,584,675</b>	<b>\$299,108,513</b>
Gold reserve.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	192,376,790	194,764,695	174,584,675	199,108,513
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$292,376,790</b>	<b>\$294,764,695</b>	<b>\$274,584,675</b>	<b>\$299,108,513</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>1,127,473,487</b>	<b>1,129,176,298</b>	<b>1,152,624,750</b>	<b>1,157,904,391</b>

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.—The net cash in the Treasury was reduced last month nearly \$2,500,000, the entire loss being in silver and National bank notes, the Treasury having increased its holdings of gold and legal tenders.

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$138,441,547	\$139,654,545	\$127,505,746	\$126,708,410
Gold bullion.....	138,502,545	142,074,889	134,186,534	127,385,067
Silver Dollars.....	404,258,284	405,061,804	408,351,769	410,157,482
Silver bullion.....	93,359,250	92,192,207	91,228,963	90,189,188
Subsidiary silver.....	6,673,205	5,959,943	6,931,821	7,185,217
United States notes.....	84,944,970	34,295,278	37,037,858	38,375,618
National bank notes.....	4,673,744	5,480,141	5,748,207	3,769,859
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$820,855,525</b>	<b>\$824,687,707</b>	<b>\$810,990,898</b>	<b>\$813,708,341</b>
<b>Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....</b>	<b>544,070,277</b>	<b>542,939,995</b>	<b>541,541,376</b>	<b>546,677,008</b>
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$276,785,248</b>	<b>\$281,747,712</b>	<b>\$269,449,522</b>	<b>\$297,031,338</b>

SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Dec. 1, 1898.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$797,428,080	\$807,451,124	\$824,493,146	\$839,011,679
Gold bullion.....	138,502,545	142,074,889	134,186,534	127,385,067
Silver dollars.....	468,238,597	470,244,857	471,780,857	473,292,867
Silver bullion.....	93,359,250	92,192,207	91,228,963	90,189,188
Subsidiary silver.....	76,670,481	76,587,161	76,015,347	76,329,061
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	242,784,803	243,817,870	243,324,226	242,965,082
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,163,664,752</b>	<b>\$2,179,049,124</b>	<b>\$2,187,710,079</b>	<b>\$2,195,873,950</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.



## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of February, and the highest and lowest during the year 1899, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1898:

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				FEBRUARY, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	197½	10¼	247½-Feb. 23	18-Jan. 7	247½	21	22½	62	
preferred.....	52½	22½	67-Feb. 23	50½-Jan. 7	67	50½	62		
Baltimore & Ohio.....	72¾	12¾	74¼-Jan. 26	66¼-Jan. 6	73¾	70	72¾		
Bay State Gas.....	91½	25¾	8½-Jan. 10	5-Feb. 27	7¾	5	5¾		
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	78¾	35	97½-Feb. 20	77¼-Jan. 8	97½	88¾	98¾		
Canadian Pacific.....	90¾	72	90¾-Feb. 24	84¾-Jan. 20	90¾	85¾	89¾		
Canada Southern.....	58	44½	70-Jan. 23	54-Jan. 5	62	57½	58		
Central of New Jersey.....	99	83¼	112-Feb. 23	97-Jan. 3	112	96½	109		
Central Pacific.....	44½	11	55¾-Feb. 18	41-Jan. 5	55¾	49½	52¾		
Che. & Ohio vtg. cdfs.....	26¾	17¾	31¼-Feb. 2	24¾-Jan. 5	31¼	28	28		
Chicago & Alton.....	172	150	174-Feb. 2	168-Jan. 11	174	170	173		
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	125¼	85¾	149¼-Feb. 18	124¼-Jan. 7	149¼	131¾	141¾		
Chicago & E. Illinois.....	66	49	69¼-Feb. 27	59¼-Jan. 4	69¼	64¼	67¼		
preferred.....	118¼	102	118¼-Feb. 17	112¾-Jan. 3	118¼	116	118¼		
Chicago, Great Western.....	18	9½	20¾-Jan. 23	15-Jan. 20	17½	15½	15½		
Chicago, Indianapolis & Lou'ville	11	7	11-Feb. 9	7¼-Jan. 6	11	8	10		
preferred.....	38¼	23	45¼-Feb. 17	31-Jan. 4	45¼	35¾	44¾		
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul..	120¾	83¼	137¾-Feb. 20	120¼-Jan. 3	137¾	124¾	129¼		
preferred.....	166¼	140	170-Feb. 21	169¼-Jan. 3	170	168	170		
Chicago & Northwestern.....	143¼	113¼	152¼-Jan. 23	141¼-Jan. 4	151¾	147	148		
preferred.....	191½	163	198-Feb. 18	188-Jan. 19	198	190	191½		
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.....	114¾	80	122½-Jan. 27	113-Jan. 7	122	115	118		
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om...	94	65	100¼-Jan. 19	91-Feb. 8	94¼	91	93		
preferred.....	170	148	173-Jan. 21	170-Jan. 16	173	170	173		
Chicago Terminal Transfer...	97½	4½	14¼-Feb. 18	7¼-Jan. 6	14¼	10¼	18¾		
preferred.....	37½	22½	40¼-Feb. 20	36¼-Jan. 3	40¼	37½	39		
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis..	47½	25	62-Feb. 2	42¼-Jan. 4	62	57¾	58		
preferred.....	97	77½	102¼-Jan. 26	95-Jan. 21	100	96	96		
Cleveland Lorain & Wheeling.	194	11¼	16¾-Jan. 26	11½-Feb. 1	187½	115½	12		
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.....	82¾	17	37¾-Jan. 9	30¼-Feb. 8	85	30¼	38¾		
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.....	8¼	2½	6¾-Feb. 23	2¼-Jan. 6	6¾	5½	6		
preferred.....	27¼	13¾	15-Jan. 4	7¾-Jan. 26	27¼	8¼	8¼		
Consolidated Gas Co.....	205¾	164	222-Feb. 24	186-Jan. 12	222	196¼	212		
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co....	114¼	93	117¾-Jan. 24	106¼-Jan. 3	116	110	112¾		
Delaware, Lack. & Western...	159	140	163-Jan. 23	157-Jan. 7	162	157¼	158		
Denver & Rio Grande.....	21½	10	24¼-Feb. 4	18¼-Jan. 7	24¼	21	22¼		
preferred.....	71½	40	78¾-Feb. 2	68¼-Jan. 11	76¾	72¼	73¼		
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	195	119	199-Jan. 20	190-Jan. 4	197¼	194	197		
Erie.....	16¼	11	16¼-Jan. 19	12¾-Jan. 6	15¾	14¾	14¾		
1st pref.....	42¾	29¼	42-Jan. 24	37¼-Jan. 5	40¾	38½	38¾		
2d pref.....	21¾	15¼	22¼-Jan. 30	19-Jan. 4	21¼	20¾	21		
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	41¾	22	41¼-Jan. 3	37¾-Jan. 19	39¾	37¾	39¾		
Express Adams.....	180	97¼	119-Feb. 25	106¼-Jan. 16	119	109	117¾		
American.....	153	116	145-Jan. 9	128-Jan. 21	144	141	141		
United States.....	58¼	38	60-Jan. 11	53¼-Jan. 5	58¼	54¾	56		
Wells, Fargo.....	131¼	112¾	129¼-Jan. 16	125-Jan. 10	127	126	126		
Great Northern, preferred....	180	122	190-Feb. 4	142¼-Jan. 6	190	174	184		
Illinois Central.....	115¾	96	122-Jan. 23	114-Jan. 6	118¾	114¼	115¼		
Iowa Central.....	111½	7¼	13-Jan. 10	10¾-Jan. 4	13	11¼	11½		
preferred.....	42½	25	51¼-Feb. 15	42¾-Jan. 3	51¼	46	46		
Kansas City, Pitts. & Gulf....	25½	15	18-Jan. 6	12¾-Jan. 19	17¼	14	15		
Laclede Gas.....	54¾	37¼	57¼-Jan. 9	52-Jan. 4	56¾	52½	52½		
Lake Erie & Western.....	23½	12	22¼-Jan. 27	15-Jan. 16	22	17	19¼		
preferred.....	83	53	75-Jan. 27	60-Jan. 15	71¼	60	66¼		
Lake Shore.....	215	170¾	208-Jan. 24	196¼-Jan. 5	202¾	202¼	202¾		
Long Island.....	59¼	40	84¼-Feb. 2	54¼-Jan. 5	84¼	73	73¼		
Louisville & Nashville.....	65¼	44	69-Jan. 27	63¾-Feb. 8	67¾	63¾	65		
Manhattan consol.....	120¼	90	118¼-Jan. 20	97-Jan. 4	116¼	109	112¾		
Metropolitan Street.....	194¼	125¼	249¼-Feb. 20	187¼-Jan. 11	249¼	215¼	242		
Michigan Central.....	118	99½	116-Jan. 24	112-Jan. 13	116	109	112		
Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	38¾	24	54¼-Feb. 23	35¼-Jan. 6	54¼	44	53¾		
1st pref.....	100	84	96¼-Feb. 23	97¼-Jan. 9	99¼	97¾	99¼		
2d pref.....	78¼	46	90-Feb. 23	73¼-Jan. 10	90	79	87		
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.....	14¼	10	15-Jan. 10	13-Jan. 25	14¼	13¼	14¼		
preferred.....	41	28¾	41¼-Feb. 20	36¼-Feb. 8	41¼	36¼	39¼		

ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1908.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1909.				FEBRUARY, 1909.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.		
Missouri Pacific.....	46¼	22	49¾—Jan. 24	43¾—Feb. 8	49¼	43¼	45¼		
Mobile & Ohio.....	32¼	24	48—Feb. 1	32—Jan. 8	43	38¼	38¼		
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River..	124¾	105	141—Jan. 23	121¼—Jan. 3	140	138¼	136¾		
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis....	155½	115½	199¼—Jan. 23	14—Jan. 5	164½	14	14½		
1st preferred.....	76	65	79—Jan. 23	70—Feb. 14	71½	70	70		
2d preferred.....	40¼	28	41—Jan. 23	34—Jan. 5	37	34	34		
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.	201	178¼	211—Feb. 2	190—Jan. 19	211	207	209		
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	19¼	13½	27¼—Feb. 27	18¼—Jan. 8	27¼	20½	26		
Norfolk & Western.....	19¾	11½	20¼—Feb. 2	17¼—Jan. 6	20¾	18	19		
preferred.....	63¾	42½	71¼—Feb. 2	61¾—Jan. 6	71¼	65¾	65¾		
North American Co.....	7¾	4¼	10¼—Feb. 28	6¾—Jan. 6	10¼	7¾	9¾		
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.	44¼	19	55¼—Feb. 16	42¾—Jan. 7	55¼	50	58		
pref tr. receipts.....	78¾	53¾	81¼—Jan. 23	76¾—Jan. 7	80¾	77¾	79		
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	61¼	35¼	52—Jan. 23	46—Feb. 21	50	46	46		
preferred.....	78	65¼	76¾—Jan. 23	71—Jan. 5	75¼	74	74		
Oregon Short Line.....	43	19¾	48—Jan. 23	41—Feb. 8	44	41	44		
Pacific Mail.....	46	21	55—Jan. 30	43¼—Jan. 4	54¼	50	51		
Pennsylvania R. R.....	123½	110¾	142—Jan. 23	122¼—Jan. 5	136¾	129¼	132		
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	112	86¼	118¾—Jan. 23	109¼—Jan. 23	116¾	110¾	113		
Pitta., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis..	63¾	38¾	88—Jan. 23	64—Jan. 3	74¾	66	67¼		
preferred.....	84¼	57	93—Jan. 23	80—Feb. 10	87	80	85¾		
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	216	182	164¾—Jan. 4	156—Jan. 21	163	156¾	156¾		
Reading Voting Tr. ctfs.....	23¾	15¼	25—Jan. 24	20¼—Feb. 8	23¾	20¼	22¼		
1st preferred.....	54¾	36	66¾—Feb. 23	51¼—Jan. 7	66¾	56¼	62¾		
2d preferred.....	29	17¾	35—Feb. 21	25¼—Jan. 7	35	28¼	32¼		
Rome, Wat. Ogdens' g.....	128¼	116¼	130¼—Jan. 26	130—Jan. 10	130	130	130		
St. Louis & San Francisco....	9¼	6	14¾—Feb. 1	8¾—Jan. 6	14¾	11¾	11¾		
1st preferred.....	70	52¼	76¼—Jan. 26	66—Jan. 9	74¼	71	73		
2d preferred.....	35	22¼	44¾—Jan. 31	33¼—Jan. 5	44¼	37	37¼		
St. Louis & Southwestern....	7¾	3¾	12—Jan. 30	6¼—Jan. 4	11¾	9¼	9¾		
preferred.....	18	7¾	31¼—Feb. 18	17—Jan. 3	31¼	25	28		
Southern Pacific Co.....	35	12	44—Jan. 31	33—Jan. 7	49¾	36	36¾		
Southern Railway.....	10¾	7	14—Jan. 16	10¼—Jan. 5	13¾	12¼	12¾		
preferred.....	43¾	23¾	51¼—Jan. 31	40¾—Jan. 4	51¼	48¾	48¾		
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	38¾	17	48¼—Jan. 27	36—Jan. 9	46¼	38¼	44¾		
Texas & Pacific.....	20¾	8¾	25¼—Feb. 27	17¼—Jan. 5	25¼	19¾	23¾		
Union Pacific.....	44¾	18¼	50¾—Feb. 21	41¾—Jan. 7	50¾	45¼	47¼		
preferred.....	74¾	45¾	84¼—Jan. 23	72¾—Jan. 6	82¾	78¼	79¼		
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf...	13¾	5¾	14¼—Jan. 6	12—Feb. 16	13¾	12	12¼		
Wabash R. R.....	9¼	6¼	8¾—Jan. 24	7¾—Jan. 5	8¾	7¾	8¾		
preferred.....	24¼	14¼	24¾—Jan. 23	21¼—Feb. 8	23¾	21¼	22		
Western Union.....	95¾	82¼	98¼—Jan. 24	93¼—Jan. 8	96¾	94	94¾		
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	6¾	3¼	13—Jan. 30	10¼—Feb. 8	12¾	10¼	11¼		
preferred.....	30¾	8	37—Jan. 30	32¼—Feb. 8	35¾	32¼	33¼		
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:									
American Co. Oil Co.....	39¾	15¼	38—Jan. 31	34¼—Jan. 9	37¼	34¼	34¾		
preferred.....	90¾	66	93—Feb. 10	86¼—Jan. 5	93	90¾	92¾		
American Spirits Mfg Co.....	15¾	6¼	15—Jan. 3	12¼—Feb. 28	14¼	12¼	12¼		
preferred.....	41¾	16	40—Jan. 3	34¾—Feb. 28	38	34¾	35¼		
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	146¾	107¼	142¾—Feb. 21	123¼—Jan. 4	142¾	127¾	137¾		
preferred.....	116	103	115—Feb. 21	110—Jan. 16	115	112	114¼		
American Tobacco Co.....	153¾	83¾	191¼—Feb. 24	132¼—Feb. 17	191¼	132¼	136¼		
preferred.....	125¼	112¼	144¼—Feb. 24	132—Jan. 4	144¼	132	144¼		
Consolidated Ice Co.....	52	27¼	50¼—Jan. 30	44¼—Jan. 9	50¼	46	48		
Federal Steel Co.....	52	29	55¾—Jan. 16	46¾—Feb. 8	53¾	46¾	51¼		
preferred.....	85¼	66¾	90—Feb. 28	82¾—Jan. 7	90	84	88¾		
General Electric Co.....	97	76	115¼—Feb. 21	95¼—Jan. 3	115¼	107	113¾		
International Paper Co.....	67	48	68¼—Jan. 23	53¼—Feb. 25	65¼	58¼	58¾		
preferred.....	95	85	95—Jan. 5	69¼—Feb. 16	93	88	88		
National Lead Co.....	39¾	26¼	40¼—Jan. 20	35¼—Feb. 6	38¼	35¼	35¼		
preferred.....	114¼	99	115—Jan. 21	111¼—Jan. 13	115	112¾	118		
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	10¾	3¼	12—Jan. 10	8¼—Jan. 3	12	9¼	10¾		
U. S. Leather Co.....	87½	5¼	8—Jan. 23	6¾—Jan. 6	7¾	6¾	6¾		
preferred.....	75¼	53¼	75—Jan. 20	70¼—Feb. 27	74¼	70¼	70¼		
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48¼	14¼	54¼—Feb. 23	42¾—Jan. 5	54¼	48	52¼		
preferred.....	113¼	60	120—Jan. 9	111—Jan. 3	118	115¼	116¼		

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'nt Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
<b>Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....</b> 1928		2,800,000	M & N	98	Feb. 15, '99	98	98	10,000
<b>Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....</b> 1945		7,000,000	Q J	89	Feb. 28, '99	90½	89	83,000
<b>Atch., Top. &amp; S. F.</b>								
Atch. Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's. 1995	124,111,500		A & O	101½	Feb. 28, '99	102½	101½	2,316,500
" registered.....			A & O	102½	Feb. 23, '99	102½	101½	70,000
" adjustment, g. 4's. ....1995	51,728,000		NOV	83	Feb. 28, '99	84½	82	4,368,000
" registered.....			NOV	83	Feb. 30, '99	83½	83	6,000
" Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's 1902	750,000		J & J					
" Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's. ....1915	1,500,000		M & S					
<b>Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's. 1934</b>	1,500,000		J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99			
<b>Atlanta &amp; Danville 1st g. 5's.....</b> 1950	1,238,000		J & J	100½	Feb. 1, '99	100½	100½	1,000
<b>B. &amp; O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.), 1919</b>	3,000,000		A & O	116	Jan. 18, '99			
" Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				112	Oct. 19, '98			
" g. 5's.....1885-1925				115	Oct. 5, '98			
" coupons off.....								
" registered.....	10,000,000		F & A	120	Jan. 18, '99			
" Speyer & Co. eng. cf. dep.				120	Feb. 1, '99	120	120	10,000
" Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				120½	Jan. 18, '99			
" con. g. 5's.....1988				118½	Sept. 7, '98			
" registered.....	11,968,000		F & A	116	Aug. 22, '98			
" J. P. M. & Co. cfs. dep't.....				114¼	July 29, '98			
" Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				118¾	Oct. 29, '98			
" bonds of loan of 1853 ext.	1,161,000		A & O	120	Nov. 18, '98			
" to 1935 at 4½ Tr. Co. cfs.								
" sterling 6½ loan of 1872 due	£1,921,800		M & S					
" 1902 Trust Co. cfs.....								
" sterling 6½ loan of 1874 due	£1,960,600		M & N					
" 1910 Trust Co. cfs.....								
" 4½ term. bonds.....1894	8,500,000		J & D					
" Trust Co. cfs.....								
" sterling 4½ loan of 1883	£2,400,000		A & O					
" (Philadelphia Branch)								
" ster. 5½ loan of 1877 due	£1,382,200		J & D					
" 1927 (B. & O. & Chic.) Tr.								
" Co. cfs.....								
<b>Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd., 1930</b>	6,000,000		M & N	105	Dec. 14, '98			
<b>W. Virginia &amp; Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....</b> 1990	4,000,000		A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95			
<b>Monongahela River 1st g. 5's 1919</b>	700,000		F & A	104½	July 1, '92			
<b>Gen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s, 1930</b>	2,500,000		M & S	111	Feb. 23, '99	112	110	7,000
<b>Colo. &amp; Cin. Mid'd 1st ext 4½'s, 1939</b>	2,000,000		J & J	85	Jan. 19, '99			
<b>Ak. &amp; Chic. June. 1st g. int. g. 5's. 1930</b>	1,500,000		M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95			
" coupons off.....				106	Aug. 9, '98			
" Tr. Co. cfs. of dep.....				115	Jan. 19, '99			
<b>Pittsb. &amp; Connellsville 1st g. 4's. ....1946</b>	2,536,000		J & J	107¼	July 23, '98			
" Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....	1,419,000		J & J					
" 1st 7½ bds 1898 Tr. Co. cfs.	1,315,000		J & J					
" con. 6½ bonds Tr. Co. cfs.....	10,667,000		J & J	111	Feb. 6, '99	111	111	73,000
<b>B &amp; O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s, 1930</b>	10,511,000		J & J	94	Jan. 27, '99			
" Trust Co. cfs.....								
" coupons off.....	8,651,000		NOV	32¼	Jan. 11, '99			
" 1st inc. g. 5's, series A. 2043	9,655,000		DEC	12	Feb. 23, '99	12	11½	22,000
" Trust Co. cfs.....				11¼	Feb. 10, '99	11¼	11¼	10,000
<b>B. &amp; O. S'w'n Term Co. gtd g 5s. ....1942</b>	1,200,000		M & N	105	Nov. 30, '98			
" Trust Co. cfs.....	2,615,000		J & J	112	Jan. 30, '99			
<b>Ohio &amp; Miss. 1st con. 4's.....</b> 1947	2,952,000		A & O	128¼	Feb. 17, '99	130¼	128¼	95,000
" coupons off.....	1,984,000		M & N	106	Feb. 7, '99	106	106	61,000
" 2d con. 7's.....1911	405,000		J & D	89	Feb. 4, '99	89	89	4,000
" Trust Co. cfs.....				102½	Feb. 25, '99	102½	102½	13,000
" 1st Springfield div. 7's, 1905								
" Trust Co. cfs.....1932								
" 1st gen. 5s.....								
" Trust Co. cfs.....								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest price and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int'rt Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Htgh.	Low.	Total.
Brooklyn E. Tr. Co. cfs 1st g. 6s. 1924		3,464,000	.....	101	Feb. 28, '99	102½	106½	87,000
Tr. Co. cfs. 2d g. 5s. 1915		1,246,000	.....	96	June 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
all instal. paid.		1,357,000	.....	100%	Feb. 8, '99	101½	100	45,000
Seas. & B. B. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 5s. 1942		6,124,000	.....	101	Feb. 28, '99	103	101	116,000
all instal. paid.		6,625,000	.....	110	Feb. 24, '99	110	108½	155,000
Union Ele. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 6s. 1897		6,124,000	.....	101	Feb. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit 5s. 1945		6,625,000	A & O	110	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
Bklyn City R. R. 1st con. 5s. 1916 1941		4,873,000	J & J	117½	Dec. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
Bklyn Qu. Co. & Sur. 1st con. gtd		2,253,000	M & N	108	Feb. 8, '99	108	107½	46,000
g. 5s. 1941		3,000,000	J & J	74	Sept. 1, '98	.....	.....	.....
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4s. 1888		4,407,000	M & S	111	Feb. 20, '99	111	109½	66,000
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5s. 1897		1,000,000	J & J	127	Mar. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. 6s. 1947		3,580,000	J & J	128	Jan. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
1,300,000		650,000	J & J	121½	May 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6s. 1822		1,000,000	J & J	105	Feb. 24, '99	105	101½	160,000
cons. 1st 6s. 1943		1,000,000	F & A	100	Feb. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5s. 1943		1,211,500	A & O	109	Feb. 17, '98	109	108½	4,000
Buff. & St. Mary's 8w'n 1st g. 6s. 1827		6,500,000	J & D	118	Feb. 10, '99	113	112	38,000
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 6s. 1913		4,426,000	A & O	110½	Feb. 4, '99	110½	110½	10,000
registered.		150,000	A & O	140	Aug. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5s. 1906		825,000	J & D	105½	Nov. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. 1st & col. 1st 5s. 1904		1,905,000	A & O	105	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.		13,420,000	J & J	109½	Feb. 23, '99	110½	109½	68,000
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st 7s. g. 1897		5,100,000	J & J	112	Feb. 24, '99	112	111½	17,000
Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6s. 1820		2,500,000	M & S	92½	Feb. 23, '99	92½	92½	15,000
1st 5s. 1821		4,880,000	M & N	95	Feb. 15, '99	95	95	1,000
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 6s. 1908		7,000,000	F & A	118	Dec. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d mortg. 5s. 1918		16,500,800	F & A	95	Feb. 28, '99	97½	92½	4,784,000
registered.		4,000,000	M & N	42	Feb. 28, '99	44½	38	479,000
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4s. 1948		7,000,000	OCT 1	14	Feb. 28, '99	15	12	201,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5s. 1987		4,000,000	OCT 1	7½	Feb. 27, '99	7½	6½	148,000
Cent. R'y of Georgia, 1st g. 5s. 1945		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered \$1,000 & \$5,000		1,000,000	J & J	99	July 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. g. 5s. 1945		418,000	J & J	86½	Sept. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. g. 5s. reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000		4,000,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st. pref. inc. g. 5s. 1945		7,000,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2d pref. inc. g. 5s. 1945		4,000,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
3d pref. inc. g. 5s. 1945		840,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
3d pref. inc. g. 5s. 1945		1,000,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Macon & Nor. Div. 1st		418,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
g. 5s. 1946		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mobile div. 1st g. 5s. 1946		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5s. 1947		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Central Railroad of New Jersey,		3,896,000	Q J	102	Feb. 23, '99	102	102	4,000
1st consolidated 7s. 1899		1,167,000	M & N	110	Jan. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
convertible 7s. 1902		460,000	M & N	112	July 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. 6s. 1908		43,924,000	J & J	118	Feb. 28, '99	118½	115½	350,000
gen. g. 5s. 1987		5,384,000	J & J	118	Feb. 28, '99	118	113½	42,000
registered.		2,991,000	Q M	101	Feb. 21, '99	101	100	24,000
Lehigh & W.-B. con. assd. 7s. 1900		4,987,000	M & N	99	Feb. 28, '99	96	90	7,000
mortgage 5s. 1912		1,082,000	J & J	115½	Feb. 3, '99	115½	114½	12,000
Am. Dock & Improvmt. Co. 5s. 1821		411,000	J & J	104	Nov. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5s. 1820		2,995,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
(N. J. Southern Int. gtd 6s. 1899		3,383,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st consolidated 7s. 1899		3,997,000	J & J	106½	Feb. 23, '98	106½	106½	155,000
convertible 7s. 1902		15,508,000	J & J	107½	Feb. 24, '99	107½	106	30,000
deb. 6s. 1908		6,080,000	A & O	105½	Feb. 23, '99	105½	105½	75,000
gen. g. 5s. 1987		4,279,000	A & O	84½	Sept. 16, '96	.....	.....	5,000
registered.		8,004,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & W.-B. con. assd. 7s. 1900		2,294,000	A & O	102	Mar. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
mortgage 5s. 1912		4,358,000	J & J	101½	Dec. 6, '97	.....	.....	.....
Am. Dock & Improvmt. Co. 5s. 1821		2,735,000	J & J	93	Jan. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5s. 1820		3,964,000	J & J	104	Nov. 30, '97	.....	.....	.....
(N. J. Southern Int. gtd 6s. 1899		4,800,000	A & O	105½	Dec. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st consolidated 7s. 1899		1,500,000	J & J	106¾	Dec. 13, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ches. & Ohio 6s. g. Series A. 1908		2,000,000	A & O	119½	Jan. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Mortgage gold 6s. 1911		25,858,000	A & O	121½	Feb. 21, '99	121½	120	6,000
1st con. g. 5s. 1939		24,050,000	M & N	118½	Feb. 28, '99	119	118½	102,000
registered.		6,000,000	M & N	113	Feb. 7, '99	113	113	500
Gen. m. g. 4½s. 1902		1,000,000	M & S	96½	Feb. 28, '99	96½	95½	998,000
registered.		1,000,000	M & S	82½	Jan. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4s. 1989		650,000	J & J	106½	Feb. 21, '99	106½	105½	57,000
2d con. g. 4s. 1989		400,000	J & J	97	Dec. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
Craig Val. 1st g. 5s. 1940		400,000	J & J	85½	May 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5s. 1941		3,007,000	M & S	98	Dec. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Eliz. Lex. & B. S. g. g. 5s. 1902		.....	M & S	104	Feb. 7, '99	104	103½	17,000

BOND SALES.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chicago & Alton sinking fund 6's. 1903		1,722,000	J & J	110	Feb. 3, '99	110	110	2,000
{ Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. 1900		1,785,000	F & A	104	Feb. 1, '99	104	104	3,000
2d 7's. 1900		300,000	M & N	106 3/4	Feb. 24, '99	106 3/4	106 3/4	6,000
501,000		501,000	A & O	105 1/4	Oct. 30, '95			
{ Miss. Riv. Edge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		28,324,000	J & J	115 1/4	Feb. 23, '99	115 1/4	115	55,000
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		2,315,000	A & O	104 1/4	Feb. 15, '99	104 1/4	104 1/4	5,000
5's, sinking fund. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	112	Feb. 23, '99	112 3/4	111 3/4	45,000
5's, debentures. 1903		8,972,000	M & N	147 1/4	Feb. 23, '99	151 1/4	135	392,000
convertible 5's. 1919		2,818,000	A & O	111 1/4	Jan. 6, '99			
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		9,050,000	A & O	105 1/4	Feb. 27, '99	105 1/4	105	24,000
4's. 1919		5,856,000	F & A	102	Oct. 19, '99			
Denver div. 4's. 1922		3,150,000	M & N	103	Feb. 3, '99	103	103	2,000
4's. 1921		2,820,000	F & A	107 1/4	Jan. 18, '99			
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1905		2,820,000	F & A	108 1/4	Feb. 23, '99	108 1/4	108	271,000
Nebraska extens'n 4's. 1927		26,110,000	M & N	97	May 9, '99			
registered. 1911		8,000,000	M & N	122 1/4	Feb. 16, '99	123 1/4	123	15,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,241,000	A & O	107 1/4	Jan. 25, '99			
{ Chic. Burl. & Northern, 1st 5's. 1926								
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	115 1/4	Feb. 2, '97	115 1/4	115 1/4	14,000
small bonds. 1924		2,653,000	A & O	134	Jan. 23, '99			
1st con. 6's, gold. 1924		9,797,000	M & N	112	Feb. 23, '99	112	110	139,000
gen. con. 1st 5's. 1927		4,636,000	M & N	103 1/4	Nov. 18, '98			
registered. 1906			J & J	107	Feb. 23, '99	107	107	1,000
{ Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. 1906								
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville		8,000,000	J & J	115	Jan. 18, '99			
Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,177,000	J & J	92 1/4	Feb. 9, '99	92 1/4	92 1/4	7,000
Chic. Ind. & Louisv. ref. g. 5's. 1947		4,700,000	J & J	108 1/4	Feb. 27, '99	107	106	22,000
refunding g. 6's. 1947								
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul								
{ Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's \$ g. R.d. 1902		2,723,500	J & J	163 3/4	Feb. 7, '99	163 3/4	163 3/4	20,000
1st 7's 2. 1902		147,000	J & J	180	Feb. 8, '94			
1st m. Iowa & D. 7's. 1909		1,822,000	J & J	163 1/4	Feb. 17, '99	162 3/4	163 1/4	4,000
1st m. C. & M. 7's. 1903		9,813,000	J & J	164 1/4	Feb. 27, '99	164 1/4	163	35,000
{ Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1905		3,099,000	J & J	165	Feb. 24, '99	165	163	38,000
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1906		4,000,000	J & J	164 1/4	Feb. 24, '99	164 1/4	163 1/4	16,000
1st 6's, Southw'n div. 1909		2,500,000	J & J	120 1/4	Jan. 31, '99			
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. 1913		7,432,000	J & J	115 1/4	Nov. 30, '98			
1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1910		5,691,000	J & J	121 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	122	121	38,000
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		980,000	J & J	130	Feb. 18, '99	130	130	5,000
5's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	109 1/4	Dec. 7, '98			
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1921		26,340,000	J & J	121 1/4	Feb. 24, '99	121 1/4	121 1/4	1,000
1st Chic. & P. W. 5's. 1921		3,063,000	J & J	121	Feb. 28, '99	121 1/4	120 3/4	64,000
Chic. & M. B. div. 5's. 1926		2,840,000	J & J	121 1/4	Jan. 31, '99			
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		1,900,000	J & J	110 1/4	Feb. 10, '99	110 1/4	110 1/4	2,000
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		4,755,000	J & J	115 1/4	Dec. 14, '98			
Wis. & Min. div. 5's. 1921		4,748,000	J & J	115	Nov. 30, '98			
terminal 5's. 1914		1,251,000	J & J	115	Feb. 27, '99	115 1/4	115	19,000
Far. & So. 6's assu. 1924		579,000	J & J	127 1/4	Jan. 27, '98			
cont. sil'k. f'd 5's. 1916		2,856,000	J & J	108 1/4	July 9, '97			
Dakota & Gt. S. 5's. 1916		23,676,000	J & J	114	Feb. 16, '99	114	112 1/4	7,000
g. m. g. 4's, series A. 1909		2,155,000	J & J	111	Feb. 23, '99	112 1/4	111	70,000
registered. 1910		5,062,000	Q	105 1/4	Feb. 19, '98			
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910			J & D	121	Dec. 27, '98			
1st convt. 6's. 1913			J & D	126	Jan. 30, '99			
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's. 1915		19,771,000	Q F	144 1/4	Feb. 20, '99	144 1/4	143 1/4	13,000
coupon gold 7's. 1902		10,351,000	J & D	118 1/4	Feb. 24, '99	118 1/4	113	14,000
registered d. gold 7's. 1902		6,069,000	J & D	120	Jan. 13, '99			
sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929		7,197,000	A & O	117 1/4	Oct. 24, '98	120	120	11,000
registered. 1903		9,800,000	A & O	106 3/4	Feb. 20, '99	106 3/4	109 1/4	18,000
5's. 1879-1929		5,900,000	A & O	106	Feb. 7, '99	106	109	8,000
registered. 1903		10,000,000	M & N	122	Feb. 27, '99	122	122	7,000
debenture 5's. 1903		5,900,000	M & N	119 1/4	Dec. 27, '98			
registered. 1909		10,000,000	M & N	110	Feb. 18, '99	110	110	2,000
25 year debent. 5's. 1909		18,632,000	M & N	109 1/4	Mar. 18, '97			
registered. 1921		7,200,000	A & O	117 1/4	Feb. 17, '99	118	117 1/4	8,000
30 year debent. 5's. 1921		455,000	A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
registered. 1880-1926		1,069,000	F A 15	107	Feb. 20, '99	107	107	8,000
extension 4's. 1880-1926		1,562,000	F A 15	106 3/4	Feb. 23, '99	106 3/4	106 3/4	15,000
registered. 1897		1,800,000	M & N	105	Feb. 27, '99	105	103 3/4	45,000
gen. g. 3 1/2's. 1903		455,000	Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98			
registered. 1901		800,000	J & J	107 1/4	May 26, '98			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's. 1907		1,069,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '94			
Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's. 1900		1,562,000	A & O	108	Oct. 21, '98			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's. 1907		1,800,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '98			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's. 1906			M & S	117 1/4	Feb. 6, '99	117 1/4	117 1/4	15,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ottumwa C. F. & St. 1st 5's.....	1909	1,600,000	M & S	111	Jan. 5 '99	.....	.....	.....
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....	1910	1,500,000	M & S	105	Apr. 22 '98	.....	.....	.....
Mill., Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's.....	1821	5,000,000	M & N	142	Feb. 23 '99	142	140	28,000
con. deb. 5's.....	1907	436,000	F & A	103½	Feb. 24 '97	.....	.....	.....
ext. & imp't. s.f'd g. 5's.....	1829	4,148,000	F & A	119	Feb. 20 '99	119	117½	28,000
Michigan div. 1st 6's.....	1824	1,281,000	J & J	138	Dec. 13 '98	.....	.....	.....
Ashland div. 1st 6's.....	1925	1,000,000	M & S	142½	Jan. 24 '99	.....	.....	.....
income.....	.....	500,000	M & N	112	Apr. 27 '96	.....	.....	.....
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup.....	1917	12,100,000	J & J	132½	Jan. 20 '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1917		J & J	135	Feb. 23 '99	132	133	10,000
gen. g. 4's.....	1968	47,971,000	J & J	106½	Feb. 23 '99	107½	106	688,000
registered.....	.....		J & J	106½	Feb. 24 '99	107	106½	65,000
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's.....	1905	1,200,000	J & J	96	Jan. 6 '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 2½'s.....	1905	1,200,000	J & J	85	Feb. 28 '98	85	85	7,000
extension 4's.....	.....	672,000	J & J	83	Mar. 15 '99	.....	.....	.....
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's.....	1823	2,750,000	A & O	110	Feb. 18 '99	111	110	7,000
small bond.....	1823	.....	A & O	100	Apr. 15 '97	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's.....	1890	13,724,000	J & D	137½	Feb. 28 '99	137½	137	5,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's.....	1918	2,649,000	M & N	126½	Jan. 31 '99	.....	.....	.....
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's.....	1890	800,000	J & J	125	May 4 '88	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's.....	1919	6,070,000	A & O	139½	Feb. 14 '99	139½	138	10,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's.....	1947	13,000,000	J & J	95½	Feb. 23 '99	96½	95	398,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's.....	1919	733,000	M & N	106	June 22 '98	.....	.....	.....
gen'l mortg. g. 6's.....	1832	9,888,000	Q M	119½	Dec. 16 '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's.....	1821	5,753,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 13 '93	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's.....	1905	996,000	A & O	119	Oct. 26 '96	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 4½'s.....	1937	2,000,000	J & J	103½	Mar. 13 '97	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's.....	1941	3,500,000	M & N	112½	Feb. 20 '99	112½	112	17,000
City Sub. R'y, Balto. 1st g. 5's.....	1822	2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17 '96	.....	.....	.....
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's.....	1820	730,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. ctf's. 1st 5's for. 1877	.....	1,907,000	.....	84½	Feb. 25 '99	85	77	201,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's.....	1893	7,574,000	J & D	94	Feb. 28 '99	94½	92½	897,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's.....	1839	5,000,000	J & J	91½	Dec. 5 '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's.....	1890	9,750,000	M & N	102½	Feb. 24 '99	102½	101½	53,000
registered.....	.....	.....	.....	90	Mar. 24 '97	.....	.....	.....
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's.....	1940	1,035,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22 '95	.....	.....	.....
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's.....	1940	650,000	J & J	87	Aug. 31 '98	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's.....	1891	4,000,000	J & J	95½	Feb. 21 '99	95½	95	20,000
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's.....	1836	7,685,000	Q F	103	Feb. 7 '99	103	103	2,000
registered.....	.....		.....	.....	85	Nov. 15 '94	.....	.....
con. 6's.....	1820	731,000	M & N	107½	June 30 '93	.....	.....	.....
Cin., S' dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's.....	1828	2,571,000	J & J	114	Oct. 7 '97	.....	.....	.....
Ind. Bloom. & W., 1st pfd. 7's.....	1900	1,000,000	J & J	107½	Feb. 19 '97	.....	.....	.....
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's.....	1838	500,000	Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's.....	1940	8,103,000	A & O	80½	Feb. 25 '99	80½	80	205,000
income 4's.....	1890	4,000,000	A	30	Feb. 25 '99	32½	30	152,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f'd.....	1899	3,000,000	M & N	102½	Feb. 10 '99	102½	102½	5,000
consol mortg. 7's.....	1914	.....	J & D	137½	Dec. 27 '98	.....	.....	.....
sink fund 7's.....	1914	3,991,000	J & D	119½	Nov. 19 '89	.....	.....	.....
gen. lien g. 4's.....	1834	3,205,000	J & J	132½	Nov. 26 '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's.....	1901	1,000,000	A & O	108½	Feb. 10 '99	108½	108½	5,000
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's.....	1833	4,300,000	A & O	107	Dec. 27 '98	.....	.....	.....
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's.....	1838	2,936,000	J & J	130	Feb. 16 '99	130	128	2,000
registered.....	.....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. Midd Ry. 1st g. 2-3-4's.....	1947	6,250,000	J & J	67½	Feb. 27 '99	67½	64	81,000
1st g. 4's.....	1947	1,011,000	J & J	74½	Feb. 20 '99	74½	74	23,000
Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
J. P. M. ctf. \$85 pd.....	1831	643,000	M & S	75½	Feb. 28 '99	76	73½	217,000
stamped assented.....	.....	7,357,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 6's, J. P. M. ctf. std.....	1904	1,903,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gen. lien g. 4's.....	1896	1,554,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's.....	1843	1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27 '93	.....	.....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's.....	1907	3,007,000	M & S	124	Nov. 7 '98	.....	.....	.....
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's.....	1906	1,966,000	A & O	126	July 23 '98	.....	.....	.....
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's.....	1914	5,000,000	M & N	143	Feb. 16 '99	143	143	4,000
bonds, 7's.....	1900	281,000	J & J	109	Nov. 23 '97	.....	.....	.....
7's.....	1871-1901	4,991,000	A & O	110½	Jan. 25 '99	.....	.....	.....
1st c. gtd 7's.....	1915	12,151,000	J & D	143	Jan. 20 '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	.....	140	Oct. 29 '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's.....	1821	12,000,000	J & J	138	Feb. 9 '99	138	138	1,000
const. 5's.....	1923	5,000,000	F & A	117½	Feb. 24 '99	117½	117	10,000
term. imp. 4's.....	1823	5,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Warren 2d 7's.....	1803	750,000	A & O	108	Aug. 1 '95	.....	.....	.....

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's...1917		5,000,000	M & S	146	Sept. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
reg. ....1917			M & S	143	May 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's...1906		3,000,000	A & O	122	Dec. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....1906			A & O	128 1/4	Feb. 12, '99	.....	.....	.....
6's.....1906		7,000,000	A & O	117 3/4	Feb. 21, '99	117 3/4	117 3/4	10,000
registered.....1906			A & O	117 1/2	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's...1921		2,000,000	M & N	151	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st r 7's.....1921			M & N	141	May 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Denver Cen. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's...1933		780,000	A & O	92	Jan. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
Denver T'way Co. con. g. 5's...1910		1,219,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's...1911		913,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Denver & Rio Grande 1st g. 7's...1900		1,934,500	M & N	106 3/4	Feb. 28, '99	109	107	32,000
1st con. g. 4's.....1936		28,650,000	J & J	100 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	101 3/4	100	239,000
con. g. 4 1/2's.....1936		4,348,000	J & J	109 1/2	Jan. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
impt. m. g. 5's.....1928		8,103,500	J & D	106 3/4	Feb. 27, '99	107	106 3/4	108,500
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's...1917		628,000	M & N	102	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit & Mack. 1st Hen g. 4s...1965		900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
g. 4s.....1965		1,250,000	J & D			.....	.....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's...1937		6,734,000	A & O	110	Feb. 21, '99	110	110	2,000
registered.....1937			A & O	101 1/4	July 23, '89	.....	.....	.....
2d l m 6s.....1916		2,000,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's...1928		500,000	J & J	92 1/4	Feb. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & A. 1st g. 5's...1937		4,000,000	J & J	112	Feb. 17, '99	112	112	11,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g. 5's...1941		7,417,000	M & N	108	Feb. 18, '99	108	106 3/4	95,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.....1897		2,482,000	M & S	115 1/4	Feb. 15, '99	115 1/4	115 1/4	6,000
2d extended 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & N	119 1/4	Aug. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
3d extended 4 1/2's.....1923		4,618,000	M & S	112	Nov. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
4th extended 5's.....1920		2,926,000	A & O	121	Jan. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
5th extended 4's.....1928		709,500	J & D	104 1/4	June 3, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		3,699,500	M & S	145 3/4	Feb. 1, '99	145 3/4	145 3/4	20,000
1st cons. fund c. 7's.....1920		3,705,977	M & S	143	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Long Dock consol. 6's.....1953		7,501,000	A & O	139	Sept. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's...1916		2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6, '99	140	140	5,000
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's...1908		1,500,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
small.....1908			J & J			.....	.....	.....
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g. 5's...1909		2,900,000	A & O	106	Feb. 8, '99	106	106	1,000
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's...1962		12,000,000	M & N	114	Feb. 27, '99	114	113 3/4	33,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.						.....	.....	.....
1st g. currency 6's.....1922		1,100,000	M & N			.....	.....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.						.....	.....	.....
Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913		3,396,000	J & J	102	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g. 5's...1943		1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
small.....1943						.....	.....	.....
Erie R.R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds...1996		30,000,000	J & J	93	Feb. 28, '99	94 1/2	93	1,117,000
registered.....1996			J & J			.....	.....	.....
gen. lien 3-4s.....1996		30,927,000	J & J	72 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	74	71 3/4	590,000
registered.....1996			J & J			.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st reldg. g. 5's...1937		3,750,000	J & J	108 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	108 3/4	106	36,000
2d g. 4 1/2's.....1937		453,000	F & A	92 1/4	Aug. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 5's.....1940		2,546,000	F & A	95 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	98	95 1/4	87,000
term. 1st g. 5's.....1943		2,000,000	M & N	111	Oct. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....1943			M & N			.....	.....	.....
1st General g 5's.....1942		3,000,000	J & D	104	Feb. 27, '99	104	102	113,000
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's...1942		3,500,000	A & O	122	Dec. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's...1910		500,000	F & A	65	Nov. 10, '97	.....	.....	.....
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g...1933		3,000,000	J & J	121 1/4	Jan. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's...1921		2,223,000	A & O	104 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	105 1/4	101	495,000
1st General g 5's.....1942		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93	.....	.....	.....
Mount Vernon 1st 6's...1923		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91	.....	.....	.....
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's...1980		1,591,000	J & J	102 1/4	Jan. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g 6's...1928		3,999,000	A & O	122 3/4	Feb. 21, '99	123	122 1/4	45,000
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's...1920		2,600,000	M & N	101 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	101 1/4	100 1/4	58,000
1st con. gold 5's.....1936		3,983,000	A & O	106	Feb. 21, '99	106	101 1/4	39,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's...1939						.....	.....	.....
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's...1918		8,000,000	J & J	103	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st land grant ex. g 5's...1930		423,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80 1/4	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4 1/2's...1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. c'tfs. dep. 1st 6's...1921		8,176,000	.....	85 1/4	Feb. 27, '99	86 3/4	84 1/4	152,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's...1928		2,863,000	J & J	63	Feb. 27, '99	64 1/4	62	426,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s...1913		2,000,000	A & O	101 1/4	Feb. 28, '99	102	100	51,000
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's...1945		2,250,000	A & O	108	Dec. 12, '88	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5s.....1945		2,922,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's...1927		5,360,000	J & J	100	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....

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NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Houston E. & W. Tex. 1st g 5's. 1933		2,700,000	M & N	108	Feb. 27, '99	104	101	51,000
Illinois Central, total out-								
standing.....	\$13,950,000							
1st g. 4's. 1894-1951		1,500,000	J & J	112½	Feb. 25, '99	112½	112½	1,000
registered.....			J & J	112½	Nov. 23, '98			
1st gold 8½'s. 1951		2,400,000	J & J	106	Feb. 21, '99	106	106	10,000
registered.....			J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98			
1st g 3s sterl. 2,500,000. 1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 30, '99			
registered.....			M & S					
collat. trust gold 4's. 1932		15,000,000	M & N	107	Feb. 2, '99	107	106½	12,000
regist'd.....			M & N	104½	Jan. 30, '99			
col.t.g. 4a L. N. O. & Tex. 1933		24,679,000	J & J	104	Feb. 20, '99	104½	103½	101,000
registered.....			J & J					
col. trust 2-10 g. 4's. 1904		4,806,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 28, '98			
registered.....			J & J					
West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1951		5,435,600	F & A	104	Feb. 14, '99	104	104	5,000
registered.....			F & A					
Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1933		14,320,000	J & J	97½	Feb. 23, '99	98½	94½	550,000
registered.....			J & J					
St. Louis div. g. 3's. 1951		4,909,000	J & J	88	Feb. 24, '99	89½	83	20,000
registered.....			J & J					
g. 3½'s. 1951		6,821,000	J & J	97	Feb. 27, '99	97	94½	297,000
registered.....			J & J					
Calro Bridge 4's g. 1950		3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98			
registered.....			J & D					
Middle div. registered 5's. 1921		600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '98			
Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s. 1951		2,000,000	J & J					
registered.....			J & J					
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's. 1951		16,555,000	J D 15	126½	Feb. 3, '99	126½	126½	1,000
gold 5's, registered.....			J D 15	123	Sept. 12, '97			
g. 3½'s. 1951		1,262,000	J D 15					
registered.....			J D 15					
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		3,500,000	J & D	104½	Feb. 17, '98	104½	104½	6,000
registered.....			J & D					
Belleville & Carodt 1st 6's. 1923		486,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99	121	121	1,000
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		550,000	M & S	93	Dec. 2, '97			
Carbond'e & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		250,000	M & S	90	Nov. 22, '98			
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's. 1935		1,834,000	J & J	108	Jan. 12, '99			
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st refdg. 5's. 1948		2,500,000	A & O	103	Feb. 8, '99	106	106	17,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold. 1919		7,954,000	M & N	124½	Feb. 27, '99	125	124½	32,000
2d g. 5's. 1909		8,543,000	M & S	97	Feb. 24, '99	97	94½	75,000
3d g. 4's. 1921		2,721,000	M & S	62	Feb. 23, '99	63	61	53,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's. 1934		6,572,000	J & D	109	Feb. 27, '99	110	107	44,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1929		3,000,000	A & O					
Kan. C. Pitt. & Gulf 1st & col. g. 5's. 1923		22,578,000	A & O	72½	Feb. 28, '99	75	69½	1,461,000
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's. 1925		3,177,000	J & J	70	Feb. 17, '99	71	70	22,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A. 1929		1,979,000	M & S	62	Feb. 27, '99	65	60	58,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's. 1937		7,250,000	J & J	117½	Feb. 20, '99	118½	117½	21,000
2d mtge. g. 5's. 1941		3,625,000	J & J	110	Feb. 24, '99	110	109½	51,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's. 1945		2,500,000	A & O	101	Feb. 6, '99	101	101	1,000
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's. 1997		5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98			
registered.....			M & N					
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s. 1940		15,000,000	J & J	106	Feb. 28, '99	106	106½	17,000
registered.....			J & J					
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1941		10,000,000	A & O	113½	Feb. 17, '99	113½	113	12,000
registered.....			A & O	109½	July 1, '97			
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1933		10,280,000	J & J	96	Feb. 7, '99	96	96	10,000
registered.....			J & J					
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's. 1945		2,000,000	M & S	93	Feb. 6, '99	93	92	4,000
registered.....			M & S					
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's 1914		750,000	A & O					
g. gtd 5's. 1914		1,350,000	A & O	101	Sept. 16, '97			
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. ctf's. for 1st g. 5's. 1937		3,145,000	Q J	35	Feb. 16, '99	35	33	21,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's. 1931		3,810,000	Q J	122½	Feb. 18, '99	122½	122½	11,000
1st con. g. 4's. 1931		1,121,000	Q J					
Long Island gen. m. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & D	100	Feb. 20, '99	100	99½	25,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s. 1922		1,500,000	M & S	101	Feb. 9, '99	101	101	8,000
g. 4's. 1932		325,000	J & D	91	Sept. 27, '97			
deb. g. 5's. 1934		1,500,000	J & D	100	May 25, '97			



BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Prtec.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
N. Y. & Rocky Beach 1st g. 5's, 1927		984,000	M & S	100	Jan. 17, '99			
2d m. inc. . . . . 1927		1,000,000	M & S	106½	July 9, '97			
N. Y. B'k'n & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's, 1935		1,728,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99			
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's. . . . . 1911		250,000	M & S					
1st 5's. . . . . 1911		750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '96			
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn'd 5's, 1922		1,075,000	Q J A N	108½	June 17, '95			
N. Y. B. R. R. 1st g. g'd 5's. . . . . 1943		200,000	J & J					
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's. . . . . 1945		300,000	J & J					
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. Tr Co. ct. gold 5's, 1932		3,534,000	J & J	55	Feb. 23, '99	56	50	884,000
Gen. mtg. g. 4's. . . . . 1943		2,432,000	M & S	5	Dec. 23, '98			
Louis. & Nash. Cecilia'n brch. 7's. 1907		490,000	M & S	108	Nov. 11, '97			
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's, 1930		5,043,000	J & J	129½	Jan. 19, '99			
2d 6's. . . . . 1930		1,000,000	J & J	117	Feb. 14, '99	117	117	2,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's. 1919		1,980,000	J & D	117	Nov. 22, '98			
general mort. 6's. . . . . 1930		10,058,000	J & D	121	Feb. 27, '99	121	118½	12,000
Pensacola div. 6's. . . . . 1930		580,000	M & S	103½	Sept. 24, '97			
St. Louis div. 1st 6's. . . . . 1921		3,500,000	M & S	125	Dec. 7, '97			
2d 3's. . . . . 1930		3,000,000	M & S	87	May 25, '95			
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's. . . . . 1900		1,900,000	J & J	107	Nov. 17, '98			
So. & N. Ala. sl'g fd. 6s, 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '98			
con. gtd. g. 6's. . . . . 1936		3,873,000	F & A	107½	Feb. 9, '99	107½	107½	15,000
gold 5's. . . . . 1937		1,764,000	M & N	105½	Feb. 27, '99	106½	106½	8,000
Unified gold 4's. . . . . 1940		14,994,000	J & J	95½	Feb. 23, '99	96½	94½	188,000
registered			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93			
coll. tr 5-20 g 4's, 1908-1918		12,500,000	A & O	100	Feb. 23, '99	100½	100	136,000
Pen. & At. 1st 6's, g. g. 1921		2,753,000	F & A	112	Jan. 27, '99			
collateral trust g. 5's, 1931		5,129,000	M & N	109½	Feb. 23, '99	110	106½	42,000
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st. g. 4's. . . . . 1945		4,000,000	M & S	109½	July 18, '98			
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's, 1937		2,086,000	F & A	107	Feb. 21, '99	107½	106½	35,000
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's. . . . . 1937		6,742,000	J & J	94	Feb. 3, '99	94	94	5,000
L. & N. Louv. Cin. & Lex. g. 4's, 1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98			
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's, 1945		3,000,000	M & S					
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's, 1930		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98			
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's. . . . . 1930		24,065,000	A & O	103½	Feb. 28, '99	107	105	1,135,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's. . . . . 1908		10,818,000	J & J	116½	Feb. 28, '99	117½	116½	54,000
2d 6's. . . . . 1909		4,000,000	M & N	102½	Feb. 8, '99	102½	102½	2,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's, 1934		2,544,000	J & D					
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's, 1913		3,000,000	J & J					
Metro. St. Ry. gen. col. tr. g. 5's. . . . . 1937		12,500,000	F & A	120½	Feb. 23, '99	122	120½	166,000
B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's, 1937		7,650,000	J & D	122	Feb. 25, '99	124	122	18,000
registered			J & D	112½	May 29, '98			
Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's, 1936		3,000,000	M & S	126	Feb. 20, '99	126	126	10,000
registered			M & S					
Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's, 1936		5,000,000	M & S	126½	Feb. 7, '99	126½	126½	12,000
registered			M & S					
Mexican Central.								
con. mtge. 4's. . . . . 1911		59,011,000	J & J	88½	Jan. 4, '99			
1st con. inc. 3's. . . . . 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '96			
2d 3's. . . . . 1939		11,310,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '96			
equip. & collat. g. 5's. . . . . 1917		950,000	A & O					
Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's, 1943		4,635,000	M & S	88½	Feb. 23, '99	86½	86½	351,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's. . . . . 1927		11,416,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95			
2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	15	Dec. 7, '98			
March 1, 1899, stamped 1st paid								
2d inc. 6's "B" . . . . . 1917		12,265,000	A	6½	Dec. 7, '98			
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's. . . . . 1910		1,313,000	J & D	97	Feb. 11, '97			
registered.			J & D					
Mill. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's, 1926		6,103,000	F & A	105½	Feb. 16, '99	105½	103½	23,000
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's, 1927		950,000	J & D	146	Jan. 12, '99			
1st con. g. 5's. . . . . 1934		5,000,000	M & N	113	Feb. 25, '99	113	112	29,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. . . . . 1909		1,015,000	J & D	125	Jan. 27, '99			
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. . . . . 1910		636,000	J & D	127	Jan. 27, '99			
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. . . . . 1921		1,382,000	J & A	128	Dec. 12, '98			
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 23, '87			
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '95			
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89 3/4	June 18, '91			
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1888		6,710,000	J & J					
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.								
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,050,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '95			
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge. g. 4's. 1900		39,718,000	J & D	94 1/2	Feb. 28, '99	85 1/2	89 1/2	1,782,000
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,600,000	F & A	67 1/2	Feb. 28, '99	69	65 1/2	2,780,000
" 1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	83 1/2	Feb. 28, '99	85	83 1/2	36,000
" of Texas 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	90	Feb. 28, '99	90	87	31,000
" Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	79	Feb. 28, '99	80	79	69,000
" Dal. & Waco 1st g. g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	95	Feb. 28, '99	95	88	44,000
" Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		558,000	M & N					
Tebo. & Neosho 1st 7's. .... 1908		187,000	J & D					
Mo Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	105	Feb. 16, '99	105	104	9,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	114	Feb. 28, '99	115	113	646,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	115 1/2	Jan. 18, '99			
" trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	96	Feb. 25, '99	96	94 1/2	51,000
" registered			M & S					
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	91	Feb. 27, '99	93	90 1/2	194,000
" reissued			F & A					
" Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	106	Feb. 27, '99	106	106	21,000
" 2d extended g. 5's. .... 1938		2,573,000	F & A	111 1/2	Jan. 19, '99			
" Verdgris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1926		750,000	M & S					
" Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J					
" St. L. & I'n. Mt. 1st ex. 4 1/2's. .... 1907		4,000,000	F & A	105 1/2	Feb. 21, '99			
" 2d. ext. g. 5's. .... 1946		6,000,000	M & N	106 1/2	Feb. 23, '99	105 1/2	105 1/2	82,000
" Ark'nsas b'nch ext 5's. 1895		2,500,000	J & D	106 1/2	Feb. 20, '99	106 1/2	104 1/2	21,000
" g. con. R.R. & l. gr. 5's. 1931		21,769,000	A & O	111 1/2	Feb. 28, '99	106 1/2	106	100,000
" stamped gtd gold 5's. .... 1931		6,945,000	A & O	111 1/2	Jan. 31, '99	112	110 1/2	1,249,000
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J					
" small		226,000	J & J					
" Inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J					
" small		500,000						
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	128	Feb. 23, '99	128	128	5,000
" 1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	117	Feb. 21, '99	118 1/2	117	6,000
" gen. g. 4's. .... 1934		9,547,000	Q J	87 1/2	Feb. 28, '99	88	86	218,500
" Montg'ry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	107	Feb. 24, '99	107	106	40,000
" St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '95			
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	132 1/2	Feb. 18, '99	132 1/2	132 1/2	6,000
" 2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	105 1/2	Nov. 9, '97			
" 1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		6,213,000	A & O	108	Feb. 18, '99	108	108	14,000
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		300,000	J & J					
" 1st 6's McM. M.W. & A. 1. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96			
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J					
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108 1/2	Aug. 13, '94			
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		20,091,000	J & J	116 1/2	Feb. 17, '99	116 1/2	116 1/2	3,000
" 1st registered. .... 1903			J & J	117 1/2	Feb. 8, '99	117 1/2	117 1/2	5,000
" debenture 5's. .... 1904		5,421,000	M & S	113 1/2	Jan. 30, '99			
" debenture 5's reg. .... 1904			M & S	113 1/2	Jan. 28, '99			
" reg. debent. 5's. .... 1899-1904		708,000	M & S	108 1/2	Feb. 21, '98			
" debenture g. 4's. 1890-1905		6,254,000	J & D	104	Dec. 20, '98			
" registered			J & D	104 1/2	Feb. 5, '98			
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		4,219,500	M & N	107 1/2	Feb. 2, '99	107 1/2	107 1/2	2,000
" registered			M & N	104 1/2	June 30, '98			
" g. mortgage 3 1/2's. .... 1907		32,447,000	J & J	111 1/2	Feb. 20, '99	111 1/2	111 1/2	1,000
" registered			J & J	111 1/2	Feb. 17, '98	111 1/2	111 1/2	2,000
" Michigan Central col. g. 3 1/2's. .... 1908		18,429,000	F & A	99 1/2	Feb. 25, '99	100	99	467,000
" registered			F & A	99	Feb. 21, '99	99 1/2	99	2,000
" Lake Shore col. g. 3 1/2's. .... 1908		90,410,000	F & A	100	Feb. 28, '99	100 1/2	99 1/2	1,225,000
" registered			F & A	98 1/2	Feb. 28, '99	99 1/2	98 1/2	18,000
" Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	108	Jan. 12, '99			
" 7's registered. .... 1900			M & N	106 1/2	Jan. 27, '99			
" N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1866		1,650,000	F & A	103	May 7, '97			
" reg. certificates			F & A					
" West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. .... 1900		50,000,000	J & J	112	Feb. 28, '99	112 1/2	112	87,000
" registered			J & J	112 1/2	Feb. 27, '99	112 1/2	112	178,000

BOND SALES.

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's.....1936		5,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 5 '98			
" registered.....			J & J	106	June 17 '98			
" 2d gtd. 5's.....1936		500,000	J & J					
" registered.....			J & J					
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940		770,000	J & J	95	July 28 '98			
" small bonds series B.....		33,100	J & J					
Gouv. & Oswego. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D					
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's.....1922		9,061,000	A & O	131	Feb. 24 '99	131	131	26,000
" coup. g. bond currency.....			A & O					
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		130,000	A & O					
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		375,000	M & N					
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd g. 5's. 1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16 '94			
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	107	Aug. 13 '98			
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1991		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14 '94			
Carthage & Adiron 1st gtd g. 4's. 1981		1,100,000	J & D					
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1993		4,000,000	A & O	103	May 22 '98			
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		1,200,000	A & O	123 1/4	Dec. 20 '98			
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern. Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1906		924,000	F & A	121	Apr. 23 '98			
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....1899		998,000	A & O	102 1/2	Feb. 17 '99	102 1/2	102 1/2	3,000
" con. co. 1st 7's.....1900			J & J	105 1/2	Feb. 8 '99	105 1/2	105 1/2	5,000
" con. 1st registered.....1900		9,153,000	Q J	108 1/2	Feb. 20 '99	108 1/2	108	10,000
" con. co. 2d 7's.....1903			J & D	116 1/2	Jan. 31 '99			
" con. 2d registered.....1903		8,725,000	J & D	116 1/2	Jan. 5 '99			
" g 3/4's.....1907			J & D	108	Feb. 14 '99	108	107 3/4	51,000
" registered.....		28,166,000	J & D	106	Jan. 5 '99			
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	108 1/4	Dec. 1 '97			
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1928		840,000	J & J					
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....1924		1,500,000	J & J	121	Oct. 24 '98			
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's.....1902		8,000,000	M & N	112	Feb. 15 '99	112	112	3,000
" 1st con. 5's.....1902		2,000,000	M & N	104 1/2	Dec. 20 '98			
" 6's.....1909		1,500,000	M & S	122	Feb. 25 '98			
" coup. 5's.....1931			M & S	121 1/4	June 21 '98			
" con. 5's.....1931		3,576,000	Q M	121	Dec. 6 '97			
" mort. 4's.....1940			J & J	106	Feb. 25 '98			
" mtge. 4's reg.....		2,600,000	J & J	106	Jan. 7 '98			
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. 6's.....1999		476,000	J & D					
N.Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1937		19,425,000	A & O	107 1/2	Feb. 27 '99	107 1/2	107	105,000
" registered.....			A & O	104	Nov. 22 '98			
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1903		2,000,000	J & D	104 1/2	Oct. 7 '97			
" con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	181	Feb. 27 '99	184	174 1/2	37,500
" small certifs.....\$100		1,430,000		177	Feb. 15 '99	177	175	2,000
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's.....1937		2,898,000	M & N	126 1/2	Aug. 24 '97			
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		575,000	M & N	115 1/2	Oct. 15 '94			
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1906		6,000,000	J & J	120 1/2	Feb. 7 '99	120 1/2	120 1/2	12,000
" 1st 6's.....1906		4,000,000	J & J	114 1/4	Jan. 20 '99			
N.Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1939		5,600,000	J & D	106	Feb. 27 '99	106 1/2	106 1/2	56,500
" Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1992		8,375,000	M & S	105 1/2	Feb. 25 '99	106	104	153,000
" Registered.....\$5,000 only.			M & S	101 1/2	Nov. 30 '98			
N.P. 1st m.R.R.&L.G.S.F.g.c.6's. 1921		5,815,000	J & J	116	Feb. 10 '99	116	115 1/2	6,000
" registered.....			J & J	117	Oct. 15 '98			
" St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's.....1923		7,985,000	F & A	131 1/4	Dec. 17 '98			
" registered certificates.....			Q F	130	Sept. 28 '98			
N. P. Ry prior In ry. & ld. g. 4's. 1997		87,770,000	Q J	103	Feb. 28 '99	103 1/2	102 1/2	1,316,500
" registered.....			Q J	103 1/4	Feb. 23 '99	103 1/2	103 1/4	13,000
" gen. lien g. 3's.....2047		56,000,000	Q F	68 1/2	Feb. 27 '99	69	67 3/4	1,707,000
" registered.....			Q F					
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948		1,538,000	QMCF	92	Feb. 6 '99	92	92	3,500
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1933		3,871,000	J & J	115	Feb. 24 '99	116	114	14,000
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's.....1941		750,000	M & N	102	June 27 '98			
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1931		7,283,000	M & N	130 1/2	Feb. 27 '99	130 1/2	130	4,000
" New River 1st 6's.....1932		2,000,000	A & O	128	Nov. 25 '98			
" imp'tment and ext. 6's.....1934		5,000,000	F & A	117 1/2	Aug. 30 '98			
" Sci'o Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1999		5,000,000	J & N	97 1/2	Feb. 27 '99	97 1/2	96 1/2	81,000
" C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g g 5's. 1922		800,000	J & J	101	Feb. 23 '97			

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				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s. 1906 registered..... small bonds.....		22,923,000	A & O	92	Feb. 28, '99	93	92	510,500
				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's..... 1906 gen. mortg. g 6's..... 1907		2,000,000 2,428,000	J & D A & O	102½	Jan. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
				85	Dec. 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern gen g 4's..... 1921 gen. eng. Trust Co. certs...		1,381,000 1,417,000	M & N .....	9	Sept. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
				8½	Sept. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's..... 1901		2,376,000	J & J	82	Feb. 27, '99	85	82	5,000
Oregon Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's..... 1909 Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		691,000 19,481,000	J & J J & D	111	Feb. 25, '99	112	110	18,000
				101½	Feb. 28, '99	102½	101½	206,000
Oregon Short Line 1st g. 6's..... 1922 Utah & Northern 1st 7's..... 1908 g. 5's..... 1923 Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1943 non-cum. inc. A 5's..... 1943 non-cum. inc. B. & col. trust		13,651,000 4,998,000 1,877,000 10,337,000 7,185,000 14,341,000	F & A J & J J & J J & J SEPT. OCT.	128½	Feb. 27, '99	129	128½	40,000
				121	June 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
				102	May 24, '94	.....	.....	.....
				110½	Feb. 28, '99	112	110½	197,000
				88	Feb. 28, '99	89	87½	147,000
70½	Feb. 23, '99	71½	70½	112,000				
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's..... 1946		4,446,000	J & D	107	Feb. 28, '99	107	106½	44,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s..... 1917 s. f. subsidy g 6's..... 1910		1,859,000 1,782,000	A & O M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
				101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st..... 1921 reg..... 1921		19,487,000 5,000,000	J & J J & J	115½	Feb. 14, '99	115½	115½	2,000
				110	July 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s Series A..... 1940 Series B..... 1942 Series C..... 1942 Series D gtd. 4's..... 1945		10,000,000 10,000,000 2,000,000 4,868,000	A & O A & O M & N M & N	115½	Feb. 1, '99	115½	115½	4,000
				116½	Feb. 1, '99	116½	116½	1,000
				118	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
				107	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
				107½	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's. 1900 1st reg. 7's..... 1900		6,863,000	F & A F & A	109½	Jan. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
				138¾	Apr. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
				141	Nov. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912 2d 7's..... 1912 3d 7's..... 1912		2,917,000 2,546,000 2,000,000	J & J A & O A & O	126	Aug. 28, '95	.....	.....	.....
				118	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
				110	May 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932 registered.....		1,506,000	A & O A & O	107	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
				113	Apr. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's. 1900 gen. gtd. g. 4½'s Ser. A. 1942		1,310,000 3,000,000	M & N J & J	107	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
				113	Apr. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
Series B..... 1942 E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3½'s Ser. B. 1940		2,000,000 2,250,000	A & O J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½ g 1941 Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's. 1942		4,447,000 5,389,000	J & J M & S	107	May 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
				102	Nov. 10, '97	.....	.....	.....
Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		1,400,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st RI Est. g 4's... 1923 { con. sterling gold 6 per cent..... 1905 con. currency, 6's registered..... 1905 con. gold 5 per cent..... 1919 registered..... con. gold 4 per cent..... 1943 Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s..... 1935 U'd N. J. RR. & Can. Co. g 4's..... 1944 Del. R. RR. & Bge Co 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1933 Sunbury & Lewiston 1st g. 4's..... 1936		1,675,000 22,782,000 4,718,000 4,998,000 3,000,000 1,250,000 5,648,000 1,300,000 500,000	..... J & D Q M 15 M & S Q M ch M & N M & N M & S F & A J & J	108	May 12, '97	.....	.....	.....
				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
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Peo., Dec. & Ev. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920 Ev. div. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920 Tr. Co. ctf. 2d mort 5's. 1926 1st instal. paid.....		1,140,000 1,433,000 1,851,000	J & J M & S M & N	101	Feb. 20, '99	101	101	2,000
				96	Feb. 3, '99	96	96	9,000
				20	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's.... 1921 2d m 4½'s..... 1921		1,495,000 1,499,000	Q F M & N	120	May 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
				90	Sept. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pine Creek Railway 6's..... 1932		3,500,000	J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93	.....	.....	.....

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1922		1,440,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1923		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's. 1922		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 6's. 1924		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
McKsp't & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	Oct. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Shema'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		2,000,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 5's. 1943		408,000	J & J	98	July 14, '97	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		4,700,000	J & J	99	Feb. 27, '99	99½	98½	802,000
J. P. M. & Co., c'tfs. ....		5,000,000	A & O	99	Feb. 24, '99	99½	98½	120,000
Pittsburg, Y. & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. 1907		62,456,000	J & J	88½	Feb. 28, '98	89½	88½	4,420,000
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. 1910		15,200,000	J & J	94½	Feb. 28, '99	94	92½	273,000
Rio Grande Juno'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1939		1,850,000	J & D	102½	Feb. 3, '99	102½	102½	1,000
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4. 1940		4,510,000	J & J	79½	Feb. 28, '99	78	72	81,000
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. 1al. 1st g. 2-3-4. 1947		2,500,000	J & J	83½	Feb. 28, '99	84	83	38,500
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1908		500,000	M & N	114½	Feb. 2, '99	114½	114½	17,000
2d g. 6's. Class B. 1906		2,709,500	M & N	114½	Feb. 15, '99	114½	114½	28,000
2d g. 6's. Class C. 1906		2,400,000	M & N	114½	Feb. 17, '99	114½	114½	2,000
1st g. 6's. P. C. & O. 1919		1,028,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 6's. 1981		7,807,000	J & J	123½	Feb. 27, '99	123½	123½	57,000
gen. g. 5's. 1981		12,288,000	J & J	106½	Feb. 28, '99	109½	106½	284,000
1st Trust g. 5's. 1927		1,099,000	A & O	106	Feb. 17, '98	106	106	1,000
Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's. 1910		304,000	A & O	106	Oct. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kansas. Midland 1st g. 4's. 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		6,398,000	J & D	88	Feb. 28, '99	88½	86½	224,000
South'n div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		1,500,000	A & O	90½	Feb. 23, '99	90½	89½	41,000
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. c'tfs. 1989		20,000,000	M & N	92½	Feb. 28, '99	93½	90	3,824,000
2d g. 4's inc. Bd. c'tfs. 1989		9,000,000	J & J	52	Feb. 28, '99	55½	51½	4,760,500
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	15	Nov. 8, 27	.....	.....	.....
gtd. gold 5's. 1937		1,188,000	J & J	80	Mar. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. 1913		1,000,000	F & A	120	Feb. 8, '99	120	120	7,000
2d 5's. 1917		2,000,000	A & O	113	Feb. 8, '99	118	113	10,000
1st con. g. 4's. 1938		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	124½	Feb. 20, '99	124½	124	10,000
Dakota ext'n 6's. 1910		5,678,000	M & N	125	Feb. 25, '99	125½	124½	68,000
1st con. 6's. 1933		18,844,000	J & J	138½	Feb. 20, '99	138½	138½	20,000
1st con. 6's. registered. ....		.....	J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '99	137½	137½	15,000
1st c. 6's. red'd to 4½'s. ....		21,983,000	J & J	113½	Feb. 24, '99	113½	113½	110,000
1st cons. 6's registered. ....		.....	J & J	106	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,805,000	J & D	106½	Feb. 20, '99	105½	106½	13,000
registered. ....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's. 1922		2,150,000	J & J	127½	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	132	Jan. 26, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's. registered. ....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's. 1987		2,700,000	J & J	115	Feb. 15, '99	115	114	18,000
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1906		4,700,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastn. R'y Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		3,625,000	J & D	113	Aug. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,940,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100½	Oct. 20, '97	.....	.....	.....
San. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. 1934		4,068,000	A & O	109½	Aug. 2, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's. 1934		1,780,000	A & O	125½	Feb. 15, '99	125½	125½	10,000
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. 1923		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's. gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's. 1919		5,260,000	M & N	104½	Feb. 27, '99	104½	103	111,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.**

**NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.**

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Southern Pacific Co.								
{ Gal. Harrisb'gh & S.A. 1st g 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	99½	Dec. 9, '98			
" 2d g 7's. 1905		1,000,000	J & D	110	Feb. 27, '99	110½	110	8,000
" Mex. & P. div 1st g 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	104	Feb. 28, '99	104½	103¾	364,000
Houst. & T C 1st Waco & N 7's. 1903		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92			
" 1st g 5's int. gtd. 1937		7,107,000	J & J	107	Feb. 21, '99	107	107	1,000
" con. g 6's int. gtd. 1912		3,455,000	A & O	112	Dec. 9, '98			
" gen. g 4's int. gtd. 1921		4,297,000	A & O	89½	Feb. 28, '99	90	88¾	28,000
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's. 1920		1,494,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 17, '98			
" 1st 7's. 1918		5,000,000	A & O	139	Jan. 21, '99			
" N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O					
" Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's. 1927		18,842,000	J & J	100¼	Jan. 24, '99			
" San Ant. & Aran Passist gtd g 4's. 1943		18,886,000	J & J	85½	Feb. 28, '99	85½	78	2,270,000
" Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's. 1915		1,620,000	F & A	116	Dec. 14, '98			
" Sabine div. 1st g 6's. 1912		2,575,000	M & S	106¼	Nov. 17, '97			
" con. g 5's. 1943		1,620,000	J & J	105	Feb. 28, '99	105¾	103¾	382,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	112	Feb. 10, '99	112	112	1,000
{ South. Pac. of Cal. 1st g 6's. 1905-12		30,577,500	A & O	118¼	Dec. 17, '98			
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's. 1937		6,696,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 11, '98			
" stamped. 1905-1937		12,788,000		109	Feb. 25, '99	109	107	398,000
" Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. 1941		1,920,000	J & J	99¼	Feb. 28, '99	99¼	95¾	300,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1937		5,500,000	J & J					
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. 1911		4,180,000	J & J	113¾	Nov. 23, '98			
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's. 1904		27,850,000	J & J	105¾	Feb. 28, '99	106½	105	650,000
" registered. 1904			J & J	98	Oct. 31, '98			
" Memph. div. 1st g. 4-4½-5's. 1906		5,083,000	J & J	107½	Jan. 4, '99			
" registered. 1906			J & J					
" East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. 1938		4,500,000	M & S	108	Feb. 27, '99	108	107¾	7,000
" registered. 1938			M & S					
" Alabama Central, 1st 6's. 1918		1,000,000	J & J	112¼	Aug. 17, '97			
" Atl. & Char. Air Line, income. 1900		750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95			
" Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. 1916		2,000,000	J & J	118	Sept. 30, '98			
" East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. 1900		3,123,000	J & J	104¾	Feb. 24, '99	104¾	104¼	10,000
" divisional g 5's. 1930		3,106,000	J & J	117	Feb. 28, '99	117	116½	26,000
" con. 1st g 5's. 1936		12,770,000	M & N	110	Feb. 23, '99	116	115	42,000
" Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. 1922		5,660,000	J & J	124½	Feb. 17, '99	124½	124	27,000
" Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. 1925		2,000,000	J & J	119½	Feb. 16, '99	119½	119½	2,000
" Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. 1915		5,597,000	J & J	123¼	Feb. 1, '99	123¼	123¼	1,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's. 1909		818,000	M & S	101	Nov. 2, '97			
" deb. 5's stamped. 1927		3,368,000	A & O	104½	Dec. 16, '98			
" Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S					
" small. 1906			M & S					
" ser. B 6's. 1911		1,900,000	M & S					
" small. 1911			M & S					
" ser. C 6's. 1916		1,100,000	M & S					
" small. 1916			M & S					
" ser. D 4-5's. 1921		950,000	M & S					
" small. 1921			M & S					
" ser. E 5's. 1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99			
" small. 1926			M & S					
" ser. F 5's. 1931		1,310,000	M & S					
" Virginia Midland gen. 5's. 1936		2,392,000	M & N	111	Feb. 23, '99	111	110¾	42,000
" gen. 5's. gtd. stamped. 1926		2,466,000	M & N	110	Dec. 29, '98			
" W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. 1924		1,025,000	F & A	90	Feb. 23, '99	90	90	1,000
" W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. 1914		2,581,000	J & J	118¼	Dec. 1, '98			
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g 6's. 1939		2,812,000	J & J					
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4½'s. 1943		500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. 1939		7,000,000	A & O	109	Oct. 12, '98			
" 1st con. g. 5's. 1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	111½	Dec. 28, '98			
" St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g. 5's. 1930		3,500,000	A & O	103	Oct. 27, '98			
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. 1914		444,000	Q JAN	105½	Dec. 18, '95			
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. 1905		3,346,000	M & S	105¼	Dec. 27, '98			
" fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth								
" 1st gold 5's. 2000		21,216,000	J & D	114	Feb. 28, '99	114	110¼	175,000
" 2d gold income, 5's. 2000		23,227,000	MAR.	52	Feb. 28, '99	54	48¾	12,746,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	125¼	Feb. 8, '99	125¼	125¼	10,000

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's...1935		3,000,000	J & J	106	Feb. 3, '99	106	106	28,000
{ " 1st M. g 5's West. div...1935		2,500,000	A & O	102	Feb. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " gen. g. 5's...1935		1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's...1930		2,340,000	A & O	85	Feb. 27, '99	85½	84	50,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's...1917		4,400,000	J & D	79	Feb. 25, '99	79	78½	17,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's 1916		8,234,000	M & N	104	Feb. 27, '99	106	102	264,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's...1928		1,852,000	J & D	99½	Feb. 24, '99	100	99	28,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's 1945		4,387,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Pacific R. R. & ld gt g 4s. 1947		90,000,000	J & J	103½	Feb. 28, '99	105	103½	2,661,000
{ " registered...1947		.....	J & J	104½	Feb. 23, '99	104½	104½	2,000
{ Union Pac. Tr. Co. cts. g. 4's...1918		2,000,000	M & N	68	Feb. 24, '99	68	68	34,000
{ U.P. Den. & G.T. Co. of. 1st g. 5's 1939		15,238,000	J & D	88	Feb. 21, '99	88	87½	19,000
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's...1939		31,664,000	M & N	115	Feb. 28, '99	115½	114½	190,000
{ " 2d mortgage gold 5's...1939		14,000,000	F & A	96	Feb. 25, '99	97½	95	125,000
{ " debent. mtg series A...1939		3,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " series B...1939		25,740,000	J & J	86½	Feb. 28, '99	87½	85½	1,091,000
{ " 1st g. 5's Det. & Chi. ex. 1940		3,439,000	J & J	107½	Feb. 28, '99	109	107½	12,000
{ St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st 6's...1908		1,000,000	A & O	109½	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's...1937		10,000,000	J & J	110½	Feb. 20, '99	110½	110½	20,000
{ " gen g. 3-4's...1943		9,739,000	A & O	59½	Feb. 28, '99	60½	57	817,000
{ " inc. 5's...1943		10,000,000	Nov.	20½	Feb. 28, '99	20½	16	205,000
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's...1928		3,999,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 40 years con. g. 5's...1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 28, '97	.....	.....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's 1911		3,250,000	J & J	118	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's 1926		1,018,000	A & O	106	Feb. 28, '99	106	105	16,000
{ " Trust Co. certificates...1922		1,982,000	.....	104½	Dec. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's 1928		1,500,000	J & J	100	Sept. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " exten. and imp. g. 5's...1930		1,624,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g. 5's 1937		1,987,000	J & J	84	Nov. 16, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ " eng. Trust Co. certificates...1937		10,013,000	.....	68½	Feb. 28, '99	70½	61½	4,688,000
{ " income mortgage 5's...1937		7,775,000	A & O	9½	Feb. 20, '99	10½	8	177,000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	YEAR 1899.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered..... Opt'l		25,364,700	Q M	99½	99	99	99	2,000
{ " 3's registered..... 1898		.....	Q F	107½	106½	107½	106½	28,500
{ " 3's coupon..... 1898		.....	Q F	105	106½	107½	106½	329,000
{ " 3's small bonds reg..... 1898		193,192,750	Q F	107½	107½	107½	107½	500
{ " 3's small bonds coupon..... 1898		.....	Q F	107½	106½	107	106½	15,020
{ " 4's registered..... 1907		559,860,400	J A J & O	112½	111½	112½	112½	8,000
{ " 4's coupon..... 1907		.....	J A J & O	113½	112½	113½	112½	42,300
{ " 4's registered..... 1925		162,315,400	Q F	120	121	128½	128	144,000
{ " 4's coupon..... 1925		.....	Q F	129½	128	129	128	53,500
{ " 5's registered..... 1904		100,000,000	Q F	113½	113½	111½	111½	5,000
{ " 5's coupon..... 1904		.....	Q F	113½	111	112	111	40,000
{ " 4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee) 1899		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
District of Columbia 3-6's... 1924		14,088,600	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " small bonds..... 1924		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " registered..... 1924		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " funding 5's..... 1899		800,400	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " small..... 1924		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " registered..... 1924		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	106¾	Feb. 28, '99	106¾	106¾	25,500
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 5's. 1900		3,068,000	Q F	108	Feb. 24, '99	108	108	35,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 8's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S	90	Feb. 23, '99	90½	89½	131,000
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		17,500,000	F & A	89	Feb. 23, '99	90	84½	164,000
Chic. Juno. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	109½	Feb. 9, '97			
non-cum. inc. 5's. 1907		2,575,000	J & J					
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	100	Feb. 23, '99	100	100	27,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		700,000	J & J	81	Feb. 11, '97			
Coupon off. ....								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	103	Dec. 1, '98			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. st g. 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	88	Feb. 20, '99	88	86½	60,000
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2387.			Q & J	103¾	Nov. 10, '98			
registered. ....		10,595,800	Q & J	104	Feb. 16, '99			
Det. Mack & Mar. Id. gt. 8½ S. A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	22	Feb. 4, '99	22	22	2,000
Eric Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. g. sfd 5's. 1923		1,905,000	J & J	110	Jan. 31, '99			
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st w. 5's. 1923		1,090,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,705,000	M & S	111	Aug. 23, '97			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99			
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	73¼	Dec. 4, '95			
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's. 1918		3,408,000	F & A	113½	Feb. 27, '99	113¾	112	119,000
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's. ....		1,975,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98			
2d g. 5's. ....		1,400,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97			
Knickerbocker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g. 5's. 1925		2,000,000	A & O	100¼	Feb. 25, '99	100¼	98½	22,000
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,350,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97			
Manh. Beh. H. & L. ltm. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95			
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k. f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	103	Feb. 17, '99	103	103	3,000
registered. ....								
Mich. Penton. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S	98	Dec. 2, '98			
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,089,000	J & J	108	Feb. 20, '99	104	108	14,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. .... 1890-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. conv. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	92¼	May 5, '96			
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. .... 1899-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		590,000	M & N	106¾	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. .... 1940		2,000,000	J & J	113	Apr. 4, '98			
Roch & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946		1,100,000	M & N					
St. Louis Term. Cupples Station & Property Co. 1st g. 4½'s. 5-20. 1917		2,000,000	J & D					
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. .... 1908		4,975,000	M & S					
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1948		2,912,000	F & A	89	Feb. 23, '99	89½	88	457,000
inc. g. 5's. 1948		7,500,000		80	Feb. 23, '99	82¾	88	1,841,000
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917		1,244,000	A & O	107	Feb. 22, '99	107	105	97,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,399,000	J & J	109¼	Feb. 24, '99	109¼	107	65,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & J	84	May 2, '95			
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910		2,428,000	F & A	103	Feb. 21, '99	108	102	53,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g. s. fd deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	117	Jan. 9, '99			
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col tr. bonds.								
Series B 5's. .... 1899-1914		1,000,000	M & N					
C 5's. .... 1900-1915		1,000,000	A & O					
D 4½'s. .... 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J					
E 4's. .... 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D					
F 4's. .... 1908-1916		1,000,000	M & S					
G 4's. .... 1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A					
H 4's. .... 1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N					
Small bonds. ....								



BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		8,640,000	M & N	108	Nov. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    7's, registered.....1900			M & N	105	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    debenture, 7's.....1884-1900		1,000,000	M & N	105½	July 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    registered.....1900		8,502,000	M & N	104½	Nov. 12, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    col. trust cur. 5's.....1908		1,957,000	J & J	114½	Feb. 27, '99	115	114	5,000
Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 6's.....1811		1,250,000	J & J	111	Nov. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904		1,250,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.1919		846,000	J & J	68	Dec. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.1947		1,150,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bost. Un. Gas l't crfs s'k f'd g. 5's.1939		7,000,000	J & J	91½	Oct. 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.1945		13,290,000	M & N	118	Feb. 25, '99	118	117½	41,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1932		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,813,000	J & J	96	Feb. 28, '99	96½	95½	118,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918		1,049,000	F & A	94	Aug. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's.1910		4,312,000	M & S	112½	Feb. 7, '99	112½	112½	47,000
"    1st con. g. 5's.....1905		2,156,000	J & J	122½	Feb. 3, '99	122½	122½	4,000
"    Brooklyn 1st g. 5's.....1940		1,800,000	A & O	110½	Feb. 4, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    registered.....1909		2,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1902		2,500,000	M & S	102	Feb. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....1922		6,000,000	J & D	115	Feb. 28, '99	115	114	25,000
Grand Rapids Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....1915		1,225,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '95	.....	.....	.....
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's.1922		3,750,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.1919		10,000,000	Q F	109	Feb. 23, '99	109½	107½	35,000
"    small bonds.....1919				97½	Nov. 1, '95	.....	.....	.....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 6's.1904		2,100,000	M & N	125	Feb. 25, '99	125	125	8,000
"    2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	107½	Feb. 27, '99	107½	107½	25,000
"    1st con. g. 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	125	Feb. 16, '99	125	125	9,000
"    refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    refunding registered.....1900		10,000,000	M & S	109½	Feb. 10, '99	109½	109½	1,000
Chic. Gas L't & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's.1937		4,346,000	J & D	108½	Feb. 6, '99	108	108½	8,000
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1936		2,000,000	J & J	106	Feb. 20, '99	106	106	5,000
Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd. g. 6's.1905		5,000,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 1, '99	106½	106½	1,000
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1947		3,905,500	M & N	101	Mar. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....1933				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Armstrong.**—David Armstrong, formerly Receiver of the Fidelity National Bank, Cincinnati, Ohio, and later of the Farmers' National Bank, Portsmouth, Ohio, died Feb. 4. He was at one time President of the First National Bank, Jackson, Ohio.

**Bockemuhle.**—H. W. Bockemuhle, President of the Bank of Ellinwood, Kans., died Feb. 13.

**Brower.**—James C. Brower, President of the German-American Bank of Brooklyn, N. Y., and one of the organizers of the bank, died Feb. 24. He was born in Dutchess County, N. Y., sixty-four years ago, and had lived in Brooklyn since 1861.

**Cameron.** William Cameron, Vice-President of the First National Bank, Waco, Texas, and largely interested in manufacturing enterprises throughout the South, died Feb. 6. He was a man of great wealth.

**Crooks.**—J. E. Crooks, Cashier of the Bank of Haywards, Cal., died Feb. 20. He was born in Cleveland, Ohio, and has resided on the Pacific Coast since 1869. He had been successfully identified with banking and other business for many years.

**Davis.**—William J. Davis, Cashier of the First National Bank of Yarmouth, Yarmouth Port, Mass., and for fifty years clerk and treasurer of the town, died Feb. 10. He was born at New Bedford, Mass., in 1816.

**Davis.**—W. W. Davis, Cashier of the Kinsman (Ohio) Banking Co., died Jan. 24.

**Dingley.**—Hon. Jeremiah Dingley, Jr., President of the First National Bank, Auburn, Me., died Feb. 12, aged seventy-seven years. He had been a member of both branches of the Legislature, had held offices in the city government and was a successful banker and manufacturer.

**Edwards.**—Richard S. Edwards, Treasurer and Secretary of the Union Trust Co., Philadelphia, died Feb. 11. Mr. Edwards was born in Philadelphia in 1850.

**Hart.**—John M. Hart, a promoter and for many years a large stockholder of the Second National Bank, Mechanicsburg, Pa., died Feb. 1, aged seventy-six years. He was a director without interval for twenty-nine years and for eighteen years the President of the Board, which office he relinquished in 1897 on account of declining health.

**Hawes.**—A. J. Hawes, Vice-President of the Cambria National Bank, Johnstown, Pa., died March 8, aged sixty years.

**Heaton.**—Homer W. Heaton, President of the Montpelier (Vt.) Savings Bank and Trust Co. from its organization in 1871, died Jan. 28, aged eighty-seven years. He presented a hospital to the city at a cost of over \$30,000, and had been prominent in political as well as business affairs.

**Hendrickson.**—Wm. H. Hendrickson, President of the Farmers and Merchants' Bank, Matawan, N. J., and formerly a member of the New Jersey State Senate, died Feb. 20. He died at the family homestead near Middletown, where his birth occurred in 1813. The property had been in possession of the family since 1696. He was President of the bank for twenty years.

**Jacobs.**—Richard S. Jacobs, President of the R. S. Jacobs Banking Co., and one of the wealthiest residents of Southwest Missouri, died at Greenfield, Mo., Jan. 31.

**Kahle.**—Hon. T. H. Kahle, Vice-President of the Bank of Ottawa, Ohio, died Feb. 7. He represented his county for two terms in the General Assembly of Ohio.

**Lambert.**—Louis A. Lambert, founder and President of the Bank of Grand Avenue, Kansas City, Mo., died Jan. 30. He was born in Troy, N. Y., in 1835.

**Maury.**—James L. Maury, formerly in the banking business at Richmond, Va., died Feb. 8, aged about seventy-two years.

**Parkinson.**—Dr. B. Parkinson, President of the Bank of Palo Alto, Cal., died Feb. 8.

**Peterman.**—Henry V. Peterman, President of the Citizens' National Bank, Muncy, Pa., died Feb. 28. He was born in Lycoming County, Pa., in 1836, and had resided there all his life.

**Rockwell.**—Geo. P. Rockwell, Vice-President of the Eastchester Savings Bank, Mount Vernon, N. Y., and engaged in mercantile business there for over forty years, died Feb. 24 in his sixty-seventh year.

**Sears.**—Jasper P. Sears died at Denver, Colo., Feb. 17. He was a member of the banking firm of Cook & Sears, formed in 1868, and which dissolved some years ago.

**Shearer.**—Joseph Shearer, founder and for twenty-seven years Cashier of the Fort Plain (N. Y.) National Bank and a director of the bank at the time of his death, died Feb. 13, aged seventy-nine years.

**Schwan.**—Valentin Schwan died at his residence near Centerville, La., on Jan. 30, aged seventy years and seven months. Mr. Schwan was a native of Germany. He was for several years a director of the First National Bank of Franklin, La., was senior member of the firm of V. Schwan & Co., Ltd., New Orleans, and was one of the most successful sugar planters in the Parish of St. Mary.

**Stice.**—W. E. Stice, Cashier of the Galena (Kans.) National Bank and one of its largest stockholders, died Feb. 28. Mr. Stice was prominent in politics, was regarded as an able financier and possessed a large estate.

**Titus.**—T. H. Titus, for twenty years Cashier of the Union National Bank, Rochester, Minn., died recently.

**Waring.**—Sebre H. Waring, Cashier of the Ketcham National Bank, Toledo, Ohio, from the time of its organization in 1888, died Feb. 13. He was an invaluable and trusted officer of the bank and one of Toledo's most popular citizens.

**White.**—Geo. H. B. White, Cashier of the National Metropolitan Bank, Washington, D. C., died Feb. 23, aged sixty-seven years.

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**WANTED**—Young man, who has had over ten years' banking experience and who now occupies a responsible position in a bank, desires to make a change of location. Would take about \$2,500 stock of paying bank in progressive town. Satisfactory references as to qualifications. Address  
CASHIER, care BANKERS' MAGAZINE.






*Francis D. Carley*

# WILLIAMS

As the law of trusts has developed, the rights of the trustee have become more and more defined. In the early days, the trustee was a mere agent of the settlor, and his powers were limited to those expressly granted to him. But now, the trustee is considered as a fiduciary, and his powers are defined by the law of trusts. The trustee must act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, and he must not exercise his powers for his own private gain. The law of trusts has also developed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, and to ensure that the trustee is held accountable for his actions. The trustee must keep accurate records of his administration, and he must be prepared to account to the beneficiaries for his actions. The law of trusts is a complex and evolving field, and it is essential for trustees to understand their duties and responsibilities. The law of trusts is a branch of equity, and it is based on the principle of fairness. The trustee is held to a higher standard of conduct than the ordinary citizen, and he must act with the utmost good faith and integrity. The law of trusts is designed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, and to ensure that the trustee is held accountable for his actions. The trustee must act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, and he must not exercise his powers for his own private gain. The law of trusts has also developed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, and to ensure that the trustee is held accountable for his actions. The trustee must keep accurate records of his administration, and he must be prepared to account to the beneficiaries for his actions. The law of trusts is a complex and evolving field, and it is essential for trustees to understand their duties and responsibilities. The law of trusts is a branch of equity, and it is based on the principle of fairness. The trustee is held to a higher standard of conduct than the ordinary citizen, and he must act with the utmost good faith and integrity. The law of trusts is designed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, and to ensure that the trustee is held accountable for his actions. The trustee must act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, and he must not exercise his powers for his own private gain.



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# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTY-THIRD YEAR.

APRIL, 1899.

VOLUME LVIII, No. 4.

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THE GROWTH OF TRUST companies is characterized in the annual report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York as remarkable. In one sense it is not at all remarkable that these companies should become a favorite investment for capital. Their powers and privileges and their comparative immunity in the matter of taxation, give them an advantage over ordinary financial institutions. They receive deposits and pay interest thereon, make loans and do all the business of an ordinary bank. At the same time they are exempt from the burdens of keeping a reserve in cash in their own place of business, and are enabled to deposit almost all their reserve funds with the regular banks and thus lose nothing in interest.

For instance, on January 1, 1899, the deposits of the trust companies in the State of New York amounted to nearly five hundred millions, of which about two hundred millions were styled deposits in trust and the remainder general deposits. On these deposits interest amounting to 1.6 per cent. was paid. The reserves held on these deposits were about fifteen per cent., of which twelve per cent. was deposited in other banks and only three per cent. on hand. Of course the banks in which the reserves were held were local banks, and payments can be made by checks on such institutions as well as by cash.

The capital of these trust companies was \$34,850,000. They are chiefly located in cities where the reserves required by law to be kept by the National banks are much larger in proportion, but even in districts where the smallest cash reserve is required of National banks, the advantage in this respect is with the trust companies. In New York city, for instance, the National banks are required to keep twenty-five per cent. of their deposits in cash. In some other cities twelve and a half per cent., and in all other places six per cent. in cash.

As it is now almost a universal practice for banks to allow interest to each other on the balances of deposits, it can be seen that the trust

companies are in a situation to maintain their reserves with the least loss of interest.

It is not remarkable either that these companies attract so large a share of deposits. The powers which they are permitted to exercise as managers and trustees of the moneys and valuables placed in their hands and which they exercise for the benefit of their depositors for the very lowest charge, frequently as a matter of accommodation for no charge at all, tend to relieve the possessors of wealth from the anxieties attendant on its management and conservation. These companies furnish legal advice and invest and guard the money of their clients. They perform the functions of the solicitor, the broker, and the policeman. They work with the certainty obtained by large operations, and machine like protect those who entrust their wealth to them not only from outside attacks, but also from their own weakness and lack of experience.

It is not so wonderful that these companies have shown a growth out of all proportion to that of other financial institutions, and the prospect is that they will continue to increase in numbers as their merits become better understood by the public. As a matter of public policy, too, there is no doubt that such institutions as trust companies ought to be encouraged by the State and be freed from such taxation as might tend to cripple their usefulness. With all their advantages and the natural tendency of capital to flow in the direction of greatest profit, it would not have been surprising to see a transfer of capital from the regular banks to this new field. There is no doubt that a great deal of the competition complained of in banking circles and the tendency to consolidation in many places is due to the business of the trust companies.

Although it would be difficult to make any very distinct discrimination between the capital handled by trust companies and that handled by the regular banks, yet a general distinction may be made. The trust companies deal more with the capital intended for investment more or less permanent, while the banks are adapted to handle the capital of actual employment. The wealth entrusted to the trust companies takes no risks and is content with sure and moderate returns. The capital handled by the banks is used to carry on the great activities of modern business and commerce, with its chance of larger profits and its risks of corresponding losses. One is wealth in the vigor and presumption of youth; the other wealth retired on its prestige and dignity.

Without the banks through which wealth is increased and accumulated, the trust companies would find it difficult if not impossible to carry on their business. The complaint of the banks is that the trust companies usurp a great deal of what is properly a banking



business, and that they are able to do this business more profitably than the banks because the taxes they pay are lighter. There is no doubt that this complaint is to a certain extent well founded, but it is difficult to see how the trust companies can carry out their powers for the conservation and increase of the wealth entrusted to them by their clients without exercising some of the functions of an ordinary bank. But the banking they do forms a small part of their whole business, although it is the most conspicuous before the public. In fact the result and conclusion of every long train of careful negotiation, investment and management, is either the drawing of a check or the posting of a credit. The banking business in a trust company bears the same relation to the other business done, that the amount of balances in the clearing-house bears to the whole amount of exchanges. It would not therefore be fair to tax the capital of trust companies in the same manner that the capital of banks is taxed, but it is possible that the taxation of both might be so adjusted that there would not be the appearance of discrimination in favor of capital invested in trust companies over that invested in banks which is now the foundation of much complaint and of considerable litigation. Moreover it is believed that with the accumulation of wealth and the increase in the forms of indebtedness in which investments may be made, that the growth of trust companies in all the wealthier sections of the country will continue to increase. The skillful care and management exercised by these companies, over the vast amount of stocks and bonds dependent for value upon properties situated all over the United States and other countries, has had and will continue to have a beneficial effect upon the properties themselves. Without trust companies it would be almost impracticable for the individual holders of stocks and bonds to exercise any influence on the represented properties, and they would tend to lose much of their value as an investment. With the growth of this form of wealth trust companies will grow. Like all other paying business institutions they will, unless checked by wise laws, become so numerous as to come in competition with each other. Competition often leads to unwise business methods, and these again to the failure of the institutions by which they are tolerated. The failure of a trust company is a much more serious event than that of an ordinary financial institution. Luckily such failures have not been numerous in the history of the country. If there is any line of business in which public policy dictates that the State should exercise control, it is in that of trust companies. Their number should not be permitted to be too large for the business to be done. In fact the nature of the business of these institutions is such that it should be confined to a smaller number of powerful companies, rather than to be scattered among a large number of weak ones. Charters for new trust

companies therefore should be granted with a great deal of circumspection, and with reference to the absence of too many other institutions of the same kind in the same field.

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AN IMPORTANT BANKING LAW DECISION is that of the Supreme Court of the United States, made recently, that a creditor of an insolvent National bank may receive dividends on his full claim regardless of the fact that he held collateral security and had realized a portion of the claim from this collateral. This case is fully reported in the Banking Law Department of this number of the MAGAZINE.

The National Banking Law provides that after an act of insolvency no assets of any description may be transferred in any manner with a view to the preference of one creditor over another, except in payment of circulating notes. The law also contemplates that when a Receiver is appointed he shall take possession of all the assets of the bank, convert them into cash and pay the cash over to the Comptroller of the Currency, who is to declare and pay *pro rata* dividends.

While a bank is doing business there is nothing to prevent its giving a portion of its assets as collateral security for money owed, and when the bank failed the courts have decided that the creditor holding such collateral for the amount due him may hold it and realize upon it, and apply the proceeds to the payment of his claim.

The contention of the Comptroller's office in such cases was that the creditor holding the collateral should first realize upon it, and deduct the proceeds from his claim, the remainder to constitute the basis of dividends. The court has, however, decided that the creditor is entitled to dividends on his whole claim, the same as paid to other creditors, and besides to what he can obtain from his collateral, up to the full amount of his claim.

If the decisions of courts were influenced by mathematical considerations, it would seem to be plain to the humblest understanding that this was giving a preference to one creditor of a National bank over another, contrary to the apparent intention of the law. If a creditor has a claim of \$100 against a National bank and holds collateral from which he realizes \$100, that would end the claim. Assume that he realizes \$50 from the collateral and receives dividends on the \$100, also, and the Receiver pays dividends amounting to fifty per cent., then this creditor receives payment in full when other creditors only receive one-half of their claims. If the Receiver pays 100 per cent. and interest, then the creditor holding the collateral might as well have put his collateral in the hands of the Receiver with the other assets. The only ground on which he keeps the collateral away from the Receiver is because it was something given to him before

insolvency in prospective payment of a debt due him. This being the case it reduced the debt by the amount of cash it produced, and the balance was the only claim he had remaining when the insolvency took place. If he receives dividends on this balance it would seem that he is no worse or no better off than other creditors.

It is believed that under certain circumstances it would be possible, under this decision, to defeat almost entirely the intention of the law to put all the creditors of an insolvent National bank on an equal footing in the distribution of its assets.

One of the important causes of the growth and success of the National banking system has been the safety of the banks to the public when in operation and the certainty that if they failed their affairs would be liquidated at the smallest possible expense and with equal fairness to all the creditors. This decision will have the effect of weakening all this, as in a sense it will place those who lend to a National bank on collateral security in the position of preferred creditors.

Lending on collateral among National banks is mostly done by one bank to another. A National bank ordinarily borrows money to meet the legitimate demands of business, and failure is seldom, if ever, due to this practice when it is for this useful purpose. But sometimes the effects of previous bad management are covered up for some time by borrowing on the few good collaterals that remain. It may be conceived that a National bank in bad condition could, taking its remaining good collaterals, effect a loan with more ease of another bank than if this decision had not been rendered, since this decision greatly increases the security for such loans. When the bank fails a great part of the assets will be found in the hands of the loaning bank, which also has equal claim with the depositors and other creditors upon whatever other assets may come into the hands of the Receiver.

It is believed that while the borrowing of money by one bank from another is necessary and proper under some circumstances, and that it is also right that the taking of collateral should be sustained, yet it is bad policy in the courts to decide so as to make banks which loan money less careful in the examination of the value of the collateral they take. When a bank makes a loan to another and takes collateral, it should depend entirely on the collateral to pay the whole loan if the borrowing bank should fail.

In view of the decision of the Supreme Court Congress should amend the law and declare again that no preference be shown to any creditor of a failed National bank, and also provide that any corporation or person making a loan to a National bank on collateral, should be required to depend on that collateral exclusively for the payment of the loan in case of failure. Such a law would not prevent the

borrowing of money by banks when necessary, but would have a tendency to cause more careful inquiry into the value of collateral and the general condition of the bank before agreeing to make the loan.

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THE DENOMINATIONS OF THE PAPER CURRENCY in circulation throughout the country may be studied with much interest. These denominations run from one dollar to ten thousand. Taking the data given by the Treasury Department for June 30, 1898, it will be found that except in the case of gold certificates the number of notes of denominations above one thousand dollars was insignificant. There were only three legal-tender notes of the denomination of five thousand dollars outstanding and only one of ten thousand dollars. There were no National bank notes, Treasury notes or silver certificates of either of these denominations. The legal-tender notes furnish \$73,635,000 of the \$76,903,900 outstanding in denominations of one thousand dollars, there being also 2,971 Treasury notes of this amount and twenty-eight National bank notes and 269 silver certificates. Of the denomination of \$500, the legal-tender notes furnish \$15,361,500 of a total of \$15,649,000. Of one hundred dollar notes, the legal tenders furnish \$25,223,600 and the National bank notes \$21,763,100, or \$46,986,700 of a total of \$58,683,900, the remainder being Treasury notes and silver certificates. There are \$48,676,650 fifty dollar notes and \$22,844,235 are silver certificates, \$10,749,150 National bank notes and \$14,821,600 legal-tender notes. The five, ten and twenty denominations are evidently the notes that perform the main work of circulation, furnishing \$793,884,485 out of a total of \$1,075,344,985. Of this sum of \$793,905,515 the silver certificates furnish nearly half, or \$316,093,640, the National bank notes \$194,699,555, Treasury notes \$69,090,270, and legal-tender notes, \$214,001,020. The denominations of one and two dollars furnish \$81,492,142. Of these \$518,148 are notes of National banks. Since 1879 banks have been forbidden by law to issue notes in denominations of less than five dollars, and the \$518,148 outstanding were therefore put in circulation prior to January 1, 1879, and as so long a time has elapsed it is highly probable that they will never be presented for redemption. This will be a gain to the Treasury, as legal-tender notes to redeem these one and two dollar National bank notes were long ago deposited by the banks.

Of the \$81,492,142, one and two dollar notes \$49,677,753 are silver certificates, and \$26,682,960, Treasury notes; only \$4,613,281 are legal-tender notes. These last, like the National bank notes, are chiefly old issues, as legal-tender notes of this denomination are no

longer put in circulation. It is evident from the foregoing analysis of the circulating medium according to the denominations of the notes, that the fives, tens and twenties are the notes most demanded and most kept in circulation. The ones and twos, it might be surmised, are subjected to the greatest wear and tear.

The large amount of legal-tender notes and National bank notes remaining outstanding so many years after their issue has ceased can only be accounted for on the theory that most of these notes have been actually worn out or destroyed. The experience with the fractional paper currency issued during the war in denominations of five, ten, twenty-five and fifty cents supports this conclusion. The total amount of the issues and reissues of fractional currency from 1863 to 1876, when subsidiary silver coin began to be paid out in its place, was \$368,720,074. On April 1, 1884, eight years after the issues ceased, the amount outstanding was \$15,363,184. Of this it was estimated by a commission appointed by the Treasury Department that more than eight millions of dollars had been so lost or destroyed that they never would be presented for redemption. The percentage of loss on these notes was therefore over two per cent.

In regard to the National bank notes of the denominations of one and two dollars a similar estimate of the percentage of notes probably lost and destroyed can now be made. Of one dollar National bank notes there were issued from October 31, 1864, to October 1, 1879, when their issue ceased, \$23,167,677. There were still outstanding on June 30, 1898, nearly twenty years after the issues ceased, \$349,640 of these one dollar notes, or about one and one-half per cent. on the full amount issued. Of the two dollar notes, from October 31, 1864, to October 31, 1879, \$15,495,038, or 7,747,519 notes, were issued. On June 30, 1898, \$168,508 in these notes were still outstanding, showing the probable loss and destruction of about one and one-tenth per cent. of the total issue.

There are no means of tracing the other denominations so completely, but it is fair to presume that loss by ordinary wear and tear would usually be smaller as the denominations become larger. The larger the denomination the greater care would be taken of the note—and this rule would probably apply except in the case of exceptionally large denominations, where the number of notes issued is small and where the loss or destruction of one note, in some manner that could not be proved or accounted for, would seem to make an unusual percentage. The usual time that elapses between the issue of a note and its redemption also is influenced to a perceptible extent by the denomination of the note.

The average period that a one dollar National bank note remains in circulation has been shown by tables given by the Comptroller of

the Currency to be about 4.3 years; of a two dollar note, about 4.5 years; of a five dollar note, about 4.9 years; of a ten dollar note, about 5.3 years; of a twenty dollar note, about 5.4 years; of a fifty dollar note, about five years; of a one hundred dollar note, about 4.7 years; of a five hundred dollar note, about five years, and of a thousand dollar note, about 3.3 years.

The general trend of these figures shows an increase in the length of life of the note as the figures of the denomination increase, until the fifty dollar note is reached, when the life of the note seems to become shorter. The only irregularity seems to be in the five hundred dollar denomination, which shows a longer life than the one hundred dollar denominations. This may be accounted for on the ground that the number of the notes of the very large figures issued was too small to afford a sure basis for an average. For instance, of the comparatively few \$500 notes issued, if fifty or one hundred notes had been held apart or hoarded for an unusual time, it would change the whole average. Or some accident might have occurred of which a number of notes of this denomination were the special victims.

The general law apparent from these figures might readily have been evolved by a SHERLOCK HOLMES process of induction. The wear and tear on the small denominations and a lesser solicitude to keep them in good condition, would necessarily shorten the life of the smaller denominations before redemption and cause a large percentage of destruction. When denominations become so large as to be inconvenient in ordinary transactions, they will not remain in circulation so long as those denominations better fitted for usual transactions. The fives, tens and twenties strike the medium. They are not so small as to be subjected to as much wear and tear as the ones and twos, and they are not so large as to be inconvenient to the holders in ordinary use. The twenty dollar note has the longest life.

These figures as to the average time a note of a given denomination remains outstanding are derived from data of National bank note circulation. The laws governing the redemption of any class of notes will of course have an effect upon the time notes of that class remain outstanding. All requirements that tend to drive the notes to the redemption agencies shorten the period of their existence. The figures given in regard to National bank notes must not be taken to refer to the average time a note will remain in a fit condition for circulation; they merely refer to the average time that elapses between the issue of a given note and its presentation for redemption. The average time that it takes to wear a note so that it may be regarded as unfit for circulation is another matter and would have to be determined on a different basis. The information as to the manner in which notes of different classes and denominations conduct them-

selves in circulation is most valuable in regulating the issues of each class so that they may each be used most effectively. For instance, if it be desirable to render silver certificates as little liable as possible to presentation for gold redemption, it is necessary to know the denominations that remain in actual circulation until wear and tear brings them in for exchange for new notes. The facts have not yet been properly collated to show this, but it would seem probable that if all silver certificates were confined to denominations of twenty dollars and under, and if no legal tenders were issued under twenty and no National bank notes under ten dollars, that the silver certificates would be so employed that except under the most unusual circumstances they would not be presented except for silver dollars or new notes.

There is a vast field for examination in tracing the actual behavior of each class of the paper currency when in use, and when the statistics in regard to this matter are properly collated and arranged many valuable deductions may be drawn from them.

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THE PROPOSITION TO PREVENT LOSS TO DEPOSITORS by some system of security in addition to that now afforded by bank reserves, stock liability and Government inspection, so increases the burden of currency reform that it would be totally impracticable to carry it through to a successful issue. A favorite way to defeat any measure is to load it with so many other propositions, both germane and otherwise, as absolutely to choke it to death with kindness.

No doubt it would be a good thing, *prima facie*, to have a system of banking under which it was impossible for a depositor to lose a dollar. It is believed to be utterly impracticable, but if it were not it is as well for all those who really desire to see the substitution of bank notes for Government notes to lay it aside until they have accomplished the first step.

The power of a bank to issue notes upon the security of its general assets will of itself give an additional protection to depositors. It was because banks did not have this power that many of them were compelled to suspend payments to their depositors during the panic of 1893.

The usual plan which is evolved for the protection of depositors involves the contribution of all the banks to a safety fund for the benefit of such banks as may for any reason fail, and it is urged that it is just as reasonable to provide a safety fund for depositors as for note holders. But an examination of the proportion that exists between capital and circulation, either existing or proposed, and the proportion which exists between capital and deposits, will indicate

that a safety fund for the protection of deposits is a much greater undertaking than a safety fund for the protection of circulating notes.

On December 1, 1898, the capital stock of the banks of New York city was \$48,700,000. If the ratio of permitted circulation were fixed at one hundred per cent. of capital there could be issued by these banks only \$48,700,000 of notes. This is all that it would be necessary to protect. A tax of one-quarter of one per cent. per annum on capital would provide an ample surplus within five years to protect the circulation which might be exposed by failures with deficient assets. The deposits of these same banks on the same date amounted to \$866,556,539, or over eighteen times the amount of possible circulation. To obtain a safety fund to protect such a sum, proportionate to the safety fund on circulation obtained by a tax of one-quarter of one per cent. on capital, would require an annual tax of more than four per cent. on capital. How a bank could make any money and pay such a tax it is difficult to see, and where they could obtain any compensating advantage is still more difficult to discover.

Instead of the banks in New York city, take the statement of all the banks in the United States on September 20, 1898. The total capital was \$621,517,895. Suppose the circulating notes to be protected to be equal to the capital, a sinking fund produced by a tax of one-quarter of one per cent. per annum on capital would be sufficient. The deposits of these banks on the same date amounted to \$2,840,798,451, equal to more than four times the amount of possible circulation, and requiring a tax of over one per cent. per annum on capital to provide a proportionate surplus fund.

These figures show how much more of an undertaking it is to maintain a safety fund for deposits than for circulation. But if the principle of protecting every bank by means of contributions by all the banks is to be carried to its logical extreme, why should not the banks insure each other's loans as well as deposits. If all the loans were insured so that their payment was absolutely guaranteed, there could be no losses to endanger the depositors, and perhaps the best way to protect depositors would be by having the banks contribute to a safety fund from which all losses and bad debts made on loans might be paid. This done the banking system would be absolutely iron-clad, and the safety funds for circulation or for deposits would not be necessary. Bank officers, knowing that they could draw on the safety fund for bad and uncollectible loans, would be able to make themselves more popular in the community. They need not assume so severe and cautious an attitude toward borrowers, and they could afford to be much less rigid as to security. They would not have to persecute the delinquent debtors of the bank, and there



is no doubt that much of the unpopularity of banks which has afforded so fertile a text for demagogues would tend to disappear.

Seriously, though, a free circulation is an advantage which a bank could afford to pay for by contributing to a safety fund; an additional resource would be obtained. But a safety fund for deposits or for loans would not add one dollar to the deposits of banks now in good reputation and standing, nor would it even help the banks of less reputation to any great extent. There is a class of bankers struggling for a reputation and envious of others in the business who have acquired better standing by longer experience, who think that if all deposits could be made absolutely certain of ultimate payment, that the public would patronize one banker as well as another, and in this way competition which injures them would disappear. But it is likely that the public would still have its preferences, and that competition would still wear out the energies of many.

When the protection already enjoyed by the depositor under the National banking system is enumerated it will be seen to be far from contemptible. There is the reserve in lawful money which must be kept by a bank at all times, equal to twenty-five per cent. in the reserve cities and fifteen per cent. in other places. Next the stockholders' liability, equal to one hundred per cent. on the par value of the stock, and last the supervision of the management of the bank by the Government.

But even if it were practical or desirable to protect deposits to the same extent as it is proposed to protect circulating notes, it is certain that to unite the two plans in one measure would at once destroy all chance of its ever becoming a law.



FEDERAL CLEARING-HOUSES acting under a uniform national law, with membership open to all National and State banks, are suggested in a communication from Mr. THEODORE GILMAN, published elsewhere in this number, together with a bill designed to provide for such organizations. Its underlying principle is to bind all the banks together into a co-operative system, and to permit the issue of notes by the banks on the security of assets deposited with a central clearing-house association, of which there shall be at least one in each State. The responsibility for the redemption of the notes is to be assumed by all the banks of a particular State or district, and in case an assessment on these banks shall not provide sufficient funds to redeem the notes of failed banks, an assessment is to be levied on all the banks in the country that are members of the clearing-house association. There is no doubt that if all the banks could be brought together in some way that would not be open to the charge of mo-

nopoly, it would be a happy solution of one of the most vexing questions in American banking; namely, to give to the banks of the United States the stability of great central banking institutions of large capital and at the same time preserve the autonomy which is such a prominent characteristic of our banking system. Mr. GILMAN's proposals seem well calculated to lead to this result so far as it can practically be done.

Circulation based on commercial assets could be made secure by a safety fund contributed by all the banks of the country, but there would be an element of injustice in the operations of such a plan. Under it the banks of a conservative State where failures are almost unknown would be continuously taxed to provide for the redemption of the notes of failed banks in some other State where bank management is comparatively reckless. It is objectionable in this respect in much the same way as a tax on all the banks to insure deposits. As to its expediency, however, that is another matter.

But under Mr. GILMAN's plan the banks of a certain district or State are given some control over the issue of notes in their jurisdiction, and the penalty for any abuse of that authority is made to fall first upon them. This is, of course, a modified application of the safety-fund principle, and one that seems entirely proper. It appears preferable to a general fund contributed by all the banks and made available for the redemption of notes of all failed banks. As nearly as may be it seeks to impose the penalty for violation of sound banking rules upon those most immediately concerned in the offense.

The propriety of allowing all banks in the United States to issue notes on the security of their general assets, even with the additional safeguard of a fund contributed by all the banks for the redemption of the notes of failed institutions, is open to serious question. To confine the privilege to the banks of large capital would give just grounds for the cry of monopoly which would surely be raised.

In the panic of 1893 hundreds of really solvent and well-managed banks were compelled to suspend temporarily, and it is not improbable that most of these failures, with their attendant consequences of ruin and disaster to business interests, might have been prevented. It is the opinion of so well-informed a banker as Mr. CHARLES PARSONS, of St. Louis, that the issue of one hundred millions of such currency as permitted by the measure under review, would have saved half or two-thirds of the ill-effects of that panic.

The banks of the United States linked together are practically invincible, and to effect such a result without creating a monopoly would not seem to be impossible, as the principle has long been in successful operation on a limited scale in the large cities of the country.

When Congress shall take up the currency question with a disposition to deal seriously with the subject, the proposals of Mr. GILMAN will be found worthy of careful consideration.

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THE BANK OF JAPAN is fully treated of in a paper published elsewhere in this number, and the article is worthy of careful study. Japan is rapidly taking a prominent place among the great modern nations of the world, and no small part of its wonderful progress in recent years is due to the fact that it has been eager and ready to adopt the most enlightened ideas relating to government and economic policies as developed by the experience of other countries. This is especially true with reference to the banking and financial system. The gold standard has been adopted, and after trying a system of National banks with notes based on bond security, patterned after the United States National Bank Act, combined with Government paper money, the Empire has abandoned both these experiments and is now engaged in substituting bank notes issued by the Bank of Japan for these two forms of currency. That this operation is proceeding successfully may be inferred from the following statistics accompanying the paper: The circulation of Government paper, January 1, 1886, was 86,304,010 yen; 46,566,086 yen on January 1, 1889, and 5,411,726 yen on January 1, 1899. On the same dates the circulation of the National banks was 30,108,129 yen, 27,562,931 yen and 1,864,620 yen respectively. While this decline was taking place in the circulation of Government paper and National bank notes, the circulation of the Bank of Japan rose from 3,944,763 yen in 1886 to 65,547,249 yen in 1889, and stood at 193,799,901 yen on January 1, 1899, compared with a total of only 7,276,346 yen Government paper and National bank notes.

It will be seen from these figures that in a short time the paper money of the country will consist entirely of paper emitted by a single bank of issue. These notes are based (1) on a metallic reserve, which may consist of one-fifth silver, but this privilege is not availed of by the Bank; (2) a further issue on commercial assets to the amount of 85,000,000 yen, which will probably be increased in the near future to 120,000,000 yen. Besides, the Bank is allowed to issue notes in excess of the legal limit, subject to a tax of five per cent., the latter being an emergency issue.

Experience has shown that in order to have a perfectly stable monetary system a nation should have but one kind of legal-tender money, the standard coin, and but one kind of paper money, issued by a strong central bank and instantly and always redeemable in the standard coin. Probably in this country it would be necessary to

overcome the prejudice against a single bank of issue by granting the privilege to all banks, binding them together, practically, through the clearing-houses or by means of a safety fund.

Japan seems to be gradually tending toward an ideal monetary system, while the United States clings to a system as obsolete, comparatively, as were the weapons employed by China in her recent unhappy attempt to vanquish the Yankees of the Orient.

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DAYS OF GRACE ON SIGHT DRAFTS have been restored in Massachusetts by the passage of a bill over the Governor's veto. This is a reaction against the general current of legislation, which has for a number of years tended to the entire abolition of days of grace. In almost every State bills have been introduced in the legislatures for this purpose, and it seemed as if by the abrogation of this custom some uniformity in the presentation of notes and drafts in the several States might be attained.

It is not so much the custom of allowing days of grace that in itself is so troublesome to bankers, but it is the great diversity of custom in this respect that prevails in different localities.

In Massachusetts days of grace were abolished, and this re-establishment of the custom in regard to sight drafts, by a vote large enough to carry the measure over the Governor's veto, seems to show that the general public felt that the want of grace on this class of paper entailed serious inconvenience.

It is not difficult to perceive that grace on sight drafts would be of much greater importance to the drawee than in the case of the maker of a note. A man may agree to be drawn upon for a given amount, and the exact date of the draft may be to the last a matter of uncertainty. In fact, the first notice of the draft may be its presentation. While in some cases this would make no difference, yet a delay of three days would probably give a satisfactory opportunity to assure the drawee of the genuineness of the draft and give him more time to meet it. There is reason for congratulation that the whole law as to days of grace was not restored.

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THE CHARGES FOR COLLECTING COUNTRY CHECKS imposed by the New York Clearing-House Association became effective April 3. With a few specified exceptions these charges are to be one-tenth or one-quarter of one per cent. of the amount of the items collected, depending upon the location of the bank on which the items may be drawn, no charge to be less than ten cents, but all items received from any one person at the same time, from each of the divisions estab-

lished by the rule, may be added together and treated as one item for the purpose of fixing the amount chargeable. The circular issued by the clearing-house association giving complete information in regard to this new rule will be found in another part of this number.

Considerable opposition to the action of the clearing-house has developed since the rule was promulgated. Several of the New York newspapers have strongly attacked the new rule of the association and tried to show that its enforcement would be a hardship on merchants and others receiving out-of-town checks in payment of bills, and also that the small charge for collecting such country items is unnecessary and against public policy. A great many of the city merchants and other business men antagonize the rule, and strong pressure is being exerted to convince the clearing-house association that its decision should be reconsidered.

The essential point of the whole matter is that the banks of New York can not do business for nothing. To illustrate: After handling the account of one of the largest department stores for some time one of the New York banks was compelled to give it up, as there was no profit whatever in it, because of the large amount of country checks deposited, which the bank at once credited as cash, and had to expend time, clerk hire, postage and stationery and be deprived of the use of the money while the checks were being collected. Many such instances might be cited.

It is not improbable that a rule similar to that adopted in New York will come into gradual use in all the commercial centers, and thus the grounds for criticizing the banks of this city especially will disappear. In fact, a similar plan has been in operation in St. Louis for some time. The whole subject is one involving many intricacies. An exhaustive treatment of the matter from a practical standpoint was given in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for February, 1898, page 221, and nothing need be added to that statement now.

Bankers all over the country have long recognized the necessity of doing something to correct what was generally regarded as a growing evil. Whether the course pursued by the clearing-house association is the wisest that might have been taken or not, it is evident to all who are acquainted with the conditions of the banking business that some action was necessary. If the present plan should prove harsh in its operations, the experience gained will probably suggest such modifications as may be found desirable.

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HON. JOSEPH H. WALKER, Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, made a speech in the closing days of the last session in which he vigorously resented the charge that he

obstinately prevented the passage of a currency reform measure by the House. This speech is printed in a recent number of the "Congressional Record," belated copies of which still appear occasionally notwithstanding Congress has not been in session since March 4.

We do not think any one doubts Mr. WALKER's conscientiousness or ability; no one has labored more indefatigably than he in behalf of currency reform, and perhaps no man in Congress was better informed on the whole subject. The reforms which he sought to accomplish in the bill that bore his name were all calculated to add to the stability and general effectiveness of the currency and banking system.

It is therefore to be regretted that Mr. WALKER should have been able to achieve so little, though of course the division of opinion may have been largely responsible for this failure. But Chairman WALKER seemed to have such strong faith in his own bill that he was unwilling to make reasonable concessions. Though seemingly unaware of this, it is strikingly illustrated in the speech to which reference has been made. After stating that he was willing to support a bill proposed by anybody that would put the burden of preserving the parity of the currency on the banks, Mr. WALKER said:

"Not only that, Mr. Speaker, but I have offered, and will offer here and now, to give \$1,000 to any benevolent society in any part of the country if any man will write a bill that will be more comprehensive, more thoroughly in accordance with true economic principles and sound banking principles, more easily understood, and that will accomplish the four things which I have suggested—viz., relieve the Treasury of maintaining parity by putting that duty on banks, unite all banks to do it, allow banks to issue true bank currency, and guarantee that currency by the Government better than the bill that I present."

There is not the least doubt that Mr. WALKER's failure to achieve more substantial results as chairman of this important committee was occasioned by an unusual conscientiousness, finding ground for action in the high admiration he had of his own plans as indicated by the above quotation. Given the conscientious man who is thoroughly aware of his own honesty of purpose, and it is often impossible for him to distinguish between the perfection of his moral, and the possible imperfection of his intellectual nature.

To harmonize the conflicting views of Congressmen in regard to currency reform and pilot a bill through the committee and the House will require the leadership of a man of Mr. WALKER's conceded ability and conscientiousness, combined with a willingness to make concessions which he did not seem to consider necessary or advisable.

## TRUSTS AND COMBINATIONS.

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On one day of the past month the formation of trusts or industrial combinations, as reported in the public press, represented a capitalization of \$256,000,000, and the movement is still going on though it can hardly keep up with the above figures, which may possibly be regarded as the high-water mark. The total capital stock and bonded debt represented by these combinations is said to exceed \$6,000,000,000.

This revolution in the method of conducting the great productive industries of the country will no doubt introduce many new problems into our banking and economic system. It has been claimed that such combinations are especially inimical to the interests of those who are somewhat indefinitely termed the laboring classes. If this designation is meant to refer to the particular laborers employed by the trusts themselves, it would hardly seem to accord with the facts. We hear no general complaint from the workmen employed by these combinations nor have there been strikes of any magnitude among them in recent years. On the contrary many voluntary advances in wages are being reported. One of these great concerns engaged in the manufacture of steel and iron increased the wages of employees from five to ten per cent., the latter increase being to those receiving the lowest wages. Nor have prices been unduly raised.

Thus instead of the calamities which have been prophesied as sure to follow the absorption of smaller concerns by these combinations, it is seen that wages have not been reduced but in many instances have been advanced, prices have not been put up to exorbitant figures, while the profits to those engaged in the numerous industries affected by the consolidations have been enhanced.

It is hardly necessary to explain how this result has been reached. The greater economy possible under the combination system is obvious.

If the benefits of this saving of outlay are fairly distributed among the trusts, the laborers employed by them and the consumers of their products, there would not seem to be any legitimate objections to such combinations.

Most of the dangers commonly ascribed to trusts are imaginary and of a kind similar to those usually attributed to accumulations of capital by persons who regard every form of wealth as a menace. The volume of denunciation directed against trusts is proportioned to the size of the aggregation, and therefore it is not to be wondered at that the outcry against them is vociferous.

Trusts, however powerful, can not be run in defiance of economic laws, nor can they afford to disregard the principles of common sense which underlie the successful management of all enterprises, great and small. If they are over-capitalized to any considerable extent the holders of their securities will ultimately suffer loss. Should they try to put up prices beyond a reasonable limit the effect will be to decrease consumption or to attract large importations of foreign goods, thus defeating their own attempts to enlarge their

profits in excess of a fair percentage. If they endeavor to reduce the wages of their employees below a just standard extensive strikes will ensue—disastrous alike to both parties. Individuals, corporations and governments are all powerless to subvert economic laws. This country once thought it could, and tried to make fifty cents' worth of silver equal to one hundred cents' worth of gold. The experiment was ruinous and proved the folly of the attempt, which has been at last abandoned.

It is suggested that the combination of so much capital will render the industrial concerns of the country more or less independent of the banks, and that the great industries will not be compelled to resort to borrowing so extensively as heretofore. Doubtless there is some basis of fact for this view, but it may be that it is exaggerated also. With a little ingenuity the banks can still find safe and profitable employment for their funds. There remains a vast field for surplus American capital in all parts of the world, and in that direction attention will no doubt be turned in the future. Smaller returns for the use of money must be expected, for that is now recognized as an unmistakable tendency of the times.

There may be possible evils in the combinations now formed, and which represent so large a share of the country's industrial interests. But these possible evils may be no greater than the known ones to which the system of unlimited competition has given rise. The evils of excessive and often ruinous competition are probably responsible for the formation of trusts now in progress or actually effected.

Without underestimating the gravity of the problems which these combinations introduce into our economic system, it may be said that it is a good time to suspend judgment in regard to them. In a few years the matter can be considered in the light of more experience. In the meantime, instead of regarding the trust as an instrument designed for the purpose of robbing and oppressing mankind, it may be as well to observe the course of events with a non-hysterical frame of mind, hoping that the trusts, like steam and electricity and the various inventions of modern civilization, are forces destined to advance the general comfort and happiness. Should this optimistic view not be borne out by experience we can readjust our opinions to conform to what we have learned, taking credit at least for a willingness to prove all things and to hold fast to that which is good.

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APPROPRIATIONS BY THE FIFTY-FIFTH CONGRESS.—The "Congressional Record" for March 11 contains the following statement by Hon. J. G. Cannon, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House:

"The appropriations made at the last session of the Fifty-fifth Congress will amount to \$673,658,400.73, showing an apparent reduction of \$219,573,214.82 below the appropriations made at the preceding session. This reduction is attributable to the necessarily large appropriations made at the session which closed in July last—the second session of the Fifty-fifth Congress—for expenses of the war with Spain.

The entire appropriations made by the Fifty-fifth Congress aggregate \$1,566,890,016.23 of which amount the sum of \$482,562,083.47 is directly chargeable or incident to the war with Spain. Deducting the latter from the former sum, the remainder, \$1,084,327,932.81, represents the ordinary appropriations made during the whole Congress for the normal requirements of the Government.

The appropriations made by the preceding Congress, the Fifty-fourth, which adjourned March 3, 1897, amounted to \$1,044,580,273.87, or only \$39,747,658.94 less than the ordinary appropriations of this Congress after deducting the sums required for the war."



## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

The creation of negotiable securities by governments, trusts and new stock companies during 1898 was nearly up to the record of the previous two years, and the three years together far surpass any previous three years in financial history. The tabulation which has been annually made up by M. Georges de Laveleye of the "*Moniteur des Interêts Matériels*," of Brussels, for many years past gives the total issues of 1898 at 10,542,830,820 francs (\$2,000,000,000), but of this amount 1,640,054,160 francs were conversions of old securities into new, so that the actual new calls for capital were 8,902,776,660 francs (\$1,700,000,000). The activity in the issue of securities during the past five years was only partially equalled in 1872 and 1873, when the big French loan to pay the war indemnity to Germany swelled the total issues and there was an unusual expansion of credit operations in Germany and Austria-Hungary. M. de Laveleye in his computation for 1891 divided the movements up to that time into five periods, which he thus characterized:

PERIOD.	Annual average.	Features of the period.
	Francs.	
1871-1873.....	10,700,000,000	Period of the war liquidation.
1874-1877.....	8,190,000,000	Period of reaction and absorption.
1877-1880.....	7,111,000,000	Period of stimulus towards new enterprises.
1880-1885.....	4,820,000,000	Period of normal conditions.
1885-1899.....	8,070,000,000	Period of conversions, and continuance until 1899 of the creation of large enterprises.

The issues of 1892, including conversions, were only 2,509,136,000 francs and those of 1893 were only 6,009,133,000 francs. These years may be considered within the limits of normal operations. M. de Laveleye expressed the opinion in 1892 that Europe was able to absorb from four to five thousand millions of francs in new securities a year by means of saving and the conversion of previous loans. He regarded the movement between 1886 and 1890 as excessive, and involving later liquidations. Still more excessive was the movement which followed 1895, as appears from the following table of the total issues, the conversions and the net issues for new enterprises during the last five years:

YEAR.	Total issues.	Conversions.	New calls.
	Francs.	Francs.	Francs.
1894.....	17,814,868,035	12,641,200,000	5,173,448,035
1895.....	6,530,021,389	1,238,822,250	5,291,199,139
1896.....	16,732,067,825	7,560,013,475	9,129,054,350
1897.....	9,593,755,680	684,895,350	8,911,870,330
1898.....	10,542,830,820	1,640,054,160	8,902,776,660

The large conversions in 1894 and 1896 were rendered possible by the decline of interest rates as the result of the large fund of surplus savings seeking investments. The conversions of 1894 resulted in savings of interest

payments to the debtors amounting to 119,433,000 francs (\$23,000,000) a year. Existing five per cent. obligations were reduced to four per cent. securities to the amount of 3,145,000,000 francs (\$600,000,000) and four and a half per cent. obligations to a three per cent. basis to the amount of 7,000,000,000 francs (\$1,350,000,000). The new issues, if computed upon a two and a half per cent. net return, would barely make up to investors their losses by the conversions of old loans, indicating in a striking manner the cheapness of capital and its diminished productive power on the European market. The conversions of 1896 saved 40,000,000 francs (\$7,740,000) a year to the debtors and wiped out a large part of the profits upon the new issues.

The present arrest of the downward tendency of interest has prevented large new conversions during the last two years, except in special cases, and M. de Laveleye declares that the period of conversion is closed for the present. There will be perhaps a few conversions, he declares, which have been delayed for some cause, but the movement has touched its extreme declension.

The classification of new issues by M. de Laveleye is frankly admitted to be incomplete, and is especially so in regard to the United States, where no Federal regulations exist for the registration of stock companies and the issue of securities. Such omissions as occur, however, may be considered as affording about the same average from year to year, so that the tables presented give a substantially accurate indication of the fluctuations in issues from time to time.

The classification of the issues of 1898 by M. de Laveleye is made according to the country for whose benefit the issue is made, rather than according to the market upon which the loan is placed. This explains some of the variations between the figures here given and those previously published in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE regarding the issues of Great Britain and France. The issues of the smaller countries are usually made upon the London, Paris or Berlin market, but Brussels has been an important centre for such issues since the Bourse laws in Germany and France became oppressive. The total of loans issued on behalf of governments, including municipalities, in 1898, is returned as 2,042,899,550 francs; for banks and credit societies, 1,411,785,450 francs; for railways and industrial corporations, 5,448,091,660 francs; and conversions, 1,640,054,160 francs. The table which appears below does not include conversions, which were an important factor in the issues of Great Britain, Germany and a few other countries. There was an important Chinese conversion of 360,000,000 francs, which was the only issue reported as originating in that country. The classification for some of the leading countries is as follows:

COUNTRY.	Total issues in 1898.*	Government loans.*	Banks.*	Railway and Industrial shares.*
Great Britain and Colonies.....	2,727,991	473,750	36,445	2,217,796
France and Colonies.....	1,134,262	8,375	2,000	308,108
Germany.....	2,926,700	427,550	1,121,575	1,237,575
Russia.....	1,286,612	.....	110,106	618,206
Austria-Hungary.....	244,753	121,857	65,740	57,156
Belgium.....	171,268	16,768	18,825	127,211
Holland and Colonies.....	318,515	178,027	5,376	134,211
Switzerland.....	98,118	22,600	9,451	60,067

\* In thousands of francs.

The constant demands for capital in Germany both at home and abroad are resulting in plans for increasing the capitalization of the large banks, in spite of the important increases already made during 1898. The Imperial Bank was able on February 21 to reduce its discount rate from five to four and a half per cent., but Dr. Koch, the President of the Bank, pointed out to the Central Committee that the Bank was not as strong as a year ago, when the discount rate was three per cent., and that a reduction to four per cent. was not advisable. The Imperial Bank will be relied upon for support in the financial operations necessary to increase the capital of the large private banks. What is proposed in regard to these banks is thus set forth by the intelligent Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist" in the issue of February 25:

"The *Dresdner Bank*, after having added £1,250,000 to its capital but little more than a year ago, will now make a further increase of £1,000,000, bringing its capital up to £8,500,000. The present increase of capital is for the purpose of absorbing the *Niedersächsische Bank* of Buckeburg, with branches in Bremen, Hanover and Detmold; and, further, for the purpose of opening several branches in other parts of the country. The *Schaffhausen Bankverein*, too, will add £1,250,000 to its capital, bringing it up to £5,000,000; the Berlin *Handels Gesellschaft* will make an increase of £500,000, giving it a capital of £4,500,000; and the Middle German Crédit Bank will add £450,000 to its capital. Besides these increases, the *Reichsbank* will absorb £1,500,000 of capital at an early day, as provided for in the Bank Bill. Here we have £4,700,000 of new banking capital at par value to be subscribed, but if we take into account the usual agio, the capital actually to be supplied will reach not less than £6,500,000 (\$31,000,000). Thus the movement toward the increase of banking capital, which has been so striking a feature of Germany's economic development during the past few years, sets in very strongly again with the present year. This fact is all the more striking, in view of the large additions made to the banking capital of the country only last year. These additions, including the new obligations of the banks, amounted to £19,112,000 (\$95,000,000)."

Notwithstanding this activity in the creation of banking capital, the annual reports of the large banks for 1898 do not make so favorable a showing as was expected. The National Bank of Berlin was the first of these institutions to publish its account, and the figures showed a gain of only 576,250 marks (\$190,000) over 1897. The governing board decided to transfer only 184,000 marks to the reserve fund, in order to leave an adequate dividend. The Berlin correspondent of "*l'Economiste Européen*," discussing the subject in the issue of February 17, said:

"It has been observed that the quotations for bank shares do not rise on the Bourse in proportion to the dividends distributed, but that all the banks are seeking to distribute dividends coming up to the rates at which their paper was recently quoted. The proof of it is found in the infinitesimal sums carried to the reserves."

An indication of the activity of the formation of new capital is afforded by the number of corporations established in leading European countries in 1898. The fact that applications for new capital for such companies were £149,227,000 (\$740,000,000) in Great Britain has already appeared in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*. The creations of new corporations in Germany are given in the "*Bulletin de Statistique*" for February and show that the number of organizations increased from 254 in 1897, with a capital of 380,500,000 marks, to 329 in 1898, with a capital of 463,600,000 marks (\$115,000,000). This record was surpassed only in the inflation years, 1871, 1872 and 1873. The years following showed very small applications for new capital, the corporations organized in 1876 being only forty-two with a capital of 18,200,000 marks (\$4,500,000). There was a considerable revival in later years, but as

recently as 1893 the new corporations were only twenty-five with a capital of 77,200,000 marks (\$19,000,000). The new corporations in France whose charters were deposited with the Tribunal of Commerce of the Seine alone, increased from 1950 in 1896 to 2097 in 1897 and 2248 in 1898. The proposed capital in 1898 was 803,491,651 francs (\$160,000,000).

**Banking in Undeveloped Countries.** Remarkable activity is appearing at present in the creation of banks for business in the undeveloped countries of Africa and Asia and in the expansion of the business connections of the banks already in existence. One of the latest projects under consideration is the creation of a Russian Bank in Abyssinia, financed by French capital. Moscow and Odessa are among the places suggested for branches. Belgian capital is reaching out into Russia and Africa and the *Crédit Congolais* has just been established at Antwerp for the commercial exploitation of the Belgian colony in the Congo. The capital has been fixed at 1,200,000 francs (\$240,000) in shares of 100 francs, and it is proposed to carry the capital later to 3,000,000 francs. French capital in Russian hands is seeking banking openings in various parts of China, and German capital is extending its connections in both European and Asiatic Turkey. The Turkish Government has approved a project for a railway to connect Tripoli on the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf, which will greatly shorten the route to India. The concession has been granted to Count Vladimir Kapnits, who represents a syndicate of Russian, French, English and Belgian capitalists.

Two new institutions of international importance are announced in the single number of "*l'Economiste Européen*" for March 3. One is a China-Japanese bank, which is under consideration by capitalists doing business in those countries in order to promote trade relations between them. The bank will be organized largely as an exchange and financial bank like the Russo-Chinese Bank. The activity of German capital in promoting banking is indicated by the creation in Mexico of a new Mexican Central Bank, with a capital of \$6,000,000 in Mexican dollars. A number of Mexican houses and some of the big German banks have joined hands for the creation of the new institution. The governing board includes the German Consul-General in Mexico and the representatives there of the big Berlin banks.

The Russo-Chinese Bank, which was organized in 1895 as a counterpoise to the big British banks in China, is doing a business of importance. The balance-sheet for September 30, 1898, as presented in the *Revue des Banques* for November, showed assets of 32,564,168 roubles (\$17,000,000). The capital ascribed to various branches is 8,594,269 roubles and the obligations of correspondents of the bank are 17,931,658 roubles. The Brazilian Bank of Germany, which represents a recent venture of German capital in South America, realized profits of 2,170,240 marks (\$500,000) for the banking year 1898. The ordinary reserve was increased 72,646 marks, and the special reserve 250,000 marks. A dividend of twelve per cent. was paid upon 10,000,000 marks of capital, and, in addition to several other items, there were carried to the new account 456,468 marks.

Banks are being formed in several continental countries for the express purpose of railway capitalization and the promotion of the export trade. A

special bank for railway business (*Central Bank for Estenbahn*) has been founded in Berlin with a capital of 5,000,000 marks. There already exist two special banks of the same character in Germany, both at Frankfort, with capitals of 10,000,000 marks each. Recent reports to "*l'Economiste Européen*" from Vienna, printed in the issue of February 25, indicate some hitch in the creation of the Bank of Exportation which was projected there. The founders have demanded an annual subsidy from the Government of 250,000 florins (\$100,000) and the guarantee of an interest of ten per cent. upon the original capital. The Minister of Commerce has received these propositions so coldly that the negotiations have been suspended.

A discussion of the large excess of imports into Great Britain during 1898, and its bearing upon the question whether the British people are living upon their capital, is presented in the annual review of the commercial history of 1898 in the London "*Economist*" of February 18. Attention is called to the fact that "those who maintain that we are eating up our capital carefully refrain from adducing any evidence on their own side." It is suggested that "If you declare that an apparently hale and sound man is suffering from a wasting disease, surely it is for you to show some justification for the assertion." The total imports of Great Britain rose from £451,029,000 in 1897 to £470,604,000 in 1898, while the exports of home products declined slightly, from £234,220,000 to £233,391,000. The "*Economist*" sums up some of the evidences of the strength of British capital in the following terms:

"Those who maintain that for years we have been drawing upon our capital to pay for our imports must be prepared to adduce some evidence of national impoverishment. Of that, however, they can give none, while there is much and cogent evidence to the contrary. There is no better measure of the national wealth than the death duties, and not to go far enough back to let comparison be affected by changes in the method of levying those duties, we find that the net amount of property on which estate duty was paid rose from £219,489,000 in 1895-6 to £248,690,000 in 1897-8. So with the income tax, the gross assessments under schedule D and E rose from £413,507,000 in 1892-3 to £429,253,000 in 1896-7 (that being the latest year for which returns have been published), notwithstanding that in the interval there had been certain expansions in the limits of exemption. Then, again, we have seen the deposits in our Savings and other banks mounting continuously upward by many millions a year. The revenue has been advancing by leaps and bounds, and many similar evidences of a growth of wealth and well-being might be cited. Yet in spite of them all we are asked to believe that because of an adverse balance of trade we have been forced to consume and eat into our capital. When those who advance that theory are able to give proofs in support of it, it will be time enough to give it serious consideration. Meanwhile the evidence all goes to show that while we have been using part of our augmented resources to procure for ourselves larger supplies of the luxuries, comforts and necessaries of life, we have nevertheless been living well within our means, and adding year by year to the national wealth."

The annual report of the Austro-Hungarian Bank for 1898, which has been received by the BANKERS' MAGAZINE through the courtesy of the Governor of the Bank, makes a more favorable showing than that of 1897, in spite of the disturbed political conditions during 1898 in Austria and Hungary. The total earnings of the Bank in 1898 were 11,667,320 florins, and the net earnings above running expenses and the note tax were 7,029,465 florins (\$2,800,000),

as compared with net earnings in 1897 of 5,821,436 florins, and in 1896 of 6,803,329 florins. It was possible to declare a dividend to shareholders of 7.35 per cent., as compared with 6.433 per cent. last year.

The metallic reserve of the Bank showed an average during 1898 of 492,763,000 florins (\$195,000,000), as compared with an average in 1897 of 498,141,000 florins. The gold increased upon the average from 348,797,000 florins to 356,494,000 florins, but foreign bills declined from 23,760,000 florins to 11,030,000 florins. Silver remained substantially unchanged at 125,239,000 florins for 1898. The state of the reserve on December 31, 1898, was 359,401,000 florins in gold, 6,743,000 florins in foreign bills, and 123,944,000 florins in silver. The average note circulation for 1898 was 657,523,000 florins (\$260,000,000), which was about 27,000,000 florins larger than in 1897. The circulation at the close of 1898 was 737,475,000 florins, which was 44,924,000 florins above the limit free of tax. The five per cent. tax on excess of circulation was levied continuously upon some part of the circulation from the week ending October 30 to the week of December 31, both inclusive. The largest excess was for the week of December 31, 1898. The tax paid to the Government on this account was 214,683 florins, as compared with payments of only 24,318 florins for 1896 and no payments for 1897. The largest reserve of notes within the tax limit during 1898 was for the week of February 23, when the margin was 101,260,000 florins. The following table exhibits the fluctuations in the circulation of the Bank for the past nine years, and carries forward the similar table given in the special article on "The Austro-Hungarian Bank" in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE for November, 1897:

YEAR.	Maximum.*	Minimum.*	Mean.*	Outstanding Dec. 31.*
1890 .....	471,376	387,888	415,570	445,384
1891 .....	466,687	392,798	421,099	455,222
1892 .....	491,709	341,371	425,959	477,987
1893 .....	504,282	427,291	463,988	486,623
1894 .....	517,742	409,349	456,911	507,805
1895 .....	620,400	446,000	527,400	519,854
1896 .....	668,000	536,882	597,656	596,726
1897 .....	706,552	574,368	630,714	699,907
1898 .....	741,914	606,952	657,523	737,475

\* In thousands of florins.

The discount rate at the Bank, which remained uniform at four per cent. throughout 1897, was maintained at this rate until October 14, 1898, when it was advanced to four and a half per cent. There was a further advance on November 25 to five per cent., which continued to be the rate until the close of the year. The total value of the paper discounted during 1898 was 1,411,239,388 florins (\$570,000,000), representing an increase of about 194,000,000 florins over 1897. There was a balance of paper on hand at the end of 1898 amounting to 258,483,093 florins, an increase of 51,546,166 florins over December 31, 1897. The number of pieces of paper held at Vienna, at the close of 1898, was 52,045, with a face value of 85,210,393 florins, as compared with 42,241 pieces, with a value of 54,439,768 florins at the close of 1897. The increase was smaller at the other establishments of the Bank, but afforded increased discounts of about 12,000,000 florins at Buda-Pesth. The number of pieces of paper held at the Austrian branches at the close of 1898 was 75,168, with a value of 68,500,507 florins; at Buda-Pesth, 45,981, with a value

of 69,344,168 florins, and at Hungarian branches, 76,181, with a value of 35,428,023 florins. The classification of the commercial bills discounted showed a slight decrease in the smallest bills, but a marked increase in the classes from 50 to 300 florins (\$20 to \$120). The following table exhibits the classification of commercial bills for representative years, according to the importance in value of the paper offered :

AMOUNT IN FLORINS.	1892.	1894.	1897.	1898.
Under fifty.....	15,413	20,609	23,040	25,437
Fifty to 150.....	176,349	239,617	343,198	369,023
Over 150 to 300.....	219,285	267,466	343,109	377,130
Over 300 to 600.....	181,283	216,405	266,243	291,021
Over 600 to 1,000.....	124,509	152,506	163,405	163,986
Over 1,000 to 2,000.....	96,886	123,891	129,272	150,123
Over 2,000.....	71,315	92,791	96,396	114,354
Total.....	884,840	1,112,782	1,380,405	1,535,578

A lively discussion is going on in Belgium over the bill introduced by the Government in the Chambers extending the charter of the National Bank. The bill proposed extends the charter for thirty years from January 1, 1899, and gives the Government a larger share than before in the profits of note issues and discounts, as set forth in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for March. The faculty of the Institute of Social Sciences, which includes Prof. Hector Denis, Prof. Guillaume de Greef, Ernest Solvay, and other students of monetary subjects, have made a serious attack upon the new law and devote the whole of an unusually large number of the *Annals of the Institute* to criticism of the Government policy. Their criticism is not so much directed against details, however, as against the haste with which the Government is trying to pass the bill and against the entire policy of a monopoly bank of issue. M. Solvay is an advocate of banking upon conventional money whose value shall be fixed by the value of objects in exchange. It is probable that the Government, which has a safe majority in the Chambers, will be able to put the bill upon the statute book, in spite of this scholarly opposition.

The annual report of the National Bank of Belgium, which was submitted to the general assembly of the shareholders on February 27, and printed in the "*Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*," shows some progress in the volume of business during 1898, but does not indicate that the Bank has greatly strengthened its metallic reserve. The discount rate at the Bank was three per cent. during the entire year until December 19, when high rates in other countries compelled an advance to four per cent. This made the mean rate for the year 3.04 per cent. The single change in the rate made at the Bank of Belgium contrasted favorably with the six changes made by the Bank of England, and the six made by the Imperial Bank of Germany. One change each was made by the Bank of France and the Bank of the Netherlands, but their rates were both lower than those of the Bank of Belgium. The note circulation has continued to grow during the last two years. The average circulation during 1897 was 476,654,470 francs and during 1898, 495,490,000 (\$96,000,000). The largest increase was about 10,000,000 francs in notes of 1,000 francs, but there was an increase of about 5,000,000 francs in the smallest

notes—those for twenty francs (§4). The following table shows the relation of the circulation to the metallic reserve and the foreign bills of exchange carried, which are counted in the European banks as the equivalent of gold, at the close of representative years:

	DECEMBER 31,	Circulation.	Metallic reserve.	Foreign bills.
		Francs.	Francs.	Francs.
1851.....		50,346,210	22,264,880	15,000,000
1860.....		117,990,980	63,023,535	4,000,000
1870.....		202,528,520	95,614,523	18,800,000
1880.....		389,959,510	98,787,206	43,450,000
1890.....		399,700,000	108,413,340	74,500,000
1895.....		461,800,000	108,500,000	107,600,000
1896.....		471,800,000	100,700,000	101,700,000
1897.....		513,268,950	103,326,156	120,078,567
1898.....		544,652,040	117,067,292	94,621,581

While the Bank has increased its gold reserve from 88,823,415 francs, at the close of 1897, to 91,940,220 francs, at the close of 1898, the silver holdings increased from 8,903,640 francs to 20,125,000 francs. The diminished proportion of gold in ordinary receipts and disbursements strengthens the argument made by M. de Laveleye as far back as 1891, that the small proportion of gold handled by the Bank indicated a constantly diminishing gold currency in Belgium. The receipts of gold by the Bank in 1889 were 76,176,000 francs, and the receipts of silver were 274,348,140 francs. The receipts of gold had shrunk in 1897 to 40,150,450 francs, while the silver receipts had risen to 345,205,560 francs. The operations of 1898 showed gold receipts of only 33,877,200 francs, and silver receipts of 396,700,060 francs.

The discount business of the Bank showed improvement during 1898, especially in the volume of discounts of domestic paper. The following table shows the number and amount of the bills discounted in the aggregate, with the foreign paper separately stated, for recent representative years:

YEAR.	TOTAL OF PAPER DISCOUNTED.		FOREIGN PAPER.	
	No. of bills.	Amt. in francs.	No. of bills.	Amt. in francs.
1870.....	1,064,281	1,337,000,000	11,489	131,900,000
1880.....	2,206,651	1,994,800,000	20,737	347,600,000
1890.....	3,085,380	2,355,500,000	15,423	396,900,000
1892.....	3,018,125	2,430,400,000	22,696	557,700,000
1894.....	3,172,085	2,546,142,032	24,290	671,394,259
1896.....	3,363,921	2,785,613,389	21,398	637,014,808
1897.....	3,444,218	2,922,219,265	24,638	758,644,965
1898.....	3,580,820	3,026,959,161	21,328	626,461,299

There was some apprehension in Germany, owing to the high rates for money, and the eagerness for industrial investments, whether the loan of 200,000,000 marks (§49,000,000) placed early in February would prove successful. The loan represented 125,000,000 marks on account of Prussia and 75,000,000 marks on account of the Empire, and bore interest at three per cent. A syndicate headed by the *Deutsche Bank* managed the transaction and has the option of taking all the bonds which the Government sees fit to issue during the present year. The public subscriptions proved to be more than 4,000,000,000 marks (§1,000,000,000), or more than twenty times the amount offered. It is



stated by the Berlin correspondent of "*l'Economiste Européen*," in the issue of February 17, that several influences contributed to the success of the loan, which surprised the Ministry of Finance as much as the public. Among these were the recent improvement in the conditions of the market, the wide margin between the nominal value and the rates of issue, and the patriotic competition which has suddenly seized the leading banking houses. The foreigner also contributed to the success—many subscriptions coming from France and England. The participation of American capital in the subscriptions is also suggested in the following comments of the Berlin correspondent of the London "*Economist*," in the issue of February 18:

"Of course everybody admits that a very large proportion of the subscription was speculative, since many subscribers named a large sum merely in order to get a favorable allotment. On the bourse this circumstance is pointed to in connection with the strength of the three per cents. of the Empire and of Prussia in the market during the past few days. Many brokers had recently sold these funds 'short,' and then subscribed to the loan in order to cover their engagements; but in forecasting the probable volume of the subscriptions they showed themselves imperfect judges of the situation. They had gauged their subscriptions upon the assumption that the loan would be subscribed for several times over—for a twenty-two-fold over-subscription they were not prepared; and hence they have had to cover their short sales in large part by purchases on the bourse, and prices have hardened in consequence. In connection with this loan the large subscriptions from abroad were of course noted with much pleasure in the financial press. Especially the participation of the United States was a noteworthy fact, being, if I remember rightly, the first time that American money has ever been offered in subscription to a European three per cent. loan."

The payment into the Imperial Treasury of the amount of the loan was completed by the *Deutsche Bank* towards the close of February, without producing any serious effect upon the market. The profits divided by the syndicate were somewhat less than three-tenths of one per cent. It is declared by the Berlin correspondent of the "*Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*," in the issue of March 5, that the entire issue has already passed mainly into the hands of capitalists and may be considered as permanently placed. The German Government spent, from October 1, 1897, to the same date in 1898, 118,694,661 marks (\$29,000,000) upon railway construction. The Government still has authority to expend 426,535,142 marks, of which 352,234,512 marks are for construction and the remainder for unforeseen expenses.

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The European Mortgage Banks. Some idea of the magnitude of the business done by the large centralized mortgage banks of Europe may be formed from the annual reports which are just reaching the public. This business is mostly done without the risks which attend the placement of mortgage loans in the United States, because of the greater steadiness of values on the European Continent. The *Crédit Foncier* of France was subject to some criticism a number of years ago for its large promotion of speculative building, but seems more recently to have pursued a more conservative course. The report for December 31, 1898, shows rural loans to the amount of 1,789,900,000 francs and town loans to the amount of 1,351,900,000 francs, making the total loans about \$600,000,000. The company carries securities to the amount of 163,000,000 francs, cash to the amount of 10,300,000 francs and other miscellaneous assets. Its outstanding bonds are nearly the same in amount as its two classes of mortgage loans—1,847,-

100,000 francs in agricultural and rural bonds and 1,327,300,000 francs in bonds based on town and city property. The present administration of the bank has been endeavoring to reduce the interest on its bonds, with benefits to the institution, and the shares have profited by an advance from 665 on January 31 to 729 francs on December 31, 1898.

The *Crédit Foncier* of Belgium showed loans on mortgages on December 31, 1898, to the amount of 36,250,929 francs (\$7,000,000). The outstanding bonds were 31,617,000 francs and the total obligations of the Bank, including the capital of 15,000,000 francs, were 52,194,719 francs. The net profits for 1898 were 539,631 francs. The bonds outstanding include 16,035,400 francs in the new 3.20 per cent. obligations, 8,416,800 francs in 3.60 per cent. bonds, 6,867,300 francs in four per cents., and 231,100 francs in three per cents.

The *Crédit Foncier Egyptien*, in spite of the greater risks upon loans in Egypt, made an extremely satisfactory showing for 1898. Its assets on October 31, 1898, consisted of unsubscribed capital of 60,000,000 francs, obligations of other banks and correspondents to the amount of 2,286,016 francs, mortgage loans for long terms, 87,925,903 francs; mortgage loans for short terms, 4,463,164 francs; receipts from sales, 9,945,805 francs, and loans upon pledges, 9,381,326 francs. The outstanding mortgage bonds amount to 106,678,978 francs and with the capital of 80,000,000 francs make up the principal portion of the total resources of 196,199,239 francs (\$38,000,000). The outstanding bonds on October 31, 1897, were 94,589,025 francs, and the total liabilities, 182,769,188 francs. The dividend allowed for 1898 was 5.60 per cent. as compared with 4.80 per cent. for the preceding year. The governing board decided early in 1898 to call in the four per cent. bonds and replace them by obligations for three and a half per cent. These were issued at 495 francs upon a par of 500, but it was declared by M. Lechenet, in "*l'Economiste Européen*" of March 3, that they easily went above par and are quoted at 505 francs.

#### The French Credit Companies.

The semi-annual reports of the big French banking corporations, which have monopolized most of the large transactions in France outside the Bank of France, show a satisfactory condition of business at the close of 1898. The *Crédit Lyonnais*, by far the largest of these institutions, carried commercial paper at the close of August, 1898, to the amount of 683,600,000 francs (\$132,000,000). This is the highest exhibit since 1892. There was some decline in the volume of discounts during the autumn, which left the amount on December 31, 1898, at 612,800,000 francs. These figures are exclusive of the reports representing advances upon securities, which touched 167,900,000 francs on September 30 and stood at 123,500,000 francs on December 31. The deposits of the *Crédit Lyonnais* touched a maximum of 1,048,900,000 francs (\$202,000,000) on September 30 and stood at 991,700,000 francs on December 31. The policy of the institution has recently been to reduce its deposits for fixed terms, which fell from 48,000,000 francs to 30,300,000 francs during the year 1898.

The *Comptoir d'Escompte*, the next largest of the big banks, showed discounts on December 31 of 308,500,000 francs and reports of 40,700,000 francs. The deposits at sight were 398,100,000 francs and those for fixed terms 64,100,-

000 francs. The *Société Générale* showed discounts on December 31 of 218,100,000 francs, *reports* of 5,100,000 francs, deposits at sight of 189,700,000 francs, and deposits for fixed terms of 116,600,000 francs. The other two important Paris banks are the *Crédit Industriel et Commercial*, with discounts on December 31 of 51,000,000 francs and deposits at sight of 91,400,000 francs, and the *Société Marseillaise*, with discounts of 31,600,000 francs and deposits at sight of 3,700,000 francs.

The recapitulation of the resources of these five large banking establishments shows liabilities to depositors of 1,707,200,000 francs and bills due of 345,500,000 francs. The available resources consisted of cash to the amount of 360,300,000 francs, discounts 1,222,000,000 francs; *reports*, 190,900,000 francs; and loans and advances, 395,800,000 francs, making a total of 2,069,000,000 francs (\$400,000,000). The remarkable growth of the business done by these banks is indicated by the fact that as recently as 1880 the Bank of France held discounts to the amount of 761,300,000 francs, while the five credit societies held only 532,000,000 francs. The Bank of France has increased its discounts only a trifle upon the average, the amount on March 2, 1899, having been 875,181,124 francs, while its five great rivals in the discount business have multiplied their business by about two and a half.

#### Charter of the Bank of Germany.

The new charter of the Imperial Bank of Germany, extending its corporate existence, is making progress in the various committees of the German legislative body.

The committee of the Reichstag to which the bill was referred has given the measure two readings and adopted several amendments to the original proposals of the Government. The Government bill, whose principal provisions appear in the *Bulletin de Statistique* for February, increased the capital to 150,000,000 marks, but negotiations are in progress for raising the amount to 180,000,000 marks (\$44,000,000). The extension of the charter is practically limited to 1921, since it is provided that the consent of the Reichstag shall be necessary for its prolongation beyond that date. The proposals of the Government for increasing the share of the Treasury in the dividends will probably be adopted. These provisions grant, first, a dividend to the shareholders of three and a half per cent. upon the capital; second, an allotment of twenty per cent. of the remaining profits to the reserve until the reserve shall amount to two-fifths of the capital; third, any profits remaining shall be divided half to the shareholders and half to the Treasury until the dividend of the shareholders is raised to five per cent., after which three-quarters of the remainder shall go into the Imperial Treasury. Premiums upon the sale of the shares shall be added to the reserve fund.

A serious contest has occurred over the provision of the bill prohibiting the State banks of issue from discounting below the official rate of the Imperial Bank. The state of the controversy up to March 8 was thus described by the Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist" in the issue of March 11:

"In committee it was first attempted to amend this by permitting the banks in question to make discounts at one-eighth per cent. below the official rate, except when the *Reichsbank* would indicate to them that the danger of gold exports was imminent, in which case they were to adhere to the *Reichsbank's* rate. This was not acceptable to the *Reichsbank* President and the friends of the bill; but when another form of compromise was brought

forward, making the official rate binding on the private issue banks, 'after it reached or exceeded four per cent.' and allowing a difference of one-eighth per cent. at other times. President Koch at once pronounced the compromise an acceptable one. As voted, however, the compromise goes somewhat further than here indicated, since the words 'reached or' were struck out, thus making the restrictions valid only when the official rate exceeds four per cent.

The change thus made in the bill will not essentially affect the commanding position of the *Reichsbank*, as it will still be able to exercise the dominant role in the money market. Neither will the change amount to a very great improvement of the position of the private banks under the new law. The portion of the financial press which represents the interests of those banks points out that the official rate is often, as now, above four per cent. for months; and that, with an open market rate one-half to one per cent. below the official rate, the private banks cannot expect to get an adequate amount of discounts to make the note privilege worth anything to them.

Another change of minor importance has been made in the bill. Hitherto the *Reichsbank*, at times when the demand for money was slack, and discount rates low, has taken discounts in some cases at a rate below the published rate. The change referred to requires the Bank to publish this, its private rate, in the Imperial Gazette, just as it must do already in case of the official rate."

#### Branch Banking in Great Britain.

The growth of the branch system in Great Britain was made the basis of some discussion, in the London "Bankers' Magazine" for February, of the usefulness of branches in distributing capital and accommodating the public. The whole number of banking offices in Great Britain and Ireland, which was 2,008 in 1858, 3,554 in 1878, and 4,460 in 1886, rose to 5,811 in 1897, and 6,102 in 1898. There were 954 places in the Kingdom where offices were opened between 1877 and 1898, where no bank had previously existed. The number of offices open daily on October 31, 1898, was 5,053, of which 3,528 were in England and Wales, 17 in the Isle of Man, 1,035 in Scotland, and 473 in Ireland. The number not open daily was 1,049, of which 830 were in England and Wales, 1 in the Isle of Man, 20 in Scotland, and 198 in Ireland. The value of branches is thus pointed out by the London "Bankers' Magazine:"

"The branch offices of a bank are to a great extent an index of its usefulness to the neighborhood which it serves. Branches are opened, as a matter of principle, to supply the wants of the customers of a bank. The directors or managers examine from time to time the districts in which their customers live, or they receive invitations to open branches in particular places or promises of support should they go there. When the new bank is opened it causes at once an increase in the industrial activity of the place. Traders, farmers and small manufacturers come to the branch manager and point out to him the opportunities for the development and improvement of their occupations which the use of a sum of extra capital would give them. If the loan can be satisfactorily made—if the security proposed is adequate, and the reason for its being asked for is suitable—the advance is readily allowed, and the customer has the opportunity of making an extra profit put in his hands, and prospers accordingly. Judgment must of course be shown in making these advances. As a rule they are small, and a multitude of small advances causes much more labor to the officers of a bank than a few large ones. But there is safety in numbers in these cases, and the prosperity of the district served is increased."

#### BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

—The monetary situation in Chile seems to have been growing steadily worse since the suspension of gold payments and the issue of paper money. A party of Senators have proposed a plan for a new issue of 50,000,000 piasters in paper, but the Chamber of Commerce of Valparaiso has protested against

the project and declares that the fear of such an issue has already caused a panic. The President of the Republic has replied to the Chamber that he is in thorough accord with them and does not believe that the loss of currency necessary for commercial transactions is likely to prove so grave a danger as the withdrawal of capital which will be caused by the proposed issue of paper.

—The Federal Council of Switzerland concluded on March 3 the discussion of the law creating the Bank of the Confederation. The decisions of the committee of experts, already printed in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, were confirmed, the only modification being in regard to the capital of the Bank. The capital is fixed at 36,000,000 francs (\$7,000,000) fully paid up, instead of 60,000,000 francs, half paid up. The Federal Assembly will have the right to double the paid-up capital if required. The project will soon be laid before the Assembly with a favorable report.

—The Bank of Spain proposes to create a branch at Paris. The business done outside of Spain by Spanish financiers is largely transacted at Paris, and the branch of the Spanish Bank is likely to prove convenient to the business community of Madrid and Paris and to the Bank.

—The discount rate of the Austro-Hungarian Bank was still maintained in February at five per cent., notwithstanding easier conditions of the money market and a somewhat lower rate at the private banks. The year 1898 was not a favorable one from a monetary point of view for Austria-Hungary. There were net exports of 38,000,000 florins (\$15,000,000) in gold, as compared with net imports of 48,000,000 florins in 1897. The gold loss fell only partly upon the Bank, which lost 5,000,000 florins, while the Government reserve lost 10,000,000 florins. An excess of imports of merchandise amounting to 22,000,000 florins and considerable importations of Austrian securities from abroad are regarded as the causes of the loss of gold.

—The Belgian Savings banks increased their deposits from 516,636,962 francs on November 30, 1897, to 548,899,078 francs on November 30, 1898. The growth of savings in Belgium has been very rapid within the past few years, the deposits at the close of 1885 having been only 189,061,089 francs and 325,415,412 francs in 1890.

C. A. C.

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**TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS.**—In a message to the New York Legislature, on March 27, Gov. Roosevelt said, in part:

“There is evident injustice in the light taxation of corporations. I have not the slightest sympathy with the outcry against corporations, as such, or against prosperous men of business. Most of the great material works by which the entire country benefits have been due to the action of individual men, or of aggregates of men, who made money for themselves by doing that which was in the interest of the people as a whole. From an armor plant to a street railway no work which is daily beneficial to the public can be performed to the best advantage of the public save by men of such business capacity that they will not do the work unless they themselves receive ample reward for doing it. The effort to deprive them of an ample reward merely means that they will turn their energies in some other direction; and the public will be by just so much the loser. Moreover, to tax corporations or men of means in such a way as to drive them out of the State works great damage to the State. To drive out of a community the men of means and the men who take the lead in business enterprises would probably entail, as one of its first results, the starvation of a considerable portion of the remainder of the population.”

## THE BANK OF JAPAN.

### GROWTH OF THE JAPANESE BANKING SYSTEM.

In order to understand the organization of the Bank of Japan let us briefly study the growth of the Japanese banking business in general. Before the Restoration there were a number of rich merchants who kept what were known as "exchange houses," and who acted as the financiers of the Shogunate Government and local feudal Daimios. They also received deposits and made advances to the public, being the centers of the credit system of the time. There still exist some firms in Tokio and Osaka which now carry on an extensive banking business, which may be rightly regarded as the direct heirs of these exchange houses.

In 1869 ten discount companies were established under the special patronage of the new Government. Among many other privileges, they received a large sum of the Government paper money as the public deposit and acquired the right of issuing certificates with the security of gold, silver or foreign coins. But these establishments shortly passed away without any success.

In 1870 Mr. Ito (now Marquis), then Vice-Minister of Finance, advised the establishment of banks after the model of the National banking system of the United States. This advice was favorably received, and as its result the National Bank Act was enacted in November, 1872. Under this Act a bank was allowed to issue notes convertible in gold, having as their securities Government bonds to sixty per cent. of the capital, which was not to be less than 50,000 yen.\* As a natural consequence of the political crisis, the New Imperial Government issued a large amount of inflated currency. The Government, in establishing these National banks, had in view the reduction of the amount of paper circulation by issuing the so-called gold redemption bonds, and with these bonds as the basis of banking, to let the banks supply the vacancy thus created in circulation, with their notes convertible in gold. But in this respect the Government was disappointed. Within six years there were but four banks organized under this Act, and they could issue only about 1,420,000 yen of bank notes out of 15,000,000 yen, which were beforehand printed in New York. Even these were rapidly retired, as they lost specie reserve on account of the constant efflux of bullion.

So in 1876 the Government felt it necessary to introduce many important amendments to the National Bank Act. Among many other changes the bank notes were made legal tender for all payments, except for the payment of custom duty and interest on Government bonds, and became convertible into Government paper money, instead of standard gold. Besides, the amount of the bonds to be deposited in the Treasury by the banks was increased from sixty to eighty per cent. of the capital, and the kind of bonds was made optional so long as they bore four per cent. interest. The most important

\* The present value of the Japanese gold yen in American currency is about fifty cents (.496).



*Tatsuo Yamamoto.*  
*Governor of the Bank of Japan.*

change, however, consisted in a gold reserve of forty per cent. of the capital being transformed into a paper reserve of twenty per cent.

These radical changes of the statute, combined with the issue of the Government loan to the amount of more than 174,000,000 yen to pay off feudal pensioners in exchange for their hereditary rights, greatly facilitated the establishment of National banks. They sprung up in rapid succession. Between 1876 and 1879 one hundred and fifty-three banks were organized in various districts of the Empire, their total capital amounting to 48,816,100 yen. At last the organization of the banks became so prevalent that the Bank Act was again amended, empowering the Minister of Finance to restrict, on the basis of population and taxation, the total amount of the issue of the bank notes, which was fixed at 40,000,000 yen, as well as the number and capital of the National banks. Their legal term of existence was also limited to twenty years. Although there were some failures among these National banks, most of them enjoyed good, prosperous business. Side by side with these National banks there also sprung up ordinary banks which are at present regulated by the Bank Act of 1890. They are either individual, partnership or joint-stock concerns. When the legal term of National banks expires, they usually continue their business as ordinary banks. These now number 1,485, their paid-up capital amounting to 191,028,716 yen.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE BANK OF JAPAN.

The rise of National banks in rapid succession increased the evil effects of an inflated currency. The price of all commodities and rate of interest rose by leaps and bounds, while the Government bonds lost their value. The proper regulation of the currency became the prime necessity of finance. To relieve this situation the Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko) was organized in 1882. This was a part of the broad scheme of Mr. Matsukata (now Count), then Minister of Finance.

He sets forth in his memorandum the object of this institution as follows:

(1) To promote the co-operation and assimilation of banks under a central bank; (2) to increase capital available to trade and industry; (3) to reduce as well as to equalize the rate of interest; (4) to transfer to the Bank various services in the Treasury when its business is firmly organized; (5) to discount foreign bills so as to regulate the influx and efflux of specie.


At the same time National banks were ordered to give up their right of issue.

In 1884 the Convertible Bank Note Act was enacted, whereby it was aimed to replace both the Government and National bank notes with those of the Bank of Japan, so as to unify the currency system under this central institution. These objects were steadily pursued. On October 10, 1882, the Bank of Japan commenced its business. In December of the same year it opened its branch office at Osaka. Since then its business has grown to an enormous extent, and at present it has branch offices in Osaka, Moji, Nagoya and Hakodate; and sub-branches in Otaru, Sapporo, Kioto, and Taihoku (Formosa), beside many agencies for the management of Government money.

#### CAPITAL AND RESERVE OF THE BANK.

At first the capital of the Bank of Japan was 10,000,000 yen. This was divided into 50,000 shares of 200 yen each. One-half of this capital was sub-





**BANK OF JAPAN, MAIN BUILDING AT TOKIO.**



I. Ienohara  
Chief of the Business Department.

scribed by the Government with its surplus fund. This was afterward transferred to the Crown property. The expansion of business necessitated the increase of capital, and in 1887 it was increased to 20,000,000 yen, and again, in 1895, to 30,000,000 yen. Its capital, which is all paid up, is divided into 150,000 shares. The shares are all registered and their ownership is allowed only to Japanese, who have permission of the Minister of Finance to acquire it. The number of the shareholders now stands at 877.

For some years a distinction was made between the shares owned by the Government and those owned by people, in the rates of dividend. But since 1887 all shares are equally treated. The profit is semi-annually divided in the following way: out of the net profit six per cent. is declared as the first dividend, and then at least one-tenth of the rest is added to the reserve and another one-tenth is distributed as the bonus of the bank officers. The second dividend is to be declared out of the remainder, some part of which may be carried to the reserve account. Since 1887 the sum of these two dividends varies between ten per cent. and fifteen per cent. per annum.


The reserve fund can be paid out only to make up for the losses of the capital or to equalize the annual dividends. This fund is to be invested only in the purchase of gold, silver or Government bonds, and the profit from the same is carried to the gross income of the Bank. The latest account of this fund stands at 12,570,000 yen. The successive directors of the Bank always endeavored to increase the fund so as to strengthen its credit.

#### THE BUILDING OF THE BANK.

The Bank now occupies a three-storied granite building 110 feet by 115 feet. Its whole ground is about three acres and a half. The plan of this building was settled upon after a careful study of the European central banks. Strong rooms are built in its basement. Electric light, water supply and other conveniences are all up to the latest improvements. In spite of comparatively low wages and cheap materials in Japan, it cost some 1,150,000 yen. It was due to the energy of the late Governor Kawada that such a magnificent building was projected. And it is also noticeable that the plan, as well as the execution of this building, is the work of a Japanese architect, Dr. Tatsuno.

#### ISSUE OF NOTES BY THE BANK.

At the time when the Bank of Japan was organized the market was flooded with inconvertible paper currency. The Government paper money amounted to 115,381,292 yen, with denominations as small as ten sen. The notes of National banks were over 34,396,818 yen, which did not all pass with the same credit. The currency was inflated to such a degree that the premium on specie was once seventy-nine sen per yen. Under such circumstances it was the policy of the Government to place the power of regulating the currency in the single hand of the Bank of Japan, and to replace this inflated currency with the notes of the Bank, which are elastic and redeemable in silver. For this purpose the Government again issued gold note redemption bonds to contract the circulation of depreciated paper and purchased silver and foreign bills to prepare the way for the return to specie payment. Within three years the Government paper money was withdrawn to such an extent that the Bank of Japan felt safe to issue its first notes on May, 1885, and



**BANK OF JAPAN, GENERAL MEETING ROOM**

the specie payment of all paper currency was announced to be commenced on January 1, 1886.

The law which regulates the notes of the Bank of Japan is based upon the German system, yet there are some interesting differences. The Bank notes are of three kinds:

(1) The notes issued on metallic reserve. This reserve has been silver, but since the adoption of the gold standard on October 1, 1897, this is gold, save that one-fifth of the total metallic reserve may be kept in silver. But like the Bank of England this exception is seldom availed of.

(2) Those issued on business assets within legal limit. This issue is limited at present to the amount of 85,000,000, yen. The limit was at first 70,000,000 yen, but has been increased to the present amount since May, 1889. But the outstanding circulation of the Government and also the National bank notes are to be counted into this amount, and it is meant to replace them gradually with the notes of the Bank. Again, for this privilege the Bank advanced to the Government a sum of 22,000,000 yen without interest. This has been used as the fund to withdraw the Government paper money. Recently there has been much discussion of increasing this authorized amount of issue; and while the writer is preparing this essay, the Lower House of the Imperial Diet had just passed a Government bill, proposing to increase the amount to 120,000,000 yen.

(3) The emergency notes, or those issued upon business assets in excess of the above legal limit. These notes are subject to a special tax. The rate of the tax is to be five per cent. or more. In the German system, as we all know, this rate is fixed at five per cent.; but in the Japanese system only the minimum rate is fixed, and the power of discretion is given to the Minister of Finance who may charge any rate above five per cent. according to the state of the money market. This is quite an effectual measure to prevent stringency of the market and at the same time to secure the immediate withdrawal of superfluous notes when the necessity is over.

That this system of note issue is admirably adapted to meet the varying demands of trade, has been very well tested in the German system. But this is especially so in the case of Japan, where for the reason of her geographical situation specie can not be called in from abroad to respond to the immediate demand of trade. Since 1890 the emergency issue has been availed of seven times. That it is effective in relieving the market is shown by the fact that Japan has so far been free from any serious commercial panic.

The notes of the Government and of National banks have been gradually retired, and the Bank notes are taking their place. The day is near at hand when the whole paper circulating medium will be unified into the notes of the Bank of Japan. The following table will show this fact:

*Table Showing the Amount of Circulation of Various Notes.*

	Jan. 1, 1886.	Jan. 1, 1889.	Jan. 1, 1899.
	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.
The Bank note *.....	3,944,763	65,547,249	193,799,901
The Government paper.....	96,304,010	46,566,066	5,411,726
The National bank note.....	30,108,129	27,562,931	1,864,620

\* The notes of the Bank of Japan are of seven denominations; one yen, five yen, ten yen, twenty yen, fifty yen, one hundred yen, two hundred yen; but twenty, fifty and two hundred yen notes have never been issued, and one yen notes are being speedily retired.

## KINDS OF BUSINESS TRANSACTED BY THE BANK.

The kinds of business transacted by the Bank of Japan are mentioned in its statute as follows:

(1) The purchase or discount of Exchequer bills, bills of exchange and other commercial paper.

(2) Dealing in gold and silver.

(3) To make loans upon gold and silver coin and bullion.

(4) To make collection of bills for banks, corporations and individuals who are the regular customers of the Bank.

(5) To receive deposits and accept the custody of objects of value and documents.

(6) To make advances in current account or in loans upon the securities of Government bonds, Exchequer bills or other bonds and shares guaranteed by the State.


Besides these the Bank performs a number of important services for the Treasury without compensation. Not only does it receive and pay out public revenues and expenditures for the State, but it also manages all operations concerning public debts, public deposits and the retirement of the Government and National bank notes. In fact certain parts of the Bank are closely united with the various departments of the Treasury.

Bills and checks in modern forms are new things in Japan. For the last twenty years the Government as well as the Bank has not spared every encouragement to their use in commercial transactions. As the result of these efforts, the discount business has grown to a considerable amount. The return of the clearing-houses in Tokio and Osaka during the last year amounts to 782,744,613 yen and 226,369,144 yen respectively. Bills offered for discount to the Bank must be endorsed by at least two substantial names and be payable within one hundred days. Those which bear a single name must be accompanied with collaterals either in the form of warehouse receipts of merchandise, or of the shares and bonds classed as securities of good credit. These shares and bonds are mostly of domestic railways, and are valued at sixty per cent. of their market price.

The loans upon securities are much smaller in amount than the discounts. These securities are the bonds of the Imperial Government and of Tokio and Osaka municipalities, and also those shares and bonds guaranteed by the State. Loans can be made for a period of three months or less and renewal is allowed only once when necessary.


The Bank receives deposits and makes advances in current accounts. The Bank of Japan does not pay interest on current deposits. Customers place their surplus money in the vault of the Bank to secure the convenience of drawing checks upon it. The banks of the clearing-house association also settle their daily balances with their current accounts in the Bank. Indeed, either in Tokio or Osaka, the whole business of the clearing-house is transacted in a room of the building of the Bank of Japan. The Bank also issues deposit receipts, draft and transfer checks. The distribution of various kinds of coins and bank notes to the different districts of the Empire constitutes no inconsiderable portion of the business of the Bank.

Hitherto the Bank allowed loan and discount exclusively to bankers, being literally the Bank of banks; but since June, 1897, the way has been opened to



BANK OF JAPAN, GENERAL MEETING ROOM OF SHAREHOLDERS.





**BANK OF JAPAN, PRIVATE ROOM OF THE GOVERNOR.**



deal directly with individuals and corporations which have good business standing. This measure has been taken to extend the benefit of the low rate of interest to the general market, and to check the excessive profit often secured by other bankers as a mere intermediary between the Bank and the public. So at present the rates of interest announced by the Bank are of two sorts; namely, banker's rates and private rates. At present they are as follows:

	<i>Loan.</i>	<i>Discount local bill.</i>	<i>Current account.</i>
Private rate*.....	2.5	2.2	....
Banker's rate.....	2.3	2.	2.5

\* Interest is counted so much a day per hundred yen. For instance, 2.5 means two sen and five rin for one hundred yen per day.

The change of the rates of interest on loans and discounts is subject to the sanction of the Minister of Finance. Their movements from week to week are carefully watched in commercial circles as indicating the state of the money market. They are determined not to check the outflow of gold so much as it is in England, but they fluctuate chiefly with reference to the economic conditions at home.


The Bank of Japan has no direct dealings in foreign markets. But it uses its sister institution, the Yokohama Specie Bank, as its foreign agent. Indeed, to encourage foreign commerce, the Bank of Japan assists this institution in many ways. Among other favors, the former advances to the latter up to the amount of 10,000,000 yen in rediscounting foreign bills at the rate of two per cent. per annum. Recently it has been proposed to increase the amount of this advance. The indemnity money lately received from China was also transferred from London to Japan through this institution either by the purchase of bullion or by exchange operations. The whole sum of money thus dealt with amounts to 363,446,464 yen, and this was carried within the space of only two years and a half.

The total business transactions of the Bank for 1898 were 9,019,330,231 yen. The discount of commercial paper amounts to 287,746,025 yen, representing 105,515 pieces of various kinds of bills. The advances upon securities amount to 128,060,910 yen, in 3,751 separate transactions. In current account 530,579,883 yen were paid and 532,530,150 yen were received. The range of these discounts and loans at one date fluctuate between a minimum of 55,134,193 yen and a maximum of 98,642,637 yen. Generally speaking, about three-fourths of this business is done in Tokio and Osaka, while the rest is distributed among the other three branches and one sub-branch. The following figures will show the growth of business of the Bank since its foundation:

	<i>Total business transactions.</i>	<i>Am't rec'd in deposit acc't.</i>	<i>Total loans and discounts.</i>
	<i>Yen.</i>	<i>Yen.</i>	<i>Yen.</i>
1883.....	157,630,152	14,988,494	5,943,950
1887.....	2,657,855,064	27,245,446	81,007,987
1892.....	1,888,088,536	216,112,764	159,773,825
1898.....	9,019,330,231	532,530,150	415,806,935

PERIODICAL REPORTS OF THE BANK.

The Bank is required to advertise every week in the "Official Gazette" the average amount of its note issue. In the Bank of Japan, as in the Bank of England, the issue department is quite separated from the business depart-



**BANK OF JAPAN, HALL OF THE BANK.**

ment. Since January, 1897, the Bank has felt it advisable to make public the statement of the condition of its business department at the close of every week. These two reports are published every Wednesday in the "Gazette." They are given herewith to show the latest condition of the Bank.

#### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BANK.

The Bank of Japan being the only bank of issue, not only is it placed under the control of the Government, but it is heavily burdened in return for the privileges granted. It has, as said before, to perform the following among other functions:

- (1) The receipt and disbursement of Government money.
- (2) The call and payment of the principal as well as the interest on the national debt.
- (3) The custody of money and the goods intrusted to the Government.
- (4) The redemption of the Government paper money.
- (5) The redemption of the National bank notes.
- (6) The rediscounting of foreign bills of exchange for the Yokohama Specie Bank, at specially low rates.

All these involve considerable sacrifice for the Bank, but are done simply for the public convenience as directed by the Government.

For the management of the Government money there are established forty-four Treasuries in the principal towns of the Empire, and each Treasury has a certain number of sub-Treasuries. These are all placed under the control of the Central Treasury, which is in the Bank. Most of the Treasuries are intrusted to other banks as agencies of the Bank, which are paid for their management.

In addition to all these, the Bank is under an important obligation to support the public credit in times of financial emergency. During the late war of 1894-95 it performed most valuable services for the country. Indeed, the war would not have been possible without the effective co-operation of the Bank. At the commencement of the war the negotiation of a foreign loan was quite generally favored in influential quarters. But the Bank opposed this idea, and was fully confident that it could depend upon the internal resources. While it supplied the Government with the necessary funds and did its best in collecting subscriptions to the war loan, the Bank was always active in providing capital to trade and industries. To the high credit of the Bank, its notes circulated during the war even in the heart of the Leao Tung Peninsula of China. The total cost of the war was 200,475,508 yen, but this was paid without causing any serious calamities in industrial circles.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY OF THE BANK.

The government of the Bank of Japan is composed of a Governor, Vice-Governor (now vacant), four directors, and from three to five auditors. The Governor and Vice-Governor are appointed by the Government, for five years. The directors are also chosen by the Government out of the double number of candidates nominated at the general meeting of shareholders, and their term of office is four years. The Governor and the directors meet daily together and constitute the Governing Board, which decides all important questions of the Bank. The auditors are elected by the shareholders for the



BANK OF JAPAN, DRAWING-ROOM OF THE BANK.

term of three years. They constitute the board of auditors, which meets at least once a month. All important actions of the board of directors, such as the changes of the rate of interest, and the rate of dividend to be declared, are subject to their approval. They also inspect books and documents of the Bank. The Governor, the Vice-Governor, the directors and auditors constitute the General Meeting of the Bank, which deliberates upon questions proposed by the Governor. These officers must live in Tokio, and during their terms of office they can not accept any other office either in the Government or other banks and corporations. The regular meeting of shareholders takes place semi-annually on the third Saturday of February and August. Those who own ten shares or more have a voice at this meeting.

Besides these bodies, the Government appoints a certain number of Comptrollers out of the high officers of the Treasury Department. They have the power to stop any act either contrary to the laws and by-laws or deemed to be against the best interest of the Government. They weekly visit the Bank and receive various reports regarding the condition of the Bank and its transactions. They can attend any meeting of the Bank officers and express their views in regard to the business of the Bank.

The internal organization of the Bank has passed through many changes since its foundation. At present it is divided into eight departments and the office of the Private Secretary; namely, Inspection Department, Business Department, Teller's Department, Issue Department, State Treasury Department, Secretary's Department, the Department of Securities, and Accountant's Department. The control of each department, and of each branch or sub-branch, is intrusted to either Managers or Sub-Managers, who number at present twenty-three. The total number of the employés now stands at 1,102.

The Bank has had already four Governors, and the present incumbent is the fifth in the person of Mr. Tatsuo Yamamoto. He has already rendered very distinguished services to the Bank, both as a director and as the chief of the Business Department. At the resignation of Baron Iwasaki, in October last, he was promoted to the present office. He is still a young man of forty-three, and much is expected in his future career.

TOKIO, Japan, February 10, 1899.

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**GOLD STANDARD IN ECUADOR.**—The "Consular Reports" for March 28 give an account of the recent adoption of the gold standard by Ecuador, also a copy of the new coinage law, which will place the country on a gold basis within two years.

Ecuador has heretofore been upon a so-called bimetallic, but practically monometallic silver, basis; no gold in circulation and her silver irredeemable. The gold coin of the country, the condor, long since ceased to circulate.

The circulation of the country was and is almost altogether paper money issued by the banks and redeemable in silver only. No city except Guayaquil has any banking institutions, but agencies of Guayaquil banks are established in several other cities of the Republic.

Ecuador is the fourth country of Latin America to adopt this measure, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Peru having already taken the step. Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, while nominally on a gold basis, are really subject to the disadvantages of paper money, because their internal financial condition precludes an easy conversion of the currency.

Commerce in Ecuador has been inconvenienced not only by the depreciation of silver, but also from the arbitrary fluctuations of exchange, sometimes as much as forty to sixty per cent. within a few months.

The effect of the law will be to put Ecuador on a gold basis, and, while paper will continue to be the money of circulation, it will be redeemable in gold and not in silver, as at present; the condor, which may be regarded as the unit of value, will be practically of the same metallic value as the pound sterling, and the silver sucre will possess an actual value of about 48.6 cents in American gold, ten of them being equal to one condor.

## \* LOANS OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Act of March 3, 1863, as has been before stated, limited the time during which legal-tender notes might be funded into United States bonds to July 1, 1863. When the legal-tender Act was agreed to by Congress the sentiment expressed in debate by its advocates was that the measure was a temporary one only excused by the necessity of the times, and it was strongly urged in favor of the measure that the notes were convertible at the will of the holder into six per cent. bonds payable in gold in twenty years. The total amount of legal-tender notes authorized to be issued by three separate Acts of February 24 and June 11, 1862, and March 3, 1863, was \$450,000,000. The highest amount outstanding at any time was on January 3, 1864, viz: \$449,338,902, a larger amount than is now outstanding of legal-tender and Treasury notes combined.

The Act of March 3, 1863, authorized the issue of ten-forty bonds, at rates of interest not exceeding six per cent. It was to facilitate the negotiation of these bonds at a rate of five per cent. that Secretary Chase asked Congress to limit the time during which legal-tender notes might be exchanged for United States bonds of previous issues bearing six per cent. interest. It was evident that no bonds bearing a less rate than six per cent. could be placed on the market, when the holders of legal-tender notes, of which \$300,000,000 were already in circulation, and \$150,000,000 more were about to be issued, could, on demand, change these notes into six per cent. bonds.

The Secretary gave notice that after July 1, 1863, he should decline to allow holders of legal-tender notes to fund such notes into bonds bearing a greater rate of interest than five per cent. Although a necessary step toward the placing of five per cent. bonds on the market, it was, nevertheless, a breach of contract with the holders of the legal-tender notes of February 24 and June 11, 1862. It was also ineffectual, for under the existing conditions of the money market and the credit of the United States at the time, the attempt to float a loan at five per cent. was a failure. The Act of June 30, 1864, provided that the total amount of United States notes issued or to be issued should not exceed \$400,000,000, and such additional sum not exceeding fifty millions, as may be temporarily required for the redemption of temporary loans.

In his report for 1865 Secretary McCulloch advised the retirement of the legal-tender notes. The House of Representatives concurred by resolution with the views of the Secretary, and an Act was passed approved March 12, 1866, authorizing the retirement of not more than ten millions of legal-tender notes within the first six months after the passage of the Act, and after that not more than four millions in any one month. By December 31, 1867, the

\* Continued from the October, 1896, number of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, page 647.

This series of articles, which began in *RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING* for October, 1898, page 1074, will be continued from time to time until it includes a complete historical sketch of the loans of the United States from the foundation of the Government up to the present.







amount of notes outstanding was reduced to \$356,000,000. On February 4, 1868, further reduction of the volume of the notes was prohibited, leaving \$356,000,000 as the outside limit until October 1, 1872. In the next year occurred the financial stress which culminated in the financial panic of 1873. Great pressure was brought to bear upon the Secretary of the Treasury to relieve the money market by additional issues of notes. This pressure was yielded to by Secretaries Boutwell and Richardson. Under the assumption that the sums retired by Secretary McCulloch were not absolutely cancelled, but, only held as a reserve, to be used in emergencies, and under the provision of the law of June 30, 1864, which permitted an additional sum not exceeding fifty millions to be temporarily used in redeeming loans, the total amount was increased to nearly \$383,000,000. Congress then on June 20, 1874, fixed the amount at \$382,000,000. The specie resumption Act of January 14, 1875, authorized a reduction of legal-tender notes, as National bank notes increased, and under this Act, \$35,318,984 were retired by May 31, 1878, when another Act was passed forbidding further retirement, leaving the amount outstanding at its present amount, \$346,681,016. The subsequent history of the legal-tender note is involved with that of the silver certificate and Treasury note, and with that of later loans, which will be taken up in their chronological order.

#### CERTIFICATES OF INDEBTEDNESS.

These were a form of floating debt which the pressure of the war expenditures rendered necessary. The bill to allow them to be issued for the amount due on audited and settled accounts was introduced in the Senate February 27, 1862, passed both houses without debate and became a law March 1, 1862. It authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue, to any public creditor who might desire to receive the same, certificates for whole amount due or parts thereof, not less than \$1,000, in satisfaction of audited and settled accounts. These certificates were to bear six per cent. interest per annum, and were payable one year from date, or earlier, at the option of the Government. The Act of March 17, 1862, authorized the holders of disbursing officers' checks drawn on the Treasurer of the United States to receive such certificates, if they so desired, in payment of the checks. The interest, by the Act of March 3, 1863, was payable in lawful money. Of these certificates \$561,753,241.65 were issued. All but about \$150,000 were redeemed by the close of 1867.

#### ISSUE OF FRACTIONAL CURRENCY.

After the suspension of specie payments in December, 1861, the premium on gold as compared with legal-tender notes was from ten to fifteen per cent., and as compared with demand notes eight per cent. The silver coins less than a dollar previously used as change, were also at a premium of from three to ten per cent., as compared with paper, and these coins began to disappear from circulation, causing great inconvenience in making change. Postage stamps began to be used for the purpose, and individuals and corporations issued shinplasters. In one quarter of the year as many stamps were called for at the Post Office Department as would ordinarily meet a year's demand. On July 17, 1862, Mr. Hooper, of Massachusetts, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill to authorize payments in stamps and

to prohibit the use of notes of less denominations than one dollar. Secretary Chase had advised Mr. Thaddeus Stevens of the rapid disappearance of small coins, and that to supply their places tokens and checks for sums less than one dollar were being issued by hotels, business houses and dealers generally; and that these should be suppressed and a substitute for the small coins provided. The Secretary suggested as substitutes either token coins of less intrinsic value, or by permitting the receipt of postage and other stamps in fractional parts of a dollar. The bill passed both houses and was signed by the President on the day of its introduction. From and after the first day of August, 1862, it was provided that stamps might be received in payment of all dues to the United States less than five dollars, and were also exchangeable for United States notes when presented in sums of not less than five dollars. The issue of shinplasters was forbidden to private corporations, banks and individuals, under penalty of fine and imprisonment.

Under this law what was known as fractional postal currency was issued, which were small notes of the denomination of five, ten, twenty-five and fifty cents, bearing as designs the representations of postage stamps of the necessary amount on the face. The law did not forbid the issue of fractional notes by cities, and many were issued by them.

The issue of this postage currency commenced August 21, 1862, and ceased May 27, 1863. The whole amount issued was \$20,215,635. There was a scarcity of one and two dollar bills and four twenty-five cent notes joined were frequently used for one dollar and four fifty cent notes for a two dollar bill.

By the Act of March 3, 1863, the postal currency was superseded by fractional notes of designs which had no reference to the postage stamps. These were of like denominations with the postal currency. The total amount to be issued at any one time was limited to fifty millions. The total amount issued including all reissues, aggregated \$368,720,079.51. All but an amount estimated at eight millions has been redeemed.

#### LOAN OF 1863—ONE AND TWO YEAR NOTES OF 1863—COMPOUND INTEREST NOTES—COIN CERTIFICATES.

The expenditures for the fiscal year 1864 were estimated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in the finance report of 1862, at \$845,413,183.56. The receipts were estimated at \$223,025,000. There remained a deficiency of \$622,388,183.56. There was also for the services of the remainder of the fiscal year 1863 the sum of \$276,912,517.66 required, making a total deficiency to be provided for of \$899,300,701.22. To provide this money the Secretary advised that recourse be had to loans, without increasing the issue of United States notes beyond the amount required by law unless a clear public exigency shall demand it. He also advised the organization of banking associations for improving the public credit. He did not recommend any change in the law providing for the negotiation of bonds, except such as might be necessary to increase the amount, the repeal of provisions restricting sales to market value, and authorizing the conversion of one class of bonds into another at will.

The Secretary recommended, if the provision of law requiring 5.20 bonds to be sold only at their market value and if the funding of legal-tender notes into such bonds were still continued, that 7 3-10 three year bonds might be issued convertible into five-twenty sixes at or before maturity, also smaller notes bearing interest at 3.65 per cent.

He held that the advance in the price of gold was not owing to overissues of Treasury notes, but that gold being practically demonetized by the suspension of specie payments by the banks, had become a mere article of merchandise, subject to fluctuations, often sudden and violent, such as might occur in other commodities. He claimed, further, that if paper money was in excess of the wants of the country, such excess was not due to the issue of Treasury notes, but to the issue of notes, by hundreds of banks, under no legal restrictions, which had flooded the country with paper money, often of doubtful value, and sometimes worthless; adducing in proof of the claim that Treasury notes were not in excess the fact that as much of the great staples of life could then be purchased with Treasury notes as could have been bought with gold before that metal disappeared from circulation.

This reasoning has a familiar sound and the Secretary may be excused for his use of it on the ground of necessity. To the disinterested reader at the present time, the Secretary's argument for Treasury notes appears to have equal weight in favor of the bank issues, which however the Secretary declares to have been in excess of the wants of the country. If the ability to purchase as much of the great staples of life with Treasury notes proves them not redundant, then the ability to do the same with State bank notes would seem to prove the latter not in excess. The purchasing power of State bank notes and Treasury notes was at the time the same.

Congress carried into effect the suggestions of the Secretary as to the organization of banking associations by enacting the National currency law on February 25, 1863.

In order to further meet the necessities of the situation a bill to provide ways and means for the support of the Government was introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. Stevens of Pennsylvania, on December 8, and considered in committee of the whole on December 23, 1862. Mr. Stevens said that the bill had "produced a howl among the money changers as hideous as that sent forth by their Jewish cousins when they were kicked out of the temple."

It is not surprising that such a measure should have given rise to consternation in Wall Street, for it proposed the additional issue of \$200,000,000 in legal-tender notes, and one billion dollars in six per cent. bonds and to tax the State banks out of existence. A substitute for this measure was reported from the Committee of Ways and Means of the House on January 8, 1863, and was considered in committee of the whole, January 12, 1863. The substitute proposed the issue of \$900,000,000 in six per cent. bonds, \$300,000,000 in Treasury notes bearing interest at the rate of 5.47½ per cent., and \$50,000,000 in fractional currency. It also contained a provision taxing the issues of State banks in excess of a certain percentage of capital, two per cent. Mr. Spaulding, of New York, advocated the passage of the bill, estimating the amount required to carry on the Government until July 1, 1863, in addition to known receipts, at \$551,221,131.59 and the total amount required to July 1, 1864, at \$1,117,139,409.57, a sum exceeding the estimates of the Secretary by over \$200,000,000.

The whole bank circulation of the Northern States was estimated at \$166,600,000, and the specie in the banks at \$86,931,000.

The whole argument for and against the carrying on the war on a Government paper basis was reiterated. It was stated that it would be

simply impossible to continue so mighty a war by the use of gold and silver alone, there not being specie enough in the country, including all that hoarded by the people, to carry on the operations of the Government four months. That the bank currency of the loyal States was also inadequate, and that if all this bank currency with all the specie were poured into the Treasury, the total would not meet the demands of war to July 1, 1864. It was stated that England and France both, in times of war, extended their paper money to the utmost limit. Even the Bank of England, strong as it was, paid no specie from 1797 to 1821, and its notes were as late as 1814 sold for twenty-five per cent. discount. After a lengthy debate and many amendments the measure became a law March 3, 1863. The first section of the law authorized the Secretary to borrow \$300,000,000 for the current fiscal year, that is, to June 30, 1863, and \$600,000,000 for the next fiscal year—issuing bonds payable in not less than ten nor more than forty years. The interest was not to exceed six per cent. The bonds could be disposed of on such terms as the Secretary might deem best, for lawful money of the United States or for certificates of indebtedness or deposit, or for any of the Treasury notes before issued, or to be issued under authority of this law. But the aggregate totals of bonds, Treasury notes or United States notes issued under the Act should not at any time exceed the sum of \$900,000,000. In addition to the bonds there were provided for by the Act of March 3, 1863, \$400,000,000 Treasury notes, payable at the pleasure of the United States, not exceeding three years from date, bearing interest not exceeding six per cent. per annum, to be paid in lawful money. The denominations were to be not less than ten dollars. These notes were to be a legal tender to the same extent as United States notes, at their face value, excluding interest. They were exchangeable by the holders at the Treasury for United States notes equal to their full value and accrued interest. When so exchanged other Treasury notes to the same amount might be issued.

In order to facilitate the exchange of Treasury notes for United States notes \$150,000,000 of the latter were, as has been noted on a previous page, authorized to be issued. Under this authority \$44,520,000 Treasury notes were issued payable one year from date and \$166,480,000 redeemable two years from date. These notes bore interest at five per cent. per annum, were a legal-tender at their face value and were known as the "one and two year notes of 1863."

Compound interest notes also derived a part of the authority for their issue from the Act of March 3, 1863. The subsequent Act of June 30, 1864, as will hereafter be seen, allowed for the issue of Treasury notes at 7 3-10 interest. It was found that by issuing notes bearing six per cent. compounded semi-annually, payable in three years, the total interest paid was less than 7 3-10 simple interest. The note seemed at the time more attractive to the public. Of these compound interest notes \$17,993,760 were issued under the Act of March 3, 1863, and the remainder, \$248,601,680, under that of June 30, 1864. These notes were a legal tender for their face value, but they were payable both principal and interest at maturity. The five per cent. Treasury notes, on which the interest was payable semi-annually, would be held from circulation until the period for the payment of interest. Immediately the interest was paid these notes would pass into and swell the paper money circulation, thus causing undue fluctuation in the money market.

The constant accumulation of interest on the compound interest notes caused them to be withheld from circulation until the three years elapsed to their maturity. They were exchanged for the one and two year five per cent. notes to the amount of \$177,045,770. Most of the compound interest notes were redeemed by 1869. The Act of March 3, 1863, also provided for coin certificates, by which the payment of coin interest might be facilitated. The public was authorized to deposit coin in the Treasury and receive certificates therefor in denominations of not less than twenty dollars. These certificates might exceed the coin and bullion in the Treasury by twenty per cent. The coin deposited was as a matter of fact gold. Coin certificates were issued and reissued under this Act amounting to \$981,134,880.

#### TEN-FORTIES OF 1864—FIVE-TWENTIES OF MARCH, 1864.

Under the Act of March 3, 1863, authority was given to borrow \$300,000,000 at not exceeding six per cent. for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1863, and \$600,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864. As a matter of fact only \$75,000,000 in bonds were issued under this authority. A bill supplemental to the Act of March 3, 1863, became a law March 3, 1864, which gave authority to borrow \$200,000,000 and issue bonds redeemable after a period not less than five years and payable at any period not more than forty years from date—principal and interest payable in coin, the latter not more than six per cent. One-half per cent. was allowed for the expense of preparation, issue and disposal of such bonds. On this authority bonds redeemable in five and payable in twenty years, with interest at six per cent., were issued to the amount of \$3,882,500. These were known as the five-twenties of March, 1864. There were also negotiated \$196,118,300 bonds redeemable after ten and payable after forty years—bearing five per cent. interest. These bonds were known as the ten-forties of 1864.

#### FIVE-TWENTIES OF JUNE, 1864—SEVEN-THIRTIES OF 1864-1865.

A bill to authorize a loan of \$400,000,000 was reported in the House of Representatives June 20, 1864. The bill contained a provision that all bonds, Treasury notes and other obligations of the United States should be exempt from all taxation by or under any State or municipal authority. This provision was objected to on the ground that it would include legal-tender notes, certificates of indebtedness and interest-bearing Treasury notes, or, in other words, would exempt from taxation all the floating wealth of the country, except the notes issued by the National banks, which it was claimed would benefit no other class of people than wealthy capitalists, the great mass of the people having no United States securities. It was said that a capitalist would be able under this Act to withdraw all his means from State and municipal taxation, and thus make its burdens fall heavier on the poorer class. The policy of exempting any bonds whatever from taxation was severely commented on, and it was asked where the Federal Government obtained the power to make such exemption, no attempt having been made to exercise it until the passage of the Act of February 25, 1862.

It was suggested by one member that it was possible that the bonds could not be taxed even if not specially exempted, and that it would be well for those who thought the exemptions should not be made, to move to amend the bill and affirm the right of the States to tax the bonds of the general

Government. It is worthy of note that not one of the speakers who debated this question appeared to be aware that the Supreme Court of the United States had already decided this question against the power of the States to tax the obligations of the United States for borrowed money. The opinion was rendered by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of *Weston, et al. vs. The City Council of Charleston*.

The bill became a law June 30, 1864. Section 1 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow from time to time, on the credit of the United States, \$400,000,000, and to issue therefor coupon or registered bonds of the United States payable at the pleasure of the Government after any period not less than five nor more than thirty years, or, if deemed expedient, made payable not more than forty years from date—the bonds to be of such denominations as the Secretary may direct, not less than \$50, and to bear an annual interest not exceeding six per cent., payable semi-annually in coin. The Secretary was authorized to sell, in the United States or Europe, any of the bonds of this Act upon such terms as he might deem advisable; also any of the five-twenty bonds, authorized by other Acts, remaining unsold, and to receive in payment lawful money of the United States, or, at his discretion, Treasury notes, certificates of indebtedness, or certificates of deposit issued under any Act of Congress; all bonds, Treasury notes, certificates of indebtedness, or certificates of deposit issued under any Act of Congress, all bonds, Treasury notes, or other obligations of the United States to be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal authority. Under this Act five-twenty bonds to the amount of \$125,561,300 were issued, bearing interest at six per cent., and were sold at an average rate of  $2\frac{531}{1,000}$  premium.

The second section of the law of June 30, 1864, authorized the issue alternatively with an equal amount of the bonds provided for in the first section, and as a part of the same loan, of \$200,000,000 in Treasury notes of any denomination not less than ten dollars, payable at any time not exceeding three years, or, if thought more expedient, redeemable at any time after three years from date, bearing interest not exceeding 7 3-10 per annum, payable in lawful money at maturity, or at the discretion of the Secretary semi-annually. These notes might be disposed of on the best terms that could be obtained in lawful money, and such of them as should be made payable, principal and interest, at maturity should be a legal tender to the same extent as United States notes for their face value exclusive of interest. They were convertible, at the discretion of the Secretary, into any bonds issued under the Act, and might be substituted in place of any United States notes or Treasury notes which might be redeemed and cancelled.

The total amount of bonds and notes issued under the Act was not to exceed \$400,000,000. This Act also contained a provision already referred to under the head "legal-tender notes," that the whole amount of United States notes issued, or to be issued, was not to exceed \$400,000,000 and such additional sum not exceeding \$50,000,000, as might be required for the redemption of the temporary loan. The notes to be issued under this Act were not to be a legal tender in payment or redemption of any notes issued by the National banks.

A great many bonds issued previous to 1864 bore interest payable annually, but the third section of the Act provided for the payment of semi-annual interest on all United States bonds. A subsequent Act of Congress of March

3, 1865, authorized a loan of \$600,000,000 additional to be made upon bonds or Treasury notes similar to those described in the Act of June 30, 1864.

It has been very generally believed that the Treasury notes of this period, particularly those known as seven-thirties, entered into the general circulation together with the United States notes, and tended to swell the grand aggregate of the circulating medium affecting prices and business. This belief is partly based on the legal-tender qualities of these notes. The seven-thirty notes were not a legal tender under the terms of their actual issue, although the Act provided that notes issued under the Act, with principal and interest payable only at maturity, should be a legal tender except for the payment of National bank notes. The compound interest notes were the only notes answering to these conditions. On the other hand there is little doubt that the one and two year notes of 1863, bearing five per cent. interest, the seven-thirty notes and even the compound interest notes, did at times and for short periods circulate from hand to hand as money. But as soon as interest began to accumulate on them they were taken out of circulation and held until the interest was paid, when in case of one and two year notes and seven-thirties they might again swell the circulation.

The interest on the seven-thirties was payable semi-annually by means of detachable coupons. The Government reserved the option to pay six per cent. in gold instead of 7.30 in lawful money.

The manner in which these notes were placed on the market is interesting. In June and July, 1864, there was more difficulty experienced in obtaining loans than ever before, on terms that could be agreed to by the Government. An appeal to the banks for \$50,000,000 failed. Proposals for a national loan on seven-thirty notes were issued on July 25, but the results did not meet expectations. There were so many forms of desirable national securities pressing on the market that there seemed to be no room for more. Requisitions on the Treasury to the amount of \$130,000,000 were suspended. The Secretary then sent seven-thirty notes in small denominations to be used in payment of the soldiers, and over \$20,000,000 were disposed of in this way. On December 4, 1865, over a year afterwards, Secretary McCulloch reported that after the close of the war, early in 1865, it was necessary to provide for the disbandment of the armies and the full payment of the soldiers. There was remaining \$530,000,000 of the loans of June, 1864, and March, 1865. These loans were placed on the market in the form of seven-thirty notes, and the whole was taken by August, 1865, and all requisitions on the Treasury were promptly met.

The total amount of seven-thirty notes issued was \$829,992,500. Almost all of this amount was redeemed or funded into long time bonds by the close of 1869.

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STATE BANK CURRENCY.—State banks are now prohibited from issuing notes to circulate as money by the ten per cent. tax on such currency. In another way the State banks might be permitted to issue notes, viz., on the security of Government bonds as the National banks do. There is no element of bank credit about such notes. They are really Government notes, and with no other security than that provided by the bonds they are perfectly safe; for even if the bonds should depreciate to par, there would still be a margin of ten per cent. between the face of the bonds and the amount of circulation which a bank could issue. At one time the privilege of issuing circulation was considered as an inducement for banking capital to range itself under the National system, but it is an advantage that is not worth much now. Such as it is, however, might with justice be extended to all State banks.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE's Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANKS—CLAIMS SECURED BY COLLATERAL— DIVIDENDS.

Supreme Court of the United States, February 20, 1899.

MERRILL vs. NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE.

A secured creditor of an insolvent National bank may prove and receive dividends upon the face of his claim as it stood at the time of the declaration of insolvency, without crediting either his collaterals, or his collections made afterwards, subject always to the proviso that dividends must cease when from them and the collaterals realized the claim has been paid in full.

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On July 17, A. D. 1891, the First National Bank, of Palatka, Fla., a banking association incorporated under the laws of the United States, having its place of business at Palatka, Fla., failed, and closed its doors. Subsequently, T. B. Merrill was duly appointed Receiver of the bank by the Comptroller of the Currency, and entered upon the discharge of his duties. At the time of the failure of the bank, it was indebted to the National Bank of Jacksonville in the sum of \$6,010.47, on sundry drafts, which indebtedness was unsecured, and also in the sum of \$10,098.34, being \$10,000, and interest, for money borrowed June 5, 1891, evidenced by a certificate of deposit, which was secured by sundry notes belonging to the First National Bank of Palatka, attached to the certificate as collateral. These notes aggregated \$10,896.22, the largest being a note of A. L. Hart for \$5,350.22. The National Bank of Jacksonville proved its claim upon the unsecured drafts for \$6,010.47, and as to this there was no controversy. It also offered to prove its claim for \$10,098.34, but the Receiver would not permit it to do this; and, under the ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency, it was ordered first to exhaust the collaterals given to secure the certificate of deposit, and then to prove for the balance due, after applying the proceeds of the collaterals in part payment.

The Jacksonville Bank collected all the notes, excepting that of A. L. Hart, obtained a judgment on the latter, which it assigned and transferred to the Receiver, applied the proceeds of the collaterals which it had collected to its claim on the certificate, and proved for the balance due thereon, being the sum of \$4,496.44. On December 1, 1892, a dividend of \$1,573.75 was paid on the claim as thus proven; and on May 17, 1893, a second dividend of \$449.64 was paid.

On September 11, 1894, the Jacksonville Bank filed its bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida against Merrill, as Receiver, which set forth the foregoing facts, complained of the action of the Receiver in not permitting proof for the full amount of the certificate of deposit, and alleged that it "gave due notice that it would demand a *pro rata* dividend upon the whole amount due your orator, without deducting the amount collected on col-



lateral security, to wit, that it would demand a *pro rata* dividend upon \$16,108.81, and interest thereon from July 17, A. D., 1891."

The prayer of the bill was, among other things, for a *pro rata* distribution on the entire amount of the indebtedness.

FULLER, C. J.: The inquiry on the merits is, generally speaking, whether a secured creditor of an insolvent National bank may prove and receive dividends upon the face of his claim as it stood at the time of the declaration of insolvency, without crediting either his collaterals, or collections made therefrom after such declaration, subject always to the proviso that dividends must cease when, from them and from collaterals realized, the claim has been paid in full.

Counsel agree that four different rules have been applied in the distribution of insolvent estates, and state them as follows :

"Rule 1. The creditor desiring to participate in the fund is required first to exhaust his security, and credit the proceeds on his claim, or to credit its value upon his claim, and prove for the balance, it being optional with him to surrender his security and prove for his full claim.

Rule 2. The creditor can prove for the full amount, but shall receive dividends only on the amount due him at the time of distribution of the fund ; that is, he is required to credit on his claim, as proved, all sums received from his security, and may receive dividends only on the balance due him.

Rule 3. The creditor shall be allowed to prove for, and receive dividends upon, the amount due him at the time of proving or sending in his claim to the official liquidator, being required to credit as payments all the sums received from his security prior thereto.

Rule 4. The creditor can prove for, and receive dividends upon, the full amount of his claim, regardless of any sums received from his collateral after the transfer of the assets from the debtor in insolvency, provided that he shall not receive more than the full amount due him."

The circuit court and the circuit court of appeals held the fourth rule applicable, and decreed accordingly.

This was in accordance with the decision of the circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit, in *Bank vs. Armstrong* (16 U. S. App. 465 ; 59 Fed. 379), Mr. Justice Brown, and the Circuit Judges Taft and Lurton, composing the court. The opinion was delivered by Judge Taft, and discusses the question on principle with a full citation of the authorities. We concur with that court in the proposition that assets of an insolvent debtor are held under insolvency proceedings in trust for the benefit of all his creditors, and that a creditor, on proof of his claim, acquires a vested interest in the trust fund ; and, this being so, that the second rule before mentioned must be rejected, as it is based on the denial, in effect, of a vested interest in the trust fund, and concedes to the creditor simply a right to share in the distributions made from the fund according to the amount which may then be due him, requiring a readjustment of the basis of distribution at the time of declaring every dividend, and treating, erroneously as we think, the claim of the creditor to share in the assets of the debtor, and his debt against the debtor, as if they were one and the same thing.

The third and fourth rules concur in holding that the creditor's right to dividends is to be determined by the amount due him at the time his interest in the assets becomes vested, and is not subject to subsequent change, but they differ as to the point of time when this occurs.

In *Kellock's Case* (L. R. 8 Ch. 769), it was held that the creditor's interest in the general fund to be distributed vested at the date of presenting or proving his claim ; and this rule has been followed in many jurisdictions where statutory provisions have been construed to require an affirmative election to become a beneficiary thereunder. For instance, the cases in Illinois construing the assignment Act of that

State, which are well considered and full to the point, hold that the interest of each creditor in the assigned estate "only vests in him when he signifies his assent to the assignment by filing his claim with the assignee." (*Levy vs. Bank*, 158 Ill. 88, 42 N. E. 129; *Furness vs. Bank*, 147 Ill. 570, 35 N. E. 624.)

On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in *Miller's Appeal* (35 Pa. St. 481), and many subsequent cases, has held, necessarily in view of the statutes of Pennsylvania regulating the matter, that the interest vests at the time of the transfer of the assets in trust. In that case the debtor executed a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. Subsequently, the assignor became entitled to a legacy which was attached by a creditor, who realized therefrom \$2,402.87. It was held that such creditor was, notwithstanding, entitled to a dividend out of the assigned estate on the full amount of his claim at the time of the execution of the assignment.

Mr. Justice Strong, then a member of the State tribunal, said :

"By the deed of assignment, the equitable ownership of all the assigned property passed to the creditors. They became joint proprietors, and each creditor owned such a proportional part of the whole as the debt due to him was of the aggregate of the debts. The extent of his interest was fixed by the deed of trust. It was, indeed, only equitable; but, whatever it was, he took it under the deed, and it was only as a part owner that he had any standing in court when the distribution came to be made. \* \* \* It amounts to very little to argue that Miller's recovery of the \$2,402.87 operated with precisely the same effect as if a voluntary payment had been made by the assignor after his assignment; that is, that it extinguished the debt to the amount recovered. No doubt it did, but it is not as a creditor that he is entitled to a distributive share of the trust fund. His rights are those of an owner by virtue of the deed of assignment. The amount of the debt due to him is important only so far as it determines the extent of his ownership. The reduction of that debt, therefore, after the creation of the trust, and after his ownership had become vested, it would seem, must be immaterial."

Differences in the language of voluntary assignments and of statutory provisions naturally lead to particular differences in decision, but the principle on which the third and fourth rules rest is the same.

In other words, those rules hold, together with the first rule, that the creditor's right to dividends is based on the amount of his claims at the time his interest in the assets vests by the statute, or deed of trust, or rule of law, under which they are to be administered.

The first rule is commonly known as the "bankruptcy rule," because enforced by the bankruptcy courts in the exercise of their peculiar jurisdiction, under the bankruptcy Acts, over the property of the bankrupt, in virtue of which creditors holding mortgages or liens thereon might be required to realize on their securities, to permit them to be sold, to take them on valuation, or to surrender them altogether, as a condition of proving against the general assets.

The fourth rule is that ordinarily laid down by the chancery courts, to the effect that, as the trust created by the transfer of the assets by operation of law or otherwise is a trust for all creditors, no creditor can equitably be compelled to surrender any other vested right he has in the assets of his debtor in order to obtain his vested right under the trust. It is true that, in equity, a creditor having a lien upon two funds may be required to exhaust one of them in aid of creditors who can only resort to the other; but this will not be done when it trenches on the rights or operates to the prejudice of the party entitled to the double fund. (*Story, Eq. Jur.* [13th Ed.] § 633; *In re Bates*, 118 Ill. 524, 9 N. E. 257.) And it is well established that in marshaling assets, as respect creditors, no part of his security can be taken from a secured creditor until he is completely satisfied (2 *White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq.* [4th Am. Ed.] pt. 1, pp. 258, 322).

In *Greenwood vs. Taylor* (1 Russ. & M. 185), Sir John Leach applied the bankruptcy rule in the administration of a decedent's estate, and remarked that the rule was "not founded, as has been argued, upon the peculiar jurisdiction in bankruptcy, but rests upon the general principles of a court of equity in the administration of assets," and referred to the doctrine requiring a creditor having two funds as security, one of which he shares with the others, to resort to his sole security first. But *Greenwood vs. Taylor* was, in effect, overruled by Lord Cottenham in *Mason vs. Bogg* (2 Mylne & C. 448, 488), and expressly so by the court of appeal in chancery in *Kellock's Case*; and the application of the bankruptcy rejected.

In *Kellock's Case*, Lord Justice W. Page Wood (soon afterwards Lord Chancellor Hatherly) said:

"Now, in the case of proceedings with reference to the administration of the estates of deceased persons, Lord Cottenham put the point very clearly, and said: 'A mortgagee has a double security. He has a right to proceed against both, and to make the best he can of both. Why he should be deprived of this right because the debtor dies, and dies insolvent, it is not very easy to see.'

Mr. De Gex, who argued this case, very ably, says that the whole case is altered by the insolvency. But where do we find such a rule established, and on what principle can such a rule be founded, as that, where a mortgagor is insolvent, the contract between him and his mortgagee is to be treated as altered in a way prejudicial to the mortgagee, and that the mortgagee is bound to realize his security before proceeding with his personal demand?

It was strongly pressed upon us, and the argument succeeded before Sir J. Leach in *Greenwood vs. Taylor*, that the practice in bankruptcy furnishes a precedent which ought to be followed. But the answer to that is that this court is not to depart from its own established practice, and vary the nature of the contract between mortgagor and mortgagee by analogy to a rule which has been adopted by a court having a peculiar jurisdiction, established for administering the property of traders unable to meet their engagements, which property that court found it proper and right to distribute in a particular manner, different from the mode in which it would have been dealt with in the court of chancery. \* \* \* We are asked to alter the contract between the parties by depriving the secured creditor of one of his remedies, namely, the right of standing upon his securities until they are redeemed."

And it was the established rule in England prior to the judicature Act (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77) that in an administration suit a mortgagee might prove his whole debt, and afterwards realize his security for the difference; and so as to creditors with security, where a company was being wound up under the Companies Act of 1862. (1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 384; *In re Brick Works*, 16 Ch. Div. 337.)

Certainly, the giving of collateral does not operate of itself as a payment or satisfaction either of the debt or any part of it, and the debtor, who has given collateral security, remains debtor, notwithstanding, to the full amount of the debt; and so in *Lewis vs. U. S.* (92 U. S. 623), it was ruled that "it is a settled principle of equity that a creditor holding collaterals is not bound to apply them before enforcing his direct remedies against the debtor."

Doubtless, the title to collaterals pledged for the security of a debt vests in the pledgee so far as necessary to accomplish that purpose, but the obligation to which the collaterals are subsidiary remains the same. The creditor can sue, recover judgment, and collect from the debtor's general property, and apply the proceeds of the collateral to any balance which may remain. Insolvency proceedings shift the creditor's remedy to the interest in the assets. As between debtor and creditor, moneys received on collaterals are applicable by way of payment; but as, under the equity rule, the creditor's rights in the trust fund are established when the fund is created, collections subsequently made from, or payments subsequently made on,

collateral, cannot operate to change the relations between the creditor and his co-creditors in respect of their rights in the fund.

As Judge Taft points out, it is because of the distinction between the right in *personam* and the right in *rem* that interest is only added up to the date of insolvency, although, after the claims as allowed are paid in full, interest accruing may then be paid before distribution to stockholders.

In short, the secured creditor is not to be cut off from his right in the common fund because he has taken security which his co-creditors have not. Of course, he cannot go beyond payment, and surplus assets or so much of his dividends as are unnecessary to pay him must be applied to the benefit of the other creditors; and, while the unsecured creditors are entitled to be substituted as far as possible to the rights of secured creditors, the latter are entitled to retain their securities until the indebtedness due them is extinguished.

The contractual relations between borrower and lender, pledging collaterals, remain, as is said by the New York Court of Appeals in *People vs. Remington* (121 N. Y. 828, 24 N. E. 793), "unchanged, although insolvency has brought the general estate of the debtor within the jurisdiction of a court of equity for administration and settlement." The creditor looks to the debtor to repay the money borrowed, and to the collateral to accomplish this in whole or in part; and he cannot be deprived either of what his debtor's general ability to pay may yield, or of the particular security he has taken.

We cannot concur in the view expressed by Chief Justice Parker in *Amory vs. Francis* ( [1820] 16 Mass. 808), that "the property pledged is in fact security for no more of the debt than its value will amount to, and for all the rest the creditor relies upon the personal credit of his debtor, in the same manner he would for the whole if no security were taken."

We think the collateral is security for the whole debt and every part of it, and is as applicable to any balance that remains after payment from other sources as to the original amount due, and that the assumption is unreasonable that the creditor does not rely on the responsibility of his debtor according to his promise.

The ruling in *Amory vs. Francis* was disapproved shortly after it was made, by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in *Moses vs. Ranlet* (1822, 2 N. H. 488), Woodbury, J. (afterwards Mr. Justice Woodbury, of this court) delivering the opinion, and is rejected by the preponderance of decisions in this country, which sustain the conclusion that a creditor with collateral is not on that account to be deprived of the right to prove for his full claim against an insolvent estate. Many of the cases are referred to in *Bank vs. Armstrong*, and these and others given in 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 2d Ed. p. 141.

Does the legislation in respect to the administration of National banks require the application of the bankruptcy rule? If not we are of opinion that the equity rule was properly applied in this case. By Section 5234 of the Revised Statutes, and Section 1 of the Act of June 30, 1876 (19 Stat. 63, c. 156), the Comptroller of the Currency is authorized to appoint a Receiver to close up the affairs of a National banking association when it has failed to redeem its circulation notes when presented for payment; or has been dissolved and its charter forfeited; or has allowed a judgment to remain against it unpaid for thirty days; or whenever the Comptroller shall have become satisfied of its insolvency after examining its affairs. Such Receiver is to take possession of its effects, liquidate its assets, and pay the money derived therefrom to the Treasurer of the United States.

Section 5235 of the Revised Statutes requires the Comptroller, after appointing such Receiver, to give notice by newspaper advertisement for three consecutive months, "calling on all persons who may have claims against such association to present the same, and to make legal proof thereof."

By Section 5243 transfers of its property by a National banking association after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof, to prevent distribution of its assets in the manner provided by the chapter of which that section forms a part, or with a view to preferring any creditor except in payment of its circulating notes, are declared to be null and void.

Section 5236 is as follows: "From time to time, after full provision has first been made for refunding to the United States any deficiency in redeeming the notes of such association, the Comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money so paid over to him by such Receiver on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction, or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, as the proceeds of the assets of such association are paid over to him, shall make further dividends on all claims previously proved or adjudicated; and the remainder of the proceeds, if any, shall be paid over to the shareholders of such association or their legal representatives, in proportion to the stock by them respectively held."

In *Cook County Nat. Bank vs. U. S.* (107 U. S. 445), it was ruled that the statute furnishes a complete code for the distribution of the effects of an insolvent National bank; that its provisions are not to be departed from; and that the bankrupt law does not govern distribution thereunder. The question now before us was not treated as involved, and was not decided; but the case is in harmony with *Bank vs. Colby* (21 Wall. 609) and *Scott vs. Armstrong* (146 U. S. 499), which proceed on the view that all rights, legal or equitable, existing at the time of the commission of the act of insolvency which led to the appointment of the Receiver, other than those created by preference forbidden by Section 5242, are preserved, and that no additional right can thereafter be created either by voluntary or involuntary proceedings. The distribution is to be "ratable" on the claims as proved or adjudicated; that is on one rule of proportion applicable to all alike. In order to be "ratable," the claims must manifestly be estimated as of the same point of time, and that date has been adjudged to be the date of the declaration of insolvency. (*White vs. Knox*, 111 U. S. 784.) In that case it appeared that the Miners' National Bank had been put in the hands of a Receiver by the Comptroller of the Currency, December 20, 1875. White presented a claim for \$60,000, which the Comptroller refused to allow. White then brought suit to have his claim adjudicated, and on June 23, 1883, recovered judgment for \$104,528.72, being the amount of his claim with interest to the date of the judgment. Meanwhile the Comptroller had paid the other creditors ratable dividends, aggregating sixty five per cent. of the amounts due them, respectively, as of the date when the bank failed. When White's claim was adjudicated the Comptroller calculated the amount due him according to the judgment as of the date of the failure, and paid him sixty-five per cent. on that amount. White admitted that he had received all that was due him on the basis of distribution assumed by the Comptroller, but claimed that he was entitled to have his dividends calculated on the face of the judgment, which would give him several thousand dollars more than he had received, and he applied for a mandamus to compel the payment to him of the additional sum. The writ was refused by the court below, and its judgment was affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the court, said: "Dividends are to be paid to all creditors, ratably; that is to say, proportionally. To be proportionate they must be made by some uniform rule. They are to be paid on all claims against the bank previously proved and adjudicated. All creditors are to be treated alike. The claim against the bank, therefore, must necessarily be made the basis of the apportionment. \* \* \* The business of the bank must stop when insolvency is declared. (Rev. St. § 5228.) No new debt can be made after that. The only claims the Comptroller can recognize in the settlement of the affairs of the bank are those which are shown by proof satisfactory to him, or by the adjudication of a competent court, to have had their origin in something done before the insolvency.

It is clearly his duty, therefore, in paying dividends, to take the value of the claim at that time as the basis of distribution."

In *Scott vs. Armstrong* (146 U. S. 499), it was argued that the ordinary equity rule of set-off in case of insolvency did not apply to insolvent National banks, in view of Sections 5234, 5236 and 5242 of the Revised Statutes. It was urged "that these sections by implication forbid this set-off, because they require that after the redemption of the circulating notes has been fully provided for the assets shall be ratably distributed among the creditors, and that no preferences given or suffered in contemplation of or after committing the act of insolvency shall stand;" and "that the assets of the bank existing at the time of the act of insolvency include all its property without regard to any existing liens thereon or set-offs thereto." But this Court said: "We do not regard this position as tenable. Undoubtedly any disposition by a National bank, being insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency, of its choses in action, securities or other assets, made to prevent their application to the payment of its circulating notes or to prefer one creditor to another, is forbidden; but liens, equities, or rights arising by express agreement, or implied from the nature of the dealings between the parties, or by operation of law prior to insolvency and not in contemplation thereof, are not invalidated. The provisions of the Act are not directed against all liens, securities, pledges or equities, whereby one creditor may obtain a greater payment than another, but against those given or arising after or in contemplation of insolvency. Where a set-off is otherwise valid it is not perceived how its allowance can be considered a preference, and it is clear that it is only the balance, if any, after the set-off is deducted, which can justly be held to form part of the assets of the insolvent. The requirement as to ratable dividends is to make them from what belongs to the bank, and that which at the time of the insolvency belongs of right to the debtor does not belong to the bank."

The set-off took effect as of the date of the declaration of insolvency, but outstanding collaterals are not payment, and the statute does not make their surrender a condition to the receipt by the creditor of his share in the assets.

The rule in bankruptcy went upon the principle of election; that is to say the secured creditor "was not allowed to prove his whole debt unless he gave up any security held by him on the estate against which he sought to prove. He might realize his security himself if he had power to do so, or he might apply to have it realized by the court of bankruptcy or by some other court having competent jurisdiction, and might prove for any deficiency of the proceeds to satisfy his demand: but if he neglected to do this and proved for his whole debt, he was bound to give up his security." (Rob. Bankr. 336.) But it was only under bankrupt laws that such election could be compelled. (*Taylor vs. Thompson*, 5 Pet. 358, 369.)

And we are unable to accept the suggestion that compulsion under those laws was the result merely of the provision for ratable distribution, which only operated to prevent preferences, and to make all kinds of estates, both real and personal, assets for the payment of debts, and to put specialty and simple contract creditors on the same footing, and so gave to all creditors the right to come upon the common fund. Equality between them was equity, but that was not inconsistent with the common law rule awarding to diligence, prior to insolvency, its appropriate reward, or with conceding the validity of prior contract rights.

We repeat that it appears to us that the secured creditor is a creditor to the full amount due him when the insolvency is declared, just as much as the unsecured creditor is, and can not be subjected to a different rule. And as the basis on which all creditors are to draw dividends is the amount of their claims at the time of the declaration of insolvency, it necessarily results for the purpose of fixing that basis that it is immaterial what collateral any particular creditor may have. The secured creditor cannot be charged with the estimated value of the collateral, or be

compelled to exhaust it before enforcing his direct remedies against the debtor, or to surrender it as a condition thereto, though the Receiver may redeem or be subrogated as circumstances may require.

Whatever Congress may be authorized to enact by reason of possessing the power to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, it is very clear that it did not intend to impinge upon contracts existing between creditors and debtors by anything prescribed in reference to the administration of the assets of insolvent National banks; yet it is obvious that the bankruptcy rule confers what on its face gives the secured creditor an equal right with other creditors into a preference against him and hence takes away a right which he already had. This a court of equity should never do unless required by statute at the time the indebtedness was created.

The requirement of equality of distribution among creditors by the National Banking Act involves no invasion of prior contract rights of any of such creditors and ought not to be construed as having or being intended to have such a result.

Our conclusion is that the claims of creditors are to be determined as of the date of the declaration of insolvency, irrespective of the question whether particular creditors have security or not. When secured creditors have received payment in full their right to dividends and their right to retain their securities cease, but collections therefrom are not otherwise material. Insolvency gives unsecured creditors no greater rights than they had before, though through redemption or subrogation or the realization of a surplus, they may be benefited.

The case was rightly decided by the circuit court of appeals. Its decree in No. 54 is affirmed; and the decree of the circuit court entered July 27, 1896, in pursuance of the mandate of that court, is also affirmed. Remanded accordingly.

Justices WHITE, HARLAN, GRAY and MCKENNA dissented.

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#### TAXATION—DEPOSITS IN SAVINGS BANKS.

Court of Appeals of New York, March 14, 1899.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK *ex rel.* MARTIN HEERMANCE, *et al.*,  
*vs.* THE STATE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS.

Depositors in Savings banks in the State of New York are not liable to taxation upon their deposits.

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GRAY, *J.*: This case presents the converse of the proposition which we had before us in the *Newburgh Savings Bank Case* (157 N. Y. 51), where it was sought by the assessor of the City of Newburgh to assess the Savings bank as to its surplus funds.\* Here the endeavor is, on the part of the taxing authorities, to assess the depositors in the Savings banks of the City of Kingston for the amount of their deposits.

In the former case referred to, we held that there could be no assessment under the statute and, in the course of the opinion, it was pointed out that the provisions of the Banking Law made it clear that every interest in the funds held by a Savings bank is vested in the depositors; that the bank acquires no interest therein and is deemed to hold what property it has for the benefit of depositors only.

The language of the exemption clause in question (Sub. 14 of Sec. 4 of Chap. 908, Laws of 1896) is to be taken as referring to the property itself which the bank is holding and managing. It is "the deposits in any bank for savings which are due depositors," which the law exempts from taxation, and it is quite immaterial whether we say that the property so exempted consists in the indebtedness of the bank to its depositors, or that it is the fund itself which is withdrawn from the operation of the Tax Law.

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\* This case was fully reported in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for November, 1896, page 801.

Clearly, the corporation is not subject to assessment, either upon the principle that it has no property in its deposits, or because, under the provisions of the Tax Law, any assessment as to its personal property would be offset by the authorized deduction of its liabilities; which, as we saw in the Newburgh Savings Bank case, covered everything which it held. Therefore, it would seem, logically, to follow that the statutory exemption applies, and was intended to apply to depositors, in Savings banks, and to relieve them from assessment for taxation as to their deposits.

The discussion in the Savings bank case, and the opinion in the Appellate Division below, render it unnecessary, in my judgment, to discuss this question further. The order should be affirmed, without costs.

All concur, except PARKER, Ch. J., and HAIGHT, J., who take no part.  
Order affirmed.

**LIABILITY OF BANK TO CREDITORS OF ANOTHER CORPORATION—UNDUE  
INFLUENCE IN AFFAIRS OF BORROWER.**

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, October 31, 1898.

NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE IN DENVER *vs.* ALLEN, *et al.*

Neither the fact that a bank held as collateral security a majority of the stock of a mercantile corporation, nor that one of its officers was for a time a director of the mercantile company, renders the latter the agent of the bank, so as to make the bank liable to creditors of the company for misrepresentations as to its financial condition made by its officers.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. This was a creditors' bill, which was exhibited by George A. Allen and others, the appellees, composing the firm of Paris, Allen & Co., against the National Bank of Commerce in Denver, the appellant, and against the A. K. Clarke Mercantile Company, hereafter termed the "Mercantile Company." The bill was filed by Paris, Allen & Co., as judgment creditors of the Mercantile Company.

In the court below a decree was rendered in favor of the complainants, which adjudged that the defendant bank should pay to the respective complainants the amount of their several demands against the Clarke Mercantile Company, all of which had been reduced to judgment, together with interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent. per annum from and after November 2, 1895.

Before Sanborn and Thayer, Circuit Judges, and Shiras, District Judge.

THAYER, *Circuit Judge* (omitting other parts of the opinion): The appellees also predicate a right to relief on the ground that the appellant bank conducted a wholesale and retail liquor, cigar, and tobacco business under the name of the Clarke Mercantile Company, for the bank's exclusive use and benefit, and that while doing so it made certain false and fraudulent representations to the business world concerning the amount that had been paid on the stock of the Mercantile Company, and concerning its assets and liabilities, whereby the appellees were deceived and induced to extend credit to that company.

[The Court here reviewed the evidence bearing upon this part of the case.]

We are of opinion, however, that the claim in question is not well founded. The Mercantile Company was a distinct legal entity, subject at all times to the control of its own officers, and it is clear, we think, that it did not become an agent of the bank either because Clarke hypothecated the bulk of its stock which he happened to own to secure a debt due to the bank, or because Morrison, an employé of the bank, served for a time on the board of directors of the Mercantile Company, or for both of these reasons combined. In a legal sense, a corporation does not become the agent of another, be it a corporation or an individual, because the latter holds a part of its stock in pledge to secure a debt; nor is the relation of principal and agent



established, as between two corporations, because an officer or employé of one is a member of the board of directors of the other. It has even been held that, where the same person is acting as director in two corporations, knowledge acquired by him, while serving in the capacity of a director in one corporation, is not imputable to the other. (Thomp. Corp. § 5214, and cases there cited.)

Moreover, while it may be conceded that one corporation may act as agent of another in a given transaction, or even in a series of transactions, yet we do not understand it to be possible for a corporation which has been incorporated to carry on a given business, to transact the whole of that business merely as the agent of, and for the exclusive benefit of, another. Ordinarily, a corporation is not even the agent of its own stockholders, in such a sense as to render them personally liable upon its contracts or for its wrongful or fraudulent acts, although its stockholders are entitled ultimately to the net profits realized from all corporate ventures; and it would be a strange result if the acquisition of stock in a corporation by one of its creditors, to be held as collateral security, or if the election of one of the creditor's employés to serve on its board of directors, should be held to place the corporation in the attitude of a mere agent.

Such a conclusion is totally inadmissible. It is doubtless true, as has been suggested, that a large creditor of a corporation or of an individual, by virtue of being such, sometimes has such an influence over his debtor as enables him to control his actions in many ways; but this is a moral power, incident to the situation, which the law permits a creditor to exercise for his own benefit and advantage, even at the expense of other creditors, provided that he does not direct the doing of acts that are either illegal or fraudulent.

The existence of such an influence, however, falls far short of establishing the relation of principal and agent, even where it is plain that it does exist and has been exercised.

In the case at bar, it is obvious that the bank counseled and advised the Mercantile Company, through Clarke, its president, to sell its property and effects, and to apply the proceeds of the sale on the company's indebtedness to the bank; and it is very probable that the Mercantile Company was induced to a large extent, by such advice, to make the sale and such appropriation of the proceeds.

But conceding this to have been the case, the transaction amounted to no more than a preference among creditors, all of whom had valid claims, and, considered by itself, we do not see that it gives the appellees any legal cause for complaint.

It seems to be well settled in the State where the transaction took place, and in other jurisdictions as well, that a private business corporation, so long as it retains the custody and control of its property, may dispose of the same so as to pay the claims of one or more of its creditors, to the total exclusion of other equally meritorious claims, although it is at the time insolvent. In this respect a private business corporation has the same power to prefer creditors which is possessed by an individual. Its property and assets not being held in trust for equal distribution among all of its creditors, it may discriminate between them like a natural person, provided it pays honest debts and makes no distribution of its property among shareholders until all legal obligations to creditors have been discharged. (*West vs. Produce Co.* 6 Colo. App. 467, 41 Pac. 829; *Burchinell vs. Bennett* [Colo. App.] 52 Pac. 51; *Crymble vs. Mulvaney*, 21 Colo. 203, 40 Pac. 499; *Sutton vs. Dana*, 15 Colo. 98, 25 Pac. 90; *Gottlieb vs. Miller*, 154 Ill. 44, 39 N. E. 992; *Henderson vs. Trust Co.* 143 Ind. 561, 40 N. E. 516; *Jewelry Co. vs. Volfer*, 106 Ala. 205, 17 South. 525; *Hollins vs. Iron Co.* 150 U. S. 371, 382, 14 Sup. Ct. 127; *Railway vs. Ham*, 114 U. S. 587, 5 Sup. Ct. 1081; *Graham vs. Railroad Co.* 102 U. S. 148, 160; *Fogg vs. Blair*, 133 U. S. 534, 541, 10 Sup. Ct. 338; *Gould vs. Railway Co.* 52 Fed. 680.)

## WHEN BANK DEEMED PURCHASER OF CHECK DEPOSITED BY CUSTOMER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, January 6, 1898.

TAFT vs. QUINSIGAMOND NATIONAL BANK.

When without more a bank receives upon deposit a check indorsed without restriction, and gives credit for it to the depositor as cash in a drawing account, the form of the transaction is consistent with, and indicates a sale, in which, as with money so deposited, the check becomes the absolute property of the bank.

But evidence of usage or other circumstances is admissible to show that the paper was received by the bank as an agent for collection only.

Under the facts of this case, *Held*, that the bank took the check as purchaser.

BARKER, J.: The action is said by the bill of exceptions to be a suit to recover the amount of a check deposited by the plaintiff in the defendant bank, and credited to him upon deposit, and afterwards charged back by the bank.

The declaration has two counts—one for refusal to pay the plaintiff's check drawn upon the defendant, and the other upon an account in which the defendant is debited with the amounts of the plaintiff's deposits, and with the protest fees on his dishonored check, and is credited with the amount of his checks paid by the defendant; the balance being the amount for which, with interest, the court below found for the plaintiff.

Whether the bank was indebted to the plaintiff, and bound to honor his check, depended upon the dealings with reference to the check which he deposited on August 2, 1897, and the amount of which was charged back upon the writing up of his pass book, on November 19, 1897.

The defendant contends that the finding that it became at any time a purchaser of the deposited check was unwarranted. But the purchase of negotiable paper by a bank is as clearly within its legitimate powers as is the collection of such paper by the bank as an agent. The deposit of money by a customer to his credit in a drawing account, without more, creates between the bank and the customer the relation "of debtor and creditor, not of agent and principal." (*Carr vs. Bank*, 107 Mass. 45.) So, when, without more, a bank receives upon deposit a check indorsed without restriction, and gives credit for it to the depositor as cash in a drawing account, the form of the transaction is consistent with, and indicates, a sale, in which, as with money so deposited, the check becomes the absolute property of the banker.

The matter may be regulated by statute, as in the State of New York, or there may be general usages of business obtaining in the locality which color the transaction. So, a bank, by general notices printed on its pass books or deposit slips, or otherwise brought to the knowledge of its depositor, or by agreement with the particular depositor as to his own deposits, or by crediting negotiable paper as paper, and not as cash, or by a particular contract in any special instance, may define its position as that of agent or purchaser.

Usually the cases in which a bank is held to have been only an agent for collection have, as a controlling element, evidence of usage or notice or particular agreement. In the present case there was no evidence of usage or custom, nor was it shown that the defendant informed its customers by notices upon its pass books or deposit slips, or otherwise, that it accepted deposits of commercial paper only as an agent for collection. Nor was it shown either that such was its general arrangement with the plaintiff, or that he understood that it was the arrangement ordinarily made by the defendant with its depositors.

The conversation between the plaintiff and the teller at the time when the deposit was made is consistent with the theory that the bank took the check as an absolute purchaser, relying for reimbursement upon the plaintiff's liability as indorser if the

check should not be paid, or the theory that the bank took the check as a conditional purchaser, with the option of retransferring its ownership to the plaintiff upon ascertaining, within a reasonable time, that the check was not honored upon presentment to the drawee, as well as with the defendant's theory that it took the check as an agent for collection. It is not disputed that no information was given by the bank to the plaintiff that there was difficulty in collecting the check until September 8, 1897. From that time, until the amount of the check was charged back to the plaintiff in the writing up of his pass book on November 19, 1897, there were frequent interviews and communications, none of which are decisive in favor of either party, between the plaintiff and the defendant's officers, with reference to the check.

It seems that, upon the receipt of the check, the defendant sent it to its Boston correspondent, who, having no correspondent near Edgemont, S. D., where the bank on which the check was drawn was located, mailed the check in a letter directed to that bank, and that the drawee has never admitted receiving the letter. Between September 8 and November 19 the plaintiff knew of the defendant's efforts to find the check, and to induce the maker to pay the check or to give a duplicate of it. In this interval the plaintiff's checks were honored by the defendant at times when his account would not have been enough to meet them if the amount of the missing check had been charged back, and on October 23 his pass book was written up by the bank without charging back this amount. In due course of mail, the defendant's Boston correspondent should have received on August 21, at the latest, an answer to its letter inclosing the check to the drawee.

It cannot be said that these circumstances show conclusively that the bank took the deposited check as an agent for collection, and the finding that it became a purchaser must stand. This finding makes all questions as to the negligence of the defendant or of its correspondent immaterial.

The defendant, having no right to charge back the amount of the deposited check, was a debtor to the plaintiff for money which the latter could recover upon demand, and the refusal to rule that the plaintiff's damages were merely nominal was right. (See *Winslow vs. Bank*, 171 Mass. —, 51 N. E. 16.) Exceptions overruled.

#### LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS—VALIDITY OF STATUTE REQUIRING THEM TO KNOW OF BANK'S CONDITION.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma, July 30, 1898.

WINFIELD vs. OTT.

Sections 1 and 3 of Chapter 7 ("Bank Depositors") of the Statutes of Oklahoma of 1893, provide that it is the duty of every person or officer, including directors, to know the condition of the bank or banking institution with which he is connected, ignorance of which shall be no defense to a civil action brought under the provisions of this Act. These sections create a rule of duty upon such persons or officers, including directors, which is voluntarily assumed by them upon the incorporation of the bank or banking institution, and the acceptance by them of their various offices. They must know the condition of the bank or banking institutions with which they are connected, as to solvency. And they are not in violation of the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The petition in this case charged that the Farmers and Merchants' Bank was a banking corporation, duly organized and doing business at Blackwell, Okl. Ter.; that the defendant was a director thereof; that on October 11, 1895, the bank received a deposit from the plaintiff upon an open account, subject to plaintiff's check, of the sum

of \$550; that on October 24, 1895, the bank, by reason of insolvency, utterly failed and ceased to do business; and the plaintiff averred that at the time of the reception of the deposit by the Farmers and Merchants' Bank it was wholly insolvent, and in failing circumstances, and that no part of the sum had been repaid. Judgment was prayed for in the sum of \$550, with interest. General denial. No evidence was offered to the effect that the defendant had any knowledge that the bank was insolvent at the time of the reception of the deposit. The plaintiff's evidence was demurred to for the reason that it did not show that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The demurrer was overruled by the court, to which the defendant excepted. The defendant offered no evidence, but rested.

Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and this judgment was affirmed.

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*STOPPING PAYMENT OF CHECK—LIABILITY OF BANK FOR FAILING TO CONFORM TO DIRECTION.*

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Term, January, 1899.

**ELDER vs. THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.**

The pass book of a customer of a bank contained a printed statement that it was agreed "that the bank shall not be responsible for the execution of an order to stop payment of a check previously drawn; that the bank will endeavor to execute such orders, but that no liability shall be created by a failure so to do, and that no rule, usage or custom shall be construed to create such liability."

It seems that this clause did not absolve the bank from the duty of exercising ordinary care, and that it was liable to a customer, who had sent it a stop-payment order as to a check, which had been entered in the books of the bank, for paying the check, through an oversight, when it came in through the clearing-house.

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**BEEKMAN, P. J.:** The plaintiff had an account with the defendant. On March 3, 1898, he drew against the account a check dated March 8, 1898, for the sum of \$40, to the order of the Adek Manufacturing Company. On March 5 he sent a notice in writing to the defendant not to pay it. This notice was duly received, and in accordance therewith and pursuant to the practice of the defendant in such cases, an entry of the receipt of such notice was made by the paying teller of the bank in a book which was kept for the purpose, and a similar entry was also made by the bookkeeper in his ledger against Elder's account. Notwithstanding this, when the check in question came in through the clearing-house, it was paid, through an oversight, as the bank officials testify, and this action was brought for the purpose of recovering the amount.

The only defense interposed by the defendant bank which calls for consideration on our part is that by express agreement with the plaintiff, made before the check in question was drawn, it was exempted from any liability whatsoever in such a case. The agreement thus set forth, with other matters not material to the question here presented, was printed upon the inside of the cover of plaintiff's pass book, and reads as follows: "It is further agreed that the bank shall not be responsible for the execution of an order to stop payment of a check previously drawn; that the bank will endeavor to execute such orders, but that no liability shall be created by failure so to do, and that no rule, usage or custom shall be construed to create such liability."

It appears that the pass book in question was substituted for a previous one which the plaintiff had received when he originally became a depositor in the bank, and which did not contain any such stipulation. The plaintiff testifies that he did not read the alleged agreement, and was not aware of what it contained at the time the check in question was drawn. The counsel for the defendant claims that there

is evidence in the case tending to show the contrary, but it is unnecessary for us to pass upon this question, which is one of fact and which it must be assumed the trial justice determined in favor of the plaintiff. But even assuming that the fact had been otherwise found, we are still of the opinion that under the circumstances the defendant was not relieved by the agreement from the consequences of its negligent act.

Undoubtedly in the absence of any agreement, the bank was bound to respect the notice which it had received, and for a failure to observe the directions of its depositor in that regard, it would have been clearly liable. The check was a mere order upon the bank to pay from the depositor's account according to the instructions in that respect contained therein, and was subject to revocation by the drawer at any time before it was paid; and if the bank should pay after notice of such revocation, it would be held to have paid out its own funds, and could not, therefore, charge its depositor with the amount, but must bear the loss itself. The agreement in question is, therefore, one which is in derogation of the common law in such cases, and being framed by the defendant itself for its own benefit, must be strictly construed.

It will be observed that such agreement does not declare unconditionally that for the failure to observe a stop order, the bank shall not be liable, but it invites the assent of its depositors to the engagement by agreeing that it will endeavor to execute such orders. This is a most important qualification, and was doubtless inserted as an assurance to them that the bank would still exercise some care in the matter. Indeed, it can scarcely be credited that any bank could obtain depositors of any account under an agreement that under no circumstances should it be responsible for a failure to observe their directions with respect to the stoppage of checks. The defendant, it will be observed, did not refuse to receive any such notices; indeed, the evidence in the case shows that it not only recognized the right of its depositors in that regard, but also provided a method of registering such notices or orders, so as to assure the proper observance of them by its clerks, thus acknowledging the obligation which it had assumed to "endeavor to execute such orders." Upon a proper construction of the language used in the agreement, we are of the opinion that its fair import was that the defendant should not be liable if in good faith it paid the check that had been stopped, unless it failed properly to fulfill its agreement to endeavor to comply with the depositor's direction. In other words, the promise to make such endeavor necessarily imported the exercise by the bank of at least ordinary care in so doing. Any other construction than this would not only render the engagement meaningless, but also most injuriously misleading to depositors.

The agreement, then, is to be construed as if it read as follows (the words inserted by us being italicized): "It is further agreed that the bank shall not be responsible for the execution of an order to stop payment of a check previously drawn; that the bank will endeavor to execute such orders, but that no liability shall be created by failure so to do, *where the bank has exercised ordinary care in that regard*, and that no rule, usage or custom shall be construed to create such liability."

The courts are not prone to construe instruments in such a way as to support a waiver of liability for negligence. (*Appleby vs. Erie County Savings Bank*, 62 N. Y. 12; *Allen vs. Williamsburgh Savings Bank*, 89 id. 314; *Mynard vs. Syracuse, etc.*, R. R. Co. 71 id. 180.)

The first two cases above cited bear upon the liability of a Savings bank for the payment of money to the wrong person. In the first case the by-law of the bank read:

"Although the bank will endeavor to prevent fraud upon its depositors, yet all payments to persons producing the pass books issued by the bank shall be valid payment to discharge the bank."

In commenting upon the rule, Church, Ch. J. giving the opinion of the court, says (p. 17):

"But these rules do not dispense with the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the officers of the bank. If, by a regulation designed to prevent fraud upon depositors, which by the rules the bank promised to 'endeavor' to do, a fact or circumstance is brought to the knowledge of the officers, which is calculated to, and ought to excite the suspicion and inquiry of an ordinarily careful person, it is clearly the duty of the officers to institute such inquiry, and a failure to do so is negligence for which the bank would be liable, and such, I understand, is the doctrine of the cases cited by the defendant. The officers of these institutions are held to the exercise of reasonable care and diligence."

The second case above cited is substantially to the same effect.

The third case is one against a common carrier, where the latter claimed exemption from liability for its negligence under an agreement contained in the contract of shipment to "release and discharge the said company from all claims, demands and liabilities of every kind and character whatsoever, for or on account of or connected with any damage or injury to or the loss of said stock, or any portion thereof, from whatsoever cause arising."

It was there held that while taken literally, the language would include a loss from negligence, it would not be so construed, the Court saying (p. 188):

"Every presumption is against an intention to contract for immunity for not exercising ordinary diligence in the transaction of any business, and hence the general rule is that contracts will not be so construed, unless expressed in unequivocal terms."

It will be noticed that the court rests the principle of its decision not upon law which is peculiar to common carriers, but upon a rule applicable to all contracts.

We are clearly of the opinion that the construction which we have been given to the agreement in question is sustained by both reason and authority, and as the record discloses evidence enough to support the finding of the trial justice that the defendant had been negligent, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.

GILDERSLEEVE and GIEGERICH, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

#### LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS—ACTION FOR DECEIT—JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.

Supreme Court of Nebraska, February 9, 1899.

STUART vs. BANK OF STAPLEHURST.

Directors of a National bank who, in simulated performance of the duties prescribed by the law applicable to such an institution, relative to the preparation and publication of advertisements, statements and reports, knowingly make and publish false statements and reports of the financial condition of the bank, with intent to deceive, and such matters are believed and acted upon by parties, to their damage, are liable for the damages, in an action for the deceit.

The liabilities which are fixed in the National Banking Law for violation of its provisions are not exclusive, and do not preclude the action for deceit.

The petition in the case at bar held to state a cause of action for deceit, and not for relief under the National Banking Law, and to present no Federal question for adjudication.

The statements and reports which are required and are made to the Comptroller, and published in the newspapers, have among their purposes that of conveyance of information to those persons, each or all, who contemplate dealings with the bank in which its financial condition enters as a vital matter.

HARRISON, C. J.: The defendant in error instituted this action in the District Court of Seward County, and alleged for cause that the plaintiff in error and parties

who were co-defendants were, at the times of the occurrences upon which the suit was predicated, directors of a National bank, in the business which its name indicates, in the city of Lincoln, and at various stated times made and published, or caused them to be published, in newspapers of general circulation in said city and in the State of Nebraska, certain false statements of fact of and concerning the bank of which they were directors, and its matters of business, and which related to its solvency and reliability; that such statements were made and published with a knowledge of their falsity, and with an intent to mislead and deceive the public and the defendant in error, and that the statements accomplished or served the purpose for which they were intended; that the defendant in error was thereby induced to deposit money to a large amount, stated in the petition, in the said bank, which was lost by reason of the insolvency and failure of the said bank.

The commencement of the action was of date February 25, 1895. On March 29, 1895, the plaintiff in error and his co-defendants filed an application or petition for the removal of the cause to the United States Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska. Said petition was accompanied by the requisite bond. On April 1, 1895, there was filed in the State court, for the plaintiff in error and each of his co-defendants, a demurrer to the petition. These were on April 5, 1895, overruled, and the application for removal was denied.

[The Court here considered a question of removal.]

An examination of the petition herein convinces us that it did not declare on any cause of action conferred by statute or United States law. It was not to enforce a liability arising solely by reason of the violation of any provision of the National Banking Law. There was in the petition a direct statement of an action for false representations, or more properly and generally stated, for deceit. Some of the acts declared upon may have been violation of the National Banking Act, but they were not relied upon as such, nor was a remedy sought under said Act. The petition for removal did not, in its statement of facts, present any stronger reason or cause for removal than was disclosed by the original petition in the action. There were some conclusions averred in it, but these did not strengthen it beyond its statements of facts.

The acts which constitute the basis for an action similar to the one at bar may be within or without the duties of officers or directors of a National bank, and they may be violative or not of the duties of the parties sued, as directors of a National bank, and the acts may furnish cause for a common-law action of deceit. (*Prescott vs. Haughey*, 65 Fed. 653; *Gerner vs. Thompson*, 74 Fed. 125; *Bank vs. Thoms*, 28 Wkly. Law Bul. 164; *Bartholomew vs. Bentley*, 15 Ohio, 660; *Mor. Priv. Corp.* § 573.) And any action which might accrue by reason of the same acts under the National Banking Law would not be exclusive of another action, and would not exclude the one of deceit. (*Prescott vs. Haughey, supra.*) It seems clear that the record disclosed on its face that the case was not one which could be removed, and that the State court did not lose its jurisdiction.

Another point of argument is that, in an action of deceit, it must appear that the representations alleged in the complaint were made directly to the complainant. We do not think this is tenable. The representations being made for the whole or any of the public, if seen, and relied and acted upon, by any person, and damages result, the right of action arises. (*Bank vs. Thoms, supra*; *Prewitt vs. Trimble*, 92 Ky. 176, 17 S. W. 356; *Tate vs. Bates*, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482; *Graves vs. Bank*, 10 Bush. 23; *Seale vs. Baker*, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S. W. 742; *Peek vs. Gurney*, 8 Moak. Eng. R. 1; *Westervelt vs. Demarest*, 46 N. J. Law, 37.)

It is also contended that the petition was defective in its joinder of the parties defendant in an action of deceit. The petition charged joint actions of the defendants, and the acts were such as might be done in combination; hence it was not

open to attack by demurrer for an improper joinder of parties. (Pom. Rem. & Rem. Rights, §§ 281, 307; *Stiles vs. White*, 11 Metc. [Mass.] 356; *White vs. Sawyer*, 16 Gray, 536; *Machine Co. vs. Keifer*, 134 Ill. 481, 25 N. E. 799; *Railroad Co. vs. Ross*, 142 Ill. 9, 31 N. E. 412; *City of Chicago vs. Babcock*, 148 Ill. 358, 32 N. E. 271.)

This disposes of all the questions argued which were raised by the assignments in the petition in error. There was another point presented, but it was not assigned for error in the petition, hence need not be considered. (*Post vs. Olmsted*, 47 Neb. 893, 66 N. W. 828.)

It follows that the judgment of the district court will be affirmed. Affirmed.

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## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

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Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

GRAND RAPIDS, Mich., March 24, 1899.

SIR: A bank receives for collection from a certain firm a note against one of its customers, and before it comes due receives instructions from the firm to accept at maturity whatever payment is offered and to hold the note for further instructions. A payment is made and the proceeds promptly remitted. Some time after that a telephone message comes to the bank with the question, alleged to come from a representative of the firm, whether the note is paid. The bank deems the question under the circumstances indelicate and a reflection on the credit of its customer. Is the bank legally constrained to answer that question?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—Having made the collection in the manner directed by the owners of the paper, and having remitted the proceeds, the bank is not legally obliged to do anything more. Whether it will answer further inquiries is a matter to be determined by its own judgment of what is proper and expedient.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

PHILADELPHIA, March 23, 1899.

SIR: Where is the drawee of a draft with a bill of lading attached to look for redress, if, after paying the draft, he discovers that the bill of lading was forged? Can he recover from the bank to whom he paid the draft, or from the bank which originally took it on deposit, or must the drawee stand the loss?

L. N. S.

*Answer.*—Whether the drawee could recover of either bank, would depend upon the circumstances of the case. If the bank to which the draft was paid had not altered its position, then undoubtedly he could recover from it the amount so paid, as money paid under a mistake of fact. But if that bank had presented the draft merely as a collecting agent, and had paid over the money before notice of the fraud, it would not be liable therefor. (See *National Park Bank vs. Seaboard Bank*, 114 N. Y. 28.)

And so, if the bank which first received the draft was only an agent, there could be no recovery from it after it had in good faith, and without notice, paid over the money. But if either bank acquired the title to the draft and bill of lading, so that it became a principal in the transaction, then it could not retain the money, but would be compelled to return the same to the drawee.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

HEALDSBURG, Cal., March 23, 1899.

SIR: Have stockholders of a bank a right to inspect any and all accounts; particularly those showing private dealings of customers of the bank. If so, would the fact of such stockholder's purpose being a malicious one justify the bank officials in refusing him access to such books?

BOOKKEEPER.



*Answer.*—The general rule is that, as a matter of abstract right, the stockholders of a corporation are entitled to examine its books and records at all reasonable times. But if this privilege is refused by the officers or directors, the stockholder must apply to the court for relief; and the rule is now well established that the court is not bound to allow an inspection, but the application is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. And as a rule of practice it is required that the stockholder show that his object is a proper one; and if it appears that his purpose is improper, or that the application is made merely to gratify his curiosity, it will be denied. (*People vs. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co.* 11 Hun, 1; S. C. 70 N. Y. 220; *People vs. Walker*, 9 Mich. 328; *Central, etc., R. R. Co., vs. Twenty, etc., Ry. Co.*, 53 How. Pa. [N. Y.] 45; *Commonwealth vs. Phoenix Iron Co.*, 105 Pa. St. 111; Cook on Stock and Stockholders [2d ed.] § 514.)

If it is made to appear that the purpose is a malicious one, then it is clear the court would not grant an inspection.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BEAUMONT, TEX., March 27, 1890.

SIR: Can a National bank be compelled to disclose to the taxing officers of a State its depositors' names and the amount due each for purposes of taxation? In the report of the Comptroller of the Currency for 1890 (Vol. 1, pp. 124, 202, 306) I noticed two or three decisions on this point. These decisions are apparently in conflict. By giving us the benefit of your valuable opinion you will assist us at arriving at a correct conclusion as to the law of the case, for which we will very much thank you.

PRESIDENT.

*Answer.*—The cases cited in the report of the Comptroller are *First National Bank of Youngstown vs. Hughes*, reported in Browne's National Bank Cases, page 176, and same vs. same, reported in Sixth Federal Reporter, page 737.

In the first of these it was held that the officers of a National bank cannot be compelled to exhibit the books of the bank to State officers for the purpose of furnishing a basis for State taxation of the deposits as against the depositors; and an injunction was granted restraining the auditor and prosecuting attorney from compelling this to be done.

In the second case the injunction was refused upon the ground that it was not proper to anticipate the action of the probate judge before whom the process was returnable, and though in this case the Federal court expressed the opinion that the State had the right to require an inspection of the books so as to ascertain the deposits of the bank's customers, this was not necessary to the decision of the case. The decision in the first case, therefore, has not been directly overruled.

**THE PHILADELPHIA EXPOSITION.**—From September 14 to November 30, 1890, there will be held in the city of Philadelphia, Pa., an exposition of American manufactures especially suited for export trade. It will be under the auspices of the Philadelphia Commercial Museum and the Franklin Institute, the latter organization having been for seventy-five years engaged in the promotion and encouragement of manufactures and the mechanical and useful arts. The former organization is also widely and favorably known, its object being to increase the export of American manufactures and products.

Extensive and well situated grounds have been secured and suitable buildings erected. The enterprise will be liberally aided by the city, the State and the Government.

The exposition will have for its especial object a proper exhibition of the products and manufactures of this country suited to the export trade. In connection with the exposition, the Second International Commercial Congress will be held. It is expected that numerous representatives of foreign chambers of commerce will be present, many of them representative buyers in the leading markets of the world. Opportunity will be offered for discussing the trade relations of the United States with those countries.

There has been a remarkable increase in our export trade in recent years, both of raw and manufactured products, and everything calculated to still further enlarge the demand for American goods is of great value to the business interests of the country. The Philadelphia Exposition will undoubtedly be the means of adding largely to our export trade. Information more in detail may be had by applying to the Director-General, W. P. Wilson, 233 South Fourth street, Philadelphia.

## INCREASING THE EARNINGS OF BANKS.

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The question of how the profits of a bank may be increased is always one of importance to bank managers, and especially in these times of close competition and low interest rates, and when the yield from investments in the best class of securities appears to be tending still lower.

Such conditions doubtless tempt many banks to look with more or less approval on enterprises that under more favorable circumstances would be regarded as doubtful and risky. Is it possible, as things now are, to increase the earnings of the banks without engaging in hazardous speculations? This is a query that is being seriously considered by many bankers, and upon an affirmative answer thereto depends the fate of the institutions over which they preside.

In an address before the New York State Bankers' Association, at its last annual convention, Hon. A. B. Hepburn called attention to the decline in interest rates, and the necessity of realizing the changes that were taking place in the returns on invested capital. Perhaps such a season as the present may be opportune for making a diligent inquiry into the subject of bank profits with a view of ascertaining whether any legitimate sources of revenue have been overlooked. Indeed, an inquiry of this sort would not be out of place at any time.

### THE PREVENTION OF LOSSES.

The first and most obvious way of enlarging the earnings of a bank is by reducing its losses to a minimum. As is well known there is no way of absolutely preventing such leaks, but by the adoption of tested safeguards it is possible to lessen the chances of defalcations and embezzlements and to provide against wasting the bank's funds by bad loans.

This ground has been so fully covered in the past that it is not the purpose to go over it again, but merely to call attention to the fact that in order to produce the best results a bank should adopt all reasonable expedients for preventing encroachments on its funds from the above-named sources. Loose methods of doing business are responsible for small profits in very many cases, and until everything possible is done to remedy the evils that are absorbing the earnings of the bank, it is time ill spent to search for new means of profit.

In the matter of preventing the raising of checks and drafts, are not the banks slow in adopting proper safeguards? Losses of this kind are by no means insignificant, yet the banks continue to issue drafts to strangers, often leave their blank checks where anyone can get hold of them, and in numerous ways invite the deprecations of the evilly-disposed. Few of the expedients suggested for preventing forging and raising checks have been used, yet they are not all impracticable, and some of them are inexpensive, easily used and would undoubtedly reduce the aggregate of bank losses.

Generally, too, where embezzlements occur, particularly if they have extended over a long period, it will be found in most cases that they might have been prevented had the ordinary precautions been taken.

### TRUST COMPANY FUNCTIONS.

There are few more remarkable developments in modern banking than the great prosperity attained by the institutions doing a trust company business. The func-

tions of these corporations are perhaps not within the domain of commercial banking, but there is no reason why a bank could not safely be granted the powers usually exercised by a trust company, especially in those States where there are no trust companies at present. In most States legislation would be necessary, but with concerted action this could doubtless be obtained in time.

The growth of trust companies is in part due to the fact that they are corporations better fitted than individuals to perform many important financial and fiduciary functions. That they are, as a rule, highly successful is well known. They are growing in numbers, and are even beginning, in some places, to absorb and supplant other banking institutions.

A bank with a charter granting it the right to exercise the functions of a trust company, to the extent that such functions were not opposed to the carrying on of a regular banking business, would have an added source of profit that would swell its annual earnings considerably. This could be done, too, with but little additional expense, without the multiplication of plants and machinery now necessary in conducting banks and trust companies as distinct institutions. If found desirable, however, the trust company department of a bank could be kept entirely separate from its commercial department.

It can not be doubted that in those localities where trust companies are at present unknown the bankers are losing a chance to make money by not availing themselves of the opportunity of adding to their banks a department for transacting such trust company functions as are not incompatible with the banking business. What are the powers and duties of these corporations may be ascertained by application to one of the many institutions represented in the *MAGAZINE'S* advertising pages. There has, perhaps, never before been so full a presentation of the advantages of this form of corporate organization as was set forth at the last annual meeting of the Trust Company Section of the American Bankers' Association, the complete proceedings of which appeared exclusively in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for September, 1898.

In some of the States where both banks and trust companies are authorized by law, a feeling of antagonism has developed between them, but it is believed that such friction has been due to jealousy because of some real or fancied advantage given to one class of institutions over the other, and not to any essentially hostile principles involved in their organization.

But in the great majority of States trust companies are unknown, and therefore such antagonism could be avoided by permitting the formation of trust departments as an adjunct to the banking business. A form of enterprise offering such safe opportunities for making money, and on lines closely allied to banking, is too important to be neglected, and is worthy of the careful study of all bankers who are seeking judiciously to extend their business.

There has been some complaint about the inequalities of taxation of banks and trust companies, it being claimed that the laws favor the trust companies. If there is more profit in running a bank than a trust company, there is nothing to prevent a bank from reorganizing under a trust company charter. Undoubtedly the trust companies are making money.

#### SAVINGS BANK DEPARTMENTS.

The accumulation of money in banks adds to its efficiency many fold, and with safety assured to depositors a large increase in such deposits ought to be recorded. It is a curious fact that the system of mutual Savings banks—that is banks whose profits belong solely to the depositors—has not become popular outside the New England and Middle States. There are those who contend that such a system is not adapted to the States generally denominated as Western. But why not? Let us

take, for example, the State of Indiana—and many other States might be included—which is largely engaged in manufacturing, having numerous wage-earners constantly employed at good pay. Is it not possible to find in every town of importance enough men of integrity and ability to manage the affairs of a Savings bank? Are the men of Indiana less honest and intelligent than those of New York? Are the State, county, city and school district bonds of Indiana less secure than those of New York?

In the State of New York the total resources of the Savings banks are over \$900,000,000, being greater than those of any other class of institutions under the supervision of the State Banking Department, and almost exceed the combined resources of such other institutions. There is no good reason why similar proportionate results could not be obtained in every State, especially wherever large numbers of wage-earners are employed. There is no direct profit in conducting a mutual Savings bank, but indirectly the commercial banks would benefit by the enhanced prosperity of the people. The available capital of any given community will in a short time be doubled and trebled by a properly-managed Savings bank.

Where it is not possible to introduce the mutual Savings bank system, the existing commercial banks would doubtless find it a source of ultimate profit and of great benefit to the people to establish Savings departments of their banks. It goes without saying that no legislative precaution for safeguarding the depositors should be omitted.

#### THE SMALL DEPOSITOR AND BORROWER.

There are city banks that appear to have forgotten the Latin maxim, "*Nihil est aliud magnum quam multa minuta.*" (Nor is there anything that hath so great a power as the aggregate of small things.)

Many of them refuse to open an account with a depositor who has less than \$500 to start with, and thus a great number of people of small means are deprived of the convenience of having a bank account. The banks also are deprived of a very important source of profit. A bank that made it known that it would open an account with anybody presenting a minimum of \$50, and would accept subsequent deposits of, say, \$5, would doubtless be surprised at the amount of money that would thus be added to its deposits. Such deposits would probably be more profitable, in proportion, than many larger accounts, as there would not be so much work to be done for nothing. The small depositor contains possibilities of profit not to be despised in these days of close competition. Averages of the deposits in the Savings banks of New York are small, but in the aggregate they make up a mighty sum approaching a thousand million of dollars.

Another source of profit often neglected is the small borrower. The Bank of France is said to discount a million pieces of paper annually below the value of \$10 each, and the Bank of France is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, financial concerns in the world.

Workmen, agriculturists and small tradesmen would be greatly benefited by being able to obtain bank accommodations in limited amounts, and by attending to the wants of this class of customers banks could augment their incomes without adding to their risks.

In a country having no real bank notes (our present National bank notes being only a form of Government paper nominally issued by the banks), every effort should be made to get the surplus money into the banks, and thus increase its utility in effecting exchanges of property and transfers of credit.

As the country grows older, the importance of catering to people of moderate means will be more fully recognized by the banks than it is now, but it is not too soon for the live banker to turn his attention to this new field.

## SAFE DEPOSIT BUSINESS.

This is a branch of business for which banks are peculiarly adapted, and it is already carried on in connection with most of the banks. In the large cities the two kinds of business are frequently separated.

It is not improbable, however, that many banks overlook the opportunities of profit to be found in caring for the securities, books and other valuables of their customers. With the rapid growth of the country in population and wealth the demand for such accommodations will increase, and the bank is wise that makes provision for it. Fortunately this may be done in many instances without incurring additional expense. In furnishing safe-deposit boxes for individuals and firms, and providing storage room for valuables and books and records, the bank will find an additional chance of making money. A bank should be the most secure spot to be found in a town or city, the safest place to keep money or valuables, affording protection from evil-disposed persons and the destructive elements. This is a legitimate branch of business closely related to banking that can doubtless be made a source of profit. Its possibilities will certainly be found worthy of investigation.

## PROFITS INCREASED BY CONSOLIDATION.

Bank profits are kept down below a fair standard in many places because there are more banks than necessary. This fact is becoming recognized, and as a result there is a well-defined movement toward bank consolidation. This movement so far has been confined principally to the large cities, but it might be extended to smaller places with profit to the banks and without detriment to the people. Anything like a banking trust or monopoly is not desirable, and for this reason the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* has not favored the concentration of the banking business of the country in the hands of a few large banks with branches; competition is desirable in banking as in other business, but there are certain limits beyond which a bank may not go with safety to itself or its depositors. Where the consolidation of banks is actuated by a desire to dispense with useless machinery for transacting a certain amount of business, or to terminate unhealthful competition, it is wise and beneficial.

There are places where more capital is employed in banking than there is a demand for, and no time should be lost in getting the business on a paying basis by liquidations and consolidations. The growth in deposits also tends to make it unnecessary to employ so much capital in banking as formerly.

## EXTENDING THE USE OF CHECKS.

Most of the agitation and discussion about what are sometimes, perhaps, contemptuously called country bank checks, begins with the assumption that such instruments are a nuisance and ought to be suppressed. There is an association (not of bankers, however), engaged in the attempt to persuade country merchants not to use such checks in making remittances.

The New York Clearing-House Association has recently adopted a rule imposing a charge varying from one-tenth to one-quarter of one per cent. for collecting such checks. If this charge is intended as a tax to prevent the use of such instruments in paying other than local debts, it would seem to be calculated to reduce the effectiveness of bank credits to a considerable extent. The fact that bank checks have been available for use at par in any part of the country has made them but little different from a genuine credit bank note, and it would not seem a proper policy to attempt to stamp out their use. The practice of city banks in crediting depositors with these items as cash, before they are collected, is certainly pernicious.

Doubtless the bankers themselves are chiefly to blame for whatever evils pertain to the use of country checks. Properly handled, they might be made a source of convenience and profit to all concerned. The country banker is hardly looking to

his own interests in favoring any movement that aims to limit the use to which his depositors' checks may be put. He should rather seek to encourage the extension of their use as much as possible. City bankers may not look at the matter from the same standpoint, but many of them realize that the proper remedy is not in trying to stamp out the country checks, but in providing adequate banking machinery for handling them at a profit.

The use of bank checks in payment of obligations of all kinds, including wages, ought to be increased rather than diminished, and if it were everywhere the law that the certification of a check acted as an assignment of that much of the deposit to the person presenting it for certification, there would be no reason why certified checks could not be made to perform substantially all the functions of bank notes.

#### LOANS ON REAL ESTATE.

Banks having large capital and surplus could in many cases find profitable employment for it in making loans on real estate. There is a conflict of opinion as to the propriety of making such loans by commercial banks. Loans of this character may not be liquid enough for a bank whose deposits are payable on demand, but that they are safe and desirable when carefully made can not be doubted. Some of the most conservatively managed Savings banks of the country loan a large proportion of their deposits on such security, and experience has confirmed the judiciousness of this course.

In the past the loaning of money on real estate has been largely in the hands of gigantic mortgage and insurance corporations, some of the former being very badly managed, and as a consequence there were numerous disastrous failures which brought the business into disrepute. It was the practice of some of these concerns to make loans on unimproved and unproductive lands, the amount loaned frequently being more than the land was worth. In fact the loan was made on the recommendation of an agent whose sole interest in the matter was the amount of commission he received, and as this was a certain percent. of the face of the loan, it can be imagined that he did not scruple to make the loan as large as possible.

The loaning of money on real estate by banks is indispensable if such institutions are to perform their proper functions in the agricultural communities. A local bank, whose officers personally know the borrower and are acquainted thoroughly with the productive character of the land offered as security for the loan, can carry on a business of this sort much more safely than an outside corporation.

The growth in bank deposits is causing many banks to reduce their capital. Perhaps a safe means of employing redundant funds might be found in a careful expansion of real estate loans. National banks are prohibited from loaning money on real estate, but probably they could find means of making such advances to borrowers without any serious infraction of the law. Loans to farmers on real estate security may be made a source of profit, and with proper care they do not involve a bank in any more risk than is incurred in loaning on any other kind of security.

#### BANKING IN OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.

The status of American incorporated banks in Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines is yet to be defined by Congress. American banking institutions have not taken secure root in foreign soil, but since these countries are all likely to become American territory, they will furnish a fresh and profitable field for banking enterprise. Great Britain has her banks established all over the world. The chartered banks of Canada are quick to seize every new opportunity for enlarging their business by establishing new branches wherever there is a promise of business.

Our new possessions ought to offer exceptional advantages to American banks to extend their operations beyond the boundaries of the United States, and though the field is new and untried, it is a promising one.

## COLLECTION OF COUNTRY CHECKS.

### *RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.*

#### AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION, ADOPTED MARCH 18, 1899.

Add to Section 8 as follows: The clearing-house committee shall have power to establish rules and regulations regarding collections outside of the City of New York, by members of the association or banks or trust companies or others clearing through such members, and the rates to be charged for such collections, and also providing for enforcement of the same. The committee may from time to time make any additions to, or changes in, such rules and regulations as it deems judicious. After any rule or regulation upon the subject has been once established, it shall not, however, be altered or rescinded until it has been in force at least three months, except by majority vote of the clearing-house association.

#### RULES AND REGULATIONS REGARDING COLLECTIONS OUTSIDE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

Pursuant to authority conferred upon it by the Constitution of the New York Clearing-House Association, the clearing-house committee of said association establishes the following rules and regulations regarding collections outside of the City of New York, by members of the association, or banks, trust companies, or others clearing through such members, and the rates to be charged for such collections, and also regarding enforcement of the provisions hereof.

Sec. 1. These rules and regulations shall apply to all members of the association, and to all banks, trust companies or others clearing through such members. The parties to which the same so apply are hereinafter described as collecting banks.

Sec. 2. For items collected for the accounts of, or in dealings with, the Governments of the United States, the State of New York, or the City of New York, and for items payable in the cities of Boston, Mass., Providence, R. I., Albany, N. Y., Troy, N. Y., Jersey City, N. J., Bayonne, N. J., Hoboken, N. J., Newark, N. J., Philadelphia, Penn., Baltimore, Md., the charge shall in all cases be discretionary with the collecting bank and the same shall not be governed by the provisions of these rules and regulations.

Sec. 3. For all items from whomsoever received (except on those points declared discretionary in Section 2), payable at points in Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin, the collecting banks shall charge not less than one-tenth of one per cent. (1-10%) of the amount of the items respectively.

Sec. 4. For all items from whomsoever received payable at points in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indian Territory, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming and Canada, the collecting banks shall charge not less than one-quarter of one per cent. ( $\frac{1}{4}\%$ ) of the amount of the items respectively.

Sec. 5. In case the charge upon any item at the rates above specified does not equal ten cents (10c.), the collecting bank shall charge not less than that sum ; but all items received from any one person at the same time and payable at the same place may be added together and treated as one item for the purpose of fixing the amount chargeable.

Sec. 6. *The charges herein specified shall in all cases be collected at the time of deposit or not later than the tenth day of the following calendar month. No collecting bank shall, directly or indirectly, allow any abatement, rebate, or return for or on account of such charges or make in any form, whether of interest on balances or otherwise, any compensation therefor.*

Sec. 7. Every collecting bank, trust company or other corporation not a member of the association, but clearing through a member thereof, shall forthwith adopt by its board of directors a resolution in the following terms, and file a certified copy thereof with the association as evidence as therein specified :

*Whereas, This corporation has acquired the privilege of clearing and making exchange of its checks through the New York Clearing-House Association, and is subject to its rules and regulations ; Now, therefore, Be it resolved, That this corporation hereby in all respects assents to and agrees to be bound by and to comply with all rules and regulations regarding collections outside of the City of New York, which may be established pursuant to the constitution of said association, and that the President of this corporation is hereby instructed to file a certified copy of this resolution with the clearing-house association as evidence of such assent and agreement on the part of this corporation.*

Sec. 8. In case any member of the association shall learn that these rules and regulations have been violated by any of the collecting banks, it shall immediately report the facts to the chairman of the clearing-house committee, or in his absence, to the Manager of the association. Upon receiving information from any source that there has been a violation of the same, said chairman, or in his absence said Manager, shall call a meeting of the committee. The committee shall investigate the facts and determine whether a formal hearing is necessary. In case the committee so concludes, it shall instruct the Manager to formulate charges and present them to the committee. A copy of the charges, together with written notice of the time and place fixed for hearing regarding the same, shall be served upon the collecting bank charged with such violation, which shall have the right at the hearing to introduce such relevant evidence and submit such argument as it may desire. The committee shall hear whatever relevant evidence may be offered by any person and whatever arguments may be submitted, and shall determine whether the charges are sustained. In case it reaches the conclusion that they are, the committee shall call a special meeting of the association and report thereto the facts with its conclusions. *If the report of the committee is approved by the association, the collecting bank charged with such violation shall pay to the association the sum of five thousand dollars, and in case of a second violation of these rules and regulations, any collecting bank may also in the discretion of the association be excluded from using its privileges directly or indirectly, and, if it is a member, expelled from the association.*

*Resolved, That the foregoing rules and regulations are hereby established and adopted and shall take effect upon the third day of April, 1899.*

[A true copy]      WILLIAM SHERER, *Manager.*

The following interpretation of Section 5 was issued by the clearing-house on March 30 :

DEAR SIR : The attention of the clearing-house committee having been called to the fact that different interpretations have been made of the meaning of the words "at



the same place." in Section 5 of the Rules regarding collections, as formulated by this committee, and it not having been intended that the word "place" in the said section should have the same meaning as the word "point" used in the preceding Sections 3 and 4; Therefore, this committee declares that the said Section 5 shall be read so as to permit all items payable within the States, Territories and districts enumerated in either Section 3 or 4, to be added together and treated as one item when "received from any one person at the same time."

By order,

W. A. NASH, *Chairman Clearing-House Committee.*

WILLIAM SHERER, *Manager.*

**KENTUCKY BANK CASES.**—On April 3 Mr. Justice White delivered the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in the Kentucky bank tax cases, one opinion covering those of the Citizens' Savings Deposit and Farmers and Traders' Bank against the city of Owensboro and County of Daviess. These were State banks, holding charters under the general law of 1856, one provision of which was that if banks incorporated in accordance with its terms would in writing accept all its requirements, they should thereafter be free from local taxation in excess of a certain named rate. The law contained a further provision reserving to the Legislature the right to alter, amend or repeal the charters granted by it. The banks named filed their written acceptances as provided. A few years ago the Legislature passed what is known as the Hewitt law, increasing the rate of taxation over that fixed in the law of 1856, and the banks sought to prevent the collection of it on the ground that the law was in violation of the contract between them and the State. The Court of Appeals held that the reserved power to alter, amend or repeal charters took the Hewitt law out of the violative class, and directed that the increased taxation be collected. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

The law also undertook to tax the franchises and intangible property of National banks in the State, and the Owensboro National Bank sued to restrain the collection of the assessment against it. The Court of Appeals said the law was good, but the United States Supreme Court decides otherwise, holding that the power of the State to tax National banks was limited to the taxing of shares of stock in the hands of shareholders. The judgment of the Court of Appeals as to this was therefore reversed. The full text of these decisions will appear later in the Law Department of the MAGAZINE.

**GROWTH OF OUR MANUFACTURES.**—In an interesting article by John P. Young on "The Menace to England's Commercial Supremacy," published in the April "Forum," we find the following:

"The Carnegie Company alone produces nearly 2,000,000 tons of pig-iron per annum, which is almost as much as the total joint output of Germany, France, and Belgium thirty years ago, and more than the total iron output of the United States up to the year 1872. The same works produce annually about 1,000,000 tons of Bessemer steel ingots and 650,000 tons of rails—figures which exceed the annual output of all the works in Great Britain up to 1830—and the same firm has lately made arrangements to produce at Homestead about 1,000,000 tons of open-hearth steel annually, which is more than the total open-hearth steel output of France, Belgium, and Germany combined, and considerably more than the total output of this description of steel in the United States, as a whole, up to 1894. \* \* \* This gigantic corporation does not stand alone. The Illinois Steel Company has also much larger resources of production than any concern in Europe; and so also has the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company in another and not less interesting region. \* \* \*

The prodigious home market, which a population of 73,000,000 affords, has called into existence enormous works, and the cheapness of the articles produced by them is due primarily not to the superiority of the American artisan over the English, but to the abundance of the raw material of manufacture and its better quality and to the fact that everything in America is done on a vast scale."

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

### 4 NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL POINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.

#### ISSUING CERTIFICATES OF STOCK.

In our former chapter the issuing of certificates of stock was introduced. One thing let me say of prime importance, and that is that every certificate of stock after being properly signed by the President and Cashier must have the seal of the bank affixed, otherwise it will not have the proper legal value. A bank is a corporation, and as such should have a seal, its impress to be affixed to all official papers of a legal character. It is customary to affix the seal in the space left for it in the lower left-hand corner of the certificate.

In the issuing of certificates they should be made out in the name of the *bona-fide* subscriber or owner. Some banks have the certificates filled out in the name of some officer of the bank, he then transferring them to a genuine stockholder. This, however, is an unsafe plan, as I have had occasion to witness, and has opened the way for irregular and fraudulent transactions.

Every stub and each certificate in the certificate book should be fully accounted for. If a certificate accidentally becomes mutilated or blotted, or filled out erroneously, it should be left in, its place in the certificate book being marked "void," with the reason, and the next stub and certificate in order be used in its place, without however changing the number.

When certificates are regularly cancelled they should always be neatly attached to their stub, so that both stub and certificate can be read and compared at any time.

The issue of certificates being complete, and the records on the stubs of the certificate book having been made full and clear, the next thing to be considered is the proper records to be kept regarding the stock, not only as regards the issue but also relating to the transfers of ownership, which in some banks are numerous, but they will occur in all banks to a greater or less degree, and unless the records are kept in a clear and systematic manner confusion will be sure to take place.

In many banks that I have seen, even where the running work was systematically performed, the capital stock records were badly confused, the idea seeming to be that once the certificates are issued the records cease there, often taking no account of the transfers, the record of which is fully as important as of the issues.

As was said in a previous chapter, the necessary books in which to keep the proper record of stock transactions are the certificate book, the stock register and transfer book, and the stock ledger. Having described the certificate book in the January number, the next book to consider is the stock register and transfer book. This is in reality two books combined. Some small banks may consider this book unnecessary, but my experience leads me to advise it as a book of ready reference, and if carefully kept will be found very satisfactory.

The form for such a book most commonly used is shown in form No. 1. The left-hand side is used for the record of the issues of stock, the items being obtained

\* Continued from the March number, page 301. This series of articles commenced in the MAGAZINE for August, 1898, page 249.

# Stock Register and Transf

Issues			Names	Date
Date	Cert. No.	Shares		
1895				
Jan'y 7	1	200	Jas. L. Pease	
"	2	150	L. B. Brown	1895 June
"	3	100	Jas. L. Billings	
"	4	100	W. L. Simpson	
"	5	150	J. H. Smith	Sept
"	6	150	S. P. Jones	Aug
"	7	100	A. B. Wilson	
"	8	50	W. H. Brown	
June 5	9	50	E. J. Brooks	
"	10	25	Jas. Peebles	
"	11	75	L. B. Brown	
Aug 9	12	50	S. B. Brewer	
"	13	100	S. P. Jones	
Sept 11	14	50	Joseph Sampson	
"	15	100	J. H. Smith	
		1450		

FORM No. 2.

ser Book No 2.

Transfers

Page	Former No.	New Nos and Certificates	Total Transfers
5 5		$\frac{9}{50} \quad \frac{10}{25} \quad \frac{11}{75}$	150
11		$\frac{14}{50} \quad \frac{15}{100}$	150
9		$\frac{12}{50} \quad \frac{13}{100}$	150
	2		
	2		
	2		
	6		
	6		
	5		
	5		450



from the stubs of the certificate book, and the right-hand columns are used for recording the transfers.

The diagram shows the issue of the original stock January 2, 1895, 1,000 shares. During the period between January 2 and September 11 there were issued 450 more shares and the transfers show the cancelling and transferring of 450 shares, which of course leaves the original 1,000 shares. In explanation of this diagram one instance will suffice. L. B. Brown, who as an original stockholder held certificate No. 2 for 150 shares, disposes of fifty shares to E. J. Brooks, who receives certificate No. 9, and twenty five shares to Jas. Peebles as shown by certificate No. 10, this leaves Mr. Brown with only seventy-five shares, and the old certificate for 150 shares being cancelled a new certificate for his seventy five shares, No. 11, is issued to him.

Another very good form, a pattern much in use, is seen in form No. 2. This form, originally used and introduced by the author as economizing space, is used by placing the records of the transfers in the form of what appears to be fractions, the number above the line representing the new certificate number and the number below the line representing the number of shares transferred. Thus what appears to be a fraction  $\frac{9}{50}$  in reality states that fifty shares of L. B. Brown's stock have been transferred and issued as new certificate No. 9. The total of the transfers being extended in the extreme right hand column simplifies the determining of the grand total, and thus keeping track of the stock.

From either of these forms a list of the existing stockholders can be very readily made by simply taking the names, and the amount of stock standing opposite them, of those against whom no transfers appear, and the total should agree with the actual stock outstanding as shown by the capital stock account on the general ledger. This can be verified by the certificate book, as all cancelled certificates having been pasted to their original stubs, the stubs to which no certificates are attached represent the outstanding stock.

While upon the question of transfers some suggestions may not be amiss. A transfer naturally refers to a change of ownership for the whole or a part of the original stock. In either case the original or old certificate should always be cancelled, and if the whole be disposed of to a new owner a new certificate should be issued for the whole amount. If only a portion of the stock be disposed of then a new certificate should be issued to the new shareholder for his portion, and a new one issued to the old stockholder for the balance held by him.

I mention this particularly because I have seen transfers made by simply noting the same upon the back of the old certificate, where a fractional part has been disposed of, and simply a new certificate issued to the new stockholder for his portion of the old certificate. Such methods as this are exceedingly irregular, and will surely bring trouble.

In cancelling the old certificates they should be stamped across the face or marked with red ink, in large letters, the word "cancelled," giving the date, and the signatures of both officials should be mutilated, so if by any accident a once cancelled certificate should be removed it could not be used. A good method of mutilating the signatures is to cut a triangular piece out of the bottom of the certificate thus  $\Delta$ , so that the point of the angle will extend through the name, thus mutilating or destroying one or two letters.

Many banks, recognizing the fact that transfers to be legal must be made upon the books, use a blank form for transfer or assignment similar to form No. 3.

These are generally bound in a book, two on a page, and although appearing to have a stub they are not intended to be detached, the stub simply completing the record, from which the items can be posted to the stock register and to the stock ledger. The bank Cashier, or proper officer, fills up one of the blank transfers, and the party making the transfer signs it, and the signature is witnessed; this makes

the transaction legal and binding. In small banks where the transfers are few the mere endorsement of the transfer or assignment that is usually printed upon the back of the certificate of stock is sufficient, in fact this will at any time constitute a legal assignment if the signature is witnessed, but the records are more complete and full where the transfer book is used.

No transfers should ever be made except upon presentation of the old certificate. If the old certificate should unfortunately be lost or destroyed, the stockholder should give a bond of indemnity to the bank for double the amount of the stock so lost before a duplicate is issued. In so issuing a duplicate the stub of the new certificate should state clearly the circumstances.

When a certificate is presented to the bank for cancellation and transfer, unless the party presenting it is well known, or is identified, it is safe for the officers to refuse until this rule is complied with. A certificate may come into a party's hands accidentally or wrongfully, and in either case he would have no right to have it transferred and a new certificate issued to him.

It is well also to carefully examine the endorsements to the transfers on the back of the certificates where not presented by the original owner, to avoid forgery; and where transfers are made through a power of attorney great care should also be exercised here to avoid forgery.

When transfers are made by a trustee or executor they should be obliged to present a certified copy of their appointment, as their authority for acting in that capacity, and this should be kept on file in the bank.

Certificates of stock made out to a trustee or executor should always state for whom, or for whose estate the party acts, thus, "Geo. L. Parsons, trustee for Jas. B. Lee," or "B. F. Brown, executor for estate of P. H. Malone."

No signature of a trustee or executor should be considered valid unless stating for whom acting.

It sometimes occurs that a single woman becomes a stockholder, desires to make a transfer after she has become a wife. Her name having been legally changed she cannot use her maiden name in making the transfer, or signing the assignment, except in connection with her married name, and both names should appear, thus "Mrs. Eliza Smith Romain, formerly Miss Eliza Smith."

Executors or administrators of estates sometimes hold among their assets shares of bank stock that were made out in the name of the deceased person, and finding no difficulty in collecting the dividends they carelessly or thoughtlessly neglect to have the stock properly transferred to themselves as executors or administrators. Very troublesome complications have sometimes arisen where this condition existed, in consequence, for instance, of the death of the executor or administrator, or serious change in the conditions in the bank. It is a safe plan therefore for the officers of a bank to watch these things, and to endeavor to have all transfers in cases of this kind promptly made.

Where a transfer is requested by the officer of another corporation who is not personally known to the bank, and especially if it comes through another party holding a power of attorney, it is safe to first obtain from the corporation a copy of the vote or resolution of the board of directors of such corporation, authorizing the transfer with the seal of the corporation attached.

#### FORM OF STOCK LEDGER, WITH DESCRIPTION.

The stock ledger, in which should be recorded the ledger account with every stockholder, should be kept with the greatest care, the postings in it only being made from actual transactions as shown by the certificate book and transfer book. Too frequently I have seen it used so carelessly as to make its records useless, arbitrary entries being made in it apparently from the memory of some officer, a very

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<i>7 day of Dec. 1898</i>		
<i>L. S. Brown</i> 		
		

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<p>persc hold the v trans</p>	<p>L. B. Brown</p>	<p>10</p>	<p>25</p>	<p>2500</p>

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unreliable source, and frequently the issues of all stock are found posted but the transfers ignored.

This ledger should be kept in such a way, and all the transactions posted up so promptly, that a list of the stockholders and the balance standing to each account can be taken off whenever requested, and the amount of stock held should agree with the capital stock account on the general ledger.

It is customary for the Cashier to keep this ledger, as it is considered a confidential record, but in many large banks the Assistant Cashier or some confidential clerk takes charge of it. The work is simple and only needs a little care to have it satisfactory.

A very complete form and one much used is here presented (form No. 4).

Where a man is an original stockholder, as in the case here shown of L. B. Brown, it is customary to use the term "cash" in crediting him with his stock, for his stock comes to him from the bank and not from any other stockholder. When transfers are made the account of the stockholder making the transfer is charged with the amount of stock transferred, the number of his certificate from which the transferred stock comes, and the name to whom transferred. In the case mentioned, certificate No. 2 being entirely cancelled and certificate No. 11 being issued for the balance of stock held by Mr. Brown, he is charged with the balance of No. 2, seventy-five shares, transferred to himself.

In the cases of the parties to whom the transfers are made they are credited with the amount of stock transferred to them, the number of the certificate issued to them, and the name of the party from whose stock the transfer came.

One important matter regarding the stockholders of a National bank is that according to the National Banking Act, Section 5210, the bank is obliged to keep at all times a full and correct list of the names and residences of all its shareholders, and such list is subject to the inspection of the shareholders and creditors, and to any State officers authorized to assess taxes. A copy of such list, verified under oath by the President or Cashier, must be sent to the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, D. C., on the first Monday of July of each year.

To be able to do this readily the necessity of keeping the careful records as stated is apparent.

The postings in the stock ledger to the credit of the shareholders are made direct from the stubs of certificate books, and the postings of the charges or transfers are made from the transfer book, if one is kept, or from the record of transfers on the stubs.

A. R. BARRETT.

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Mr. A. R. Barrett, the author of the series of articles now running under the head of "Modern Banking Methods," is a New Yorker by birth. He began his banking experience when a lad as a check clerk in the Seventh Ward Bank in that city, and in the many years which he devoted to that business in New York, the West, the South, and in Philadelphia, he has filled nearly every position in a bank. Besides this, he has had long experience as an expert and bank examiner under the United States Treasury Department, and Department of Justice, his special duties being the examining of banks where suspicion of the breaking of the laws existed. Some of the most celebrated cases of violations of the National Bank Act were investigated by him or under his supervision. His long experience as a bank officer and expert examiner and accountant, especially in banking matters, has well fitted him to write these articles. Mr. Barrett has also been a frequent contributor to various magazines, writing chiefly on banking topics.

## PATENTED BANK NOTES AND CHECKS.

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It is a matter of some surprise, even to those familiar with banking methods, that of the many ingenious and apparently effective means for preventing the alteration of notes and checks to be found in the Patent Office records, there are practically none in universal use to-day. The reason for this state of facts may not be so easy to ascertain, but it may be given as an almost invariable law regarding inventions that it generally requires less exercise of the inventive faculties to produce a patentable device than it does to secure its general adoption by the public, however good or bad it may be. The very best inventions do not always find their way into public favor, and unless the inventor has some ability in the line of barter and sale, it will be difficult to find the right person to do it for him.

An ingenious method of producing paper currency which would be difficult to raise or alter was patented in 1886.

One of the features of the invention consists in printing on the notes or bills a panel of a length corresponding to the denomination of the face value. The one, two and five dollar notes have a panel one-half an inch long. In this panel is printed in letters the denomination of the note, and then the numeral or figure is superposed or printed upon the letters. The ten, twenty and fifty dollar notes have a panel one inch long, and the larger values have still larger or longer panels. These panels are so arranged that should it be attempted to elongate the panel to raise the bill, it would be necessary to destroy a vital part of the reading matter on the face of the note.

Another feature of the invention consists in printing all the notes of single-figure value in one color, as for instance, green. The double-figure values are printed in another color, and so on.

To make the bills readily distinguishable in denomination, all the letters on the one-dollar bill are printed in script; those on the two dollar bill in old English text, and the fives in Roman capitals. This idea is also carried out in the larger denominations.

To still further make a distinction, the borders on the bills are different for each denomination—the ones having round corners, the twos having octagon corners, and the fives, square corners.

It will be obvious that in order to successfully raise one of these notes the entire face of the paper must be changed.

If there are any good reasons why such a method would not be effective for the purpose intended, they are not apparent, and it is to be wondered at that the Government could not be induced to use the invention.

An ingenious method of preventing the alteration of checks or drafts is shown in the illustration on the opposite page (Fig. 1).

There are a series of longitudinal lines extending across the face of the check. Another series of lines extend from the center of the check to near the bottom. Numerals from one to ten are printed in spaces formed by the lines. When a check is drawn on this paper the amount is written by beginning the initial letter in the space just above the numeral which corresponds to it.

A check of this kind and drawn in the manner described would be difficult to raise, as it would require the erasure of the face value line and the name of the payee.

Many of the patents to be found in the Patent Office, in the class known as

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<p><i>Always begin to write the amount of this Duplex Bank Check directly over a printed word or numeral, indicating, how many of the highest denomination is to be expressed.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><sup>10</sup> New York <sup>11</sup> 189 <sup>12</sup> N<sup>o</sup> <sup>13</sup></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>"Duplex" Bank Check Co.</b></p> <p>Pay to the order of: <sup>14</sup></p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1000</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">100</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">10</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/10</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/100</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/1000</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/10000</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/100000</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/1000000</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/10000000</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/100000000</td> <td style="width: 5%; text-align: center;">1/1000000000</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="text-align: center;">9</td> <td style="text-align: center;">10</td> <td style="text-align: center;">11</td> <td style="text-align: center;">12</td> <td style="text-align: center;">13</td> <td style="text-align: center;">14</td> <td style="text-align: center;">15</td> <td style="text-align: center;">16</td> <td style="text-align: center;">17</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="13" style="text-align: center;"><i>Seventy five Dollars</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="13" style="text-align: center;"><i>No Fractions only</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="13" style="text-align: center;"><i>John Bull</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="13" style="text-align: center;"><i>John Bull</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="13" style="text-align: center;"><i>John Bull</i></td> </tr> </table>	1000	100	10	1	1/10	1/100	1/1000	1/10000	1/100000	1/1000000	1/10000000	1/100000000	1/1000000000	1	3	5	7	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	<i>Seventy five Dollars</i>													<i>No Fractions only</i>													<i>John Bull</i>													<i>John Bull</i>													<i>John Bull</i>													<p style="text-align: center;"><i>This Duplex Check requires the signature to begin directly under the first letter of the written amount &amp; on the second space below it.</i></p>
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FIG. 1.

"Checks, Bonds and Notes," are for various kinds of safety paper, such as chemically treated and also compound papers made of strips of gutta-percha, impressed or rolled into the fibre of the paper.

All kinds of indelible and delible inks have been used in the printing of tints and backgrounds of checks and notes. Any attempt to alter the face of such a note would be apparent at a glance.

The following illustration shows the characters printed upon the face of a check recently patented :




FIG. 2.

This paper is printed in different colors ; that is to say, one of the characters of the background or tint is printed in one color with delible ink and the other set of characters or lines is printed in a different color with indelible ink.

It will be obvious that any attempt to alter the face of a check or draft printed in this manner would destroy the surface of the paper and make the two inks run together and show evidence of fraud on the face.

Another method which seems to be popular with inventors in this line consists in using a series of letters or figures as a key, to be held by the Cashier and to be understood by the depositors.

As shown by this illustration, the book kept by the Cashier or paying teller gives a series of letters and a series of figures, underneath them, varied for each depositor and kept secret by the bank and depositor.

In the example check shown in Fig. 4 it will be noticed that the check is drawn by John Smith, is payable to George Washington, and calls for two hundred and sixty dollars. It will also be seen that the maker of the check has added at the lower left hand corner the letters J. O. R., and after them the single letter E. When

Page 93.												
<i>James S</i> -----	V	N	P	C	K	R	T	E	B	U	A	<i>b</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	B	<i>b'</i>
<i>Henry S</i> -----	R	K	Z	E	J	V	L	A	D	C	T	<i>c</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	B	<i>c'</i>
<i>John Smith</i>	L	J	C	A	D	O	W	Z	Y	R	E	<i>d</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	B	<i>d'</i>
<i>Frank S</i> -----	Z	E	M	T	L	A	H	C	Q	I	D	<i>e</i>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	B	<i>e'</i>

FIG. 3.

this check is presented at the bank, the teller first refers to page 93 of the secret detector book (Fig. 3), runs down said page until he comes to the name of John Smith, glances at the spaces of said name, and finding that J stands over the numeral 2, O over 6, R over the cipher 0, he knows that said check calls for two hundred and sixty dollars. If there is any discrepancy between the combination of letters and the amount written on the face of the check, payment will be refused.

The single letter E instructs the teller to pay the check to the party presenting

<b>P.93.</b>	<i>Cincinnati, O. March 4<sup>th</sup> 1892.</i>
<b>FIRST NATIONAL BANK.</b>	
Pay to.....	<i>George Washington</i> <small>bearer or order.</small>
<i>Two hundred and sixty</i> ----- <b>DOLLARS.</b>	
<i>\$ P. O. R. E</i>	<i>John Smith.</i>

FIG. 4.

it, because the letter E stands directly over B, which is the character representing bearer.

The combination of letters may be changed as often as desired by the depositor and bank.

It cannot be doubted that some of these methods could be used to advantage and would afford considerable protection against the raising or alteration of banking paper.

EMMETT PAGE BUNYEA.

## THE CLEARING-HOUSE.

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### HOW IT MAY BE UTILIZED IN THE ISSUE OF A BANK CREDIT CURRENCY.

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In the February, 1899, number of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* John H. Blacklock, of Baltimore, Maryland, gave the banking public a most valuable and comprehensive, as well as able, article on "The Clearing-House, Its Constitution, Rules and Practical Working Forms." The article is timely, for it treats of a subject hardly second in importance to any other which commands the attention of the business community.

#### CLEARING-HOUSES REPRESENTATIVE IN CHARACTER.

The first and fundamental characteristic of a clearing-house as described by Mr. Blacklock is that it is based on the principle of equality and representative government. Every bank joining a clearing-house is the equal in rights and privileges of any other bank. The rules of the association apply equally to all. Section 4 of Article IV of Mr. Blacklock's constitution reads: "At all meetings a majority of the members of the association shall be a quorum for the transaction of business. All motions and questions shall be decided by a majority of the members present except where it is otherwise ordered in this constitution." The exception seems to be in the issue of clearing-house certificates, when "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the association" is required to authorize their issue.

These provisions make of the clearing-house a miniature republic, and as such it is in harmony with a government of, by and for the people.

#### MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE A RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE.

The next consideration, to make the clearing-house acceptable to the citizens of a republic, is that membership therein shall be the right and privilege of every bank, duly organized under State or national law. That is, the possession by a National bank of a certificate from the Comptroller of the Currency that "such association has complied with all the provisions required to be complied with before commencing the business of banking, and that such association is authorized to commence such business," should entitle said bank to membership by simply filing this certificate with the clearing-house association.

A State bank duly authorized by a State Superintendent of Banking to do business as a State bank should also have the same right and privilege of membership on presentation of a regular certificate.

To require further examination or to impose any other tests or conditions, would be an expression of doubt as to the thoroughness of the inspection by the Comptroller or Superintendent or of the value of their recommendations.

By these provisions the right to membership in the clearing-house would be as free as the right of an adult citizen, duly enrolled, to vote.

If this were not the case, it is evident that local competition or jealousy might control the banking of a city or other locality. The organization of the clearing-house should be free from all taint of monopoly, and the republican spirit which demands general laws and free banking should control in the formation of clearing-houses the same as of popular banks.

## SUSPENSION OF MEMBERS BY REGULAR PROCESS.

No National or State bank should, on the other hand, be deprived of its clearing-house membership except when it is in default or when the Comptroller or Superintendent has appointed a Receiver therefor. That is, all summary and irregular action, which may be prompted by other considerations than those of solvency, should be carefully guarded against. The provisions contained in Section 4 of Article II and Section 4 of Article V of Mr. Blacklock's constitution, which prescribe the mode of suspension, are excellent in scope and effect, and perhaps do not require any change. These two sections provide against all arbitrary action which might unjustly deprive a bank member of its rights. Such protection is needed to secure the confidence of all stockholders and depositors.

The three points above referred to are, first, that the clearing-house should be democratic, and second, that it should be free to all, and third, that the rights of all its members should be carefully preserved and no member should be deprived of any except by due process of law.

## CLEARING-HOUSES SHOULD BE INCORPORATED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

It immediately becomes evident that if a system of clearing-houses is to be established having these characteristics, it can only be accomplished by a general Federal law providing for the incorporation of clearing-houses. Such a law would simply authorize the formation of clearing-houses, in the same way that the National Bank Act provides for the formation of National banks, or a State law provides for the formation of State banks. The National Bank Act allows some latitude in the articles of association, requiring only that they "shall specify in general terms the object for which the association is formed, and may contain any other provisions not inconsistent with law, which the association may see fit to adopt for the regulation of its business and the conduct of its affairs." The whole Act, however, in a sense becomes the by-laws of every National bank. So an Act incorporating clearing-houses, need only outline the salient features of such an association and leave each to make rules for its government. Some clearing-houses would only need few rules, others with more complex and greater interests and questions to guard, would require more elaborate rules.

## CHIEF REQUIREMENT, A GENERAL LAW.

But the chief thought underlying the whole subject is, that in a democratic country with a representative government, in which all questions are decided by a majority vote, banks and all other organizations can only form a union on these political principles which constitute the basis of our government.

## PROVISION FOR A CLEARING-HOUSE CURRENCY.

If the law under which clearing-houses are organized is a Federal law, and prevails over the whole country, it would then be possible to provide for a clearing-house currency instead of clearing-house certificates. The Federal power alone can do this. A currency issued in the same manner as provided for the issue of certificates, would be equally safe as certificates. If issued as currency in all denominations from one dollar up, the banks could pay them out to their customers and thus keep their legal reserves without diminution. Clearing-house certificates weaken the banks issuing them, as well as the banks that receive them, by displacing legal reserves. A clearing-house currency so issued, limited in amount to the par of the capital of any bank, would provide the banks with a resource which would strengthen and protect them against any panic.

## THE CLEARING-HOUSE TAKES PLACE OF A GOVERNMENT BANK.

In monarchial countries the single governmental bank supports all the popular banks with its power of issue and great reserve. In a country where a representative government prevails, the clearing-house may be developed to afford more perfect protection than a governmental bank, not only to all banks but to the whole business community.

The thoughts of financial men are now turning towards the development of the clearing-house as the means by which this country may reach monetary stability and freedom from panics, and Mr. Blacklock's article is a great help in the direction of showing how simple the formation of a clearing-house is, and how great the advantages would be to the whole country from the wide extension of the system.

THEODORE GILMAN.

NEW YORK, March 7, 1890.

The chief provisions of the plan advocated by Mr. Gilman are contained in the following extracts from a bill which he prepared:

A BILL to protect and support commercial credit, to equalize rates of interest, to provide for the incorporation of clearing-houses, to regulate and define their operations, to provide a clearing-house currency secured by pledge of commercial assets and the responsibility of the associated banks, and to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That associations, to be known as clearing-houses, for the settlement of money transactions by effecting clearances between banks, and for doing other business for and between banks not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, may be formed by any number of banks not less than five duly incorporated, either under the National Currency Act or under the laws of any State or Territory, of which a majority shall be organized under the National Currency Act, in any city of not less than six thousand inhabitants, who shall enter into articles of association for the regulation of the business of the association and the conduct of its affairs, which said articles shall be approved by the stockholders of each bank uniting to form the association at a meeting called for the purpose and shall be signed by the officers of each bank by authority conferred upon them to do so by vote of the stockholders, and a copy of them forwarded to the Comptroller of the Currency, to be filed and preserved in his office. \* \* \*

SEC. 3. That every association formed pursuant to the provisions of this Act \* \* \* may elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors appoint a president, vice-president, treasurer, and other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them, and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss said officers, or any of them, at pleasure, appoint others to fill their places, and exercise under this Act all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of a clearing-house for the settlement of money transactions by the mutual set-off of debits and credits, commonly called making clearances for banks, and by obtaining and issuing to the banks composing the association notes according to the provisions of this Act, and by acting as trustee for the note holders in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and by receiving and holding in trust securities pledged by the members of the association as collateral to the notes issued to them, to be called "clearing-house currency." \* \* \*

SEC. 8. That the clearing-house association organized under this Act, in the chief commercial city in each State, or in the city most central and convenient for business in each State, or any clearing-house so organized effecting bank clearings of over two hundred million dollars annually, to be designated and approved by the Comptroller of the Currency, shall be made a clearing-house of issue. And if there shall be more than one clearing-house of issue in a State, then the Comptroller of the Currency shall divide the State into clearing-house districts, and banks in each State or district shall do business only with the clearing-house of issue in their State or district.

## ISSUE OF A CLEARING-HOUSE CURRENCY.

SEC. 9. That a clearing-house of issue shall be authorized and empowered to receive from its bank members, or from any bank member of a clearing-house within its State or district, with the approval of the directors of said clearing-house, commercial assets, promissory notes, bills of exchange, convertible bonds and stocks, and other securities and evidences of



debt as collateral security for the circulating notes of the said association, to be issued as provided in this Act, and on the approval of the value of said commercial assets by its loan committee, the said clearing-house of issue may deliver to said bank member seventy-five per centum of said value in its said circulating notes as an advance upon said pledged property, and shall require from said bank member its promissory note of equal amount, which note shall be in form as approved by said clearing-house of issue. The bank member taking said circulating notes shall engage to redeem them in the lawful money of the United States at all times upon demand of payment duly made during the usual hours of business at the office of such bank member, and also when called upon to do so by the clearing-house issuing the notes, and to give any additional collateral needed to restore any depreciation in the value of the assets pledged, on demand; and on failure to comply with such demands before the close of business hours of the day when made said bank member shall be adjudged in default, and shall be thereupon closed pending an examination by a committee from the association which issued the notes. On recommendation by the examining committee the loan committee shall proceed to liquidate the loan by turning the securities into cash, in accordance with the method provided in Section 10. The bank member taking said notes may release its securities from pledge by depositing with the said clearing-house of issue clearing-house currency, United States legal-tender notes, or coin certificates, with any charges made by said clearing-house of issue, whereupon it shall be entitled to and shall receive all its securities so pledged. The charges shall be regulated by each clearing-house of issue. Upon the receipt of such deposit the clearing-house of issue shall immediately give notice in a newspaper published in the city, town, or county in which the association is located, which notice shall be published at least once a week for six months successively, that the notes of such bank member will be redeemed at par, and that all the outstanding circulating notes of such bank member must be so presented for redemption within six years from the date of such notice, and all notes which shall not be thus presented for redemption and payment within the time specified in such notice shall cease to be a charge upon the funds in the hands of the clearing-house for that purpose. At the expiration of such notice it shall be lawful for the clearing-house of issue to surrender, and such bank member, or its legal representative, shall be entitled to receive, all the money remaining after such redemption, except so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the reasonable expenses chargeable against the said accounts, including the payment for the publication of the above-mentioned notices.

#### SECURITY FOR THE NOTES ASSURED.

SEC. 10. That each bank member taking such circulating notes shall guarantee the clearing house of issue from loss resulting from such issue to them, and in case of a default in the payment of a loan when demanded by the clearing-house of issue or of default arising in any other manner, then it shall be the duty of said clearing-house of issue to levy upon all the clearing-houses in said State or district, in proportion to the capital of their bank members, a sufficient sum to provide for the payment of said loan, which sum shall be held for the payment and redemption of the circulating notes so issued. And if enough money can not be obtained by such assessments, then it shall be the duty of said clearing-house of issue to report to the Comptroller of the Currency the fact of said default, and it shall be his duty to levy a further assessment upon all the clearing-houses organized under this Act in all the States and Territories until such sum is secured, in which case the funds so raised by the Comptroller shall be paid by him to the Treasurer of the United States as a special fund to pay the circulating notes of the defaulting bank member; and he shall appoint a Receiver for the collateral securities to the loan or loans in default, who shall take possession thereof and turn them into cash and distribute the proceeds to the banks which have contributed to the assessment, and any surplus after reimbursing them their advances shall be handed over to the bank member in default or its legal representative. But if the assessment by the clearing-house of issue on the banks of its State or district is sufficient to provide the needed funds, then the collaterals shall be administered upon and turned into cash by the loan committee or by a liquidating committee of said clearing-house of issue, and the cash proceeds shall be appropriated as above provided. At no time shall the total amount of such notes issued to any bank member exceed the amount at such time actually paid in of the capital stock of the bank member so applying. And said loan committee are charged with the duty of supervising said loans so as to maintain the margin of value of the collateral security, and shall demand additional securities to make good any depreciation in their value, and they may allow withdrawals and substitutions of securities which shall not diminish the said value.

#### NOTES ISSUED ON DEPOSITS OF GOLD COIN.

SEC. 11. That a clearing-house of issue shall be authorized and empowered to receive from its bank members gold coin of the United States of full weight, and may deliver to said bank member its circulating notes at the par of the gold coin so deposited, and the said

bank member shall engage to redeem said circulating notes at all times when called upon to do so by the association issuing them. Such notes may be issued to any bank member in exchange for gold coin without regard to the amount of the capital stock of the bank depositing the gold coin. The clearing-house of issue shall make report of notes so issued to the Comptroller of the Currency and shall make no charge for the issue of its notes against the deposit of gold.

SEC. 12. That in order to furnish suitable notes for circulation as provided in this Act the Comptroller of the Currency is hereby authorized and required, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to cause plates and dies to be engraved, in the best manner, to guard against counterfeiting and fraudulent alterations, and to have printed therefrom, and numbered, such quantity of circulating notes, in blank, of the denominations of one dollar, two dollars, five dollars, ten dollars, twenty dollars, fifty dollars, one hundred dollars, five hundred dollars, and one thousand dollars, as may be required to supply under this Act the associations entitled to receive the same, which notes shall express upon their face that they are secured by deposit with the clearing-house of issue at (naming the city) of commercial assets at seventy-five per centum of their market value, or of gold coin at its par value, and that said clearing-house holds said assets or gold coin as trustee for the note holder to secure their payment, which payment is guaranteed by the associated banks of the United States through any clearing-house, and shall be attested by the signatures of the president or vice-president and treasurer of said clearing-house of issue as for account of the bank member receiving said notes; and on requisition of a clearing-house of issue the Comptroller of the Currency shall forward the amount of blank notes in denominations as called for as may be required to supply the bank member entitled to receive the same under this Act.

#### NOTES TO BE RECEIVABLE AT PAR.

SEC. 13. That after any such clearing-house of issue shall have caused its promises to pay such notes on demand to be signed by the president or vice-president and treasurer thereof, in such manner as to make them obligatory promissory notes, payable on demand, such clearing-house of issue shall deliver them to the bank member entitled to receive them, who is hereby authorized to issue and circulate the same as money, and the same shall be received at par at all the clearing-houses in the United States organized under this Act; and said clearing-house of issue shall thereupon forward to the Comptroller of the Currency a certificate setting forth the amount of notes delivered, the name of the bank member receiving same, and the amount of the collateral security held in trust for their redemption.

And every bank member of every clearing-house organized under this Act shall take and receive at par, for any debt or liability to it, any and all notes or bills issued by any clearing-house of issue organized under this Act. \* \* \*

#### CLEARING-HOUSES TO EXERCISE SUPERVISION.

SEC. 14. That the Comptroller of the Currency, with the approbation of the Secretary of the Treasury, as often as shall be deemed necessary or proper, or at the request of any clearing-house, shall appoint a suitable person or persons to make an examination of the affairs of every association organized under this Act, which person shall not be a director or other officer in any association whose affairs he shall be appointed to examine, and who shall have power to make a thorough examination into all the affairs of the association, and in doing so to examine any of the officers and agents thereof on oath, and shall make a full and detailed report of the condition of the association to the Comptroller, who shall fix the compensation for his services.

SEC. 24. That the clearing-houses organized under this Act may organize among themselves associations to include the banks members thereof in any State or district, and may hold annual conventions and meetings at other times, for the formulation of rules and regulations for the conduct of their affairs and for the discussion of financial subjects and for the preservation and exchange of information to govern the granting of credits, and when approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, such rules and regulations shall be binding upon the banks and clearing-houses within said State and district.

SEC. 25. That clearing-houses organized under this Act may form a National association, which shall meet in convention annually, and whose object shall be the promotion of the interests of the banks of the United States receiving the benefits of this Act, and said convention may pass rules and regulations to govern the operations of clearing-houses and the banks connected with same, which, when approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, shall be binding upon such clearing-houses.

## \* FRANCIS D. CARLEY.

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In an age demanding specialized knowledge in every field of investigation and effort, it is natural that the necessity of having trained financial specialists should be recognized. The man who makes all knowledge his province, as did Sir Francis Bacon, may astonish us by the breadth of his information; but should occasion arise for putting that knowledge to the test, indignation and pity for its superficiality will most likely equal the surprise with which we regarded its extent.

Concentration of means, energies and purposes is now essential to the highest degree of success. Gigantic combinations of capital and resources are but an evidence that the recognition of this truth has penetrated the minds of those charged with the management of great financial and productive concerns.

There is scant room in the business world of to-day for the man who can do many things indifferently well, but who excels in nothing. Only the skilled mechanic can expect to receive the highest emoluments. It is the specialist in law, medicine, art and in business and industry as well, who reaps the richest rewards in fame and money.

The student of finance, who devotes a lifetime to the study of the subject in all its ramifications, is apt to be appalled at the extent of the task. By confining his investigations to some particular branch of the subject, he may acquire such knowledge as will give to his opinions the stamp and weight of authority.

It is now indisputably recognized by all thoughtful men that there are great laws and principles in trade and finance working with the certainty and regularity of other natural laws. These underlying forces that determine the alternation of seasons of prosperity and stagnation are not fixed by the acts of parliaments or legislatures, though their decrees may be among the contributory influences governing results. The great operations in trade, transportation and finance are governed by laws not easily discerned by the casual observer, but apparent to the expert.

From the intimate relations they bear to the distribution of the products and commodities of the country, the railways are justly regarded as corporations of the first importance. Since their services are indispensable under the conditions of modern commerce, they have become a favorite investment for capital. Generally, when honestly organized, and managed with due regard to proper business methods, they assure a fair return and security to the principal sums invested.

The subject of this sketch is a specialist, having devoted many years to the study of investments in railway equities and the relation of such equities to general financial conditions. His accurate perception has been often confirmed by the course of events which he has foretold. Disclaiming the gift of prophecy, Mr. Carley has the faculty of forecasting the trend of the market with reference to railway securities with more than ordinary precision. But these forecasts cannot be classed as mere fortunate guesses. They are based upon a thorough understanding of all the laws which govern the course of such securities and the ability to apply them to varying conditions in the financial, industrial and commercial world. When the fundamental laws of a science are known, their operation under given conditions may be accurately foretold. The service which one possessing this knowledge and skill may render to the public is illustrated by the following refer-

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\* A portrait of Mr. Carley, engraved from a recent photograph especially for the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE**, is presented in this number as a title illustration.

ence to Mr. Carley in an article on "The New Wall Street," appearing in "Munsey's Magazine" for April :

"What it means to have the public with you in Wall Street is shown with especial clearness in what Francis D. Carley has accomplished for the minority stockholders of a railroad controlled by a bigger corporation through the ownership of a majority of the capital stock. The property has been making money, but no dividends have been paid. Mr. Carley undertook to champion what he held to be the minority's rights. Professional Wall Street looked on amused. The stock for which Mr. Carley stood was selling around \$25 a share, and the talent of the Stock Exchange forthwith went short of it, expecting to buy back speedily at a ten point profit. They did not. Instead of any decline advances began, and from twenty-five the quotation rose steadily above ninety. Chief of all reasons for this was that the public, inclined to take hold of anything fairly promising, was persuaded that Mr. Carley was in earnest and would fight loyally.

This reference is quite apart from any suggestion as to what may or may not be the right or the wrong in the contentions finally resolved into litigation between Mr. Carley and the great Pennsylvania Railway Company; but it demonstrates what can be done when the public takes hold—as the public has in this special instance taken hold."

Mr. Carley's investigations have led him to believe that finance is a science whose laws may be revealed by diligent study and observation. The reputation he has gained particularly in reference to railway securities proves that this belief was no mere theory, but the recognition of an important truth. Mr. Carley is not a theorist by any means, but a practical man of affairs, as may be learned from the following brief sketch of his career :

Francis Dighton Carley, the son of Rufus Washburn Carley and Mary Ann (Maphet) Carley, was born at St. Clairsville, Ohio, January 19, 1839. He is a graduate of the University of Ohio, located at Athens. For a short time he practiced law at Chicago, but his active business career began at Louisville, Ky., and extended from 1865 to 1890. During this quarter of a century he was associated prominently with large business enterprises. As President of the Southern Branch of the Standard Oil Company he was identified with one of the greatest financial corporations in the country. He was also President of the Citizens' Gas Company of Louisville. That he was regarded as a representative business man of the city may be inferred from the fact that he was President of the Louisville Board of Trade.

In 1890 Mr. Carley came to New York, and going into business in Wall Street, he has, as before stated, devoted his time mainly to finance as related to railway equities and railway equities in their relation to general financial conditions.

Mr. Carley resides at Tuxedo Park. He is a member of the Union League Club, the Lotos Club and the Tuxedo Club. His wife was Miss Grace Chess, of South Bend, Ind. They have three children. One daughter is the wife of R. H. Hunt, a well-known New York architect, and another is the wife of Oliver Harriman, Jr., a banker of New York. They also have one son, Francis C. Carley.

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LATE REVENUE RULINGS.—Recent decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are, in substance, as follows :

Foreign sight drafts cashed in this country are taxable the same as checks, at the rate of two cents each, and not at two cents for each \$100.


Both the mortgage and bond given to secure a real estate loan must be stamped.

Express and telegraph companies issuing money orders are not liable to the taxes imposed on bankers and brokers.

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A USEFUL PUBLICATION.—We have received from the publishers, Messrs. Chapman & Hasty, Minneapolis, Minn., the first copy of "The Official Call," containing the official statements of National, State and Savings banks in the States of Minnesota, North and South Dakota. Subsequent numbers will be issued within two weeks after each call of the Comptroller. It is a creditable enterprise, and will be very useful in furnishing late official information in regard to the banks of the above-named States.





*Henry H. Cook*

THE HISTORY OF BALTIMORE

At the time of the late war, he was a member of the Baltimore Board of Health, and was one of the first to propose the establishment of a Board of Health for the city. He was also one of the first to propose the establishment of a Board of Health for the city. He was also one of the first to propose the establishment of a Board of Health for the city.

In the last generation, he had a son, called Maria W. ... a son, whom they named ... doctor until his death ... thus completing the family line.

Auburn, New York, where he ... capacity at Bath. In 1840 ... successfully that in ten years he was ...

Mr. Cook next went to ... of Bath, a State institution, in April ... prosperous career for just ten years. Then ... National bank, and again, for just ten years ... prosperity remained unaltered. In 1854 ...


Mr. Cook was elected President of ... As the duties incident to the position ... his entire attention, he entered ... railroad business, and has been ...

... and well-known companies, as ... and Western and the Baltimore ... Company, the State Trust Company, ... the Washington Life Insurance ...

... since 1875. His house ... to the priest on Manhattan Island ... which he has named "Whitely ...

... of York, England. ... of paintings and other ... are the Union League ... Metropolitan Museum of Art ... American Fine Arts Society ... Baltimore Society. ... Church and is a vestryman ...

On September 27, 1848, Mr. Cook was married to Maria ... of Bath, New York, whom he ... and named ... of the Pottrey estate. They had three daughters ... D. McDermid, of Auburn, New York; Maria Louise, wife ... of Bath; Sarah McCreary, wife of Charles F. Gansser, of ... wife of John Henry Keene, of Baltimore, Md., and ... of Paris, France.



Henry M. Corby



## HENRY HARVEY COOK.

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As a merchant, banker and financier, the subject of this sketch has been so successful that a brief review of his life will be found of general interest and value.

Early in the Seventeenth Century, Captain Thomas Cook, of Earle's Colne, Essex, England, came to Boston, and in 1637 settled at Taunton, in the Plymouth Colony, of which place he was one of the proprietors, and in 1643 removed to Pocasset, now Portsmouth, Rhode Island. In England his family was descended from the nobility, with annals dating back almost to the Norman Conquest. In New England the family became prominent for its private virtues as well as its energy in promoting the public welfare.

In the last generation Judge Constant Cook lived at Warren, New York, and married Maria Whitney. To them was born, at Cohocton, New York, on May 22, 1822, a son, whom they named Henry Harvey Cook. He was sent to school at Cohocton until his eighteenth year, and then to an academy at Canandaigua for two years, thus completing his studies. His business career began as a dry-goods clerk at Auburn, New York, where he remained for a year, and then another year in the same capacity at Bath. In 1844, he opened a store at Bath, and conducted it so successfully that in ten years he was able to retire from it with a handsome fortune.

Mr. Cook next went into the banking business, and with his father organized the Bank of Bath, a State institution, in April, 1854. Of it he was Cashier, and it had a prosperous career for just ten years. Then, in April, 1864, it was organized as a National bank, and again, for just ten years, Mr. Cook served as its Cashier, and its prosperity remained unabated. In 1874, his father, the President of the bank, died, and Mr. Cook was elected President in his place, and still retains the office.

As the duties incident to the presidency of the bank were not sufficient to occupy his entire attention, he came to New York in 1875 and entered into general financial and railroad business, and has been highly successful. He has become a director of such large and well-known corporations as the Union Pacific, the New York, Lake Erie and Western and the Buffalo, New York and Erie railroads, the American Surety Company, the State Trust Company, the National Bank of North America, and the Washington Life Insurance Company. Mr. Cook has lived in this city most of the time since 1875. His house on the upper part of Fifth avenue ranks among the finest on Manhattan Island. He has also a fine country place at Lenox, Massachusetts, which he has named "Wheatley," after the estate of one of his ancestors, Sir Henry Cook, of Yorkshire, England. In his houses he has large and valuable libraries and collections of paintings and other works of art. Among the clubs to which Mr. Cook belongs are the Union League, Metropolitan and Riding, of New York, and he is also a member of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the American Natural History Museum, the American Fine Arts Society, the New York Geological Society, and the New York Historical Society. Like his father, he belongs to the Protestant Episcopal Church, and is a vestryman of St. Thomas' Parish, in this city.

On September 27, 1848, Mr. Cook was married to Miss Mary McCay, daughter of William Wallace McCay, of Bath, New York, who for many years was the principal agent and manager of the Poultney estate. They have five daughters: Mariana, wife of Clinton D. McDougall, of Auburn, New York; Maria Louise, wife of Judge M. Rumsey Miller, of Bath; Sarah McCay, wife of Charles F. Ganson, of Buffalo; Fanny Howell, wife of John Henry Keene, of Baltimore, Md., and Georgie Bruce, wife of Carlos De Heredia, of Paris, France.

## A DINNER TO BANKERS.

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The Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association met in New York city, March 15, transacted the usual routine business and selected Cleveland as the place for holding the next annual convention. On the evening of the above-named date a dinner was given to the council at the Union League Club, the hosts being a number of leading city bankers whose names will be found below. Bradford Rhodes, Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, proposed the dinner as a mark of appreciation of the good work the association is doing in protecting the banks and in promoting their interests generally, and to bring the practical advantages of the association to the attention of the large city banks especially. This proposal met with a hearty response, most of the prominent National and State banks as well as several private banking firms and trust companies being represented among the hosts who entertained the visiting bankers. It is believed that as the real benefits of this organization of the bankers of the country become known, a more thorough and active co-operation on the part of the principal members of the New York Clearing-House may be expected, and that they will be influential in still further enlarging the practical usefulness of the American Bankers' Association.

Dinner was served in the alcove room of the club, which was appropriately decorated with flags and flowers. Hon. Joseph C. Hendrix, ex-President of the American Bankers' Association and President of the National Union Bank, New York, presided. At his right was Hon. E. J. Hill, a member of Congress from the Fourth District of Connecticut and a member of the Banking and Currency Committee and the Coinage, Weights and Measures Committee of the House. On the left of Mr. Hendrix was Hon. Geo. E. Roberts, Director of the Mint.

The other guests were the following members of the executive council: George H. Russel, President American Bankers' Association and President State Savings Bank, Detroit; Walker Hill, First Vice-President of the American Bankers' Association and President American Exchange Bank, St. Louis; Alvah Trowbridge, Chairman Executive Council American Bankers' Association and Vice-President of the National Bank of North America, New York; Geo. M. Reynolds, Treasurer American Bankers' Association and Cashier Continental National Bank, Chicago; R. H. Rushton, Vice-President and Cashier Fourth Street National Bank, Philadelphia; John C. Neely, Cashier Merchants' National Bank, Chicago; John H. Leathers, Cashier Louisville National Banking Co., Louisville; A. C. Anderson, Cashier St. Paul National Bank, St. Paul, Minn.; W. J. Cocker, President Commercial Savings Bank, Adrian, Mich.; Robert J. Lowry, President Lowry Banking Co., Atlanta, Ga.; John P. Branch, President Merchants' National Bank, Richmond, Va.; P. W. Huntington, President Hayden National Bank, Columbus, Ohio; J. B. Finley, President People's Bank, Monongahela, Pa.; J. E. Sands, Cashier First National Bank, Fairmont, W. Va.; F. G. Bigelow, President First National Bank, Milwaukee, Wis.; G. W. Garrels, Cashier Franklin Bank, St. Louis; A. G. Campbell, President First Natchez Bank, Natchez, Miss.; J. C. Hunter, Cashier American Exchange Bank, Duluth, Minn.; Charles R. Hannan, Cashier First National Bank, Council Bluffs, Iowa; Homer W. McCoy, Vice-President Merchants' National Bank, Peoria, Ill.; S. R. Shumaker, Cashier First National Bank, Huntingdon, Pa.; Robert McCurdy, President First National Bank, Youngstown, Ohio; A. P. Wooldridge, President City National Bank, Austin, Texas; J. C. Mitchell, Cashier Denver

National Bank, Denver, Colo.; Jos. G. Brown, President Citizens' National Bank, Raleigh, N. C.; H. L. Burrage, Cashier Third National Bank, Boston; James R. Branch, Secretary of the American Bankers' Association. Rev. Geo. William Douglas, of Grace Church, New York city; and Charles W. Jones, President of the New England National Bank, Boston, were also present as guests.

A unique feature of the menu card was an autographic list of the hosts, as follows:

*W. W. W. W.*

Gallatin National Bank.

*Richard Duffell*

National Park Bank.

*A. B. Stephens*

Chase National Bank.

*M. M. M. M.*

Chemical National Bank.

*James H. Smith*

Hanover National Bank.

*Edwin Lawrence*

Central National Bank.

*W. A. Nash*

Corn Exchange Bank.

*E. A. Watson*

Bank of N. Y. N. B. A.

*H. B. Schenck*

Mercantile National Bank.

*M. M. M. M.*

National City Bank.

*COOPERMAN*

Bank of America.

*Arthur S. S. S.*

Manhattan Co. Bank.

*R. M. R. M.*

Merchants' National Bank.

*S. P. S. P.*

Western National Bank.

*W. H. W. H.*

Irving Nat. Bank.

*J. J. J. J.*

Liberty Nat. Bank.

*E. H. E. H.*

National Bank Republic.

*Luther Kountze*

Kountze Bros.

*H. W. H. W.*

First National Bank.

*J. H. J. H.*

Manhattan Trust Co.



Merchants' Exchange National Bank.



Importers and Traders' National Bank.




J. P. Morgan &amp; Co.



Westchester County National Bank.



Mamaroneck Bank.



National Shoe and Leather Bank.



Lincoln National Bank.



Seaboard National Bank.




National Bank Commerce.



National Bank North America.



Fourth National Bank.



National Union Bank.



Brown Brothers &amp; Co.



Before the after-dinner speaking began a number of the diners united in answering some questions that were asked of Mr. Hendrix and others. Jos. C. Hendrix, A. B. Hepburn, Gen. Thomas L. James, William H. Perkins, Bradford Rhodes and Representative Hill signed a statement in reply to these inquiries, in substance, as follows:

The present wave of prosperity is likely to continue for some time, unless checked by some unforeseen circumstances. The reasons for this opinion are to be found in the ease of the money market, and the demand for breadstuffs and manufactured articles.

The acquisition of territory will brighten this prospect, because it opens new fields for trade and commerce, and will make gold the only standard.

Chairman Hendrix made a short address of welcome, in which he had something characteristic to say about each of the guests. He then introduced Hon. E. J. Hill, Representative in Congress from the Fourth District of Connecticut, and a member of the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures and also of the Banking and Currency Committee. Mr. Hill spoke as follows:

## ADDRESS OF HON. E. J. HILL.

We are in the closing years of a century. When the nineteenth century was born the commerce of the world was barter, and the slow sailing ship carried its treasure-chest from which the balance on each transaction was settled in actual coin. The area of domestic trade was circumscribed and limited to production points. The railroad, the steamship, the telegraph and the telephone were then unthought of, and the modern postal system and commercial bank unknown. To-day the whole world is each man's market, and the daily paper gives the prices current in every commercial center on the globe.

Then the volume of trade was limited almost to the necessities of life, and even that restricted by the scarcity of the precious metals with which to carry it on. To-day the division of labor and a higher standard of living have made every man's work and the luxuries of a century ago a necessity to all, and the use of credit instruments in effecting the world's exchanges has almost done away with the need of transferring coin and bullion.

A hundred years ago the prices of commodities were more or less controlled by the volume of money, and this determined by the world's production of gold and silver. To-day gold and silver have themselves become commodities and in so far as they are used as money, are only measures of value and tools for the transaction of trade.

For three centuries prior to 1800 the production of gold had averaged less than eight millions, and of silver less than sixteen millions annually; and both together were not enough for the "change" money needed in daily life, to say nothing of international exchanges. But in the year just closed more than five hundred millions of gold and silver have been taken from God's treasure house to supply the wants of man, and in this century now ending the increase in the world's supply of gold alone will far exceed the total amount of both gold and silver which had been produced since Columbus discovered the Western Hemisphere.

A hundred years ago every nation in the world was using gold and silver as standard money. To-day the only nation in the world which continues the free coinage of silver is Mexico, and the same law which compelled the one course then compels the other now, and that is the inexorable law of natural choice and the adaptation of the best means to secure the desired end.

In trade as in manufactures, the men or the nations which use the best tools will force competitors to do the same, or drive them into bankruptcy.

This wonderful revolution has not been wrought by legislation, but in spite of it, for while nations have been striving to maintain a fixed ratio between gold and silver, the stamp mill and the miner's pick have driven them far apart, and the only reason for silver being used anywhere in the world to-day as anything but subsidiary coin, is the possibility that the accumulation of gold is not yet sufficient for all mankind to exercise its natural choice.

Already 88.48 per cent. of the world's commerce is transacted on a gold basis; 2.88 per cent. with silver and the small balance with irredeemable paper and other substitutes for money.

In the face of this tremendous change, two political parties here in 1896 declared for the free coinage of silver and a double standard.

Unmindful of the great events of the nineteenth century, they planned to enter the next with the United States a straggler on the march of nations, but seven and a quarter million voters of this land declared for gold and the Republican party is under pledge to give to that verdict "the vitality of public law."

It is said by some, and even by some Republicans, that there is no necessity for any legislative action in regard to the gold standard now, for they claim it would in no way change existing conditions.

I admit that the unit of value in the United States is 25.8 grains of standard gold, and that redemptions are in accord therewith, but the fact remains that there is no provision of law, except the parity clause of the Sherman Act, which authorizes such practice, and even this makes it discretionary with the Secretary of the Treasury to redeem in gold or silver as he may choose.

In view of the fact that six and a quarter millions of our people voted three years ago for the free coinage of silver into standard money, and that the Senate of the United States last year by a vote of forty-seven to thirty-two declared that it would not be in violation of the public faith to pay the obligations of the Government in money so provided, who doubts but that a change in the Administration with a divided Congress two years hence, would cause a change in the present policy?

The good faith of a great nation cannot be safely made the sport of party politics, and while I admit that no Congress can enact a law which another cannot change, I believe that this Administration with a Congress now Republican in both branches, owes it to the country and the world to put the question beyond dispute and declare in clear and specific terms that from this time on our standard of value shall be gold and every obligation of the Government paid in gold. This was the declaration of the last National platform, that our silver and paper

should be maintained at parity with gold, not only while this Administration should be in power, but as the established policy of the nation. It was by this sign that we conquered. Why not enact it into law?

It was not alone to pass a tariff bill, but coupled with that was the promise to "favor all measures designed to maintain inviolable the obligations of the United States and all our money, whether coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth."

The President gave his interpretation of that victory when he said: "Whatever effort therefore is required to make the settlement of this vital question clear and conclusive for all time, we are bound in good conscience to undertake and if possible realize."

In my judgment the last House should have endorsed that declaration and thus set the pace which the present Congress, Republican in both branches, would be bound to follow, and which the next National Republican Convention dare not disavow, if a clear gold standard majority does not develop during the next session.

But such a declaration was not made. Instead of it, a caucus committee was named to frame legislation for the future. Made up as it is of able and distinguished men, coming from all sections of the country, they will bring to their difficult task not only individual honesty of purpose, but the best type of Republican thought, and yet behind them must stand, if they succeed, the sound money sentiment of this country, regardless of political lines, for the legislative margin is dangerously small in the next House and the precise character of the majority in either branch of Congress on the money question is not yet made known.

They have a right to the active aid and co-operation of every gold standard advocate and every believer in a sound financial system for this Government. No man is doing his duty in contenting himself with criticism, but he should add his mite, however small, to constructive effort. Both are needed, and I am sure that both will be welcomed by every member of the Fifty-sixth Congress.

I have sometimes thought that the Republican party had mistaken the work which it was commissioned to do. It was the Government financial system which the platform and the President said should be revised and placed upon a firm and enduring basis. It was Government money, both coin and paper, which were to be made and kept for all time as good as gold, but this has been forgotten, and the whole effort, if effort there has been, seems to have exhausted itself in striving to compel the banks of the country to prop up and maintain a currency system which will not, and as now constituted never can, stand alone.

I have always thought that if the Government would put its own Treasury on a sound financial basis and stop issuing paper and silver fiat money without as much reserve as even an ordinary country bank is compelled to keep, the banks would take care of themselves without legislation, except the removal of the straight-jacket which now enwraps the national system.

It is precisely this which the Republican party is pledged to do. It was the belief that this pledge would be fulfilled which in the election of 1896 gave New York by three hundred thousand, New Jersey by eighty-seven thousand, and Connecticut by fifty-four thousand to the Republican ticket. It was the lingering remnant of that same faith which saved, "as by fire," these same States last fall and made the next Senate Republican by twenty votes and the House by thirteen votes. Twice have thousands of voters who disagreed with us on other important questions, loyally and patriotically endorsed the Republican ticket to secure a needed reform in our national currency. They have a right to insist that our pledge shall be fulfilled.

Never were conditions better. With an enormous trade balance in our favor last year and this, with gold flowing like a river into our Treasury and banks, with millions loaned in Europe and subject to call, with splendid crops and improving prices for labor and its products, with interest rates almost as low as London, Paris and Amsterdam, and less than Berlin, Hamburg, St. Petersburg and Vienna, the time is ripe now to secure for the future the advantages which we temporarily possess and achieve for this country the financial supremacy of the world.

How can this be done? I answer, by making every obligation in the land specifically payable in gold or its equivalent, and thus drawing the accumulated capital of the old world to the fixed investments of the new, at lower rates of interest, and so releasing our own to be employed in productive industries which will not only afford better returns but give employment to labor and opportunity to energy and ambition.

National, State and municipal bonds, the obligations of railroads already constructed, sewers, water-works and fixed investments of every kind, have exhausted their power in this respect. They represent past expenditure. Transmute their cost into live, active, working capital and it means the opening of mines, the building of ships, the construction of new railroads, the development of new manufacturing industries and an increased prosperity all over the land which will not only easily meet the interest charges, but will soon make our own people the owners of the borrowed capital as well.

A few months ago I received a letter from a gentleman in Connecticut from which I wish to quote as touching this point: "The people are constantly calling for more money, but at the same time some of them are doing their utmost quite effectually to lessen the volume, as may be seen from the following facts. Early in September, in London, I asked one of the largest dealers in money in the world why England did not take all of the stocks in the market of such character as St. Paul preferred, New York Central, New York and New Haven, and those of other first-class roads that would net more than four per cent interest, instead of investing in European securities that pay less than three per cent. His reply was, 'Because they are currency obligations and Europe is still in doubt whether the basis of the currency of the United States is to be gold or silver. The London market is destitute of American railway shares of an investment character. They have all been sold and sent home, and had I an order to buy them I should be obliged to fill it in New York.'

The day I left Liverpool for home one of the finance committee of the Liverpool, London and Globe Insurance Co., a gentleman who knows this country well, told me that it was useless to suggest in committee a larger investment in American securities, 'because of the danger of silver legislation.'

Remove that danger and hundreds, yes, thousands of millions of dollars of European money would come like a flood for investment."

You say that this fear was foolish, and that we are now upon a gold basis. I say to you that this letter was written October 16, 1896, and that within that same year the Senate of the United States had voted to pay our debts in silver, that one hundred and ten members of the House had voted to issue one hundred and fifty millions of demand obligations without any provision for redemption, a proposition defeated by only thirty-seven votes; and that forced by the necessity of an immediate provision for the expenses of an unexpected war, the Republican majority consented to an amendment by which nearly a hundred and fifty millions more depreciated silver dollars will be added to almost five hundred millions now stored away in the Treasury vaults.

We cease to notice these things from our every-day familiarity with them, but the world is looking on and wondering at our folly. We recognize it only when a spasm of virtue comes over us, and in attempting to retrace our steps we discover the difficulties of the backward way.

The time for sound money men to press for a positive, decisive declaration for the gold standard is now, when plans are being formed for future legislation. Three years have already passed since the pledge was given and nothing has been done, and if the next session of Congress in its early hours does not take action, with the excitement and timidity and political cowardice of a Presidential election possessing the country, the old, miserable disgraceful policy of drifting on from bad to worse will not be changed.

But, says one, let us make a specific declaration for the gold standard and stop with that. I would as soon think of sustaining life by studying a bill of fare as to declare for the gold standard without providing the machinery for its maintenance and gold redemption. Brazil and Portugal do that and pay irredeemable paper. Argentina, with a monetary unit of the gold and silver dollar, but with no redemption fund except the good faith of the nation, does the same thing.

The world demands of nations, as of men, some evidence not only of willingness to pay, but of ability as well, and the fact that we are strong and great and rich does not give confidence, if we do not use our wealth and strength to maintain our credit.

We were rich and strong in 1894, but the demand notes of this nation came within one day of going to protest then. Since that time, instead of guarding against a repetition of that experience, we have actually increased our gold liability by the amount of the seigniorage on the silver dollars coined and have added more than four hundred millions to our bonded debt.

I know that it is claimed by many Republicans that the panic of 1893 and the miserable business conditions of the four succeeding years were due to the fear of free trade legislation, and so far as the trade and commerce of the country were concerned, I fully agree with that view, but it is susceptible of indisputable proof that the currency panic and the drain upon the gold reserve sprung directly from a well-grounded apprehension of the national Treasury being forced to redemption in depreciated silver, and this was allayed only by the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman law in response to the irresistible demand of the whole country. But assuming the opposite to be true, how much more need now of fortifying the Treasury against a recurrence of that fear.

In the seven years prior to 1894 the surplus of revenues over expenditures was \$423,708,-304.91, and yet the disaster came; but in the seven years following, including 1899 and 1900, as estimated by the Secretary of the Treasury, an estimate which is certain to be largely exceeded, an aggregate deficiency will be shown of \$335,959,810.11. The very argument of deficient revenues demonstrates the necessity of prompt action now to stop the coming of future and greater trouble.

But the argument is not a sound one. No man can point to a case in history where a rich and powerful nation in a time of peace, unburdened by a bonded debt and without demand obligations, ever came to financial grief because of temporary deficiencies in its fiscal transactions. Think of a good substantial business house, with capital unimpaired, with an abundance of live assets, with not a dollar of paper out, and with enterprise, industry and brains to manage it, going into a Receiver's hands because in one year, out of many prosperous ones, it failed to add to an accumulated surplus.

With one exception, the comparison holds good with our condition in 1893. We were the richest nation on the globe. It was a generation since the war. We had paid off eighteen hundred millions of our bonded debt and what remained was trivial compared with our assets, and none of it was maturing for fourteen years. If this had been all, we could have added the deficiencies of our fiscal system to our bonded debt for one year or four, and not have affected the general business of the country one iota.

But it was not all, for we had outstanding five hundred millions of notes payable on demand in the world's money of intrinsic value, while we were coining silver at a fictitious price with which to pay them at our own convenience or never, as the popular fancy might decide.

Is it any wonder than when the burden of our own folly was thrust upon us that it almost broke the nation's back. And yet from that day to this, these notes have not been paid, and to-day millions of them are carried in the Treasury and counted as cash on hand with which to meet the expenses of the Government.

Think of it! A man's own notes figured as assets in his own inventory. Mr. Micawber in his palmyest days never attained to such financial genius as is exemplified in our Treasury system. Even the Government itself forbids a National bank to count its own notes as cash on hand, although secured by Government bonds, but gives to us a daily statement of its own available cash balance, with its unsecured obligations counted as a part thereof. Out on such hypocrisy! The nation's notes are not money; they are only promises to pay money on demand, and just as long as a single one remains unpaid they are a source of danger and a weakness in our financial system. The experience of mankind condemns their use as money.

The solvent nations of the world are not issuing them to-day, and those which have them are retiring them as rapidly as possible and in some cases at enormous cost.

A bank can safely issue notes to circulate as money, but a Government cannot.

A Government borrows but does not lend. A bank lends but should not borrow.

Note the difference. A customer goes to a bank with a three months' note to be discounted. The bank receives the time note and gives in exchange its own notes payable on demand. To-morrow and thereafter it repeats the process. Three months hence, and each day thereafter, if its loans are well distributed, the returning payments on the time notes enable the bank to meet its own returning obligations which meanwhile have been guarded by the prudence and experience of the managers, or anticipated by the use of capital and reserve.

At any rate, for every dollar of note issue which goes out, at the instant of its going, something comes in to anticipate its return.

With a Government it is not so. A nation does not pay out a single dollar except for expenditures already incurred at the time of the payment, and if it pays in promises to pay, it has no returning stream of assets with which to meet the notes, and its sole dependence is on its power to tax the people.

The universal experience of mankind has shown that it is far safer to exercise this power at the time the expenditure is incurred, for it is just as hard for nations as for individuals to pay for dead horses, much more to pay their living value.

Again, if a bank confines itself to its legitimate business it cannot issue notes at all, except in response to some commercial demand, but there is no relation whatever between the Government promises to pay for past expenditures and the currency necessities of the country, and if an unneeded currency is forced into the circulation, that which is needed and more desirable is just as certainly forced out.

I do not believe that I need to refute the claim that because no interest is paid on these notes their issue is profitable to the Government. The very fact that the instant a demand note is signed the maker must be ready to meet it and must always continue so till payment is made, is a sufficient argument against the claim, and the difference between the interest rates on call loans and time money, on every exchange in the world, demonstrates conclusively the market price of the danger incurred.

But even if the claim were true, which I deny, you cannot separate the slight profit to the Government from the enormous loss to the people in their individual business enterprises.

Let me use an illustration which I cited in the last campaign.

Within the memory of most of us this nation has been twice engaged in war. The first, the War of the Rebellion, was waged on promises to pay, and this one on a specie basis. In July, 1864, when Early's guns were trained on Washington, thirty-nine cents in gold would





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buy a Government promise to pay a dollar. Nine months later, when Lee surrendered at Appomattox, that same promise had doubled in price.

With every recurring issue and every political change, until resumption came in 1879, every business transaction in the whole land was affected for good or ill. By their use, the cost of the war was doubled and the losses to the people far exceeded the amount of the entire issue, with interest from the original date until now.

How has it been in the war with Spain, waged on a gold basis, with an issue of long-time bonds and a revenue law adjusted to meet the increased expense? No man has felt the malign influence of a depreciated currency, no legitimate business interest is now looking forward with dread of the always inevitable shrinkage to gold values.

When the Republican majority in Congress declared at the beginning of the Spanish War against the Bland proposition to issue one hundred and fifty millions of dollars in Treasury notes with which to prosecute the war, it put the seal of condemnation on every dollar of Government paper money already issued and demolished any argument which Republicans may hereafter make for its continuance.

If it is an advantage to keep that which we now have, it would have been wise to issue more when money was needed last year, rather than to lay taxes and issue bonds.

If the greenbacks and Treasury notes are a good currency for the business necessities of the country, the Republican vote last year was wrong, and Congress should at the earliest possible moment withdraw the National bank notes and let the Government supply their place with its own issues.

We are forced to one conclusion or the other. It is no argument to say that because they have not troubled us for the past two years, and may not for the next two, we need not retire them now.

If the issue of Government paper money is unsound in theory and dangerous in practice, as I have tried to show, now is the time to begin their retirement when we can. They were never intended to be a permanent feature of our financial system. They were issued against the protest of every financier and only as a war necessity. When issued we had no gold in circulation.

On January 1, 1879, when we promised to redeem them, we had as an estimated monetary stock in the country \$24,199,478. On January 1, 1899, it had grown to \$949,526,012. In the last two years we have added to our monetary stock \$251,670,768 in gold. What it will be in ten years hence, when under any reasonable legislation, the legal-tender notes should all be retired, it is hardly possible to imagine, in view of the rapid increase in gold production. If not a dollar is imported in exchange for merchandise, and we barely retain our own production, the increase will far exceed the entire amount of legal-tender paper now outstanding.

If under these conditions we cannot slowly retire the greenbacks, when will circumstances be more propitious?

Suppose that the retirement was limited to additional issues of bank notes for every dollar of greenbacks cancelled, then a dollar bank note and at least twenty-five cents in gold from the reserve fund in the Treasury would go into circulation, in addition to the natural accumulation of the product of the mines. But, says some timid brother, you are retiring three hundred and forty-six millions of legal-tender money and substituting non-legal tender for it, and thus reducing the volume of redemption money by just so much, with the result that prices will shrink and panic and disaster result therefrom.

The claim is only partially true, and if wholly so, the conclusion drawn from it, in my opinion, is entirely unwarranted.

The retirement and cancellation of greenbacks would certainly release and put in circulation a hundred millions of gold, which for twenty years has been securely locked up in the Treasury, and long before this could be exhausted, the increased production of gold, and the very fact of cancellation of greenbacks, would bring into the Treasury, and thence into circulation, an abundant supply of coin.

#### THE RELATION OF THE MONEY SUPPLY TO PRICES.

Furthermore, I dispute the proposition that the volume of redemption money is the controlling factor in the regulation of prices. Any such claim ignores the rapidity of circulation, the telegraphic transfer of credits, the use of checks and credit instruments on the monetary side, and on the commodity side improved facilities of transportation, development of productive machinery, use of labor-saving processes and all the marvellous results of inventive genius.

I am willing to admit that the volume of redemption money bears some relation to the structure of credit which may be built upon it, but in what precise proportion it must be, no man has yet discovered. One thing is certain, that it must vary in every nation according to the commercial habits and customs of its people.

The advocates of the quantitative theory of money have a few problems to settle before they can prove its correctness.

From 1862 to 1898 the prices of commodities in this country fell 9.1 per cent. During the same time the per capita volume of money increased 133¼ per cent. From 1873 to 1899 prices fell from 29.48 per cent. (according to the Senate tables, supplemented by the American's Summary of Index Numbers) but in the same period the per capita volume of money increased eighteen per cent.

The per capita of gold and silver alone on January 1, 1899, was only .17 of one per cent. less than the per capita of gold, silver and paper in 1873, so that upon the quantitative theory of money, the United States, acting independently of any other nation, which I believe our free silver friends advise, we could at once call in all of our greenbacks, Treasury notes and National bank notes and burn them up and still confidently rely upon an increase in prices of eighteen per cent. over what they now are, instead of expecting a shrinkage, as they prophesy, from the retirement of the greenbacks alone.

Placing themselves firmly upon the quantitative theory, our friends declare that by making exchangeability of all forms of money with gold we destroy everything else as money of final redemption, but if this were true, I point to them the fact that on January 1, 1899, we had of gold alone nearly four times as much per capita as we had of gold and silver in 1873, and fifty-nine per cent. more than we had of both in 1879, when we resumed specie payments. So that taking either horn of the dilemma, the advocates of the quantitative theory are impaled by their own proposition.

The fact of the case is that their theory irresistibly drives them to the Populist idea, that all money should be issued by the Government and the volume arbitrarily maintained at a uniform percentage to the property of the nation, and then they would never have any changes in prices and everybody would always be happy.

There is another plan of dealing with the greenbacks, which retains them as legal tender but virtually transforms them to a gold certificate. It is that when once paid in gold they shall be held in the Treasury until gold is presented for them. It is certainly true that when the entire issue is thus covered by gold in the Treasury the element of danger is removed, and that it would prove a wonderful convenience to the banks of the country to have gold thus stored for them, but the cost to the Government would be far greater and the contraction of the currency much more rapid than if cancelled when paid on any plan which has thus far been proposed.

It has been suggested by some that the banks should be compelled by law to hold them in their reserves, but a reserve which cannot be drawn upon when needed is no reserve at all, and when needed most, in time of panic and danger, would be the very time when the Treasury would be least prepared to meet them.

The law compelling the reissue of greenbacks when paid into the Treasury, so far as their demands upon the gold reserve is concerned, is equivalent to making their volume absolutely unlimited, as illustrated by the fact that more than five hundred millions have been redeemed with the whole three hundred and forty-six millions still outstanding, and it is a very serious question whether gold redemption can be kept up and exchangeability of silver and gold maintained, unless some permanent disposition of the greenbacks can be made.

But suppose that gold is substituted for greenbacks, either by cancellation or the impounding process, and that the whole field of small bills and change money is occupied by silver certificates of small denominations, with bank notes limited to ten dollars and upwards, who doubts the ability of the Government to maintain the gold standard under any and all conditions.

With four hundred and seventy millions of silver distributed by small certificates among seventy-five million people, an average of \$6.25 each, it would be so firmly held in every day use, that any considerable demand for exchange for gold would be improbable and our rapidly increasing population would soon put the question beyond a doubt.

With such a plan once put in operation, the Government Treasury would be impregnable, and gold might come or gold might go, and the balance of trade might be favorable or the reverse, still the banks of the country would have to carry the gold redemption of their own note issues and receive or pay out, as the case might be, the gold required in foreign trade.

Now, why don't we do it? I venture the opinion that there is not a sound money advocate in the United States who would now vote to issue three hundred and forty-six millions of greenbacks, and at the same time put into circulation six hundred and seventy millions of depreciated silver. Why not manfully face the consequences of our own past folly, and so legislate that, in the words of William McKinley, "No doubt shall exist anywhere concerning the stability and integrity of the currency of the United States or in the inviolability of its obligations of every kind."

With this done, we shall be ready to enter the contest for the commercial supremacy of the world. With a National currency soundly and solidly based on gold, we shall then be able to organize a banking system which will not only furnish our own people with the best instruments for domestic trade, but will eventually carry our commerce into every sea and control the exchanges of the globe.

Hon. Geo. E. Roberts, Director of the Mint, was introduced and spoke as follows:

ADDRESS OF HON. GEORGE E. ROBERTS, DIRECTOR OF THE MINT.

Gentlemen—I am honored to be one of your company; pleased to be here and happy to be able to congratulate you upon the fact that the business interests of this country have at last emerged from the conditions of uncertainty and distress that for years hung about them and obscured the future. You are witnesses of and agents in an expansion which everybody welcomes—the kind that is registered in the clearing houses. The locomotive engineer has an expressive phrase which he sometimes applies to his engine. At times the great intricate machine, which seems more like a thing of life than inanimate mechanism, has a touch of human nature and seems to get out of sorts. It labors and strains to draw its load and the engineer feels that it doesn't respond to him. And then she, as he calls it, will seem to wake up. All her joints appear to limber; she leaps with a new power; she responds to every touch on the throttle, and the old engineer smiles and says, "she's finding herself." And so, as we look out to-day, and see the new stir in the markets, the new fires on the forges, the new wage scales on the bulletin boards, the new hope in the homes, we may say of our country as the engineer says of his pet, "God bless her, she's finding herself."

It is a glorious and inspiring sight to see this country with all its powers awake; with all its productive forces in full action. The sun never shone upon such creation of wealth, such multiplication of things that contribute to the comfort and well being of man, such general and widespread distribution of the comforts of life, as in this favored land, and in the past year. We are swinging into the full tide of an unexampled prosperity. There is but one shadow across the scene. When Prosperity, the welcome guest, has come, you can't keep down the question, when will it go?

It is a most interesting subject of study, this ebb and flow of national prosperity. It is an elusive and apparently fickle spirit, somewhat like the wind which bloweth where it listeth. Like happiness, it is even more a state of mind than a state of facts. Most of us don't know it when we have it, and see it only with the eye of the imagination in the halcyon past or the hoped-for future.

The poets and philosophers recognize this: "Man never is but always to be blest." Emerson, writing an essay forty or fifty years ago, asked if anybody could "remember when the times were not hard and money scarce." No one ever can. And yet the conditions that constitute a state of healthy prosperity are well ascertained. When it is realized that all business consists in an exchange of commodities and services, it is easy to understand that the highest efficiency of labor, the greatest activity in the exchanges, and the largest possible rewards for all are to be had when the working forces of society are so distributed in the various occupations that products find ready and fair exchange.

Modern industrial society with its division of labor, is like a great factory in which each person prepares some part of a finished whole, or does some one thing of many required to complete an article. The efficiency of its labor, the output of the factory, the success of the business, depends upon the proper distribution of its labor in various departments.

So we find that a period of prosperity is a period of harmonious and well balanced production, when the farm, the factory and all the agencies of production and distribution are working together like the well appointed parts of one machine.

We are entering upon a period of investment, construction, expansion, confidence and activity. In so far as this investment and construction are to meet present needs and obtain prompt returns, the movement will be a healthy one and will have no reaction. In so far as capital is tied up and made unproductive, and labor is drawn into occupations which will prove to be but temporary, this prosperity will be a delusion and a snare. In so far as these great industrial organizations, which are the feature and the problem of the day, are in harmony with the economic law; in so far as they obey the great law of all things, physical and moral, which is the law of highest efficiency and service, they will be successful, but everyone that contravenes those laws, will prove a pitfall to receive so much of our prosperity. No other body of men can do so much to keep the energies and investments of the people within safe lines and to thus prolong our new lease of prosperity as the bankers of the country.

GREAT INCREASE IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOLD.

I do not believe the silver question in itself can become so acute again, but the spirit of discontent which found expression in the demand for free silver will always have to be reckoned with. The arguments used for silver in 1896 have been practically destroyed by the marvelous outpouring of gold from the mines. Production is going forward by leaps and bounds. It was \$62,000,000 in the United States in 1890 and \$65,000,000 in 1896. It was \$30,000,000 in Australia in 1890 and \$90,000,000 in 1896. It was \$9,000,000 in South Africa in 1890 and \$80,000,000 in 1896. It was nothing in the Klondike two years ago, \$10,000,000 last year, and will be

\$20,000,000 this year. It was \$118,000,000 in the world in 1890 and will probably be \$400,000,000 in 1900. The product of gold in the world in the year of the next presidential election is likely to equal the aggregate product of both gold and silver in the year of the last presidential election. So that while Mr. Bryan has been waiting for a second opportunity to offer his arguments for more money, the miners have dug up the amount he was demanding in gold.

I have been interested in the able address just made by Congressman Hill, and can testify that his position in the House has been as unequivocal as his utterances here. I agree to his declarations that the Republican party is bound by its professions and its duty to not only maintain the existing gold standard, but to so fortify it by statute law that it may be secure from the mere accidents and ordinary revulsions of our politics. American capital, American labor and American enterprise should be free to develop the matchless resources of this country without continual fear that something may break down at Washington.

#### DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF CURRENCY REFORM.

But I do not think there is cause for surprise or discouragement because Congress has not as yet agreed upon a measure for reforming the currency. Those who have attempted constructive work upon the subject can alone appreciate the difficulties to be overcome.

A number of members of Congress have given laborious and intelligent attention to the subject and have drawn comprehensive bills for reforming the currency. But, leaving out the comparatively simple measure offered by Mr. Hill, I believe not one of these gentlemen can even understand any of these plans but his own, and not one has been able to convince Congress that he foresees and takes account of all the results of his own.

There is reason for this. It would be comparatively easy, if the ground were clear to begin with, to organize a harmonious and effective system, but to organize one out of our present hodge-podge of currency is a different problem. We have gold as our standard of value, the large volume of over-valued silver, the greenbacks inherited from the war period, the Treasury notes issued under the Act of 1890, and we have the National bank notes. What shall we do with them all in the new system? How shall all these forms of credit currency be kept at par with gold? Upon whom shall that responsibility devolve? One man who has given as much attention to the subject as anybody has developed an elaborate plan for putting upon the banks the burden of maintaining all forms of paper and all of our silver at par with gold. It is promptly said in opposition that no banks will come into such a system, and furthermore that it is only right and just that the Government shall be responsible for the money it has issued, and for which it has received full value.

Others offer plans under which the Government shall become responsible for the redemption in gold of its paper and silver and banks shall become responsible for the redemption of their own notes in gold. That sounds like a fair proposition, but it is immediately urged that under this arrangement the banks would probably find it convenient to obtain their stock of gold from the Government by presenting its paper, so that the obligation nominally placed upon them would be merely passed on to the Government Treasury, maintaining, and in the opinion of some, aggravating, the evil from which we seek to escape.

It is said again that it is unwise for the Government to discriminate against any of its money, as it would do by requiring banks to redeem their notes only in gold. That, in the judgment of some would give a superiority to gold which in itself would make greater the burden of maintaining silver at par.

Again, what sort of a position would a bank be in which put out notes payable only in gold in exchange for customer's notes payable in lawful money? A bank depends upon its bills receivable to meet its liabilities, but if its bills receivable are payable in any form of currency, while its notes must be met in gold, what security does it have that it could meet its notes, and what freedom would it feel to issue notes?

Finally, there is the grave question in the minds of many people, whether, theoretically admirable as a bank note currency appears to be, it is adapted to a country like this and a bank system such as we have. Whether it is prudent and practical to permit 5,000 to 10,000 individual banks, big and little, scattered from Maine to Texas and from Texas to Alaska, to issue circulating notes upon assets in their own hands. With all that can be said in favor of a system which grants this, and I admit that it can be made very plausible, there is no such system in the world to-day. Canada comes nearest to it, but the Canadian system is one of a few big banking corporations with many branches. The responsibility and direction is centered. England has no such system. The Scotch system includes but eight or ten corporations with branches. France has no bank of issue but the Bank of France. Russia has no bank of issue but the Imperial Bank. Austria-Hungary has no bank of issue but the Austro-Hungarian Bank. Germany has only the banks of issue that were in existence when the Imperial Bank was organized, and it is significant that the new charter now pending for the Imperial Bank in the Reichstag provides that no other bank in the Empire shall loan money at a less rate than is fixed by the Imperial Bank for itself on the same day. This provision is



designed to give the Imperial Bank control of the note issues of all other banks, in other words, to center the responsibility for note issues. By raising the rate of interest they can always be checked.

This hasty sketch of difficulties encountered will give an idea of the jungle in which the currency reformers are wandering. I feel warranted in saying, however, that before we enter upon another national campaign, a measure will become a law that will at least make ample provision for maintaining all forms of our present currency at par with gold, leaving nothing to the choice or discretion of executive officials, and in terms so plain as to admit of but one construction. That Act once passed will be secure under the new Senate for at least eight years, and long before that time has passed, gold will be the overwhelmingly dominant element in our currency. It is a fact of great moment that those who believe in the gold stand, and now hold the strategic position. Time counts on our side. Every year strengthens our position. Our territory is expanding, our population is growing, our business is increasing, and there is practically no provision for increasing the money stock except by the coinage of gold. Our gold product is ample, saying nothing of what may come to us by favorable trade balances. Consequently, the proportion of gold in our currency is annually and rapidly increasing and soon all other forms of money will be fully required by the retail trade, which only needs a token currency. When that is the case the question of redemption will not be important, for no considerable portion of a currency that is in daily demand for retail trade can by any possibility appear for redemption.

We have almost reached that condition now. You can't find any considerable quantity of our legal tenders or silver certificates. The Government doesn't hold them and the banks haven't got them. It is not for me to suggest to you what the bankers of New York would do if a demand for gold for export should spring up, but judging by the way gold is being paid in at the Custom House, I suspect they would rather pay their customers' checks in gold than in legal tenders. Once the Government's gold reserve is made a fixed quantity, safe from entanglement with its revenues and expenditures and independent of the personal or political views of the executive, the demands upon the Government for redemption will cease entirely.

That is the first thing to be accomplished in currency reform. The next should be some simple measure under which an emergency issue of notes can be made by banks or clearing-houses in times of extraordinary pressure for ready money. No commercial country can escape these periods of alarm and liquidation, and the business community ought not to be exposed to another recurrence, possible at any time, without provision for relief. These two steps in currency reform are the first to be taken. They are too important to wait on the perfection of an elaborate banking system, over which experts will disagree and which the average man will have to take on faith and under suspicion.

Brief addresses were also made by Geo. H. Russel, President of the American Bankers' Association; Walker Hill, Vice-President; Joseph G. Brown, of Raleigh, N. C.; J. B. Finley, of Monongahela, Pa.; and Rev. Geo. Wm. Douglas, of New York.

Money in the United States Treasury.

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$139,654,545	\$127,505,746	\$138,706,410	\$156,745,506
Gold bullion.....	142,074,889	134,186,534	127,385,067	121,560,849
Silver Dollars.....	405,061,304	408,351,769	410,157,482	410,656,670
Silver bullion.....	92,192,207	91,228,953	90,189,188	88,825,937
Subsidiary silver.....	5,959,343	6,931,831	7,185,217	6,994,375
United States notes.....	34,285,278	37,037,858	38,375,618	39,161,899
National bank notes.....	5,480,141	5,748,207	3,709,359	2,873,462
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$824,687,707</b>	<b>\$810,990,898</b>	<b>\$813,708,341</b>	<b>\$823,718,698</b>
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	542,939,995	541,541,376	546,677,003	548,177,356
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$281,747,712</b>	<b>\$269,449,522</b>	<b>\$267,031,338</b>	<b>\$275,541,342</b>

**Of Invaluable Service.**—The worth of a reliable book on practical banking methods is recognized in the following, recently received from the Mutual Bank, New York city:

"In reference to 'Patten's Practical Banking,' would say that I am in possession of same and have found it of invaluable service to me.

WM. B. KRUG, Assistant Cashier."

## THE MANHATTAN COMPANY.

### *CENTENARY OF A FAMOUS NEW YORK CITY BANK.*

In 1799 Aaron Burr obtained from the Legislature of the State of New York a charter for the Manhattan Company, apparently organized for the purpose of supplying New York city with pure water. The capital was \$2,000,000, one-half of which was immediately employed in banking under a clause in the company's charter permitting it, in case it was found impracticable to employ the whole of its capital in the water-works, to employ the surplus in any moneyed transactions and operations not inconsistent with the laws or constitution of the State. Since 1840 the company has been a banking institution exclusively.

With the exception of the Bank of New York, the Manhattan Company is now the oldest bank in the city. Its centenary occurred on April 8, and was appropriately commemorated by a dinner at Sherry's, at which many of the leading bankers of the city were present, invitations being sent to the Presidents of the banks in the New York Clearing-House Association. The guests also included Hon. Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.

The table was in the form of a horseshoe, at the toe of which sat President Stephen Baker of the Manhattan Company. On his right was Hon. Lyman J. Gage, and on his left Bishop Henry C. Potter.

Other guests were ex-Gov. Levi P. Morton, President Fifth Avenue Trust Co.; State Comptroller William J. Morgan, State Bank Superintendent F. D. Kilburn, United States Senator Chauncey M. Depew, John A. Stewart, ex-Assistant United States Treasurer, and President of the United States Trust Company; State Treasurer John P. Jaeckel, Recorder John W. Goff, Andrew Carnegie, ex-Secretary of the Treasury Charles S. Fairchild, Alexander E. Orr, President of the Chamber of Commerce; John Sloane, Assistant United States Treasurer Conrad N. Jordan, ex-Comptroller of the Currency W. L. Trenholm, James J. Hill, President of the Great Northern Railroad; John S. Kennedy.

Frederic P. Olcott, President of the Central Trust Company; James T. Woodward, President Hanover National Bank; George F. Baker, President First National Bank; J. Edward Simmons, President Fourth National Bank; Frederick D. Tappan, President Gallatin National Bank; James Stillman, President National City Bank; Robert M. Gallaway, President Merchants' National Bank; Warner Van Norden, President National Bank of North America; William W. Sherman, President National Bank of Commerce; William A. Nash, President Corn Exchange Bank; Henry W. Cannon, President Chase National Bank; Oliver S. Carter, President National Bank of the Republic; Valentine P. Snyder, President Western National Bank; Frederick B. Schenck, President Mercantile National Bank; R. L. Edwards, President Bank of the State of New York.

Joseph C. Hendrix, President National Union Bank; Walter G. Oakman, President of the Guaranty Trust Company; John W. Harper, Hugh D. Auchincloss, Francis A. Palmer, President National Broadway Bank; Frank Tilford, President Bank of New Amsterdam; John Harsen Rhoades, President of the Greenwich Savings Bank; Forrest H. Parker, President New York Produce Exchange Bank; A. S. Frissell, President Fifth Avenue Bank; John Kendrick Bangs, Charles T. Barney,

Vice-President Knickerbocker Trust Co.; Scott Foster, President People's Bank; James Talcott, Henry Parish, President New York Life Insurance and Trust Co.; John E. Borne, President Colonial Trust Co.; William Sherer, Manager New York Clearing-House; John M. Crane, President National Shoe and Leather Bank; Richard Delafield, Vice-President National Park Bank; John Kean, Senator-elect from New Jersey; S. G. Bayne, President Seaboard National Bank; Charles B. Tooker, John I. Waterbury, President Manhattan Trust Co.; Silas B. Dutcher, J. G. Jenkins, James McMahon, John L. Riker, John S. Foster, William H. Perkins, President Bank of America; Theodore Rogers, W. H. Gelshehen, President Garfield National Bank; Walter S. Johnston, President State Trust Co.; Edwin Langdon, President Central National Bank.

President Baker was the first speaker after the dinner. He gave a brief history of the bank and concluded by proposing the health of the President of the United States.

Hon. Chauncey M. Depew, Senator from New York, made an address in which he warned the banks of their duty in seeing that a fictitious value was not given to the securities of the great trusts. He eulogized Alexander Hamilton, and said that he had a worthy successor in the present Secretary of the Treasury. Frederick D. Tappen, President of the Gallatin National Bank, spoke in behalf of the New York Clearing-House Association. Bishop Henry C. Potter paid a tribute to the high character of the banking institutions of the city.

On rising to speak, Secretary Gage was received with hearty applause. After referring to the great service the New York banks had frequently rendered the Government, he said in reference to the report in the newspapers that the Treasury contemplated a further issue of bonds:

"I do not see any need of such action. The Treasury now has \$284,000,000 of net money, and after payment of the Spanish claim there will be \$264,000,000. The condition of the financial market is not such as to create anxiety." Notwithstanding the heavy war expenses, Secretary Gage declared that for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, the deficit would not much exceed \$30,000,000.

"I want to express my purpose," he concluded, "of keeping the Treasury of the United States in a sound, solid and satisfactory condition, and I want to appeal to you to keep the affairs of the Government of the United States from the financial point of view in your minds and in your thoughts and to study its drifts and bearings."

After Secretary Gage had concluded, State Bank Superintendent F. D. Kilburn spoke briefly.

The Manhattan Company is to be congratulated on its long and prosperous career. Its capital is now \$2,050,000 and surplus the same. Deposits exceed \$24,000,000. The officers are: President, Stephen Baker; Vice-President, Henry K. McHarg; Cashier, D. H. Pierson; Assistant Cashier, Wm. E. Trotter. The directors are: George W. Smith, John W. Harper, James Talcott, M. C. D. Borden, John S. Kennedy, Henry K. McHarg, John Sloane, Stephen Baker, Hugh D. Auchincloss, Frederick G. Bourne, Robert W. Paterson, Samuel Sloan.

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THEOLOGY AND FINANCE.—Of a life after death the Old Testament makes no mention.—*"Matthew Marshall"* in *New York Sun*.

Matthew Marshall is the *nom de plume* of a Mr. Thomas Hitchcock, who writes financial articles for the "New York Sun," and it is believed that much that appears in the editorial columns of that paper in opposition to bank currency and in favor of Government legal-tender paper is also written by him.

Without presuming to criticize so eminent an authority, we must venture to express the hope that his researches in the realm of financial knowledge have not been so painstaking and laborious as his studies in eschatology. Too much learning, like too much honor, is a load too heavy for a man that hopes to walk in the narrow way of truth.

TABLE SHOWING PROFIT ON NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION, BASED ON A DEPOSIT OF \$100,000 BONDS, ON OCTOBER, 31, 1895, 1896, 1897 AND 1898.—PREPARED BY THE GOVERNMENT ACTUARY.

1895.

Bonds.		Receipts.				Deductions.				Profit on circulation.						
Class.	Market value.	Maximum circulation obtainable.	Interest on circulation at 6 per cent.	Interest on bonds.	Gross receipts.	Tax.	Cost of redemption.	Express charges.	Plates.	Agents' fees.	Sinking fund.	Total.	Net receipts.	Interest on cost of bonds at 6 per cent.	Amount.	Per cent.
2's	\$96,9215	\$5,233.76	\$5,233.76	\$2,000	\$7,233.76	\$872.29	\$45.00	\$7.50	\$7.50	\$7.00	.....	\$634.79	\$6,298.97	\$5,215.29	\$463.68	0.409
4's	111,4897	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	\$686.60	1,649.10	7,750.90	6,689.02	1,061.88	.852
4's	121,7527	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	277.13	1,219.63	8,160.37	7,305.16	855.21	.705
5's	114,7534	5,400.00	5,400.00	5,000	10,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	1,392.33	2,354.83	8,045.17	6,895.20	1,159.97	1.011
6's	105,9845	5,400.00	5,400.00	6,000	11,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	2,104.80	3,067.30	8,332.70	6,359.67	1,973.03	1.961

1896.

2's	\$92,6712	\$5,404.08	\$5,404.24	\$2,000	\$7,404.24	\$834.04	\$45.00	\$3.00	\$7.50	\$7.00	.....	\$906.54	\$6,107.70	\$5,560.27	\$547.43	0.991
4's	107,6712	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	\$518.62	1,481.12	7,918.88	6,480.27	1,438.61	1.305
4's	116,7527	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	229.57	1,192.07	8,207.83	7,005.16	1,202.77	1.090
5's	110,1284	5,400.00	5,400.00	5,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	1,125.42	2,067.92	8,312.08	6,897.70	1,404.38	1.548
6's	100,9845	5,400.00	5,400.00	6,000	11,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	676.25	1,538.79	9,861.21	6,059.67	3,801.54	3.774

1897.

2's	\$99,0000	\$5,400.00	\$5,400.00	\$2,000	\$7,400.00	\$900.00	\$45.00	\$3.00	\$7.50	\$7.00	.....	\$952.50	\$6,437.80	\$5,940.00	\$497.80	0.659
4's	114,0000	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	\$1,079.19	2,041.09	7,358.21	6,840.00	518.21	.456
4's	128,3750	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	418.58	1,381.08	8,018.94	7,702.50	316.44	.246
5's	116,0000	5,400.00	5,400.00	5,000	10,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	2,124.68	3,091.36	8,091.36	6,960.00	1,131.36	.801
6's	102,3750	5,400.00	5,400.00	6,000	11,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	3,563.70	4,516.20	6,883.60	6,162.90	740.70	.734

1898.

2's	\$98,5000	\$5,400.00	\$5,400.00	\$2,000	\$7,400.00	\$900.00	\$45.00	\$3.00	\$7.50	\$7.00	.....	\$922.50	\$6,437.50	\$5,910.00	\$527.50	0.635
3's	105,0000	5,400.00	5,400.00	3,000	8,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	\$162.24	1,124.74	7,275.26	6,363.75	911.51	.859
4's	112,2500	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	2,068.43	2,068.43	7,343.67	6,735.00	608.67	.842
4's	128,1550	5,400.00	5,400.00	4,000	9,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	447.07	1,409.57	7,990.43	7,067.50	902.93	.946
5's	113,2500	5,400.00	5,400.00	5,000	10,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	2,166.87	3,128.87	7,271.63	6,795.00	476.63	.870
6's	102,5000	5,400.00	5,400.00	6,000	11,400.00	000.00	45.00	7.50	7.50	7.00	3,708.71	4,668.21	6,782.79	6,106.00	576.79	.539

a Maturing July 1, 1907. b Maturing February 1, 1925. c Maturing February 1, 1904. d Maturing July 1, 1908. e This profit is somewhat greater than shown, but is indeterminate, owing to uncertainty of date of maturity. f Maturing August 1, 1916.

## CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS.

Abstract of reports of condition of National banks in the United States on September 30 and December 1, 1898, and February 4, 1899. Total number of banks September 30, 1898, 3,585; December 1, 1898, 3,590; February 4, 1899, 3,579.

RESOURCES.	Sept. 30, 1898.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,155,961,627	\$2,214,394,898	\$2,299,041,947
Overdrafts.....	16,557,982	22,674,456	18,542,345
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	224,628,840	228,586,200	235,236,290
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	83,928,230	95,528,020	89,190,240
U. S. bonds on hand.....	30,614,010	29,224,090	25,028,370
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	18,971,197	19,859,781	19,061,207
Stocks, securities, etc.....	255,198,927	259,135,919	276,704,595
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	79,386,337	79,190,505	79,173,842
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	30,484,417	30,965,488	30,589,528
Due from National banks.....	159,128,045	196,886,881	203,074,179
Due from State banks and bankers.....	46,324,878	56,246,803	60,391,784
Due from approved reserve agents.....	320,002,050	359,371,346	432,035,501
Checks and other cash items.....	16,828,942	19,223,078	17,056,884
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	110,286,935	194,981,281	75,672,644
Bills of other National banks.....	19,649,723	22,062,333	20,650,964
Fractional currency, nickels and cents.....	1,023,834	1,016,620	1,107,636
Specie.....	293,874,158	328,900,711	371,843,494
Legal-tender notes.....	110,038,300	117,845,732	116,006,066
U. S. certificates of deposit.....	16,810,000	17,905,000	21,140,000
Five per cent. redemption fund.....	9,795,055	10,484,284	10,286,903
Due from Treasurer U. S.....	4,019,551	2,181,696	2,174,649
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,003,511,044</b>	<b>\$4,313,394,519</b>	<b>\$4,403,883,073</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$621,517,895	\$620,516,245	\$608,301,245
Surplus fund.....	247,555,108	246,695,532	247,522,450
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes.....	99,015,097	94,403,831	86,439,845
National bank notes outstanding.....	194,483,765	207,093,317	203,636,184
State bank notes outstanding.....	55,907	55,107	53,112
Due to other National banks.....	446,417,454	521,988,396	600,964,563
Due to State banks and bankers.....	251,917,900	272,965,525	312,136,056
Dividends unpaid.....	1,008,410	1,243,005	1,455,443
Individual deposits.....	2,031,454,540	2,225,269,813	2,232,193,156
U. S. deposits.....	70,187,368	88,324,695	81,120,873
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	4,977,832	5,580,659	5,502,537
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	6,084,815	4,131,642	1,752,621
Bills payable.....	11,285,332	6,076,208	3,383,891
Liabilities other than those above.....	23,551,615	19,050,578	19,421,092
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,003,511,044</b>	<b>\$4,313,394,519</b>	<b>\$4,403,883,073</b>

Changes in the principal items of resources and liabilities of National banks as shown by the returns on February 4, 1899, as compared with the returns on December 1, 1898, and February 18, 1898. Total number of banks February 4, 1899, 3,579; December 1, 1898, 3,590; February 18, 1898, 3,594.

ITEMS.	SINCE DECEMBER 1, 1898.		SINCE FEBRUARY 18, 1898.	
	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
Loans and discounts.....	\$84,647,109	.....	\$160,963,666	.....
U. S. bonds.....	.....	\$14,000,500	88,967,600	.....
Due from National banks, State banks and bankers and reserve agents.....	85,996,433	.....	116,322,903	.....
Specie.....	43,242,783	.....	100,465,569	.....
Legal tenders.....	.....	1,842,636	.....	\$4,262,119
U. S. certificates for legal tenders.....	3,235,000	.....	.....	28,110,000
Capital stock.....	.....	12,215,000	.....	20,589,075
Surplus and other profits.....	.....	7,137,088	.....	666,024
Circulation.....	.....	3,457,133	19,529,862	.....
Due to National and State banks and bankers.....	118,146,757	.....	148,148,150	.....
Individual deposits.....	6,923,343	.....	249,532,223	.....
United States Government deposits.....	.....	7,281,944	55,189,643	.....
Bills payable and rediscounts.....	.....	5,071,338	.....	3,124,109
<b>Total resources.....</b>	<b>90,488,554</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>456,935,958</b>	<b>.....</b>

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc.**, under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—A. G. Loomis, President of the *Ætna National Bank* of Hartford, Ct., has been elected a Vice-President of the *National City Bank* and has accepted the position. Mr. Loomis passed through all grades of bank work in the *Ætna National*, and is regarded as an authority upon commercial credits.

—The *Astor National Bank* is now a member of the *New York Clearing-House Association*.

—The *Mutual Trust Co.* is reported to be organizing with \$2,500,000 capital, which has been largely over-subscribed.

—The *Trust Company of North America* is now in process of formation, with \$2,500,000 capital and the same amount of surplus.

—At the annual meeting of the stockholders of the *United States Mortgage and Trust Co.*, March 9, William H. Baldwin, Jr., President of the *Long Island Railroad Co.*, was elected a director.

—Charles Lee Andrews and Hugh F. Criss, *Stock Exchange* members, have formed a partnership under the style of *Andrews & Criss*, and will transact business at 45 Broadway.

—Gen. Edwin A. McAlpin, of *D. H. McAlpin & Co.*, and Alexander W. Kinnan, of *J. Romaine Brown & Co.*, have been elected directors of the *Mutual Bank*.

—Thomas Williams succeeds his father, the late Ichabod T. Williams, as a director of the *People's Bank*.

—At the annual meeting of the directors of the *Schermerhorn Bank*, Brooklyn, March 16, Charles H. Roberts was elected President and William H. Wallace, Vice-President.

—On March 20 the *Hudson River Bank* and the *Astor Place Bank* were merged into the *Corn Exchange Bank*, becoming branches of the latter. The *Corn Exchange Bank* has increased its capital from \$1,000,000 to \$1,400,000. It is reported that the absorption of one or two Brooklyn banks by this bank is in prospect.

—The rules relating to the collection of country checks adopted by the *New York Clearing-House*, March 13, and which became effective April 3, will be found in preceding pages of this number.

—Messrs. J. & W. Seligman & Co. confirm the report that they will soon establish a bank at Manila, P. I. They are also interested in the organization of an American bank in Honolulu.

—Charles P. Holzderbor, recently elected a member of the *Stock Exchange*, has been admitted to an interest in the firm of *Henry Clews & Co.*

—The *Central Council of the National Sound Money League* met in this city March 28. President J. Sterling Morton, of Nebraska, in the chair. The attendance included representative men from nearly all parts of the country. Secretary E. V. Smalley, in his annual report, declared that the sentiment in favor of the gold standard was growing, and cited the fact that a number of States heretofore inclined toward free silver have recently voted for sound money.

—Hon. Thomas L. James, formerly Postmaster-General, and President of the *Lincoln National Bank*, had a birthday celebration on the evening of March 29, at the *Union League Club*. About fifty of his friends were present, including a number of prominent bankers and other business men of the city.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Bank Restored to Solvency.**—The *Hampshire County National Bank*, Northampton, Mass., which has been in the hands of a Receiver for some time, was restored to solvency on March 20 and resumed business, under new management, April 1, with \$150,000 capital.

**Bank Reduces Capital.**—At a special meeting of the shareholders of the Rockville (Conn.) National Bank, March 17, it was voted to reduce the capital from \$300,000 to \$200,000, returning the difference to the shareholders. The number of the shareholders will be reduced from 3,000 to 2,000.

**New Savings Bank.**—The Nonotuck Savings Bank was recently organized at Northampton, Mass.

**Too Many Depositors.**—To protect its small depositors the Worcester County Institution for Savings, Worcester, Mass., at its annual meeting on March 25, voted to take no deposits from any except residents of Worcester county. Four per cent. interest, which the bank has been paying, has proved a strong temptation for rich depositors, who have been flooding the bank with heavy deposits. Unless this was stopped it was held by the bank that the rate of interest must be decreased from four to three and one-half per cent. The annual statement of the Treasurer of the bank shows deposits of more than \$14,000,000.

**Bank Not to Liquidate.**—At a meeting of the shareholders of the First National Bank, Westborough, Mass., March 1, the proposal to place the bank in voluntary liquidation failed to carry by the necessary two-thirds.

**New Haven, Ct.**—The banks of this city have asked the New York Clearing-House Association to place this city on the list of discretionary points in making charges for the collection of country checks.

**Boston.**—At a special meeting of the Boston Clearing-House, March 30, the report of the sub-committee on collection of country checks was presented and adopted. It is proposed to establish a sub-clearing-house under the supervision of the clearing-house association. A letter which will be forwarded to bank officials throughout New England explaining the plan, says:

"It has been considered expedient to modify the plan heretofore suggested for a system of clearing New England checks and to have all the work done through the Boston Clearing-House instead of through the correspondent banks in Boston. The committee, therefore, begs to ask if, on receiving from the Manager of the Boston Clearing-House in one letter checks on your bank received on deposit in Boston banks represented in the New England Clearing-House, you will send by return mail to the Manager of the Boston Clearing-House a draft on your Boston correspondent for the amount of such checks at par. It is thought wise to begin this work with the State of Massachusetts and to add the other New England States as soon as the new system is working successfully."

#### MIDDLE STATES.

**Baltimore, Md.**—James T. Woodward, President of the Hanover National Bank, New York, was recently elected a director of the Mercantile Trust and Deposit Co., of this city. The whole number of directors was increased from twenty-four to thirty-six.

—The directors of the St. James' Savings Fund have elected Robert J. Reich as Acting Secretary and Treasurer to succeed the late Henry Vees.

—The Drivers and Mechanics' National Bank has been absorbed by the New Realty Trust Co. It is reported that \$250 a share was paid for the stock.

—Prominent capitalists of this city, New York and Richmond, are organizing the International Trust Co. It will have ample capital, and will give especial attention to operations connected with the marketing of cotton.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—The Bank of Buffalo recently sent the following circular to its depositors:

"We beg to announce that on and after April 1, 1899, interest allowed by this bank on quiet investment accounts will be calculated at the rate of 2 per cent. per annum. This reduction, in itself, strengthens the bank and assures our depositors increased security. In addition we are taking the necessary preliminary steps toward increasing our capital and surplus. Our capital will be \$500,000, our surplus \$500,000, and our stockholders' liability \$500,000, giving our depositors protection to the amount of \$1,500,000."

An addition of \$200,000 is made to the capital and also to the surplus of the bank.

—It is announced at the Buffalo Commercial Bank, which is disposing of the business of the Ellicott Square Bank, that D. Clark Ralph, who was Cashier of the latter, will remain with the Commercial Bank for a year. Fully eighty per cent. of the Ellicott Square business is being transferred to the Commercial Bank.

**Hoboken, N. J.**—The First National Bank and the Hudson Trust and Savings Institution, located in the same building and heretofore closely affiliated, have decided that it would be mutually advantageous to conduct the business of each separately in the future, and amicable arrangements to that effect have been consummated. Frank Hodson was recently elected Cashier of the First National Bank, to succeed Wm. B. Goodspeed, deceased.

**Media, Pa.**—The First National Bank will erect a three-story stone, granite, steel-frame bank building. It will be 40 x 80 feet, finished in hard wood and embrace all modern improvements.

**New York Banking and Financial Legislation.**—The Senate Committee on Banks (New York) has agreed to report favorably Senator Krum's bill authorizing Savings banks to invest their deposits in the mortgage bonds of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company; Michigan Central Railroad Company; Illinois Central Railroad Company, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Delaware and Hudson Canal Company; Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company; New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company; Boston and Maine Railroad Company, Maine Central Railroad Company, provided the railroads shall have earned and paid regular dividends of not less than four per centum per annum for the ten years next preceding such investment, and provided the capital stock shall equal or exceed in amount one-third of the par value of all its bonded indebtedness.

—The bill to reduce the legal rate of interest from six to five per cent. has been defeated in the Assembly of the New York Legislature by a vote of 65 to 64.

—The Assembly Committee on Banks (New York) has favorably reported a bill which provides that no banking corporation shall become or remain a member of any association or combination wherein the membership rules require them to charge for the collection of checks or drafts drawn to be presented or paid within the State under a penalty of the forfeiture of its charter.

**New State Bank.**—The Citizens' Bank, of Penn Yan, N. Y., is a new State institution with \$50,000 capital. It will occupy the rooms formerly used by the Yates County National Bank.

**Bank Reorganizes.**—The Delaware National Bank, of Delhi, N. Y., which has been closed for some time, has reorganized.

**Philadelphia.**—The Ridge Avenue Bank opened for business recently in the building formerly occupied by the Spring Garden National Bank.

—Since the rule of the New York Clearing-House went into effect imposing a charge for the collection of country checks, some of the banks of this city have sent out circulars to country banks offering two per cent. on daily balances and to collect free of charge all checks on points in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, and to transfer funds to New York at par. It is reported that the banks here have decided not to adopt check collection rules. They have found that they are benefiting, since the adoption of the rules by the New York banks, by getting the accounts of New York firms. One large Philadelphia bank is reported to have increased its deposits \$1,000,000 in a week in this way.

**New Jersey Banking Law.**—The laws of New Jersey, covering the entire ground of banks, trust companies and financial institutions, as revised by the commission appointed by the Governor has passed both houses and has become a law.

Banks are governed along the lines of the National Bank Act. Trust companies are allowed unlimited capital, have all the powers of the New York trust companies, together with the additional power to represent corporations in New Jersey as their agent in all matters required by the statutes of New Jersey.

**Superintendent Kilburn Reappointed.**—Hon. F. D. Kilburn, State Superintendent of Banks (New York) has been renominated and confirmed as his own successor.

**Savings Deposits Exempt.**—The New York Court of Appeals recently decided that deposits in Savings banks are exempt from taxation. The decision is fully reported in the MAGAZINE'S Law Department.

## SOUTHERN STATES.

**Raleigh, N. C.**—The Legislature of North Carolina at its recent session passed the general Negotiable Instruments Act, the only amendment being as follows:

Sec. 197. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. That nothing in this Act shall authorize the enforcement of an authorization to confess judgment, or a waiver of homestead and personal property exemptions, or a provision to pay counsel fees for collection incorporated in any of the instruments mentioned in this Act; but the mention of such provisions in such instruments shall not impair the negotiability thereof. The laws now in force in this State in regard to days of grace shall remain in force, and shall not be construed to be repealed by this Act.

**Georgia Banking News.**—The Bank of Adel, Ga., was recently organized with \$15,000 capital. W. S. Witham is President.

—A new bank is reported at Augusta, Ga.



**Texas Bank Consolidation.**—The First National Bank, of Eagle Pass, Texas, which recently absorbed the Simpson National Bank of that place, reports the following changes in officers as a result of the consolidation: M. L. Oppenheimer, President in place of F. V. Blesse; F. V. Blesse, Cashier in place of P. De Bona.

**Arkansas Bankers' Association.**—The ninth annual meeting of the Arkansas Bankers' Association will be held at Little Rock, Thursday and Friday, April 20 and 21. S. S. Faulkner, of Helena, is president and M. H. Johnson, of Little Rock, secretary.

**Richmond, Va.**—Directors of the Richmond Trust and Safe Deposit Co. have voted to increase its capital to \$1,000,000.

### WESTERN STATES.

**Des Moines, Iowa.**—The recent application for a temporary Receiver for the German Savings Bank was refused and the court also refused to enjoin the collection of the forty per cent. assessment levied on its stock.

—J. B. Burton, a banker at Kellogg, Ioa., will open a bank at University Place in this city about May 1.

**Missouri Bankers' Association.**—The convention of the Missouri Bankers' Association will be held at Kansas City May 24 and 25.

**Change in Ownership.**—A controlling interest in the Webb City (Mo.) Bank has been bought by C. R. Jones and W. A. Wilson, of Kansas City. The former becomes Vice-President, the other officers of the bank remaining as before.

**New Bank in Oklahoma.**—The Bank of Wellston, Okla., was recently incorporated with \$5,000 capital.

**Louisville, Ky.**—It is reported that the Louisville Clearing-House Association will adopt a rule making it obligatory on its members to charge for collecting country checks.

**Chicago.**—Miller & Son have opened a bank at Lake and Clark streets. It is a branch of the same bank at Tiffin, Ohio.

—A lot of Illinois Trust and Savings Bank stock sold recently at 52½, the highest price the shares have brought. The last previous sale was at 500. In three years the stock has advanced from 350 to 52½.

—It is reported that the banks of this city will soon adopt a rule in regard to the collection of country checks similar to the one recently put in force in New York.

—Resources of the State banks of this city on March 6 were \$147,291,068—an increase of nearly \$20,000,000 since December 12 last.

**New Bank Building.**—The Boulder (Colo.) National Bank is just completing a fine building for its use. General building operations there are reported more active than for some time past.

**Cincinnati, Ohio.**—A twelve-story bank and office building is to be erected at the north-west corner of Fourth and Walnut streets. It is expected that the banking rooms will be occupied by the Union Savings Bank and Trust Co.

**Sioux City, Iowa.**—The consolidation of the First National Bank of this city with the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, reported in the March MAGAZINE, has been consummated, the new officers are as then reported, with the addition of M. J. Gotthelf, Assistant Cashier. The stock of the First National was purchased by the Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., but the combined institutions will hereafter be known as the First National Bank.

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—This city is to have another new bank—State Banking and Trust Co.

**Capital Stock Increased.**—The Cedar Rapids (Ioa.) Savings Bank has increased its capital from \$75,000 to \$100,000.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Seattle, Wash.**—At a recent meeting of the trustees of Dexter Horton & Co., W. M. Ladd, of the banking firm of Ladd & Tilton, Portland, Ore., was elected President to succeed the late A. A. Denny. Mr. Ladd had been Vice-President, and is succeeded in that office by R. H. Denny. M. W. Peterson was elected Cashier.

—The general law in relation to Negotiable Instruments has passed the Legislature of this State.

**Death of an Ex-Forgery.**—George Bidwell, who was concerned in defrauding the Bank of England out of large sums on forged bills of exchange several years ago, died at Butte, Mont., March 26. His brother, Austin, who was also connected with the fraudulent operations against the Bank, died at the same place, March 7.

**Banks Consolidate.**—The Columbia National and Citizens' National Bank, of Dayton, Wash., have consolidated, the title of the former being retained. Levi Ankeny will be President and G. M. Rice, Cashier, as before the union.

**Capital Reduced.**—The Citizens' State Bank, Puyallup, Wash., has reduced its capital stock from \$25,000 to \$10,000.

**New Bank Organized.**—The Hemet (Cal.) Bank has completed its organization, with \$100,000 capital stock, of which \$25,000 is paid up.

**San Francisco.**—T. Aoki, Manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank, has retired from that position and will return to Japan. His successor will be Mr. Sakaomi, who has been Manager of the same bank at Honolulu.

—The Italian-American Bank has been incorporated here with \$500,000 capital stock.

—The Mercantile Trust Co. has been incorporated with \$1,000,000 capital.

**Montana Bank Changes.**—Hoge, Daly & Co., at Anaconda, and Hoge, Brownlee & Co., at Butte, have been succeeded by Marcus Daly & Co., the firm being comprised of Marcus Daly, J. B. Haggin and M. Donohue. There will be no change in the staff of the banks.

**New Bank in Utah.**—The Commercial and Savings Bank was recently organized at Richfield, Utah. Some of the incorporators had previously been interested in the organization of a National bank, but withdrew from the list of incorporators and started the bank above named.

## CANADA.

**New Branches Reported.**—The Merchants' Bank of Canada, head office Montreal, reports the following new branches, all in Ontario: Chesley, Hanover, Lansdowne and Mildmay.

—The Traders' Bank of Canada reports a new office at Sudbury, Ont.

**New Private Bank.**—V. H. Pickering & Co. have opened a private bank at Shoal Lake, Manitoba.

**New Bank Building.**—The Merchants' Bank of Halifax will put up a three story brick and stone building at Roseland, B. C.

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## Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.

**California.**—The County Bank, San Luis Obispo, suspended on March 11. Liabilities are reported at about \$430,000.

The Commercial Bank, of San Luis Obispo, also closed on March 11.

—The Bank of Paso Robles suspended March 11, owing depositors about \$100,000.

—On March 13 the Citizens' Bank, of Paso Robles, reported to be a branch of the Commercial Bank, of San Luis Obispo, failed to open.

—The Bank of Templeton also suspended on March 13.

**District of Columbia.**—On March 14 Albert Marshall and A. S. Caywood were appointed Receivers of the Capital Trust Co., of Washington. It is alleged that some of the officers have been attempting to turn the assets over to the Dime Savings Bank, a new concern, without due authority.

**Illinois.**—The Cobden Exchange Bank assigned March 3, after doing business for twenty-seven years.

—The Bank of La Grange assigned March 13, and the proprietor, C. F. Gillett, is reported missing.

—It is reported that the First National Bank, of Pana, will close up its business voluntarily.

**Missouri.**—The Bank of Montrose, a State institution, with \$30,000 capital, closed March 11. Deposits are reported about \$15,000.

**New York.**—The Excelsior Bank, of Silver Creek, assigned March 22. Liabilities about \$100,000.

**Ohio.**—The American National Bank, of Lima, went into voluntary liquidation March 9. It was robbed of about \$18,000 in December last.

**Tennessee.**—The Continental National Bank, of Memphis, it is reported, will go into voluntary liquidation on April 25, and will be succeeded by another bank. It was organized in 1860 with \$1,000,000 capital, which was afterwards reduced to \$800,000.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

Farmers and Producers' National Bank, Scio, Ohio; by J. M. Adams, *et al.*  
Bank of Commerce National Banking Association; by Geo. S. Russell, *et al.*  
Farmers and Traders' National Bank, Colebrook, N. H.; by A. H. Eastman, *et al.*  
Iron City National Bank, Cleveland, Ohio; by R. N. Pollock, *et al.*  
Oystermen's National Bank, Sayville, N. Y.; by I. H. Green, Jr., *et al.*  
First National Bank, Rantoul, Ill.; by Messrs. Steffler & West, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Genoa, Neb.; by O. E. Green, *et al.*  
Milford National Bank, Milford, N. Y.; by C. J. Armstrong, *et al.*  
Ontonagon County National Bank, Rockland, Mich.; by Thomas B. Dunstan, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### CALIFORNIA.

HEMET—Hemet Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. F. Whittier; Cas., S. W. Leffingwell.  
SAN FRANCISCO—Italian-American Bank; capital, \$300,000; Pres., Andrea Scarboro; Vice-Pres., H. J. Crocker.—Mercantile Trust Co.; capital \$1,000,000.

#### CONNECTICUT.

BRIDGEPORT—East Side Exchange Bank (Sherwood & White).

#### GEORGIA.

ADEL—Bank of Adel; capital, \$15,000; Pres., W. S. Witham; Vice-Pres., J. T. Wilkes; Cas., W. L. Warnell.  
AUGUSTA—Union Savings Bank (successor to Irish-American Dime Savings Bank); capital, \$30,000; Pres., William Schweigert; Vice-Pres., A. S. Morris; Cas., John D. Sheahan.—Irish-American Bank; capital, \$35,000; Pres., Patrick Armstrong.  
MOLENA—Bank of Molena (branch of Barnesville Savings Bank, Barnesville, Ga.); Pres., W. S. Witham; Cas., W. L. Pirkle.

#### IDAHO.

NAMPA—Bank of Nampa.

#### ILLINOIS.

CHICAGO—Robert Miller & Son (branch of Tiffin, Ohio); Vice-Pres., T. A. Miller; Cas., W. O. Cook.  
RANTOUL—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Herbert West; Vice-Pres., H. J. Steffler; Cas., E. B. Rogers.  
WENONA—L. J. Hodge & Sons (successors to First National Bank); Pres., L. J. Hodge; Cas., J. W. H. Hodge; Asst. Cas., Geo. O. Hodge.

#### INDIANA.

LAFAYETTE—Lafayette Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000; Pres., William Wallace; Vice-Pres., Charles Warner.

#### IOWA.

DES MOINES—Security Loan and Trust Co.—Central Savings and Loan Association; capital, \$10,000.  
FOSTORIA—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Ackley Hubbard; Vice-Pres., Wm. Flindt; Cas., G. W. Anderson.  
GLENWOOD—Glenwood State Bank (successor to B. F. Buffington & Son); capital \$25,000; Pres., C. R. Buffington; Cas., T. Q. Records.  
MARTINSBURG—Martinsburg Bank; capital, \$3,000; Pres., James R. Speirs; Vice-Pres., I. N. Ogden; Cas., J. W. Young; Asst. Cas., John R. Speirs.  
MCINTIRE—Aetna Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Charles W. Bopp; Cas., C. N. Dean.  
MUSCATINE—German-American Savings Bank.  
PERRY—Perry Savings and Exchange Bank; capital, \$50,000.  
TITONKA—People's Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Rodney Hill; Vice-Pres., Geo. B. Hall; Cas., J. J. Budlong.—Bank of Titonka; capital, \$10,000; Pres., E. E. Secor; Cas., H. G. Gardner.  
UNIVERSITY PLACE—J. B. Burton.  
WODEN—Bank of Woden; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. P. Healy; Vice-Pres., Thomas A. Way; Cas., J. O. Lewis.

#### KANSAS.

HUTCHINSON—St. John Trust Co.; capital, \$30,000; Pres., Geo. H. Burr; Vice-Pres., A. Aitkin; Treas., Howard Gray.  
MADISON—People's State Bank; capital, \$20,000.  
MARION—Marion State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Cas., C. C. Minton.

#### KENTUCKY.

BARDWELL—People's Bank.  
DAWSON SPRINGS—Bank of Dawson; capital,

\$15,000; Pres., W. T. Alexander; Cas., B. R. Kuykendall.

LOUISVILLE—Mechanics' Trust Co.; capital, \$300,000.

#### MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE—International Trust Co.; Pres., Douglas H. Gordon; Vice-Presidents, J. E. Searles, J. W. Middendorf and C. T. Westcott. — Realty Trust Co.; capital, \$500,000; Pres., J. D. Wheeler; Vice-Pres., H. F. New; Sec. and Treas., B. B. Sellman.

WOODSBORO—Frederick County Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Josephus Long; Cas., J. Q. Lough.

#### MICHIGAN.

AKRON—Bank of Akron; Cas., R. C. McKay.

ATHENS—Athens State Savings Bank; Pres., H. M. Doubleday; Vice-Pres., Wm. Lehr.

BELLEVILLE—Bank of Belleville (unincorporated); capital, \$5,000; Pres., James R. Clark; Cas., F. H. Clark.

CARLETON—Bank of Carleton; Pres., L. W. Simmons; Cas., Harry I. German.

FENNIVILLE—First State Bank; capital, \$15,000.

#### MINNESOTA.

CALEDONIA—Houston County State Bank (successor to Caledonia Commercial Bank); Pres., W. E. Boddow; Vice-Pres., Jno. H. Thornton; Cas., T. A. Beddow; Asst. Cas., C. J. Scofield.

HANCOCK—Hancock Bank; Pres., C. S. McLaury; Cas., J. L. McLaury.

MORRISTOWN—People's State Bank.

SACRED HEART—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., P. C. Brevig; Cas., Nels J. Brevig.

#### MISSOURI.

ALTAMONT—Stevens & Lancaster; capital, \$5,000; Cas., W. G. Lancaster; Asst. Cas., Lee DeFord.

ARMSTRONG—Bank of Armstrong; capital, \$20,000.

#### MONTANA.

ANACONDA—Marcus Daly & Co. (successors to Hoge, Daly & Co.)

BUTTE—Marcus Daly & Co. (successors to Hoge, Brownlee & Co.)

#### NEBRASKA.

HEBRON—Hebron State Bank.

PALMER—Palmer State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., John Clay, Jr.; Vice-Pres., W. C. Kerr; Asst. Cas., H. J. Templin.

VALLEY—Valley State Bank; Pres., C. I. Rogers; Vice-Pres., A. H. Norton; Cas., F. C. Kennedy.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

COLEBROOK—Farmers and Traders' National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Albert H. Eastman; Vice-Pres., Volney F. Day; Cas., John D. Annis.

MANCHESTER—Nutting & Moore.

#### NEW YORK.

ALBANY—Max Elser.

FAYETTEVILLE—Platt H. Smith.

NEW YORK—Corporation Trust Co. of Delaware; capital, \$100,000—Mutual Trust Co.; capital, \$2,500,000.—Trust Co. of America.

PENN YAN—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., John H. Johnson; Cas., John A. Underwood.

SAYVILLE—Oystermen's National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., I. H. Green, Jr.; Vice-Pres., Samuel P. Green; Cas., H. T. Rogers.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

CHAPEL HILL—Bank of Chapel Hill; capital, \$10,000.

MADISON—Bank of Madison.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

BRADDOCK—Bank of Braddock; capital, \$5,000; Pres., W. M. Matthews; Cas., W. O. Irwin. — Emmons County State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., C. B. Little; Cas., S. S. M. Pye; Asst. Cas., J. C. Anderson.

CHRISTINE—Christine State Bank; capital, \$10,000.

EDINBURG—Bank of Edinburg.

VALLEY CITY—Valley City State Bank (organizing).

WASHBURN—McLean County State Bank.

#### OHIO.

CLEVELAND—State Banking and Trust Co.; capital, \$300,000.

LIMA—Bank of Lima.

LORAIN—South Lorain Savings Bank; capital, \$100,000.

WALDO—Waldo Bank Co.; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Henry Mohr.

#### OKLAHOMA TERRITORY.

CUSHING—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; Pres., Jacob Puckett; Vice-Pres., C. W. Carpenter; Cas., John Foster.

WELLSTON—Bank of Wellston; capital, \$5,000.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

LANCASTER—City Saving Fund and Trust Co. (successors to D. P. Locher & Sons); capital, \$150,000; Pres., Chas. H. Locher; Treas., David R. Locher.

MARTINSBURG—Morrison's Cove Bank; Pres., J. B. Skyles; Vice-Pres., J. C. Sanders.

PHILADELPHIA—Ridge Avenue Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Herman Kretz; Vice-Pres., Richard Y. Filbert; Cas., Edgar S. Gardner.

#### TEXAS.

HILLSBORO—Hillsboro Loan and Trust Co.; J. M. Carlisle, Mgr.

LEWISVILLE—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., B. L. Spencer; Vice-Pres., J. W. Spencer; Cas., E. L. Berry.

#### UTAH.

RICHFIELD—Commercial and Savings Bank; Pres., Hans Tuft; Vice-Pres., J. A. Ross; Cas., E. E. Hoffmann.

WASHINGTON.

SEATTLE—Pacific Trust Co.; capital, \$10,000.

WEST VIRGINIA.

MARLINTON—Bank of Marlinton; capital, \$25,000.

WISCONSIN.

CASHTON—Bank of Cashton; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Jno. C. Ford; Vice-Pres., Watson Earle; Cas., L. M. Earle.

NEW LISBON—Bank of New Lisbon; capital, \$20,000; Pres., W. H. H. Cash; Cas., A. L. Jennings.

CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

ARKANSAS.

LITTLE ROCK—S. J. Johnson & Co.; Sidney J. Johnson, Pres., deceased.

CALIFORNIA.

HAYWARDS—Bank of Haywards; J. E. Fardum, Cas. in place of J. E. Crooks, deceased.

LOS ANGELES—National Bank of California; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. D. Radford. — State Bank and Trust Co.; title changed from State Loan and Trust Co.

MADERA—Bank of Madera; capital reported reduced to \$50,000.

NATIONAL CITY—People's State Bank; O. M. Barrett, Pres., deceased.

SALINAS—First National Bank; John K. Alexander, Vice-Pres. in place of John L. Matthews.

SAN FRANCISCO—Yokohama Specie Bank; M. Sakaomi, Mgr. in place of T. Aoki.

COLORADO.

DENVER—American National Bank; no Cas. in place of B. N. Freeman.

CONNECTICUT.

ROCKVILLE—Rockville National Bank; voted to reduce capital stock to \$200,000.

GEORGIA.

ADAIRSVILLE—Bank of Adairsville; W. S. Witham, Pres.; N. D. Pinkston, Cas.

ILLINOIS.

CHICAGO—Bankers National Bank; Herman D. Cable, director, deceased.

KNOXVILLE—Farmers' National Bank; J. Z. Casus, Pres. in place of F. G. Sanburn, deceased.

OAK PARK—Dunlop's Bank; Simpson Dunlop, Pres., deceased.

INDIANA.

NORTH MANCHESTER—Lawrence National Bank; Francis M. Eagle, Pres. in place of Calvin Cowgill.

SUMMITVILLE—Summitville Bank; O. E. Gordon, Asst. Cas., deceased.

WINAMAC—Bank of Winamac; Lewis Keller, Pres., deceased.

IOWA.

BUFFALO CENTER—First National Bank; J. P. Strong, Asst. Cas.

CEDAR FALLS—Cedar Falls National Bank; no Second Vice-Pres.

CANADA.

ONTARIO.

CHESLEY—Merchants' Bank of Canada; J. R. Little, Mgr.

MIDLAND—Bank of British North America.

SUDBURY—Traders' Bank of Canada; L. P. Snyder, Mgr.

MANITOBA.

SHOAL LAKE—Vere H. Pickering & Co.

NOVA SCOTIA.

LANSDOWNE—Merchants' Bank of Canada; Sub-Agency to Gananoque.

CEDAR RAPIDS—Cedar Rapids Savings Bank; amendment filed to increase capital stock to \$100,000.

LAMONI—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$25,000; Thomas Teale, Pres.; Bert Teale, Cas.; O. E. Teale, Asst. Cas.

MUSCATINE—Hershey State Bank; Alfred B. Brown, Pres., deceased.

OSKALOOSA—Oskaloosa National Bank; corporate existence extended until March 6, 1919.

SIoux CITY—First National Bank and Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.; consolidated under former title; James F. Toy, Pres. in place of Thomas G. Stone; A. Groninger, Vice-Pres.; T. A. Black, Cas.; M. J. Gottneff, Asst. Cas.

SPIRIT LAKE—First National Bank; L. D. Goodrich, Asst. Cas.

KANSAS.

GALENA—Galena National Bank; G. L. Immel, Cas. in place of W. E. Stice, deceased.

OSBORNE—First Nat. Bank; T. M. Walker, Pres. in place of Geo. Bicknell.

WELLINGTON—Wellington National Bank; W. R. Savage, Vice-Pres. in place of O. M. Saylor.

KENTUCKY.

FULTON—First National Bank; H. Ekdahl, Asst. Cas. in place of R. T. Caldwell.

MAINE.

SOUTH PARIS—South Paris Savings Bank; N. Dayton Bolster, Pres. in place of Alva Shurtleff.

WATERVILLE—People's National Bank; E. G. Hodgdon, Pres. in place of J. W. Pailbrick.

MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE—Mercantile Trust and Deposit Co.; James T. Woodward, elected director. —St. James Savings Fund; Robert J. Reich, Act. Sec. and Treas. in place of Henry Vees, deceased. —Hopkins Place Savings Bank; Robert M. Rother, Pres. in place of Benjamin F. Smith, deceased; A. W. Monroe, Treas. in place of Robert M. Rother.

EASTON—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; William G. Denny, Cas. in place of F. C. Goldsborough.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**ADAMS**—Greylock National Bank; J. C. Anthony, Cas. in place of Frank Coenen, resigned.

**BOSTON**—National Hamilton Bank; Geo. W. Newhall, Pres. in place of Henry G. Denny. —Institution for Savings in Roxbury; William F. Day, Vice-Pres., deceased; also director People's National Bank.

**MARLBOROUGH**—People's National Bank; B. F. Greeley, Vice-Pres. in place of W. M. Warren.

**NEW BEDFORD**—Mechanics' National Bank; Edward S. Brown, Cas. —First National Bank; Edward S. Taber, Pres., deceased.

**NORTHAMPTON**—Nonotuck Savings Bank; Geo. L. Loomis, Pres.; O. W. Prouty, 1st Vice-Pres.; L. D. James, 2d Vice-Pres.; John Prince, Treas. —Hampshire County National Bank; authorized by Comptroller to resume business March 20; capital, \$100,000; J. W. Mason, Pres.; F. A. Macumber, Cas.

**NORWELL**—South Scituate Savings Bank; Henry J. Curtis, Pres., deceased.

**MICHIGAN.**

**CHARLOTTE**—First National Bank; J. M. C. Smith, Pres.

**MINNESOTA.**

**ROCHESTER**—Union National Bank; A. C. Gooding, Cas. in place of T. H. Titus, deceased; John Hall, Asst. Cas. in place of A. C. Gooding.

**MISSISSIPPI.**

**HATTIESBURG**—National Bank of Commerce, John Kamper, Vice-Pres.

**MISSOURI.**

**GREENFIELD**—R. S. Jacobs Banking Co.; John H. Howard, Pres. in place of Richard S. Jacobs, deceased.

**KANSAS CITY**—Bank of Grand Avenue; H. C. Lambert, Pres. in place of Louis A. Lambert, deceased.

**WEBB CITY**—Webb City Bank; C. R. Jones, Vice-Pres.

**NEBRASKA.**

**BURWELL**—First Bank; T. H. Doran, Pres.; A. U. Dan, Cas. in place of John Doran.

**COLUMBUS**—Commercial National Bank; Herman P. H. Oelrich, Vice-Pres.; Frank Rorer, Asst. Cas.

**CRETE**—First National Bank; C. W. Weckbach, Cas.; V. C. Sprk, Asst. Cas. in place of C. W. Weckbach.

**WYMORE**—First National Bank; J. E. Cameron, Asst. Cas.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**COLEBROOK**—Colebrook National Bank and Colebrook Savings Bank, reported resumed.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**HOBOKEN**—First National Bank; Frank Hodson, Cas. in place of Wm. B. Goodspeed, deceased; Myles Tierney, Vice-Pres., resigned.

**LAMBERTVILLE**—Lambertville Nat. Bank;

Calvin Soliday, Pres. in place of A. C. Barber.

**NEW YORK.**

**BINGHAMTON**—Strong State Bank; Edward L. Rose, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**BROOKLYN**—Schermerborn Bank; Charles H. Roberts, Pres. in place of Henry N. Whitney; William H. Wallace, Vice-Pres.

**CAMBRIDGE**—Cambridge Valley Nat. Bank; Hiram Sisson, Vice-Pres. in place of James Law, deceased.

**CATSKILL**—Tanners' National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Frederick Hill, deceased.

**DELHI**—Delaware National Bank (resumed); James R. Honeywell, Pres.; James F. Scott, Vice-Pres.; C. L. Andrus, Cas.

**EARLVILLE**—First National Bank; N. L. Douglass, Pres. in place of H. G. Greene.

**NEWBURGH**—Highland National Bank; D. E. McKinstry, Cas. in place of M. G. Muir.

**NEW YORK**—National Citizens' Bank; William H. Oakley, Pres., deceased; also director Manhattan Savings Institution. —Chase National Bank; A. B. Hepburn, Vice-Pres. in place of W. H. Porter. —Corn Exchange Bank; capital increased to \$1,400,000; Astor Place Bank and Hudson River Bank merged into Corn Exchange Bank. —National City Bank; A. G. Loomis, Vice-Pres. —Herzog & Sichel; Alfred M. Herzog, deceased. —Astor National Bank; elected member of Clearing-House.

**SYRACUSE**—Commercial Bank; Hamilton L. White, director, deceased.

**OHIO.**

**MARIETTA**—Citizens' National Bank; E. M. Booth, Pres.; T. M. Sheets, Cas. in place of E. M. Booth; C. L. Booth, Asst. Cas.

**PLYMOUTH**—First National Bank; D. F. Irwin, Vice-Pres.

**TOLEDO**—Ohio Savings Bank and Trust Co.; Geo. Weber, Asst. Sec. and Treas. and Asst. Cas.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**CATASAUQUA**—National Bank of Catasauga; Owen F. Fatzinger, Pres. in place of Frank M. Horn; H. H. Riegel, Vice-Pres. in place of Owen F. Fatzinger; Frank M. Horn, Cas. in place of C. R. Horn.

**JOHNSTOWN**—Cambria National Bank; H. Y. Haws, Vice-Pres. in place of A. J. Haws, deceased.

**MUNCY**—Citizens' National Bank; W. J. McCarty, Pres. in place of H. V. Peterman, deceased.

**PHILLIPSBURG**—First National Bank; F. E. Lukenbach, Cas. in place of O. Perry Jones.

**PITTSBURG**—German National Bank; W. W. Ramsey, Cas. in place of O. C. Burgdorf; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. H. E. Wessler.

**RHODE ISLAND.**

**NEWPORT**—National Exchange Bank; Edward A. Brown, Pres. in place of A. C. Titus.

**WOONSOCKET**—Citizens' National Bank; Harry H. Smith, Cas. in place of L. C. Lincoln.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**ABERDEEN**—First National Bank; F. B. Gannon, Pres. in place of C. F. Easton; J. H. Suttle, Asst. Cas.

**BRITTON**—Citizens' Bank; S. E. Forest, Cas. in place of J. J. Aplin, deceased.

**STOUX FALLS**—Union National Bank; Louis Caille, Cas. in place of B. H. Re Qua; no Asst. Cas. in place of Louis Caille.

#### TEXAS.

**CLARENDON**—Bank of Clarendon; T. S. McClelland, Pres. in place of D. W. Van Horn, deceased.

**EAGLE PASS**—First National Bank; M. L. Oppenheimer, Pres. in place of F. V. Blesse; F. V. Blesse, Cas. in place of P. De Bona.—Border National Bank; T. G. George, Vice-Pres.

**ENNIS**—Ennis National Bank; Mark Latimer, Pres. in place of W. R. Howell; no 2d Vice-Pres. in place of Mark Latimer.

**FORT WORTH**—American National Bank; no 2d Vice-Pres. in place of B. J. Tillar.

**MIDLAND**—First National Bank; O. B. Holt, Asst. Cas.

**TEMPLE**—Temple National Bank; Geo. C. Pendleton, Pres. in place of J. Z. Miller.

#### VERMONT.

**BRATTLEBORO**—Brattleboro Savings Bank; Oscar D. Esterbrook, Vice-Pres., deceased.

### BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.

#### CALIFORNIA.

**CAYUCOS**—Agency County Bank of San Luis Obispo.

**PASO ROBLES**—Citizens' Bank.—Bank of Paso Robles.

**SAN LUIS OBISPO**—County Bank.—Commercial Bank.

**SAN MIGUEL**—Bank of San Miguel.

**TEMPLETON**—Bank of Templeton; reported closed.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

**WASHINGTON**—Capital Trust Co.

#### ILLINOIS.

**COBDEN**—Cobden Exchange Bank.

**LA GRANGE**—Bank of La Grange; assigned to James McEdwards.

**PANA**—First National Bank.

**SANBORN**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation March 1.

#### LOUISIANA.

**NEW ORLEANS**—Mutual National Bank; Frank L. Richardson, Receiver in place of William E. Huger.

#### VIRGINIA.

**NORFOLK**—Norfolk Bank of Savings and Trusts; Caldwell Hardy, Vice-Pres.; W. W. Vicar, Cas. in place of Caldwell Hardy.

**RICHMOND**—Richmond Trust and Safe Deposit Co.; voted to increase capital stock to \$1,000,000.

#### WASHINGTON.

**DAYTON**—Citizens' National Bank and Columbia Bank; reported consolidated under latter title.

**PUYALLUP**—Citizens' State Bank; capital reduced to \$10,000.

**SEATTLE**—Boston National Bank; M. B. Haynes, Asst. Cas. in place of F. K. Struve.—Dexter Horton & Co.; W. M. Ladd, Pres. in place of Arthur A. Denny, deceased.

#### CANADA.

##### ONTARIO.

**KINGSTON**—Bank of British North America; G. A. Robinson, Mgr., resigned.

**LEAMINGTON**—Merchants' Bank of Canada; A. B. Patterson, Mgr.

##### NORTHWEST TERRITORY.

**MOOSE JAW**—Union Bank of Canada; G. H. Fisher, Mgr.

**SOUTH EDMONTON**—Imperial Bank of Canada; J. M. Kains, Mgr.

##### NOVA SCOTIA.

**KENTVILLE**—Bank of Nova Scotia; J. M. Walker, Act. Mgr.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**NEW BEDFORD**—Citizens' National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 21.

#### MICHIGAN.

**SAGINAW**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 6.

#### MISSOURI.

**MONTROSE**—Bank of Montrose.

#### NEW YORK.

**SILVER CREEK**—Excelsior Bank (August Heine); assigned March 22.

#### OHIO.

**LIMA**—American National Bank.

#### OREGON.

**SALEM**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation March 1.

#### TENNESSEE.

**MEMPHIS**—Continental National Bank.

#### CANADA.

##### ONTARIO.

**LEAMINGTON**—Thomas Fuller; retired from business.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, April 3, 1899.

INCREASED ACTIVITY IN BUSINESS, ADVANCING PRICES AND DEARER MONEY were among the principal features of the past month. In the business and financial world transactions are reaching a magnitude for which there is no parallel in past history. The consolidation of vast business enterprises into heavily capitalized organizations is assuming such enormous proportions and extending so rapidly that a revolution is apparently impending in commercial and industrial methods.

In the past three months combinations have been formed and corporations created to engage in various industrial enterprises whose aggregate stock and bond capital is estimated at \$1,500,000,000 or even more. Ice, gas, whiskey, beer, copper, steel, salt, electricity, paper, wire, rubber and various other products are included in the list for the manufacture or sale of which new combinations of capital have been formed.

While new economic conditions are forcing changed methods of business, the organization of industrial companies gets some inspiration from the speculative sentiment that has recently been developed in and about Wall Street. Of twelve stocks which were the most active at the New York Stock Exchange in March six were industrial stocks, and about 4,500,000 shares of those stocks were traded in, or about one-quarter of the aggregate sales at the Exchange.

The stock market increased in activity and strength last month, the total sales of stock at the Stock Exchange amounting to nearly 18,000,000 shares—one-third of them unlisted—as compared with about 16,000,000 shares in February, 10,000,000 shares in March, 1898, and 5,000,000 shares in March, 1897. In the first quarter of 1899 the sales of stocks aggregated 58,000,000 shares, as against 28,000,000 shares last year and 11,000,000 shares in 1897. About \$89,000,000 of bonds were sold in March and \$325,000,000 in the three months.

The advance made by some stocks last month have rarely been equalled in the history of the Stock Exchange. The gains as a rule were largest in the industrial stocks and in city railway shares. For the month and quarter ended March 31 many of the advances were extraordinary. We show the most important in the following list:

INDUSTRIAL STOCKS.	—Advanced in— First quarter, 1899.		RAILWAY STOCKS.	—Advanced in— First quarter, 1899.	
	March, 1899.	P. c.		March, 1899.	P. c.
American Sugar.....	45%	58%	Atchison preferred.....	5	13%
American Tobacco.....	42	95	Chic., Bur. & Quincy.....	8½	21½
Federal Steel.....	18½	21½	Chicago & Northwest.....	19½	24½
Glucose Sugar.....	11½	11½	Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis..	5½	18%
New York Air Brake.....	50	83	Del., Lack. & West.....	17½	17½
People's Gas, Chicago.....	15½	17½	Fort Worth & Rio Grande....	10	16
Tennessee Coal & Iron pref... 15		34	Great Northern preferred....	14	52%
			Long Island.....	7	23%
			New York Central.....	13½	23
CITY RAILWAY STOCKS.			Pennsylvania.....	6¼	14½
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	47½	59	Reading first preferred.....	7½	16%
Manhattan.....	12%	19	St. Louis & Southwestern....	1½	18
Metropolitan Street.....	34	81½	Union Pacific preferred.....	6½	10%
Third Avenue.....	34	62			

The old favorites of speculation in the railroad share list have not of late maintained their prestige, and newer and less well-known securities have recorded



advances well calculated to tempt the "outsider" to try his luck in Wall Street. Money has shown a hardening tendency during the last month and call loans on Stock Exchange collateral have frequently ruled above 6 per cent., even rising to 12 per cent. on the last day of March. The loan market has been disturbed to some extent by some heavy operations involving the purchase of railroad and other properties by different corporations, also by the payment of the Central Pacific indebtedness to the Government. While it is not probable that money will rule at a very high figure, it is the general opinion that the great increase in business will cause the interest rate to advance.

While prices for grain and provisions have suffered a decline during the month, and cotton has also dropped  $\frac{1}{4}$  cent, there has been a very great advance in iron and steel. Iron No. 1 foundry advanced from \$13 to \$16.50 per ton, the price a year ago being \$12. Steel billets are now quoted at Pittsburg at \$25 a ton, an advance in a month of \$7 and from the price of a year ago of \$9.75. A scarcity of pig iron is reported, and there is not a question that the iron trade is entering upon a period of prosperity the greatest ever known.

In various fields of labor wages have been advancing. In the cotton mills of New England the wages that ruled prior to the reduction in January, 1896, are being restored.

An interesting occurrence of the month was the decision of the New York Clearing-House banks to charge a uniform rate for collecting checks on out-of-town banks. This action is another sign of the tendency of all business to operate on a closer margin of profit.

No surer evidence of the increased activity of business is afforded than in the recent discussion of the supposed scarcity of paper money. Contrary to the frequently expressed opinion there has been an increase in the actual supply of paper money, and on April 1 there was more in circulation than on any corresponding date in the last ten years. This fact is clearly demonstrated in the following table showing the amount of each class of paper currency in circulation on April 1 of each year since 1890:

APRIL 1.	Gold certificates.	Silver certificates.	Currency certificates.	U. S. notes.	Treasury notes.	National bank notes.	Total paper money.
1890.....	\$134,938,079	\$290,605,562	\$7,660,000	\$322,101,359	.....	\$186,337,406	\$951,642,406
1891.....	144,317,069	309,632,535	11,145,000	334,080,198	\$53,921,973	168,119,827	1,001,108,602
1892.....	154,329,229	325,683,149	29,840,000	323,904,962	77,908,410	168,644,955	1,080,007,705
1893.....	111,485,000	322,958,958	16,670,000	316,738,314	128,956,781	172,267,433	1,089,131,480
1894.....	70,306,909	329,447,264	52,720,000	290,591,356	141,316,855	197,118,886	1,081,489,270
1895.....	48,943,189	323,746,756	36,825,000	256,935,759	121,457,600	203,091,318	980,899,622
1896.....	43,239,249	337,032,426	34,460,000	232,238,432	103,728,966	214,205,029	964,954,152
1897.....	37,456,789	364,026,153	74,460,000	248,518,640	90,244,810	222,420,183	1,037,121,125
1898.....	36,319,199	387,770,898	37,900,000	267,305,537	99,709,432	221,742,388	1,060,747,504
1899.....	32,662,649	398,874,006	22,335,000	310,519,117	94,075,701	240,261,430	1,086,957,903

It will be observed that while there has been a decrease in gold and currency certificates and in Treasury notes in circulation, on the other hand silver certificates, United States notes (greenbacks) and National bank notes all show an increase, while the total paper money in circulation on April 1 was nearly \$1,100,000,000 as compared with \$1,050,000,000 a year ago, and about \$965,000,000 on April 1, 1896. There is nearly \$150,000,000 more paper money in circulation than in 1890.

The increase in paper money, however, is small when compared with the amount added to our coin circulation in recent years. The increase in gold coin in the last twelve months exceeds \$112,000,000, and in the last three years amounted to nearly \$250,000,000, and the increase in silver coin has been almost \$11,000,000 in a year and \$16,000,000 in three years. We show the coin, paper and total circulation yearly for ten years as follows:

APRIL 1.	Gold coin.	Silver coin.	Total coin.	Total paper.	Total money.
1880.....	\$373,624,488	\$111,822,628	\$485,457,116	\$951,642,406	\$1,437,099,522
1891.....	406,466,860	120,175,012	526,643,872	1,001,106,602	1,529,810,474
1892.....	407,614,418	121,019,207	528,633,625	1,080,007,705	1,618,641,330
1893.....	407,799,951	125,590,265	533,390,216	1,069,131,420	1,602,521,636
1894.....	404,101,956	113,113,582	517,215,538	1,051,499,270	1,568,714,808
1895.....	479,493,899	113,790,903	593,284,802	990,899,622	1,584,184,424
1896.....	445,912,266	117,763,055	563,675,321	984,954,152	1,528,629,473
1897.....	517,125,757	114,753,812	631,879,569	1,037,121,125	1,669,000,694
1898.....	582,129,742	123,181,269	705,311,011	1,050,747,504	1,756,058,515
1899.....	694,865,942	134,033,097	828,899,039	1,006,957,903	1,827,846,942

The total coin circulation is now nearly \$830,000,000 as compared with \$705,000,000 a year ago, \$563,000,000 in 1896 and \$485,000,000 in 1890, while the total amount of money of all kinds in circulation is about \$1,928,000,000 as against \$1,756,000,000 in 1898, \$1,528,000,000 in 1896 and \$1,437,000,000 in 1890. There has been an increase of nearly \$491,000,000 since 1890, and until recently it is certain that there was no corresponding increase in the volume of business transactions.

Requests have been sent to the Treasury to supply notes instead of coin, but with only about \$14,000,000 of United States notes on hand it has been unable to comply. There have been times when the Treasury has had even fewer notes on hand, and in 1892, when for a time currency certificates were issued in place of Treasury notes of 1890, the certificates outstanding were in excess of the United States notes held in the Treasury. A year ago the Government had \$41,000,000 of legal tenders on hand, and on April 1 it had \$30,000,000. At the present time \$14,000,000 is considered to be so small an amount that the Secretary of the Treasury does not deem it wise to reduce it.

In our foreign trade there is now a change which may come to be of considerable significance. Late last autumn the imports of merchandise began to increase and in February the total reached a value of more than \$60,000,000, an increase of nearly \$12,000,000 as compared with September last when the aggregate was less than \$48,500,000. February's total is the largest since March, 1898, when the imports were valued at \$61,500,000, and the only other time it was exceeded since March, 1896, was during the four months March to June, 1897, when tariff legislation caused a very heavy importation of sugar.

The detailed statement of the imports in February has not yet been issued by the Bureau of Statistics, and the items of increase are not yet available. For several years past, however, the volume of imports has been very small, and a recovery is likely to result beneficially to the finances of the Government, and will be welcomed as a favorable sign in the business world.

In the calendar year 1890 the total imports of merchandise were valued at more than \$323,000,000, while in 1898 the value fell short of \$335,000,000, a decrease of more than \$188,000,000.

In some cases the decrease in prices has been largely responsible for the reduction in aggregate values. The largest losses are in coffee and wool. In the first-named article there was a decrease in value of nearly \$31,000,000, although the quantity imported increased from 491,000,000 pounds to 804,000,000 pounds. The imports of raw wool decreased about \$4,000,000, principally in carpet wool. In manufactured wool the decrease was nearly \$39,000,000, woollen cloths decreasing from 14,600,000 pounds to 4,000,000 pounds, and women's and children's dress goods from about 119,500,000 square yards to 33,000,000 square yards.

The decrease in cotton manufactures was only about \$3,500,000 about all of which was in knit goods, while the imports of cotton cloth increased from 30,000,000 to 46,000,000 square yards.

There was a decrease in iron and steel imports of \$32,000,000, more than \$20,000,-

000 of which was in tin plates, terne plates, and tagger's tin. In almost all lines of iron and steel manufactures there has been a decrease, cutlery for instance showing a reduction from about \$2,400,000 in 1890 to \$1,000,000 in 1898.

While the imports of raw silk increased \$7,000,000 manufactured silk decreased \$16,000,000. Sugar decreased \$17,000,000 in value but increased in quantity from 3,061,000,000 pounds to 3,427,000,000 pounds. The value of tea declined \$4,500,000, the quantity falling from 90,000,000 to 69,000,000 pounds. Wines, cigars, etc., also show a considerable falling off.

The following comparative statement for the two years shows where the losses were the heaviest :

	1890.	1898.
Chemicals, drugs and dyes.....	\$46,442,414	\$42,240,289
Coffee.....	84,378,649	53,652,513
Cotton—manufactured.....	82,912,359	29,300,228
Fibers, vegetable.....	46,178,642	41,966,450
Fruits and nuts.....	26,379,423	15,493,655
Hides and skins.....	26,098,662	39,903,307
India rubber and gutta percha.....	17,067,637	26,530,377
Iron and steel.....	44,540,413	12,473,637
Jewelry and precious stones.....	14,539,332	12,004,359
Leather.....	12,563,183	11,349,427
Silk—raw.....	19,814,943	26,686,184
Silk—manufactured.....	41,065,990	25,284,641
Sugar.....	95,009,976	77,961,965
Tea.....	14,138,151	9,544,976
Tobacco leaf.....	18,399,735	8,558,686
Tobacco—manufactured.....	4,196,966	1,799,474
Wines.....	10,061,647	6,268,806
Wood.....	18,601,797	13,963,778
Wool—raw.....	15,483,926	11,598,576
Wool—manufactured.....	53,996,914	15,203,365
Other articles.....	181,604,927	155,393,736
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$823,397,726</b>	<b>\$634,953,229</b>

The returns of the National banks of the country to the Comptroller of the Currency for February 4 show that the number of banks was reduced by eleven since December 1, 1898, and the capital stock was reduced \$12,215,000, or nearly \$20,600,000 in the past twelve months. Individual deposits increased less than \$7,000,000 since December 1, but the amount due to National, State and private banks increased more than \$118,000,000. The specie reserve increased \$43,000,000 of which more than \$40,000,000 was in gold. The net legal-tender reserve increased about \$1,400,000. Compared with February, 1898, the National banks hold \$100,000,000 more specie and \$32,000,000 less legal tenders. The total resources increased nearly \$90,500,000 since December and about \$457,000,000 since a year ago.

CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

	Capital.	Surplus.	Individual deposits.	Gold.	Silver.	Legal tenders.
Mar. 9, 1897.....	\$642,424,195	\$247,130,061	\$1,669,219,061	\$188,304,755	\$45,644,107	\$196,332,352
May 14, 1897.....	637,002,396	246,736,684	1,723,063,971	190,896,251	45,680,062	174,144,992
July 23, 1897.....	632,153,042	246,403,782	1,770,480,563	193,696,596	47,236,005	172,596,020
Oct. 5, 1897.....	631,498,095	246,345,020	1,853,349,128	195,895,107	43,492,595	149,494,329
Dec. 15, 1897.....	629,655,354	246,416,888	1,916,630,252	207,093,145	45,070,408	158,404,875
Feb. 18, 1898.....	629,390,320	248,484,530	1,982,660,963	222,855,517	48,522,409	169,515,185
May 5, 1898.....	624,471,670	247,995,979	1,999,308,439	267,644,954	49,537,819	143,033,681
July 14, 1898.....	622,016,745	247,935,215	2,023,367,159	234,321,377	50,755,753	135,299,997
Sept. 20, 1898.....	621,517,396	247,555,108	2,031,454,540	250,670,436	43,203,732	126,848,300
Dec. 1, 1898.....	620,516,245	246,695,552	2,225,299,813	231,475,195	47,125,516	135,750,702
Feb. 4, 1899.....	608,301,245	247,522,450	2,232,198,156	321,915,796	49,927,969	137,143,066

The extraordinary increase in the amount due to other banks in the two months from December 1 to February 4, invites attention again to the large amount of

money deposited in banks by other banks. On February 1 the National banks held nearly \$601,000,000 belonging to other National banks and \$312,000,000 belonging to State banks and bankers, a total of \$913,000,000, equal to forty-one per cent. of the individual deposits. Of this amount \$407,000,000 was held in New York city, while the individual deposits of the National banks in that city were only about \$399,000,000. We present here a comparative statement for December 17, 1896, and February 4, 1899, for the National banks of the four principal cities:

DECEMBER 17, 1896.	New York.	Boston.	Phila- del- phia.	Chicago.	Total U. S.
Due National banks.....	\$145,974,898	\$39,070,294	\$15,430,574	\$32,981,773	\$317,500,000
Due State banks.....	62,976,955	15,587,718	5,281,910	20,130,370	168,656,953
Total.....	\$208,951,853	\$54,658,012	\$20,712,484	\$53,112,043	\$488,486,808
Individual deposits.....	299,912,336	106,208,918	89,156,229	66,584,076	1,662,968,304
FEBRUARY 4, 1899.					
Due National banks.....	\$389,976,301	\$46,644,337	\$30,140,083	\$68,266,973	\$900,968,594
Due State banks.....	117,579,951	30,418,747	10,220,023	35,732,443	312,136,554
Total.....	\$407,556,252	\$77,063,084	\$40,360,056	\$104,739,416	\$912,100,899
Individual deposits.....	899,301,520	148,455,576	121,055,568	96,285,987	2,232,198,156

The National banks in both New York and Chicago owe to other banks more than to individual depositors, while in Boston the amount due banks is over fifty per cent., and in Philadelphia thirty-three and one-third per cent. of the individual deposits.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—The local money market has been affected by the increased activity in general business and in transactions at the Stock Exchange. Special influences also operated to cause higher rates at least temporarily. Several times call money advanced beyond 6 per cent., while time money and commercial paper were about 1 per cent. higher at the close of the month than a month ago. At the close of the month call money ruled at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 12 per cent., the average rate being about 7 per cent. Banks and trust companies quote 6 per cent. as the minimum, many loaning at 8 per cent. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 4 per cent. for sixty to ninety days and 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for four to six months. For commercial paper the rates are  $3\frac{3}{4}$  @ 4 per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable, 4 @ 5 per cent. for first-class four to six months single names, and 5 @ 6 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

#### MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$ —2	2— $2\frac{1}{2}$	2—3	$2\frac{1}{4}$ —3	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	$2\frac{1}{2}$ — $2\frac{1}{2}$
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	2—	$2\frac{1}{2}$ — $2\frac{1}{2}$	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$ —3	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	6—8
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —	3—	3—	$2\frac{1}{4}$ —	3—	4—
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	3—	$2\frac{1}{4}$ —3	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	3—	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{1}{2}$	3—	$2\frac{3}{4}$ —3	3—	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{1}{2}$	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4—5
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	4—5	4—5	4—5	4—5	5—6

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—Since the beginning of the month the deposits in the New York Clearing-House banks have been declining and in the last four weeks there has been a reduction of about \$16,000,000. One bank, the Astor National

Bank, has been admitted to the clearing-house and its deposits of nearly \$4,000,000 affect the comparison to some extent. The loans are only about \$650,000 less than on March 4, but the Astor National Bank reports loans of \$3,526,000. The total specie reserve has been reduced \$11,000,000 and legal tenders about \$800,000, while the surplus reserve has fallen \$9,000,000 and is now less than \$15,500,000 as compared with nearly \$36,000,000 a year ago and \$47,000,000 in 1897.

NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 4...	\$780,607,700	\$198,407,100	\$54,873,600	\$914,810,300	\$24,578,125	\$14,495,200	\$1,292,090,600
" 11...	777,545,700	196,200,100	58,666,700	906,655,200	23,208,000	14,468,500	1,201,879,400
" 18...	773,951,800	190,059,300	53,727,800	896,851,700	19,074,175	13,886,900	1,246,322,800
" 25...	779,481,800	190,232,500	53,857,600	902,250,700	18,557,425	13,820,800	1,247,937,100
Apr. 1...	779,951,100	187,144,300	58,079,800	896,917,000	15,494,850	13,870,600	1,233,899,200

DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$530,785,000	\$33,286,950	\$675,064,200	\$15,788,750	\$923,087,700	\$19,180,975
February.....	563,331,800	59,148,250	722,484,200	35,809,450	961,637,500	39,232,025
March.....	573,704,300	57,520,975	739,214,800	22,729,125	910,573,800	30,324,900
April.....	569,226,500	47,668,575	682,236,800	35,720,800	898,917,000	15,494,850
May.....	576,863,900	48,917,625	658,508,300	44,504,675		
June.....	575,600,000	46,616,100	696,008,400	53,704,600		
July.....	604,983,700	41,384,875	750,074,600	62,013,550		
August.....	623,045,000	45,720,150	741,680,100	41,904,475		
September.....	636,996,000	39,517,700	752,389,800	14,960,050		
October.....	619,353,200	15,550,400	702,123,200	15,327,150		
November.....	625,339,000	24,271,800	761,574,200	26,091,550		
December.....	666,278,600	22,122,950	789,525,800	17,067,950		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$914,810,300 on March 4, 1899, loans, \$780,607,700 on March 4, 1899, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

Dates.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Mar. 4.....	\$65,780,400	\$74,150,200	\$3,790,700	\$4,125,700	\$9,104,300	\$4,637,700	\$3,120,850
" 11.....	66,600,100	74,911,300	3,647,100	4,271,500	8,862,600	4,425,400	2,508,775
" 18.....	66,923,700	75,111,700	3,628,300	4,250,400	8,962,500	4,425,200	2,488,475
" 25.....	60,427,700	66,667,700	2,806,600	3,517,000	7,786,300	3,945,300	1,645,775
Apr. 1.....	61,127,000	67,408,000	2,824,300	3,783,300	7,553,100	3,929,000	1,237,500

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following tables:

BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 4.....	\$194,936,000	\$225,372,000	\$18,741,000	\$7,088,000	\$5,068,000	\$143,629,800
" 11.....	195,956,000	231,830,000	18,230,000	6,974,000	5,108,000	127,579,000
" 18.....	195,095,000	233,241,000	19,059,000	6,784,000	5,098,000	127,451,800
" 25.....	194,845,000	234,318,000	19,151,000	6,822,000	5,067,000	128,999,500
Apr. 1.....	193,089,000	234,365,000	18,643,000	6,654,000	5,068,000	124,941,900

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 4.....	\$131,186,000	\$156,689,000	\$49,014,000	\$6,061,000	\$111,486,500
" 11.....	181,465,000	154,429,000	47,453,000	6,049,000	93,963,500
" 18.....	131,318,000	155,154,000	48,084,000	6,037,000	90,302,900
" 25.....	133,620,000	155,292,000	47,812,000	6,019,000	88,680,100
Apr. 1.....	134,394,000	156,812,000	46,740,000	6,061,000	77,096,700

EUROPEAN BANKS.—About \$16,000,000 of gold went out of the Bank of England last month, some being exported and a considerable amount going to the interior of Great Britain. France lost about \$2,000,000 and Germany gained about the same amount. England holds \$8,000,000 less than it did a year ago, France nearly \$10,000,000 less and Russia \$35,000,000 less. Germany has \$3,000,000 more.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	February 1, 1899.		March 1, 1899.		April 1, 1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£32,682,771		£34,062,851		£30,808,265	
France.....	72,834,762	£47,961,696	73,014,109	£47,890,189	72,567,656	£48,013,247
Germany.....	28,132,000	14,492,000	29,083,000	14,831,000	30,441,000	15,693,000
Austro-Hungary...	35,878,000	12,431,000	35,789,000	12,471,000	35,905,000	12,534,000
Spain.....	11,062,000	8,591,000	11,156,000	9,205,000	11,625,000	11,466,000
Netherlands.....	4,315,000	6,778,000	4,313,000	6,832,000	3,998,000	6,897,000
Nat. Belgium.....	3,178,000	1,588,000	3,173,000	1,587,000	3,157,000	1,578,000
Totals.....	£188,080,533	£91,869,696	£190,590,980	£91,816,189	£188,501,321	£96,170,247

MONEY RATES ABROAD.—The market rates for money abroad have tended upwards during the month particularly in London and Berlin, but the minimum

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Oct. 14.	Nov. 18.	Dec. 16.	Jan. 11.	Feb. 10.	Mar. 10.
London—Bank rate of discount....	4	4	4	4	3	3
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	3½	3¼	3½—7 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	2½	2	2¼—¾
6 months bankers' drafts.....	3¼—½	3	2½—3	2½	2¼	2½—¾
Loans—Day to day.....	2½	2½	2½	2½	1½	1½
Paris, open market rates.....	2	3	3	3	2½	2½
Berlin, .....	3½	4½	5½	4½	3½	4½
Hamburg, .....	4	5½	5½	4½	3½	4½
Frankfort, .....	4	5½	5½	4½	3½	4½
Amsterdam, .....	2	2½	2½	2½	2¼	2½
Vienna, .....	4	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½
St. Petersburg, .....	4	5½	5½	5½	6	6
Madrid, .....	5	5	5	5	4	3
Copenhagen, .....	4½	5	5	5	4½	4

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Dec. 14, 1898.	Jan. 11, 1899.	Feb. 8, 1899.	Mar. 16, 1899.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£26,940,525	£27,721,420	£26,484,785	£26,553,840
Public deposits.....	5,783,473	7,690,790	11,283,618	16,796,784
Other deposits.....	35,406,396	41,513,353	40,303,812	36,324,021
Government securities.....	10,939,535	15,192,036	13,383,438	13,396,274
Other securities.....	27,212,882	32,040,707	32,650,986	34,913,574
Reserve of notes and coin.....	20,848,354	20,058,988	23,715,319	23,284,293
Coin and bullion.....	30,983,879	30,980,408	33,400,084	33,038,133
Reserve to liabilities.....	50½%	40½%	45½%	49¼%
Bank rate of discount.....	4½	4½	3½	3½
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	3½	2½	2½	2¼@2½
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	106½	110½	111½	110½
Price of silver per ounce.....	27½	27½	27½d	27½d.
Average price of wheat.....	27s. 6d.	27s. 0d.	26s. 6d.	26s. 10d.

rates of discount have not been advanced. The Bank of England maintains its rate at 3 per cent., France 3 and Germany  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London at the close of the month were  $2\frac{3}{8}$  @  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. against  $2\frac{3}{8}$  per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., the same as a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort  $4\frac{1}{8}$  @  $4\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. against  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. a month ago.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—Until the last week of the month the sterling exchange market was weak and dull, the dearer rates for money in New York being largely responsible. Then there came a very sharp advance for which no explanation has been given other than a rumor that the payment of \$20,000,000 to Spain was about to be made and sterling to be purchased for the remittance. That rumor has not been confirmed.

RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Mar. 4.....	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.84	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.86 @ 4.86 $\frac{1}{4}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 11.....	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.86 @ 4.86 $\frac{1}{4}$	4.85 @ 4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 18.....	4.85 @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.86	4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.82 @ 4.83
" 25.....	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.86 @ 4.86 $\frac{1}{4}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.83	4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$
Apr 1.....	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.87 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.87 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.84	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$

FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	Dec. 1.	January 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	April 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 2	4.83 — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
" " Sight.....	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
" " Cables.....	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 3	4.85 — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	4.87 — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.87 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
" " Commercial long.....	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 1	4.81 — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 4	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 4
" " Docu'tary for paym't.....	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 1 $\frac{1}{4}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 1 $\frac{1}{4}$	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.83 — 4	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.16 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 15	5.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 16 $\frac{1}{2}$
" " Bankers' 60 days.....	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.20 — 17 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
" " Bankers' sight.....	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	5.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 15	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 17 $\frac{1}{2}$
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.20 — 20	5.20 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 94 $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
" " Bankers' sight.....	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 95	95 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	95 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.23 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 23 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.22 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.19 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	5.19 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 18 $\frac{1}{2}$
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40 — $\frac{1}{2}$	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 40	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Kronors—Bankers' sight.....	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ —
Italian lire—sight.....	5.55 — 50	5.52 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 50	5.55 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 53 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.55 — 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.56 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Austrian florins sight.....	.....	.....	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$

GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.—The United States mints in March coined \$12,176,715 gold, \$2,346,557 silver and \$48,801 minor coin, a total of \$14,572,073. There were \$1,900,301 of standard silver dollars coined.

COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$7,803,420	\$1,964,800	\$3,420,000	\$1,624,000	\$18,032,000	\$1,642,000
February.....	10,152,000	1,519,794	4,065,302	1,167,584	14,848,800	1,506,000
March.....	13,770,900	1,617,654	5,385,463	1,488,139	12,176,715	2,346,557
April.....	8,800,400	1,535,000	8,211,400	948,000	.....	.....
May.....	4,489,950	1,600,000	7,717,500	1,433,000	.....	.....
June.....	2,100,547	1,856,754	6,903,982	1,432,185	.....	.....
July.....	377,000	280,000	5,853,900	1,027,834	.....	.....
August.....	8,756,250	701,438	9,344,200	2,350,000	.....	.....
September.....	8,762,375	1,050,092	7,355,315	2,178,389	.....	.....
October.....	3,845,000	2,301,000	5,180,000	3,354,191	.....	.....
November.....	3,544,000	2,108,000	5,006,700	2,755,251	.....	.....
December.....	3,626,642	1,977,187	9,492,045	3,275,481	.....	.....
Year.....	\$76,028,464	\$18,486,697	\$77,965,757	\$23,034,084	\$45,057,515	\$5,586,557

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion :

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$.55	\$.70	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.76
Mexican dollars.....	47½¢	.49	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.80
Peruvian soles, Chilian pesos..	42½¢	44½¢	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.82
English silver.....	4.82	4.88	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.80
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.86	4.88	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.70
Five francs.....	.93	.96	Ten guilders.....	3.96	4.00
Twenty francs.....	3.85	3.87			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 27½d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 59½ @ 60½c. Fine silver (Government assay), 59½ @ 61c.

SILVER.—The price of silver in London made a net advance of 1-16d. per ounce in March, closing at 27 7-16d. It fell to 27½d. early in the month, but advanced to 27 9-16d. on March 17, declining ½d. subsequently.

MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1897, 1898, 1899.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.		MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	29½	29¼	28¾	28¼	27½	27¼	July.....	27½	26¾	27½	27		
February.	29½	29¼	28¾	25½	27½	27¾	August..	26½	23¾	27½	27½		
March....	29½	28¾	28½	25	27½	27¾	Septemb'r	27½	23¾	28½	27½		
April.....	28½	28¼	28½	25½	27½	27¾	October..	27½	25¾	28½	27½		
May.....	28½	27½	28½	25½	27½	27¾	Novemb'r	27½	26¾	28½	27½		
June.....	27½	27½	27½	26½	27½	27¾	Decemb'r	27½	25½	27½	27½		

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.—The circulation of the National Banks was reduced \$149,950 in March, but is \$18,654,298 greater than a year ago. The circulation based on Government bonds was reduced \$1,229,028, while the lawful money deposited to retire circulation increased \$1,878,978.

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Dec. 31, 1898.	Jan. 31, 1899.	Feb. 28, 1899.	Mar. 31, 1899.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$248,735,105	\$243,241,501	\$242,902,387	\$243,052,317
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	214,015,987	211,041,299	211,155,017	209,825,999
Circulation secured by lawful money....	29,719,118	32,200,202	31,747,351	38,126,328
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Pacific R.R. bonds, 6 per cent.....	1,815,000	55,000	.....	.....
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	21,486,750	21,385,900	21,512,550	21,582,650
" " 1907, 4 per cent.....	138,972,050	132,048,050	130,976,650	129,765,350
Five per cents. of 1894.....	15,010,400	14,530,400	14,620,400	14,228,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	20,725,650	20,051,150	19,608,650	19,089,650
Three per cents. of 1898.....	46,933,000	48,409,340	49,357,440	49,787,340
Total.....	\$239,942,850	\$236,479,840	\$236,075,990	\$234,438,800

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits : 2 per cents of 1891, \$1,564,500; 4 per cents of 1907, \$24,830,100; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$7,998,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$10,918,500; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$27,823,840; a total of \$73,134,740.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$82,575.

FOREIGN TRADE.—The exports of merchandise in February fell below \$100,000, - 000 for the first time since September last, but the month being a short one, the daily average was not very much below that of January. The total for the month was \$93,884,149 as compared with \$115,591,602 in January, 1899, and \$94,917,453 in February, 1898. Imports of merchandise have increased materially amounting to \$60,260,032, the largest total for any month since June, 1897, when our sugar imports were large, with the single exception of March, 1898, when they were \$61, - 562,183. The excess of exports was \$33,624,117, which compares with \$57,000,000 in January and nearly \$42,000,000 in February, 1898. The net exports for the eight months ended February 28 this year are \$416,277,007, while for the same



period last year they were \$419,593,681. Whether or not our large balances have at last started upon a decline, it is not yet possible to predict. We gained by imports in February \$4,824,066 of gold, making more than \$65,000,000 for the eight months of the year, exceeding the big record of two years ago.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF FEBRUARY.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1894.....	\$65,175,331	\$48,725,094	Exp., \$16,450,237	Exp., \$1,068,335	Exp., \$3,271,320
1895.....	55,982,734	58,315,951	Imp., 2,333,217	Imp., 4,141,501	1,975,065
1896.....	77,701,904	65,478,116	Exp., 15,223,788	" 9,468,239	" 2,599,559
1897.....	79,821,086	59,237,377	" 20,583,709	" 477,023	" 2,394,558
1898.....	94,917,453	58,074,649	" 41,842,804	" 5,182,289	" 1,674,336
1899.....	93,854,149	60,200,052	" 33,654,117	" 4,824,066	" 3,135,169
<b>EIGHT MONTHS.</b>					
1894.....	638,823,851	420,276,457	Exp., 218,550,394	Imp., 53,303,339	Exp., 25,236,885
1895.....	557,835,668	494,233,616	" 61,652,052	Exp., 42,114,788	" 17,634,240
1896.....	602,666,573	541,194,855	" 61,472,040	" 52,394,293	" 21,391,413
1897.....	734,993,213	422,515,394	" 312,482,819	Imp., 64,499,242	" 22,071,620
1898.....	813,284,900	393,691,179	" 419,593,681	" 27,581,439	" 15,913,195
1899.....	843,480,420	427,203,413	" 416,277,007	" 65,059,143	" 18,347,839

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.—The Treasury statement for March shows a surplus of \$14,051,668, but included in the receipts is the Central Pacific Railroad payment of \$11,798,314. Still, excluding that, a surplus of nearly \$2,300,000 is shown. Customs receipts were \$4,000,000 greater than in February, and internal revenue receipts \$3,400,000 greater. Expenditures were \$1,000,000 less than in the previous month, the decrease, however, being entirely made up by a reduction in pension payments.

UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

Source.	RECEIPTS.		Source.	EXPENDITURES.	
	March, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.		March, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.
Customs.....	\$20,983,436	\$151,810,087	Civil and mis.....	\$9,142,563	\$75,781,620
Internal revenue...	22,071,107	201,299,561	War.....	14,696,466	194,706,377
Miscellaneous.....	18,425,696	20,334,779	Navy.....	4,842,435	50,895,023
			Indians.....	2,588,054	10,232,790
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$57,090,239</b>	<b>\$382,444,427</b>	Pensions.....	11,251,944	106,519,975
	*14,051,668	85,057,376	Interest.....	462,109	20,324,523
			<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$42,978,571</b>	<b>\$467,502,303</b>

\*Excess of receipts.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1898.			1899.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$37,333,628	\$36,696,711	*\$164,236,798	\$41,774,930	\$51,122,771	\$228,652,341
February.....	28,572,358	26,599,256	167,823,182	37,909,332	43,918,929	*230,413,206
March.....	32,958,750	31,882,444	174,584,116	57,030,239	42,978,571	*245,413,706
April.....	33,012,943	44,314,062	181,238,137			
May.....	30,074,818	47,849,909	171,818,055			
June.....	38,509,813	47,852,261	167,004,410			
July.....	43,847,108	74,263,475	189,444,714			
August.....	41,782,707	56,260,717	217,904,485			
September.....	30,778,070	54,223,921	243,297,543			
October.....	30,630,051	53,982,276	239,865,162			
November.....	38,900,915	49,090,980	241,863,444			
December.....	41,404,793	41,864,907	248,529,178			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.



## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of March, and the highest and lowest during the year 1899, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1898:

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				MARCH, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	199 $\frac{1}{2}$	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	247 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 23	18 Jan. 7	227 $\frac{1}{2}$	205 $\frac{1}{2}$	214 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 Feb. 23	50 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 7	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	50 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Baltimore & Ohio	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	128 $\frac{1}{2}$	74 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 26	66 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 6	72	68	69 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Bay State Gas	94	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	85 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 10	29 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 11	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Brooklyn Rapid Transit	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	136 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 29	77 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 8	136 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	133		
Canadian Pacific	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	72	90 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 24	84 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 15	90	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	86 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Canada Southern	58	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	70 Jan. 23	54 Jan. 5	61	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	60		
Central of New Jersey	99	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	119 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 25	97 Jan. 3	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	105	118 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Central Pacific	441 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	555 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 18	41 Jan. 5	528 $\frac{1}{2}$	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	511 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Ches. & Ohio vtg. ctfs.	269 $\frac{1}{2}$	174 $\frac{1}{2}$	311 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 2	247 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 5	288 $\frac{1}{2}$	261 $\frac{1}{2}$	279 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago & Alton	172	150	175 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 25	168 Jan. 11	175 $\frac{1}{2}$	172 $\frac{1}{2}$	175 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	149 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 18	124 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 7	145 $\frac{1}{2}$	137 $\frac{1}{2}$	144 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago & E. Illinois	66	49	75 Mar. 27	59 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 4	75	69 $\frac{1}{2}$	74		
"  preferred	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	125 Mar. 2	112 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 3	125	122 $\frac{1}{2}$	122 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago, Great Western	18	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 23	15 Jan. 20	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	16 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville	11	7	11 Feb. 9	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 6	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	381 $\frac{1}{2}$	23	493 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 6	31 Jan. 4	493 $\frac{1}{2}$	43	44 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul	129 $\frac{1}{2}$	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	138 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 20	120 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 3	130 $\frac{1}{2}$	126 $\frac{1}{2}$	128		
"  preferred	166 $\frac{1}{2}$	140	173 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 17	166 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 3	173 $\frac{1}{2}$	169	171		
Chicago & Northwestern	143 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	166 Mar. 29	141 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 4	166	146 $\frac{1}{2}$	159 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	1911 $\frac{1}{2}$	163	194 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 21	188 Jan. 19	194 $\frac{1}{2}$	182	193		
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	80	122 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 27	113 Jan. 7	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	118 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	94	65	100 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 19	91 Feb. 8	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	96 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	170	148	176 Mar. 21	170 Jan. 16	176	174	176		
Chicago Terminal Transfer	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	25 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 27	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 6	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	23		
"  preferred	374 $\frac{1}{2}$	229 $\frac{1}{2}$	561 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 27	361 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 8	561 $\frac{1}{2}$	374 $\frac{1}{2}$	527 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	474 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	62 Feb. 2	42 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 4	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	59 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	97	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 26	95 Jan. 21	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	96	97 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Cleveland Lorain & Wheeling	194 $\frac{1}{2}$	114	163 Jan. 26	109 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 23	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	109 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	37 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 9	30 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 8	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	32	36		
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	84	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 Mar. 20	89 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 26	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	89 $\frac{1}{2}$	94		
"  preferred	274 $\frac{1}{2}$	129 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 Mar. 30	18 Mar. 20	20	18	20		
Consolidated Gas Co.	206 $\frac{1}{2}$	164	223 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 11	189 Jan. 12	223 $\frac{1}{2}$	202 $\frac{1}{2}$	204 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	117 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 23	106 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 3	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	115 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Delaware, Lack. & Western	159	140	174 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 23	157 Jan. 7	174 $\frac{1}{2}$	167	172		
Denver & Rio Grande	214	10	243 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 4	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 7	24	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	23		
"  preferred	719 $\frac{1}{2}$	40	769 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 2	68 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 11	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	71 $\frac{1}{2}$	75 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	195	119	199 Jan. 20	190 Jan. 4	196	193 $\frac{1}{2}$	193 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Erie	164 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	164 Jan. 19	139 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 30	147 $\frac{1}{2}$	139 $\frac{1}{2}$	139 $\frac{1}{2}$		
1st pref.	439 $\frac{1}{2}$	294 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 Jan. 24	37 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 5	403 $\frac{1}{2}$	374 $\frac{1}{2}$	38		
2d pref.	279 $\frac{1}{2}$	154 $\frac{1}{2}$	224 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 30	19 Jan. 4	215 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	20		
Evansville & Terre Haute	419 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	414 Jan. 3	36 Mar. 23	39	36	36		
Express Adams	180	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	119 Feb. 25	106 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 16	116 $\frac{1}{2}$	112	116		
"  American	153	116	145 Jan. 9	138 Jan. 21	143	140 $\frac{1}{2}$	140 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  United States	564 $\frac{1}{2}$	38	60 Jan. 11	52 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 27	56	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	53		
"  Wells, Fargo.	131 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	129 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 16	125 Jan. 10	129	125	125		
Great Northern, preferred	180	122	195 Mar. 13	142 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 6	195	181	193		
Illinois Central	1159 $\frac{1}{2}$	96	122 Jan. 23	113 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 3	118 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	117 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Iowa Central	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	74	13 Jan. 10	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 7	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	104	115 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	421 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	514 Feb. 15	423 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 3	473 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	47		
Kansas City, Pitts. & Gulf	254 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	18 Jan. 6	7 Mar. 15	158 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	10		
Laclede Gas	549 $\frac{1}{2}$	374 $\frac{1}{2}$	57 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 9	51 Mar. 4	559 $\frac{1}{2}$	51	534 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Lake Erie & Western	234 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	224 Jan. 27	15 Jan. 16	20	18	184 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	83	53	75 Jan. 27	60 Jan. 15	72	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	69 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Lake Shore	215	170 $\frac{1}{2}$	208 Jan. 24	196 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 5	200	200	200		
Long Island	594 $\frac{1}{2}$	40	84 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 2	59 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 5	80	73	79		
Louisville & Nashville	654 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	69 Jan. 27	63 Mar. 6	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	654 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Manhattan consol.	1204 $\frac{1}{2}$	90	1184 Jan. 20	97 Jan. 4	116	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	116		
Metropolitan Street	1944 $\frac{1}{2}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	239 Mar. 23	187 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 11	239	235	236 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Michigan Central	118	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	116 Jan. 24	112 Jan. 13	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	114	114		
Minneapolis & St. Louis	389 $\frac{1}{2}$	24	544 Feb. 23	354 Jan. 6	54	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	52 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  1st pref.	100	84	99 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 25	97 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 9	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  2d pref.	794 $\frac{1}{2}$	46	90 Feb. 23	73 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 10	86 $\frac{1}{2}$	86	86 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	144 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	15 Jan. 10	13 Jan. 25	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	137 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"  preferred	41	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	41 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 20	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 8	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	38 $\frac{1}{2}$		

ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				MARCH, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.		
Missouri Pacific.....	46½	27	46½—Jan. 24	45½—Feb. 8	48¾	44½	48¾		
Mobile & Ohio.....	32½	24	45—Mar. 23	32—Jan. 3	45	37	44½		
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River..	124½	105	144½—Mar. 29	121¾—Jan. 3	144¾	131½	141½		
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis....	15½	11½	19¾—Jan. 23	13¾—Mar. 14	15	13¾	15		
1st preferred.....	76	65	79—Jan. 23	65—Mar. 7	70	65	70		
2d preferred.....	40¾	28	41—Jan. 23	38—Mar. 27	34½	33	34½		
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.	201	178¼	211—Feb. 2	190—Jan. 19	210	204¼	210		
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	19½	13¾	23¾—Mar. 27	18¾—Jan. 3	23¾	25¾	27¾		
Norfolk & Western.....	19¾	11½	20¾—Feb. 17	17¾—Mar. 17	19¼	17¾	19		
preferred.....	68¾	42¾	71¼—Feb. 2	61¾—Jan. 6	67¼	62¾	67		
North American Co.....	7¾	4¼	10¼—Feb. 23	6¾—Jan. 6	9¾	8¾	9¾		
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.	44¼	19	55¼—Feb. 16	42¾—Jan. 7	54¼	49¼	53		
pref tr. receipts.....	79¾	56¾	81¼—Jan. 23	76¾—Jan. 7	80¾	77¾	79¾		
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	61¼	35¼	53—Jan. 23	44—Mar. 18	44	44	44		
preferred.....	78	65¼	76¾—Jan. 23	71—Jan. 5	73	71	73		
Oregon Short Line.....	43	19¾	48—Jan. 23	41—Feb. 8	41¾	41¾	41¾		
Pacific Mail.....	46	21	55—Jan. 30	43¼—Jan. 4	51	45¼	48¾		
Pennsylvania R. R.....	123½	110¾	142—Jan. 23	122¼—Jan. 5	136¼	130	135¼		
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	112	86¼	126¼—Mar. 29	100¼—Jan. 23	126¼	111	125¼		
Pitts. Cin. Chic. & St. Louis..	63¾	38¾	88—Jan. 23	56—Mar. 17	67	56	57¾		
preferred.....	84¼	57	98—Jan. 23	80—Feb. 10	85¾	80¼	82¾		
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	216	132	164¾—Jan. 4	156—Jan. 21	162	156¼	161¼		
Reading Voting Tr. cfts.....	23½	15¼	25—Jan. 24	20¼—Feb. 8	25	21¼	23¾		
1st preferred.....	54¾	36	68¼—Mar. 24	51¼—Jan. 7	68¼	60¼	65¼		
2d preferred.....	29	17¾	36¼—Mar. 22	26¼—Jan. 7	36¼	31¾	35¾		
Rome, Wat. Ogdens' g.....	123¼	116¼	131—Mar. 16	130—Jan. 10	131	129¾	131		
St. Louis & San Francisco....	9¼	6	14¾—Feb. 1	8¾—Jan. 6	12¾	10¼	13		
1st preferred.....	70	52¼	75¼—Jan. 26	66—Jan. 9	72	69¾	70¼		
2d preferred.....	36	22¼	44¾—Jan. 31	32¼—Jan. 5	41¾	37¼	40		
St. Louis & Southwestern....	7¾	3¾	12—Jan. 30	6¾—Jan. 4	12	8¼	11¼		
preferred.....	18	7¾	36—Mar. 28	17—Jan. 3	35	26¼	24¼		
Southern Pacific Co.....	35	12	44—Jan. 31	32¾—Mar. 6	37	32¾	35¾		
Southern Railway.....	109¼	7	14—Jan. 16	10¼—Jan. 5	13¼	12	12¾		
preferred.....	43¾	23¾	52¾—Mar. 23	40¾—Jan. 4	52¾	47¼	51¾		
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	38¾	17	54¾—Mar. 23	36—Jan. 9	54¾	43¾	53¾		
Texas & Pacific.....	20½	8¾	25¾—Mar. 1	17¼—Jan. 5	25¾	21¾	23¾		
Union Pacific.....	44¾	16¼	50¾—Feb. 21	41¾—Jan. 7	49¼	43¾	48		
preferred.....	74¾	45¾	84¼—Jan. 23	72¾—Jan. 6	83¼	77	82¾		
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf...	13¾	5¾	14¼—Jan. 6	11¾—Mar. 3	13¾	11¾	13¾		
Wabash R. R.....	9¼	6¼	8¾—Jan. 24	7¾—Jan. 5	9¾	8	8¼		
preferred.....	24¼	14¼	24¾—Jan. 23	21¼—Feb. 8	24	21¼	23¾		
Western Union.....	95¾	82¼	96¼—Jan. 24	93¼—Mar. 6	95	93¾	95¾		
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	6¼	4	13—Jan. 30	10¼—Feb. 8	12	11	11¼		
preferred.....	30¾	8	37—Jan. 30	31¾—Mar. 30	33¾	31¾	31¾		
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:									
American Co. Oil Co.....	39¾	15¾	38—Jan. 31	33¾—Mar. 6	37¾	33¾	36		
preferred.....	90¾	66	93¾—Mar. 21	86¼—Jan. 5	93¾	91	92¾		
American Spirits Mfg Co.....	15¾	6¼	15¼—Mar. 13	12¼—Feb. 23	15¼	12¾	13¾		
preferred.....	41¾	16	41¾—Mar. 13	12¾—Mar. 1	41¾	36	39		
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	146¾	107¾	182—Mar. 20	123¼—Jan. 4	182	136¾	168		
preferred.....	116	103	123—Mar. 20	110—Jan. 16	123	114	117¾		
American Tobacco Co.....	153¾	83¾	227¼—Mar. 23	132¼—Feb. 17	227¼	186¼	224		
preferred.....	135¾	112¾	150—Mar. 6	132—Jan. 4	150	142¾	145¾		
Consolidated Ice Co.....	52	27¼	50¼—Jan. 30	44¼—Jan. 9	48¾	46¼	47¼		
Federal Steel Co.....	52	29	67¼—Mar. 30	46¾—Feb. 8	67¼	49¾	67¼		
preferred.....	85¼	66¾	90¾—Mar. 29	82¾—Jan. 7	90¾	86	89¾		
General Electric Co.....	97	76	120¼—Mar. 7	95¼—Jan. 3	120¼	112¼	117		
International Paper Co.....	67	48	68¼—Jan. 23	51—Mar. 17	59	51	53¼		
preferred.....	95	85	95—Jan. 5	80¼—Mar. 18	88¾	80¼	82		
National Lead Co.....	39¾	26¼	40¼—Jan. 20	32¼—Mar. 17	36¼	32¼	36		
preferred.....	114¾	99	115—Jan. 21	111¾—Jan. 13	113	112¾	113		
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	10¾	3¼	12—Jan. 10	8¾—Jan. 3	12	9¾	11¾		
U. S. Leather Co.....	87½	5¼	8—Jan. 23	6¼—Mar. 7	7¼	6¼	7		
preferred.....	75¼	53¾	75—Jan. 20	69—Mar. 2	74¼	69	73		
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48¾	14¼	54¼—Feb. 23	42¾—Jan. 5	54¾	48	52		
preferred.....	113¼	60	120—Jan. 9	111—Jan. 3	117¾	115¼	117		

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	100%	Mar. 25, '99	100%	99	80,000
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1995	7,000,000	Q J	89½	Mar. 30, '99	90	88½	105,000
<b>Aтч. Top. &amp; S. F.</b>								
{ Aтч Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1995	126,823,000	A & O	108½	Mar. 30, '99	108½	101½	2,808,000
{     " registered.....			A & O	101	Mar. 23, '99	102½	101	52,500
{     " adjustment, g. 4's.....	1995	51,728,000	NOV	83¾	Mar. 30, '99	84½	81¾	3,928,500
{     " registered.....			NOV	88	Feb. 20, '99			
{     " Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	750,000	J & J					
{     " Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S					
{ Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99			
{ Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,288,000	J & J	100½	Feb. 1, '99			
<b>B. &amp; O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.).....</b>	1919	3,000,000	A & O	116	Jan. 18, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				112	Oct. 19, '98			
{     " g. 5's.....	1885-1925			115	Oct. 5, '98			
{     " coupons off.....								
{     " registered.....		10,000,000	F & A	120	Jan. 18, '99	119¼	119¼	8,000
{     " Speyer & Co. eng. cf. dep.....				120	Feb. 1, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				119¼	Mar. 17, '99			
{     " con. g. 5's.....	1988			118½	Sept. 7, '98			
{     " registered.....		11,988,000	F & A	116	Aug. 22, '98			
{     " J. P. M. & Co. cfs. dep't.....				114¼	July 23, '98			
{     " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....				116¾	Oct. 23, '98			
{     " bonds of loan of 1853 ext.....		1,161,000	A & O	120	Nov. 18, '98			
{     " to 1935 at 4½ Tr. Co. cfs.....								
{     " sterling 6½ loan of 1872 due.....		£1,921,800	M & N					
{     " 1902 Trust Co. cfs.....								
{     " sterling 6½ loan of 1874 due.....		£1,980,600	M & N					
{     " 1910 Trust Co. cfs.....								
{     " 4½ term. bonds.....	1894	8,500,000	J & D					
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....								
{     " sterling 4½ loan of 1883.....		£2,400,000	A & O					
{     " (Philadelphia Branch).....								
{     " ster. 5½ loan of 1877 due.....		£1,382,200	J & D					
{     " 1827 (B. & O. & Chic.) Tr.....								
{     " Co. cfs.....								
{ Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd.....	1990	6,000,000	M & N	106½	Mar. 8, '99	106½	106½	16,000
{ W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....	1990	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95			
{ Monongahela River 1st g. 5's.....	1919	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92			
{ Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1930	2,500,000	M & S	111	Feb. 23, '99			
{ Colo. & Cin. Mid'd 1st ext 4½'s.....	1933	2,000,000	J & J	85	Jan. 19, '99			
{ Ak. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. int. g. 5's.....	1930	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95			
{     " coupons off.....				105	Aug. 9, '98			
{     " Tr. Co. cfs. of dep.....				115	Jan. 19, '99			
{ Pittsb. & Connellsville letg. 4's.....	1948	2,536,000	J & J	107¾	July 23, '98			
{     " Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....								
{     " 1st 7½ bds 1898 Tr. Co. cfs.....		1,419,000	J & J					
{     " con. 6½ bonds Tr. Co. cfs.....		1,315,000	J & J					
{ B & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s.....	1990	10,667,000	J & J	108	Mar. 13, '99	108	108	5,000
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....								
{     " coupons off.....								
{     " S'w'n Ry 1st con g 4½'s.....	1998	10,511,000	J & J	94	Jan. 27, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....								
{     " coupons off.....								
{     " 1st inc. g. 5's, series A.....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	82½	Jan. 11, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....								
{     " 1st inc. g. 5's, series B.....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	12	Feb. 23, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....				11½	Feb. 10, '99			
{ B. & O. S'w'n Term Co. gtd g 5s.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	105	Nov. 30, '98			
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....								
{ Ohio & Miss. 1st con. 4's.....	1947	2,615,000	J & J	112	Jan. 30, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....								
{     " coupons off.....								
{     " 2d con. 7's.....	1911	2,952,000	A & O	128½	Feb. 17, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....				126	Mar. 28, '99	126	126	7,000
{     " 1st Spr'gfield div. 7's.....	1905	1,984,000	M & N	103	Mar. 17, '99	103	103	7,000
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....				103	Mar. 17, '99	103	103	11,000
{     " 1st gen. 5s.....	1932	405,000	J & D	89	Feb. 4, '99			
{     " Trust Co. cfs.....								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest price and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Brooklyn E. Tr. Co. cfs 1st g. 6e's, 1924		3,464,000	.....	106	Mar. 30, '99	106	101½	204,000
Tr. Co. cfs. 2d g. 5's, 1915		1,246,000	.....	86	June 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
all instal. paid.			.....	105	Mar. 27, '99	105	105	23,000
Seas. & B. B. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 5's, 1942		1,857,000	.....	106½	Mar. 29, '99	106½	101½	281,000
all instal. paid.			.....	113	Mar. 30, '99	113	109	142,000
Union Ele. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 6's, 1937		6,124,000	A & O	117½	Dec. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's, 1945		6,625,000	J & J	107	Mar. 30, '99	108	107	200,000
Bklyn City R. R. 1st con. 5's 1916, 1941		4,373,000	M & N	74	Sept. 1, '98	.....	.....	.....
Bklyn Qu. Co. & Sur. 1st con. gtd		2,255,000	J & J	106½	Mar. 24, '99	108½	106½	30,000
g. 5's, 1941		3,000,000	M & S	127½	Mar. 15, '99	127½	127½	1,000
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4's, 1938		4,407,000	J & J	128	Jan. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's, 1937		1,000,000	F & A	121¼	May 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. 6's, 1947		1,300,000	J & D	105	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rochester & Pittsburg, 1st 6's, 1921		3,920,000	F & A	100	Feb. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
cons. 1st 6's, 1922		650,000	A & O	109	Mar. 29, '99	109	109	55,500
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. 5's, 1943		1,000,000	A & O	116	Mar. 8, '99	116	116	10,000
Buff. & St. Mary's S'w'n 1st g. 5s, 1927		1,211,500	A & O	110½	Feb. 4, '99	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's, 1913		6,500,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
registered.		6,425,000	A & O	106½	Nov. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's, 1906		150,000	A & O	105	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's, 1934		825,000	J & D	110	Mar. 30, '99	110	109	57,000
registered.		1,905,000	M & S	109½	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st 7's, g. 1927		13,920,000	J & D	98	Mar. 29, '99	98	91	43,000
Ced. Rap Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's, 1920		5,100,000	M & N	95	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's, 1921		2,500,000	F & A	116¼	Mar. 28, '99	118	116¼	26,000
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's, 1908		4,880,000	F & A	97	Mar. 30, '99	97½	95	1,343,000
2d mortg. 5's, 1913		7,000,000	M & N	41	Mar. 29, '99	42	40¼	385,000
registered.		16,500,000	M & N	14	Mar. 29, '99	14	12¼	108,000
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's 1948		4,000,000	OCT 1	7¼	Mar. 29, '99	7¼	7¼	9,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's, 1987		2,000,000	OCT 1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Central R'y of Georgia, 1st g. 5's, 1945		7,000,000	F & A	99	Mar. 30, '99	99	98	12,000
registered \$1,000 & \$5,000		4,000,000	M & N	114½	Mar. 29, '99	114½	114½	1,000
con. g. 5's, 1945		1,000,000	M & N	102	Mar. 24, '99	102	101	108,000
con. g. 5's, reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000		7,000,000	M & N	99	Mar. 20, '99	99	98	12,000
1st. pref. inc. g. 5's, 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	102	Mar. 24, '99	102	101	108,000
2d pref. inc. g. 5's, 1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	7¼	Mar. 29, '99	7¼	7¼	9,000
3d pref. inc. g. 5's, 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Macon & Nor. Div. 1st		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
g. 5's, 1946		1,000,000	J & J	99	July 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mobile div. 1st g. 5's, 1946		413,000	J & J	86¼	Sept. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5's, 1947			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Central Railroad of New Jersey								
1st consolidated 7's, 1899		3,836,000	Q J	102	Mar. 9, '99	102	102	11,000
convertible 7's, 1902		1,167,000	M & N	112	Jan. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
deb. 6's, 1908		463,800	M & N	112¼	Mar. 20, '99	112¼	112¼	8,000
gen. g. 5's, 1987		43,924,000	J & J	116¾	Mar. 26, '99	119	117	117,500
registered.			Q J	116¾	Mar. 24, '99	116¾	116¼	28,500
Lehigh & W.-B. con. asst. 7's, 1900		5,384,000	Q M	102	Mar. 24, '99	102	101	108,000
mortgage 5's, 1912		2,891,000	M & N	99	Mar. 20, '99	99	98	12,000
Am. Dock & Improvmt. Co. 5's, 1921		4,987,000	J & J	114½	Mar. 29, '99	114½	114½	1,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's, 1920		1,082,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. J. Southern int. gtd 6's, 1899		411,000	J & J	104	Nov. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Gen. P. ex. g. 5's Speyer & Co. cfs. A, 1898		2,966,000	.....	103½	Mar. 15, '99	104½	103½	12,000
B C D, 1899		3,383,000	.....	104	Mar. 25, '99	106½	103½	100,000
E, 1898		3,997,000	J & J	106½	Feb. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
F G H I, 1901		15,508,000	.....	103¼	Mar. 23, '99	108½	108	9,000
San Joaquin br. g. 6's, 1900		6,090,000	A & O	108¼	Mar. 29, '99	108½	107	55,000
gtd. g. 5's, 1939		4,279,000	A & O	84½	Sept. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs., 1900		8,004,000	A & O	120¾	Mar. 28, '99	121¼	119¼	536,000
land grant g. 5's, 1900		2,294,000	A & O	110¼	Mar. 21, '99	110½	110	80,000
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's, 1918		4,358,000	J & J	101½	Dec. 6, '97	.....	.....	.....
Western Pacific bonds 6's, 1909		2,735,000	J & J	108¾	Mar. 23, '99	106	106¾	17,000
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's, gtd., 1907		3,994,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97	.....	.....	.....
gtd. g. 5's, 1938		4,800,000	A & O	105¼	Dec. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's, 1936		1,500,000	J & J	108¾	Dec. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ches. & Ohio 6's, g., Series A, 1908		2,000,000	A & O	118¼	Mar. 20, '99	118¼	119¼	3,000
Mortgage gold 6's, 1911		2,000,000	A & O	118¼	Mar. 2, '98	118¼	118¼	1,000
1st con. g. 5's, 1939		25,858,000	M & N	118¼	Mar. 30, '99	120	118	80,000
registered.			M & N	118¼	Mar. 15, '99	118¼	117¼	11,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s, 1932		24,050,000	M & S	94	Mar. 30, '98	94	91½	864,000
registered.			M & S	92¾	Jan. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's, 1938		6,000,000	J & J	105¾	Mar. 24, '99	107	106	24,000
2d con. g. 4's, 1939		1,000,000	J & J	97	Dec. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's, 1940		650,000	J & J	95½	May 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's, 1941		400,000	M & S	98	Dec. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's, 1902		3,007,000	M & S	101¾	Mar. 23, '99	102¾	101¾	38,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chicago & Alton sinking fund 6's 1903		1,722,000	J & J	110	Feb. 2, '99			
{ Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's.....1900		1,785,000	F & A	104	Feb. 1, '99			
2d 7's.....1900		300,000	M & N	103½	Feb. 24, '99			
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		501,000	A & O	105¼	Oct. 30, '95			
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's 1903		28,924,000	J & J	115	Mar. 29, '99	115½	114¼	112,000
5's, sinking fund.....1901		2,315,000	A & O	105	Mar. 16, '99	105	105	1,000
5's, debentures.....1913		9,000,000	M & N	112¼	Mar. 30, '99	112¼	111¼	24,000
convertible 5's.....1903		7,623,700	M & S	145	Mar. 27, '99	145	138¾	66,500
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,318,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 6, '99			
4's.....1919		9,050,000	A & O	105¼	Feb. 27, '99			
Denver div. 4's.....1922		5,854,000	F & A	102¼	Mar. 30, '99	102½	101½	22,000
4's.....1921		3,150,000	M & S	103	Feb. 3, '99			
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's.....1905		2,320,000	F & A	107¼	Jan. 18, '99			
Nebraska extensi'n 4's, 1927 registered.		26,110,000	M & N	108¼	Mar. 30, '99	108¾	108	147,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's, 1911		8,000,000	M & S	120	Mar. 23, '99	120¼	120	6,000
Chic. Burl. & Northern, 1st 5's, 1923		8,241,000	A & O	108	Mar. 24, '99	108	107½	17,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	115½	Feb. 2, '97			
small bonds.....1904		2,653,000	J & D	112	Apr. 2, '96			
1st con. 6's, gold.....1934		2,653,000	A & O	134	Jan. 23, '99			
gen. con. 1st 5's.....1937 registered.		9,767,000	M & N	113	Mar. 30, '99	113	111½	45,000
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's.....1933		4,636,000	J & J	107	Feb. 23, '99			
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville		8,000,000	J & J	116¼	Mar. 20, '99	116¼	116¼	1,000
{ Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's.....1910		8,177,000	J & J	95	Mar. 21, '99	95	93¼	13,000
Chic. Ind. & Louisv. ref. g. 6's. 1947		4,700,000	J & J	108	Mar. 29, '99	108	108	19,000
refunding g. 6's.....1947								
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul		2,723,500	J & J	168	Mar. 22, '99	169	164¼	17,000
{ Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's \$ & g. R.d. 1902		147,000	J & J	120	Feb. 8, '94			
1st m. Iowa & D. 7's.....1909		1,692,000	J & J	163½	Feb. 17, '99			
1st m. C. & M. 7's.....1903		9,838,000	J & J	164½	Mar. 7, '99	164½	164½	1,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's, 1905		3,099,000	J & J	169	Mar. 27, '99	169	164½	42,000
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex., 1909		4,000,000	J & J	164½	Mar. 8, '99	165	164½	2,000
1st 6's, South'n div., 1919		2,500,000	J & J	120¼	Mar. 10, '99	120¼	120¼	4,000
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav., 1919		7,432,000	J & J	115¼	Nov. 30, '98			
1st So. Min. div. 6's.....1910		5,880,000	J & J	121½	Mar. 22, '99	121½	121	8,000
1st H'st & Dk. div. 7's, 1910		990,000	J & J	131	Mar. 29, '99	131	130¼	11,000
5's.....1910		3,000,000	J & J	109	Mar. 13, '99	109	109	1,000
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's, 1921		25,240,000	J & J	121¼	Mar. 23, '99	122¼	121¼	4,000
1st Chic. & P. W. 5's, 1921		3,063,000	J & J	120¾	Mar. 28, '99	121	120¾	158,000
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's, 1923		2,940,000	J & J	121¾	Jan. 31, '99			
Mineral Point div. 5's, 1910		1,360,000	J & J	110	Mar. 14, '99	110	110	3,000
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's, 1921		4,755,000	J & J	115¼	Dec. 14, '98			
Wis. & Min. div. 5's.....1921		4,748,000	J & J	118	Nov. 30, '98			
terminal 5's.....1914		1,250,000	J & J	116¼	Mar. 24, '99	116¼	115¼	21,000
Far. & So. 6's assu. 1924		576,000	J & J	127¼	Jan. 27, '98			
cont. s'k. f'd 5's.....1916		2,856,030	J & J	103¼	July 9, '97			
Dakota & Gt. S. 5's.....1916		23,674,000	J & J	114	Feb. 16, '99			
g. m. g. 4's, series A.....1909 registered.		2,500,000	J & J	111¼	Mar. 25, '99	111¼	111	69,000
gen. g. 3½'s, series B, 1909 registered.		2,155,000	J & J	105¼	Feb. 19, '98			
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's, 1910		5,062,000	J & D	121	Dec. 27, '98			
1st convt. 6's.....1913			J & D	126	Jan. 30, '99			
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's.....1915		12,771,000	Q F	143¼	Mar. 7, '99	143¼	143	8,000
coupon gold 7's.....1902		10,308,000	J & D	113	Mar. 25, '99	114¼	113	21,000
registered d. gold 7's.....1902		6,069,000	J & D	113¾	Mar. 30, '99	113¾	113	9,000
sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929 registered.		7,197,000	A & O	122¼	Mar. 13, '99	122¼	122¼	5,000
5's.....1879-1929 registered.		9,800,000	A & O	117¼	Oct. 24, '98			
debenture 5's.....1903 registered.		5,900,000	A & O	107	Mar. 27, '99	110¼	109	8,000
25 year debent. 5's.....1909 registered.		10,000,000	A & O	105¼	Mar. 28, '99	105¼	105¼	1,000
30 year debent. 5's.....1921 registered.		18,632,000	M & N	122	Mar. 20, '99	122	122	3,000
extension 4's.....1896-1926 registered.		7,336,000	M & N	119¼	Dec. 27, '98			
gen. g. 3½'s.....1907 registered.		455,000	M & N	111	Mar. 29, '99	111¼	110	8,000
Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's.....1901		600,000	A & O	109¼	Mar. 19, '97			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		1,086,000	A & O	117¼	Feb. 17, '99			
Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's.....1900		1,662,000	A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,602,000	F A 15	107¼	Mar. 23, '99	108	107¼	28,000
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1906		1,000,000	F A 15	106¾	Feb. 20, '96			
			M & S	105¾	Mar. 14, '99	105¾	105	39,000
			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98			
			J & J	107¼	May 26, '98			
			F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
			A & O	108	Oct. 21, '98			
			M & N	127	Apr. 17, '99			
			M & S	117¼	Feb. 6, '90			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ottumwa C. F. & St. Ist 5's.....	1909	1,600,000	M & S	111	Jan. 5, '99	.....	.....	.....
Northern Illinois Ist 5's.....	1910	1,500,000	M & S	105	Apr. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mil., Lake Shore & We'n Ist 6's.1921		5,000,000	M & N	140½	Mar. 18, '99	140½	140½	8,000
con. deb. 5's.....	1907	496,000	F & A	103½	Feb. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
ext. & Imp't. a'f'd g. 5's.1923		4,148,000	F & A	119½	Mar. 27, '99	119½	119	8,000
Michigan div. Ist 6's.1924		1,281,000	J & J	185	Dec. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ashland div. Ist 6's.....1925		1,000,000	M & S	140	Mar. 6, '99	140	140	5,000
income.....		500,000	M & N	112	Apr. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup.1917		12,100,000	J & J	133¼	Mar. 30, '99	133¼	132	8,000
registered.....	1917		J & J	123	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 4's.....	1988		J & J	107¾	Mar. 30, '99	108	106¾	286,000
registered.....		47,971,000	J & J	107¾	Mar. 30, '99	107¾	105½	153,000
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge Ist 4's.1905		1,200,000	J & J	98	Mar. 31, '99	98	98	10,000
Ist 2½'s.....	1905	1,200,000	J & J	85	Mar. 11, '98	85	85	8,000
extension 4's.....	1905	672,000	J & J	83	Mar. 15, '97	.....	.....	.....
Keokuk & Des M. Ist mor. 5's.1923		2,750,000	A & O	112¼	Mar. 30, '99	112¼	112¼	23,000
small bond.....	1923		A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's.1930		13,776,000	J & D	128	Mar. 25, '99	128	127½	8,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. Ist 6's.1918		2,637,000	M & N	128	Mar. 27, '99	128	128	1,000
North Wisconsin Ist mort. 6's.1930		800,000	M & J	140	Mar. 23, '99	140	140	6,000
St. Paul & Sioux City Ist 6's.....1919		6,070,000	A & O	133¼	Mar. 25, '99	134	133¼	5,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's.1947		18,000,000	J & J	100¼	Mar. 30, '99	100¼	95½	1,017,000
Chic. & Wm. Ind. Ist s'k. f'd g. 6's.1919		783,000	M & N	108	June 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen'l mortg. g. 6's.....	1932	9,868,000	Q & M	120½	Mar. 14, '99	120½	120½	1,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's.....1921		5,753,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....						.....	.....	.....
Cin., Ham. & Day con. s'k. f'd 7's.1905		998,000	A & O	119	Oct. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 4½'s.....	1937	2,000,000	J & J	109¼	Mar. 18, '97	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Day & Ir'n Ist gtd. g. 5's.1941		3,500,000	M & N	113½	Mar. 21, '99	113½	113½	1,000
City Sub. R'y. Balto. Ist g. 5's.....1922		2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's.1930		730,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. c'tfs. Ist 5's for.1917		1,907,000	.....	91	Mar. 30, '99	91	78	60,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's.1938		7,574,000	J & D	94	Mar. 30, '99	95	93	216,000
do Cairo div. Ist g. 4's.....	1938	5,000,000	J & J	91½	Dec. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. Ist col. trust g. 4's.1930		9,750,000	M & N	102	Mar. 18, '99	102	101½	20,000
registered.....						.....	.....	.....
Sp'gheld & Col. div. Ist g. 4's.....	1940	1,035,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
White W. Val. div. Ist g. 4's.....	1940	650,000	J & J	87	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. Ist g. 4's.1931		4,000,000	J & J	95¼	Feb. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. Ist g. 4's.1936		7,685,000	Q & F	103½	Mar. 30, '99	103½	103½	7,000
registered.....						.....	.....	.....
con. 6's.....	1920	781,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cin. S'dusky & Clev. con. Ist g. 6's.1928		2,571,000	J & J	114	Oct. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
Ind. Bloom. & W., Ist pfd. 7's.....	1900	1,000,000	J & J	107¾	Feb. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
Ohio, Ind. & W., Ist pfd. 5's.....	1938	500,000	Q & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Eastern Ist con. 4's.....	1940	8,103,000	A & O	85½	Mar. 30, '99	86½	85½	89,000
Income 4's.....	1940	4,000,000	M & A	80	Mar. 30, '99	81	79½	70,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. Ist 7's s'k. f'd.1899		3,000,000	M & N	102½	Feb. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
consol mortg. 7's.....	1914	3,991,000	J & D	107½	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
s'k. fund 7's.....	1914		J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. consol 6's.....	1934	3,205,000	J & J	132¼	Nov. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....						.....	.....	.....
Cin., Sp. Ist m. C., C. & Ind. 7's.1901		1,000,000	A & O	108½	Feb. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. Ist 5's.1933		4,300,000	A & O	107	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's.....	1933	2,936,000	J & J	130	Feb. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....						.....	.....	.....
Col. Midld Ry. Ist g. 2-3-4's.....	1947	6,250,000	J & J	84	Mar. 28, '99	85½	84	151,000
Ist g. 4's.....	1947	1,011,000	J & J	72½	Mar. 29, '99	72½	70½	51,000
Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's.....		208,000	M & S	74	Mar. 28, '99	76	74	99,000
J. P. M. c'tf., \$95 pd.....	1931	7,792,000	J & D	80	Mar. 3, '99	80	80	2,000
stamped assented.....						.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 6's, J. P. M. c'tf. std.1904		1,941,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gen. lien g. 4's.....	1936	1,556,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....						.....	.....	.....
Conn., Passumpic Riv' 1st g. 4's.1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's.1907		3,067,000	M & S	124	Nov. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. Ist 7's.1916		1,966,000	A & O	126	July 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Morris & Essex Ist m. 7's.....	1916	5,000,000	M & N	144	Mar. 28, '99	144	143	14,000
bonds, 7's.....	1910	281,000	J & J	109	Nov. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
7's.....	1871-1901	4,991,000	A & O	111	Mar. 14, '99	111	111	1,000
Ist c. gtd 7's.....	1915	12,151,000	J & D	143½	Mar. 25, '99	143½	143	5,000
registered.....						.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. Ist 6's.....	1921	12,000,000	J & J	138¼	Mar. 15, '99	138¼	138¼	1,000
const. 5's.....	1923	5,000,000	F & A	117½	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
term. imp. 4's.....	1923	5,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Warren 2d 7's.....	1908	750,000	A & O	108	Aug. 1, '96	.....	.....	.....



BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's.	1917	5,000,000	M & S	146	Sept. 13 '98	.....	.....	.....
reg.	1917		M & S	143	May 4 '98	.....	.....	.....
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's.	1906	3,000,000	A & O	122	Dec. 6 '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.	1906		A & O	128½	Feb. 12 '94	.....	.....	.....
6's.	1906	7,000,000	A & O	117½	Feb. 21 '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.	1906		A & O	117½	Jan. 27 '99	.....	.....	.....
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's.	1921	2,000,000	M & N	153	Mar. 20 '99	153	153	3,000
1st r 7's.	1921		M & N	141	May 6 '98	.....	.....	.....
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's.	1933	730,000	A & O	92	Jan. 24 '99	.....	.....	.....
Denver T'way Co. con. g. 5's.	1910	1,219,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's.	1911	918,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Denver & Rio Grande 1st g. 7's.	1900	1,934,500	M & N	108½	Mar. 8 '99	108½	108½	8,000
1st con. g. 4's.	1936	28,650,000	J & J	101½	Mar. 29 '99	101½	100	283,000
con. g. 4½'s.	1936	4,348,000	J & J	109	Mar. 18 '99	109	109	4,000
impt. m. g. 5's.	1928	8,163,500	J & D	105	Mar. 29 '99	105½	104½	66,500
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's.	1917	628,000	M & N	102	Oct. 26 '98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s.	1905	900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24 '95	.....	.....	.....
g. 4s.	1905	1,250,000	J & D			.....	.....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.	1937	6,734,000	A & O	111	Mar. 23 '99	111	111	1,000
registered.	1937		A & O	101½	July 23 '99	.....	.....	.....
2d 1 m 6s.	1916	2,000,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.	1928	500,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 11 '98	.....	.....	.....
Duluth S. Shore & A. gold 5's.	1937	4,000,000	J & J	118½	Mar. 14 '99	115	112½	20,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's.	1941	7,417,000	M & N	109	Mar. 30 '99	109½	108½	78,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.	1897	2,482,000	M & S	115½	Feb. 15 '99	.....	.....	.....
2d extended 5's.	1919	2,149,000	M & N	119½	Aug. 2 '98	.....	.....	.....
3d extended 4½'s.	1923	4,618,000	M & S	112	Nov. 11 '98	.....	.....	.....
4th extended 5's.	1920	2,928,000	A & O	123½	Mar. 20 '99	123½	123½	1,000
5th extended 4's.	1928	709,500	J & D	104½	June 3 '98	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's.	1920	3,669,500	M & S	145½	Feb. 1 '99	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. fund. c. 7's.	1920	3,705,977	M & S	143	Dec. 30 '98	.....	.....	.....
Long Dock consol. 6's.	1933	7,500,000	A & O	139	Sept. 20 '98	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.	1916	2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6 '99	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's.	1908	1,500,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
small.	1908		J & J			.....	.....	.....
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's.	1909	2,800,000	A & O	106	Feb. 8 '99	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.	1932	12,000,000	M & N	114½	Mar. 17 '99	115	114½	28,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. Co. 1st g. currency 6's.	1922	1,100,000	M & N			.....	.....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's.	1913	3,896,000	J & J	102	Aug. 31 '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's.	1846	1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27 '98	.....	.....	.....
small.	1846		M & N			.....	.....	.....
Erie R. R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds.	1906	80,000,000	J & J	93½	Mar. 30 '99	93½	92½	577,000
registered.	1906		J & J	93½	Mar. 13 '99	93½	93	5,000
gen. lien 3-4s.	1906	30,927,000	J & J	73	Mar. 30 '99	74½	72	727,000
registered.	1906		J & J			.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st retdg. g. 5's.	1937	3,750,000	J & J	106½	Mar. 29 '99	109	107½	21,000
2d g. 4½'s.	1937	453,000	F & A	92½	Aug. 25 '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 5's.	1940	2,546,000	F & A	97½	Mar. 30 '99	97½	95½	201,000
term. 1st g. 5's.	1943	2,000,000	M & N	111	Oct. 6 '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.	1943	\$5,000 each	M & N			.....	.....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g 5's.	1942	8,000,000	J & D	106½	Mar. 28 '99	106½	106½	113,000
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's.	1910	8,500,000	A & O	122	Mar. 18 '99	122	122	5,000
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's.	1933	500,000	F & A	65	Nov. 10 '97	.....	.....	.....
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.	1921	3,000,000	J & J	121½	Jan. 16 '99	.....	.....	.....
1st General g 5's.	1942	2,223,000	A & O	106½	Mar. 28 '99	106½	104½	240,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.	1923	375,000	A & O	110	May 10 '93	.....	.....	.....
Sul. Co. Beh. 1st g 5's.	1930	450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15 '91	.....	.....	.....
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.	1926	1,591,000	J & J	99½	Mar. 28 '99	100	99½	22,000
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.	1927	3,999,000	A & O	124	Mar. 23 '99	124	122½	6,000
1st con. gold 5's.	1939	2,600,000	M & N	102½	Mar. 30 '99	102½	100½	150,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.	1939	3,983,000	A & O	105	Mar. 17 '99	106	104½	11,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.	1918	3,000,000	J & J	101	Mar. 20 '99	101	101	5,000
1st land grant ex. g 5's.	1930	423,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.	1943	4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14 '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.	1941	1,006,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11 '98	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctf. dep. 1st 4's.	1921	8,176,000	.....	84½	Mar. 30 '99	85	83	107,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.	1928	2,863,000	J & J	66	Mar. 30 '99	66½	63½	405,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s.	1913	2,000,000	A & O	102½	Mar. 30 '99	102½	100	13,000
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's.	1945	2,330,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12 '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5s.	1945	2,322,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's.	1927	5,360,000	J & J	100	Jan. 31 '99	.....	.....	.....

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Houston E. & W. Tex. 1st g 5's. 1933		2,700,000	M & N	104½	Mar. 22, '99	104½	103	98,000
Illinois Central, total out-								
standing.....	\$13,950,000							
1st g. 4's. 1894-1951		1,500,000	J & J	114	Mar. 30, '99	114	113	3,000
registered.....			J & J	112½	Nov. 23, '98			
1st gold 3½'s. 1951		2,499,000	J & J	106	Feb. 20, '99			
registered.....			J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98			
1st g 3s sterl. £500,000. 1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 26, '99			
registered.....			M & S					
collat. trust gold 4's. 1952		15,000,000	M & N	105	Mar. 30, '99	105	105	2,000
regist'd.....			M & N	104½	Jan. 30, '99			
col. t. g. 4s L. N. O. & Tex. 1953		24,079,000	J & J	104½	Mar. 23, '99	105	104	79,000
registered.....			J & J	100½	Sept. 28, '98			
col. trust 2-10 g. 4's. 1904		4,806,000	J & J	104	Feb. 14, '99			
registered.....			F & A	99½	Mar. 29, '99	99½	97½	622,000
West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1951		5,426,000	J & J	83	Mar. 17, '99	83	82	20,000
registered.....			J & J	97	Mar. 29, '99	96½	96½	228,500
Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1953		14,320,000	J & J	101½	Sept. 10, '95			
registered.....			J & J	116½	Aug. 16, '95			
St. Louis div. g. 3's. 1951		4,999,000	J & J	121	Feb. 24, '99			
registered.....			J & J	93	Dec. 2, '97			
g. 3½'s. 1951		6,821,000	J & J	90	Nov. 22, '98			
registered.....			J & D	109	Mar. 28, '99	110	109	18,000
Calro Bridge 4's g. 1950		3,000,000	J & D					
registered.....			F & A					
Middle div. registered 5's. 1921		600,000	F & A					
Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s. 1951		2,000,000	J & J	123	Sept. 12, '97			
registered.....			J & D	104½	Feb. 17, '98			
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's. 1951		16,555,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99			
gold 5's, registered.....			J & D	93	Dec. 2, '97			
g. 3½'s. 1951		1,352,000	J & D	90	Nov. 22, '98			
registered.....			J & D					
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		3,500,000	J & D					
registered.....			J & D					
Belleville & Carolt 1st 6's. 1923		485,000	J & D					
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		550,000	M & S					
Carbondale & Shaw't'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		250,000	M & S					
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's. 1935		1,824,000	J & J	105	Mar. 29, '99	105	105	1,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st refdg. 5's. 1948		2,500,000	A & O	108	Mar. 23, '99	108	108	17,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st. 6's, gold. 1919		7,964,000	M & N	125	Mar. 28, '99	125	124½	4,000
2d g. 5's. 1909		6,593,000	M & S	98	Mar. 27, '99	94	92½	18,000
3d g. 4's. 1921		2,722,000	M & S	60	Mar. 13, '99	60	60	18,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's. 1935		6,572,000	J & D	109	Mar. 28, '99	110	109	18,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1929		3,000,000	A & O					
Kan. C. Pitt. & Gulf 1st & col. g. 5's 1923		22,578,000	A & O	95	Mar. 30, '99	72½	64	1,004,000
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's. 1925		3,177,000	J & J	85	Mar. 29, '99	85	72	34,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A. 1929		1,979,000	M & S	84	Mar. 28, '99	84	62	783,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's. 1937		7,250,000	J & J	118	Mar. 27, '99	119	118	25,000
2d mtge. g. 5's. 1941		3,625,000	J & J	109½	Mar. 30, '99	110	107	46,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's. 1945		2,500,000	A & O	105	Mar. 30, '99	105	105	1,000
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's. 1997		5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98			
registered.....			M & N					
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s. 1940		15,000,000	J & J	106½	Mar. 21, '99	107	106½	39,000
registered.....			J & J					
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1941		10,000,000	A & O	113½	Mar. 13, '99	113½	113½	2,000
registered.....			A & O					
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1933		10,280,000	J & J	96	Feb. 7, '99			
registered.....			J & J					
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's. 1945		2,000,000	M & S	93	Feb. 6, '99			
registered.....			M & S					
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's 1914		750,000	A & O					
g. gtd 5's. 1914		1,250,000	A & O	101	Sept. 16, '97			
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. cdfs. for 1st g. 5's. 1937		3,145,000	Q J	35	Mar. 30, '99	37	35	19,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's. 1931		3,610,000	Q J	122½	Mar. 21, '99	122½	122½	1,000
1st con. g. 4's. 1931		1,121,000	Q J					
Long Island gen. m. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & D	100	Mar. 21, '99	100	100	19,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s. 1922		1,500,000	M & S	99½	Mar. 7, '99	99½	99½	1,000
g. 4's. 1932		325,000	J & D	100	Sept. 27, '97			
deb. g. 5's. 1934		1,500,000	J & D	100	May 25, '97			

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's. 1927		984,000	M & S	100	Jan. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    2d m. inc. .... 1927		1,000,000	S	106½	July 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B'kln & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's. 1935		1,728,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's. .... 1911		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    1st 5's. .... 1911		750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch 1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's. 1932		1,425,000	QJAN	108¾	June 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. d' 5's. .... 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's. .... 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis 1st con. Tr.Co.ct. gold 5's. 1939		3,627,000	J & J	69¾	Mar. 24, '99	72	55	734,000
"    Gen. mtg. g. 4's. .... 1943		2,432,000	M & S	9	Mar. 28, '99	10	6	861,000
Louis. & Nash Cecilian brch. 7's. 1907		435,000	M & S	106	Nov. 11, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's. 1930		5,000,000	J & J	131¼	Mar. 30, '99	131¼	131	32,000
"    2d 6's. .... 1930		1,000,000	J & J	122	Mar. 18, '99	122	117½	5,000
"    E., Hend. & N. 1st 6's. 1919		1,990,000	J & D	117	Nov. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    general mort. 6's. .... 1930		9,794,000	J & D	120	Mar. 28, '99	120	119	80,000
"    Pensacola div. 6's. .... 1920		580,000	M & S	103¼	Sept. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    St. Louis div. 1st 6's. .... 1921		3,500,000	M & S	125	Dec. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    2d 3's. .... 1980		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's. .... 1900		1,900,000	J & J	107	Nov. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    So. & N. Ala. st'g fd. 6's. 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92¼	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    con. gtd. g. 5's. .... 1938		3,678,000	F & A	108¼	Mar. 28, '99	108¼	108¼	14,000
"    gold 5's. .... 1937		1,764,000	M & N	110	Mar. 30, '99	110¼	109¼	24,000
"    Unified gold 4's. .... 1940		14,994,000	J & J	96¼	Mar. 30, '99	96¼	95	262,000
"    registered. .... 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
"    coll. tr 5-30 g. 4's. 1903-1918		12,500,000	A & O	101	Mar. 29, '99	101	100¼	295,000
"    Pen. & At. 1st 6's. g. 5's. 1921		2,753,000	F & A	111¼	Mar. 21, '99	111¼	111¼	1,000
"    collateral trust g. 5's. 1931		5,129,000	M & N	109¼	Mar. 17, '99	109¼	109¼	6,000
"    L. & N. & Mob. & Montg 1st. g. 4's. .... 1945		4,000,000	M & S	109¼	July 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's. 1937		2,096,000	F & A	107¼	Mar. 28, '99	107¼	106¼	35,000
"    Kentucky Cent. g. 4's. .... 1937		6,742,000	J & J	94	Feb. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    L. & N. Louv. Cin. & Lex. g. 4's. 1931		3,268,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		3,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1980		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's. .... 1980		24,065,000	A & O	109¼	Mar. 30, '99	109¼	104¼	953,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's. .... 1908		10,818,000	J & J	117	Mar. 30, '99	117¼	117	22,000
"    2d 6's. .... 1899		4,000,000	M & N	102½	Mar. 25, '99	102½	102¼	18,000
Manitoba Swn. Coloniza'n g. 5's. 1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Metro. St. By. gen. col. tr. g. 5's. 1997		12,500,000	F & A	121¼	Mar. 30, '99	121¼	120	281,000
"    B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1997		7,450,000	J & D	124	Mar. 30, '99	124	122	22,000
"    registered. .... 1997			J & D	112¼	May 29, '93	.....	.....	.....
"    Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1993		3,000,000	M & S	124	Mar. 7, '99	124	124	5,000
"    registered. .... 1993			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g. 5's. 1993		5,000,000	M & S	124¾	Mar. 8, '99	124¾	124	7,000
"    registered. .... 1993			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Central. "    con. mtge. 4's. .... 1911		59,011,000	J & J	68¾	Jan. 4, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. inc. 3's. .... 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    2d 3's. .... 1939		11,310,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    equip. & collat. g. 5's. .... 1917		950,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's. 1942		4,635,000	M & S	87¼	Mar. 30, '99	87¾	85¼	378,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's. .... 1927		11,416,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,285,000	M & S	15	Dec. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    March 1, 1899, stamped 1½ paid						.....	.....	.....
"    2d inc. 6's "B" .... 1917		12,285,000	A	9¼	Dec. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's. .... 1910		1,318,000	J & D	97	Feb. 11, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    registered. .... 1910			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's. 1926		6,102,000	F & A	106¾	Feb. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	146	Jan. 12, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. g. 5's. .... 1934		5,000,000	M & N	113¾	Mar. 30, '99	113¾	113	54,000
"    Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1909		1,015,000	J & D	125	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1910		636,000	J & D	127	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. .... 1921		1,362,000	J & A	128	Dec. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.						.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '96	....	....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				80½	June 18, '91	....	....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's 1928		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's..... 1919		4,060,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '95	....	....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtgce g. 4's. 1900		80,718,000	J & D	94	Mar. 30, '99	94½	93	543,000
" 2d mtgce. g. 4's..... 1900		20,600,000	F & A	88	Mar. 30, '99	88½	86½	956,500
" 1st ext gold 5's..... 1904		998,000	M & N	89	Mar. 23, '99	89	84	111,000
" of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's 1942		2,688,000	M & S	86½	Mar. 20, '99	87	86½	40,000
" Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's 1900		2,500,000	F & A	75½	Mar. 30, '99	79	77½	77,000
" Dal. & Waco 1st g. g. 5's 1940		1,340,000	M & N	95	Mar. 27, '99	95	95	34,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's... 1906		558,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tebo. & Neosho 1st 7's..... 1903		187,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mo Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	106	Mar. 29, '99	106	103	71,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	120	Mar. 30, '99	121	114½	1,381,000
" 3d mortgage 7's..... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	114½	Mar. 1, '99	114½	114½	5,000
" trusts gold 5's..... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	100	Mar. 27, '99	100½	99½	831,000
" registered		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	94½	Mar. 30, '99	96½	90	527,000
" registered		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1928		7,000,000	M & S	107	Mar. 30, '99	107½	106	56,000
" 2d extended g. 5's..... 1928		2,578,000	F & A	111½	Jan. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1926		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1928		520,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. L. & I'm. Mt. 1st ex. 4½'s... 1897		4,000,000	F & A	105½	Mar. 21, '99	105½	105½	12,000
" 2d. ext. g. 5's..... 1946		6,000,000	M & N	106½	Mar. 27, '99	106½	106½	17,000
" Ark'nass b'nch ext 5's 1896		2,500,000	J & D	106½	Mar. 30, '99	106½	106½	24,000
" g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's 1881		21,789,000	A & O	111½	Mar. 30, '99	112	110½	3,481,000
" stamped gtd gold 5's. 1861		6,945,000	A & O	111½	Mar. 13, '99	111½	111	9,000
Mob. & Birm. prior lien, g. 5's... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small..... 1945		228,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" inc. g. 4's..... 1945		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small..... 1945		500,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. 1927		7,000,000	J & J	127½	Mar. 23, '99	128	126½	20,500
" 1st extension 6's..... 1927		974,000	J & D	117	Feb. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
" gen. g. 4's..... 1928		9,547,000	Q & J	85½	Mar. 30, '99	85½	83½	95,000
" Mont'ry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	107	Mar. 22, '99	107	106½	26,000
" St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's..... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	88	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	132½	Mar. 30, '99	132½	132	25,000
" 2d 6's..... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	105½	Nov. 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 1st cons. g. 5's..... 1928		6,218,000	A & O	106	Mar. 29, '99	106½	106	62,000
" 1st 6's T. & Pb..... 1917		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 1st 6's McM. M. W. & Al 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	115	Mar. 22, '99	115	115	1,000
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,320,000	A & O	109½	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. 1903		19,917,000	J & J	115	Mar. 20, '99	115	115	8,000
" 1st registered..... 1903		.....	J & J	114½	Mar. 9, '99	114½	114½	20,000
" debenture 5's..... 1904		.....	M & S	113½	Jan. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
" debenture 5's reg..... 1904		6,406,000	M & S	113½	Jan. 26, '99	.....	.....	.....
" reg. debent. 5's... 1899-1904		708,000	M & S	109½	Feb. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
" debenture g. 4's. 1890-1906		6,180,000	J & D	104	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered..... 1906		.....	J & D	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's... 1906		4,194,000	M & N	107½	Feb. 2, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered..... 1906		.....	M & N	104½	June 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" g. mortgage 3½'s..... 1907		88,020,000	J & J	113½	Mar. 23, '99	113½	111½	85,000
" registered..... 1907		.....	J & J	113½	Feb. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. 1906		18,458,000	F & A	99	Mar. 30, '99	99½	98½	127,000
" registered..... 1906		.....	F & A	99	Mar. 30, '99	99½	97½	17,000
" Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s..... 1906		90,420,000	F & A	100½	Mar. 30, '99	100½	99½	1,781,000
" registered..... 1906		.....	F & A	95½	Mar. 15, '99	99	98½	15,000
" Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c..... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	106	Mar. 14, '99	106	106	6,000
" 7's registered..... 1900		.....	M & N	106	Mar. 21, '99	106	106	7,000
" N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1866		1,660,000	F & A	108	May 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
" reg. certificates..... 1866		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's.....		50,000,000	J & J	114½	Mar. 30, '99	114½	113	174,000
" registered..... 1866		.....	J & J	113½	Mar. 23, '99	113½	113½	87,000

BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's.....1936		5,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 5, '98			
" registered			J & J	106	June 17, '98			
" 2d gtd. 5's.....1936		500,000	J & J					
" registered			J & J					
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, {		770,000	J & J					
1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940				95	July 23, '98			
small bonds series B.....		83,100	J & J					
Gov. & Oswego 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D					
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's.....1922		9,081,000	A & O	132	Mar. 30, '99	132	130½	21,000
coup. g. bond currency.....			A & O					
".....			A & O					
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		120,000	J & J					
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		375,000	M & N					
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gtd 5's. 1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94			
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	107	Aug. 13, '98			
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1891		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94			
Carthage & Adiron 1st gtd g. 4's. 1881		1,100,000	J & D					
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1883		4,000,000	A & O	103	May 22, '98			
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		1,200,000	A & O	123¼	Dec. 20, '98			
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern.....								
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1908		924,000	F & A	121	Apr. 28, '98			
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....1899		998,000	A & O	102½	Feb. 17, '99			
con. co. 1st 7's.....1900			J & J	106¼	Mar. 30, '99	107	106½	28,000
" con. 1st registered.....1900		9,153,000	Q J	106¼	Feb. 20, '99			
" con. co. 2d 7's.....1903			J & D	117¼	Mar. 20, '99	117¼	117¼	8,000
" reg. 5's.....1931		8,725,000	J & D	116¼	Jan. 5, '99			
" con. 2d registered.....1903			J & D	110¼	Mar. 29, '99	110¼	108½	153,000
" g 3½'s.....1997		28,186,000	J & D	108	Jan. 5, '99			
" registered.....			A & O	108¼	Dec. 1, '97			
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	J & J					
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1928		840,000	J & J	121	Oct. 24, '98			
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....1934		1,500,000	M & N	113	Mar. 20, '99	112	112	5,000
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's.....1902		8,000,000	M & N	104¼	Dec. 20, '98			
1st con. 5's.....1902		2,000,000	M & S	125	Feb. 25, '98			
" 6's.....1909		1,500,000	M & S	121¼	June 21, '98			
" coup. 5's.....1931		8,576,000	Q M	121	Dec. 6, '97			
" reg. 5's.....1931			J & J	106	Feb. 25, '98			
" mort. 4's.....1940		2,600,000	J & J	108	Jan. 7, '98			
" mtge. 4's reg.....			J & D					
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. 6's.....1899		476,000	A & O	107¾	Mar. 30, '99	107¾	107	180,000
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1897		19,425,000	A & O	104	Nov. 22, '98			
" registered.....								
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1903		2,000,000	J & D	104¼	Oct. 7, '97			
" con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	181½	Mar. 17, '99	184	181½	2,000
" small certifs.....\$100		1,420,000		180	Mar. 29, '99	180	180	700
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's.....1937		2,938,000	M & N	123½	Aug. 25, '97			
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		575,000	M & N	115¼	Oct. 15, '94			
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1905		6,000,000	J & J	120½	Mar. 7, '99	120½	120½	1,000
" 1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	114¼	Jan. 20, '99			
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1939		2,884,000	J & D	107¼	Mar. 30, '99	107¼	106½	23,000
" Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1922		11,811,000	M & S	104	Mar. 30, '99	104¼	103¼	154,000
" Registered.....\$5,000 only.			M & S	101¼	Nov. 30, '98			
N. P. 1st m. R.R. & L.G.S.F. g.c. 6's. 1921		5,815,000	J & J	118	Mar. 21, '99	118	116½	5,000
" registered			J & J	117	Oct. 15, '98			
" St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's.....1923		7,965,000	F & A	131¼	Dec. 17, '98			
" registered certificates.....			Q F	130	Sept. 23, '98			
N. P. Ry prior in ry. & id. g. 4's. 1907		87,770,000	Q J	104	Mar. 30, '99	104	102½	1,700,500
" registered.....			Q J	103¼	Mar. 21, '99	103¼	103¼	6,000
" gen. Hen g. 3's.....2047		56,000,000	Q F	87½	Mar. 30, '99	88¼	87½	937,500
" registered.....			Q F					
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948		1,538,000	Q M CH	92	Feb. 6, '99			
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1933		3,871,000	J & J	116	Mar. 13, '99	116	116	7,000
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's.....1941		890,000	M & N	102	June 27, '98			
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1931		7,283,000	M & N	130¼	Feb. 27, '98			
" New River 1st 6's.....1932		2,000,000	A & O	128	Nov. 25, '98			
" Imp'ment & ext. 6's.....1934		5,000,000	F & A	119	Mar. 15, '99	119	119	1,000
" Sci'o Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1938		5,000,000	F & N	98½	Mar. 29, '98	98½	97	67,000
" C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g g 5's. 1922		600,000	J & J	101	Feb. 23, '97			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.			
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.	
Norfolk & West, Ry 1st con. g. 4s. 1906 registered.....	22,923,000		A & O	95½	Mar. 30, '99	96	91½	880,000	
small bonds.....									
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's..... 1906	2,000,000		J & D	102¼	Jan. 23, '98				
gen. mortg. g 6's..... 1907	2,423,000		A & O	85	Dec. 16, '98				
Ohio Southern gen g 4's..... 1921	1,381,000		M & N	9	Sept. 7, '98				
gen. eng. Trust Co. certs...	1,417,000			8½	Sept. 8, '98				
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's..... 1901	2,376,000		J & J	82½	Mar. 23, '99	83	81	9,000	
Oregon Ry. & Nav. 1st a. f. g. 6's. 1909	691,000		J & J	111½	Mar. 30, '99	111½	111	6,000	
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946	19,481,000		J & D	102	Mar. 30, '99	102½	101	252,000	
Oregon Short Line 1st g. 6's..... 1922	13,651,000		F & A	123½	Mar. 23, '99	129	123½	86,000	
Utah & Northern 1st 7's..... 1906	4,963,000		J & J	121	June 18, '98				
g. 5's..... 1928	1,877,000		J & J	102	May 24, '94				
Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946	10,337,000		J & J	111½	Mar. 30, '99	111½	110	95,000	
non-cum. inc. A 5's..... 1946	7,185,000		SEPT.	86½	Mar. 30, '99	87½	85	78,000	
non-cum. inc. B. & cool. trust	14,341,000		OCT.	70½	Mar. 30, '99	71	68	147,000	
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's..... 1946	4,446,000		J & D	107½	Mar. 29, '99	108	107	45,000	
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s... 1917	1,859,000		A & O						
a. f. subsidy g 6's..... 1910	1,782,000		M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91				
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.									
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s 1st..... 1921	19,467,000		J & J	115½	Mar. 23, '99	115½	115½	18,000	
reg..... 1921			J & J	113½	Mar. 23, '99	115½	113½	10,000	
gtd. 3¼ col. tr. reg. cts. 1937			M & S	114½	Feb. 15, '99				
Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s	10,000,000		A & O	116	Mar. 14, '99	116	116	1,000	
Series A..... 1940	10,000,000		A & O	116½	Mar. 30, '99	116½	116	33,000	
Series B..... 1942	2,000,000		M & N	113	Nov. 23, '98				
Series C..... 1942	4,888,000		M & N	107	Dec. 30, '98				
Series D gtd. 4's..... 1945	6,868,000		F & A	105½	Mar. 15, '99	105½	105½	4,000	
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's. 1900	2,917,000		F & A	109¼	Apr. 23, '97				
1st reg. 7's..... 1900	2,546,000		F & A	141	Mar. 29, '99	141	141	2,000	
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912	2,000,000		J & J	141	Nov. 10, '98				
2d 7's..... 1912	2,000,000		A & O	128	Aug. 23, '95				
3d 7's..... 1912	1,508,000		A & O	113	May 14, '98				
Chic., St. Louis & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932	1,310,000		A & O	110	May 2, '98				
registered.....	3,000,000		M & N	107	May 25, '98				
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's. 1900	2,000,000		J & J	113	Apr. 18, '95				
gen. gtd. g. 4½'s Ser. A. 1942	2,250,000		A & O						
Series B..... 1942	1,118,000		J & J						
E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3½'s Ser. B. 1940	4,455,000		J & J	107	May 18, '96				
C. 1940	5,889,000		J & J	108	Nov. 10, '97				
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g. 4½ g 1941	1,400,000		J & J						
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's. 1942									
Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd g. 4's. 1945									
Penn. RR. Co. 1st RI Est. g 4's... 1923	1,675,000			106	May 12, '97				
con. sterling gold 6 per cent... 1905	22,782,000		J & D						
con. currency, 6's registered... 1905	4,718,000		QM 15						
con. gold 5 per cent..... 1919	4,998,000		M & S						
registered.....									
con. gold 4 per cent..... 1943	3,000,000		QMch						
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s..... 1935	1,250,000		M & N	111	July 8, '97				
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's... 1944	5,648,000		M & S	115½	Feb. 14, '98				
Del. R. RR. & Bge Co 1st gtd. 4's. 1936	1,300,000		F & A						
Sunbury & Lewiston 1st g. 4's. 1936	500,000		J & J						
Peo., Dec. & Ev. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920	1,140,000		J & J	101	Mar. 29, '99	101	101	20,000	
Ev. div. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920	1,433,000		M & S	97	Mar. 3, '98	97	97	5,000	
Tr. Co. ctf. 2d mort 5's. 1928	1,851,000		M & N	20	Dec. 20, '98				
1st instal. paid.....									
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's.... 1921	1,495,000		Q F	120	May 11, '98				
2d m 4½'s..... 1921	1,498,000		M & N	90	Sept. 22, '98				
Pine Creek Railway 6's..... 1932	3,500,000		J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93				

BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. .... 1922		1,440,000	J & J	121	Nov. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & L. R. 2d g. 5's ser. A, 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's, 1932		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 6's. .... 1934		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. .... 1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Lpt. 1st g. 5's, 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	Oct. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitta., Shena'go & F. R. 1st g. 5's, 1940		8,000,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. 5's. .... 1943		408,000	J & J	98	July 14, '97	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's, 1917		1,953,000	J & J	99½	Mar. 29, '99	99½	99	15,000
J. P. M. & Co., ctfs., ....		7,747,000	.....	99½	Mar. 29, '99	99½	99	11,000
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's, 1927		1,522,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. .... 1997		62,456,000	J & J	89½	Mar. 30, '99	90½	89½	5,701,000
registered. ....			J & J	87½	Mar. 14, '99	87½	87½	2,000
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. .... 1939		15,200,000	J & J	97½	Mar. 30, '99	98	94	445,500
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's, 1939		1,850,000	J & D	102½	Feb. 8, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4, 1940		4,510,000	J & J	72½	Feb. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's, 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. lal. 1st g. 2.342. .... 1947		3,500,000	J & J	81	Mar. 27, '99	84	81	78,000
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's, Class A, 1906		500,000	M & N	115	Mar. 27, '99	115	114½	27,000
2d g. 6's, Class B. .... 1906		2,709,500	M & N	115	Mar. 29, '99	115½	114½	84,000
2d g. 6's, Class C. .... 1906		2,400,000	M & N	115	Mar. 25, '99	115	115	3,000
1st g. 6's P. C. & O. .... 1919		1,023,000	F & A	118	May 22, '92	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 6's. .... 1981		7,907,000	J & J	124½	Mar. 29, '99	124½	123	59,000
gen. g. 5's. .... 1981		12,293,000	J & J	109	Mar. 30, '99	109½	108	414,000
1st Trust g. 5's. .... 1987		1,099,000	A & O	105½	Mar. 27, '98	105½	102½	6,000
Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's, 1910		304,000	A & O	105	Oct. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1996		6,388,000	J & D	88	Mar. 27, '99	88	87½	89,000
South'n div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		1,500,000	A & O	102	Mar. 16, '99	102	100	100,000
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctfs., 1889		20,000,000	M & N	93½	Mar. 30, '99	93½	90½	1,469,000
2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctfs. .... 1889		9,000,000	J & J	56½	Mar. 30, '99	57	51	2,753,500
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con.g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	108½	Mar. 9, '99	108½	108	7,000
gtd. gold 5's. .... 1937		1,138,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1913		1,000,000	F & A	120	Feb. 8, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d 5's. .... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	118	Mar. 25, '99	114	118	21,000
1st con. g. 4's. .... 1938		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	124	Mar. 2, '99	124	124	5,000
Dakota ext'n 6's. .... 1910		5,676,000	M & N	124½	Mar. 17, '99	125	124½	7,000
1st con. 6's. .... 1938		13,344,000	J & J	139½	Mar. 20, '99	139½	138½	20,000
1st con. 6's, registered. ....		.....	J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s. ....		21,983,000	J & J	112½	Mar. 27, '99	113	112½	50,000
1st cons. 6's register'd. ....		.....	J & J	105	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		7,805,000	J & D	107½	Mar. 27, '99	107½	106½	144,000
registered. ....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's. .... 1922		2,150,000	J & J	127½	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. .... 1937		6,000,000	J & J	134½	Mar. 18, '99	134½	134½	8,000
1st 6's, registered. ....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st g. g. 5's. .... 1937		2,700,000	J & J	115	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. .... 1908		4,700,000	A & O	113½	Mar. 2, '99	113½	113½	1,000
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastn. R'y Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. .... 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's, 1938		3,625,000	J & D	113	Aug. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's, 1947		4,940,000	M & S	96	Mar. 13, '99	96	95	20,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's, 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100¼	Oct. 30, '97	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. .... 1934		4,056,000	A & O	125½	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's. .... 1934		1,780,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	112	112	4,000
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. .... 1928		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. .... 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold, 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '88	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's, 1919		5,260,000	M & N	106	Mar. 30, '99	106	104½	128,000

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NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Southern Pacific Co.								
{ Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	99%	Dec. 2, '98			
" 2d g 7's. 1905		1,000,000	J & D	110	Feb. 27, '99			
" Mex. & P. div 1st g 5's. 1931		14,418,000	M & N	104½	Mar. 30, '99	104½	103%	265,000
Houst. & T C 1st Waco & N 7's. 1908		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92			
" 1st g 5's int. gtd. 1937		7,107,000	J & J	112	Mar. 6, '99	112	111½	23,000
" con. g 6's int. gtd. 1912		3,455,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	112	112	2,000
" gen. g 4's int. gtd. 1921		4,297,000	A & O	90	Mar. 30, '99	90	89½	129,000
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's. 1920		1,484,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 17, '98			
" 1st 7's. 1918		5,000,000	A & O	139	Jan. 21, '99			
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O					
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's. 1927		18,842,000	J & J	105	Mar. 23, '99	105	103	28,000
San Ant. & Aran Pass 1st gtd g 4's. 1943		18,886,000	J & J	89½	Mar. 30, '99	85½	81½	813,000
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's. 1905		1,620,000	F & A	116	Dec. 14, '98			
" Sabine div. 1st g 5's. 1912		2,575,000	M & S	106½	Nov. 17, '97			
" con. g 5's. 1943		1,620,000	J & J	105	Mar. 30, '99	105½	104½	280,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	114½	Mar. 30, '99	114½	114	23,000
{ South. Pac. of Cal. 1st g 6's. 1906-12		30,577,500	A & O	118½	Dec. 17, '98			
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's. 1937		6,696,000	M & N	105½	Mar. 8, '99	105½	105½	15,000
" stamped. 1906-1937		12,788,000		108%	Mar. 30, '99	108%	107½	86,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. 1941		1,920,000	J & J	100%	Mar. 30, '99	100%	98½	232,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g 4's. 1937		5,500,000	J & J					
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. 1911		4,180,000	J & J	113½	Nov. 23, '98			
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's. 1994		27,869,000	J & J	108½	Mar. 30, '99	108½	105½	800,000
" registered.			J & J	106½	Mar. 21, '99	106½	106½	2,000
" Memph. div. 1st g 4-4½-5's. 1996		5,088,000	J & J	107½	Jan. 4, '99			
" registered.			J & J					
East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. 1938		4,500,000	M & S	107	Mar. 30, '99	107	106	25,000
" registered.								
Alabama Central, 1st 6's. 1918		1,000,000	J & J	112½	Aug. 17, '97			
Atl. & Char. Air Line, income. 1900		750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95			
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. 1916		2,000,000	J & J	117	Mar. 18, '99	117	117	6,000
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. 1900		3,123,000	J & J	105	Mar. 20, '99	105	104%	95,000
" divisional g 5's. 1930		3,108,000	J & J	117½	Mar. 28, '99	117½	117	6,000
" con. 1st g 5's. 1956		12,770,000	M & N	118½	Mar. 30, '99	118½	115½	32,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. 1922		5,690,000	J & J	124	Mar. 27, '99	124½	124	4,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. 1925		2,000,000	J & J	122	Mar. 30, '99	122½	120	24,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. 1915		5,597,000	J & J	123½	Mar. 13, '99	123½	123½	10,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's. 1909		818,000	M & S	100	Mar. 17, '99	100	100	2,000
" deb. 5's stamped. 1927		3,368,000	A & O	104½	Dec. 16, '98			
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. B 6's. 1911		1,900,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. C 6's. 1916		1,100,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. D 4-5's. 1921		960,000	M & S					
" small.			M & S					
" ser. E 5's. 1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99			
" small.			M & S					
" ser. F 5's. 1931		1,310,000	M & S					
Virginia Midland gen. 5's. 1936		2,362,000	M & N	112	Mar. 24, '99	112½	112	4,000
" gen. 5's. gtd. stamped. 1926		2,466,000	M & N	110	Dec. 29, '98			
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. 1924		1,025,000	F & A	90	Feb. 23, '99			
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. 1914		2,531,000	J & J	118½	Dec. 1, '98			
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g 6's. 1939		2,812,000	J & J					
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4½'s. 1943		500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. 1939		7,000,000	A & O	109	Oct. 13, '98			
" 1st con. g 5's. 1934-1944		4,500,000	F & A	111½	Dec. 28, '98			
" St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g 5's. 1930		3,500,000	A & O	103	Oct. 27, '98			
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. 1914		444,000	Q JAN	105%	Dec. 18, '95			
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. 1905		3,346,000	M & S	106	Mar. 22, '99	106	106	1,000
" fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth			J & D	113	Mar. 29, '99	113½	112	187,000
" 1st gold 5's. 2000		21,216,000	J & D	53%	Mar. 30, '99	54%	51½	9,838,000
" 2d gold income, 5's. 2000		23,227,000	MAR.					
Third Avenue 1st g 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	126	Mar. 8, '99	126	126	5,000



BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's...1835		3,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 14, '99	105	105	5,000
{ 1st M. g 5's West. div...1835 gen. g. 5's...1835 Kanaw & M. 1st g. 4's...1890		2,500,000	A & O	102	Dec. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
		1,500,000	J & D	88½	Mar. 30, '99	88½	88½	41,000
		2,340,000	A & O	82	Mar. 30, '99	82	79	88,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's...1917		4,400,000	J & D	82	Mar. 30, '99	104	102	188,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's...1916		8,284,000	M & N	103½	Mar. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's...1928		1,852,000	J & D	99	Mar. 28, '99	99	99	9,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g.5's...1945		4,887,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Pacific R. R. & id gt g 4s...1947 registered. Union Pac. Tr. Co. cts. g. 4's...1918 U.P. Den. & GT. Co. cf. 1st c. g. 5's...1939		90,000,000	J & J	105½	Mar. 30, '99	105½	106½	2,197,500
		2,000,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
		15,288,000	M & N	98	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's...1939 2d mortgage gold 5's...1939 deben. mtg series A...1939 series B...1939 1st g.5's Det. & Chi. ex. 1940 St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B. 1st 5's...1908		81,664,000	M & N	116	Mar. 30, '99	116	114½	309,000
		14,000,000	F & A	97	Mar. 30, '99	97	94	181,000
		3,500,000	J & J	89½	Mar. 30, '99	87½	84½	1,610,000
		25,740,000	J & J	107½	Mar. 9, '99	106½	107½	31,000
		3,438,000	J & J	107½	Mar. 9, '99	.....	.....	.....
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's...1937		10,000,000	J & J	111½	Mar. 23, '99	112½	110½	81,000
{ gen g. 3-4's...1943 inc. 5's...1943		9,789,000	A & O	65¼	Mar. 30, '99	65¼	59	480,000
		10,000,000	Nov.	23½	Mar. 30, '99	23½	19½	328,000
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's...1928		3,969,000	M & N	99	Dec. 28, '97	.....	.....	.....
40 years con. g. 5's...1936		6,031,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's...1911		3,250,000	J & J	113	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's...1926 Trust Co. certificates... Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's...1928 exten. and imp. g. 5's...1930		1,018,000	A & O	105½	Mar. 22, '99	105½	105½	3,000
		1,982,000	.....	104½	Dec. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
		1,500,000	J & J	98½	Mar. 1, '99	98½	98½	10,000
		1,624,000	F & A	82½	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g.5's...1937 eng. Trust Co. certificates... income mortgage 5's...1937		1,987,000	J & J	84	Nov. 16, '97	.....	.....	.....
		10,013,000	.....	67¾	Mar. 30, '99	70	66¾	1,467,000
		7,775,000	A & O	6	Mar. 4, '99	6	6	10,000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1899.		MARCH SALES.		
				Hgh.	Low.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered..... Opt'l		25,364,700	Q M	99½	99	.....	.....	.....
{ 3's registered...1898 3's coupon...1898 3's small bonds reg...1898 3's small bonds coupon...1898 4's registered...1907		193,386,000	Q F	108½	106½	106½	107½	19,000
			Q F	108½	106½	106½	107	1,183,500
			Q F	107½	107½	.....	.....	.....
			Q F	107½	106½	107½	106½	8,800
			J A J & O	112½	111	112½	111	43,400
4's coupon...1907		559,595,900	J A J & O	114	112½	114	112½	81,000
4's registered...1925		162,842,200	Q F	129	128	128½	128½	1,000
4's coupon...1925			Q F	129½	128	129½	128½	434,500
5's registered...1904			Q F	112	111½	112	112	10,000
5's coupon...1904		100,000,000	Q F	113¼	111	112½	111½	74,000
{ District of Columbia 3-6's...1924 small bonds... registered... funding 5's...1899 small... registered...}		14,033,600	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
			J & J	800,400	J & J	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	105½	Mar. 30, '99	105½	104½	53,500
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		3,068,000	Q F	107	Mar. 20, '99	107	106½	8,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S	89½	Mar. 30, '99	89½	85½	61,000
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		17,500,000	F & A	89	Mar. 20, '99	90	88½	97,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	100½	Feb. 9, '97			
non-cum. inc. 5's. 1907		2,575,000	J & J					
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	100½	Mar. 8, '99	100½	100½	10,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd. g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	81	Feb. 11, '97			
Coupon off.								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108	Dec. 1, '98			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	88½	Mar. 20, '99	89½	85	382,000
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2397.		10,595,800	Q & J	103½	Nov. 10, '98			
registered.			Q & J	104	Feb. 16, '98			
Det. Mack. & Mar. Id. gt. 3½ S. A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	109½	Mar. 20, '99	20	17½	65,000
Erie Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. g. sf d. 5's. 1928		1,905,000	J & J	110	Jan. 31, '99			
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1928		1,080,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,705,000	M & S	111	Aug. 23, '97			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99			
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95			
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's. 1918		8,408,000	F & A	112½	Mar. 18, '99	112½	112	20,000
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Tr.								
1st g. 5's. 1928		1,975,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98			
2d g. 5's. 1928		1,000,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97			
Knick'r'ker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	101	Mar. 20, '99	101	100	28,000
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97			
Manh. Beh. H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95			
Metrop. Tel. & Tel. 1st s'k. f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108	Feb. 17, '99			
registered.			M & N					
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S	98	Dec. 2, '98			
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,089,000	J & J	101	Mar. 29, '99	101	100½	15,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1990		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. conv. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	92½	May 5, '98			
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. 1899-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. 1920		580,000	M & N	108½	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	113	Apr. 4, '98			
Roch & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946		1,100,000	M & N					
St. Louis Term. Cupples Station. & Property Co. 1st g. 4½'s 5-20. 1917		2,000,000	J & D					
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st g. 6's. 1908		4,975,000	M & S					
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		2,912,000	F & A	80	Mar. 20, '99	80½	85½	168,000
inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000		83½	Mar. 30, '99	84½	89	1,843,000
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		379,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917		1,244,000	A & O	110½	Mar. 20, '99	110½	107	42,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,731,000	J & J	110½	Mar. 27, '99	111	108	382,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & J	84	May 2, '95			
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910		2,428,000	F & A	104	Mar. 30, '99	105	102½	346,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6s g. s. d. deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	118½	Mar. 21, '99	118½	118	7,000
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g. col. tr. bonds.								
Series B 5's. 1899-1914		1,000,000	M & N					
C 5's. 1900-1915		1,000,000	A & O					
D 4½'s. 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J					
E 4's. 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D					
F 4's. 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S					
G 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A					
H 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N					
Small bonds.								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's...1910		640,000	J & D					
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		8,640,000	M & N	103	Nov. 21, '98			
7's, registered.....1900			M & N	105	Mar. 11, '98			
debenture, 7's.....1884-1900			M & N	106½	July 7, '97			
registered.....			M & N	104½	Nov. 12, '97			
col. trust cur. 5's.....1938		8,502,000	J & J	115½	Mar. 14, '99	115½	114½	57,000
Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 6's.....1911		1,957,000	J & J	112	Mar. 21, '99	112	112	2,000
Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904		1,250,000	J & J					
Wheel L. E. & P. C. Co. 1st g 5's.1919		846,000	J & J	68	Dec. 23, '96			
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.1947		1,150,000	J & D					
Boat. Un. Gas t&c cfs s'k f'd g. 5's.1939		7,000,000	J & J	91¾	Oct. 12, '98			
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.1945		13,239,000	M & N	118	Mar. 20, '99	118½	117½	124,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1932		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98			
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,313,000	J & J	95	Mar. 28, '99	96	95	118,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's....1918		1,049,000	F & A	95	Mar. 30, '99	95	95	8,000
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's.1910		4,312,000	M & S	110¾	Mar. 30, '99	110¾	110	49,000
1st con. g. 5's.....1905		2,156,000	J & J	122½	Mar. 16, '99	122½	122½	12,000
Brooklyn 1st g. 5's.....1940		1,600,000	A & O	110¾	Feb. 4, '97			
registered								
1st con. g. 4's.....1939		2,000,000	J & J					
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1932		2,500,000	M & S	102	Feb. 14, '98			
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.1922		6,000,000	J & D	115	Mar. 30, '99	115	114½	21,000
Grand Rapids Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....1915		1,225,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '95			
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's.1922		3,750,000	A & O					
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.1919		10,000,000	Q F	108	Mar. 28, '99	109	107½	163,000
small bonds.....					97½	Nov. 1, '95		
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	125	Feb. 25, '99			
2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	107½	Feb. 27, '99			
1st con. g 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	123	Mar. 21, '99	126½	123	33,000
refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 16, '98			
refunding registered.....			M & S					
Chic. Gas L't & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's.1937		10,000,000	J & J	113	Mar. 30, '99	113	110	40,000
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1938		4,346,000	J & D	109½	Mar. 27, '99	109½	108½	13,000
Eq. Gas & Fuel. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 6's.1905		2,000,000	J & J	103	Feb. 20, '99			
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1947		5,000,000	M & N	108½	Mar. 28, '99	107	106	59,000
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....1933		3,803,500	M & N	101	Mar. 16, '98			

SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.—The total stock of money in the United States increased \$7,500,000 last month, the gain in gold being \$7,000,000, the additional increase being the result of the coinage of silver bullion in dollars.

SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Feb. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$807,451,174	\$824,498,148	\$839,011,679	\$851,601,448
Gold bullion.....	142,074,889	134,186,534	127,385,067	121,560,849
Silver dollars.....	470,244,857	471,780,857	473,232,857	475,193,158
Silver bullion.....	62,192,207	91,228,953	60,189,188	88,825,937
Subsidiary silver.....	78,587,161	76,015,247	76,329,061	76,399,984
United States notes.....	348,681,016	346,661,016	348,681,016	346,661,016
National bank notes.....	243,817,870	243,324,226	242,965,082	243,194,992
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,179,019,124</b>	<b>\$2,187,710,079</b>	<b>\$2,195,873,960</b>	<b>\$2,203,388,254</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

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**Adams.**—John F. Adams, President of the Pendleton (Ore.) Savings Bank, died March 23, at McMinnville, Ore., where he resided. He was born in Franklin County, Me., in 1826, but had resided in Oregon since 1856.

**Barrett.**—Judge O. M. Barrett, President of the People's State Bank, National City, Cal., died March 2, aged sixty-four years. He was a member of the Iowa Legislature for several terms, but had resided in California about six years.

**Beal.**—Nathaniel B. Beal, President of the Phillips (Me.) National Bank, died March 2, aged seventy-five years.

**Brown.**—Alfred B. Brown, President of the Hershey State Bank, Muscatine, Iowa, died March 13.

**Curtis.**—Henry J. Curtis, for twenty-six years Secretary of the South Scituate Savings Bank, Norwell, Mass., and its President since 1896, died March 26. He was born at that place in 1822. In 1856 and 1872 he served in the State Legislature, and had also been honored with a number of other offices.

**Day.**—W. F. Day, Vice-President of the Institution for Savings in Roxbury, Boston, Mass., and a director of the People's National Bank, died March 8. He was born in Roxbury in 1836.

**Duncan.**—W. M. Duncan, who was formerly prominently identified with banking and other important business enterprises at Nashville, Tenn., died March 24, aged sixty-one years.

**Esterbrook.**—Oscar D. Esterbrook, an incorporator of the Brattleboro, Vt., Savings Bank and Vice-President since 1882, died March 7, aged sixty-six years.

**Foote.**—Walter Foote, Treasurer of the Branford (Ct.) Savings Bank, and who held several local offices, died March 31.

**Fulton.**—D. C. Fulton, President of the First National Bank, Hudson, Wis., died March 31. He was formerly United States Marshal and had been local manager of the National Soldiers' Home, Milwaukee.

**Geneer.**—J. W. Geneer, Cashier of the German Savings Bank, Des Moines, Iowa, and one of the well-known bankers of the State, died on the street, of heart disease, March 23.

**Haws.**—A. J. Haws, Vice-President of the Cambria National Bank, Johnstown, Pa., and a wealthy manufacturer, died March 8.

**Johnson.**—S. J. Johnson, a successful banker of Little Rock, Ark., died March 17, aged thirty-five years.

**Keller.**—Lewis Keller, President of the Bank of Winamac, Ind., committed suicide, March 18.

**McCouch.**—J. B. McCouch, at one time engaged in banking in Pittsburg and later in Philadelphia, but for some years connected with the Treasury at Washington, died March 29.

**Oakley.**—Wm. H. Oakley, President of the National Citizens' Bank, New York city, died March 19. He entered the bank as a clerk in 1851, was made Cashier in 1865 and President in 1882. Mr. Oakley was a trustee of the Manhattan Savings Institution and connected with many other prominent business and social organizations.

**Otis.**—George L. Otis, formerly connected with the Merchants' Loan and Trust Company, Chicago, and from 1865 to 1885 an officer of the Commercial National Bank, died March 29.

**Rose.**—Edward L. Rose, Vice-President of the Strong State Bank, Binghamton, N. Y., died March 18.

**Taber.**—Edward S. Taber, President of the First National Bank, New Bedford, Mass., and a leading business man, died March 10.

**Tead.**—Edward L. Tead, President of the National Exchange Bank, Boston, since 1876, died April 2. Mr. Tead was born in 1826, and had been prominently connected with several Boston banks.

**Van Horn.**—D. W. Van Horn, President of the Bank of Clarendon, Texas, was fatally injured while attempting to board a moving train at Caldwell, Kans., March 1. He was born at Lockport, N. Y., sixty-one years ago. At the opening of the Civil War he enlisted on the Union side, and fought until the close of the war, when he was discharged with the rank of captain.

**Wheeler.**—Cyrenus Wheeler, Jr., President of the Cayuga County Savings Bank, Auburn, N. Y., died March 24. He was held in the highest regard both as a banker and a citizen.





*Richard DeLafield*

THE  
**BANKERS' MAGAZINE**

RHOODES' JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

FIFTY-THIRD YEAR.

MAY, 1899.

**I**NDUSTRIAL STOCKS AS A BASIS FOR BANK LOANS.—INDUSTRIAL STOCKS have fallen into some disfavor as a result of the speculative operations of various concerns capitalized on an extensive scale. The reaction taken as a conservative reaction on the part of the banks and investors are necessarily an important factor in upholding or depressing prices on the Stock Exchange.

The period since the panic of 1893 has been the general period known one of economy and recuperation. The unobscured growth of exports, both of products and manufactures, has brought a large amount of money into the country during the past three or four years. For a time the distrust consequent on the financial crisis of 1893 prevented investment, and the gradually accumulating surplus of the country was piled up in banks, waiting for opportunities.

The tendency to turn almost all forms of business into corporations has been prominent during the last quarter of a century. The competition among these corporations had become nearly if not quite as great as it ever was among private firms. The next step in the line was to endeavor to overcome this competition by the consolidation of rival corporations into trusts. The motives for this course of consolidation and the arguments in its favor are well known; they were greater economy in management, and a more absolute control of markets. The growth of the foreign trade of the United States gave additional reasons for the formation of these combinations. There is no doubt that a large part of the confidence which has been manifested toward the stocks of industrial consolidations has been due to the belief that a great foreign market is now opening for American manufactures. There is certainly a solid foundation for the confidence manifested by the public, and if this foundation had been the only thing relied on, profits corresponding to the original amounts invested in the industrial stocks would have been realized. But



*Richard DeLafield*



T H E

# BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTY-THIRD YEAR.

MAY, 1899.

VOLUME LVIII, No. 5.

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**I**NDUSTRIAL STOCKS AS A BASIS FOR BANK LOANS appear to have fallen into some disfavor as a result of the recent consolidation of various concerns capitalized on an extensive scale. This may be taken as a conservative reaction on the part of the banks, whose loans are necessarily an important factor in upholding or depressing prices on the Stock Exchange.

The period since the panic of 1893 has for the general public been one of economy and recuperation. The immense growth of exports, both of products and manufactures, has brought a large amount of money into the country during the past three or four years. For a time the distrust consequent on the financial crisis of 1893 prevented investment, and the gradually accumulating surplus of the country was piled up in banks, waiting for opportunities.

The tendency to turn almost all forms of business into corporations has been prominent during the last quarter of a century. The competition among these corporations had become nearly if not quite as great as it ever was among private firms. The next step in this line was to endeavor to overcome this competition by the consolidation of rival corporations into trusts. The motives for this process of consolidation and the arguments in its favor are well known; they were greater economy in management, and a more absolute control of markets. The growth of the foreign trade of the United States gave additional reasons for the formation of these combinations. There is no doubt that a large part of the confidence which has been manifested toward the stocks of industrial consolidations has been due to the belief that a great foreign market is now opening for American manufactures. There is certainly a solid foundation for the confidence manifested by the public, and if this foundation had been the only thing relied on, profits corresponding to the original amounts invested in the industrial stocks would have been realized. But

speculation always accompanies every development of this kind, and there seems to be no doubt that in many cases the prices of industrial stocks have advanced far beyond the point warranted by the real facts surrounding the business of the trust or corporation. Also when enterprises started on a sound basis win the confidence of the investing public, there are sure to start up a crowd of mushroom growths of the same apparent character, which it is hard to distinguish from the real thing. There is no doubt that great discrimination should be exercised in judging of this new class of securities. Industrial stocks should not be condemned wholesale. There are many of them that can show an ample basis of value. It must also be remembered that very few of these industries have by actual experience shown what degree of profit they can realize. All that is known in regard to most of them is the average profit of the separate concerns out of which the trust was composed. Of course this forms a starting point, but the increased profits to grow out of the new organization are necessarily in a great degree speculative, being dependent upon the economies, the improved methods of manufacture and the wider markets.

The true rule by which all this class of securities should be judged is the profits before the new organization, with the addition of such actual figures as can be obtained in regard to the working of the new system.

The use of the new industrial securities as collateral for the loans necessary to carry them in Stock Exchange speculation exposed them to all the risks of unwarranted rise in price, and equally unreasonable depreciation. Most of these fluctuations have been entirely independent of any real figures as to the probable profitableness of the business involved. They were dependent upon the state of the money market, the fears of the loaning banks, or the desire to reap a profit during a brief speculative excitement.

It is usually considered essential to the success of the stock he is promoting, for a promoter to get it listed on the Stock Exchange. It gives it the only prominence that is essential in the minds of a large part of the investing public, who knowing the risks invest simply with the gambler's hope that they will get out in good time. But there is little doubt that many sound enterprises have had serious setbacks on account of too early exploitation in the stock markets.

The action of the New York banks in giving a check to the too rapid rise in industrial stocks was one that will in the long run redound to the interest of all industrial organizations that have something in them. Moreover, it seems probable from many indications that the general public in investing in these industrials are not so blind as many suppose. That they have considerable knowledge of

the real worth of many of these enterprises may be suspected from the persistence with which they purchase the stocks, when professional speculators see fit to unload them. Many of these trusts are formed to carry on business, with the details of which many people are much more familiar than with the management of railroads or steamship lines, and they either know or think they know that there must eventually be profits.

Like all new kinds of investment, the industrials must have time to settle each one to its true rank in the investment market. The apparent attack upon them as a basis for loans was really a blessing in disguise and will tend to prevent the disastrous results of unchecked speculation.

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THE PROPORTION OF CAPITAL TO DEPOSITS naturally tends to grow less as the surplus wealth of the country increases and accumulates in the banks either in the form of money or bank credits.

On February 4, 1899, the returns to the Comptroller of the Currency of the National banks in New York city showed deposits amounting to about eight hundred and fifty millions of dollars. The capital alone of these banks was \$47,600,000, and the surplus and undivided profits about \$61,000,000. The stockholders' liability was in addition \$47,600,000 more.

The capital of the New York banks is only about one-seventeenth of the deposits. An examination of the returns for the same date from other cities shows a similar disproportion between capital and deposits. But by a sort of a paradox the public seem to show a tendency to increase their deposits in the banks having the smallest proportionate amount of capital, as this proportional amount seems to decrease at those points known as money centres, to which deposits seem to flow from all parts of the country. It appears to be a natural law that as the wealth of a country increases the deposits in banks increase out of all proportion to the capital invested by the stockholders.

In all the history of the second Bank of the United States, from 1817 to 1840, the capital of the bank being \$35,000,000, the deposits never exceeded \$32,000,000, and much of the time they did not equal one-half of that sum.

The truth is that in the highest type of banking credit almost wholly takes the place of capital, and it is entirely probable that if the law permitted the capital of most of the New York banks could be altogether withdrawn, and deposits would continue to come to them just the same as ever. Between the Bank of the United States with its capital of \$35,000,000 and from sixteen to thirty-two millions

of deposits, and the National banks of New York city with a capital of \$47,000,000 and deposits of \$850,000,000, the contrast is very great.

The real security for deposits rests not on capital but on the management of the loans and bank reserves.

The confidence of the public in the institutions referred to as well as in a proportionate degree in all the banks in the country, as shown by the entrusting of their money on deposit, indicates most clearly that there could be no great danger in entrusting these banks with the issue of circulating notes and the maintenance of the gold reserve of the country.

The trouble is that in this matter the lessons of the past are interpreted too literally. Under the conditions which existed in the early history of the country, when the privilege of issuing circulating notes was in many cases a gift of capital, bestowed by the Legislature on political favorites, the public were often made the victims of ignorant and dishonest speculators. Such abuses of the circulation privilege as occurred under the banking systems of many States when the country was new would at the present time be almost impossible. In those times the circulation privilege was the only resource of many banks. They had no capital and no deposits to speak of. To-day banks cannot commence business without a paid-in capital; but what is more important, they cannot profitably continue business without a line of deposits at least equal to their capital.

Many of the apprehensions felt by conservative bankers in regard to the issue of circulation on the basis of general assets would be removed, if the privilege were confined to established banks having a line of deposits equal at least to their capital.

In other words, if no new bank were permitted to have circulation except such as was secured by bonds, until after its business became well established and examination showed a line of *bona fide* deposits equal to its capital.

It has been customary to measure the circulation allowed by capital. This custom is derived from the days when deposits were small and fluctuating. The circulation permitted to be issued should more reasonably bear some relation to the average deposits of a bank. In the days when bank charters were granted by Legislatures as political prizes, and stock subscriptions were given away as desirable presents, it was important to fix the proportion of circulation to capital. The happy holder of the right to subscribe gave his note for his shares. When the circulation was issued he received his proportion and paid his note. If the proportion was 100 per cent. of capital, his bank stock cost him nothing. If it was more, he had enough to start a deposit account; if less, he had to furnish money from his own funds or borrow. The whole business of the bank started and grew from

the circulation privilege. In many cases it was all the capital the bank had.

Many of the older and more conservative bankers fear a return to this sort of thing if the privilege of circulation on general assets were again permitted. The danger would be very slight with those banks already well established, but some might be tempted to start new banks simply to obtain circulation. This, it is suggested, might be prevented by putting all new banks on a period of probation until they had demonstrated the reason of their being by obtaining a line of *bona fide* deposits at least equal to their paid-in capital. This would not prevent well-established State banks from receiving the privilege; it would in fact protect all established banks from unfair competition. The circulation privilege properly exercised is in fact primarily a protection to deposits and not to capital except indirectly. To fix its limit by capital is arbitrary though necessary, because capital is the most stable item in a bank account.

It is believed that to make a good line of *bona fide* deposits a *sine qua non* of the issue of circulation to any bank, would remove the most serious objection to the issue of circulation on the basis of general assets.

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THE SCARCITY OF PAPER CURRENCY has had the effect of reviving the agitation in favor of the issue of gold certificates, which was suspended by Secretary CARLISLE in 1893, under the provision in the Act of July 12, 1882, which requires such suspension whenever the amount of gold coin and gold bullion reserved in the Treasury for the redemption of United States notes shall fall below one hundred millions of dollars. It appears to be the policy of the Treasury not to resume the issue of such certificates unless directed to do so by Congress. There seems to have yet been no appeal made either to judicial authority or to Congress to determine whether it is within the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury to resume the issue of these certificates after the suspension contemplated by the law of 1882 had once gone into effect.

There is no doubt that these certificates in large denominations were a great convenience to the banks at the money centres in the handling of the gold transferred from one to the other in the settlement of the balances of the exchanges. They seemed to be the more necessary because of the large transfers of gold between the United States sub-Treasury (the chief officer of which is a member of the New York Clearing-House) and the banks, because the gold certificates issued by the banks themselves are not available for transactions with the sub-Treasury.

This demand for convenience in making the transfer of gold in large amounts seems to be the most important reason for resuming the issue of the gold certificates. If it were not for this demand there would probably be no agitation of the subject. The Treasury itself has been averse to resuming the issue because the general public were by means of these certificates enabled to use the Treasury as a cheap place of deposit for their gold, which was always drawn out at a time when the moral effect of its withdrawal was most injurious to the credit of the Government.

Perhaps the difficulty might be obviated by restricting the issue of gold certificates to large denominations only; but this could not be legally done, inasmuch as if the issue were resumed at all, no gold offered for deposit could be refused, and the denominations authorized by law could be demanded. It is possible that the law might be construed to give the Secretary a discretion, as it simply provides that the certificates shall be in denominations of not less than twenty dollars, and that he might confine issues to large denominations under this discretion, but there is no doubt that he would expose himself to attack for discriminating in favor of the banks and against the general public.

It seems probable, however, that the inconvenience of the transfer of gold might be overcome by the issue of legal-tender notes of large denominations in exchange for gold. The Secretary now receives gold in exchange for legal-tender notes, and there would be no difficulty in printing such quantity of large denominations as might be required, retiring an equal quantity of the smaller legal-tender notes. This would have the effect of relieving the inconvenience now encountered in exchanges of gold between the sub-Treasury and the banks, and would place some millions of legal-tender notes in a position where they would be less likely to be presented for redemption; moreover if they were presented for redemption the gold would be taken out of that portion of the reserve provided by the public. It is possible that the present Congress may pass a law carrying out the suggestion of the President, restricting the issue of legal-tender notes once redeemed to cases where gold is deposited against them. The result of such a law would be to convert all the outstanding legal-tender notes into gold certificates within a year or two and the whole controversy in regard to resuming the issue of the gold certificates of 1882 would come to an end. The denominations of legal-tender notes may be as large as the Secretary shall deem expedient. Such large legal-tender notes issued against gold would perhaps in time be used almost exclusively for clearing-house purposes in place of and in addition to the clearing-house certificates now improvised by the banks themselves; and in that event, a large portion if not the whole of the present legal-tender notes might be taken out of circulation.

THE RECENT ARRESTS OF COUNTERFEITERS of silver certificates and revenue stamps indicate the importance of having the printing of the paper money of the country under the control of the general Government. Whatever changes may be made in the currency laws, whether the notes are issued by the banks or the Government, the preparation of the plates and the printing of the notes should be under the direct supervision of the latter. In this way only, in a country of so great extent as the United States, can counterfeiting of the notes be most effectually guarded against.

Under the State banking systems in operation before the Civil War, the great diversity in the designs of the notes, and the uncertainty in regard to the value of many of those that were genuine, tended to create so much confusion in the public mind that the counterfeiter had a tempting field for his activity. The laws of each State, moreover, in regard to the crime of counterfeiting the notes of its banks, varied in their character from those of other States, and could not be enforced in other States except by requisition and extradition. The central Government, having jurisdiction over the whole territory, is in a position to keep up a system of secret service that would be burdensome as an expense to any one State.

The argument derived from these considerations is very strong in favor of the view that it is against public policy if not unconstitutional for a State to charter a bank having the privilege of issuing circulating notes.

The extent to which paper notes are now issued and the comparative infrequency with which they are redeemed, make it worth while for the counterfeiter to develop his greatest resources. Under the old State bank system, no one bank issued any very large quantity of notes compared with the aggregate, and the issue of any profitable number of counterfeits on any one bank was sure to attract attention. The similarity of the design of the National bank note makes the increase of the issue of one bank of little moment. In taking National bank notes not one person in ten ever notes the particular institution by which it may have been issued. In regard to Government notes there is no distinction of this kind.

The counterfeiter is tempted, therefore, to carry on his business on a grand scale. The success with which the attempts hitherto made to impose imitation money on the public have been detected and punished, indicates the skill with which the operations of the secret service are conducted.

Apparently one of the greatest opportunities for counterfeiting on a large scale is afforded by the standard silver dollar. Although to a certain extent a mere token of value, the material of which it is made is held to be determinate of its genuineness to the ordinary

observer. A silver dollar from silver nine-tenths fine made elsewhere than at the United States mints would probably pass in general circulation almost as readily as if made at those mints, and yet technically it would be a counterfeit. The outside manufacturer of such dollars would make a profit of more than one hundred per cent. on each dollar manufactured. It has been rumored from time to time that many such dollars have been put into circulation. It certainly would require much less skill to prepare a design for a silver dollar than for a one dollar paper note. Counterfeiters, however, seem to reason that as they must run considerable risk in any event, they will make the business as profitable as possible, and in doing this they are almost sure to neglect in their manufactures the expensive finish which causes the genuine notes and coin to bear sure witness of their quality to the expert.

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THE COLLECTION OF COUNTRY BANK CHECKS, which has been for so long a subject of discussion in banking circles, is at length being acted upon in a number of the leading cities.

The Boston banks have been for some time considering a system by which checks of New England banks outside of Boston deposited in Boston institutions could be sorted and cashed and returned to the bank upon which the checks were drawn. The scheme involves the keeping in some Boston bank by each of the New England banks of an account from which checks drawn upon it can be paid. The whole design is analogous to the Suffolk Bank system of redemption of the notes of New England State banks which was successfully in operation before the Civil War.

There is no reason why country checks could not be handled in this manner with advantage both to the banks of Boston and their correspondent New England banks. Some charge would necessarily be made for the labor of carrying out this plan, but it might be made very moderate, as most of the checks would be settled through the clearing-house. The charge would fall upon the banks on which the checks are drawn and not on the merchants or business men who take them at par from their customers.

The use of personal checks in making payments has been growing from year to year. These checks are in reality a form of currency furnished by the people themselves and they add very much to the promptness and convenience of making remittances. There is no doubt, however, that to the principal city banks where these checks tend to accumulate in large amounts, their collection is a considerable expense, and it is right that they should be reimbursed for this expense. But there is much diversity of opinion upon whom this



expense should fall. Under the arrangement made by the New York Clearing-House, charging a certain percentage upon such checks deposited with the clearing-house banks, the entire expense seems to fall on the merchants and business men whose accounts with their customers are settled with these checks. Of course the merchants can make themselves whole by charging sufficiently more for their goods to make up for the discount on checks received in payment, or they can refuse to receive such checks, and demand funds at par in New York. But this course will at once interfere with the convenience of the purchasing public, and may tend to take trade away from New York city.

It seems most reasonable that the expense of collecting these checks should be borne by the banks upon which they are drawn, as these banks are the ones that received the benefit of the delay in the presentation of the checks for payment. The depositors in the banks who draw the checks are the ones to finally bring about the necessary reform, by requiring their banks to keep such accounts in the money centres as will cause checks drawn upon them to be at par in those centres. As a matter of fact most of the outside banks of the country do keep balances with banks in the great financial centres, and some system, like that proposed for the New England banks in Boston, could be easily inaugurated for all the country banks in any of the money centres. When the public begins to understand this matter rightly no one will deposit money in any bank which will not agree to make its checks equal to par at any of the money centres.

The action of the New York Clearing-House banks is, however, right from their standpoint. It is the only way in which the expense of collecting the checks in question can eventually be put where it belongs. The merchants and others who will have to bear the first brunt of these charges can readily manage to place the expense where it belongs, viz. : on the drawee banks, by advising their customers that they must take steps to furnish funds at par in New York. No doubt there will be inequalities at first, but in the end all banks will probably find it to their advantage in securing accounts to pay their customers checks at the money centres.

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THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN having been effected by the formal exchange of ratifications, the remaining problem is to establish good government among the people of the acquired territory.

In a new and somewhat unlooked-for situation it is to be expected that there will be many differences of opinion as to the course to be pursued. The greatest opposition to the policy of the present Administration seems to be in regard to the Philippine Islands. As no

policy has been formally declared, the critics are mainly attacking inferences drawn by themselves from the action of the commanders of the American forces in the islands. The war with the natives of the islands has grown out of circumstances that were unexpected and beyond control. The march of events was so rapid and there was such lack of information in regard to the conditions existing in Manila, that no plan could be formed in advance. The first troops were sent to support the fleet and to complete the conquest of the Spanish forces. Almost before they arrived the war with Spain in Cuba and Porto Rico had collapsed. The natives under AGUINALDO, in haste to plunder the effects of the Spaniards retiring from Manila and too impatient to allow the Americans time to declare their purposes, broke out into open war. Our forces could not decline the contest. They were bound to protect themselves and to protect property. There is hardly any step that has been taken by the American Generals which cannot be defended on the ground of intelligent self-defense. The character of the fighting has been such as might be expected when one of the combatant parties is little removed from the condition of savagery.

There are signs that the opposition to the establishment of American authority in the Philippines on the part of AGUINALDO and his followers is on the point of collapse, and the end of the insurrection may be announced at any time. When this condition of affairs is reached, the discussion of the future disposition of the islands or the form of government to be given them will be opportune, but not before.

Some critics never have any patience; they are like the man who condemned the bean because it did not sprout the next day after it was planted. To any one who does not wish to impute motives, there seems to be yet ample time in which the United States may extend freedom of government to the natives of the Philippines, combined with protection from foreign interference, in a manner that will relieve them from the burdens of Spanish despotism and enable them to set up a government of their own.

Notwithstanding all the apparent opposition to what is called imperialism, and the carping at the various steps by which the country became involved with the Philippine Islands, the complaints that if this, that or the other thing had or had not done, the situation would have been different, the tendency to advise, remonstrate, and plaintively reflect, on what is finished and unalterable—notwithstanding all this, it is probable that no one would to-day advocate that our fleets and armies should evacuate and sail away, leaving the natives to their devices.

If a protectorate is established, the United States cannot confine itself to having ships sailing around the islands and warning off for-

eign interlopers. Order must be maintained on shore; and to maintain this order in some cases force must be used before the warring elements among the natives can be reduced to a happy family.

Probably the worst government that could be introduced by a civilized nation would be better than any government which could be inaugurated by the Filipinos themselves.

The excitement about the policy to be pursued toward the acquired territories will no doubt die out as soon as the charms of novelty of a new subject of discussion have become worn. In five years the interest in these foreign apanages will have become of the same sort as that now manifested about the Indian reservations.

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THE PERMANENCY OF THE GOLD STANDARD in the United States, under prevailing conditions, is frequently a subject of speculative discussion. The only conclusion that can be reached in such an inquiry is that as far as can be judged from the present wealth and production of the country, its increasing exports, and the balance of trade in its favor, there is no reason to fear any failure to keep all the currency of the country redeemable in gold. So far there is no harm in the speculation, although it has little utility.

The danger from this and other kindred discussions is that they furnish ammunition to the opponents of the gold standard, and continue an agitation which might otherwise die a natural death. Other nations not nearly so rich or advantageously situated as the United States have established and maintained the gold standard. They may at times have suspended coin payments, but the standard still existed and all departures from it were accurately measured from day to day. The mere suspension of specie payments does not indicate any abrogation of the monetary standard. During the Civil War all monetary transactions were carried on in paper money which was temporarily irredeemable, but the gold standard was never abrogated. The real value of this paper currency was continually known by the application of the metallic standard during every hour of the business day. The gold premium showed how far this currency varied from the standard, and it was only in comparison with the standard that its value was measured.

The suspension of specie payments, therefore, is a very different thing from a real change in or abrogation of a previously existing standard of value. In the United States, for instance, the present gold standard will be maintained so long as by explicit law, or by the construction of existing law, the gold dollar of present weight and fineness is unchanged, and is not superseded by a gold dollar of any other weight or fineness, nor by a dollar composed of any other metal.

At present construction of existing monetary laws practically makes the gold dollar the standard by which all other money, coin and paper, is measured or redeemed. This dollar has been the standard since 1837, and in this sense the gold standard has been maintained in the United States for over sixty years. But during that period there have been several suspensions of coin payment both on the part of the banks and of the United States Treasury. The same thing might also happen in the future, but is no more likely to happen with the gold standard than with the silver or any other metallic standard.

The speculation, therefore, in regard to the future ability of the United States to maintain the gold standard, as far as it concerns the security of that standard from any essential change, that is, from the change from a gold dollar of one weight and fineness to another weight and fineness, or from a gold dollar to a dollar of any other metal, can soon satisfy its doubts by the fact that for over sixty years the unchanged gold dollar has been the standard in the United States.

If, however, this speculative investigation concerns itself with the probabilities whether specie payments can always be maintained in the future, it at once branches out into a realm of bewildering uncertainty. In the first place there is no possibility of knowing at what moment Congress may change or amend the present monetary laws. It is one thing to speculate what might happen financially in the event the present laws are to continue, and another if they are to be changed. It would be bewildering enough to undertake to prophesy the financial future of the country if it were sure that the present laws were to be unchanged. If forecasts are to be made in regard to the effects of changes in the monetary laws, assumptions and suppositions innumerable must be made and each of them worked out separately even to approach a tangible conclusion. There even can be no certainty that in making these assumptions the right one will be hit upon, as the possibilities of the variations of laws are almost infinite.

The speculation therefore necessarily resolves itself into a forecast of the future increase in wealth and resources, founded on present conditions, and the conclusion may be reached that a country of wealth and resources sufficiently great may maintain specie payments on a gold basis. Such a country, however, could also manage to worry along with any standard or any system of currency. In fact, the survival of the business interests of the country notwithstanding unwise monetary laws and dangerous experiments with silver, is ascribed by many to the superabundant vigor and vitality of the nation. The hardy fruit tree in rich soil will grow and blossom and bring fruit, although trained in a position constrained and unnatural. The mere fact that there is great promise of the future increase of

the wealth and resources of the country, proves nothing for the gold standard particularly. The best way to maintain it is to refrain from much discussion of the subject. The sooner the country begins to look upon it as a fixed fact no more to be successfully interfered with than the equator or the zodiac, the better. It is of course possible to scientifically discuss the nature of the equator and the zodiac, but whether they will be maintained in the future seems to be a rather futile subject of speculation.

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THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SHIP CANAL between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans at some point in the comparatively narrow neck of land connecting North and South America, should be of great importance to the United States.

There are at least four proposed routes, and of these two, the Nicaragua and Panama lines, are in the possession of private companies. The Panama route is the scene of the great DE LESSEPS failure, and is being worked by a successor of his company. It is impossible to judge accurately of the energy which is being expended on the development of this route, but it may be suspected that the present company has yet to secure much greater resources before the completion of this canal will be feasible.

The Nicaraguan route is in possession of the Maritime Canal Company, by concessions from the Nicaraguan Government, which concessions are disputed, and the Maritime Company virtually confesses to its inability to complete the canal within any reasonable period with the resources it is able to procure on its own credit.

If it were to be determined to be of vital importance to the United States to have the canal constructed, before the work could be done the Government would on either of the two routes mentioned have to clear the ground by buying up the company in real or assumed possession. One of these companies is French and the other American, and this, of course, is a sentimental reason why the Nicaragua route should be selected and the American company bought out; but in reality commercial companies have no nationality, and probably one will prove as rapacious as the other.

It is suspected that the show of life lately visible in the Panama Company is due to the belief that the United States or some other country will step in to complete the canal, and as a preliminary buy out the French owners, who will thus secure some little return for the immense amount of French capital wasted on this enterprise.

There is no doubt a feeling among the nations of the earth that the United States would look with a hostile eye on any nation that would attempt to construct an inter-oceanic canal in the Western

Hemisphere. The DE LESSEPS attempt did not excite any great apprehension, because it was not undertaken on the part of the French Government, and there was a feeling from the first that the undertaking would not succeed, based, perhaps, on the knowledge that the difficulties were greater than should be attempted by private capital. It was practically impossible to secure subscriptions to the scheme in this country. It was the success of DE LESSEPS with the Suez Canal which inspired the confidence of French capital in the Panama scheme. The fact was overlooked that in the Suez scheme DE LESSEPS had the real assistance of the Egyptian Government, without which his private company would probably have entirely collapsed, as did his Panama Company, where he could obtain no Government assistance.

France is not commercially of sufficient importance to warrant her giving governmental support to the construction of any of the great inter-oceanic canals, or to undertake their construction. Great Britain's interests do not lie so much in a western route as they do in the eastern. There are no other nations likely to undertake the construction of inter-oceanic canals in the Western Hemisphere. This is known pretty well by all thinking men, and the private companies which, on one pretext or another, control these inter-oceanic routes, all look to the United States as the source of their profits. The Tehuantepec and Darien routes also have their advocates, interested in much the same manner as the Nicaragua and the Panama routes.

Assuming that a ship canal, if it is constructed at all, will be constructed by the United States Government, and that such construction is necessary for the commercial advantage and protection of the Nation, there is no doubt that the United States could by diplomatic negotiations secure concessions from the Central American States for the construction of the canal over any route which might be selected, as cheaply as it could buy out any one of the companies now alleging that they have concessions and franchises for sale.

It is not at all certain that better routes could be discovered than any of those that have been so widely advertised. But before anything is undertaken, a careful examination of all the proposed and other possible routes should be made. It is possible that after buying out the Maritime Company, for instance, or the Panama Company, that the United States Government would discover that it had still to buy out Nicaragua or the States of Colombia. As to the Nicaragua route there seems already to be some kind of a contest between two or three different sets of companies holding concessions. And there are grave doubts whether the concession already made to the Panama Canal Company has not lapsed by limitation. It is better before any bill is passed that the matter should be investigated by an impartial commission which will report upon all aspects of the matter.

## REPUBLICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD CURRENCY REFORM.

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The Republicans of the new House of Representatives appointed a caucus committee to act during the recess, and to draw up a bill for currency reform to be presented early in the session when Congress again meets. The appointment of this committee may indicate that the majority are realizing that a political error may have been made in neglecting the monetary question at the last session, and are now in earnest in the desire to accomplish something in this direction at the earliest possible moment, or it may be merely a palliative against adverse criticism, in line with the temporizing policy heretofore pursued.

The make-up of the committee shows that it will not be prejudiced in favor of any of the measures introduced during the last Congress, as none of its members has prepared or introduced any of these bills. They are all men who will give great weight to the political possibilities involved in monetary reform.

After all, however, when Congressional legislation is considered, the distinction between political motives and those not political is more apparent than real. The main question with those who desire legislation, monetary or otherwise, is whether it can pass both houses and become a law. The securing of the necessary votes is always a political question. Thus in regard to currency reform, several good plans have been proposed which, if they could be enacted into laws, would apparently be beneficial in their operation upon the business of the country. But none of these plans has sufficiently impressed itself on the minds of legislators to cause them even to take it up in earnest. All of these plans contained features for the amendment of the Federal banking laws, and it seems it is this phase of the monetary question which forms the greatest stumbling-block.

Why the men who are regarded as the best qualified to judge of political chances appear to fear to undertake any banking legislation can only be surmised. It was by appeals to the thrifty classes, to the real working people of the country, that the victory over the free coinage of silver was won. As respects the maintenance of the gold standard the banks and all capitalists, large and small, were a unit. If they were similarly united as to banking legislation there would be no more difficulty in getting Congress to enact amendments to our banking laws than in defeating laws in favor of the free coinage of silver. The committee appointed to prepare a currency measure for the next Congress is, it is said, very loath to recommend any serious change in the bank currency, but is not disinclined to definitely declare the gold dollar the standard and to make all bonds and other obligations of the United States payable in that standard dollar alone.

The hesitation as to bank legislation on the part of the average member of the House of Representatives of whom the members of the caucus committee may be taken as typical, appears to be mainly due to the conflicting

views and the rivalries among the banks themselves. There are now in the United States financial institutions which in one way or another do some kind of a banking business in five chief classes. There are trust companies, Savings banks, State banks, private banks and National banks. All of these are practically on a par as far as the issue of circulating notes is concerned for under the present law the National banks have no advantage in the use of their credit as a basis for circulation. A law to issue circulation on general credit would change this basis of practical equality. No banks but National banks could avail themselves of its provisions. State and private bankers could of course become National banks by going through the process of conversion, but trust companies and Savings banks could not. The State banks and private bankers had rather have the currency continue as it now is, because if the change is made and they continue as State banks and private bankers, they will be at a serious disadvantage in competition with National banks. To change their status is distasteful to their instinct of conservatism and would also radically change many of their methods of doing business. Trust companies and Savings banks would be still more loath to endorse any change in the law, as they can in no way gain any possible advantage from it. The present method of having all the paper currency issued by the Government places all the financial institutions on a level, giving no advantage to one class above another. The opposition therefore to the issue of a currency by the banks comes more from the banks themselves than from any other class in the community. It is believed that a canvass of the members of the House of Representatives from all sections would show that they are made aware of this, whenever any plan for a bank currency is proposed, by letters from their most influential constituents.

If this is the case, what is to be done? It is acknowledged by the very ones who oppose bank currency legislation that the legal-tender notes and other Government notes ought to be retired; that their retention is a constant menace to the Treasury; but that they can not very well be retired unless some other form of paper currency is substituted. It must be acknowledged that Government notes in several respects meet the wants of the community. They are homogeneous and safe to the holder. If it were not for their lack of elasticity and the periodical danger they entail on the Treasury, by which the indirect losses to the business community are greater than any gain in their use, there would be no reason for their retirement.

Owing however to the tacit opposition to a credit bank currency issued by National banks which arises from the conservatism of financial institutions, it is probable that if any measure for such bank currency becomes a law it will have to be forced on the financial community, as much as the original National Currency Act was forced upon them in 1863. Congress never rises to the height of opposition to an important class except under the very greatest pressure of emergency, and it is not likely that such pressure will arise.

It is extremely doubtful whether the caucus committee will do more than recommend legislation strengthening the gold standard and gradually retiring the legal-tender notes. It is, however, of little importance how much they recommend if their action results in the currency question being seriously taken up by Congress. Agitation will go on until a good working system of banking and currency is secured, and this consummation will be hastened by the report of the caucus committee, whatever its character may be.



## THE PRINCIPLES OF A BANKING CURRENCY.

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The bank note is only one of several forms in which a bank may grant its credit, but it has attracted the special attention of writers and lawmakers because of its use in general circulation as a substitute for money. The issue of notes was a common-law right in England until the passage of the Bank Act in 1844. The restrictions imposed by the Act extending the charter of the Bank of England in 1709 did not affect individuals and partnerships of less than six persons. When it was finally thought proper, upon grounds of public policy and convenience, to limit future issues of bank notes to the Bank of England, the vested right of banks already issuing notes was not assailed and they were permitted in perpetuity and without regulation as to reserves or guarantees for the safety of the notes, to keep in circulation as many notes as the average amount outstanding for each bank during the twelve weeks preceding April 27, 1844. The amount then left outstanding was £5,153,417 for the 207 private banks and £3,478,230 for the 72 joint-stock banks, of which £1,374,376 remained outstanding on account of the private banks and £1,742,868 on account of the joint-stock banks on January 1, 1899. In France the right of private note issue was declared to exist by a competent writer as recently as 1866,\* and in Belgium the Government, while restricting the issue of notes to corporations authorized by the State, has reserved the right to create such corporations at any time as rivals of the National Bank.† This original status of the bank note is a fact which should not be overlooked in following its later development. The view which has been industriously encouraged by the critics of a banking currency, that the issue of notes is equivalent to the coining of money and should be an exclusive right of the Government, whatever may be its abstract merits, is not based upon historical precedent. The bank note was originally recognized as one of several forms of issuing banking credit, subject in the nature of the case to no other restrictions than those imposed upon the issue of deposit receipts or the granting of loans. How closely the one form of credit resembles the other is suggested by the following passage from Prof. MacLeod: ‡

“Bankers’ notes were at first merely written on paper, like any other promissory notes; and they were for any sums. In 1729 Child & Co. introduced the practice of having their notes partly printed and partly written like a modern check. But still they were not like modern bank notes for even pounds, but just for any odd sums that might be required, like a check. London bankers appear to have issued their own notes till about 1793, when perhaps the panic of that year may have shown them the danger of having their notes in the hands of the public; and it seems that they discontinued issuing them about that time. But they were never forbidden to issue notes till the Bank Charter Act of 1844.”

The origin of the bank note only partly covered by the metallic reserve is shrouded in the uncertainty which surrounds the creation of any instrument of modern civilized life which is a natural growth from certain conditions

\* Horn, “*La Liberté des Banques*,” p. 386, *seq.*

† Noel, “*Banques d’Émission en Europe*,” I, p. 481.

‡ “*The Theory and Practice of Banking*,” I, p. 381.

rather than an isolated event. Prof. MacLeod finds that certificates representing deposits of gold and silver were issued in China under the dynasty of Thang as early as 807 of our era. A later issue in 960, under the dynasty of the Soung, was known as *pian-thsian*—"flying" or "current" money. A joint-stock company of rich merchants was authorized in 1021 to issue notes payable in three years. This seems to have been the first case of partly covered notes. The company met with disaster and the Emperor forbade the future formation of such banks.\* The origin of the bank note in Europe is usually attributed to Palmstruch, the founder of the Bank of Sweden, in 1658, but Prof. Block declares that "bills to bearer have been without doubt invented several times and in different countries." The manner of this evolution he thus describes: †

"There can be only conjectures upon the origin of the bill payable at sight and to bearer, called the bank bill or bank note. It is probable that receipts (*bulletins*) or certificates of deposit became a medium of circulation by the custom which was established of passing them from hand to hand without endorsing them, which naturally resulted in replacing the name of the depositor by a formula which ascribed the certificate to the bearer. \* \* \* Certain authors credit the birth of the bank bill to Sweden about 1660, at least as a governmental measure, but paper to bearer is much more ancient. It is evident that it springs from the usage of certain bankers in offering their paper, already known upon the market, for the paper of their client. As they paid punctually, the circulation strengthened by their signature was a powerful aid to them. The bill of the small merchant has three defects: (1) The signature is unknown; (2) the amount of the bill is not even, and hence is inconvenient for exchanges; (3) the maturity is relatively distant. The remedy consisted in avoiding these three inconveniences, and the *trapezistas*, or Greek bankers, as soon as they had acquired sufficient standing, were able to replace the certificate of deposit (uniformly or at the will of the depositor) by a direct engagement to pay at sight to the bearer, divided into bills for round sums."

The bank note is described by Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu as "a promise made by a banker to pay a definite sum to bearer at sight." ‡ This is equally true whether the note is fully covered by coin or partly covered by commercial securities. In the first instance the only advantage of the note is the greater convenience of handling and transporting paper as the representative of coin. This advantage is important and is illustrated by the large use of notes in France, England, Russia, and other countries, notwithstanding the fact that nearly their equivalent in coin and bullion is in the custody of the great banks. The handling and counting of gold coin in large amounts is not only much less convenient than the counting of piles of notes but wears out the coin and requires the testing of each piece showing wear, in order to determine if the reduction of the weight is within the limit of tolerance allowed by law. Paper notes are so much preferred to coin for making actual payments, that the United States authorized in 1882 the issue of gold certificates by the Treasury upon the deposit of gold coin, § and the suspension of this privilege by the Secretary of the Treasury in 1893 resulted in material inconvenience to the banks, which were compelled to make payments in coin.

It is the bank note partly covered by the metallic reserve and partly covered by commercial securities which has been, during the present century,

\* "The Theory of Credit," I, p. 85. † "Les Progrès de la Science Économique," II, p. 89.

‡ "Traité d'Économie Politique," III, p. 463.

§ Act of July 12, 1882, Sec. 12. The issue of silver certificates for small sums, under the Act of August 4, 1886, also contributed greatly to obviate the inconvenience of circulating silver dollars. The silver dollars in circulation in the United States never exceeded \$63,000,000, while the silver certificates in circulation on March 1, 1899, were \$396,400,705.

the chief subject of discussion by economists and around which the warmest controversies have raged. Such a note is simply an engagement to deliver metallic money. In this respect it does not differ from an engagement to deliver wheat, except that the article promised is of more general acceptability. Both engagements represent value and either is capable of exchange for other commodities. It is not necessary in either case that the signer of the engagement should possess the full amount of the commodity which he promises; it is only necessary that his reputation and other forms of property should inspire confidence in his ability to fulfill the promise. As the wheat broker possesses money and credit with which he knows that he can obtain wheat at some price for fulfilling his engagements, so the banker possesses securities of various sorts maturing within short terms for which he knows that he can obtain money for fulfilling all demands upon him for money. In the promise to deliver money, the partly covered note does not differ from the deposit receipt, if the promise is fulfilled. In the language of Prof. Horn, "The reason of their more or less general acceptance or their ability to circulate is the same—the receipt or the bill is accepted because of the certainty or the supposed certainty that the bank is able and willing to honor its engagements."\* The well conducted bank is able to do this, without keeping coin to the full amount of the notes issued, because experience has demonstrated that only a portion of the notes will be presented at any one time for conversion into coin.

The functions of the well secured bank note are similar to the functions of metallic money. The bank, by means of its note issues, is able to accumulate the small capitals of individuals, convert them into a form divisible into small and even amounts, guaranteed by its endorsements, and by this means to distribute through the whole community a form of credit which becomes a convenient medium of exchange. The operation of issuing bank notes by a commercial bank is by the discount of notes and bills of exchange. A bank having been established with adequate capital, is able by means of its note issues to do a large business without receiving direct deposits. The typical manner in which its notes are put in circulation is by loaning them to traders. The loan is made upon a bill of exchange brought to the bank by the trader. The bill represents goods sold for which the cash has not been received. The title to property exists, but cannot be converted by the holder into a negotiable and divisible form generally acceptable as currency. The bank provides the equivalent of cash for the use of the borrower, pending final payment by the purchaser of the goods upon the maturity of the bill. The bank may do this by issuing its credit—which may be either by bank notes or by the power to draw checks. In the great money centers, where banks are within easy reach and large transactions are carried on by well-known establishments, the need for bank notes is not felt, because other forms of credit are generally acceptable. The supply of metallic money suffices for small transactions and checks are employed for the larger credit operations. The disadvantages of restrictions upon note issues in certain cases, however, have been forcibly set forth by Secretary Gage:†

\* "La Liberté des Banques," p. 226.

† Address before Virginia Bankers' Association, at Richmond.—BANKERS' MAGAZINE, March, 1890, LVIII, p. 374.

"If the banker has money in hand he can supply his customer's need. If his supply of money on hand be only adequate to form a proper reserve against his own outstanding liabilities, money he cannot lend. His credit, however, he may extend. He can give to the proposed borrower a credit upon his books against which the borrower might check; but, unfortunately the borrower must make use of the credit at outside points where his credit is not known, and where his checks upon the banker would not be received. He desires to buy wheat, or cattle, or lumber, or employ labor, so that, in the case I have just supposed, as he cannot borrow the money of the banker, who has not the money to spare, and as he cannot avail himself of the banker's credit because of the disability just pointed out, his purpose is defeated and his enterprise to the community is by so much lost."

The actual capital represented by bank notes is obtained from the public. If the power of issuing notes does not exist, this capital can be obtained only by the deposit of cash or titles to cash with the bank by depositors. Where the power of issuing notes exists, the loan is equally made by the public to the bank, and by the bank to the borrower from the capital belonging to the public, but it is made in a less direct and conscious manner. Each producer who surrenders goods to another for a bank note has given up real capital for a promise by the bank to deliver capital. He is thus in a sense a lender to the bank, as he would be if he made a direct deposit there. But these evidences of the indebtedness of the bank are exchangeable for the commodities of others and they are based upon real capital, because they are issued in the first instance upon the evidences of title to real capital entrusted to the bank by the borrower. The manner in which the bank facilitates transactions and makes it an advantage to the public to accept its evidences of indebtedness is well set forth in the report of the Monetary Commission of the Indianapolis Convention (page 169):

"The real function of a bank is thus to assist the man of business who has property, and whose credit is good where known, to secure an advance of current funds which he can use in his business. Those selling commodities to him may not be willing to let him owe them, for they may not know what his credit is, or even if they do, may insist on being paid because they need the money, and those to whom they must make payments would not know the merchant's credit, and hence would not be willing to take his notes. They know the bank, however, and are willing to have it owe them (either as evidenced by bank notes or deposits), because they know that the customs of the community make such bank liabilities a form of money. The members of the community, therefore, are willing to leave funds with a bank which they can call for; and on the strength of these, and with the aid of the bank's capital as a guarantee, the bank makes the advance to the merchant who needs means of payment. The bank's promises are convenient and useful to the community, since they are currency, while an individual's promises are not usually sufficiently well known or guarded; and third, the one is more acceptable and valuable than the other. For this reason the merchant is willing to pay the bank for giving him immediate means of payment for his note, even though what he receives may be only the bank's promise instead of his own. So long as the bank's promises are convertible into money and are accepted by the public as equally as good as money and even more convenient, they are currency and means of payment, which his own promises are not."

#### CHARACTER OF THE BANK NOTE.

While bank notes, therefore, are only one form of expressing banking credit, they may be the form most useful in a given community. Let us now examine some of the principles which are necessary to the orderly operation of a banking currency and some of the restrictions which are justified or enforced upon the freedom of its movements. The definition of a bank note given by Comptroller Hepburn in his Annual Report to Congress in 1892 (page 14), is as follows:

"A bank bill or note is a non-interest-bearing obligation payable to bearer upon demand, in lawful money, title to which passes by delivery. The value of such note depends upon the financial credit of the bank issuing the same, the special provision of law for its redemption, the security set apart for such purpose, the fidelity with which such laws are enforced, as to redemption, the character of supervision, and the degree of conservative banking thereby insured."

From this definition may be deduced the following summary of the qualities required in bank notes, in order that they may attain their highest usefulness as substitutes for money:

1. Bank notes should be payable to bearer on demand in standard money.
2. They should not bear interest.
3. They should be issued in uniform style in bills for round sums, such as are likely to prove convenient in daily transactions.
4. They should be transferable to bearer without formality and without recourse on the part of the holder to any prior holder except the issuing bank.

I. The essential condition laid down in this definition, and in all sound definitions of bank notes, is that they shall be convertible on demand into standard money. This standard money is usually gold or silver coin.\* Redemption in standard money on demand is the essential condition of a sound banking currency, because bank notes are issued in lieu of money. Metallic money possesses the character of exchangeability in the highest degree. It is the pre-eminent function of money to afford command over commodities, with the option of the commodity in the holder. It is necessary that bank notes should possess an equally exchangeable character, in order to make them the equivalent of money. When they cease to be convertible into metallic money, they lose in some degree their command, at the option of the holder, over all commodities. They sink to the character of other merchandise, which may have value in exchange, but which is not universally desired because it does not give the option of commanding at once any other article. When banks notes, therefore, cease to be convertible into metallic money, they usually cease also to command commodities in the same degree that metallic money does. Their exchange value depends upon a variety of influences, among which are the probabilities of their future exchange for metallic money and the demand for them as a medium of exchange which may be created by their scarcity and the scarcity of other means of making exchanges.

It is because bank notes are substitutes for money that conversion into money without loss and without delay is the fundamental condition of a sound banking currency. The business of a commercial bank is not carried on mainly with the capital of the banker, but with the capital of the community. If the banker employed his own capital, he might invest it as he might think proper, because the option would lie with him when to convert it again into money. He obtains the use of the capital of others, whether consciously by deposits or unconsciously by the acceptance of notes, because he furnishes the owners of the capital with a convenient tool of exchange. But it is the condition of the contract that the lender of capital to the bank may reclaim it at any time. It is his right to obtain the conversion of his

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\* In the United States and some other countries, the legal-tender notes of the Government are employed as standard money and their use is permitted in the redemption of bank notes. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed in the discussion of the theory of note issues that redemption in coin is the required condition of sound banking.

deposit or his bank note into money on demand, without preliminary notice. It is the necessity of meeting such demands which determines the limits of commercial banking credits. In the language of Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Banks do not distribute all credit, but only certain classes of credit," and the wherefore of this distinction he thus sets forth:\*

"Banks obtain their resources generally from the most mobile part of a country's capital—from funds scarcely constituted, destined for an investment whose character has not been determined or for consumption slightly postponed. In view of this origin of the larger part of banking resources, it follows that the capital lent by banks ought always to remain in the condition of circulating capital, easily convertible into money, and should not be transformed into fixed and inconvertible capital. *Banks are constituted to make capital circulate, not to lock it up.*"

The public accepts the printed notes of the bank in exchange for goods and services. These notes are accepted in the belief that they can be converted into goods and services without loss and because they afford a convenient medium for daily transactions. The bank does not issue its notes without compensation or security, as is sometimes assumed by the critics of bank note issues. The bank, on the contrary, holds the pledges of responsible business men to pay their commercial paper, and this paper is based upon property in process of production and exchange. A great mass of tangible property thus lies behind every bank note—not in the form of a security specifically pledged, but in the form of an obligation of the owner of the property to meet the paper by which the bank note is secured. The bank notes issued, therefore, upon the commercial transactions of a community rest upon its whole exchangeable wealth, in just the proportion that members of the business community avail themselves of banking facilities. If every business man is engaged in obtaining discounts from his bank, the property of all business men is pledged for the redemption of the outstanding obligations of the banks. The solidity of bank-note issues upon commercial assets is thus set forth by the Report of the Monetary Commission (p. 233):

"These assets are the result of loans made by the banks to those carrying on the business of the country; they represent in the main marketable products or commodities in the process of exchange and distribution. They are made by bankers whose interest it is to see that they are sound, inasmuch as the first loss, if any, must fall on the bank and its stockholders. These assets, therefore are based on and secured by the best business of the country; their character rests on that which is a condition precedent to all solvency, individual, corporate, and governmental. Should the time ever come, in this or any other country, when the best business assets were not worth on the average thirty-five cents on the dollar, a time will have come when Government and municipal bounds will likewise be practically valueless."

There are two principal resources for keeping bank notes convertible into money on demand. The first of these is the maintenance of a cash reserve. Every sound bank of issue keeps in its vaults such an amount of coin as is calculated to meet the ordinary demands of business, with some margin for emergencies. The proportion of this reserve to the notes outstanding varies according to the banking customs of the community, the requirement of law, and the degree of prudence of the banker. The proportion of coin held against outstanding notes considered essential by many writers on the theory of the subject is twenty-five per cent. This amount is sometimes insufficient, and sometimes much more than is ordinarily required. The National Banking

\* *Traité d'Économie Politique*, III, p. 479.

Act of the United States originally required a reserve of twenty-five per cent. in the reserve cities against both notes and deposits, but the requirement was abolished as to notes because a small redemption fund in the Treasury was found sufficient. The laws governing several of the European banks, including the Bank of the Netherlands, the Austro-Hungarian Bank, and the Swiss banks, require the notes to be covered to the amount of forty per cent. by coin and bullion or by foreign bills of exchange, which can be immediately converted into coin. The British banks outside the Bank of England usually hold very small cash reserves in their own vaults, but have deposits at the Bank of England, which holds the ultimate cash reserve of the country.

A cash reserve of twenty-five per cent., or even a much less amount, is adequate for all ordinary demands for the conversion of notes into cash or for the withdrawal of deposits in cash. The depositor, indeed, where a banking system is well established and the bank is in good credit, is usually willing to accept notes rather than coin.\* But the second condition of maintaining the cash reserve at a constant point, and increasing it in case of emergency, is that all the other assets of the bank shall be quickly convertible into cash. It is this necessity which gives a distinctive character to commercial banks and to the class of business which alone they can do with safety. Their principal assets consist of commercial paper payable within two or three months, which is offered for discount by traders who expect to realize upon their merchandise before the maturity of the paper. A bank of issue, or even a bank of deposit, compelled to meet its notes and checks upon demand, cannot safely invest any considerable portion of its assets in paper which is not convertible into money within a short time.

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(To be continued.)

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\* This is especially the case where the notes are a first lien upon the assets, as under the Canadian Banking Law—Breckenridge, p. 394. Heavy withdrawals of deposits were made from the Western Bank of Scotland when its affairs became involved in 1857, for the purpose of establishing relations with other banks, but the notes of the Western Bank were freely accepted for this purpose—MacLeod, "Theory and Practice of Banking," II, p. 230.

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**A CANADIAN MINT.**—The Canadian Bankers' Association has declared strongly against the establishment of a mint in that country, stating several grounds on which its opposition is based, the chief one being, perhaps, the statement that a mint would be a superfluity, as gold coin will not circulate, the people greatly preferring paper. Canada's monetary system is based upon the United States gold standard, and our gold coins doubtless fully supply whatever demand there may be for metallic redemption of the legal-tender and bank notes. The preference for paper instead of coin, which the association states exists in Canada, also prevails in this country, except in a few sections. It is difficult to overcome the habits of the people in such matters, as has been shown by the recent experience of Russia in trying to force gold into circulation.

In the United States gold will not circulate so long as the field is occupied by notes of small denominations, and the Government shows no disposition to begin educational work by retiring these notes and filling their place with gold. That it would be wise to do so, however, is maintained by many who have given the matter much study.

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

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### Reorganization of Spanish Finance.

The recent remarkable improvement in Spanish exchange and in the quotations for Spanish bonds on the Paris and other markets, is the subject of discussion in most of the European financial journals. Prof. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, in "*L'Economiste Français*" of April 1, points out that too sanguine a view should not be taken of the ability of Spain to pay her debts. He considers it a gratifying sign that the war with the United States has come to an end and a humiliating peace been accepted without a revolution, and that the premium on gold, which was for a time 100 per cent., has fallen to twenty-six per cent., making a quotation of about eighty per cent. for Spanish exchange. This is a more favorable rate for the peseta than prevailed before the American war, and is attributed in some quarters to the influx of Spanish capital which is in process of withdrawal from the old Spanish possessions in the West Indies. "*L'Economiste Européen*" of March 31 already notes an unfavorable effect of the improvement in exchange in the increase of merchandise importations, which is likely to be accompanied by a reduction of the large export trade by which Spain has been compensating for heavy foreign obligations.

The improvement in the quotations for bonds does not justify the belief that the Spanish Government will be able to pay the charges in full upon the old debt and the great debt created by the struggle in the West Indies. The belief that this might be done has been fostered by the action of the Government in paying the last quarterly interest and announcing that the home Government felt in honor bound to assume the debts of the colonies, repudiated alike by the United States and by the Cubans, because these debts had the guarantee of the home Government when issued.

Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu sums up the war expenses at 3,000,000,000 francs (\$580,000,000), exclusive of the Cuban debt, which adds 980,000,000 francs. The interest upon these new obligations at five per cent., which the French authority declares "is a modest rate of interest for Spain," would amount to 200,000,000 francs, and a small sinking fund would raise the annual charge to 220,000,000 francs. The old debts of the home Government demanded 338,000,000 francs in the budget of 1899, out of total estimates of 804,000,000 francs. There was a deficiency even upon this basis. The situation, therefore, Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu declares, is that 550,000,000 francs will be required for the debt service, and at least 500,000,000 francs for the ordinary expenses of the Government, while receipts have never exceeded 750,000,000 francs. There is, therefore, an obvious deficit of 300,000,000 francs (\$58,000,000), or forty per cent. beyond the present resources of the Government. It is not possible to increase the receipts fifty per cent., as would be required to wipe out this deficit. France came the nearest of any nation to doing this, in her effort to meet the war indemnity of 1871, when she increased her tax collections from 1,763,000,000 francs in 1869 to 2,518,000,000 francs in 1874, an



advance of forty-three per cent. ; but France was an immensely richer nation and her resources were much more elastic.

M. Leroy-Beaulieu thinks it possible that the gap to be bridged might be reduced, by increase in taxation and some economies at home, to 160,000,000 francs. This amount he thinks that the bondholders will have to meet in the reduction of their interest, and the entire loss will fall upon about 420,000,000 francs of annual interest obligations, since a large floating debt, including that to the Bank of Spain, will have to be financed at par. He believes that a reduction of interest to the old bondholders, both at home and abroad, in this degree, with a promise of a share in future improvements in receipts, will be less injurious to national interests than the alternative proposition, which is being discussed in Spain, of a tax of twenty or twenty-five per cent. upon negotiable securities. The latter proposition, he fears, would stifle national industries which are now upon a solvent basis.

The new Government is outlining a brave programme of reforms in taxation, but it is doubtful how far they can be carried out in the face of popular inertia. The Madrid correspondent of the London "Economist," in the issue of April 8, outlines some of these proposed reforms as follows:

"The new Finance Minister, Senor Villaverde, is generally expected to attempt to develop the revenue by reforms in the incidence and assessment of taxation, by a fairer distribution of the burden of taxation, by an unsparing search for dutiable property of every kind, by a proper survey of landed property, by a more vigorous collection of existing taxation, particularly direct taxes, and last, but not least, by a severe clearing out of notorious abuses and frauds in every branch of the administration of finance. Should he succeed in doing so, he will be in touch with public opinion, and particularly with the aspirations of the chambers of commerce and agriculture, so plainly embodied in the petitions and programmes of these influential representatives of material interests in Spain during the last twelve months. \* \* \*

It is supposed that he will meet very little opposition from the bondholders, if he proposes to spread the amortization of the imperial and colonial debts over a longer term of years to effect an annual saving of three millions sterling. If Senor Villaverde can make out on paper in the financial programme that he proposes to place before the Cortes by the middle of June, that he can draw from the reforms in existing taxation, and from the reduction in the amortizations, six millions sterling, he will then show that he can get the rest of what he wants to level his future budget, from some new taxes on alcohols, on petroleum, on native and foreign sugars, and above all, from a scheme which would be very popular in Spain, '*an impuesto sobre las utilidades*' in the vernacular, virtually a sort of income tax that would increase the present very light tax of three per cent. upon all State, provincial, municipal debts, and securities of every sort, to put the holders thereof on a level with landed interests that pay from eighteen to twenty-two per cent. of their revenue, and with the industrial and commercial classes, that also pay very heavy taxes."

The run upon the Bank of Spain which prevailed for a short time after the Spanish disasters in the West Indies, for the redemption of its notes in silver, has long since ceased. The Madrid correspondent of "*l'Economiste Européen*" of April 7 declares that the public now prefers the bank notes. He says that "at Barcelona, where the exchange of notes for silver was carried on upon a large scale, the public now complains that the branch of the Bank of Spain, instead of paying checks in notes, pays them in part in silver, which very much wearies the holders." There is a surplus of silver, especially five-peseta pieces (95 cents), and it is evidently believed that the Bank will eventually resume payments upon the gold basis at some higher rate than the bullion value of silver. The Madrid mint has coined 156,000,000 pesetas in five-peseta pieces since July last, and the Bank of Spain

has witnessed an increase of its silver holdings from 195,000,000 pesetas on December 1, 1898, to 292,000,000 pesetas at the close of March. The result seems to have been similar to the operation of the Sherman law in the United States, in making silver a redundant and undesirable currency.

The annual report of the Imperial Bank of Germany was presented to the shareholders at the General Assembly of March 9, and a full abstract appears in "*Le Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" for April 2.

The German Banks in 1898. The profits of the Bank were even more considerable during 1898 than during the favorable year 1897. The total earnings were 38,204,118 marks (\$9,100,000), as compared with 32,699,102 marks in 1897. The expenses were 15,926,172 marks, as compared with 13,302,270 marks in 1897, leaving a net profit for division between the shareholders and the Government of 22,277,946 marks for 1898 against 19,396,832 marks for 1897. The total amount paid to the shareholders was 10,219,487 marks upon the nominal capital of 120,000,000 marks. The Government received 3,000,000 marks as the result of the equal division of dividends in excess of three and a half per cent. up to six per cent., and received 9,058,459 marks as the result of the provision that three fourths of the dividends after allotting six per cent. to the shareholders should go to the Treasury. The whole amount thus received by the Treasury was greater than that going to the shareholders.

The earnings of the Imperial Bank were obtained upon a large volume of business, but were partly due to the high discount rates which prevailed in Germany during a large part of 1898. The whole volume of operations of the Bank was 163,395,520,600 marks, of which 57,764,706,500 marks was at Berlin and 105,630,814,100 marks at the branches. The entire volume of exchanges in 1897 was 142,110,610,900 marks. The whole number of pieces of commercial paper discounted during 1898 was 4,531,169, of a face value of 8,443,249,413 marks (\$2,000,000,000). The number of pieces discounted in 1896 was 3,997,839 with a value of 7,286,543,861 marks, and the number discounted in 1897 was 4,268,291 of the value of 7,681,135,706 marks. The number of current accounts increased from 265,618, with deposits of 2,768,641,753 marks, on December 31, 1897, to 267,064, with deposits of 2,789,303,632 marks, on December 31, 1898. The loans upon merchandise during 1898 were 1,689,316,240 marks, as compared with similar loans in 1897 of 1,552,955,720 marks.

The circulation was subjected to severe pressure during 1898 and the maximum amount of bills outstanding was attained on December 31, when the amount was 1,357,392,000 marks. The average for the year was 1,124,594,000 marks, which was an increase of 38,890,000 marks over 1897. The discount rate of the year averaged 4.267 per cent. as compared with the rate of 3.806 per cent. during 1897. The result of the pressure for currency was a long continuance of the excess of circulation above the legal limit and the payment to the Government of 1,927,401 marks (\$460,000) on account of the five per cent. tax on excess circulation, as compared with payments in 1897 of 767,915 marks. The metallic reserve was reduced from 826,556,000 at the close of 1897 to 752,419,000 marks on December 31, 1898. Of this amount 231,966,000 marks as in gold bars and foreign coin, 272,707,000 in German gold coin, and the remainder in silver thalers and subsidiary silver. The average

metallic reserve of the year was 850,938,900 marks, which was 20,512,000 marks less than the average for 1897.

The complete returns of the condition of the ten large Berlin banks for 1898 have been compiled and the results are the subject of an article in "*l'Economiste Européen*" of March 17 by M. Léon Picard. With rare exceptions the year 1898 was very favorable to the German banks, especially those of Berlin. The ten large institutions have capitals and reserves of 859,000,000 marks out of total capitals and reserves for the 102 banks of the Empire amounting to 1,699,000,000 marks (\$405,000,000). All the reports of the directors felicitate the shareholders upon the remarkable progress of the year. Even the stringency in the money market tended to increase rather than diminish banking profits. The average discount rate for 1898 was 3.56 per cent. as compared with 3.08 per cent. in 1897. The total earnings of the banks increased 18,930,000 marks over 1897, reaching 116,100,000 marks (\$28,000,000), or 11.90 per cent. of the present capital and reserves as compared with 11.71 per cent. for 1897. The net profits were 92,970,000 marks, an excess of 16,130,000 marks over 1897, but the increase of capital reduced slightly the percentage of dividends paid. The amount actually distributed in dividends was 72,000,000 marks (\$17,000,000) an increase of 12,940,000 marks over 1897.

The total value of the paper discounted by the ten Berlin banks for the Treasury year 1898, as indicated by the stamp tax, reached the remarkable aggregate of 19,894,000,000 marks (\$4,700,000,000). The capital of the banks has increased during 1898 from 706,200,000 marks to 791,200,000 marks, while the reserves amount to 23.7 per cent. of the capital. There has been a further increase of capital since the beginning of 1899 of 69,000,000 marks. The obligations of the banks amounted at the close of 1898 to 1,862,190,000 marks, an increase of 278,980,000 marks over 1897. Acceptances for 1898 amounted to 541,190,000 marks; deposits to 380,300,000 marks; and creditor current accounts to 940,700,000 marks. The available assets aside from cash were 1,434,460,000 marks, an increase over 1897 of 191,000,000 marks. The most important of these assets were commercial bills to the amount of 651,900,000 marks (\$160,000,000); advances on securities, 399,800,000 marks (\$95,000,000); and other negotiable paper 201,750,000 marks (\$50,000,000).

The *Deutsche Bank* stands at the head of the list, with commercial bills discounted to the amount of 223,530,000 marks and advances of 114,120,000 marks. The *Dresdner Bank* ranks second, with bills for 92,820,000 marks and advances of 57,590,000 marks. The *Disconto Gesellschaft* carries more commercial bills but fewer advances than the *Dresdner Bank*, the former amounting to 114,100,000 marks and the latter to 31,750,000 marks.

#### New Demands for Capital.

An address of M. Witte, the Russian Finance Minister, before the Bourse of St. Petersburg has attracted considerable attention among European capitalists. M. Witte took the broad view which has usually characterized his financial policy and declared that foreign capital was an absolute necessity for the rapid economic development of Russia. He deprecated the employment of Russian capital in useless speculation and the policy of the private banks in lending upon securities money which was only employed for further speculation. He

pointed out that the private banks have not enough capital to employ thus and to constitute at the same time a fund for the promotion of agriculture, commerce and industry. He warned the banks that feverish speculation would bring a crash and that when they addressed the Imperial Bank for aid they would not find encouragement in their present policy.

The address of M. Witte attracted attention in Russia because of its open protest against the policy of the so-called nationalists, who are objecting to what they call "the invasion of foreign capital for the purpose of skimming the cream of the national wealth." The Finance Minister declared that there is not sufficient capital in Russia at the service of business and enterprise to make it wise to refuse foreign aid. In a country where commercial loans are still from six to eight per cent. and where in all branches capitalists are able to make an income of fifteen or twenty per cent. even thirty or forty, it is desirable, it was declared, to promote the influx of foreign capital. Without it the riches of the soil cannot be rendered fertile and home capital will not have the opportunity for employment in new enterprises. The address of M. Witte is interpreted abroad as an invitation and advertisement of the desire for foreign capital in Russia and the high return which it is likely to pay. This was one of the purposes of the adoption of the gold standard, in order that there might be no question of losses to investors in Russia through the fluctuations of exchange.

Other opportunities for the employment of European capital abroad are discussed by "*le Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" of April 9 in connection with the address of M. Witte. It is said that "while Europeans are struggling in China to obtain their spheres of influence and to commence the equipment of this great country, so backward from the economic point of view, they perhaps forget that by her side Japan is uttering a loud cry to foreign capital for the completion and perfection of her industrial equipment." Japan has made great progress within the last dozen years and counts not less than 2,968 manufacturing establishments, with 5,375 steam engines representing 58,172 horse power, and 273,793 employees, exclusive of 4,398 manufacturers not employing steam power, with 140,243 hands. But the demands for capital have been so great that loans are made at a minimum of ten per cent., and the dividends of manufacturers are materially impaired. Mexico is also showing a remarkable development, which is likely to afford an opportunity for the employment of large sums.

The pressure upon the German money market continues to be acute and the private rate of discount in April was four and a half per cent., the same as at the Imperial Bank. Evidence of the increased demand for capital in Germany is given by the Berlin correspondent of "*l'Economiste Européen*" in the issue of April 7 in the following terms:

"The scarcity of money, although it favors the operations of the banks to the detriment of those of the Bourse, is proving a subject of serious reflection to the representatives of high finance. Industry turns back upon the market none of the capital which it has absorbed and the additions to circulating capital only count for a moment. The difficulty of financial operations is such that public loans of cities or States have become impossible below four per cent. After a series of small cities have been able heretofore to place obligations at three and a half per cent., and even at three per cent., the city of Worms has lately been compelled to borrow at four per cent. It has naturally resulted that securities paying a fixed return, even Government loans, are quoted at rates which make them investments of the second order."

**English Banks in  
Scotland.**

The success of English banks in establishing competing branches against the old chartered banks of Scotland is discussed in an interesting manner in the London "Economist" of April 1. The conclusion is reached that banks making small discounts would have great difficulty in establishing connections, remitting drafts, and collecting checks without the consent of the older banks. The obstacles derived from the privileges of the chartered banks are not considered insurmountable, but are admitted to afford an advantage to the Scotch banks in the following manner:

"The existing banks are able to keep their drawers stocked with notes instead of coin, and these notes have only to be taken account of so far as meeting the excess of circulation with coin is concerned when they are in circulation. The new banks, on the other hand, would require to keep either coin or Bank of England notes, and in the latter case the expense would be the same, with the exception of the cost of transmission, as they would require to be paid for; besides, the lowest denomination being £5, they would be of comparatively little use in small towns. This argument is effective enough as regards the provinces of Scotland (which are not populated to the extent that provincial England is), more especially when we consider that the country has been so overrun by the present banks, that in many instances there can be no actual direct profit from the branch; but we see no reason why non-issuing banks can be worked very profitably south of the border, and not in cities such as Edinburgh, and Glasgow, and Dundee, so far as their non-issuing powers are concerned."

The opinion is expressed that there is an opening for a certain amount of new business in Scotland in the form of loans upon securities, which would have advantages over the old Scotch method of granting overdrafts. A change even among the chartered banks has already been noted during the last half dozen years. The manner in which an English bank might take advantage of this business is thus outlined by "The Economist:—"

"Instead of the overdrafts on current account of former times, advances are being increasingly taken at special rates for fixed periods. These rates are much lower than were obtained for the former overdrafts, but the security is of a more readily marketable nature, viz., stocks and shares (generally registered in the names of the bank's nominees) regularly quoted, and at once convertible into cash if the necessity for realization arose. Moreover, as the loans are for short periods, from one month upwards (stock brokers are allowed loans from account to account at special rates), the system has the additional attraction for bankers that they may either be renewed or curtailed at the expiry of the time arranged for, thus acting like a continuous series of bills falling due at different dates, and the zest with which people attack new issues of all sorts and conditions of company enterprise, together with the extended range of the speculative spirit which seems to have permeated the whole of society, provide an outlet for the resources of the banks, of which they readily avail themselves in the granting of these fixed advances."

The Indian currency committee held several sittings during March and is expected to report soon a plan for a currency system in British India. The witnesses heard at the recent sittings were chiefly the advocates of a gold standard for India, but they urged that the standard should be introduced with caution and that an adequate gold reserve should be accumulated before the free exchange of gold and rupees should be announced. It is possible that the existing system, fixing a definite rate of exchange for the silver rupee, will be continued for some time, pending the arrangements for a gold reserve.

Sir James Westland, the Finance Minister of the Indian Government, has estimated that there will be a surplus in the Indian budget for the fiscal year

which closed on March 31, 1899. A surplus of nearly 40,000,000 rupees (\$13,000,000) would justify some remissions of taxation, but for the deficits of the preceding two years and the preparations for the adoption of a new monetary system. Sir James Westland declared in his report to the Indian Legislative Council, "We consider that we should act unwisely if we were to reduce our financial strength by remitting existing taxation, and run the risk of finding ourselves by our own action less free than we should otherwise be to undertake any measures of currency reform that we should deem advisable."

The London "Economist" of March 25, in commenting upon the Indian Treasury situation and in renewing its protest against the reopening of the mints to silver, says:

"It may, therefore, be taken for granted that the committee will recommend the adoption by India of a gold standard without, however, endeavoring to enforce it by any such severe measures of currency contraction as the Indian Government proposed, and the experience of the past twelve months during which an average exchange of 1s. 4d. per rupee was obtained, points to that as the rate upon which the gold standard will in all probability be based. The question of the convertibility of the rupee into gold of course remains to be decided, and also that of the desirability of accumulating a stock of gold which would at once and at the same time serve as a guarantee of convertibility, and as an evidence of the determination of the Government to carry whatever scheme may be adopted into effectual operation. In any case it is evident that in carrying out any measure of reform the hands of the Government will be greatly strengthened by the possession of a large free surplus."

#### The German Bank Charter.

The adjournment of the German Reichstag for the Easter holidays left the bill renewing the charter of the Imperial Bank still pending. The proposals of the Government on the subject are encountering stubborn resistance from the agrarians and many efforts on their part to execute flank movements against the Bank. The situation in the Reichstag as viewed by the Berlin correspondent of "*Le Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" of March 26 is, however, quite different from the situation in 1896, when the Government was practically overborne in the matter of the Bourse law by the agricultural interests. The Government in the present instance is resolutely opposed to converting the Imperial Bank into a great socialist institution, and the committee to which the charter was referred voted by a large majority for its extension for ten years. A number of changes have been introduced, however, into the original bill and some have had the consent of Dr. Koch, the Governor of the Bank.

The bill as passed to a third reading retains the proposition that the capital shall be increased by 60,000,000 marks, of which 30,000,000 marks are to be issued within the present year and the remainder before the close of 1905. The limit of untaxed note issues, which is now about 296,000,000 marks, is raised to 450,000,000 marks (\$106,000,000) instead of 400,000,000 marks, as originally proposed by the Government. The reserve funds are to be raised to 72,000,000 marks—two-fifths of the future capital.

The Imperial Bank is not permitted to make loans at a discount rate below that officially announced. The other German banks of issue are forbidden to loan more than a quarter of one per cent. below the official rate of the Imperial Bank. One of the most important concessions made to the agrarians is the provision that all the profits of the Bank above six per cent.

are to go to the Government. The present law gives the Government three-fourths of the profits after a dividend of six per cent. has been allotted to the shareholders, but the new proposition has encountered much stronger opposition. The changes made in the bill by the committee have been so numerous that the correspondent of "*Le Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" expresses doubt whether the Reichstag will sanction them when the time arrives for a vote. "I should not be surprised," he declares, "if the parliament ended by adopting the project as it was offered by the Government, which would make only insignificant changes in the position of the shareholders." Dr. Arendt, the well-known bimetallist, submitted a proposition at the meeting of the committee on March 14, which is thus discussed by the Berlin correspondent of the London "*Economist*," in the issue of March 18:

"Looking to an increase of the gold stock of the Bank, and to the introduction of the system of the Bank of France of charging a premium on gold for export, Dr. Arendt sought to prove that the high rates for money in Germany were due to the export of gold. Against this contention Dr. Koch showed that the high rates have been caused by the unusual activity in new emissions; and another director of the Bank pointed out that the circulation of Germany is saturated with gold, and that the stock of gold is greater than in France. Dr. Siemens, of the *Deutsche Bank*, gave the following explanation of existing conditions in the German money market: 'The rate of interest in Germany at present is high because money has found many applications. The activity in manufactures is locking up capital in new plants. Besides this our technical economic system is at this moment undergoing a transformation through electricity, so that our time affords a parallel to the period about 1830, when the railway was introduced. I am convinced that we shall have to reckon for the present upon permanently high interest rates.' Dr. Arendt's proposition was voted down."

#### Italian Subsidiary Silver Coins.

The arrangement by which the Italian Government was authorized by the other States of the Latin Union to resume the issue of subsidiary silver, upon condition that it should not be receivable in the other countries of the Union, has been put in effect by the Italian Government. The orders for the issue of the coins were transmitted to Italian Treasury offices on March 15. The amount of 160,000,000 lire (\$32,000,000) in pieces of one and two lire is ready for issue. The decree announces the fact that the new coins will not be current abroad and that exportation is prohibited. The fractional paper of one and two lire which is still in circulation will be redeemable for two years and will cease to be treated as a liability of the Treasury after five years.

The French Government, in spite of the precautions taken by the Italian Government against the exportation of the new coins, has some fears that the money may again penetrate France. A warning has accordingly been given the public that silver coins are not legal tender and are not current in the Republic. The Italian subsidiary silver formerly circulated in France, along with the silver coins of other Latin Union countries, and as the rate of exchange was against Italy nearly all the Italian silver passed into France. It was collected by the Bank of France in 1894 and was returned to Italy, and at the same time a law was passed in France declaring that it ceased to be a legal tender, although Italy forms part of the Latin Union. The Italian Government, on its side, to prevent this coin again returning to France, abstained from putting it in circulation, and issued small notes against it. As that system is now about to be abandoned by the Italian Government, the French Treasury has given notice to the public that if they accept the

small Italian coin it will be at their own risk, and they must not count on the Government to take it off their hands. Italian pieces of five francs will, however, continue to be current in France.

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The French Savings Banks in 1898. The deposits in the French Savings banks declined somewhat during 1898, in spite of an increase in the number of accounts. The number of banks, which was 545 at the close of 1897, was not changed during 1898, but twenty-two branches were founded, increasing the number at the close of 1898 to 1,203. The number of books opened during 1897 was 487,171, and during 1898, 447,385. The net result of new accounts and the reduction of accounts was a gain of 69,575 accounts during the year, carrying the total number from 6,772,582 to 6,842,157. The deposits made during 1898 were 675,149,117 francs, but the repayments were 786,325,243 francs and the amount remaining due to depositors on December 31, 1898, was 3,388,364,323 francs (\$655,000,000). This was a diminution of 38,732,565 francs as compared with December 31, 1897. The figures of the net deposits take account of transfers and various payments which do not figure in the withdrawals by depositors. The average deposits per account fell from 506.03 francs in 1897, or an average of 88.97 francs per head of the French population, to 495.20 francs per account for 1898, or 87.97 francs per head. The interest allowed during 1898 at the rate of 3.25 per cent. was 111,871,600 francs. The securities purchased in 1898 for the Savings banks and their depositors, including those for the reduction of deposits which have passed the maximum, absorbed 16,485,067 francs in 1898 as compared with 16,214,277 francs in 1897, and 18,813,840 francs in 1896.

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The New Swiss National Bank. The full text of the proposed charter of the Swiss National Bank, as proposed by the Federal Council, has been made public and is the subject of an interesting discussion in "*le Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" of April 9. The principal provisions—a paid-up capital of 36,000,000 francs; a division of ownership in equal parts between the Confederation, the cantons or cantonal banks, and private subscribers; and the requirement of a forty per cent. cash reserve against note issues—have already been set forth in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE**. The definitions of the functions of the bank in the issue of notes, the discount of bills of exchange, the purchase of foreign bills, advances on securities, transfers of money, the purchase of gold and silver, and the custody of securities and valuables, are similar to those of other sound banks of issue.

There is one provision, however, which is the subject of some criticism by the Belgian financial journal. This is the authority to receive deposits on current account with interest. It is declared by M. Georges de Laveleye, the editor, that "The doctrine usually admitted forbids awarding interest, in order that banks charged with the issue of notes may not become deposit banks, that capital may not flow too freely into them and that they may not possess heavy liabilities on account of deposits at interest to be added to those at sight resulting from the issue of notes." A feature which is not found in other European bank charters is the authority to issue gold and



silver certificates, but it does not appear that these are intended to be anything more than warehouse receipts at the market value of the metals. The bank is authorized to purchase obligations of the Confederation, the cantons, or foreign States, when payable to bearer and easily realizable, but these purchases are to be made only for the temporary employment of the resources of the bank. Another feature of a special character is the declaration of Article 5, that all the participants, without exception, are responsible only for the amount of the capital which they have subscribed or acquired. The State is responsible for the entire obligations of the bank in most cases where State banks have been established, but M. de Laveleye declares that it was with definite purpose that this article was inserted, because the project of an exclusive State bank with unlimited responsibility was rejected by the Swiss people in the *referendum* of February 28, 1897.

The metallic basis of note issues is set forth in Articles 18 and 19, which declare that the notes must be represented by legal coin, gold bullion at current quotations, foreign gold money, and by securities discounted in Switzerland and abroad. The metallic portion of the reserve must equal at least forty per cent. of the notes in circulation. Article 19 declares that "the bank must also possess at all times the counterpart of all its liabilities for short term, in paper discounted upon Switzerland or abroad, in legal specie, in foreign gold money or gold bullion." Engagements for short term are interpreted as those maturing within ten days.

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The National Bank of Roumania had a prosperous year during 1898. The dividend was fixed at 112 lei (\$22) per share as compared with 90 francs in 1897. The discount operations of the Bank grew from an aggregate of 149,000,000 lei in 1897 to 216,000,000 lei (\$43,000,000) in 1898. The balance of commercial paper carried, which was 33,869,204 lei on December 31, 1897, was 43,630,237 lei at the close of 1898. The deposits at the close of 1897 were 91,268,095 lei. The amount deposited during 1898 was 121,218,580 lei, and the amount withdrawn was 137,787,978 lei, leaving a balance on December 31, 1898, of 74,698,697 lei (\$14,500,000). The average note circulation rose from 138,902,608 lei in 1897 to 161,271,191 lei in 1898. The ratio of the metallic reserve to the circulation varied during the year from 44.79 per cent. to 54.55 per cent. The public securities held by the Bank had a value at the close of 1898 of 13,207,000 lei, and the reserve fund was 11,420,873 lei. The funds making up the reserve at the close of 1898 were 458,000 lei in fundable five per cent. Government bonds and 12,346,700 lei in fundable four per cents. The total face value, therefore, was 12,804,700 lei, but the actual market value at the purchase price was that given as constituting the reserve.

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The arrangement for the assignment of certain Financial Conditions in Greece. Greek revenues for the payment of interest on the recent loan guaranteed by the leading powers, has greatly improved Greek credit abroad, but there is still some doubt of the permanent restoration of the finances of the country. The annual report of the National Bank of Greece showed assets on December 31, 1898, of 285,-

206,415 drachmas (\$55,000,000), but a large proportion are not capable of prompt realization. The commercial portfolio is only 14,361,728 drachmas, while 71,355,000 drachmas represent a loan to the Government in legal-tender bank notes, 10,095,283 drachmas a loan of the same character in notes for one and two drachmas, 33,748,890 drachmas loans upon first mortgage, and 68,450,360 drachmas more is held in Government obligations. The circulation of the Bank on its own account, exclusive of the notes advanced to the Government, was 45,427,147 drachmas. Deposit liabilities were 33,425,368 drachmas. The real condition of the assigned revenues is thus set forth in the London "Economist" of April 8:

"From the periodical statements of the International Commission, it has appeared that the receipts from the assigned revenues have yielded more than sufficient to meet the service of the guaranteed loan, and should provide some surplus for division between the Greek Government and the old bondholders, as was provided in the scheme of control. This increase of yield over what was estimated might be taken to imply an improvement in the financial position, but it can scarcely, according to the report of Mr. Consul F. B. Wood, be attributed to so favorable a cause. There is no evidence of any greater elasticity in the revenue itself though, no doubt, the collection has been more thorough, but the main cause of the apparent improvement is the decline in exchange and the consequent better yield of the amount collected when converted. Mr. Wood gives a table showing that the average rate of exchange in 1898 was 37.71 drachmas as compared with an average of 43.401 for 1897, and 43 drachmas for 1896. This decline, he says, apparently implies an improved condition in the general financial position of this country. Unfortunately it can not be said that any such improvement exists, the decline in exchange being principally due to the favorable results expected to ensue from the working of the 'financial control.'"

#### BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

—The accumulation of savings in Belgium continues at a striking rate. The savings deposits in the General Savings Bank were only 125,093,287 francs at the close of 1880, and 325,415,412 francs at the close of 1890. This amount had risen at the close of 1895 to 453,429,300 francs, and on November 30, 1897, to 516,636,962 francs. The latest available report, for November 30, 1898, printed in the "*Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" of March 5, shows deposits of 548,899,078 francs (\$106,000,000). Even this amount is not a complete measure of the savings of the Belgian people, since the deposits in the Savings bank of Belgian Government obligations purchased from the savings deposits are 151,509,400 francs (\$30,000,000), an increase of nearly 13,000,000 francs within a year.

—The new note issues of the Bank of France are said by experts to be the most artistic things yet seen in money designs. They are printed in three colors—bistre, red and blue. This is done in order to make it impossible for counterfeiters to copy them by means of photography. Bank of France notes are rarely scribbled on as they are in England, and the reason for this is two-fold—the back of the notes is glazed, and the French people have a kind of superstitious respect for the Bank's notes.

—The upward march of the deposits in the Russian Savings banks continues with remarkable regularity. The number of accounts at the close of November, 1898, was 2,750,650 and the deposits were 518,537,000 roubles (\$270,000,000).

C. A. C.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS—ACTION BY CREDITORS.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2, Feb. 21, 1899.

UNION NATIONAL BANK OF KANSAS CITY, *et al.*, vs. HILL, *et al.*

The general creditors of a bank cannot maintain an action against the directors for neglect of their duties in the management of the bank.

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This was an action by certain creditors of the Citizens' Stock Bank of Slater, Mo., against the directors of that bank to recover from them upon the ground that the insolvency of the bank was brought about by their neglect and mismanagement. The bank had made an assignment; and this action was brought after a demand upon, and a refusal by, the assignee to institute suit.

BURGESS, *J.* [After discussing the general question whether the directors had been negligent]: It would therefore seem that the defendant directors were remiss in the discharge of their duties in not knowing, when it was their duty to know, that loans were being made by the bank in violation of the statute, and to persons in amounts larger than its capital. Indeed, the case made out by plaintiffs is one of the most absolute and unqualified inattention and neglect by the directors. And while it is not pretended that they misappropriated any of the funds of the bank, or that they were guilty of any fraudulent conduct, they were guilty of gross neglect in leaving the entire management of the business of the bank to the Cashier; and it is no excuse for the want of diligence to say that they had no benefit from it, and that their services were gratuitous, when, by the exercise of ordinary care, they could have prevented the disastrous consequences which flowed from the want of such care.

The defendant bank was doing business under Article 7 § 3, c. 42, Rev. St. 1889, and by Section 2748 of the Statutes, which is to be found in that article, it is provided that the affairs and business of such corporations shall be managed by a board of directors or managers; thus imposing upon them functions which are inalienable, and which they could not confer upon any officer or officers. "Thus, the making of discounts is an inalienable function of the directors. They cannot part with it, or invest any officer or officers with it. It rests in them alone and exclusively. It is a power of that degree of vital importance that it cannot be taken out of the policy of the general principle that powers of a public nature, given by the Legislature, cannot be subdelegated. The Legislature imposes upon the board the duty of taking charge of all those matters of business upon the wise and skillful conduct of which the prosperity of the institution and the safety of persons dealing with it depend. This duty they cannot shift, in whole or in part, upon others, and it covers no department of banking business more unquestionably than the making of loans

and discounts." (Morse, Banks, § 117; *Gibsons vs. Anderson*, 80 Fed. 345; 3 Thomp. Corp. §§ 4108, 4109; 1 Mor. Corp. §§ 552, 556; *Spering's Appeal*, 71 Pa. St. 11.)

The directors having been guilty of negligence in the discharge of their duties by reason of which losses were sustained by the bank, they were liable in an action at law to the corporation, while a going concern, for such losses, or to the assignee after the assignment, or in equity to the stockholders, in the event of the declination of the assignee to bring suit.

*Thompson vs. Greeley* (107 Mo. 577), was an action by the Receiver of an insolvent Savings bank against its directors, for losses sustained by the bank by reason of its having loaned its moneys in violation of the statute, and it was held that the directors were liable, at the suit of the corporation, for the losses to the corporate assets thereby sustained; citing *Bent vs. Priest* (86 Mo. 482); *Slattery vs. Transportation Co.* (91 Mo. 217); *Ward vs. Davidson* (89 Mo. 445); *Hodges vs. Screw Co.* (1 R. I. 812); *Smith vs. Hurd* (12 Metc. [Mass.] 371); *Attorney-General vs. Insurance Co.* (2 Johns. Ch. 371); Thomp. Liab. Off. 376; *Cogswell vs. Bull* (39 Cal. 320); *Insurance Co. vs. Jenkins* (8 Wend. 130); *Hun vs. Cary* (82 N. Y. 70); *Mining Co. vs. Ryan* (42 Minn. 198). It was said in that case that a Receiver of an insolvent corporation succeeds to the title of the property and rights of action of the corporation, when so invested by statute, or by the decree of the court appointing him, and is the proper party to a suit to enforce them by legal proceedings. If a right of action against these directors existed in favor of the corporation, this action is properly prosecuted in the name of the Receiver. (*Alexander vs. Relfe*, 74 Mo. 516; *Gill vs. Baliss*, 72 Mo. 429; High, Rec. § 316; Thomp. Liab. Off. 377, and authorities cited; Morse, Banks, § 129; *Hun vs. Cary*, *supra*.)

If then an action can be maintained by a Receiver of an insolvent bank against its directors for losses sustained by the bank because of their failure to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the management of the business of the bank, for like reason an assignee may do so because, by reason of the assignment, he succeeds to all interests and assets of the bank.

So it has been held that, if the assignee refuse to sue, the stockholders, who are the real parties in interest, may maintain an action in their own names, making the corporation a defendant. (*Brinckerhoff vs. Bostwick*, 88 N. Y. 52; *Greaves vs. Gouge*, 69 N. Y. 154; *Seale vs. Baker*, 70 Tex. 283; *Bank vs. Caperton*, 87 Ky. 306.) And shareholders and creditors will be permitted to sue in similar circumstances. (*Wallace vs. Bank*, 89 Tenn. 630; *Marshall vs. Bank*, 85 Va. 676; *Halsey vs. Ackerman*, 88 N. J. Eq. 508; *Ackerman vs. Halsey*, 87 N. J. Eq. 356.)

In each of these cases, the person or persons suing were either stockholders, or stockholders and creditors, and the fact that they were stockholders was chiefly relied upon for a recovery, so that they are not authority for the contention that persons who are creditors only may maintain such an action against the directors of an insolvent bank.

(*Warner vs. Hopkins*, 111 Pa. St. 328), was an action by the creditors of an insolvent bank against its directors and assignee to charge the directors for losses sustained by the bank by reason of their mismanagement to such an extent as to render it insolvent, and it was held that the action might be maintained. The Court said:

"Had the creditors the right to file a bill? Of this we entertain no doubt. It was held in *Watt's Appeal* (78 Pa. St. 370) that the shareholders are entitled to proceed by bill against the directors of a corporation for mismanagement of its affairs; citing *Spering's Appeal* (71 Pa. St. 24) and *Gravenstine's Appeal* (49 Pa. St. 310). It is settled by numerous cases that the creditors have the same right."

So in *Trustees vs. Bosseix* (3 Fed. 817) it was held that the directors of an insolvent corporation might be sued by one or more of its creditors for losses sustained by the bank by reason of their negligence.

In *Foster vs. Bank* (88 Fed. 604) plaintiffs, who were depositors in the Bank of Abington, sued the bank and its directors, for themselves and all other creditors who might come in and be made parties plaintiffs, for losses sustained by the bank, by reason of their negligence, so as to render it insolvent; and, upon demurrer to the petition, it was held that the general relation of the bank to a depositor is that of debtor and creditor (citing *City of St. Louis vs. Johnson*, 5 Dill. 241, Fed. Cas. No. 12,235), and that plaintiffs might maintain the action. (*Delano vs. Case*, 121 Ill. 247) was a suit by a general depositor in a bank against its directors for negligence in permitting it to be held out to the public as solvent when, in fact, it was at the time insolvent, by reason of which he sustained damages, and it was held that he might prosecute the action. (See, also, 3 Thomp. Corp. § 4123; *Maisch vs. Saving Fund*, 5 Phila. 80.)

These decisions all seem to proceed upon the theory that the directors of a banking corporation and its creditors occupy towards each other the relation of trustee and *cestui que* trust, but we are not prepared to adopt this view. "They are not express trustees; they are agents. They are trustees in the sense that every agent is a trustee for his principal, and bound to exercise diligence and good faith." (*Wallace vs. Bank*, 89 Tenn. 630.) The relation of the creditors towards the corporation "is that of contract, and not of trust." (*Briggs vs. Spaulding*, 141 U. S. 132.) In *Deadrick vs. Bank* (Tenn. Sup.) 45 S. W. 786, it is held that directors of a corporation are its agents, and the agents of its stockholders, but owe no duty to corporate creditors, and are not liable to such creditors, after insolvency of the corporation, for loss made possible by their neglect to properly supervise the management of its affairs. The Court said: "That directors are liable in an action at law to their principal, the corporation, for losses resulting to it from their malfeasance, misfeasance, or their failure or neglect to discharge the duties imposed by their office, and, in equity, to the stockholders for these losses, the corporation declining to bring suit, is clear, upon the authorities. Though the corporation is the legal entity, yet the stockholders are interested in the operations of the corporation while in a state of activity, and, upon its dissolution, in the distribution of its property, after all debts are paid; and so its officers or agents stand in a fiduciary relation to both. But it is otherwise as to creditors. The directors of a going corporation, whether able to pay its debts or not, owe no allegiance to them. It is true that the creditors may extend credit upon the faith that the company has assets to pay its debts, and that these assets are prudently managed; yet they are strangers to the directors; they maintain no fiduciary relation with them; there is a lack of privity between the two.

As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in *Briggs vs. Spaulding* (141 U. S. 132), the relation between the creditors and the corporation 'is that of contract, and not of trust;' but there is nothing, of either contract or trust, in all ordinary cases, to create any relation between the creditor and the directors.

A creditor of a going corporation, being thus a mere stranger, we think it clear that he can no more, after the suspension of the corporation by insolvency, either in law or equity, set in motion litigation to hold its directors liable for losses attributable merely to inattention, than could the creditor of any other insolvent debtor maintain a suit against his agent under similar circumstances. In such a case as the one we are dealing with—that is, loss to the corporation resulting from mere negligence on the part of its directors—a creditor seeking to hold the directors liable for this loss, even in a suit like this, must rest his claim upon some provision of positive law."

*Landis vs. Hotel Co.* (53 N. J. Eq. 654) was a proceeding in equity by plaintiff, who was both a stockholder and a creditor of an insolvent corporation, to charge its directors with losses sustained by their mismanagement.

The court reviewed the cases of *Halsey vs. Ackerman* and *Williams vs. McKay*,

*supra*, and held that, in so far as the plaintiff was a stockholder, they were liable to him for losses resulting from their negligence, because of the fiduciary relations existing between them; but, as for losses sustained by him as a mere creditor, they were not liable to him for such negligence, because they did not occupy the relation to him as such creditor, and there was no evidence of diversion by them of the bank funds from their legitimate channel.

In *Manufacturing Co. vs. Foster* ([Iowa] 41 N. W. 212) it was held that "the fact that directors of a corporation have mismanaged its business does not render them liable to creditors, unless they are made liable by the provisions of the articles of incorporation or by statute." (3 Thomp. Corp. 4137.)

So, in *Fusz vs. Spauhorst* (67 Mo. 266) it is held that, in the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, a director or officer of an insolvent incorporated bank is not individually responsible in an action at law for injury resulting to a creditor or depositor from the management of the bank, unless the injury be occasioned by his intentional or fraudulent act. Our conclusion is that the relation of defendant bank to plaintiffs is that of debtor and creditor, and that for the mere failure of the bank directors to exercise ordinary diligence and care as such, in the management of the business affairs of the bank, by reason of which the bank became insolvent, they cannot be held responsible at the suit of its general creditors. We accordingly affirm the judgment.

GANTT, P. J., and SHERWOOD, J., concur.

#### TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANK STOCK.

Supreme Court of the United States, February 27, 1899.

##### FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF WELLINGTON vs. CHAPMAN, TREASURER.

The term "moneyed capital," as used in Sec. 5219 Rev. Stat. U. S., does not include capital which does not come into competition with the business of National banks; and exemptions from taxation, however large, such as deposits in Savings banks or of moneys belonging to charitable institutions, which are exempted from reasons of public policy, and not as an unfriendly discrimination as against investment in National bank shares, cannot be regarded as forbidden by the Federal statute.

Under the laws of Ohio the shares in National banks, and also in State banks, are what is termed "stocks" or "investments in stocks," and are not credits from which debts may be deducted.

Rev. St. Ohio, § 2759, relating to the taxation of unincorporated banks and bankers, provides for deducting the debts of the business from the amount of capital employed therein, and assessing the remainder for taxation, without permitting a further deduction of the banker's general debts. Sections 2762 to 2766, relating to incorporated banks, State and National, require the shares of stock to be listed at their "true value in money," which is taken as the assessment after first deducting the amount of the bank's real estate, which is taxed separately. *Held*, that the true value of the shares in money can only be ascertained by deducting the debts of the bank from its assets; and hence the result is practically the same as in the case of unincorporated banks, so that there is no unlawful discrimination in favor of the latter, and against National banks.

The fact that, by tax laws of Ohio (Rev. St. § 2730f), the owners of what are termed "credits" are allowed to deduct their debts therefrom, and are assessed only upon the balance, while no such right of deduction is given to the owners of National bank shares, cannot be held an unlawful discrimination against the latter, in the absence of any data from which the court can determine what proportion the moneyed capital of individual citizens included in the term "credits" bears to the amount invested in National bank shares.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court: Complaint is made in behalf of the shareholders of the National bank in ques-

tion that they are, by means of the system of taxation adopted and enforced in the State of Ohio, subjected to taxation at a greater rate than is imposed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, contrary to Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.

The complaint is founded upon the allegation that the owners of what is termed "credits" in the law of Ohio (Rev. St. § 2730) are permitted to deduct certain kinds of their debts from the total amount of their credits, and such owners are assessed upon the balance only, while no such right is given to owners of shares in National banks. The claim is that shares in National banks should be treated the same as credits, and their owners permitted to deduct their debts from the valuation. The owners of property other than credits are not permitted to deduct their debts from the valuation of that property.

It is also claimed that there is an unfavorable discrimination against the National bank shareholder, and in favor of an unincorporated bank or banker.

At the outset it is plain that the system of taxation adopted in Ohio was not intended to be unfriendly to, or to discriminate against, the owners of shares in National banks; for, as observed by the State Supreme Court, that system was adopted long prior to the passage of the law by Congress providing for the incorporation of National banks. Under this system the owner of shares in National banks is taxed precisely like the owner of shares in incorporated State banks. (Rev. St. Ohio, § 2762.)

The main purpose of Congress in fixing limits to State taxation on investments in National banks was to render it impossible for the State, in levying such a tax, to create and fix an unequal and unfriendly competition by favoring institutions or individuals carrying on a similar business and operations and investments of a like character. The language of the Act of Congress is to be read in the light of this policy. "Moneyed capital" does not mean all capital the value of which is measured in terms of money, neither does it necessarily include all forms of investments in which the interest of the owner is expressed in money. Shares of stock in railroad companies, mining companies, manufacturing companies, and other corporations, are represented by certificates showing that the owner is entitled to an interest expressed in money value in the entire capital and property of the corporation; but the property of the corporation which constitutes this invested capital may consist mainly of real and personal property, which, in the hands of individuals, none would think of calling moneyed capital, and its business may not consist in any kind of dealing in money or commercial representatives of money. This statement is taken from *Mercantile Bank vs. City of New York* (121 U. S. 188, 155). That case has been cited with approval many times, especially in *Bank vs. Ayers* (160 U. S. 660, 16 Sup. Ct. 412), and in *First Nat. Bank of Aberdeen vs. Chehalis Co.* (166 U. S. 440, 17 Sup. Ct., 629).

The result seems to be that the term "moneyed capital," as used in the Federal statute, does not include capital which does not come into competition with the business of National banks, and that exemptions from taxation, however large, such as deposits in Savings banks or of moneys belonging to charitable institutions, which are exempted for reasons of public policy, and not as an unfriendly discrimination as against investments in National bank shares, cannot be regarded as forbidden by the Federal statute.

The case last cited contains a full and careful reference to most of the prior cases decided in this court upon the subject, and gives the meaning (as above stated) of the term "moneyed capital," when used in the Federal statute.

With no purpose to discriminate against the holders of shares in National banks, and with the taxation of the shareholders in the two classes of banks, State and National, precisely the same, the question is whether this system of taxation in

Ohio, in its practical operation, does materially discriminate against the National bank shareholder in the assessment upon his bank shares.

Under the Ohio law, the shares in National and also in State banks are what is termed "stocks" or "investments in stocks," and are not credits from which debts can be deducted. As between the holders of shares in incorporated State banks and National banks, on the one hand, and unincorporated banks or bankers, on the other, we find no evidence of discrimination in favor of unincorporated State banks or bankers. In regard to this latter class, there is no "capital stock," so called; and Section 2759 of the Revised Statutes therefore makes provisions, in order to determine the amount to be assessed for taxation, for deducting the debts existing in the business itself from the amount of moneyed capital belonging to the bank or banker, and employed in the business, and the remainder is entered on the tax book in the name of the bank or banker, and taxes assessed thereon. This does not give the unincorporated bank or banker the right to deduct his general debts disconnected from the business of banking and not incurred therein, from the remainder above mentioned. It cannot be doubted that, under this section, those debts which are disconnected from the banking business cannot be deducted from the aggregate amount of the capital employed therein. The debts that are incurred in the actual conduct of the business are deducted so that the real value of the capital that is employed may be determined, and the taxes assessed thereon.

This system is, as nearly as may be, equivalent in its results to that employed in the case of incorporated State banks and of National banks. Under the sections of the Revised Statutes which relate to the taxation of these latter classes of banks (Section 2762, *et seq.*), the shares are to be listed by the Auditor at their true value in money, which necessarily demands the deduction of the debts of the bank, because the true value of the shares in money is necessarily reduced by an amount corresponding to the amount of such debts. In order to arrive at their true value in money, the bank returns to the Auditor the amount of its liabilities as well as its resources. Thus, in both incorporated and unincorporated banks the same thing is desired, and the same result of assessing the value of the capital employed in the business, after the deduction of the debts incurred in its conduct, is arrived at in each case as nearly as is possible, considering the difference in manner in which the moneyed capital is represented in unincorporated banks as compared with incorporated banks, which have a capital stock divided into shares. That mathematical equality is not arrived at in the process is immaterial. It cannot be reached in any system of taxation, and it is useless and idle to attempt it. Equality, so far as the differing facts will permit, and as near as they will permit, is all that can be aimed at or reached. That measure of equality, we think, is reached under this system. So far as this point is concerned, it is entirely plain there is no discrimination between unincorporated banks and bankers, on the one hand, and holders of shares in National banks, on the other.

If the value of National bank shares is increased by reason of the franchises of the bank itself, as claimed by the plaintiff in error, while no such added value obtains in the case of unincorporated banks, there is no discrimination against bank shareholders on that account. This is simply a case where added elements of value exist in the National bank shares which are absent in the case of unincorporated banks; but in both cases all the debts of the business itself are deducted from the capital employed before reaching the sum which is assessed for taxation, and in neither case can the debts of the individual, simply as an individual, be deducted from the value of the capital assessed for taxation.

The court below did not hold, as erroneously suggested by counsel for plaintiff in error, that, as the State and National banks were placed on an exact equality



regarding taxation, therefore there was no discrimination made against National banks, and in favor of other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens. The State court said upon this subject that, if the State and National banks were treated equally, the latter were not assessed at a greater rate than the former; that National bank shareholders were not, in such event, illegally assessed, unless there were a clear discrimination in favor of moneyed capital other than that employed in either State or National banks. This statement, we think, is plainly correct.

The question recognized by the State court, therefore, remains, whether there is any such discrimination.

The chief ground for maintaining that there is exists in the fact that the owner of what is termed "credits" in the statute is permitted to deduct certain classes of debts from the sum of those credits, upon the remainder of which taxes are to be assessed, while the National bank shareholder is not permitted to deduct his debts from the value of his shares upon which he is assessed for taxation.

It is claimed, in substance, that all credits are moneyed capital, and that they are large enough in amount, when compared with the moneyed capital invested in National banks, to become an illegal discrimination against the holders of such shares.

There is no finding of the trial court upon the subject of the total amount of credits in the State. Reference was made on the argument to the report of the Auditor of the State for 1893, from which it is said to appear that the total credits, after deducting the debts allowed, were \$106,000,000 or \$111,000,000, the amounts differing to that extent as presented by the counsel for the different parties. The case does not show that the trial court received the report in evidence, and nothing in any finding has reference in any way to that report. We do not think it is a document of which we can take judicial notice, or that we could refer to any statement or alleged fact contained therein, unless such fact were embraced in the finding of facts of the trial court, upon which we must decide this case.

However, if we were to look at this report, we should then see that the total credits do not show what portion of those credits consists of moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, which in fact enters into competition for business with National banks. It is only that kind of moneyed capital which this court, in its decisions above cited, holds is moneyed capital, within the meaning of the Act of Congress.

Indeed, there is no evidence as to what the total moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, and included in the term "credits," amounts to, even under the widest definition of that term.

In looking at the statutory definition of the term "credits," we find that so far from its including all legal claims and demands of every conceivable kind, except investments in bonds of the classes described in Section 2730, and investments in stocks, it does not include any claim or demand for deposits which the person owning, holding in trust, or having the beneficial interest therein, is entitled to withdraw in money on demand, nor the surplus or undivided profits held by societies for savings or banks having no capital stock, nor bank notes of solvent banks in actual possession; and, from the credits as defined, their owner cannot deduct certain kinds of indebtedness therein mentioned. It cannot be contended that all credits, as defined in the statute, are moneyed capital, within the meaning of the Act of Congress. The term "credits" includes, among other things, as stated in the statute, "all legal claims and demands \* \* \* for labor or service due or to become due to the person liable to pay taxes thereon." These claims are not, in any sense of the statute, moneyed capital. They include all claims for professional or clerical services, as well as for what may be termed "manual labor," and their total must amount to a large sum. What proportion that total bears to

the whole sum of credits we do not know, and the record contains no means of ascertaining.

It is impossible to tell, from anything appearing in the record, what proportion of the whole sum of credits consists of moneyed capital, within the meaning of the Federal Act. We know that claims for labor or services do not consist of that kind of capital. We also know that there are probably large amounts of other forms of property which might enter into the class of credits as defined in the Act which would not be moneyed capital, within the meaning of the Act of Congress, as that meaning has been defined by this court in the cases above cited. It is thus seen that there are large and unknown amounts of what are in the Act termed "credits" which are not moneyed capital, and that the total amount of credits which are moneyed capital, within the definition given by this court to that term, is also unknown. That portion of credits which is not moneyed capital, as so defined, does not enter into the question, because the comparison must be made with other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens. We are thus wholly prevented from ascertaining what proportion the moneyed capital of individual citizens included in the term "credits" (and from which some classes of debts can be deducted) bears to the amount invested in National bank shares. We are therefore unable to say whether there has or has not been any material discrimination such as the Federal statute was enacted to prevent. We cannot see upon these facts any substantial difference between this case and those of *Bank vs. Ayers* (160 U. S. 660, 16 Sup. Ct. 412); *First Nat. Bank of Aberdeen vs. Chehalis Co.* (166 U. S. 440, 17 Sup. Ct. 329), and *National Bank of Commerce vs. City of Seattle* (166 U. S. 463, 17 Sup. Ct. 996).

As a result, we find in this record no means of ascertaining whether there is any unfavorable discrimination against the shareholders of National banks in the taxation of their shares, and in favor of other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens. There is nothing upon the face of these statutes which shows such discrimination, and therefore it would seem that the plaintiff in error has failed to make out a case for the intervention of the court.

It is stated, however, that this specific question has been otherwise decided in *Whitbeck vs. Bank* (127 U. S. 198 8 Sup. Ct. 1121). If this were true, we should be guided by and follow that decision. Upon an examination of the case, it is seen that the court gave chief attention to the question, whether an increase in the value of the shares in National banks made by the State Board of Equalization, from 60 per cent. of their true value in money, as fixed by the auditor of Cuyahoga county, to 65 per cent., as fixed by the board (other property being valued at only 60 per cent.), amounted to such a discrimination in the taxation of the shareholders of such banks as is forbidden by the Federal statute. It was held that it did.

Coming to the question of the deduction of the *bona fide* indebtedness of shareholders, the court assumed that, under the statute of Ohio, owners of all moneyed capital other than shares in a National bank were permitted to deduct their *bona fide* indebtedness from the value of their moneyed capital, but that no provision for a similar deduction was made in regard to the owner of shares in a National bank; and it was held that the owners of such shares were entitled to a deduction of their indebtedness from the assessed value of the shares as in the case of other moneyed capital. The point to which the court chiefly directed its attention related to the question whether a timely demand had been made for such deduction of indebtedness. It was held that it was made in time, for the reason that the court below expressly found that "the laws of Ohio make no provision for the deduction of the *bona fide* indebtedness of any shareholder from the shares of his stock, and provide no means by which such deduction could be secured." As a demand at an earlier period would have been useless, the court held it unnecessary.

An examination of the statutes of Ohio in regard to taxation shows that debts can only be deducted from credits, and how much of credits is moneyed capital is unknown. The case is not authority adverse to the principle we now hold.

For the reasons already stated, we think the judgment in this case should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

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*NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT TAKEN AS COLLATERAL SECURITY—CHANGE  
EFFECTED BY NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW IN NEW YORK.*

Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, February, 1899.

JOHN H. BREWSTER, *et al.*, vs. HENRY SHRADER, *et al.*

The Negotiable Instruments Law has changed the rule which formerly prevailed in New York; and now in this State one who takes a negotiable instrument as collateral security only is deemed a holder for value.

Such holder is entitled to recover of the indorser, though the instrument was diverted from the purpose for which it was given, in fraud of the rights of such indorser.

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WERNER, *J.*: The facts in the case are not controverted. The action is brought to recover upon a promissory note made by Sarah Doyle and indorsed by the defendant. The note bears date May 20, 1898. It was for \$212.54, and is payable three months after date. The note was given as collateral security for the payment of an indebtedness from said Sarah Doyle to the plaintiffs, for goods previously sold and delivered, and which was due when said note was given. No express agreement for an extension of time of payment was made when said note was given. The defendant testifies without contradiction, that prior to the execution of the note in suit, the husband of said Sarah Doyle requested the defendant to indorse a note for \$65 upon which one Patrick Nary had agreed to become a prior indorser, and which was to be discounted at the First National Bank of Salamanca. That the defendant indorsed the note in suit upon the express condition that it should be discounted at said bank, and that it should not be used until said Patrick Nary had indorsed it. Said Nary never indorsed said note, and he testifies that he never agreed to indorse it. The plaintiffs had no knowledge of the alleged representations of Doyle as to the indorsement of Nary.

Upon these facts the defendant contends: First. That the plaintiffs are mere holders of collateral security, for an antecedent debt, and not entitled to recover as against an indorser, in fraud of whose rights this security has been diverted from the purpose for which it was given.

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It may be assumed, for the purposes of this argument, that if Chapter 612, Laws of 1897, known as "The Negotiable Instruments Law," has not changed the rule laid down in *Coddington vs. Bay*, 20 Johns. 637, and subsequent kindred cases, upon which the defendant relies, it was error for the court to decide as a question of law, that the plaintiffs were holders for value. Prior to the enactment of said law, it was the well-settled rule in this State, that one who receives a promissory note as collateral security, merely, for an antecedent debt, cannot enforce such note against a maker or indorser thereof, when the same has been obtained by fraud, or has been fraudulently diverted from the purpose for which it was made. (*Coddington vs. Bay*, *supra*; *Phœnix Ins. Co. vs. Church*, 81 N. Y. 218; *Farrington vs. Frankfort Bank*, 24 Barb. 554; *United States Nat. Bk. vs. Ewing*, 181 N. Y. 506; *Moore vs. Ryder*, 65 id. 438; *Benjamin vs. Rogers*, 126 id. 60.)

Plaintiffs' contention that the taking of the note was in itself an agreement to extend the time of payment, and, therefore, constituted them holders for value, cannot be sustained in the light of *Cary vs. White* (52 N. Y. 138), and other cases

there cited. In the absence of an express agreement to extend the time of payment of the original debt, or a new and substituted agreement between the parties, the pre-existing obligation remains in full force. The note which was taken as collateral security, was entirely independent of it. The doctrine in *Jagger Iron Co. vs. Walker* (76 N. Y. 524), cited by plaintiffs, is not in conflict with these views. The operation of every note is to extend the time of payment until it becomes due. But this has reference only to the note, and not to the original debt.

Has Section 51 of the "Negotiable Instruments Law," changed the rule in the leading case of *Coddington vs. Bay*, *supra*, and the cases which have followed it? We think it has. Said section reads as follows:

"Consideration, what constitutes.—Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract (a). An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time (b)."

The language of this section, when given its usual and ordinary signification, ought to leave no room for doubt upon the subject. There is, however, such a universal disposition among lawyers to look for some hidden or subtle meaning in the most simple language, that it has become quite the fashion to require the courts to construe statutes, which, to the average lay mind, seem to require no construction.

If the language of the section under consideration were not obviously clear and unequivocal, and there were need of ascertaining the legislative intent in order to give proper effect to such language, the history of the subject, of the judicial decisions in England and the States of this country, and of the proceedings of the commission on uniformity of laws, leave no possible doubt as to the purpose of this section.

It is a fact known to every lawyer, that the diversity of laws and judicial decisions which obtains in the several States of our Union, is a source of great inconvenience in practice, and a standing menace to the proper administration of justice. So apparent has this evil become that many of the States have taken steps to secure if possible a uniformity of those laws in which all have a common interest.

Among the more important of these laws are those relating to negotiable instruments. Since 1823, when the case of *Coddington vs. Bay* was decided by our court of errors, the decisions of our courts have been at variance with those of the courts of England and of the United States upon the question whether a person receiving negotiable paper as security for an antecedent or pre-existing debt, but without notice of facts which would vitiate such paper as between the antecedent parties, is a holder for value. In this State the rule has been that such a holder is not a holder for value within the meaning applied to that term by the law merchant. *Coddington vs. Bay*, *supra*, contains the leading exposition of the rule, and has been followed in *Phoenix Ins. Co. vs. Church* (31 N. Y. 218); *Furrington vs. Frankfort Bank* (24 Barb. 554); *United States Nat. Bank vs. Ewing* (131 N. Y. 506); *Moore vs. Ryder* (85 id. 438); *Benjamin vs. Rogers* (136 id. 60), and many other cases.

The difficulty of applying this rule to holders of negotiable paper acquired in the regular course of commercial dealings has led to great confusion and many subtle refinements in the decisions of this State. These were sought to be removed by the decision in *Grocers' Bank vs. Penfield* (69 N. Y. 503), in which it was held that "Where a promissory note is made for the accommodation of the payee but without restriction as to its use, an indorsee taking it in good faith as collateral security for an antecedent debt of the payee and endorser without other consideration, occupies the position of a holder for value, and can recover thereon against the maker. The precedent debt is a sufficient consideration for the transfer and no new consideration need be shown.

"It is only where the note has been diverted from the purpose for which it

was intended by the payee, or where some other equity exists in favor of the maker, that it is necessary that the holder should have parted with value on the faith of the note in order to enforce the same." This was the law of this State down to October 1, 1897, and is the law to-day if the Negotiable Instruments Law has not changed the rule in reference to negotiable paper affected by fraud or equities between the original parties without the knowledge of the holder seeking to enforce the same. The courts of England and our Federal courts have held that a *bona fide* holder of a negotiable instrument who takes the same in payment of, or as security for, an antecedent debt is a holder for a valuable consideration, entitled to protection against all the equities between antecedent parties. In *Railroad Co. vs. National Bank* (102 U. S. 26) the Supreme Court of the United States, in an exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, squarely adopted the view that the taking of a note in payment of, or as collateral security for, a pre-existing debt, constitutes the holder thereof a holder for value in the usual course of business. In the discussion of this proposition the Court says: "One of the grounds upon which some courts of high authority refuse in such cases to apply the rule announced in *Swift vs. Tyson* (16 Peters, 1) is that transactions of that kind are not in the usual and ordinary course of commercial dealings. But this objection is not sustained by the recognized usages of the commercial world nor, as we think, by sound reason. The transfer of negotiable paper as security for antecedent debts constitutes a material and an increasing portion of the commerce of the country. Such transactions have become very common in financial circles. They have grown out of the necessities of business, and in these days of great commercial activity they contribute largely to the benefit and convenience both of debtors and creditors. \* \* \*

Another ground upon which some courts have refused to sanction the rule announced in *Swift vs. Tyson* is, that upon the transfer of negotiable paper merely as collateral security for an antecedent debt, nothing is surrendered by the indorsee—that to permit the equities between prior parties to prevail deprives him of no right or advantage enjoyed at the time of transfer, imposes upon him no additional burdens, and subjects him to no additional inconveniences. This may be true in some, but it is not true in most cases, nor in our opinion is it ever true when the note, upon its delivery to the transferee, is in such form as to make him a party to the instrument and impose upon him the duties which according to the commercial law must be discharged by the holder of negotiable paper in order to fix liability upon the indorser."

In 1882 the English Parliament passed "An Act to Codify the Law Relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes." The language of Section 27 of that Act is in substance the same as that of said Section 51 of the New York Act. The English Act contains the word "liability" after the word "debt," but this does not alter the meaning of the section.

In 1890 the Legislature of this State passed "An Act to provide for the appointment of commissioners for the promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States." (Chapter 205, Laws of 1890.) The duty of this commission was to "examine the subjects of marriage and divorce, insolvency, the form of notarial certificates and other subjects;" to ascertain the best means to effect an assimilation and uniformity in the laws of the States, and especially whether it would be wise and practicable for the State of New York to invite other States of the Union to send representatives to a convention to draft uniform laws to be submitted for the approval and adoption of the several States, and to devise and recommend such other course of action as shall best accomplish the purpose of this Act. In 1891 said commission made a report to the Legislature. In 1895 a conference of commissioners from a large number of States was held in Detroit. At that conference the committee on commercial law was instructed to prepare a codification of the law of bills

and notes. This committee in turn referred the matter to a subcommittee, the members of which employed Mr. John J. Crawford, of New York city, to draft the proposed law. The bill prepared by him has become a law in this State (Chapter 613, Laws of 1897), and the States of Connecticut, Colorado and Florida. The author of this law says, in his annotated publication of the same, that Section 51 thereof was designed to change the rule laid down in *Coddington vs. Bay, supra*. James W. Eaton, Esq., instructor on law of bills and notes in the Albany Law School, in his published edition of the New York Law, in a note to Section 51, says: "It is to be inferred that the above statute extends the New York rule to include instruments given merely as collateral security."

It seems evident, therefore, from the history of this subject, as well as from the obvious purpose for which this statute was enacted, no less than from the language of the statute itself, that the New York rule, so-called, has been modified so as to conform to the rule in England and in our Federal court of last resort. We have discussed this question at such great length because we have been unable to find any reported case in which it has arisen.

Under the views above expressed plaintiffs must be regarded as holders for value, whose title to the note in suit is unaffected by any existing equities between antecedent parties. Upon the uncontradicted evidence on that branch of the case it was properly treated as a question of law. [The court then considered the question as to notice of dishonor.]

Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied, with \$10 costs.

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**INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANK—PAYMENT OF CHECK—WHAT WILL  
CONSTITUTE.**

United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

**NATIONAL UNION BANK vs. GEORGE H. EABLE, AS RECEIVER OF THE CHEST-  
NUT STREET NATIONAL BANK.**

Bank C being indebted to Bank U, forwarded its check on Bank R, which was presented through the clearing-house on the morning of December 23. The check was returned about an hour afterwards by Bank R, which had learned that Bank C had been closed that day by the Comptroller of the Currency; and under the rule of the clearing-house which requires the bank presenting the check "to pay the amount reclaimed at once and to adjust the merits of the claim afterwards," Bank U returned the amount to Bank R, which paid it over to the Receiver of Bank C.: *Held*, That the transaction constituted an assignment of the fund, and that Bank U could recover the same from the Receiver.

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DALLAS, *Circuit Judge*: This is a general demurrer to a bill which prays a decree for \$21,145.43. The facts properly pleaded, and therefore admitted, are well summarized in the complainant's brief as follows:

"The Chestnut Street National Bank, a Philadelphia institution, was a collecting agent of the complainant, the National Union Bank, of the city of New York. The arrangement between the parties required that the Chestnut Street National Bank should remit to the National Union Bank on Wednesday of each week for the balance as shown by its books to be due to the latter at the close of business on the preceding day, and this custom was invariably followed.

On December 22, 1897, the Chestnut Street National Bank held, as such collecting agent, the proceeds of collections made by it for the National Union Bank in the amount of \$21,103.43.

The Chestnut Street National Bank, having at that time funds on deposit with the National Bank of the Republic, in the city of New York, more than sufficient to satisfy its liability to the complainant, as aforesaid, and desiring to apply said funds and appropriate the same to the satisfaction of said liability, drew its Cashier's check

for that purpose on the National Bank of the Republic against said funds, in the amount of \$21,103.43, and forwarded the same to the National Union Bank, and immediately upon forwarding debited itself and credited the National Bank of the Republic, and credited itself and debited the National Union Bank with the amount of said draft.'

The said Cashier's check was received by the complainant early on the morning of December 23, 1897, and was presented by it at ten o'clock on that morning to the National Bank of the Republic, at the clearing-house in the city of New York, of which both the said National Bank of the Republic and the said National Union Bank were members, 'and the said check was duly paid by the said National Bank of the Republic through said clearing-house at that time.'

It appears that on that day (December 23, 1897) the Comptroller of the Currency required the Chestnut Street National Bank to close its doors and suspend business because of its insolvency. This fact, however, was not known either to the complainant or to the National Bank of the Republic at the time the Cashier's check in question was received by the former, and presented to the latter. Shortly before eleven o'clock on that day the National Bank of the Republic, having received unofficial information that the Chestnut Street National Bank had suspended business, returned the said Cashier's check to the National Union Bank, endorsed 'bank suspended,' and requested the repayment thereof, whereupon the National Union Bank (acting, however, solely in pursuance of a custom prevailing among the clearing-house banks in New York in cases of such reclamation, 'to pay the amount reclaimed at once and to adjust the merits of the claim afterwards'), repaid to the National Bank of the Republic the amount of the check. Thereafter the complainant demanded from the National Bank of the Republic the return of the money so restored to that bank, which refused, however, to repay the same, or any part thereof, and thereafter remitted the said funds to the respondent, who had been appointed the Receiver of the Chestnut Street National Bank. Thereupon the complainant duly demanded the return of said money from the respondent, but without avail."

That the delivery of a check will not, of itself, operate as an assignment must, for this court at least, be regarded as settled. But where the delivery of the check was accompanied by, or has been connected with, circumstances from which it may be reasonably inferred that an appropriation of the fund, to the extent of the amount of the check, was intended, or if such an appropriation has been actually effected, it is equally well settled that the transaction, as a whole, constitutes an equitable assignment *pro tanto*. From "the conduct of the parties, the nature of their dealings, and the attendant circumstances" in this case, I think that, under the authorities, a purpose by the Chestnut Street Bank to appropriate the fund in question must be implied; and, also, that when "the said check was duly paid," the purpose became fully executed and the appropriation was consummated. (*Fourth Street Nat. Bank vs. Yardley*, 165 U. S. 644; *Clark vs. Sigua Co.* 39 U. S. A. 754.)

The Bank of the Republic paid the check by an adjustment of balances effected in accordance with the rules of the clearing-house, of which it and the Union Bank were members; but in legal contemplation the transaction was the same as if the payment had been specifically made. The Union Bank received a fund which was absolutely its own. It returned this fund to the National Bank of the Republic, upon reclamation made by the latter, in pursuance of the contractual obligation which the Union Bank had assumed, to comply with the requirement of the clearing-house that such reclamations should be honored. The Chestnut Street Bank, not being a member of that organization, could not have invoked this requirement, and in point of fact had nothing whatever to do with the return of the money.

The situation and motives of the two New York banks are obvious. The Bank

of the Republic had, without knowledge or notice of the insolvency of the drawer, paid a check of a National bank. At a later hour it learned of the failure of that bank. It then apprehended that some question might arise respecting the legality of the payment which it had made; and, in consequence, it exercised its right to demand that the money should be restored to its keeping "at once, and to adjust the merits of the claim afterwards." This demand was of necessity complied with; but by this compliance the Union Bank did not disclaim or affect its title to the fund. The Bank of the Republic clearly did not acquire, and did not claim to have, any beneficial interest in it. It took it as a trustee for the actual owner, and held it to await a proper determination of any doubt which might have been supposed to exist respecting its ownership. There never was any such determination, yet the Bank of the Republic transferred the money to the Receiver of the Chestnut Street National Bank, who was not entitled to it, and, apparently, in total disregard of the rights of the Union Bank, whose money it really was. If it were still in the custody of the Bank of the Republic, its duty to pay it over to the Union Bank, would, I think, be unquestionable; and, in my opinion, a court of equity, avoiding unnecessary circuitry, should not require the defendant, into whose possession the fund has been traced, to execute the trust which adheres to its possession, by relinquishing that fund to the plaintiff.

The demurrer is overruled, and the defendant is assigned to answer *sec reg.*

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FRAUD OF NATIONAL BANK—DEFENSE OF ULTRA VIRES.

Supreme Court of Washington, March 3, 1899.

FRANGES *vs.* OLD NATIONAL BANK, *et al.*

A National bank is liable for fraud perpetrated under the guise of a partnership agreement, though it had no power to make such agreement.

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This was an action brought by the respondent against appellants for damages arising from fraud alleged to have been perpetrated upon respondent by the appellants. The acts constituting the fraud charged, as shown by the complaint, are briefly these: The appellant bank is a National bank doing business at Spokane, in Spokane county, and the appellants Glidden and Vincent are respectively President and Cashier thereof. That about October 18, 1896, the respondent had on deposit in the appellant bank some \$2,200, which he was desirous of investing in some profitable business; and the appellants, conspiring together to cheat and defraud him of his money, induced him to open a bank at the town of Cheney, in that county, and invest therein \$2,000, promising and agreeing to invest therein a like amount, and such further sums as the exigencies of the business would from time to time demand. That appellants had no intention of making any investment in the Cheney Bank, but made the agreement for the sole purpose of putting off on to the respondent certain worthless paper belonging to the appellant bank. That upon the organization of the Cheney Bank the appellant bank became its correspondent, and furnished the Cheney Bank with monthly statements showing the condition of the account between defendants and the Cheney Bank. That in one of these statements, furnished on the last of March, 1897, it charged the Cheney Bank with two items, one for \$500, under date of March 15, and the other of \$1,000, under date of March 18, both credited to the O. K. Gold-Mining Company. That upon receiving the statement the respondent made inquiry by telephone of the appellant bank concerning these items, and was told that the items represented charges taken from tickets furnished the book-keeper by the Cashier, and that no one present could give any further explanation as to them; that Vincent, the Cashier, was East, and would explain upon his return. That upon the return of Vincent he renewed his inquiry, and was informed that



they represented two notes, for the several amounts mentioned, executed to the appellant bank by the O. K. Gold-Mining Company. That Vincent assured him that the payor was solvent, that the notes were as good as any paper the appellant bank had, and would be paid promptly on demand. That the respondent relied on the statements made to him by Vincent, accepted the notes, and gave the appellant bank credit for them. That the notes were the property of the appellant bank, were worthless, and the payor insolvent, all of which was known to the appellants. That the notes were forwarded to him, and representations were made to him, for the sole purpose of cheating and defrauding him out of his money, in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into by the appellants. That, upon learning of the spurious character of the notes, the respondent rescinded the transaction, tendered the notes to appellants, and demanded payment of them, which the appellants refused. That by reason of the frauds he was damaged, etc. The appellants severally demurred to the complaint on the ground that no cause of action was stated.

FULLERTON, J.: 1. The first assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint. That the complaint is sufficient as to the appellants Vincent and Glidden is not here seriously disputed.

On the part of the bank it is argued that the agreement set forth in the complaint was one of partnership; that the respondent was bound to know that it was beyond the power of a National bank to enter into a partnership agreement, and hence there were no representations on the part of the bank on which he had a right to rely; that, if there is any liability at all on the part of the bank to respondent, it is only on contract to recover a balance of account due from the bank.

We think the demurrer was properly overruled. It is true, a corporation, as a merely legal entity, can have no will, and cannot, of itself, act at all. But in its relation to the public it is represented by its officers and lawfully authorized agents, and their acts in the course of corporate dealings are, in law, the acts of the corporation.

Whatever the rule may have been formerly, it is now settled beyond controversy that a corporation is liable to the same extent, and under the same circumstances, as a natural person, for the consequence of its wrongful acts, and will be held to respond, in a civil action, at the suit of an injured party, for every wrong which it commits, however foreign to its nature or beyond its granted powers the wrongful transactions may be. In such cases the doctrine of *ultra vires* has no application. (*Bank vs. Graham*, 100 U. S. 699; *Merchants' Bank vs. State Bank*, 10 Wall. 604; *State vs. Morris & E. R. Co.* 23 N. J. Law. 360; *Railway Co. vs. Harris*, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct. 1286; *Alexander vs. Relfe*, 74 Mo. 495; *Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. vs. Standard Oil Co.* [N. Y. App.] 12 N. E. 825; *Jackson vs. Insurance Co.* [N. Y. App.] 1 N. E. 539; *Nevada Bank of San Francisco vs. Portland Nat. Bank*, 59 Fed. 838; *Thomp. Corp.* §§ 6329, 6279.)

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**INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANK—SALE OF COLLATERALS—JURISDICTION OF COURT.**

United States Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania, February 27, 1899.

*In re* EARLE.

The courts are not vested with any general supervisory or directing power over the liquidation of insolvent National banks, and cannot order or authorize a Receiver to sell at private sale securities held by the bank as pledgee, which do not come within the authority given by Rev. St. § 5234, to order the sale or compounding of bad or doubtful debts, or the sale of real or personal property of the association.

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DALLAS, *Circuit Judge*: The prayer of the annexed petition is for a decree authorizing the petitioner, as the Receiver of a National bank, to sell certain certifi-

cases of stock, which were held by the bank as pledgee, and not as owner, at private sale, "the proceeds thereof to be applied by him to the part payment of said notes," etc. The authority to make such a decree is supposed to be conferred by Section 5334 of the Revised Statutes. But it is not. That section provides that a court of record of competent jurisdiction may make an order to sell or compound bad or doubtful debts, or for sale of real or personal property of the association. The order now asked is for neither of these. It is obviously not for the sale or compounding of a debt, and the property which it is contemplated to sell is not the property of the association. No general advisory or directing power is vested in the court. It is for the Receiver, under the direction of the Comptroller, to collect all debts, dues, and claims belonging to the bank, in accordance with the provisions of law. It is only when debts are bad or doubtful, and it is deemed expedient to sell or compound them, that the court can be called upon to make any order respecting them.

The learned counsel of the petitioner have referred me to the cases of *Ellis vs. Little* (27 Kan. 707), and *In re Third Nat. Bank* (4 Fed. 775). I find nothing in either of them to lead me to doubt the correctness of the views I have hastily expressed. The petition is dismissed, without prejudice.

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## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

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Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

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*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

FORT SCOTT, Kansas, April 24, 1890.

SIR:—Please answer the following inquiry in the next issue of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, if possible:

On July 11, 1883, the First National Bank of Fort Scott, Kans., issued to E. R. Chenault a certificate of fifty shares of its capital stock of the par value of one hundred dollars each. Said E. R. Chenault has been since January 1, 1890, indebted to the bank in the sum of six thousand dollars. Said E. R. Chenault on November 5, 1891, executed and delivered to R. and J. S. McCord his promissory note for twenty-five hundred dollars, which note is still due and unpaid, and at the same time said Chenault delivered to McCord as security for the note said certificate of stock.

C. H. Harbison is the sole legatee of R. and J. S. McCord who are both dead, and said Harbison is the owner and holder of said note and also holder of said certificate of stock. Said certificate of stock has never been assigned to either R. and J. S. McCord or Harbison on the books of the bank, but still stands on the bank books in the name of E. R. Chenault.

Said certificate of stock has printed thereon that "no assignment or transfer of this stock will be recognized by the First National Bank unless all indebtedness of the owner of the stock is first paid."

That on February 15, 1896, the First National Bank declared a dividend upon said stock of two per cent. or two dollars per share; like dividends were declared on September 15, 1894, and February 15, 1897.

The officers of said bank as individuals knew of the fact that E. R. Chenault had delivered his certificate of stock to R. and J. S. McCord, but no written notice was ever given to the bank of that fact.

The bank has applied the said dividends declared on said stock to the payment of the indebtedness due it from said E. R. Chenault. Due demand for said dividends was made by said Harbison and payment refused.

The by-laws of the bank contain the following provision:

"Transfer of Stock.—The stock of this bank shall be assignable and transferable only on the books of this bank, subject to the restrictions and provisions of the banking laws; and a transfer book shall be provided in which all assignments and transfers of stock shall be made. Transfers of stock shall not be suspended preparatory to the declaration of dividends; and, unless an agreement to the contrary shall be expressed in the assignments, dividends shall be paid to the stockholder in whose name the stock shall stand at the date of the declaration of the dividends. Certificates of stock signed by the President and Cashier may be

issued to the stockholders, and the certificate shall state upon the face thereof that the stock is transferable only upon the books of the bank; and when stock is transferred, the certificates thereof shall be returned to the bank and cancelled, and new certificates issued."

Can the First National Bank hold the dividends declared on this stock, or can the dividends be collected from the bank by the present holder of the certificate?

W. CHENAULT, *President*.

*Answer.*—We think that the dividends can be held by the bank. They did not belong to the pledgees, but to the pledgor; and he being indebted to the bank, the bank had the right to apply them to the satisfaction of that debt. (*Hagar vs. Union National Bank*, 63 Me. 523.) In the case cited, it was said: "The rule has long prevailed in many jurisdictions that a corporation has no implied lien on the shares of its stockholder for debts due from him and cannot hold them against a purchaser or attaching creditor (*Sargent vs. Franklin Ins. Co.* 8 Pick. 90; *Mass. Iron Co. vs. Hooper*, 7 Cush. 187); but that a bank deals with its stockholders in the same manner as it does with its general customers, taking the same security and not relying upon its stock. A different rule was adopted in relation to dividends declared. They were considered as so much money in the possession of the bank belonging to the stockholder, but which should be considered as pledged toward the payment of any just debts then due from him. (*Bates vs. N. Y. Ins. Co.* 3 Johns. Cas. 288.) This rule was considered a 'reasonable one,' and was adopted by the court in *Sargent & Franklin Ins. Co. supra*. We fail to perceive any real objection to such a rule. It is not inconsistent with any provision in the Bank Act, and neither is it in conflict with any principle of public policy. It cannot affect the free sale and transfer of shares, for the dividend does not pass with the transfer of the shares, being the property of him who is the shareholder when it is declared. So long, then, as the plaintiff's overdue notes remained unpaid, he could not recover the dividends declared upon his shares, because of this equitable lien." The court treats the question as one of an equitable lien. But the bank would also be justified in its action on the principle of set-off; for the dividends, when declared, became a debt due from the bank to the stockholder, and it had the right to set off this debt against the one due to itself from the stockholder.

In the late case of *Buffalo Insurance Company vs. Third National Bank* (29 App. Div. [N. Y.] 187) it was held that notwithstanding the prohibition in the National Bank Act as to loans made by banks upon the security of their own stock, the bank could enforce a lien given by its by-laws against a transferee of the stock, where the certificates give notice of the lien; but we do not think it necessary for the bank to rely upon that principle in this case.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

WATERBURY, Conn., April 26, 1890.

**SIB.**—Banking hours are usually from 10 A. M. to 3 P. M. At what hour does a note mature if note and check are presented at same time, and which takes precedence, there being not sufficient funds for both, or are they on same basis as if both were checks, when neither can be paid. This question came up on the assertion that a note could be presented at ten o'clock of day due, and if not paid could then at once be protested. Others claim that party has until three o'clock to make note good and check previously presented should be paid. **CASHIER.**

*Answer.*—The Negotiable Instruments Law, which has been adopted in Connecticut, places notes payable at a bank on the same footing with checks in respect to presentment and payment. By Section 87 it is provided that "where the instrument is payable at a bank, it is equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account of the principal debtor thereon;" and by Section 75 it is provided that "where the instrument is payable at a bank, presentment for payment must be made during banking hours." The bank should, therefore, treat the note as it would a check. The suggestion that the maker has until the close of banking hours to make the note good is not tenable; for the holder may present the same for payment

at any time during banking hours (Sec. 75) and if payment is refused may immediately treat the note as dishonored (Sec. 102). But it is an error to suppose that the bank must not pay either the note or the check because the depositor's balance is not sufficient to pay both. This view, sometimes expressed by text-writers, is based upon the notion that a check is an assignment of the fund; but the Negotiable Instruments Law declares that "a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank" (Sec. 189). In this respect the bank is like any other drawee, and where it has not funds to pay all the drawer's orders, may select such as it will pay.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SONORA, Cal., April 19, 1899.

SIR:—A check is drawn payable to John Doe, or bearer. The check is lost and the drawer notifies the bank upon which it is drawn to stop payment. The check is found by a party who negotiates it for cash. The signature and responsibility of the drawer being well known, the check changes hands several times before it is presented at the bank for payment. Payment being refused, has the holder any recourse upon the drawer? CASHIER.

*Answer.*—If the check is in the ordinary form, so as to be a negotiable instrument, and the present holder, or any prior holder under whom he claims, paid value for the same, then he is entitled to recover the amount of the drawer. (See Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1469.)

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BOWLING GREEN, Ky., April 27, 1899.

SIR:—The following is a true copy of a paper upon which suit was brought by J. R. Kirby against the Gray Tie Lumber Company, and sought recovery on it on the idea that it was a foreign bill of exchange, and as such the company could not defend it:

"Cedar Bluff Mills, Ky., May 26, 1898.

\$1500. At sight, pay to the order of J. H. Flora fifteen hundred dollars, in full payment for 15 to 20,000 first-class ties, which I have this day inspected and received from J. H. Flora, advanced on ties for Gray Tie and Lumber Company, and have branded same with—"To Gray Tie and Lumber Company, Evansville, Ind."

No. 8088.

C. W. Neel."

Indorsed—"Have this day delivered to C. W. Neel for Gray Tie and Lumber Company, the ties named in this draft, and said ties are free from all liens and incumbrances of any character, and hereby agree to pay all landing or yard rent, bankage or wharfage on the ties named in this draft until said ties are removed. J. H. Flora.

(Draft not good unless above bill of sale is signed and draft also properly indorsed)."

The facts were that Neel was the agent of the lumber company to buy cross-ties. He delivered the paper to Flora. Flora took it to Kirby and got \$1,500 on it, and he delivered the paper to Kirby without indorsing it to him. When the paper was presented to the Lumber Company it refused either to accept or pay it, the fact being developed in the meantime that Flora didn't have the cross-ties which he represented that he had, and upon the face of which representation Neel gave him the draft. The question is, can Kirby recover against the lumber company upon this paper as a foreign bill of exchange?

C. G. SMALLHOUSE, *President.*

*Answer.*—We do not see how there can be any recovery against the Gray Tie and Lumber Company upon the instrument, even if it be deemed a foreign bill of exchange; for it is elementary that a drawee is not liable upon a bill until he has accepted the same. If Neel had signed the name of the company as drawer, then a different question would arise; but having used his individual name he and not the company is to be deemed the drawer. The rule is that persons dealing with negotiable instruments are presumed to take them upon the credit of the parties whose names appear upon them, and that a person not a party cannot be charged upon proof that the ostensible party signed or indorsed as his agent. (*Manufacturers', etc., Bank vs. Love*, 13 App. Div. [N. Y.] 561.) Besides, the holder having obtained title to the draft without the indorsement of the payee, holds it subject to all the equities between the original parties, although he paid full consideration without notice (*Goshen Nat. Bank vs. Bingham*, 118 N. Y. 349); and the company may interpose as against him the defense that Flora did not deliver the ties.

## \* RICHARD DELAFIELD.

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As an officer in the National Park Bank of New York, an institution which is second in deposits but first in commercial affiliations among the banks of the United States, Richard Delafield, its Vice-President, is fittingly a subject for notice in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE**.

Trained step by step in business life, rising gradually though quickly from clerk to manager, and then engaging in business for himself, which was successful from the start, Mr. Delafield to-day constitutes a type of a progressive business man. Banking, which in itself is a business, made up of many details, has need of executives who have had business schooling, and who have succeeded in their own mercantile enterprises. Such training is essential to the man who enters the banking fraternity, for it means the possession of a practical knowledge of actual business conditions; in a word, it is the equipment which makes the man a practical and not a theoretical banker.

As he bears the name of a family prominent in France ten centuries ago, and originally spelled de la Feld, Richard Delafield has reason to treasure the family name; but it is more particularly as an ardent American that he cherishes his later ancestry. The founder of the family name in America was John Delafield, who emigrated from England during the eighteenth century and settled in New York. John Delafield married the daughter of Gen. Joseph Hallett, a prominent citizen of Hallett's Cove (now known as Astoria, N. Y.), and thus the Delafield family was founded in this country. Richard Delafield, great-grandson of the former, was born at New Brighton, S. I., on September 6, 1858. His father, Rufus King Delafield, of whom Alexander Hamilton was Godfather, was a prominent merchant of New York city. His mother was the daughter of the late William Bard, whose father was physician to Gen. Washington. Their son entered the Anthon Grammar School in New York, and was educated there.

In 1873 he began his business career as a clerk in a New York house; later, he became manager of the business. In 1880, seven years after beginning his career, he commenced business on his own account, engaging in the California trade. Later he formed a partnership under the name of Delafield, Morgan, Kissel & Co., which was finally changed to the present firm of Delafield, McGovern & Co. This firm, of which he is senior partner, has its general offices in New York city (95 Hudson St.), and branches at San Francisco and St. Louis. As dealers in Pacific Slope products his house ranks among the first engaged in this line of business.

Commercial success inevitably brings to the winner a measure of increased business standing, which is revealed in his community by practical evidences of further confidence. In the career of Mr. Delafield this fact is especially prominent. Beginning with his success as a merchant, he has accepted and used wisely the numerous opportunities offered him in various walks of business life. An integral quantity in every merchant's business, something that each must reckon upon closely in striving for success, is his personal banking ability as applied to the management of his own invested capital.

Successful as he has been in his own mercantile affairs, it has been but a natural

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\* A portrait of Mr. Delafield, engraved especially for the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** from a recent photograph, is presented in this number as a title illustration.

step for Mr. Delafield to become a prominent member of the present banking fraternity in New York. On December 26, 1890, he entered the directorate of the National Park Bank of New York. This institution, which first opened its doors for business on March 31, 1856, has in the forty-three years of its existence risen in prosperity till to-day in extent of business it is the first commercial bank in the United States. It has always been looked upon by merchants as a well-managed institution. The management has never swerved from two characteristics—caution, so far as regards its own affairs, and courteous consideration where the interests of its customers are concerned.

The bank's financial condition is shown by the following figures taken from the report furnished the United States Government at the close of business February 4, 1899 :

Loans and discounts.....	\$48,125,972
Specie.....	21,804,849
Legal tenders.....	2,860,406
Total resources.....	80,882,177
Capital stock paid in.....	2,000,000
Surplus fund.....	2,500,000
Undivided profits.....	663,000
Deposits.....	75,582,980

On June 1, 1896, Mr. Delafield was elected to the Vice-Presidency of this bank, the board of officers then standing as now. The officers of the bank are : Edward E. Poor, President ; Richard Delafield, active Vice-President ; Stuyvesant Fish, Honorary Vice-President ; George S. Hickok, Cashier, and Edward J. Baldwin, Assistant Cashier. The board of directors of the National Park Bank consists of the following gentlemen : Joseph T. Moore, Stuyvesant Fish, George S. Hart, Charles Sternbach, Charles Scribner, Edward C. Hoyt, Edward E. Poor, W. Rockhill Potts, August Belmont, Richard Delafield, Francis R. Appleton, John Jacob Astor, George S. Hickok, George Frederick Vieter and Hermann Oelrichs.

Mr. Delafield's election to the Vice-Presidency of this institution, which has had an honored past, a present degree of prosperity little less than wonderful, and giving evidences of an even greater future, can only be said to have been a tribute to his diligence and abilities.

Socially, Mr. Delafield is well known in New York city. As a vestryman of Trinity Church, as a member of the Sons of the Revolution ; and having membership in the Merchants, Union League, Tuxedo and New York Athletic Clubs, as well as being interested officially in several benevolent institutions in and around New York city, Mr. Delafield attests his interest in the things that concern his fellows.

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CHARGE FOR COLLECTING CHECKS.—We have received the following letter from Mr. G. N. Henson, President of the Citizens' Bank and Trust Co., Chattanooga, Tenn. :

"We are obliged to accept all sight drafts from our depositors here over the counter at par. We naturally seek to avoid loss in the collection of these items, and to that end have been forced through the agreements entered into by the New York banks to seek a means of collecting our New England items through other avenues than New York. My own judgment is that it will hurt the business of New York seriously through diverting a large amount of deposits. I may be wrong, but I think the New York banks committed a serious error in trying to force the banks of the United States to pay them a fixed rate of exchange on everything, when they were able to collect the bulk of the items without cost to themselves. The banks throughout the United States are not slow to adopt means to relieve themselves of every possible burden in the matter of collecting their items, and when New York levies a charge on them they will naturally seek some other avenue."

## INCREASE IN THE MONEY IN CIRCULATION.

The money in circulation in the United States has more than doubled in the last twenty years, it has increased fifty per cent. since 1886, and more than twenty-five per cent. since July 1, 1896.

A table just prepared by the Treasury Bureau of Statistics shows that on July 1, 1879, the amount in circulation was \$318,631,793; on July 1, 1889, \$1,379,964,770; and on April 1, 1899, \$1,927,846,942.

No period in our history has shown a more rapid growth in the money in circulation than the last three years. On July 1, 1896, the beginning of the new fiscal year, the amount in circulation was \$1,509,725,200. By July 1, 1897, it had reached \$1,646,028,246, an increase of \$136,303,046. On July 1, 1898, it was \$1,843,435,749, an increase for that year of \$197,407,503, and at the beginning of the present month it was \$1,927,846,942, an increase in the nine months of the present fiscal year of \$84,411,193. The increase since July 1, 1896, has been at the rate of nearly half a million dollars for each business day, and during the past year has averaged considerably more than a half million dollars for each business day.

The per capita circulation on April 1, 1899, was the largest ever shown at that period of the year in the history of our country. At that date it was, according to the official statement of the Treasury Department, \$25.45 per capita, while that of April 1, 1898, was \$23.69; April 1, 1897, \$23.01, and April 1, 1896, \$21.53.

The figures of the last three years when placed side by side for comparative purposes show an interesting and remarkable growth in the circulating medium, and are as follows:

	<i>April 1,</i>	<i>Money in circulation.</i>	<i>Per capita.</i>
1896.....		\$1,523,629,463	\$21.53
1897.....		1,669,000,694	23.01
1898.....		1,756,058,645	23.69
1899.....		1,927,846,942	25.45

The increase in gold coin in circulation during the past few years has been quite as remarkable as the general increase in circulation. On April 1, 1896, the gold coin in circulation was, according to the Treasury figures, \$445,912,256; on April 1, 1897, \$517,125,757; on April 1, 1898, \$582,129,742, and on April 1, 1899, \$694,855,942.

The table which follows shows the gold coin and total money in circulation at the beginning of each quarter of the fiscal year from July 1, 1896, to date:

	<i>Gold coin in Circulation.</i>	<i>Total money in Circulation.</i>
July 1, 1896.....	\$456,128,483	\$1,509,725,200
October 1, 1896.....	478,771,490	1,582,302,289
January 1, 1897.....	517,743,229	1,650,223,400
April 1, 1897.....	517,125,757	1,669,028,246
July 1, 1897.....	519,146,675	1,646,028,246
October 1, 1897.....	528,098,763	1,678,840,538
January 1, 1898.....	547,568,880	1,721,100,640
April 1, 1898.....	582,129,742	1,756,058,645
July 1, 1898.....	600,959,880	1,843,435,749
October 1, 1898.....	622,649,812	1,816,596,392
January 1, 1899.....	667,796,579	1,897,301,412
April 1, 1899.....	694,855,942	1,927,846,942

## HON. WARNER MILLER.


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Besides being prominently and honorably identified with American political life, Hon. Warner Miller has been connected with some of the great financial enterprises of the country. Though not extensively engaged in banking at any time, he was one of the charter members who organized the First National Bank of Herkimer, N. Y., and the First National Bank of Frankfort, N. Y., both of them highly prosperous institutions. His inventions introduced such improvements in a leading industry as almost to revolutionize it, while his energy in promoting the construction of a canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific has done much to keep alive the interest in that project and to bring it to the successful issue which now appears to be probable in the near future. As a member of the New York Legislature, of the U. S. House of Representatives, and as a Senator in Congress from the State of New York, Mr. Miller established a reputation as a wise legislator. He has been distinguished for devotion to principle, regardless of its immediate effect upon his political fortunes, and both in business and public life his record is one worthy of study and imitation.

Warner Miller was born in Otsego county, N. Y., August 12, 1838, and is a descendant of John Miller, who was one of the Dutch settlers of Westchester county, N. Y., about the year 1680. His great grandfather was Col. Eltjah Miller, who was in the American army in the Revolutionary War, and was killed in that war. The home of the widow, near White Plains, N. Y., was once Washington's Headquarters, and a notable landmark of that part of the State.

At the age of eighteen Warner Miller became a student at Union College, having previously acquired a good preliminary education at the local schools, filling the interval between terms at work on his father's farm. While a student at Union College he partly paid his expenses by teaching school. He maintained a high rank as a scholar and graduated in the summer of 1860. The same fall he became Professor of Greek and Latin in the Fort Edward Collegiate Institute at Fort Edward, N. Y. He resigned this position at the outbreak of the Civil War, and endeavored to enlist a company of recruits; he did not get a whole company, but persuaded his comrades to enlist in the Fifth New York Cavalry, which he himself joined as a private. He served under Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, and was promoted for gallant conduct in the field through the various ranks until he became a lieutenant. When Jackson defeated Banks at Winchester, he was taken prisoner and was thus held for some weeks. Then, while sick in the hospital, he was paroled and returned to Fort Edward, where he secured employment in a paper-mill, and after learning the business became superintendent. He was sent for a year to Belgium to introduce American methods of making paper from straw. On his return he organized a company of his own to engage in the manufacture of paper at Herkimer, N. Y., not out of straw but out of wood pulp. He invented the machines needed for that work, and in his factories at Herkimer made the first wood paper, and started an industry which has now risen to gigantic proportions. He did not try to keep a monopoly of the business but made his processes public and sold his machines to all who would buy. It was difficult at first to persuade paper manufacturers to adopt the new system, but Mr. Miller at last succeeded. Wood-pulp paper practically revolutionized the paper trade, and the newspaper and book publishing business as






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## HON. WARNER MILLER.


His name has been prominently and honorably identified with American politics. Mr. Warner has been connected with some of the great financial enterprises of the country. Though not extensively engaged in banking at any time, he was one of the charter members who organized the First National Bank of New York, N. Y., and the First National Bank of Frankfort, N. Y., both of them highly prosperous institutions. His inventions introduced such improvements in banking as almost to revolutionize it, while his energy in promoting the construction of a canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific has done much to keep alive the interest in that project and to bring it to the successful issue which now appears to be probable in the near future. As a member of the New York Legislature of the U. S. House of Representatives, and as a Senator in Congress from the state of New York, Mr. Miller established a reputation as a wise legislator. He has been distinguished for devotion to principle, regardless of its immediate effect upon his political fortunes, and both in business and public life his record is one worthy of study and emulation.

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well, for the cost of white paper was reduced from fifteen to three cents a pound. Mr. Miller amassed a fortune from the business, and established factories of his own at Palmer's Falls and Lyon's Falls, besides those at Herkimer. Mr. Miller has a fine farm of several hundred acres in the old Dutch town of Herkimer which it is his pride to make and keep a model farm in all respects.

In 1839 Mr. Miller became interested in the great project of constructing a ship canal across the Isthmus of Nicaragua. He became president of the company having that project in hand, and devoted to it years of hard work and a large share of his fortune. It was his company, indeed, that first practically began the work and opened the way to its completion. Unfortunate Government policies caused the company to become embarrassed and the work to be suspended; but there is at this time a prospect of resumption of it under happier auspices and of a triumphant conclusion being made of this second great work of Mr. Miller's life.

Mr. Miller became interested in politics at an early date. At a political meeting at Herkimer in 1867 he was called upon suddenly to take the place of a speaker who had failed to arrive, and acquitted himself so well that he at once became a political leader. The Republicans elected him chairman of the county committee and kept him there for years. He was elected to the State Assembly from Herkimer county in 1873 and again in 1874. In 1878 he was elected to Congress and was re-elected in 1880. His second term was interrupted by his election, in the summer of 1881, to the United States Senate as successor to Thomas C. Platt, resigned. As Senator he secured the passage of the letter carriers' eight-hour law, an important pension law, the "head money" law regulating immigration, and the "alien contract labor" law. He also secured important improvements for the harbor of New York and was instrumental in the creation of the Department of Agriculture and the Labor Bureau. In 1888 Mr. Miller was a leading member of the Republican National Convention which nominated General Harrison for the Presidency, and was himself the party candidate for Governor of New York. It is generally conceded that his splendid efforts did much to secure the electoral vote of New York for General Harrison, but he was himself defeated. Since that time he has been a commanding figure in the councils of the Republican party.

Mr. Miller was married many years ago to Miss Churchill, a daughter of Henry Churchill, of Gloversville, Fulton county, N. Y., whose maternal grandfather introduced into this country the manufacture of gloves, an industry now of enormous proportions. They have had four sons and one daughter. Mr. Miller has since his childhood been identified with the Methodist Episcopal Church to which his family has belonged for several generations, and he has devoted to its interests much of his strength, time and means.

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GREATER AMERICA EXPOSITION.—Inspired by the great success of the Trans-Mississippi Exposition at Omaha, Neb., last year, the progressive people of that city are arranging to open another exposition on July 1 on somewhat different lines, using the buildings and grounds that proved so suitable for displaying the exhibits of the former exposition.

It is the purpose of the promoters of the present enterprise to make a comprehensive exhibit of the products of the islands acquired as a result of the recent war with Spain, and to give an opportunity of seeing natives of those islands who will illustrate the customs and modes of life common to their respective places of nativity. While this will be a prominent feature of the exposition, it will also be devoted to a liberal display of the machinery and manufactured and other products of the United States, as well as a notable art exhibit. There are many attractive special features announced which will help to make the exhibition one of unusual interest.

The Philippines, Porto Rico and Cuba are now engaging a large share of public attention, and the opportunity which this exposition will afford of gaining a better knowledge of their resources will be generally welcomed.

# CANADIAN BANKING AND COMMERCE.

## QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE BANK RETURNS.

The renewal of the Banking Act at the expiration of every ten years brings the subject of any changes that may be thought desirable to the minds of those interested generally and to bankers themselves in particular. The changes made in the Act of 1890 in its amended form were not many, however; some of them, though seeming of little importance, have by the experience gained from the expired portion of the term given satisfaction.

The present Act came into operation on July 1, 1891, and has therefore been in force for a period of nearly eight years, during which but little has been heard regarding contemplated changes for the next ten-year period which will commence July, 1901.

Great prosperity may be said to have attended the expired portion of this decade in the way of a healthy growth of Canadian banks, and a freedom from panic to anything like the extent felt in other countries.

Since the Act became operative in its present form, many parts of the Dominion which were formerly without banking facilities have now the conveniences and advantages of modern banking facilities. This advancement has shown itself particularly in Western Ontario, Manitoba, the Northwest Territories and the Klondike region, the two latter places to a wonderful extent. These new offices have been largely instrumental in increasing the resources of the banks, also the business of the country. Under the operation of the present Act it may be interesting to give the figures under a few of the important headings.

FOR YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,	<i>Bank notes in circula- tion.</i>	<i>Public de- posits.</i>	<i>Loans on stocks and bonds on call.</i>	<i>Current or commercial loans.</i>	<i>Specie and Dominion notes.</i>
1891.....	\$31,879,886	\$142,633,215			\$17,408,494
1892.....	32,614,999	160,942,778	\$15,550,797	\$182,498,671	17,325,410
1893.....	35,483,413	170,817,433	14,880,873	208,798,415	18,547,669
1894.....	30,254,159	174,830,936	14,800,915	208,958,912	21,455,211
1895.....	30,106,578	180,664,123	16,763,622	205,497,046	20,945,369
1896.....	30,336,844	183,769,962	13,024,606	208,014,178	21,985,797
1897.....	32,366,174	201,141,688	14,898,629	208,627,660	24,584,894
1898.....	36,539,103	227,063,343	20,066,715	222,413,568	24,497,536
<b>QUARTER ENDING</b>					
Sept. 30, 1898.....	40,071,148	238,573,704	23,745,140	222,861,623	27,485,509
Dec. 31, 1898.....	40,258,881	243,872,085	26,523,040	229,900,050	26,066,245
March 31, 1899.....	38,409,227	248,286,015	23,156,434	240,668,615	26,229,774

The figures covering the first quarter of the present year show no lack of promise for a successful business season. In fact the returns are more favorable than in former years for a large summer and fall trade. The output of the Klondike gold-fields will no doubt prove very large. Exports and imports are looking fairly promising and advances are being made on a solid and steady basis.

At the end of the March quarter specie and Dominion notes were held by the banks to the extent of \$1,708,734 more than on that date a year ago, but less than at the end of the December quarter by \$836,469. Amount due from banks and agencies in foreign countries are nearly two millions higher than a year ago, although \$1,869,759 short of the figures at the end of the December quarter. Amount due

from banks and agencies in United Kingdom show an increase of \$3,407,596, although a reduction is shown for the quarter ending March 31. Canadian municipal and other securities show a decrease for the quarter but an increase for the year of \$518,313. Railway securities prove emphatically that they are not in demand, as they show a falling-off for the quarter of \$1,739,315 and \$1,403,069 for the year. Call loans on bonds and stocks have lately proved very active. As shown the increase for the year invested is \$7,818,919, and during the quarter the increment is \$1,624,394.

The wonderful demands for current loans place beyond doubt the activity introduced with the opening of navigation. The increase for the year shows \$22,532,972 more than that actively employed at the same date a year ago, and \$10,668,585 during the March quarter. Overdue debts show a contraction for the year but little change during the quarter.

Capital stock and reserve fund continue to grow. Bank notes in circulation show a contraction for the quarter, which is always the case, but are well above the amount of last year at the same date. Public deposits payable on demand and after notice give proof of sufficient money in the banks to meet any probable demand for cash for commercial enterprises. The amount of increase for the quarter ending March 31 was \$7,389,578, and for the year, same date, \$31,101,509. Total assets March 31, \$394,709,946; increase for year, \$38,833,187, and for quarter, \$4,239,618. Liabilities on same date, \$302,063,861; increase for year, \$36,012,401, and for quarter, \$1,290,786.

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The statistical abstract of the chartered banks of Canada, published on the following page, will be found of interest compared with the statement of the National banks of the United States.

There are only thirty-eight chartered banks in Canada, as against 3,579 National banks. Canadian banks have much larger capital than those in the United States, as a rule. The Canadian banks do not keep anything like the reserve of the banks in New York, Chicago and St. Louis, where the law requires a reserve of twenty-five per cent. The Dominion banks hold \$25,229,774 of specie and Dominion notes against deposits of the public amounting to \$248,000,000. This is not much over ten per cent. The National banks of New York, with individual deposits of about \$400,000,000, have cash on hand amounting to \$217,411,509, or more than fifty per cent. of their deposit liabilities to the public. A full consideration of all the facts might show that this apparent disproportion between the reserves of the Canadian banks and those of the National banks is not so great as would seem from the foregoing, but the reserves which a bank finds it necessary to keep in Canada are certainly much less than the law considers essential in the United States. Allowance must be made for the great difference in the banking systems of the two countries. The Canadian system would seem to require only a minimum of idle money to be locked up as bank reserves, to the advantage of the banks and the public. When payment of deposits is demanded, and even when there is a run on a bank, it can meet the demand by paying out its own notes.

It has been estimated that the privilege of using their notes as till money adds from \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000 to the loanable funds of the banks, and that a further sum of from \$30,000,000 to \$38,000,000 is available by the absence of any provision requiring the notes to be secured by a special pledge of bonds, as in the United States.

The matter of reserve in the Dominion is left to the discretion of the banks, and not fixed by law.

There is no doubt that the banks of Canada are as safe and well managed as those of any country.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF CANADIAN CHARTERED BANKS—COMPARISON OF THE IMPORTANT ITEMS.

ASSETS.	Mar. 31, 1898.		Dec. 31, 1898.		Mar. 31, 1899.		Increase and decrease for quarter.		Increase and decrease for year.	
Specie and Dominion notes.....	\$95,299,774	\$26,088,248	\$23,521,040	Dec., \$896,469	Dec., 1,908,868	Dec., 1,908,868	Dec., 1,908,868	Inc., \$1,705,784	Inc., 982,868	Inc., 982,868
Notes of and checks on other banks.....	8,920,498	10,829,864	7,987,640	Dec., 1,908,868	Dec., 1,908,868	Dec., 1,908,868	Dec., 1,908,868	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Due from banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	21,328,325	22,293,094	19,428,325	Dec., 2,864,769	Dec., 2,864,769	Dec., 2,864,769	Dec., 2,864,769	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Due from banks and agencies in United Kingdom.....	11,607,741	12,169,599	9,200,145	Dec., 2,969,454	Dec., 2,969,454	Dec., 2,969,454	Dec., 2,969,454	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Canadian municipal securities and British provincial or colonial, other than Dominion.....	16,551,328	17,209,572	16,088,065	Dec., 1,121,507	Dec., 1,121,507	Dec., 1,121,507	Dec., 1,121,507	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Railway securities.....	15,490,790	17,220,105	16,898,999	Dec., 321,106	Dec., 321,106	Dec., 321,106	Dec., 321,106	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Loans on stocks and bonds on call.....	28,152,424	28,532,040	20,827,515	Dec., 7,704,525	Dec., 7,704,525	Dec., 7,704,525	Dec., 7,704,525	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Current loans to the public.....	240,568,615	220,900,060	218,085,643	Dec., 28,814,417	Dec., 28,814,417	Dec., 28,814,417	Dec., 28,814,417	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Overdue debts.....	2,468,546	2,468,410	3,227,976	Dec., 759,366	Dec., 759,366	Dec., 759,366	Dec., 759,366	Inc., 1,900,970	Inc., 3,407,966	Inc., 3,407,966
Total assets.....	\$394,708,946	\$380,470,222	\$355,876,759	Dec., \$38,832,186	Dec., \$38,832,186	Dec., \$38,832,186	Dec., \$38,832,186	Inc., \$38,832,186	Inc., \$38,832,186	Inc., \$38,832,186
CAPITAL.										
Capital stock paid up.....	\$68,862,512	\$68,241,523	\$62,293,726	Dec., \$6,947,797	Dec., \$6,947,797	Dec., \$6,947,797	Dec., \$6,947,797	Inc., \$6,947,797	Inc., \$6,947,797	Inc., \$6,947,797
Reserve fund.....	28,051,264	27,965,807	27,694,066	Dec., 86,441	Dec., 86,441	Dec., 86,441	Dec., 86,441	Inc., 86,441	Inc., 86,441	Inc., 86,441
LIABILITIES.										
Bank notes in circulation.....	\$38,409,227	\$40,266,881	\$35,990,085	Dec., \$4,276,796	Dec., \$4,276,796	Dec., \$4,276,796	Dec., \$4,276,796	Inc., \$4,276,796	Inc., \$4,276,796	Inc., \$4,276,796
Balance due to Dominion Government.....	2,907,100	3,491,721	3,561,708	Dec., 584,621	Dec., 584,621	Dec., 584,621	Dec., 584,621	Inc., 584,621	Inc., 584,621	Inc., 584,621
Balance due to Provincial governments.....	2,595,343	2,002,073	2,452,726	Dec., 456,653	Dec., 456,653	Dec., 456,653	Dec., 456,653	Inc., 456,653	Inc., 456,653	Inc., 456,653
Deposits of the public payable on demand.....	88,915,886	90,747,210	76,471,017	Dec., 14,276,193	Dec., 14,276,193	Dec., 14,276,193	Dec., 14,276,193	Inc., 14,276,193	Inc., 14,276,193	Inc., 14,276,193
Deposits of the public payable after notice.....	161,222,629	157,824,875	140,525,459	Dec., 16,697,416	Dec., 16,697,416	Dec., 16,697,416	Dec., 16,697,416	Inc., 16,697,416	Inc., 16,697,416	Inc., 16,697,416
Deposits payable on demand or after notice between banks.....	3,354,264	2,898,319	2,595,465	Dec., 298,854	Dec., 298,854	Dec., 298,854	Dec., 298,854	Inc., 298,854	Inc., 298,854	Inc., 298,854
Due to banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	668,523	605,904	509,463	Dec., 156,441	Dec., 156,441	Dec., 156,441	Dec., 156,441	Inc., 156,441	Inc., 156,441	Inc., 156,441
Due to banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	5,169,327	2,217,753	3,853,429	Dec., 2,354,376	Dec., 2,354,376	Dec., 2,354,376	Dec., 2,354,376	Inc., 2,354,376	Inc., 2,354,376	Inc., 2,354,376
Total liabilities.....	\$362,068,361	\$360,773,075	\$326,051,480	Dec., \$35,295,286	Dec., \$35,295,286	Dec., \$35,295,286	Dec., \$35,295,286	Inc., \$35,295,286	Inc., \$35,295,286	Inc., \$35,295,286
MISCELLANEOUS.										
Directors' liabilities.....	\$7,190,627	\$7,602,665	\$8,122,579	Dec., \$412,038	Dec., \$412,038	Dec., \$412,038	Dec., \$412,038	Inc., \$412,038	Inc., \$412,038	Inc., \$412,038
Greatest amount of bank notes in circulation at any time during month.....	38,911,600	43,314,303	36,999,394	Dec., 4,402,703	Dec., 4,402,703	Dec., 4,402,703	Dec., 4,402,703	Inc., 4,402,703	Inc., 4,402,703	Inc., 4,402,703



## DAILY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT.\*

The Treasury Department publishes a daily "Statement of the Condition of the United States Treasury and the Receipts and Expenditures of the Government."

This statement shows the amount of cash in the Treasury and of what it consists; the Government receipts and expenditures; the deposits and redemptions on account of the National Bank Fund, and the redemptions of United States notes and of Treasury notes since the dates of their respective authorization. Only the receipts and expenditures, however, are explained in this article. This part of the daily statement is as follows:

### GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES, MAY 4, 1899.

RECEIPTS.	<i>This day.</i>	<i>This month.</i>	<i>This fiscal year.</i>
Customs.....	\$758,723.87	\$2,858,947.02	\$172,314,980.29
Internal revenue.....	897,809.01	3,740,257.87	227,246,917.88
Miscellaneous.....	33,255.69	246,915.48	31,340,236.72
<b>Total receipts.....</b>	<b>\$1,079,588.57</b>	<b>\$6,846,120.15</b>	<b>\$430,902,134.89</b>
<b>EXPENDITURES.</b>			
Civil and miscellaneous.....	\$175,000.00	\$765,000.00	\$105,184,224.85
War.....	15,000.00	1,165,000.00	211,310,536.47
Navy.....	80,000.00	405,000.00	55,927,394.01
Indians.....	90,000.00	200,000.00	11,488,743.04
Pensions.....	1,500,000.00	4,575,000.00	121,464,043.05
Interest.....	.....	.....	34,685,968.39
<b>Total expenditures.....</b>	<b>\$1,890,000.00</b>	<b>\$7,110,000.00</b>	<b>\$540,561,409.31</b>
<b>Excess of expenditures over receipts.....</b>	<b>180,411.43</b>	<b>263,879.85</b>	<b>109,659,274.42</b>

The receipts are grouped under the three heads of Customs, Internal Revenue and Miscellaneous; and the expenditures are classed under the six heads of Civil and Miscellaneous, War, Navy, Indians, Pensions, and Interest. The Treasury arrives at the conclusion set forth in these published statements as follows: The estimate of expenditures for any day is based upon the aggregate amount carried by the warrants issued by the Secretary of the Treasury on the preceding day; and the receipts are made up of the aggregate amount shown upon the reports received at the Treasury on the preceding day, of all moneys collected through the various revenue sources of the Government and reported to the Treasurer, the amounts reported being counted as the receipts of the day upon which the reports of them reach the Treasury Department.

Each warrant issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, and carrying money out of the Treasury, is based upon some one of the appropriations made by Congress for the various purposes of the Government. For example, Congress appropriates \$12,000 for reindeer in Alaska, which subject comes under the supervision and control of the Secretary of the Interior Department. The Secretary of the Interior, by virtue of his office, becomes charged with the proper application of the money thus appropriated to the specific purpose for which the appropriation is made; and he, therefore, approves a "requisition" for the money upon the Secretary of the Treas-

\* By Burton T. Doyle, Attorney at Law, Washington, D. C., and late Assistant Chief, War-rant Division, United States Treasury Department.

ury. This "requisition" asks that a part or all of the money, appropriated for the purpose named therein, be placed with the Treasurer of the United States (or with some Assistant Treasurer or designated depository) to the official credit of the person named in the requisition (such person having been previously bonded to the United States in an amount sufficient to cover all the money so placed to his official credit upon such requisition); and it also directs the Secretary of the Treasury to raise a charge, equal to the amount so advanced, against the appropriation made by Congress for the purpose named. Thereupon, the Secretary of the Treasury issues a warrant for the amount required by this requisition, and charges it not only upon the appropriation ledger against the appropriation named in the requisition, but also upon the personal ledger against the person named in the requisition, to whose official credit it is asked to have the money placed.

Of course the amount named in the appropriation (authorizing the expenditure) limits, on the appropriation ledger, the amount which may be thus advanced for the general purpose named; and if there is more money required or used for that purpose than is provided by the Act making provision for it, a "deficiency" is created which Congress is asked at its next session to supply by a "deficiency appropriation."

The bonded officer to whose official credit the money is thus advanced upon requisition and warrant, may draw the money out by giving a check therefor payable to himself, and then expend it for the purposes designated; or he may check it out to other parties to whom he may make payment on account of these purposes. But whether he draws the money himself and uses it, or checks it out in payment of demands and obligations against the appropriation, he takes a receipt to be used as a "voucher" in the account which he must render to the Government, showing what disposition was made by him of the money thus advanced. He gets relieved of the personal charge entered against him on the books of the Treasury, for all money so advanced to his official credit, by rendering to the Treasury a proper account, supported by these "vouchers" and bearing the approval of the head of the Department under which he is employed. This account is thoroughly reviewed, scrutinized, and audited by the proper accounting officer of the Government, that officer being the auditor for the Interior Department in the case supposed.

Now the amount advanced upon this warrant is put into the statement and makes, together with the amounts advanced or paid upon all other warrants drawn upon the same day with it, the aggregate of Government expenditures published for the preceding day, although some of it may be never actually paid out. There may be an unexpended balance of it which is never used, but is covered back into the Treasury and carried by repay warrant back to the credit of the appropriation under which it was advanced to be, in turn, carried back into the fund of unappropriated moneys by a surplus fund warrant.

The daily statement is always issued for the day preceding the date it bears; but it does not therefore represent the actual receipts and actual expenditures of that day. The total of receipts appearing upon these statements from day to day, represents only the amounts of receipts shown upon the reports of receipts received at the Treasury upon the day preceding the one named; and the total of expenditures represents the sum total of the amounts carried by all the warrants actually issued on the preceding day.

These statements of both receipts and expenditures are therefore only approximations. The Department can not issue, on the very next day following that upon which the money is actually received into the revenue channels of the Government, a statement showing the total amount of money actually received by the Government into its various collecting agencies and channels of revenue throughout the country on that day, as that would be an impossibility. The reports of the various and sundry amounts received each day into these various revenue channels

all over the world are made only at certain stated times; and the amount shown upon this daily statement of receipts for the day preceding that of its publication represents the amounts shown upon these receipt-reports which actually reach the Treasury on that day. So that instead of these figures showing the actual receipts and expenditures of the Government for the day preceding that upon which they are published, the receipts shown represent the aggregate amount reported upon the receipt-reports received at the Treasury on that day (although some of the money represented in such receipt-reports might have been actually received into some far-away agent's hands a fortnight or more previously); and the figures representing the expenditures do not show the amount actually expended by the Government on the day preceding that of publication; but rather the amount charged on that day against the appropriations made by Congress for the various purposes of the Government.

And yet this daily statement is the closest approximation which it is possible for the Government to make of its daily financial transactions; and like many other valuable publications it is published by the Government for gratuitous circulation in editions large enough to supply actual demands. Any National bank may have this statement mailed to it daily, "without money and without price," by simply requesting to have its name entered upon the mailing-list of the Treasury Department.

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**RESERVE ON BILLS PAYABLE.**—A correspondent wrote the *MAGAZINE* recently inquiring whether National banks are required to keep a reserve against bills payable. In reply the following was given from "Patten's Practical Banking," page 471:

"It is very doubtful whether National banks have power either to take time deposits or to borrow money and create bills payable. At all events, it is believed that whatever agreement may be made with a depositor or party from whom money is received on time, or borrowed, the bank would be obliged to pay on demand if the other parties did not choose to adhere to their agreement. For this reason all time deposits or bills payable reported by National banks are held to require a reserve the same as other deposits."

We are advised that the Comptroller's office rules otherwise. Without seeking to reflect at all on the ruling of the Comptroller, it may be said that the principle laid down by Patten would seem to be sound in theory. For if banks are required to keep a reserve against time deposits—which is indisputable—it is even more important that they should have a reserve against bills payable which they may be required to meet on demand.

In the case of *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong*, the United States Supreme Court said, referring to the National Bank Act:

"The power to borrow money or to give its notes is not expressly given by the Act. The business of a bank is to lend, not to borrow, money."

The court further said, however, that "a bank, in certain circumstances, may become a temporary borrower of money," but stated that "such a transaction would be so much out of the course of ordinary and legitimate banking as to require those making the loan to see to it that the officer or agent acting for the bank had special authority to borrow money."

As a matter of precaution, regardless of what the National Bank Act may require, it would be well for banks that borrow money to keep a reserve against said debts equal to the reserve on deposits, at least. It would be better still, no doubt, if banks would confine themselves to what the Supreme Court declares is their legitimate function—lending money and not borrowing it.

## WILLIAM SALOMON.

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As a former member of one of the leading international banking firms of this country, the subject of this sketch affords a proper study for those engaged in the banking business.

William Jones Salomon, for many years resident partner of Messrs. Speyer & Co., New York, was born at Mobile, Ala., October 9, 1852, removing with the family to Philadelphia three years later. Mr. Salomon's mother was Rosalie Alice Levy, a granddaughter of Capt. Jacob De Leon, a Revolutionary officer of Charleston, S. C., and a great granddaughter of Hayman Levy, in whose establishments in the early days of New York John Jacob Astor and Nicholas Low, the well-known merchants, obtained their first commercial experience. On the side of his father also Mr. Salomon is of Revolutionary stock, his great grandfather being Haym Salomon, the Philadelphia banker and Revolutionary patriot.

His early education was beset with difficulties, and owing to illness he was soon compelled to give up his studies in the Philadelphia school which he had entered, and in 1864 came to New York, where he was placed under private tutors, his health improving rapidly. In 1865 his father moved to New York. The son was a student at the Columbia Grammar School until his fifteenth year, his studies being confined to elementary branches. Later he acquired a knowledge of the French and German languages.

On leaving school he immediately began his business training in the firm of which he was so long a member. Desiring to gain a personal knowledge of the foreign connections of the house, and to perfect himself in the languages named above, he sought and obtained permission to visit Frankfort-on-the-Main, the head office of the firm. The breaking out of the war between France and Germany made it necessary for him to remain some time in London, where he was placed at a desk in the branch of the firm in that city. After two years spent in Germany, he returned to New York in his twentieth year. In 1875, one of the partners being called abroad, Mr. Salomon was invested with the management of the firm, and for many years continued prominent in its councils, being identified with its subsequent history.

Messrs. Speyer & Co. strongly supported the public credit during the Civil War by their successful efforts in placing United States bonds with German investors. They have been instrumental also in selling large amounts of the bonds of American railways to European capitalists, notably the great loans of the Central Pacific and Southern Pacific Railways. Mr. Salomon was closely identified with the reorganization of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., and has become chairman of the board of directors.

He has made the field of railway investments a specialty, and the thoroughness of his knowledge may be judged by the prestige the house has attained in this line, being the medium through which were issued, in addition to those mentioned, the loans of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul, Illinois Central, Lake Shore and Michigan Southern, and the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific.

Mr. Salomon has travelled extensively abroad, but has not neglected his own country. He has visited all the States and Territories and every principal city, and



*W. W. Linn*

## WILLIAM SALOMON.

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William James Salomon, for many years resident partner of Messrs. New York, was born at Mobile, Ala., October 9, 1852, removing to Philadelphia three years later. Mr. Salomon's mother was Rebecca, granddaughter of Capt. Jacob De Leon, a Revolutionary officer of war, and a great-granddaughter of Hayman Levy, in whose establishment, in the days of New York, John Jacob Astor and Nicholas Low, the wealthy financiers, obtained their first commercial experience. On the side of a speculator in Revolutionary stock, his great grandfather being the first Philadelphia banker and Revolutionary patriot.

His early education was tedious, with difficulties, and owing to compulsion to give up his studies in the Philadelphia school which he attended, and in which came to New York, where he was placed under private tuition, improving rapidly. In 1868 his father moved to New York. Then at the Comstock Grammar School, in his fifteenth year, his studies to elude his branches. Later he acquired a knowledge of the French language.

On leaving school he immediately began his business training, in the office of his father, he was so long a member. Desiring to gain a personal knowledge of the continental conditions of the house, and to perfect himself in the languages, he sought and obtained permission to visit Friedrichs-on-the-Mosel, the head of the firm. The breaking out of the war between France and Germany made it for him to remain some time in London, where he was placed at a distance of the trouble in that city. After two years spent in Germany, he returned to New York in his twentieth year. In 1873, one of the partners being called to Europe, Mr. Salomon was invested with the management of the firm, and he has since conducted prominent in its councils, being identified with its success and glory.

Messrs. Spayer & Co. strongly supported the public credit of America, and by their successful efforts in placing United States bonds, while Germany was in debt. They have been instrumental also in securing large amounts of foreign capital for the ways to European capitalists, notably the great loans of the Chesapeake and Southern Pacific Railways. Mr. Salomon was conspicuously identified with the organization of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., and has been a member of its board of directors.

He has made the field of railway investments a specialty, and the success of his knowledge may be judged by the prestige the house has acquired, the line being the medium through which were issued, in addition to those of the loans of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul, the Central, Lake Shore and Michigan Southern, and the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific.

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*W. H. Brown*





has a thorough comprehension of the resources of the United States. He has not been a politician, but his interest in sound money caused him to serve as Chairman of the Finance Committee of the New York Democracy in 1891, whose purpose was to promote the nomination of Mr. Cleveland for President because of the soundness of his views on finance.

Mr. Salomon was married in 1892 to Helen Forbes Lewis, daughter of William McKenzie Forbes, of Taine, Rosshire, Scotland.

Though closely devoted to the exacting requirements of business since early life, Mr. Salomon has cultivated a natural taste for art and literature. As a contributor to the magazines on topics of moment to business interests, he has shown force and clearness of reasoning in the presentation of his views. His financial skill is grounded upon diligent study and long experience. He believes in the present and future greatness of the United States of America, and to his success in impressing this belief upon others, especially those who have capital to invest, no small part of the prosperity of the firm of Speyer & Co. is due.

**New York Savings Bank Investments.**—At the recent session of the New York Legislature a bill was passed extending the investments of Savings banks to include certain additional railway bonds. This bill has been signed by the Governor and is now a law.

Following is that part of the amendment giving the new investments permitted:

" \* \* \* Also in the first mortgage bonds of any railroad corporation of this State, the principal part of whose railroad is located within this State, or of any railroad corporation of this or any other State or States connecting with and controlled and operated as part of the system of any such railroad corporation of this State, and of which connecting railroad at least a majority of its capital stock is owned by such a railroad corporation of this State, or in the mortgage bonds of any such railroad corporation of an issue to retire all prior mortgage debt of such railroad companies respectively; provided, that at no time within five years next preceding the date of any such investment shall such railroad corporation of this State or such connecting railroad corporations respectively have failed regularly and punctually to pay the principal and interest of all its mortgage indebtedness, and in addition thereto regularly and punctually to have paid dividends upon all its outstanding capital stock during the preceding five years, at the rate of not less than four per centum per annum; and provided, further, that at the date of every such dividend the outstanding capital stock of such railroad corporation, or such connecting railroad company respectively, shall have been equal to at least one-half of the total mortgage indebtedness of such railroad corporations respectively, including all bonds issued or to be issued under any mortgage securing any bond in which such investment shall be made.

Also in the mortgage bonds of the following railroad corporations: The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company; Michigan Central Railroad Company; Illinois Central Railroad Company; Pennsylvania Railroad Company; Delaware and Hudson Canal Company; Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company; New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company; Boston and Maine Railroad Company; Maine Central Railroad Company.

Provided, that at the time of making such investment the said railroads shall have earned and paid regular dividends of not less than four per centum per annum in cash on all their issues of capital stock for the ten years next preceding such investment, and provided the capital stock of any of said railroad corporations shall equal or exceed in amount one-third of the par value of all its bonded indebtedness; and further provided that all bonds hereby authorized for investments shall be secured by a first mortgage on the whole or a part of the railroad or railroad property actually in the possession of and operated by such company.

Also in the first mortgage bonds of the Fonda, Johnstown and Gloversville Railroad Company, or in the mortgage bonds of said railroad company of an issue to retire all prior mortgage debts of said railroad company, and provided the capital stock of said railroad company shall equal or exceed in amount one-third of the par value of all its bonded indebtedness; and provided also that such railroad be of standard gauge of four feet eight and one-half inches.

Not more than twenty per centum of the whole amount of deposits of any bank shall be loaned or invested in railroad bonds, and not more than five per centum of the deposits of any bank shall be invested in the bonds of any one railroad. Street railroad corporations shall not be considered railroad corporations within the meaning of this subdivision."

## PLAN FOR COLLECTING COUNTRY CHECKS.

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The use of personal checks by merchants in settlement of accounts payable in other towns will increase for two reasons, its convenience and the saving of cost of exchange. To endeavor to discourage this custom is to repeat the attempt to sweep back the Atlantic with a broom. The questions remaining are for the banks, how they can collect them at least cost and whether they will charge their customers for them.

As to cost of collection which is now so great an expense and which rests chiefly on the city banks or their customers for the benefit of the United States post office and the country paying banks, I maintain that all country checks can be collected without any cost for exchange with less expense for handling and with a saving of the interest now lost while the items are in transit. How? Let all items be sent through the clearing-house to the city correspondents of the drawee banks and by them be charged immediately to account of drawee.

What steps are necessary to put this plan in practice? Only an agreement by the clearing-house banks of New York and of Chicago to pass country checks through the clearing-house and, following that, an understanding that country bank accounts with city banks must be reciprocal accounts.

What are the benefits of this plan? It makes a local check practically equal to a New York draft, for the bank in which it is first deposited gets its money as soon as on a bank draft, and it thus saves the expense and loss of time in sending the check home for collection.

What are the obstacles? The only serious one is that the country banks will object to losing their present revenue from exchange charged when remitting for these checks. But this matter lies in the control of the city banks. The same unanimity which now fixes the rate of interest on country balances can enforce the rule of reciprocal accounts. Should any bank desire to waive the rule it would do so at its own expense. Reciprocal accounts are now largely in use and this would be but the extension of an established custom.

Objection might be made to the labor thus thrown on the clearing-house. But a moment's reflection will show that this is no greater than would be the handling of the drafts which otherwise would be drawn in payment for these same checks. The only real expense will be the additional labor of listing and charging checks, over listing and charging drafts and the cost of stationery and stamps required to send the checks home to the paying banks. But the banks as a whole do this work now and pay exchange to the paying bank besides.

It is true that the expense of collecting is now borne proportionally to the number of checks received on deposit, while under the new plan the expense will be proportioned to the size of a bank's list of correspondents. Had all the banks the same number of correspondents, no inequality would result; but, as some have more than others, the bank with the largest list will have the most work to do. But, *per contra*, that bank will have the largest number of deposits so that its benefits will be in substantial agreement with its expenses. Yet, should some bank have a slightly greater expense than its exact share of benefits, this will be far more than offset by the saving in exchange made on its whole line of country checks deposited. This plan adopted, the discussion about charging customers for them will be settled forever.

By this simple device the whole vexed question which has so long annoyed merchants all over the country will be settled. The cost of exchange has been steadily

diminishing; its entire abolition will be another step in the annihilation of space so nearly already accomplished by the telephone and kindred inventions.

CHICAGO.

FRANK H. TUTHILL.

Without entering into a discussion of the above plan, it would seem to have some practical objections. For instance, John Smith, a Chicago merchant, owes John Jones, in New York, \$1,000. Mr. Smith draws his check on the First National Bank, Chicago, to the order of Mr. Jones, and sends it to him in New York. Mr. Jones deposits this check in his bank, which presents it through the clearing-house to the National City Bank, the correspondent of the First National Bank of Chicago. Here some questions arise. How is the National City Bank to know, in the first place, that the signature is that of Mr. Smith? What evidence has it that Mr. Smith has \$1,000 or any other sum to his credit in the First National Bank of Chicago? A bank that pays a check should know these things, and not shift the responsibility upon others.

These and other difficulties could be obviated, however, by having the check certified by the drawee bank before sending it to New York.

**A MONETARY PANACEA.**—We have received from J. D. Rice, of Philadelphia, a leaflet bearing the title "An International Monetary Panacea," from which we quote:

"It proposes the recoining of all gold coins now in use, of every denomination, and every nationality.

It proposes to enhance the value of 'standard coin gold' to double its present value. All new coins under this system to contain just one-half the amount and weight of the present standard coin gold as the respective coins now contain, each denomination of coin to retain their intrinsic value the same as those in present use: in other words it proposes to make two coins out of one, each of the two to be of same value as the one original one (like making two blades of grass to grow where there is but one). These new coins would be smaller and lighter—quite an advantage in handling large amounts.

Coin the size and weight of our present \$20 gold piece, to be denominated the 'great eagle,' and its value to be \$40; coin the size and weight of our present \$10 piece, to be denominated the 'double eagle,' and its value \$20; coin the size and weight of our \$5 piece, to be denominated the 'eagle,' and its value \$10; coin the size and weight of our \$2.50 piece, to be denominated the 'half-eagle,' and its value \$5 (no coin less than \$5); the total value of these four coins, \$75, instead of \$37.50, as now.

It is not proposed that other nations shall adopt our system of gold coins; not at all, but only and simply to enhance the value of their gold coinage to double its present value, so as not to disturb foreign exchange."

It is pointed out that this simple operation of reducing the weight of our gold coins one-half would add \$696,000,000 to our supply of gold coin, doubling it in fact, and the author of the scheme proceeds to inquire:

"And now, what would these \$696,000,000 and over of gold coin cost us? Simply the expense of recoining—no bonds or other obligations to be issued for it. There is no way possible to gain so much at so little cost—almost nothing! \* \* \*

It is incredible that any nation, any bank, or any moneyed institution, or any individual, possessing gold coin should object to its being increased to a two-fold value: it would be anomalous in the extreme, to say the least."

Mr. Rice may intend his proposals to be taken humorously, but they do not, in substance, differ from the proposition of Mr. Bryan and his followers. Both proceed on the assumption that calling fifty cents' worth of metal a dollar will give it the value of a dollar. The value of a coin is determined by the amount of commodities it will buy, irrespective of what the coin may be called, and the value of a gold eagle of half the present weight could no more be doubled by calling it a double eagle than the capacity of a half-bushel measure could be doubled by calling it a bushel.

Unfortunately, a knowledge of this primary fact in regard to money does not appear to have penetrated the minds of several millions of the voters of the country.

The idea that by putting one-half the amount of metal in the gold coins their intrinsic value would remain the same as now, is a curious one surely, but it is exactly on a par with the free silver scheme for which more than 6,000,000 Americans voted in 1896. Both fallacies are based upon the mistaken notion that there is some magic power in the mint stamp, and that by calling anything a dollar its purchasing power will thereby be made equal to 25.8 grains of gold.

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

### A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.

#### DIVIDEND BOOK.

Closely allied to the stock certificate books is the dividend book. It often occurs that banks have no use for this book for several years after their organization, for there is frequently the desire to build up the required surplus (twenty per cent. of the capital stock) before declaring dividends.

Under the National Banking Act banks are permitted to declare a dividend semi-

*Merchants National Bank Centre City Pa.*

*4<sup>th</sup> Semi Annual Dividend Nov. 1<sup>st</sup> 1898 4%*

Names of Shareholders	Address	No. of Shares	Amount of Dividend	Receipt, acknowledge Receiver of the ac- companied dividend
<i>Jas. L. Dease</i>	<i>Centre City</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>800</i>	<i>J. L. Dease</i>
<i>Jas. L. Billings</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>Jas. L. Billings</i>
<i>H. L. Simpson</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>H. L. Simpson</i>
<i>A. B. Wilson</i>	<i>Fairfield</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>Cashier Chk. # 114</i>
<i>W. H. Brown</i>	<i>Centre City</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>W. H. Brown</i>
<i>S. P. Jones</i>	<i>New York</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>600</i>	<i>Cashier Chk. # 15</i>
<i>J. H. Smith</i>	<i>Centre City</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>J. H. Smith</i>
<i>L. B. Brown</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>L. B. Brown</i>
<i>S. B. Brewer</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>S. B. Brewer</i>
		<b>1000</b>	<b>4000</b>	

FORM 1.—DIVIDEND BOOK.

annually. There is no legal restriction against their declaring it quarterly or annually. But before the declaration of such dividend they must carry one tenth part of their net profits to the surplus fund until that fund shall amount to twenty per cent. of the capital stock.

The customary method of declaring and paying dividend is about as follows: At the usual semi-annual (or quarterly or annual) meeting of the board of directors the Cashier presents a statement to the board, obtained from the general ledger, showing the gross profits of the bank for the past regular period, and the running expenses, also the losses from bad debts; this will show the net profits, if any. The board then decides what sum is to be charged off to surplus fund, and what to profit and loss, such as a portion of the premium account, and a portion from furniture and fixtures account, and also instructs the Cashier regarding the charging off to profit and loss

\* Continued from the April number, page 590. This series of articles commenced in the MAGAZINE for August, 1898, page 249.

of bad debts. From the net result they are able to determine what dividend to declare, if any, and upon motion the proper action is taken.

If a dividend has been declared it then becomes necessary for the Cashier to prepare for it.

This preparation consists of entering the names, and the amounts due, upon the dividend book and the making out of the proper dividend checks.

The dividend book is very simple in its arrangement, a form most commonly in use being shown by the preceding figure, Form 1.

It will be noticed that this form has a space upon which those stockholders who come to the bank for their dividends can sign a receipt. This is the old custom and many prefer to continue it. On some accounts it is very satisfactory to have the stockholders come to the bank and meet the officers, and talk over the business and the prospects, just as in other lines of business it is pleasant for the customers and heads of the house to meet.

Many banks are, however, adopting the plan of mailing all the dividend checks, and as these are always made payable to "order" the proper endorsement of the checks is considered a sufficient receipt. Where this is done the column for receipts is unnecessary, and is usually left out. The dividend checks are generally made upon a form especially used for this purpose, and indicate somewhere on their face the number of the dividend paid, and are signed by the Cashier, Assistant Cashier, or President.

The following is a very good form for a dividend check, and one much in use :

Dividend No. 4	No. 174	Centre City, November 1st, 1898.
	<b>Merchants National Bank,</b>	
	Pay to <u>Jas L. Pease</u> or order,	
	<u>Eight Hundred</u> Dollars.	
	<u>\$ 800<sup>00</sup></u>	<u>W. H. Brown</u> <small>Cashier</small>

FORM 2.—DIVIDEND CHECK.

In mailing the dividend checks it is customary to use a form for a letter of remittance, the following is a good one (Form 3), much in use, and was the one adopted by our new bank :

<p>DEAR SIR :</p> <p>Enclosed please find check for semi-annual dividend of four per cent. on the stock of this bank standing in your name, payable to-day. Kindly deposit the same or have it cashed at your earliest convenience.</p> <p>The proper endorsement of the check will be sufficient acknowledgment of receipt.</p> <p>Please give prompt notice of any change of address.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Respectfully yours,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">W. H. BROWN, Cashier.</p>	<p>CENTRE CITY, Pa., Nov. 1, 1898.</p>
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FORM 3.

According to the National Banking Law, Section 5212, every bank is obliged to report to the Comptroller of the Currency, within ten days after declaring any divi-

dent, the amount of such dividend, and the amount of net earnings in excess of such dividend. These reports are made in duplicate upon blank forms furnished by the Comptroller's office, one copy to be kept in the bank on file. The penalty for not complying with the above promptly is a fine of \$100 per day for each day of delay after the period named.

There are few reports sent to the Comptroller's office which are more frequently made out erroneously than this, many banks apparently not understanding the

No. 39.  
**REPORT OF EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS OF**  
located at Centerville, in the State of Penna.  
Declared Oct 28, 1898. Payable Nov 8, 1898.

No. of Bank. 3972 No. of Dividends. 4

"The Merchants National Bank for the period of six months ending Nov 1, 1898.

<p>3. Premiums on bonds charged off since last report (if any)..... 0</p> <p>4. Losses sustained through bad debts, decrease of values, etc. since last report..... 13249.8</p> <p>5. Expenses and taxes paid since last report..... 3511.11</p> <p>6. Net earnings and profits or loss of past six months carried over..... 2805.30</p> <p>TOTAL..... 7641.96</p> <p>9. Carried to surplus fund (not less than one-fourth of item 6, unless surplus is already so per cent of capital)..... 2805.30</p> <p>10. Dividend of <u>4</u> per cent (on capital \$2900.00)..... 400.00</p> <p>11. Amount of net profits undivided or loss to be carried forward..... 1566.57</p> <p>TOTAL..... 5746.10</p>	<p>1. Gross earnings since last report..... 7641.96</p> <p>2. Other profits realized since last report..... 0</p> <p>TOTAL..... 7641.96</p> <p>4. Net earnings and profits or loss of past six months brought over..... 2805.30</p> <p>7. Undivided profits or loss brought forward from last report (item 11 of that report)..... 3041.20</p> <p>12. Amount withdrawn from surplus (if any)..... 0</p> <p>TOTAL..... 5746.10</p>
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<p>13. Total surplus fund proper at date of this report..... 1280.00</p> <p>16. Total dividends since organization as National Bank..... 1300.00</p> <p>17. Total other profits on hand (same as item 11 of this report)..... 1566.57</p> <p>TOTAL..... 2736.57</p>	<p>13. Total profits on National Bank since organization (less expenses, premiums, losses, etc.)..... 2736.57</p> <p>14. Add profits of old organization at date of conversion to the national system..... 0</p> <p>TOTAL..... 2736.57</p>
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State of Pennsylvania  
County of Centre  
I, W. F. Brown, Cashier of the above-named bank, do solemnly swear that the above statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed before me this 3 day of November, 1898.  
W. J. Jackson, Notary Public.

FORM 4. — REPORT SHOWING PROFITS.

proper use of the form. I therefore give below two forms properly filled out, one showing profits and another showing loss, which may be of assistance.

In the report showing a loss it will be seen that in item No. 6 on each side the words "earnings and profits" are ruled out; this is done because the figures opposite represent a loss, and are shown in the report in red ink, according to the notation appearing at the bottom of the report. Some banks do not seem to recognize the necessity of showing the loss items in red ink, but it is exceedingly important and makes trouble when the instructions are not complied with.

It is customary to put a notice in the daily papers stating that the board of directors have declared a semi-annual (or quarterly or annual) dividend of (stating the rate), payable at (specifying the date).

Except in cases of old well-established banks with a large surplus it is unwise to adopt the policy of paying large dividends, even if large profits are made. Seasons of depression will come which affect the banking business as well as any other, and the wise banker will nurse his resources, pay reasonable dividends, and seek to build

No. of Bank, 4722 No. 59. No. of Dividend, 11

### REPORT OF EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS OF

The Second Nat Bank located at Genevieve, in the State of Idaho  
for the period of six months ending Nov 1, 1898. Declared Oct 31, 1898. Payable Nov 15, 1898

<p>Premiums on bonds charged off since last report (if any)..... <u>500</u></p> <p>Losses sustained through bad debts, decrease of values, etc., since last report..... <u>356.77</u></p> <p>Expenses and taxes paid since last report..... <u>357.30</u></p> <p><del>Net unamortized expense</del> loss of just six months carried over..... <u>417.60</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TOTAL..... <u>7214.47</u></p> <p>Carried to surplus fund (not less than one-tenth of item 6, unless surplus is already 20 per cent of capital)..... <u>0</u></p> <p>Dividend of _____ per cent (on capital \$<u>100,000</u>)..... <u>0</u></p> <p>Amount of net profits unwithdrawn or loss to be carried forward..... <u>2147.91</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TOTAL..... <u>2147.91</u></p>	<p>1. Gross earnings since last report..... <u>7214.47</u></p> <p>2. Other profits realized since last report..... <u>0</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TOTAL..... <u>7214.47</u></p> <p>3. Net <del>unamortized expense</del> loss of just six months brought down..... <u>417.60</u></p> <p>4. Unwithdrawn profits or loss brought forward from last report (item 11 of that report)..... <u>2565.51</u></p> <p>12. Amount withdrawn from surplus (if any)..... <u>2147.91</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TOTAL..... <u>2147.91</u></p>
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<p>13. Total profits as National Bank since organization (less expenses, premiums, losses, etc.)..... <u>47947.91</u></p> <p>14. Add profits of old organization at date of conversion to the national system..... <u>0</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TOTAL..... <u>47947.91</u></p>	<p>15. Total surplus fund proper at date of this report..... <u>12800</u></p> <p>16. Total dividends since organization as National Bank..... <u>33000</u></p> <p>17. Total other profits on hand (same as item 11 of this report)..... <u>2147.91</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TOTAL..... <u>47947.91</u></p>
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State of Idaho County of Adams

I, Josias Robbins, Cashier of the above-named bank, solemnly swear that the above statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15 day of Nov, 1898

Wm. W. Price Notary Public

Josias Robbins Cashier.

FORM 5.—REPORT SHOWING LOSS.

up a large surplus during his flush times to prepare for the dull times. Let me give two examples from my personal experience.

One bank that I was connected with many years ago had for several years unusual opportunities for making money. They built up the surplus required by law, but all the balance was paid out in dividends. For several years the dividends ranged from twenty-five per cent. to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. semi-annually. Their unusual opportunity finally ceased and they were obliged to come

Teller's Cash Feb. 13<sup>th</sup> 1898

	Colln. No.	Collection Detail	General Dr. Items	General Cr. Items	Total Dr.	Total Cr.
Cash Balance						48064.52
General Crs.				8304.61 800.50 507.75 572 178.23 100 100		10216.28
Individual Crs.				100 100 100 100		27819.04
Discounts Dr.			10000	10216.28	10000	
" Cr.				12000		12000
Drafts Drawn				1067.23		1067.23
Exchange				1573		1573
Discount				62.50		62.50
Interest						
Expense			265		265	
General Dr.			1825 100 1874.50 1806.25 165.64 100.74 1250 1000 2007.75 7046.69		7046.69	
Individual Dr.					24227.91	
Balance					52705.67	
					94245.27	94245.27
<u>Cash</u>						
Gold					12000	
Silver				44508		
- fractional				462.50	4970.50	
Legals					3103.5	48005.58
Nickels & Cents						215.22
National Bk. Notes						200.5
Chks. on other Banks						2262.94
Cash Items			25.35 15.34 1.50 12.50 45 51			217.21
						52705.37

FORM 6.—TELLER'S CASH.



down to the level of ordinary banks. Then came business depression and heavy losses, and it was only by superhuman effort and the consolidation with another bank that failure was averted. Had this bank been satisfied to have paid good fair dividends, six per cent. to ten per cent. semi-annual (which would be large for the present day), and laid by a good solid surplus, well invested, it could reasonably have expected to have weathered most any financial storm.

Another bank with which I am personally acquainted took the opposite policy, and in its palmy days carefully nursed its profits and built up its surplus. It has safely gone through all the panics of the last twenty-eight years and to-day is one of the most solid institutions in the country.

#### TELLER'S SETTLEMENT BOOK.

The teller's settlement book is, as its name implies, the book upon which the teller makes his records, and upon which he balances his cash at the close of the day.

In large banks where there are more than one teller, the paying teller being in reality the chief teller, each of the other tellers proves his own cash and then turns it over to the paying teller. The latter besides proving his separate cash makes up a general settlement which must show the total of all the cash in the bank, and this total must agree with the cash balance as called for by the general ledger book-keeper.

The balancing time, after the close of the bank for the day, is generally the anxious time, for the proof of the teller's cash is the test of the correctness of most of the running work for the day. Where the various vouchers taken from the teller's desks have been entered twice and their totals proved by comparison at various periods during the day, there is generally very little trouble in balancing. Sometimes even with care something will be overlooked; then comes the trouble, and the checking back of the work. If after all the entries have been proved to be correct, and correctly footed, the difference still remains, it is pretty conclusive that an error has been made at the tellers' desks either in counting the money on hand, or possibly during the day in paying or receiving.

Where the cash is short or over at the close of the day the teller should enter the item on the proper side of his settlement book with the proper notation; this item given to the general ledger bookkeeper should be entered in his journal and posted to the debit or credit of an account styled "Overs and Shorts Account."

The book which the teller uses with which to balance his cash for the day is called the "settlement book." Where one teller performs all the work, as in most of the banks in the small towns, the book is quite simple in form, as will be seen by Form 6, which is one much in use.

In large banks there is a variety of systems, but I give here some of the best. Those giving the regular transactions for a day's business, where both paying and receiving tellers are employed, show the connection between the two departments. One feature is considered important in the settlement books and that is the proper classification of the money, and the nearer this can conform to the classification required by the Government, either State or National, in the making of reports, the less trouble will be found.

In Form 7 will be seen a book called "first teller's cash details" in which is placed at the close of the day as the cash is counted, the amounts of each character of money, or vouchers representing the same, under or opposite their proper classification. The item at the bottom of the "right-hand page" of this form called "checks" represents the checks of all kinds paid by the paying teller during the day, and the amount is obtained from the check scratchers, either individual or foreign.

Left hand page

First Teller's Cash Details. *April 26/98*

Cash Balance				996	0	65	52
Discount Account		35	94				
Exchange Account							
U. S. Treas. other than 5% Fund							
Temporary Loans							
Clearing House Gold Certif.							
U. S. Treas. Gold Certif.							
U. S. Legal Tender Certif.		45	00				
Due Bills		212	337	25			
Shorts and Overage Account				257	373	19	
				1253	430	71	

FORM 7.

First Teller's Cash Details.

Right hand page

Merchants National Bank

April 26

1898

		U. S. Legal Tender Notes		Silver Certificates	
Vault			50000		90000
\$1000.					
500.					
100.			23000		1000
50.			3000		1000
20.					2000
10.					4500
5.					8900
1's and 2's.					2200
Odd Sum					1329
Mutilated					
Asst. Treasurer's Receipt.					
<i>Mixed</i>			5000		
			83000		110929
		Cash Items			
Temporary Loans			834		
National Bank Notes			534		12000
Nickels and Cents			1034		148741
			3196		
			30		
Gold Coin	Tray		7106	1229250	
	Vault		65	175000	18729250
			12140		
			2130		
U. S. Treas. Gold Certs.			8050		
Clearing House Gold Certs.			34590		
Silver Dollars					2948
Silver Treasury Certs.					110929
Fractional Silver					25727
U. S. Treasury Notes					
Legal Tender Notes					83000
U. S. Certfs. of Dep. for Legal Tender					
U. S. Treas. other than 5% Fund					
Misc, Checks and other Cash Items					34590.
Expenses					22849
Checks					421395830
					82948041
					125343871

Forms 8 and 9 belong to the same set and show the second, or receiving teller's work in balancing.

Form 8 gives the cash details at the close of the day at this teller's desk, and Form 9 shows the receiving teller's settlement. Form 10 shows the teller's general settlement. After each teller has proved his own desk, the work and items of the two are then combined in this book, and this gives the total cash balance of the bank, which as said before, should agree with the balance called for by the general ledger bookkeeper. This book is kept by the first teller.

Forms 7, 8, 9 and 10, all belong to one set, and show one day's actual transactions at the two tellers' desks in one of the best managed large banks in the country.

Form 11 shows the settlement book of a large and very flourishing bank. This is in reality a general settlement similar to the one before shown, but in this case the details of the cash and vouchers are kept on scratchers. The "cash items" are

Second Teller's Cash Details *April 26/98*

Temporary Loans				
National Bk. Notes	5250			
Nickels and Cents	188			
Gold Coin	11750			
Gold Treasury Cts.				
Silver Dollars				
Silver Treasury Cts.	45079			
Fractional Silver Coins	9955			
Legal Tender Notes	3800			5734798
Miscellaneous Checks				
Asst. Treas.	250	Forward	216882	
"	42018	Held Overs	379296	
"	411	Trust Companies	2106529	
"	30	Peoples Sargd.	15915	
"	1230	City Trust	779120	
Guar Trust	600	"	660480	
Floyd	23156	Moore	3250	
Karns	150			
Bell Tel	1309			
Notary	5297			
Bemis	125			
U.S. Exp.	152			
"	75			
Cont Trust	562			
Pa. R.R.	3120			
"	10			
Craig	1740			
Susq. Coal	3250			
Pa. Canal	25			
Tryon	1023			
Mobb	350			
Forward	216882			4164477

written up and footed on narrow strips by use of the arithmometer, and these strips pasted in a scratcher.

The receiving teller makes a separate balance as is seen by Form 12. This book, as will be seen, is used with a stub. The receiving teller notes on the stub the totals of each classification, which should agree in aggregate with the settlement slip. This is his memoranda. The settlement slip is torn from the stub at the perforated

Receiving Teller's Settlement.

April 26<sup>th</sup> 1898

Temporary Loans			
Amount sent to Clearing House	345	590	59
National Bank Notes	5250		
Nickels and Cents			188
Gold Coin	117		50
Gold Treasury Certificates			
Gold Clearing House Certificates			
Silver Dollars			
Silver Treasury Certificates	450	79	
Fractional Silver		99	55
Legal Tender Notes	3800		
U. S. Certs. of Deposit			
Miscellaneous Checks and other Cash Items	416	447	2
	1141	130	52
Checks	699	547	28
	1141	130	52
Individual Deposits	424	849	87
General Deposits	644	110	40
Receipts from Notes	72	170	25
	1141	130	52

End last page

Teller's General Settlement April 26 1898.

Cash Balance				99606552			
Discount Account		3574					
Exchange Account							
U. S. Treas other than 5% Fund							
Temporary Loans							
Clearing House Gold Certfs.							
U. S. Treas. Gold Certfs.							
U. S. Legal Tender Certfs.		45000					
Due Bills		212337	25				
				257373	19		
Second Teller's Receipts				1253	438	71	
				1141	130	52	
				2394	569	23	

FORM 10.

Right hand page.

Teller's General Settlement, April 26 1808

	PAYING TELLER.			RECEIVING TELLER.			TOTAL CASH.				
Temporary Loans											
Amount from 2d Teller } sent to Clearing House }				345	590	59	345	590	59		
National Bank Notes	12	000		5	250		17	250			
Nickels and Cents	1	487	41		188		1	489	29		
Gold Coin	187	292	50		117	50	187	410			
U. S. Treas. Gold Certfs.											
Clearing House Gold Certfs.											
Silver Dollars		2	948					2	948		
Silver Treasury Certfs.	110	929		45	079		156	008			
Fractional Silver	25	727			99	55	258	26	55		
U. S. Treasury Notes											
Legal Tender Notes	83	000		3	800		86	800			
U. S. Certfs. of Deposit for } Legal Tenders }											
U. S. Treas. other than 5% Fund											
Miscellaneous Checks and } other Cash Items }	3	45	90	4	16	47	2	19	62		
Expenses		2	28	49				2	28	49	
Checks	4	23	958	30	4	41	583	24	865	541	54
	8	29	480	41	6	99	547	28	1529	027	69
	12	53	438	71	11	41	130	52	2394	569	23

FORM 10.

Left hand page

First Teller's Settlement <i>July 14</i> 1898			
Cash Balance	3723	565	85
Due to Receiving Teller	1146	035	91
Due Bills	331	886	61
Second Teller's Receipts	5201	488	37
	3340	561	45
	8542	049	85

FORM 11.

line, and really forms a receiving teller's report, which is turned over to the first teller with the money and vouchers representing the same. The first teller enters the amounts as shown by the report in his general settlement in the column marked "receiving teller," and in the column marked "total" is extended the amounts comprised in both tellers' desks, which makes the total cash balance of the bank.

To facilitate an early balance, soon after the closing of the doors, it is extremely necessary that the tellers keep their currency counted pretty closely. This especially applies to the receiving teller who is receiving money of all kinds during the day. As the bills are received they should be assorted according to denominations, and then placed in their proper tills. Another thing to be considered when assorting the notes is to separate the legal tenders from the National bank notes. This is



Right hand page

First Teller's Settlement *July 14* 189*8*

	Paying Teller			Receiving Teller			Total Cash		
Sent to Clearing House				109	1689	87	109	1689	87
Due by Paying Teller	x			114	6035	91			
Due by Receiving Teller									
Cash Items	10	042	50	107	482	10	117	524	60
Nat'l Bank Notes	60	000		16	000		76	000	
Mutilated Currency	58	506					58	506	
Fractional Coin	9	327	5	16	710		1099	85	
Silver Coin	8	280		16	00		9880		
Silver Notes									
Gold Coin	88	380		142	50		88	527	50
Legal Tender Notes	166	690		15	855		182	545	
U. S. Legal Tender Cts.	1100	000					1100	000	
U. S. Gold Cts.	15	000					15	000	
C. H. Gold Cts.	820	000					820	000	
Checks	2027	831	25	2378	972	48	3560	767	82
	287	365	7	12	961	589	3895	246	12
							1146	035	91
	5201	488	37	3340	561	48	8542	049	85

FORM 11.

important, for in computing the reserve of the bank these two classes should be considered differently, the legal tenders (which comprise the "greenbacks"), and the gold certificates and silver certificates, being the class that can be considered as part of the reserve.

In the small banks the receiving teller occupies much of his spare time in putting his money up in packages, the \$1 and \$2 bills in packages of \$100 each, the \$5, \$10 and \$20 bills in packages of \$500 each. These packages are then bunched, ten packages in a bundle, each bundle representing \$1,000 of the small denominations or \$5,000 of the large. In large banks the receiving teller has assistants who are kept busy in this recounting, assorting and bundling of the money.

The coin is put in bags, the bags of gold containing \$5,000 each, and silver dollars in bags containing \$1,000 each. The fractional silver, that is not required for immediate use, is put into smaller bags, generally containing from \$250 to \$500 in a bag. The nickels and pennies not needed for immediate use are also kept in bags or in boxes, as it is very customary to have these put up in rolls containing \$1 each of the former and 25 cents each of the latter. Many banks also have some of their small change put up in quite small bags containing from \$5 to \$25 in each, to facilitate the disbursing of these coins in large numbers when wanted.

7/14/98		Receiving Teller's Settlement		July 14 1898	
1091.689.87 1146.035.91 107.482.10 142.50 1.767.10 16.000. 15.855. 961.589.	Exchanges Due by First Teller Sundries Gold Silver Natl. Bank Notes Legal Tender Notes Checks	1091.689.87 1146.035.91 107.482.10 142.50 1.767.10 16.000. 15.855. 961.589.	Due to First Teller Note Work Scratcher Blotters	271.374.66 1709.236.20 1359.950.62	3340561.48 3340.561.48
		3340	561	48	3340561.48

FORM 12.—RECEIVING TELLER'S SETTLEMENT.

The fact that the gold and silver coins are considered a part of a bank's reserve makes the necessity of keeping this class by itself apparent.

Most banks which handle considerable coin have coin scales, which are so delicately balanced that they will show even the effect of the usual abrasion of the coins, by the short weight. It simplifies the counting of the coin very much to be able to put a bag full upon the scales and judge its value. If a considerable quantity of the coins are old and much worn it is safer to count, as the abrasion may make a difference of several dollars in a bag.

All the features mentioned in this chapter, regarding the best form of teller's books, dividend book and coin scales, together with racks for the stocking of the bills when counted, trays for the coin and to aid in making change, were duly considered by the new bank, and the best being thought to be the cheapest, the selection was made with that in view.

A. R. BARRETT.

**Values the Magazine.**—J. W. McCoy, Cashier of the Bank of New Richmond, Wisconsin, in remitting for a year's subscription, says:

"I have taken the MAGAZINE for eighteen years, and would not want to get along without it.

I am especially interested in the articles on 'Modern Banking Methods,' now running."

**Output of Gold in Russia.** Under a recent date, Consul Smith of Moscow, writes that the total output of the gold mines in Russia for the year 1896 amounted to 1,300,000 ounces.

## EUGENE H. PULLEN.

Eugene Henry Pullen, Vice-President of the National Bank of the Republic, New York, and ex-President of the American Bankers' Association and long a prominent and active member of that organization, died at his home in Brooklyn, New York city, April 29.

Mr. Pullen was a native of Baltimore and was about seventy years of age at the time of his death. He entered the National Bank of the Republic November 5, 1861, was elected Assistant Cashier in 1874, Cashier in 1879, and on March 1, 1892, became Vice-President, Oliver S. Carter, who had held that office, being elected President to succeed Jno. Jay Knox, deceased. His advancement from a subordinate position to a leading place in the management of one of the great city banks was due to his faithful attention to duty and the ability manifested in filling the various offices to which he was successively assigned.

He was Chairman of the Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association for three years, and the ability displayed in this position, combined with his earnest and untiring labors in behalf of the association, led to his promotion as President of the American Bankers' Association, to which office he was elected on October 17, 1895, without solicitation on his part, but in recognition of his services and abilities.

At the time of his death he was Chairman of Group VIII of the New York State Bankers' Association, having been elected to this office in 1898. This group embraces the banks of New York city, and Mr. Pullen appreciated the honor as an expression of confidence on the part of his banking associates.

He was a faithful attendant at the conventions of the American Bankers' Association and has made a number of addresses at these meetings, which were notable for wit and eloquence. His interest in the association was very great and he did much to promote its practical efficiency.

As a banker Mr. Pullen occupied a foremost position, being familiar with the business in its minutest details, and also having a thorough knowledge of the broad general principles of finance. During his long connection with the National Bank of the Republic, embracing a period of almost thirty-eight years of continuous service, he was thoroughly devoted to its interests. It was a matter of pride to him that under his direction so many young men were trained in the bank and fitted for positions of responsibility and trust. He believed that the clerks and subordinates in a bank should share in its prosperity, and that promotions should be made as rapidly as possible, based upon considerations of merit alone.

As a lecturer and contributor to the press, Mr. Pullen was distinguished for a brilliant and epigrammatic style. His literary accomplishments were far beyond the ordinary, and his forceful and eloquent addresses made him a welcome guest at many gatherings, both of those of his own fraternity and others. He was noted for a keen sense of humor, an unselfish disposition and a sympathetic nature.

Mr. Pullen's long experience in banking, combined with natural capacities, further enlarged by study and observation, gave him a high reputation for thorough knowledge and sound judgment in all matters related to bank management. In the social relations of life he possessed qualities which made him esteemed by his friends. His death is a distinct loss to the banking circles of New York, and of the country in general, where he was well known and greatly respected.

The resolutions adopted at a special meeting of the directors of the National Bank of the Republic on May 1, and which are printed below, indicate the high esteem in which Mr. Pullen was held by his banking associates.

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PULLEN.—THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC, MAY 1, 1899.—At a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the National Bank of the Republic of New York, held at its banking house this day, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

“ *Whereas*, We have learned with deep regret the sad intelligence of the death of our former colleague and revered friend, Eugene H. Pullen, Vice-President of this bank; and

*Whereas*, During his connection with this bank as Clerk, Assistant Cashier, Cashier and Vice-President, covering a period of nearly thirty-eight years, he endeared himself to all and commanded our profound respect, admiration and affection.

We, his associates in the board, feel that we cannot express too highly his many noble traits, and consider his loss irreparable. His superior qualities as a man, his firm character, keen intellect, signal ability and high sense of honor, gained for him a position in the financial and business world which many might envy.

His sympathetic nature, kind consideration for those in trouble, his keen judgment and foresight in business matters, were all attributes which raised him to a lofty standard.

He possessed the highest type of noble virtue and gained for himself a name worthy of the greatest praise.

*Resolved*, That in the death of Mr. Pullen we, the members of this board, have lost an efficient officer, wise counsellor, warm and kind friend.

*Resolved*, That this tribute to his worth and this expression of our sorrow be recorded on the minutes of this board, and that a copy of these proceedings, officially signed by the President and Cashier, be transmitted to his family, to whom we extend our heartfelt sympathy in this their great bereavement.”

OLIVER S. CARTER, *President*.

CHARLES H. STOUT, *Cashier*.

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## BOOK NOTICES.

NOTABLE NEW YORKERS. By Moses King; New York: Moses King.

This is a volume of 616 pages, printed and bound in the most attractive style. It contains 2337 portraits of well-known New Yorkers in almost every walk of life, accompanied by a brief but sufficiently comprehensive reference to the portrait, giving in two lines a clear statement of who each person is and the important facts in his career.

It is a fine portrait gallery of noted men, requiring great care and labor in its production, and will prove permanently valuable for reference.

Bankers and financial men of note are fully represented in the volume.

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FINANCIAL NEW YORK: a History of the Banking and Financial Institutions of the Metropolis. By William Ten Eyck Hardenbrook. New York and Chicago: Franklin Publishing Co.

This compilation of the banking and financial history of New York is, perhaps, the most elaborate and costly work of its kind ever published. As a history of the noted banks and bankers of New York from the earliest times to the present, embracing a record of much of the important history of banking in the country, this is a work of great value. It is embellished by numerous full-page portraits of notable bankers and financiers. The letter-press contains a large amount of trustworthy information, and the illustrations are of superior excellence.

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GROWTH OF A SAVINGS DEPOSIT.—Without saying a single little word about it to anyone, not even the one benefited, twenty-nine years ago a benevolent person deposited \$400 to the credit of a man in one of the Springfield, Mass., banks. Recently the bank paid out nearly \$1,900 on account of it.—*American Investments*.

## STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATIONS.

### REPORTS OF RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE MEETINGS.

#### ARKANSAS BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The ninth annual convention of the Arkansas Bankers' Association opened at Little Rock April 20. Hon. J. H. Harrod made the address of welcome, and W. K. Ramsey, Cashier of the Ouachita Valley Bank, Camden, responded.

President Faulkner in his annual address referred to a number of matters of practical interest, such as reciprocal drafts, State clearing-house, and the need of a State banking law, speaking on the latter point in part as follows :

"There should certainly be prepared a code of good banking laws and an effort made to get the Legislature to pass them. There have been several bills introduced as banking bills, and I do not doubt that if an effort had been made suitable amendments would have been allowed, and such a bill as would have been approved by all conservative bankers secured. I regard it as necessary that some action be taken, for the credit of the State is often questioned, when we are compelled to say that banks are governed by a corporation law. I have never been able to understand why a body of men who are usually so alive to their own interests as the Arkansas Legislature have not demanded a wise banking law, that they could easily construe and understand—for a law of this kind would protect the commercial interests of the State and insure lower interest rates.

While I realize that an effort in this direction might cause many inconveniences to some of the banks, still it would strengthen our credit among the financial institutions in the East and be the means of making all banks that are not solvent get out of business.

I hope the progress and enterprise of our business men will be so clearly demonstrated that the Legislature will realize that capital must have fair laws to remain active, and new enterprises seeking investment can only be secured when there is confidence that the laws controlling it will not be repealed. I hope the day is not far distant when this association will feel disposed to give this matter consideration."

In conclusion Mr. Faulkner said :

"I think the banks have just cause to be thankful for their success during the past year. Not a bank has failed, and all seem to be enjoying the utmost prosperity. With such a record before us our aim should certainly be to enact legislation that will help us to continue."

At the second day's session of the convention there was an increased attendance. Treasurer W. H. Gee, Cashier of the Dardanelle Bank, reported as follows : Received from ex-treasurer, \$216.08 ; dues paid, \$620 ; less forty per cent. to protective fund, \$248 ; disbursements, \$379.30 ; balance, \$208.78.

Judge Jacob Trieber, of Little Rock, delivered a comprehensive address on "The Effect of the Present Bankrupt Law." He thought that, upon the whole, the law is a good one, and that whatever defects are discovered by experience will be remedied by Congress.

In view of the recent passage of an anti-trust law by the Legislature, which has had the effect of driving fire insurance companies out of the State, a resolution was passed asking the Governor to remit the prescribed penalties imposed upon the insurance companies until the matter could be finally passed on by the courts. [The law has been declared unconstitutional since the convention adjourned.]

The following were appointed as a committee to present the resolutions to Governor Jones :

W. K. Ramsey, Cashier Ouachita Valley Bank, Camden ; W. H. Gee, Cashier

Dardanelle Bank ; C. T. Walker, Cashier Bank of Little Rock ; B. H. Kuhl, President State Bank, Texarkana ; J. L. Ward, Cashier Bank of Osceola.

The committee on the president's address made the following report, which was adopted :

"We, your committee on president's address, beg leave to report that we have carefully examined same and heartily commend his prompt action in placing funds through the Arkansas Bankers' Association at the services of the Governor in the time of the State's great need for money to properly organize the patriotic volunteers of the State for service in the late Spanish war.

We admire the president's love for his child, the reciprocal draft, and feel assured that if this infant was properly nurtured by the association it might soon grow to such proportions as would prove beneficial to each and all of us.

We agree with him that the State of Arkansas should have a proper and well-guarded banking law, one that would be fair to depositors as well as the banks.

As to a State clearing-house, we hardly think the time propitious to inaugurate the plan suggested by the president.

We heartily agree with him that the interests of our association should be to a greater extent manifested by the bankers of the State, and we suggest that each member constitute himself a committee of one to endeavor to promote this interest among the banks who have not yet joined. We admit if proper interest had been shown in the State association the group system suggested by the president might be successfully operated, but we doubt the advisability of attempting it now.

We commend the zeal and fidelity of our retiring president. He has left nothing undone to promote the growth and usefulness of our association so far as lay in his power, and the thanks of the association are certainly due him. Most respectfully submitted.

W. K. RAMSEY, CHAS. N. BIL,

I. J. STACY,

Committee."

The committee on nominations made the following report, which was adopted :  
 President—W. Y. Foster, President Hempstead County Bank, Hope.  
 First Vice-President—John G. Fletcher, President German National Bank, Little Rock.

Second Vice-President—Charles McKee, Cashier Bank of Fordyce.

Third Vice-President—J. W. Underwood, Cashier German-American Bank, Stuttgart.

Fourth Vice-President—I. J. Stacy, Cashier Bank of Augusta.

Fifth Vice-President—W. R. Cherry, Cashier Bank of Paris.

Sixth Vice-President—S. A. Pernot, Cashier Crawford County Bank, Van Buren.  
 Secretary—M. H. Johnson, Little Rock.

Treasurer—A. B. Colvin, Cashier Bank of Beebe.

Members of Executive Council—Geo. T. Sparks, President First National Bank, Fort Smith, three years ; J. S. Pollock, Cashier Exchange National Bank, Little Rock, to fill unexpired term of W. Y. Foster.

Delegates to American Bankers' Association—S. S. Faulkner, Cashier First National Bank, Helena ; F. H. Head, Cashier Merchants and Planters' Bank, Pine Bluff, alternate.

The new president, Mr. Foster, was pleasantly introduced by Mr. Faulkner, and accepted the honor in a fitting speech.

After the usual resolutions of thanks the convention adjourned.

#### FLORIDA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The Florida Bankers' Association met at Jacksonville April 19, it being the ninth yearly meeting. President Bion H. Barnett called the convention to order and made a brief address. Secretary T. W. Conrad presented his annual report, and the treasurer's statement was also read. There was an interesting general discussion of matters of interest to the banks of the State. A committee was appointed to protest

against the charges for collecting country checks, imposed by the New York Clearing-House. Hereafter the expenses of the association will be met by an annual assessment of the members, not to exceed \$5 each.

Officers were chosen for the ensuing year as follows :

President—E. T. Shubrick, Vice-President National Bank of the State of Florida, Jacksonville

Vice-Presidents—(first), F. W. Hoyt, President First National Bank, Fernandina; (second), George Lewis, President First National Bank, Tallahassee; (third), E. P. Branch, Cashier Melbourne State Bank.

Secretary and Treasurer—Wm. Rawlinson, Cashier Commercial Bank, Jacksonville.

Executive Committee—Frank E. Bond, Cashier Volusia County Bank, De Land; Henry G. Aird, Cashier State Bank of Florida, Jacksonville; Arthur F. Perry, Treasurer Southern Savings and Trust Co., Jacksonville.

#### MISSOURI BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The annual Convention of the Missouri Bankers' Association will be held at Kansas City, Mo., May 24 and 25.

#### IOWA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

A meeting of the council of administration of the Iowa State Bankers' Association was held at Council Bluffs, April 6, at which a programme was arranged for the next annual convention to be held at Burlington, June 14 and 15. Hon. James H. Eckels, former Comptroller of the Currency, and now President of the Commercial National Bank, Chicago, will be one of the speakers.

**Increase in Exports of Manufactures.**—No other feature of the wonderful success of American manufacturers in foreign markets has been quite so wonderful as that pertaining to iron and steel. While the exportation of manufactures in the fiscal year 1899 is likely to show an increase of more than \$30,000,000 over that of last year, that of iron and steel alone will supply more than one-half that increase. In the eight months of the fiscal year for which the Treasury Bureau of Statistics figures are now available, the exports of iron and steel are nearly \$16,000,000 greater than in the corresponding months of the preceding fiscal year, and show a gain of thirty-six per cent. over those of last year, and nearly seventy per cent. over those of the preceding year. In importations of iron and steel there is a reduction as compared with last year, though not in so marked a degree, the falling off in imports for the eight months being but ten per cent., while the corresponding period of last year showed a reduction of twenty per cent.

The following figures show the imports and exports of manufactures of iron and steel in the eight months ending with February in each of the last three fiscal years :

FISCAL YEAR.	Imports.	Exports.
Eight months of 1897.....	\$10,517,588	\$35,781,809
Eight months of 1898.....	8,397,977	42,864,262
Eight months of 1899.....	7,564,958	58,377,784

Nearly all of the great classes of iron and steel manufactures show an increase over last year. Exports of wire nails, of which the exportation in eight months of the fiscal year 1898 was 16,133,325 pounds, in eight months of 1899 were 28,997,735 pounds; exports of bars or rods of steel increased from 18,720,798 pounds to 37,708,442 pounds; steel plates and sheets, from 13,523,675 pounds to 64,784,626 pounds, and wire from 80,054,200 pounds to 126,858,949 pounds.

Railway engines show an increase of nearly thirty per cent., the value of those exported in the eight months of this fiscal year being \$3,178,642, against \$2,260,570 in the corresponding months of last year, and \$1,958,278 in the same months of the preceding year, and in exports of electrical and metal working machinery an equally large increase is apparent.

## THE BEST BOOKS ON BANKING.

*From the "New York Times," April 10.*

"We have received the following note from a young man in one of the interior towns of Pennsylvania:

'Knowing you to be well versed in financial matters, I would be greatly indebted to you if you could furnish me with a list of a few good books on finance, viz., our monetary system, its origin and growth: banking, stocks, bonds, etc. I am a bookkeeper in a bank at this place (a young man, twenty-one), and wish to fit myself for something higher than an ordinary bank clerk. There are a great many books which give certain phases of a single question, but when one hasn't facts they do very little good in enlightening a person. What I want to get is a general knowledge of finance.'

Despite the confidence of our correspondent in our acquaintance with financial matters, we thought it better to refer his request to some one of practical experience in the calling for which he evidently wishes to prepare himself. The gentleman of whose kindness we were able to avail ourselves is the President of a prominent and highly successful bank. He is, moreover, one who takes a broad view of his profession, and personally illustrates his conviction that it is a science as well as an art, repaying the application of intelligent generalization based on thorough study. The books which it was agreed would most nearly serve the purpose of our correspondent are:

'Patten's Practical Banking' (New York, Bradford Rhodes & Co., 78 William Street); 'Money and Banking, Illustrated by American History,' by Horace White (New York, Ginn & Co., 1895); 'Corporation Finance—A Study of the Principles and the Methods of the Management of the Finances of Corporations in the United States, with Special Reference to the Valuation of Corporation Securities,' by Thomas L. Greene (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898); 'Economics—An Account of the Relations Between Private Property and Public Welfare,' by Arthur Twining Hadley, Professor of Political Economy in Yale University (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898).

There are, of course, numerous other books bearing on the inquiry of our correspondent, but these seem fairly to cover his purpose.

It will be noticed that the list contains only one book relating entirely to practical banking in detail. \* \* \* If a young man have the intelligence and industry and ambition to master the practical part of the calling, the broader his knowledge of its general principles and its wider relations the greater success he is likely to attain. And at this point we shall take the liberty to allude to an incident in the history of the bank President to whom we are indebted for counsel in this matter. When he was a mere lad his father put in his hands a book long since out of print, written by an English gentleman, Mr. James William Gilbart, the General Manager of the London and Westminster Bank, then and still one of the great joint stock banks of England. It was entitled 'A Treatise on Banking,' and in its pages our friend found a passage that determined the course of his business career. It ran in part as follows:

'If a clerk is intended to be trained for a manager, it may be questioned whether he will be improved by remaining a long time as a clerk. The two offices are very distinct and they call into operation distinct qualities and operations of the mind. A very old banker's clerk (unless he has been a chief clerk) is generally, from the very length of his service, disqualified



for being a manager. Seven to ten years' experience as a clerk is quite long enough, and after that period, the sooner he becomes a manager the better, provided he has the necessary qualifications.'

The reasons for this view were given and the young reader was so impressed by them that he made up his mind that he would not remain a clerk any longer than he was compelled. It is needless to say that he was under no delusion as to the possibility of rising from a clerkship until he had thoroughly mastered its duties. But it was his experience as it has since been his observation that the clerk is the best who is most firmly resolved to fit himself for a higher position. He has proved his faith in this proposition since by steadily encouraging and advising those under him to act upon it until his bank is known in the city as a training school for bank officers, from which a very large number of successful men have been graduated. The principle is a sound one, and it is at the foundation of the success of more than one institution in the business life of the country."

**Condition of the National Banks.**

Abstract of reports of condition of National banks in the United States on December 1, 1898, February 4, 1899 and April 5, 1899. Total number of banks December 1, 1898, 3,560; February 4, 1899, 3,579; April 5, 1899, 3,583.

RESOURCES.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,214,394,838	\$2,299,041,947	\$2,403,410,895
Overdrafts.....	22,074,456	18,542,345	17,945,729
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	238,586,260	235,209,290	233,731,140
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	95,528,020	89,100,240	89,200,540
U. S. bonds on hand.....	29,224,060	25,028,370	22,154,400
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	19,859,781	19,061,207	18,589,916
Stocks, securities, etc.....	259,135,309	276,704,595	300,281,257
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	79,190,505	79,173,842	79,006,522
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	30,965,488	30,583,528	30,900,209
Due from National banks.....	195,886,881	208,074,179	213,213,074
Due from State banks and bankers.....	56,246,803	60,391,784	58,340,492
Due from approved reserve agents.....	359,371,346	432,085,501	412,677,297
Checks and other cash items.....	19,223,078	17,056,884	18,806,769
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	194,981,281	75,672,644	212,818,211
Bills of other National banks.....	22,092,333	20,650,964	20,711,021
Fractional currency, nickels and cents.....	1,016,620	1,107,636	1,109,785
Specie.....	328,600,711	371,843,494	364,162,552
Legal-tender notes.....	117,845,702	116,003,066	110,235,423
U. S. certificates of deposit.....	17,905,000	21,140,000	19,820,000
Five per cent. redemption fund.....	10,484,284	10,286,903	10,306,883
Due from Treasurer U. S.....	2,181,696	2,174,649	1,736,037
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,313,394,519</b>	<b>\$4,403,883,073</b>	<b>\$4,639,138,160</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$620,516,245	\$608,301,245	\$607,362,570
Surplus fund.....	246,695,552	247,522,450	246,169,893
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes.....	94,403,831	86,439,845	93,687,856
National bank notes outstanding.....	207,063,317	203,636,184	203,820,270
State bank notes outstanding.....	55,107	53,112	53,110
Due to other National banks.....	521,988,336	600,964,563	599,170,922
Due to State banks and bankers.....	272,965,525	312,136,056	333,177,342
Dividends unpaid.....	1,243,005	1,455,443	1,932,494
Individual deposits.....	2,325,289,813	2,232,193,156	2,437,223,420
U. S. deposits.....	88,324,695	81,120,873	81,340,227
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	5,580,659	5,502,537	5,832,609
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	4,131,642	1,752,621	1,620,476
Bills payable.....	6,076,208	3,383,891	5,675,587
Liabilities other than those above.....	19,050,578	19,421,062	22,162,378
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,313,394,519</b>	<b>\$4,403,883,073</b>	<b>\$4,639,138,160</b>

A comparison of these reports shows a marked decline in the capital of the National banks of the country, there having been a loss of over \$13,000,000 since December 1 last. Both deposits and loans show substantial gains, and compared with the previous statement there is an increase of four in the number of banks, though the number is still seven less than on December 1.

## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[All books mentioned in the following notices will be supplied at the publishers' lowest rates on application to BRADFORD RHODES & CO., 78 William Street, New York.]

A. B. C. UNIVERSAL COMMERCIAL ELECTRIC TELEGRAPHIC CODE. By W. CLAUSON-THUL, F. R. G. S. Fourth edition. Price, \$5.

The great economy resulting from the use of a properly arranged telegraphic code is such as to recommend its general adoption by all who have occasion to make extensive use of the telegraph. In communicating with foreign countries a code is almost indispensable, and it will also be found valuable for purposes of domestic communication. It condenses a message by means of representative words, one word often standing for an entire sentence. The arrangement of the words and their meaning is so simple and logical as to make the sending or translation of a message an easy operation.

DICTIONNAIRE DU COMMERCE, DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DE LA BANQUE. Publié sous la direction de MM. YVES GUYOT et A. RAFFALOVICH. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie. Each part, 3 francs.

The energy and system with which French economists keep pace with the current of events, in their literature as well as their work, is indicated by the new "Dictionnaire du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de la Banque," which is coming out under the direction of Prof. Yves Guyot, the former Minister of Public Works, and M. Arthur Raffalovich, the financial representative of the Russian Government in Paris. Both the editors are men whose names carry weight in economic circles and they have secured the aid of a circle of well-known students and writers, each upon his specialties. The new Governor of the Bank of France, M. Georges Palain, who was formerly Director of Customs, appears as one of the contributors to the first part, on the temporary admission of articles for manufacture and exportation upon which import duties are remitted. M. André Liesse, who has edited the new edition of Courcelle-Seneuil's "Opérations de Banque," M. Raphael Georges Lévy, Professor at the School of Political Science; M. Alfred Neymarck, the editor of "Le Rentier;" M. A. De Foville, the Director of the French Mint; and M. Charles Gomel, whose polished works upon the financial causes of the French Revolution having been attracting so much attention, are among the contributors whose names are best known on this side of the Atlantic, but there are many others of equal competence.

The new dictionary is almost a necessity for a student of economics who desires to keep pace with events, but it differs very considerably from the dictionary of political economy issued in 1891 by the same house. It deals with facts rather than theories in the main, but discusses fully such subjects as the management of the Bourse, changes in the banking laws, and operations in foreign exchange. The purpose of the work, as set forth in the announcement of the editors, is "eminently practical, precise and concise, to the exclusion of the merely curious, and of historical matter which is not useful in the explanation of actual conditions." It is a commercial dictionary, in respect to giving the definition of the leading articles of wholesale commerce; the place of origin; the manner of production or manufacture; the statistics of production and consumption; tariff rates; variations of price and commercial usages. There is also a complete gazetteer of places which play an important part in commerce, with reference to their industries, shipping, railway, canals, foreign trade and commercial usages. The articles are frankly French in regard to matters of commercial law and practice, but foreign usages are set forth briefly in connection with foreign products and places of production. The work will be issued in about sixteen parts, of which five have already appeared.

## RUSSIAN MONETARY REFORM.

The following statement in regard to the accomplishment of monetary reform in Russia is taken from the official Report made to the Emperor on the Budget of the Empire for 1899:

"During the year, the important operation of reforming the currency was completed by Your Imperial Majesty's Decree of March 27, by which all transactions were to be settled in roubles, value  $\frac{1}{4}$  of an imperial, and which defined the limits of coining silver, and of the amount to which private persons are obliged to receive it as legal tender; at the same time, this concluded the measures for the actual transition of this country from the use of a paper currency to a metallic one. Thus, the wise reform undertaken by Your Imperial Majesty has been carried out: the currency of the Russian Empire has been brought into order, and placed on as firm a basis as the currency of countries where this branch of the national economy has for a long time been in a model condition. The best proof of this will be found in the comparison of the figures for 1897 and 1898, of the metallic reserve in the Treasury and State bank, as well as the sums of the principal kinds of money in circulation (amounts in roubles):

	1897.	1898.	Increase or decrease.
<b>GOLD.</b>			
In State Bank and Treasury.....	1,315,000,000	1,146,000,000	*169,000,000
In circulation.....	155,000,000	445,000,000	290,000,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>1,470,000,000</b>	<b>1,591,000,000</b>	<b>121,000,000</b>
<b>STANDARD SILVER.</b>			
In State Bank and Treasury.....	63,000,000	48,000,000	*15,000,000
In circulation.....	99,000,000	142,000,000	43,000,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>162,000,000</b>	<b>190,000,000</b>	<b>28,000,000</b>
<b>BANK NOTES.</b>			
In State Bank and Treasury.....	60,000,000	41,800,000	*27,200,000
In circulation.....	930,000,000	683,200,000	*246,800,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>990,000,000</b>	<b>725,000,000</b>	<b>*274,000,000</b>

\* Decrease.

The above figures bear witness to two very important and highly favorable results obtained in 1898.

First of all, standard coin (chiefly gold) is attaining the most prominent position in the circulation: of the total amount of money (including token money)—1,355 million roubles, 33 per cent., falls to the share of gold, and 10 per cent. to that of silver; if one bears in mind that only some three years ago, at the beginning of January, 1896, bank notes and token coinage formed 98 per cent of the money in circulation, and that there was less than 2 per cent. of gold and standard silver, then the success attained in this respect must be acknowledged as very great.

Secondly, during the year 1898, there has been an increase in the general amount of gold in the country, and likewise in the gold covering fund: in 1897 this was 141 per cent., while at present it amounts to 168 per cent.

The bank notes issued into circulation in Russia are guaranteed far more strictly by a gold covering fund than is the case with foreign banks of issue. By our law, an issue of notes to the amount of 600 million roubles must be covered by a gold fund of no less than 300 million roubles; over the amount of 600 million roubles, the notes are to be covered by gold, rouble for rouble. According to this law, the 683 million roubles of bank notes issued into circulation must be covered by a gold fund of 383 million roubles. Now, the amount of gold in the State bank (not to mention the gold in the Treasury—140 million roubles) exceeds this sum by 623 million roubles. From this it will be evident how unfounded are the fears that there will be a flow of gold out of the country, to an extent that may threaten the stability of the cashing of notes in gold."

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc.**, under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—Owing to increasing business the National Park Bank has added another Vice-President to its official staff, Albert H. Wiggin, Vice-President of the Elliot National Bank, of Boston, being elected to that position on May 2. Edward E. Poor, President of the National Park, has been in poor health for some time and the active management has devolved upon Vice-President Richard Delafield.

Mr. Wiggin began his business career in 1885, when he entered a private banking house in Boston, remaining there eight months. From there he went to the National Bank of the Commonwealth, of which Mr. A. L. Newman was at that time President. He remained with this bank six years, serving in various clerical positions, through all the different departments. In 1891 he was appointed Assistant to National Bank Examiner Alfred Ewer, and was with him in the Boston District for three years. In 1894 Mr. Ewer was transferred to the Massachusetts District and had no use for an Assistant. After a few months Mr. Wiggin was appointed Assistant Cashier of the Third National Bank of Boston, where he remained two years and a half, and from that position went into the Elliot National Bank as Vice-President, which position he now holds. As above stated he has just been elected to the Vice-Presidency of the National Park Bank of this city, and will divide the duties of that office.

Though but about thirty-five years of age Mr. Wiggin has had extensive experience in banking and has shown himself capable of successful bank management. He will prove a valuable addition to the already strong official staff of the National Park Bank.

—Payment of the \$20,000,000 indemnity due from the United States to Spain, under the provisions of the Paris treaty, has been made through the National City Bank, in cooperation with the Deutsche Bank, of Berlin. This large international transfer of money was made without the shipment of any gold and without disturbing the local money market. That a transaction of such magnitude has been attended with so little difficulty is an evidence of skillful management of the affair by the National City Bank.

—William W. Sherman, President of the National Bank of Commerce, has resigned with a request that his resignation be acted upon not later than July 1, when he will have been in the service of the Bank of Commerce forty-one years. He began as assistant to the receiving teller. In 1862 he was elected President. He broke his hip last summer on the swimming float at his country place, and since then he has not been in the best of health.

—The dealings at the New York Clearing-House on April 10 broke all records in magnitude, aggregating \$352,882,567, with resulting balances amounting to \$17,345,452, a little less than five per cent.

—It is reported that the North American Trust Co. has appointed Frank M. Hays, formerly Receiver of the Keystone National Bank, Erie, Pa., as Manager of the Havana office of the Company.

—At a meeting of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, April 12, resolutions were adopted in opposition to the recent clearing-house rule in regard to charging for collecting country checks.

—Extensive additions and alterations of the offices of the National City Bank, 52 Wall street, have been made necessary by the bank's increasing business. There are rumors that this bank may possibly absorb one or more large banking institutions in the near future.

—The Fulton Bank, of the Borough of Brooklyn, has been purchased by the Mechanics' Bank with which it will be consolidated, and the former bank will ultimately go out of business. Generous provision has been made by the directors of the Fulton Bank for its employees. They have been given substantial cash presents and will be assisted in securing other employment.

—H. C. Hoskier has been admitted as a partner in the firm of F. S. Smithers & Co.

—The new Broadway Branch of the Corn Exchange Bank was opened on May 1 at Broadway and Spring street. Capital, surplus and profits of this bank now aggregate \$3,062,145.

—Having arranged to erect a new building on the site of its present building at Broadway and Cedar street, the American Exchange National Bank has removed into temporary quarters at 115 Broadway.

—A meeting of the shareholders of the Franklin National Bank was held April 19, and the question of placing the bank in liquidation was voted on and failed to carry. The report of a committee of shareholders, appointed to consider means of promoting the interests of the bank, recommended an increase of the capital from \$200,000 to \$500,000 and the creation of a surplus fund of \$100,000. These proposals are to be voted on May 25.

—It is the custom of Messrs. Spencer Trask & Co. to distribute a share of the annual profits among the firm's employees. The cash distribution made on May 1 is reported to have been equal to 100 per cent. of salaries paid for the year.

—At a quarterly meeting of the trustees of the American Surety Co., April 12, Henry B. Lyman, for the past fourteen years first Vice-President, was elected President to succeed Walter S. Johnston, who has become President of the State Trust Co.

—The new Union Surety and Guaranty Co., which it is reported has absorbed the Citizens' Trust and Surety Co., of Philadelphia, has elected these officers: President, James A. Roberts; Vice-President, Frederick B. Esler; Treasurer, D. N. Morgan.

—Permission has been given the Hamilton Bank by the Superintendent of the Banking Department to open a branch on Amsterdam avenue, between 144th and 145th streets.

—Edmund Pavenstedt, of the banking house of Muller, Schall & Co., is one of the incorporators of the American Colonial Banking Company, the charter for which was recently granted at Charleston, W. Va. The company will establish a bank at San Juan, Porto Rico. The authorized capital is \$1,000,000. It is expected that the bank will begin operations immediately.

—At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Indianapolis Monetary Convention held at the Chamber of Commerce rooms April 8, the following resolution was adopted unanimously:

*Resolved*, That the Executive Committee of the Indianapolis Monetary Convention continue to urge upon Congress the adoption of a monetary system based upon the gold standard, adequate in volume and sufficiently flexible in character to afford the legitimate means to our producers and manufacturers for meeting the rapidly expanding volume of domestic trade, and for competing upon equal terms in the world's markets with other nations, thereby giving full employment and just returns to American labor.

The meeting was called by Chairman H. H. Hanna of Indianapolis.

—Residents in the Flatbush district of the city, Borough of Brooklyn, have taken steps preliminary to the organization of a new trust company, capitalized at \$200,000 with \$50,000 paid-in surplus.

—Capital stock of the new Williamsburg Trust Co., in the Borough of Brooklyn, will be \$700,000, and the surplus \$350,000—an increase of \$200,000 and \$100,000 respectively over the amounts previously reported.

—A meeting of the Executive Committee of Group VI, New York State Bankers' Association, was held at the Hotel Manhattan April 8, the following members of the committee being present: David Cromwell, President White Plains Bank; Bradford Rhodes, President Mamaroneck Bank; F. D. Dewey, Cashier First National Bank of Rondout, Kingston; C. A. Pugsley, President Westchester County National Bank, Peekskill. Others present were: Wm. H. Doty, President First National Bank, Yonkers; Peter J. Elting, Vice-President Citizens' National Bank, Yonkers; Frank Barber, Cashier Sullivan County National Bank, Liberty; T. Ellwood Carpenter, President Mount Kisco National Bank; Chas. F. Van Inwegen, President First National Bank, Port Jervis, and chairman of the group.

There was a general discussion of the recent action of the New York Clearing-House Association in imposing a charge for the collection of country checks, but no action was taken or proposed.

It was decided to hold the regular spring meeting in the latter part of May or early in June, in New York.

—It is probable that a large bank and office building will be erected by the Mercantile National Bank on its present site and adjoining property recently purchased.

—The Trust Company of America is reported to be organizing with \$2,500,000 paid-in capital and the same amount of surplus. Branches will be established in various parts of the country, according to reports.

—Another big trust company is said to be in course of organization, and it will endeavor to take up some of the securities of the old Equitable Mortgage Co.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—At the annual meeting of the Boston Clearing-House Association, April 10, the former managing officers were re-elected. For the year ending March 31, the exchanges were \$5,774,567,078, an increase of \$348,969,909 over the previous year.

—On April 13 Harold Murdock, Cashier of the National Exchange Bank, was elected President to succeed the late Edward L. Tead. Charles A. Price, Assistant Cashier, was promoted as Mr. Murdock's successor, and Frank Houghton was chosen Assistant Cashier.

—A special meeting of the shareholders of the Third National Bank was held April 5, at which it was decided to reduce the capital from \$2,000,000 to \$1,500,000, the difference being returned to the shareholders in cash.

—The National Bank of the Republic has moved into large and well-appointed banking rooms in the building of the Mutual Life Insurance Co. at 95 Milk street.

—At the annual meeting of the Boston Clearing-House Association, April 10 the constitution was amended to provide for the organization of a sub-clearing-house for the collection of checks, and the clearing-house committee was given full power to proceed with the organization. A committee was appointed to select a site for a new clearing-house, to be owned by the association. Under the new plan New England checks not available at the Boston Clearing-House may be deposited with the managers of the new clearing-house for collection, and the proceeds of such items shall be discharged through the regular morning settlement. Each bank is to pay \$125 annually, and the expenses beyond this amount will be assessed pro rata.

Country banks are asked to remit at par for checks on their banks presented through this sub-clearing-house. Under this plan it appears that the Boston banks are to bear the expense of sorting the checks and sending them to the drawee banks for redemption, the latter banks to remit to Boston without charge for exchange.

**Woonsocket, R. I.**—Hon. Latimer W. Ballou, who has been Cashier of the Woonsocket Falls Bank and the Woonsocket National Bank for forty-nine years, having reached the age of eighty-seven, has retired from active duty, though still remaining a director. E. C. Francis, formerly Assistant Cashier, is Mr. Ballou's successor.

**Savings Bank to Close.**—At a meeting of the trustees of the People's Dime Savings Bank, Middletown, Ct., March 30, it was practically decided to request all depositors to withdraw their deposits. It is an old institution, but of late years has not been receiving new deposit accounts.

**Appointed Bank Examiner.**—David N. Williams, for eighteen years teller in the Home National Bank, Meriden, Ct., was recently appointed National bank examiner for the district comprising Connecticut and Rhode Island.

**Bank in New Quarters.**—The First National Bank, of Hillsborough Bridge, N. H., moved into its new building on April 22. The new rooms are large and well arranged for banking purposes, vaults of modern construction forming an important part of the equipment. Part of the rooms are occupied by the Savings bank, which has separate vaults.

**Bank to Resume.**—The Colebrook (N. H.) Savings Bank, which was forced to suspend some time ago, will resume soon.

A new National bank has been organized in place of the Colebrook National Bank. It will be called the Farmers and Traders' National.

**Providence, R. I.**—The twenty-eighth anniversary of the Bank Clerk's Mutual Benefit Association was celebrated April 18, about 400 being present. President John W. Vernon reported that the association has a membership of 313. Governor Dyer and Congressman A. B. Capron were among the speakers, the latter giving it as his opinion that a satisfactory currency reform measure would be enacted by the Congress which assembles next December.

**Bank Without Books.**—It is said that the Granite State Savings Bank, which opened for business a short time ago at Milford, N. H., will keep accounts with depositors by cards, no books being used except a day cash book. This is said to be the fourth bank in the State to adopt the system.

### MIDDLE STATES.

**Baltimore.**—It was recently reported that the Traders' National Bank had been bought by a syndicate, par being paid for the stock. The bank was organized at Annapolis, twenty-eight years ago, but removed to this city three years after it was started. Capital is \$200,000 and surplus and profits, \$32,908. Deposits were about \$420,000.

—Webster Bell, assistant teller of the National Union Bank of Maryland, has been appointed Assistant Manager of the Baltimore Clearing-House Association.

—The Fraternal Trust and Banking Co., according to reports, will absorb the United States Trust Co. Capital will be \$500,000 of the par value of \$10, sold at \$12.50, making a paid-in surplus of \$125,000.

—Richard B. Sellman, who has been Cashier of the National Farmers and Planters' Bank for over fifteen years, has resigned to become Secretary and Treasurer of the Realty Trust Company.

—It is announced that the National Mechanics' Bank, which has absorbed the National Farmers and Planters' Bank, will hereafter occupy the building in which the latter has heretofore done business.

—The Maryland Casualty Company will increase its capital from \$500,000 to \$750,000.

—Directors of the Guardian Trust and Deposit Company recently recommended an increase in the capital from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000, to be issued at \$130 a share. An eight or ten-story building will be erected on its property.

—The International Trust Company is a new corporation with \$3,000,000 capital and \$1,500,000 surplus. Messrs. Middendorf, Oliver & Co., of this city, John L. Williams & Sons, of Richmond, Va., and John E. Searles, of New York, are prominently connected with the new enterprise.

—Messrs. Sperry, Jones & Co., are interested in promoting the organization of the new Mortgage and Trust Co., which will have \$3,000,000 capital. It is the intention not to do a banking business, but to confine operations to trust company functions.

—It is stated that at the recent quarterly meeting of the Mercantile Trust and Deposit Company the reports showed net profits for the quarter amounting to \$1,300,000. On a capital, surplus and profits of \$4,000,000 this is equal to 130 per cent. a year. Doubtless these unusual profits were due to the financing of large reorganizations.

—Banking here appears to be undergoing a general readjustment, the latest move being the organization of the Atlantic Trust Company, which is reported to have purchased the Traders' National Bank, which it will be intimately related to, but will not absorb.

**Philadelphia.**—The April 5th statement of the Fourth Street National Bank showed deposits of \$25,000,024.

—Capital of the new Ridge Avenue Bank will be \$150,000 instead of \$100,000 as at first intended.

**Pittsburg, Pa.**—On April 24 the new banking building of the Union Trust Company was opened for business, and was visited by about 8,000 friends and patrons, President James S. McKean and Secretary Wm. A. Carr receiving the visitors. The formal opening of the building took place on May 10. It is a handsome and well-appointed structure. An armor-plate money vault is a conspicuous feature of the counting-room.

**Change in Cashiers.**—John A. Evans was recently elected Cashier of the Harford National Bank, Belair, Md., to succeed Wm. W. Finney, resigned.

**New Trust Companies.**—The Trust Company of New Jersey, Jersey City, is a new institution with \$100,000 capital.

—The Trust and Safe Deposit, Title and Guarantee Company is being organized at Elizabeth, N. J., to have a capital of not less than \$250,000.

**Albany, N. Y.**—The Albany Savings Bank, next to the oldest Savings bank in the State, now occupies its new building, which is in all respects a model structure. Deposits of more than \$22,000,000 sufficiently indicate the esteem in which this old and honorable institution is held. On April 20 several hundred friends of the bank were invited to inspect its new habitation.

The formal opening of the new building took place on April 25, the first deposit being made by a daughter of President J. Howard King.

**Lonsaoning, Md.**—George Gernent was elected President of the Miners and Merchants' Bank on April 14, succeeding Clarence Hodson, resigned.

**New Bank in Prospect.**—There is a new bank in prospect at Jeannette, Pa., to be called the Merchants and Farmers' Bank; capital, \$50,000.

**National Banks Organized.**—On April 15 a certificate of organization was issued to the Oystermen's National Bank, of Sayville, N. Y.; capital, \$50,000. Isaac H. Green, Jr., is President.

—The Red Lion (Pa.) First National Bank is being organized with \$50,000 capital.

**National Bank Reopened.**—On April 5 the Delaware National Bank, Delhi, N. Y., which has been closed since June last, reopened under new management.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—The Manufacturers and Traders' Bank has let the contract for the safe-deposit vaults to be constructed in its new building. They will be of the finest and heaviest type known. The main vault will be thirty-five feet long and sixteen feet wide, with a capacity of 10,000 safe-deposit boxes.

The new building will be handsome, being a pure Grecian type of architecture with an immense window, two stories high, flanked on the lower front with Doric and on the upper story with Corinthian granite columns, and will be simply decorated in keeping with the character of the institution by which it is to be occupied. Work on the building will begin at once.

**Prosperous Country Bank.**—The Bank of Huntington, N. Y., in its recent official report to the State Banking Department, showed: Deposits, \$403,484; total resources, \$400,467. The capital is \$30,000 and surplus and profits, \$53,720.

**Bridgeton, N. J.**—The recent statement of the Bridgeton National Bank shows capital and surplus each \$100,000, and undivided profits, \$33,780. Total resources are \$680,535 and individual deposits subject to check, \$346,109.

**New Bank Building.**—It is reported that the First National Bank, of Somerville, N. J., is preparing to build on property purchased some time ago.

**Danville, N. Y.**—The Citizens' Bank is having its banking rooms renovated and greatly improved, occupying temporary quarters elsewhere while the work is in progress.

### SOUTHERN STATES.

**New Banks in Georgia.**—The Bank of Dallas, Ga., was organized March 31, with W. S. Witham as President.

—The Bank of Morgan County has been established at Madison, Ga., with \$25,000 paid-up capital. Its Atlanta correspondent will be the Lowry Banking Company.

**Charges on Checks.**—Some of the Texas banks have announced the following schedule of charges for the collection of checks: "On all items received for credit or remittance, whether received from correspondents or other banks, as follows: Forty dollars and under, ten cents; forty dollars to sixty dollars, fifteen cents; sixty dollars to eighty dollars, twenty cents; eighty dollars to one hundred dollars, twenty-five cents. One-quarter of one per cent. on all items over; \$100 based on total footings of each letter."

**Winchester, Tenn.**—The Bank of Winchester is reported to be putting up a three-story building; the first floor to be used by the bank, the second as offices, and the third as lodgerooms.

**Good Banking Profits.**—The Farmers' Bank of Edgefield, S. C., as a result of the last year's business, added \$1,000 to surplus, \$1,323 to undivided profits and paid shareholders an eight per cent. dividend. S. B. Mays and J. L. Caughman are new directors, elected to fill vacancies.

**Banks Consolidated.**—It is reported that the Farmers' Bank of Roxboro, N. C., has consolidated with the People's Bank, business to be hereafter under the latter name.

**Change in Organization.**—The Brownville (Tenn.) Bank succeeds the Brownville Savings Bank, with the same officers; capital, \$25,000.

**Banking Company Chartered.**—On April 5 the Secretary of State of West Virginia granted a charter to the American Colonial Banking Company to establish a bank at San Juan, Porto Rico. New York capitalists are the principal incorporators.

### WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—An addition of \$1,000,000 to the capital of the Illinois Trust and Savings Bank has been decided on, making the total \$3,000,000; the surplus and profits amount to the same sum. Deposits are now about \$56,000,000. The bank has recently added a large volume of business by acting as trustee for a number of industrial and other corporations.

—John R. Walsh, President of the Chicago National Bank, is a director in the Bedford (Ind.) National Bank, recently organized with \$50,000 capital and \$10,000 surplus.

—At a meeting of the board of directors of the Hibernian Banking Association on April 6, Louis B. Clarke was promoted from Assistant Cashier to Second Vice-President, and John W. MacGeagh elected to succeed him as Assistant Cashier.

**Milwaukee, Wis.**—Arrangements have been made to increase the banking facilities of the First National Bank by improving and fitting up two adjoining store rooms which, with the present banking rooms, will afford the First National quarters as commodious and elegant as those of any other bank in the State.



—About thirty members of the Milwaukee Bankers' Association attended the banquet and election at the Milwaukee club on the evening of April 15. Two papers, one on "True and False Currency Reform," by A. J. Frame, President of the Waukesha National Bank, of Waukesha, and another on "England and Russia in China," by Prof. Paul S. Reinsch, of the University of Wisconsin, were presented.

President John Johnston presided at the banquet, and after the social features were past, the association proceeded to the election of officers for the coming year. John Johnston, Cashier of the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company Bank, was re-elected President, and the other officers are: J. W. P. Lombard, Vice-President of the National Exchange Bank, Vice-President; George W. Strohmeier, President of the Milwaukee National, Secretary and Treasurer. The new Executive Committee consists of Charles Best, Vice-President of the Wisconsin National; William Bigelow, Vice-President of the First National, and Gustav Reuss, Assistant Cashier Marshall & Ilsley Bank.

**Indianapolis, Ind.**—O. M. Packard, for six years a National bank examiner for this State, was elected Vice-President of the Capital National Bank, of this city, on April 25. During his six years of service in the former capacity, Mr. Packard established a reputation for thorough and efficient work. His practical knowledge of banking and his wide acquaintance among the bankers of the State will make him a valuable acquisition to the already strong official staff of the Capital National.

**Iowa State and Savings Banks.**—The statement of the State and Savings banks of Iowa on April 5 shows total deposits of \$72,334,381, and total assets of \$92,860,869. The deposits have increased over \$8,000,000 since the statement of January 10. It is the only time in the State's history that there has been an increase between the January and April statements.

**St. Louis, Mo.**—An increase of the capital of the Mechanics' Bank from \$600,000 to \$1,000,000 has been recommended by the board of directors. If the recommendation is approved it will be carried out by the declaration of a stock dividend of fifty per cent, giving stockholders one additional share of stock for each two held, dividends on odd shares being adjusted in cash, and by the sale of 1,000 shares at a price to stockholders of \$175 per share. The proceeds of the sale of this 1,000 shares, added to the present capital and surplus of the bank, will make up the proposed \$1,000,000 capital, and leave \$500,000 as a surplus fund.

**Kansas City, Mo.**—Deposits in the National banks of this city, as shown by the statements of April 5, were nearly \$40,000,000, which is a gain of almost \$7,000,000 since last December, and a gain of over \$3,000,000 in the two months prior to April 5. Though loans have increased, the proportion of cash held is still very high. It is believed that the heavy deposits are a result of increased profits in all lines of production and trade.

—In a paper read a short time ago before the Commercial Club, W. B. Clarke, President of the United States Trust Co., called attention to the great need of a Savings bank in this city. He proposed that one be started with \$100,000 capital, to be a guaranty fund for securing deposits, and recommended "that so soon as suitable legislation could be had and the institution had a surplus fund of a reasonable amount, say \$100,000, that the guaranty fund be returned to the lenders, and that thereafter the institution be conducted through its board of trustees as a purely benevolent savings institution." His suggestions were favorably received, and the organization of such a bank may result.

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—The National Bank of Commerce and the Western Reserve National Bank voted April 3 to go into liquidation, for the purpose of uniting the two banks into a new institution, the Bank of Commerce National Banking Association; capital, \$2,000,000.

—Capital of the Merchants' Banking and Storage Company has been reduced to \$100,000.

**Change in Organization.**—The Ontonagon (Mich.) Bank is succeeded by the State Bank of Ontonagon, with \$15,000 capital and the following officers: President, James Mercer; Vice-President, John Hawley; Cashier, C. Meilleur.

**Evansville, Ind.**—Local and Indianapolis capitalists are organizing a trust company, which will have upwards of \$200,000 capital, and will confine its operations strictly to the functions usually exercised by such institutions, and will not do a general banking business.

**Bank to Reorganize.**—The First National Bank, Custer, South Dak., will reorganize as a State Bank, the business of the town and community not warranting the employment of as much capital as required for a National bank.

**St. Joseph, Mo.**—Leading bankers and other capitalists of this city have incorporated the Missouri Valley Trust Company, with \$100,000 capital, divided into 1,000 shares of the par value of \$100 each, distributed as follows: John J. Tootle, 300 shares; Milton Tootle, 250 shares; Charles F. Enright, 250 shares; J. O. Fairleigh, 150 shares; R. A. Brown, 50 shares. The office of the company will be in the new bank building of the well-known banking firm of Tootle, Lemon & Co.

**Rocky Ford, Colo.**—H. Van Buskirk has removed the Van Buskirk State Bank here from Arlington, South Dakota, and changed the name to the Farmers and Merchants' Bank.

**Duluth, Minn.**—The first floor of the American Exchange Bank building is being remodelled, and the counting-room of the bank enlarged and otherwise improved.

**Columbus, Ohio.**—Deposits in the banks of this city are now the highest ever reported, being \$2,193,563, an increase of \$862,061 in the last year. In the same time loans have increased \$575,066 and cash \$380,269.

#### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**San Francisco.**—The new Italian-American Savings Bank elected officers on March 23. It has \$500,000 capital, one-half of which is paid up.

**California Banks Resume.**—The Commercial Bank of San Luis Obispo, Cal., which suspended on March 11, resumed business April 3.

—The Bank of Paso Robles, Cal., resumed business on April 4, it having suspended on March 11.

**New Bank in Montana.**—W. B. Miner writes that the new Judith Basin Bank, Lewiston, Mont., expected to open May 1 with \$75,000 paid-up capital.

**Salt Lake City, Utah.**—A. B. Jones, formerly Cashier of the Utah National Bank, and who was charged with having shot Joseph M. Stoutt, formerly President of the Bank, was acquitted of the charge on April 8. The circumstances surrounding the case seemed to disprove the charge, and his reputation for uprightness aided the jury in reaching a conclusion favorable to Mr. Jones.

#### CANADA.

**New Branches Established.**—Lake Bennett, Alaska, has a new branch of the Merchants' Bank of Halifax.

—A branch of the Standard Bank of Canada was recently opened at Ailsa Craig, Ont.

—Molsons Bank reports new branches at Hensall, Ont., Knowlton, Que., and Port Arthur, Ont.

—The Ontario Bank has a new branch at Tweed, Ont.

—F. D. Soloan has opened a branch of the Commercial Bank of Windsor at Sydney, C. B.

—A branch of the Bank of Toronto was opened at Stayner, Ont., May 1 under the management of J. B. Edwards.

**New Loan Company.**—The Standard Loan Co. has been organized at Toronto with \$1,000,000 capital. W. R. Dinnick will be Manager and Henry Cooke, Secretary.

**Montreal.**—Edson L. Pease, Manager of the Montreal Branch of the Merchants' Bank of Halifax, has been appointed Joint-General Manager, with headquarters in this city. W. B. Torrance, Assistant Cashier, has been appointed Superintendent of Branches, with headquarters at Halifax.

—The Canadian Bankers' Association has decided against the proposition to establish a Canadian mint, for the following reasons:

(1) Because the operation of a mint will result in loss to either the miner or the Government, according as one or the other is made to bear the expense of coinage.

(2) Because a better and far more widespread market for gold bullion is provided by the banks than can be supplied by a mint.

(3) Because the intrinsic value of the metal is not enhanced by its conversion into coin, bullion being frequently preferable for the purpose of international exchange and settlement.

(4) Because experience has demonstrated that paper is preferred to gold coin as a circulating medium, and bullion minted in Canada will not be retained in the country.

(5) Because the coinage of gold would introduce an element of uncertainty and disturbance in the currency system, prejudicial to the commercial and industrial interests of the Dominion.

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#### American Bankers' Association.

The Twenty-fifth Annual Convention of the American Bankers' Association will be held at Cleveland, Ohio, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, September 5, 6 and 7.

The business meetings will be held in the new Chamber of Commerce building. It is expected that the programme will be of exceptional interest. Full particulars will shortly be sent to all the banks and bankers throughout the United States, and the programme will be published in the MAGAZINE as soon as completed.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

- 5183—Farmers and Traders' National Bank, Colebrook, New Hampshire. Capital, \$50,000.  
5184—Red Lion First National Bank, Red Lion, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5185—First National Bank, Rockwell City, Iowa. Capital, \$50,000.  
5186—Oystermen's National Bank, Sayville, New York. Capital, \$50,000.  
5187—Bedford National Bank, Bedford, Indiana. Capital, \$50,000.  
5188—Citizens' National Bank, Alton, Illinois. Capital, \$100,000.  
5189—First National Bank, Genoa, Nebraska. Capital, \$50,000.  
5190—Citizens' National Bank, Navasota, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- Brown County National Bank, Green Bay, Wis.; by William Larsen, *et al.*  
Citizens' National Bank, Navasota, Texas; by W. R. Howell, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Glen Campbell, Pa.; by J. O. Clark, *et al.*  
German National Bank, Marietta, Ohio; by A. L. Gracey, *et al.*  
Retailers' National Bank, Pittsburg, Pa.; by R. H. Smith, *et al.*  
Bloomsburg National Bank, Bloomsburg, Pa.; by A. Z. Schoeb, *et al.*  
Coal and Iron National Bank, Cleveland, Ohio.  
Southern National Bank, Louisville, Ky.  
Waggoner National Bank, Vernon, Texas; by R. C. Neal, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALASKA.

LAKE BENNETT—Merchants' Bank of Hallfax.

#### ARKANSAS.

BOONEVILLE—Bank of Booneville; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. H. Cooke; Vice-Pres., O. M. Ellsworth; Cas., C. E. Bennett.

#### COLORADO.

FLORENCE—Merchants and Farmers' Bank; Cas., Frank Ruby.

ROCKY FORD—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; Pres. and Cas., H. Van Buskirk; Asst. Cas., A. G. Elverson.

#### DELAWARE.

DOVER—Corporation Trust Co. of Delaware; capital, \$100,000; Pres., William T. Watson; Sec., W. L. Sawyer.

WILMINGTON—Wilmington Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

#### GEORGIA.

DALLAS—Bank of Dallas; Pres., W. S. Witham; Vice-Pres., E. Davis; Cas., R. D. Leonard.

LAFAYETTE—Lafayette Banking Co.; capital, \$20,000; Pres., N. K. Betting; Cas., James E. Patton.

MADISON—Morgan County Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., L. O. Benton; Vice-Pres., R. U. Thomason; Cas., W. P. Robertson.

VIENNA—J. P. Heard & Sons; capital, \$25,000.

WAYCROSS—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$25,000.

#### IDAHO.

BLACKFOOT—D. W. Standrod & Co.; capital, \$50,000; Cas., Dan R. Jones.

LEWISTON—Idaho Investment Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.

#### ILLINOIS.

ALTON—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., August Schlafley; Cas., Charles F. Stelzel.

ERIE—Farmers' Exchange Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres. and Cas., G. N. Mason; Asst., Cas., C. S. Mason.

GREENUP—Feltner's Bank; Pres., L. C. Feltner; Cas., L. E. Feltner.

OAK PARK—Avenue State Bank; capital, \$50,000.

PANA—Farmers and Merchants' State Bank; capital, \$50,000.

SHANNON—Shannon Bank.

SPRINGFIELD—Scott & Co.; Cas., Edgar S. Scott.

VERONA—Verona State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Asst. Cas., G. L. Beal.

#### INDIANA.

BEDFORD—Bedford National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., John R. Walsh; Cas., Thomas O. Daggy; Asst. Cas., William Irwin.

**BRAZIL**—Brazil Deposit and Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000; Wm. E. Carpenter, Mgr.  
**EVANSVILLE**—Ohio Valley Trust Co.; capital, \$200,000; Pres., James O. Parker.  
**IDAVILLE**—Bank of Idaville; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Robert Parker; Cas., J. M. Townsley.

## IOWA.

**CRYSTAL LAKE**—Crystal Lake Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., G. S. Gilbertson; Vice-Pres., C. J. Thompson; Cas., H. M. Hjerleid.  
**DECATUR**—Citizens' Bank; Pres., Wm. Woodward; Vice-Pres., James Creswell; Cas., E. W. Townsend.  
**FENTON**—Fenton State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., M. Weisbrod; Vice-Pres., E. J. Murtagh; Cas., S. N. Harris.  
**HAYFIELD**—Bank of Hayfield; Cas., F. W. Wellemayer.  
**HOPKINTON**—F. R. Tesar's Bank.  
**LEDYARD**—First City Bank (successor to Dunlap Bros. Bank); Pres., E. F. Dunlap; Vice-Pres., F. T. Miller; Cas., H. M. Scovell.  
**LOWDEN**—A. Nieting & Co.  
**MILLER**—Bank of Miller; capital, 10,000; Pres., E. C. Abbey; Cas., H. V. Reed; Asst. Cas., C. S. Terwilliger.  
**NEW PROVIDENCE**—O. E. Miller & Son, Exchange and Collections.  
**OLIN**—Citizens' Savings Bank; Pres., John Moreland; Vice-Pres., W. H. Crain; Cas., H. W. Flenniken.  
**RINGOSTED**—State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Tom Sherman; Vice-Pres., George E. Boyle; Cas., B. F. Crose.  
**ROCKWELL CITY**—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., E. A. Richards; Vice-Pres., J. C. Kerr; Asst. Cas., Chas. D. Case.  
**RUTHVEN**—Bank of Ruthven; capital, \$8,000; Pres., E. P. Barringer; Cas., H. A. Bryan.  
**SALEM**—Savings Bank of Salem; capital, \$16,000; Pres., Robert Dinsmore; Vice-Pres., R. S. Pease; Cas., Wm. H. Bliss; Asst. Cas., O. H. Tyner.  
**VENTURA**—Ventura Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., E. C. Abbey; Vice-Pres., C. S. Terwilliger; Cas., J. W. Pollock.  
**WEST BEND**—West Bend Savings Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., M. L. Brown; Vice-Pres., J. P. Becker; Cas., L. A. Martin.

## KANSAS.

**CLEARWATER**—State Bank; capital, \$50,000.  
**ELLINWOOD**—Citizens' State Bank (successor to Citizens' Bank) capital, \$15,000.  
**LEON**—Leon State Bank (successor to Leon Exchange Bank); capital, \$10,000; Pres., J. Banninghoff; Vice-Pres., H. E. King; Cas., G. A. Kenoyer; Asst. Cas., G. M. Kenoyer.  
**WILLIS**—Willis State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., N. M. Johnson; Cas., W. O. Johnson; Asst. Cas., T. J. Thorson.

## KENTUCKY.

**OWENTON**—Farmers' Deposit Bank; capital, \$15,000.

**PARIS**—Central Trust Co.; capital, \$5,000; Pres., W. B. Allen; Sec.-Treas., Jas. McClure.

**WHEATLEY**—Farmers' Deposit Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., A. E. Threlkeld; Cas., A. P. Baker; Asst. Cas., M. C. Gentry.

## MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Atlantic Trust Co.; capital, \$1,000,000; surplus, \$500,000.—Fraternal Trust and Banking Co.—Mortgage and Trust Co.; capital, \$3,000,000.

**MANCHESTER**—Manchester Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000.

**MYERSVILLE**—Flook, Gavier & Co.; capital, \$20,000.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

**WORCESTER**—Fuller, Tilton & Co.; W. A. Gaylord, Mgr.

## MICHIGAN.

**ATHENS**—Athens State and Savings Bank; (successor to S. R. Culp & Son); capital, \$15,000; Pres., H. M. Doubleday; Cas., Charles A. Standiford, Asst. Cas., E. D. Albertson.

**DETROIT**—Holmes, Holmes & Beaton.

**FENNVILLE**—Old State Bank; (successor to Fennville City Bank); capital, \$15,000; Pres., Chauncey Richards; Vice-Pres., Geo. L. Dutcher; Cas., J. E. Hutchinson.

**LINDEN**—Bank of Linden; (successor to Linden Banking Co.); capital, \$5,000; Cas., Walter T. Hammon.

**MINDEN CITY**—Bank of Ira Arnot; capital, \$15,000.

**NORTH ADAMS**—Bank of North Adams; capital, \$15,000; F. W. Patterson, Proprietor.

**ONTONAGON**—State Bank (successor to Ontonagon Bank); capital, \$15,000; Pres., James Mercer; Vice-Pres., John Hawley; Cas., C. Meilleur.

**STANDISH**—Noble, Sleeper & Co. (successors to A. Forsyth).

## MINNESOTA.

**EVELETH**—O. D. Kinney & Co. (successors to Bank of Eveleth); Pres., O. D. Kinney; Vice-Pres., E. Z. Riggs; Cas., A. J. Gos.

**LITCHEFIELD**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., F. W. Thompson; Cas., J. W. Danbury.

**MORRISTOWN**—Morristown State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., A. J. Speckeen; Cas., I. N. Donaldson; Asst. Cas., H. N. Donaldson.

**PERHAM**—German-American State Bank; capital, \$25,000.

## MISSISSIPPI.

**MACON**—Bank of Macon; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. W. Shannon, Vice-Pres., W. H. Scales; Cas., N. Scales; Asst. Cas., V. C. Cavett.

**NEWTON**—Bank of Newton; capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. H. Selby; Vice-Pres., T. C. Niverett; Cas., W. D. McRaven.

## MISSOURI.

- KANSAS CITY**—Municipal Securities Corporation; Pres., W. C. Allen; Vice-Pres., R. J. Waddell; Sec., C. B. Voorhis.
- MILAN**—International Bank; capital stock, \$28,000.
- STOTTS CITY**—Stotts City Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Sard S. Reed; Vice-Pres., Clement Steel; Cas., J. M. Browning; Asst. Cas., W. D. Beck.
- ST. JOSEPH**—Missouri Valley Trust Co.
- WILLIAMSBURG**—Bank of Nine Mile; Pres., John Yates; Cas., S. McCall.

## MONTANA.

- BUTTE**—Miners and Mechanics' Bank; organizing.
- LEWISTON**—Judith Basin Bank; capital, \$75,000; Pres., Herman Otten; Vice-Pres., David Hilger; Cas., Geo. J. Bach; Asst. Cas., W. B. Miner.
- TOWNSEND**—State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. E. Kanouse; Vice-Pres., A. W. Schreiber; Cas., John Kearns; Asst. Cas., Louis Rotwitt.

## NEBRASKA.

- COLON**—State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., F. J. Kirchman; Vice-Pres., A. Franson; Cas., J. W. Daily.
- GENEVA**—Geneva State Bank (successor to Geneva National Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. Sandrook; Cas., C. S. Trotter.
- GENOA**—First National Bank (successor to Commercial State Bank); capital, \$50,000. Pres., O. E. Green; Cas., W. J. Stewart.

## NEW JERSEY.

- ELIZABETH**—Trust and Safe Deposit, Title and Guarantee Co., of Union County.
- JERSEY CITY**—Trust Company of New Jersey; capital, \$100,000; Pres., W. C. Heppenheimer; Vice-Pres., E. F. C. Young; Treas., A. P. Hexamer; Sec., Henry Mehl.

## NEW YORK.

- BROOKLYN**—Flatbush Trust Co.
- NEW YORK**—Union Surety and Guaranty Co.; Pres., James A. Roberts; Vice-Pres., Frederick B. Esler; Treas., D. N. Morgan.—Corn Exchange Bank, Broadway Branch; Pres., F. C. Mayhew; Vice-Pres., B. Hollander.—Hamilton Bank (Branch).
- SILVER CREEK**—State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., R. J. Quale; Vice-Pres., F. R. Green.

## NORTH CAROLINA.

- CHARLOTTE**—Southern Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$10,000.
- LAGRANGE**—Bank of Lagrange (Thompson & Carr); capital, \$10,000.
- THOMASVILLE**—Bank of Thomasville; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. M. Armfield; J. M. Morris and George A. Thompson, Vice-Pres.; Cas., J. L. Armfield.

## NORTH DAKOTA.

- WIMBLEDON**—Merchants' State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. E. Martin; Cas., A. I. Hegge.

## OHIO.

- EUCLID**—Garfield Savings Bank Co. (Branch).
- FLUSHING**—Dollar Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$25,000.
- MONTPELIER**—Commercial Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.
- MOUNT VERNON**—Dime Savings Bank; Pres., O. Poppleton; Cas., F. H. Avery.
- TOLEDO**—Union Central Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., F. D. Suydam; Vice-Pres., F. E. Southard.
- WALDO**—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Wm. Gabler; Cas., W. H. Mohr; Asst. Cas., Wm. Gabler.

## OKLAHOMA.

- BRAMAN**—Southern Trust Co.; capital, \$10,000; Pres. B. J. Templeton; Cas., D. L. Wetmore.
- LUTHER**—Bank of Luther; capital, \$50,000; Pres., John W. Howard; Cas., J. C. Finch.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

- JEANNETTE**—Merchants and Farmers' Bank (W. W. & Wm. K. Frank); capital, \$50,000.

## SOUTH CAROLINA.

- MULLINS**—Bank of Mullins; capital, \$25,000.

## TENNESSEE.

- BROWNSVILLE**—Brownsville Bank (successor to Brownsville Savings Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., S. F. Thomas; Cas. R. M. Chambliss.
- MOUNT PLEASANT**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank of Columbia. (Branch.)

## TEXAS.

- NAVASOTA**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. R. Howell; Vice-Pres., J. W. Rodes; Asst. Cas., W. T. Talliaferro.
- SAN ANGELO**—A. J. Baker & Co.
- VERNON**—O. T. Herring.
- WAXAHACHIE**—Waxahachie Loan and Trust Co.; Pres., R. H. Conally; Vice-Pres., Fred Fleming; Sec. and Treas., A. Templeton.

## VIRGINIA.

- PHOEBUS**—Bank of Phoebus; capital, \$20,000; Pres., E. M. Tennis; Vice-Pres., A. Hemsickel; Cas., H. L. Schmeltz.
- RICHMOND**—Edward S. Rose Co.; Pres., E. B. Thomson; Vice-Pres., E. S. Rose; Sec., Spencer Carnicke.—Provident Savings Bank; Pres., S. Galeski; Cas., John W. Arrington.

## WASHINGTON.

- ELMA**—Carr & Carr; capital, \$5,000; Mgr., F. L. Carr; Cas., F. W. Byles.
- SEATTLE**—Twitchell & Kelley; Treas., J. Foster Kelley.

## WEST VIRGINIA.

- SHINNSTON**—Bank of Shinnston; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. A. Short; Cas., M. C. Jarrett.—Farmers' Bank.

## WISCONSIN.

- BALDWIN**—State Bank (successor to Bank of Baldwin); capital, \$25,000.

**PORT WASHINGTON**—Port Washington State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., G. E. Henry; Cas., Clarence Hill.

**WYOMING.**

**SARATOGA**—Saratoga State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., John B. Cosgriff; Vice-Pres., James E. Cosgriff; Cas., F. W. Champion.

**CANADA.****BRITISH COLUMBIA.**

**ATLIN**—Bank of British North America; J. Anderson, Mgr.

**ONTARIO.**

**AILSA CRAIG**—Standard Bank of Canada; D. A. Mackellar, Mgr.

**BOLTON**—Vandusen & Fawcett.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.****ARKANSAS.**

**STUTTGART**—German-American Bank; G. W. Fagan, Vice-Pres. in place of R. S. Spafford.

**CALIFORNIA.**

**PASO ROBLES**—Bank of Paso Robles; resumed.

**POMONA**—First National Bank; John Law, Pres. in place of C. Seaver; Charles E. Walker, Cas.

**SAN LUIS OBISPO**—Commercial Bank; resumed.

**SAN FRANCISCO**—Nevada National Bank; I. W. Hellman, Jr., 2d Vice-Pres.; Geo. Grant, Cas. in place of D. B. Davidson; W. McGavin, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. Grant.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**BRANFORD**—Branford Savings Bank; Wm. R. Foote, Asst. Treas. in place of Walter Foote, Treas., deceased.

**FLORIDA.**

**ST. AUGUSTINE**—First National Bank; G. B. Lamar, Jr., Cas.

**GEORGIA.**

**BRUNSWICK**—Brunswick Savings and Trust Co.; title changed to Brunswick Bank and Trust Co.

**MILLEN**—Bank of Millen; J. H. Hillsman, Cas. in place of Hogan Jackson, resigned.

**VALDOSTA**—Merchants' Bank; Louis Strickland, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**ILLINOIS.**

**BUSHNELL**—First National Bank; Mack M. Pinckly, Vice-Pres. in place of J. Skinner.

**CHICAGO**—Hibernian Banking Association; Louis B. Clarke, 2d Vice-Pres.; John W. McGeagh, Asst. Cas. in place of Louis B. Clarke.—Illinois Trust and Savings Bank; capital increased to \$3,000,000.—Corn Exchange National Bank; D. A. Moulton, Asst. Cas. in place of James P. Hankey.

**DANVILLE**—First National Bank; Charles P. Nelson, Asst. Cas. in place of J. C. English.

**GALESBURG**—Second National Bank; Andrew Harrington Vice-Pres. in place of Parley M. Johnson.

**HENSALL**—Molsons Bank.

**STAYNER**—Bank of Toronto; J. B. Edwards, Mgr.

**PORT ARTHUR**—Molsons Bank; E. E. Ward, Mgr.

**TORONTO**—Standard Loan Co.; capital, \$1,000,000; W. R. Dinnick, Mgr.

**TWEED**—Ontario Bank; A. C. Osborne, Mgr.

**QUEBEC.**

**KNOWLTON**—Molsons Bank.

**MANITOBA.**

**ALTONA**—Ritz & Widmeyer.

**NOVA SCOTIA.**

**SYDNEY, C. B.**—Commercial Bank of Windsor; F. D. Soloan, Agt.

**GRANT PARK**—Grant Park National Bank; Cass J. Hayden, Asst. Cas.

**MOUNT VERNON**—Ham National Bank; C. D. Ham, Pres., deceased.

**INDIANA.**

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Capital National Bank; Orlando M. Packard, Vice-Pres. and director.

**AUBORA**—First National Bank; Henry W. Smith, Pres., deceased.

**IOWA.**

**DES MOINES**—German Savings Bank; J. W. Geneser, Cas., deceased.

**ESTHERVILLE**—First National Bank; E. B. Soper, Pres. in place of F. E. Allen, deceased.

**OTTUMWA**—State Bank; title changed to Citizens' Bank.

**SIOUX CITY**—Iowa State National Bank; H. A. Jandt and John McHugh, Vice-Presidents; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. J. H. Swan.

**KANSAS.**

**CHANUTE**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of C. P. Dildine, deceased.

**EL DORADO**—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; W. F. Benson, Cas. in place of H. H. Gardner, deceased; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. F. Benson.

**LINDSBORG**—First National Bank; C. M. Norstrom, Act. Cas. during absence of John A. Swenson, Cas.

**KENTUCKY.**

**COVINGTON**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of T. B. Sellers.

**MIDDLESBOROUGH**—Manufacturers' Bank; A. L. Voris, Cas.

**MAINE.**

**PHILLIPS**—Phillips National Bank; John A. Emery, Pres. in place of Nathaniel B. Beal, deceased.

**WATERVILLE**—People's National Bank; Jno. N. Webber, Vice-Pres. in place of E. G. Hodgdon.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—National Farmers and Planters' Bank; Richard B. Sellman, Cas., resigned.

—Maryland Casualty Company; capital stock increased to \$750,000.—Maryland Title, Insurance and Trust Co.; Edgar G. Miller, Jr., Pres.; John Duncan, Sec. and Treas.—Baltimore Clearing-House Association; Webster Bell, Asst. Mgr.

**BEL AIR**—Harford National Bank; John A. Evans, Cas. in place of Wm. W. Finney.

**LOACONING**—Miners and Merchants' Bank; George Gernent, Pres. in place of Clarence Hodson, resigned.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Columbia Trust Co.; John H. Sullivan, Pres., deceased.—Third National Bank; A. P. Stone, 2d Asst. Cas.; capital reduced to \$1,500,000.—National Exchange Bank; Harold Murdock, Pres. in place of Edward L. Tead, deceased; C. A. Price, Cas. in place of Harold Murdock; F. Houghton, Asst. Cas. in place of C. A. Price.—National Bank of the Republic, removed to 95 Milk St.

**EASTHAMPTON**—First National Bank; J. Victor King, Cas. in place of Chas. H. Johnson.—Easthampton Savings Bank; Chas. H. Johnson, Treas.

**NEW BEDFORD**—First National Bank; W. P. Winsor, Pres. in place of Edward S. Taber, deceased; Wm. A. Mackie, Cas. in place of W. P. Winsor.—New Bedford Safe Deposit and Trust Co.; Frederic Taber, Pres. in place of John W. Macomber, deceased.

**STOCKBRIDGE**—Housatonic National Bank; Daniel R. Williams, Pres., deceased.

#### MICHIGAN.

**DETROIT**—Detroit National Bank; Theodore D. Buhl, Vice-Pres. in place of W. C. Colburn, deceased.—National Loan and Investment Co.; Frank B. Leland, Sec. in place of Geo. H. Paine.

**MANTON**—Exchange Bank; Pres., J. H. Jones; A. Jones, Vice-Pres.; J. E. Jones, Cas.

#### MINNESOTA.

**RED WING**—Goodhue County Bank; F. Busch, Pres. in place of T. B. Seldon; T. B. Seldon, Vice-Pres.; C. F. Hjermstad, Cas. in place of Jesse McIntire.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**HATTIESBURG**—First National Bank; P. E. Blacklack, Vice-Pres.

#### MISSOURI.

**CHILLICOTHE**—Citizens' National Bank; W. W. Edgerton, Pres.; Joseph C. Minter, Vice-Pres., in place of W. W. Edgerton.

**INDEPENDENCE**—First National Bank; Frank C. Wyatt, Asst. Cas. in place of T. N. Smith.

**KANSAS CITY**—United States Trust Co.; E. S. Bigelow, Asst. Sec.—New England National Bank; S. B. Armour, director, deceased.

**ST. LOUIS**—Union Trust Co.; George W. Parker, director, deceased.

#### NEBRASKA.

**HUMBOLDT**—State Bank; J. F. Walsh, Cas. in place of S. W. Grinstead, deceased; H. E. Boyd, Asst. Cas.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

**BEBLIN**—Berlin National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of John D. Annis.

**BRISTOL**—First National Bank; Benjamin F. Perkins, Vice-Pres.

**COLEBROOK**—Farmers and Traders' National Bank; Volney F. Day, Pres. in place of Albert H. Eastman; no Vice-Pres. in place of Volney F. Day.

#### NEW JERSEY.

**JERSEY CITY**—Fifth Ward Savings Bank; John C. Lembeck, Pres. in place of Charles W. Cropper.

**TRENTON**—Wm. Hancock & Co.; William Hancock, deceased; firm succeeded by Charles L. Patterson.

#### NEW YORK.

**ALBANY**—Farmers and Mechanics' Bank; John J. Olcott, Vice-Pres. deceased.

**AUBURN**—Cayuga County Savings Bank; Cyrenus Wheeler, Jr., Pres., deceased.

**BABYLON**—Babylon National Bank; W. W. Wood, Cas. in place of A. E. Hawkins, deceased.

**BROOKLYN**—Williamsburgh Trust Co.; capital, \$700,000; surplus, \$350,000; J. G. Jenkins, Pres.; Moses May and Herman O. Armour, Vice-Pres.; W. A. Field, Sec.; I. Hamburger, Asst. Sec.—Hamilton Bank; Edward B. Jordan, John Munro, Henry H. Sheldon and William H. Ziegler elected directors.—Fulton Bank; purchased by Mechanics' Bank.

**BUFFALO**—Buffalo Savings Bank; Spencer Clinton, Pres. in place of Jewett M. Richmond, deceased.—Bank of Buffalo; capital, \$500,000; surplus, \$500,000.

**CAMBRIDGE**—Cambridge Valley National Bank; Hiram Sisson, Vice-Pres. in place of James Law, deceased.

**DELHI**—Delaware National Bank; authorized by the Comptroller to resume business April 3; Charles L. Andrus, Vice-Pres.; James F. Scott, Cas.

**JAMESTOWN**—Farmers' National Bank; W. A. Harder, Vice-Pres. in place of F. F. Folger, deceased; Granvill Hills, Asst. Cas.—Union Trust Co.; Frank Merz, Pres. in place of James S. Patterson, deceased.

**NEW YORK**—National Bank of the Republic; Eugene H. Pullen, Vice-Pres., deceased.—American Exchange National Bank; Frank B. Anderson, 2d Asst. Cas.—National Park Bank; Albert H. Wiggin, Vice-Pres.—National Bank of North American and Mercantile Trust Co.; Henry B. Hyde, director, deceased.—American Surety Co.; Henry B. Lyman, Pres. in place of Walter S. Johnston.—C. A. Harned & Co.; C. A. Harned, deceased.—Herzfeld & Co.; succeeded by Herzfeld & Stern.—Mutual

Bank; E. A. McAlpin and Alexander W. Kinnan, elected directors. — People's Bank; Thomas Williams, elected director in place of Ichabod T. Williams.—United States Trust Co.; Daniel Lord, director, deceased.—Fidelity and Casualty Co.; Thos. L. Moore, director, deceased. — United States Mortgage and Trust Co.; William H. Baldwin, Jr., elected director.—First National Bank; Frederick F. Thompson, director, deceased.—Van Schaick & Co.; Jenkins Van Schaick, deceased; also director German-American Bank.—Chemical National Bank; Robert Golet, director, deceased. — Twelfth Ward Bank; Edward P. Steers, Pres., deceased; also director Produce Exchange Trust Co.—Lawrence Turnure & Co.; Lawrence Turnure, deceased; also director National City Bank. Woerishoffer & Co.; H. D. Spears, admitted to firm May 1.

**NORTH TONAWANDA**—State Bank; James H. De Graff, Pres., resigned.

**SAYVILLE** — Oystermen's National Bank; Dow Clock, Cas.

**SYRACUSE**—Third National Bank; Thomas Molloy, director, deceased.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

**CHAPEL HILL**—Bank of Chapel Hill; J. S. Carr, Pres.; C. L. Lindsay, Vice-Pres.; S. T. Peace, Cas.

**DURHAM**—Morehead Banking Co.; E. C. Murray, Cas. in place of W. M. Morgan.

**ROXBORO**—People's Bank and Farmers' Bank; consolidated under former title.

#### OHIO.

**CIRCLEVILLE**—First National Bank; Lawrence H. Sweetman, Pres., deceased.

**CLEVELAND**—Merchants' Banking and Storage Co.; capital reduced to \$100,000.

**LIMA**—American National Bank; Gus Kalb, Vice-Pres. in place of R. W. Thrift; no Asst. Cas. in place of Harri O. Jones.

#### OREGON.

**EUGENE**—First National Bank; S. B. Eakin, Vice-Pres.; P. E. Snodgrass, Cas. in place of S. B. Eakin.

**PENDLETON**—Pendleton Savings Bank; John Franklin Adams, Pres., deceased.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

**DELTA**—Miles National Bank; William McSparran, Pres. in place of J. H. Miles; L. K. Stubbs, Vice-Pres. in place of H. R. Lloyd; R. L. Jones, Cas. in place of R. S. Parke; no Asst. Cas.

**JOHNSTOWN**—Cambria National Bank; H. Y. Haws, Pres. in place of B. F. Speedy, deceased; Harry Swank, Vice-Pres. in place of H. Y. Haws.

**NEW CASTLE**—National Bank of Lawrence Co.; C. F. Montgomery, Cas. in place of Robert Crawford, deceased; G. L. Patterson, Asst. Cas. in place of C. F. Montgomery.

**MARTINSBURG**—Morrison's Cove Bank; capital, \$15,000; Charles O. Spillman, Cas.

**PHILADELPHIA**—Frederick Narr, banker, deceased.—Stahl & Straub; removed to 507 Chestnut st.—Ridge Avenue Bank; capital increased to \$150,000.

**PITTSBURG**—United States National Bank; William Eberhardt, director, deceased.

**PITTSFORD**—People's Savings Bank; J. B. Shiffer, Pres., deceased.

**RED LION**—Red Lion First National Bank; C. S. La Motte, Vice-Pres.; W. H. Meyers, Asst. Cas.

**STEELTON**—Steelton National Bank; Robert M. Rutherford, Cas. in place of W. J. Snaveley.

#### RHODE ISLAND

**PROVIDENCE**—Second National Bank; J. H. Chace, Pres. in place of James M. Kimball, deceased; also director Rhode Island Safe Deposit Co.

**WOONSOCKET**—Woonsocket National Bank; E. C. Francis, Cas. in place of L. W. Ballou; no Asst. Cas. in place of E. C. Francis.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

**ROCK HILL**—National Union Bank; T. L. Johnson, Cas. in place of R. Lee Kerr; L. C. Harrison, Asst. Cas.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**ABERDEEN**—First National Bank; J. H. Suttle, Vice-Pres. in place of H. S. Williams; J. A. Schlueter, Cas. in place of S. H. Jumper.

#### TENNESSEE.

**CAMDEN**—Camden Bank and Trust Co.; W. E. McRae, Pres. in place of A. C. McRae; Mike Fry, Cas. in place of W. E. McRae.

**MURFREESBORO**—First National Bank; H. L. Fox, Asst. Cas.

**WAVERLY**—Waverly Bank and Trust Co.; A. P. McMurray; Vice-Pres. J. G. Wilkinson; A. M. Young, 2d Vice-Pres.; Hough Arnold, Cas.

#### TEXAS.

**MEXIA**—Prendergast, Smith & Co.; J. W. Blake, retired from firm.

**WEATHERFORD**—First National Bank; J. D. Baker, Pres., deceased.

**WHARTON**—R. T. Irvin & Co., succeeded by G. C. Gifford & Co.

#### VERMONT.

**BRATTLEBORO**—Brattleboro Savings Bank; E. L. Waterman, Pres. in place of B. D. Harris; F. K. Barrows, Vice-Pres. in place of O. D. Esterbrook.

**FAIR HAVEN**—Allen National Bank; corporate existence extended until April 5, 1919.

**SWANTON**—People's National Bank; H. F. Martin, Vice-Pres. in place of H. G. Morton.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

**CLARKSBURG**—Merchants' National Bank; S. R. Harrison, Cas. in place of Lee Hammond; no Asst. Cas. in place of S. R. Harrison.



**WHEELING**—National Bank of West Virginia; G. A. Wagner, Asst. Cas.

**WISCONSIN.**

**HUDSON**—First National Bank; A. E. Jefferson, Pres. in place of D. C. Fulton, deceased.

**MARINETTE**—First National Bank; Warren J. Davis, Cas. in place of Ira D. Buck.

**WEST SUPERIOR**—First National Bank; Robert Kelly, Vice-Pres.

**CANADA.****NOVA SCOTIA.**

**BEAR RIVER**—Commercial Bank of Windsor; L. A. Dodge, Mgr. in place of F. D. Solean.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****COLORADO.**

**DENVER**—American National Bank; in voluntary liquidation April 1.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**MIDDLETOWN**—People's Savings Bank.

**PUTNAM**—Thompson National Bank; in voluntary liquidation April 24.

**GEORGIA.**

**AMERICUS**—People's National Bank; in voluntary liquidation April 15.

**CORDELE**—First National Bank; James McDowell, Receiver in place of Geo. R. De Saussure.

**ILLINOIS.**

**CARBONDALE**—Bank of Carbondale.

**IOWA.**

**CEDAR FALLS**—Iowa Loan, Trust and Investment Co.

**KANSAS.**

**EVEREST**—Farmers' State Bank.

**MISSOURI.**

**WARRENSBURG**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; business transferred to Citizens' Bank.

**NEBRASKA.**

**GENEVA**—Geneva National Bank; in voluntary liquidation March 25.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**LAKEPORT**—Lake Village Savings Bank.

**NEW YORK.**

**NEW YORK**—Dimock & Co.

**OHIO.**

**CLEVELAND**—Marine Bank Co.; going out of business.

**HILSBOROUGH**—Citizens' National Bank; John Hulitt, Receiver in place of Robert M. Dittay, resigned.

**LIMA**—American National Bank; in voluntary liquidation April 8.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**ERIE**—Keystone National Bank; George H. Higgins, Receiver in place of Frank M. Hayes.

**TENNESSEE.**

**MEMPHIS**—Continental National Bank; in voluntary liquidation April 25.

**WASHINGTON.**

**DAYTON**—Citizens' National Bank; in voluntary liquidation March 11.

**SEATTLE**—Merchants' National Bank; Archibald W. Frater, Receiver in place of Charles H. Baker.

**WISCONSIN.**

**ALMA**—Exchange Bank (Hunner & Ginzkey).

**Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.**

**California.**—Investigation of the affairs of the Union Savings Bank, San Jose, which failed a short time ago, shows that the bank holds at least \$240,000 of valueless securities.

**Iowa.**—On April 16 the Iowa Loan, Trust and Investment Co., Cedar Falls, suspended. It was incorporated in 1891, with \$45,000 paid-up capital.

**Kansas.**—The Farmers' State Bank, of Everest, has paid off all depositors and suspended business voluntarily.

**Missouri.**—On April 6 the Farmers and Merchants' Bank, of Warrensburg, turned its business over to the Citizens' Bank and quit business. Reports are to the effect that the bank was started in the interests of free-silver politics, and prospered for a time, but business declined as the public ceased to be concerned about the silver question, and bestowed their patronage upon other institutions, regardless of politics.

**New Hampshire.**—Because of continued withdrawals the Lake Village Savings Bank, of Lakeport, N. H., suspended on April 27.

**Wisconsin.**—The Exchange Bank, operated by Hunner & Ginzkey, at Alma, closed April 11 with deposit liabilities of about \$60,000.

**Gold Product of South Africa.**—In the course of a speech delivered on April 29, President Kruger announced that the Transvaal was now the largest gold-producing country in the world.

He said the output in 1898 was £16,240,630 (\$81,203,150), being an increase of £4,586,906 (\$22,934,525) over the output of the previous year.

## NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

By the courtesy of the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** has been favored with the complete returns of the National banks in all the reserve cities, at the date of the call on April 5, 1899. These are published below in conjunction with the two preceding statements of December 1, 1898 and February 4, 1899. In this form the figures become much more valuable by reason of the comparison. In this complete shape the returns of National banks in the reserve cities are published in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** exclusively.

### NEW YORK CITY.

RESOURCES.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.
Loans and discounts.....	\$493,284,116	\$544,320,829	\$567,411,243
Overdrafts.....	106,544	263,138	419,286
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	19,588,500	17,645,500	16,686,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	44,275,240	34,836,880	34,689,880
U. S. bonds on hand.....	4,316,310	2,142,310	963,570
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	4,200,871	3,450,636	3,269,674
Stocks, securities, etc.....	55,937,153	57,202,062	62,562,330
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	14,717,304	14,710,771	14,704,485
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,982,968	1,806,906	1,782,061
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	38,487,153	37,331,984	36,674,380
Due from State banks and bankers.....	7,566,799	7,140,232	5,435,486
Due from approved reserve agents.....	.....	.....	.....
Checks and other cash items.....	3,836,400	2,527,788	2,923,040
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	134,675,052	37,205,631	142,854,167
Bills of other National banks.....	1,001,931	1,218,299	809,430
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	68,799	57,378	64,191
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	15,299,474	19,421,651	13,782,773
Gold Treasury certificates.....	6,378,600	6,571,510	6,370,250
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	115,296,000	143,324,000	140,770,000
Silver dollars.....	104,437	102,086	118,977
Silver Treasury certificates.....	5,307,901	7,073,153	5,630,498
Silver fractional coin.....	574,031	486,888	539,924
Legal-tender notes.....	32,664,555	32,722,221	29,060,866
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	7,100,000	7,710,000	7,820,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	872,132	782,137	744,502
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	933,343	905,231	883,206
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,008,574,634</b>	<b>\$980,959,262</b>	<b>\$1,096,487,744</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$48,700,000	\$47,600,000	\$47,500,000
Surplus fund.....	43,041,000	43,225,000	43,185,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	18,515,966	18,369,324	19,869,655
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	17,138,530	15,009,337	14,369,527
State bank notes outstanding.....	16,556	16,542	16,542
Due to other National banks.....	243,589,647	299,976,300	277,347,922
Due to State banks and bankers.....	106,361,812	117,579,951	132,061,306
Dividends unpaid.....	103,533	124,469	156,894
Individual deposits.....	475,068,264	399,381,520	509,901,769
U. S. deposits.....	44,022,166	34,089,489	33,932,141
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	372,619	261,869	307,425
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	150,000	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	14,466,018	15,335,457	17,681,562
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,008,574,634</b>	<b>\$980,959,262</b>	<b>\$1,096,487,744</b>
Average reserve held.....	26.51 p. c.	28.77 p. c.	26.51 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$182,723,996	\$217,411,509	\$203,583,817

U. S. NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

RESOURCES.	ALBANY, N. Y.			BALTIMORE, MD.			BOSTON, MASS.		
	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Apr. 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Apr. 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Apr. 5, 1899.
Loans and discounts.....	\$7,166,039	\$8,905,116	\$9,584,033	\$85,280,604	\$88,168,790	\$49,364,917	\$174,172,987	\$178,055,009	\$186,507,388
Overdrafts.....	3,435	4,083	10,635	25,114	29,584	29,414	225,725	103,181	95,578
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	350,000	400,000	400,000	2,915,000	3,377,140	3,877,140	6,967,000	5,677,000	6,017,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	261,100	261,100	261,100	2,662,960	2,667,960	2,675,960	4,061,000	4,065,000	3,965,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	143,000	1,000	1,000	112,460	5,340	100,920	385,200	232,000	3,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	37,250	37,250	37,250	882,758	408,847	414,676	455,564	383,111	393,976
Stocks, securities, etc.....	891,285	683,659	989,185	2,385,021	2,498,327	3,066,515	8,130,358	8,224,788	8,612,466
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	259,562	259,562	259,562	2,395,068	2,375,088	2,185,068	2,520,868	2,500,044	2,501,961
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	132,182	108,966	108,966	217,352	214,408	214,408	568,589	204,849	215,361
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,668,453	1,440,315	1,587,471	3,064,172	3,075,021	3,223,764	16,106,782	16,044,569	17,387,189
Due from State banks and bankers.....	871,539	1,061,144	1,452,677	4,963,473	3,875,667	3,433,281	2,044,679	3,403,243	2,067,145
Due from approved reserve agents.....	3,440,853	2,029,407	1,643,658	4,391,504	4,617,028	4,662,284	48,162,745	44,239,109	36,065,427
Checks and other cash items.....	61,383	124,417	177,113	208,362	157,640	276,170	454,872	646,666	665,979
Exchanges for clearing-houses.....	134,000	55,386	108,084	8,397,173	1,589,844	3,619,163	13,968,778	6,382,965	16,451,428
Bills of other National banks.....	53,528	55,386	60,914	176,523	231,795	246,916	1,163,544	1,232,940	985,759
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,450	2,115	3,173	21,664	17,855	18,001	21,452	20,244	19,587
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	549,469	528,678	504,285	1,068,180	1,854,740	1,568,012	4,881,981	4,063,731	4,365,134
Gold Treasury certificates.....	330,760	380,750	380,750	433,280	369,660	478,020	1,646,670	1,422,180	1,422,180
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	20,747	25,845	39,498	490,000	1,295,000	1,095,000	8,595,000	11,979,000	11,365,000
Silver dollars.....	36,410	25,380	31,020	73,630	94,745	79,350	64,613	61,263	54,969
Silver Treasury certificates.....	24,596	25,676	34,568	95,677	1,137,451	1,065,468	2,079,068	1,951,144	1,755,961
Legal-tender notes.....	376,761	419,282	484,068	1,251,411	1,242,180	1,232,229	6,310,876	5,964,500	5,592,853
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	16,750	16,754	18,000	1,475,000	2,185,000	2,210,000	570,000	590,000	590,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	1,000	1,000	1,000	181,175	151,971	150,611	308,822	259,852	257,687
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,000	1,000	1,000	2,106	4,506	6,066	306,622	91,824	62,645
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,854,196</b>	<b>\$16,846,263</b>	<b>\$16,975,549</b>	<b>\$63,847,572</b>	<b>\$67,364,246</b>	<b>\$76,469,887</b>	<b>\$304,094,370</b>	<b>\$300,710,016</b>	<b>\$300,290,359</b>
LIABILITIES.									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$13,243,280	\$12,688,280	\$12,688,280	\$49,650,000	\$38,840,750	\$38,865,176
Surplus fund.....	1,372,000	1,372,000	1,372,000	5,195,875	5,295,525	5,295,525	14,411,275	13,879,265	13,933,300
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	214,687	230,579	230,579	2,159,081	2,059,527	2,059,527	4,685,886	4,412,159	4,554,817
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	301,040	316,500	336,860	2,598,280	2,848,200	2,987,420	6,114,022	5,136,645	5,262,050
State bank notes outstanding.....	4,865,104	5,214,766	4,603,560	4,604	1,723	1,723	51,020,964	53,220,855	56,510,084
Due to other National banks.....	1,940,654	1,941,589	2,219,736	7,463,311	8,790,087	10,224,490	24,816,312	30,418,477	27,194,011
Due to State banks and bankers.....	757	23,317	23,317	2,688,654	2,688,308	2,688,308	30,860	21,907	166,511
Dividends unpaid.....	6,331,521	5,930,705	6,335,147	56,871	81,769	71,033	30,800	30,800	30,800
Individual deposits.....	251,824	251,824	251,824	23,724,070	30,972,852	37,878,265	148,298,349	148,455,576	157,298,180
U. S. deposits.....	4,916	21,738	9,064	2,455,287	2,590,484	2,675,408	8,705,209	3,539,414	8,710,840
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	21,738	21,738	50,000	295,000	150,000	150,000	720,674	76,144	112,385
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	146,335	269,358	191,178	480,556	162,966	1,444,581
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	181,178	164,469	240,981
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,854,196</b>	<b>\$16,846,263</b>	<b>\$16,975,549</b>	<b>\$63,847,572</b>	<b>\$67,364,246</b>	<b>\$76,469,887</b>	<b>\$304,094,370</b>	<b>\$300,710,016</b>	<b>\$300,290,359</b>
Average reserve held.....	45.11 p. c.	31.79 p. c.	27.37 p. c.	80.84 p. c.	85.45 p. c.	27.13 p. c.	87.38 p. c.	84.47 p. c.	81.05 p. c.
*Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,241,753	\$1,365,321	\$1,424,239	\$6,038,311	\$7,506,968	\$7,728,607	\$24,240,862	\$23,581,051	\$25,224,983

	BROOKLYN, N. Y.		CHICAGO, ILL.		CINCINNATI, OHIO.	
	Dec. 1, 1898.	Apr 15, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Apr 15, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Apr 15, 1899.
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,323,477	\$11,599,175	\$12,855,336	\$12,397,206	\$23,397,242	\$23,155,278
Overdrafts.....	554	1,745	382,085	163,517	4,537	11,790
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	642,000	1,350,000	1,290,000	4,981,500	4,831,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	1,043,000	1,183,000	2,883,000	2,883,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	9,000	9,000	401,120	558,400	1,453,230	985,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	29,500	24,300	83,114	85,114	994,984	949,719
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,419,906	2,245,077	10,107,331	12,098,825	5,391,107	6,978,940
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	601,804	591,300	798,144	798,974	798,182	745,194
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	98,151	75,651	712,340	655,365	168,362	169,181
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	69,184	69,184	82,870,823	83,992,089	3,873,724	4,081,885
Due from State banks and bankers.....	192,543	117,802	10,098,974	10,782,319	1,092,274	1,039,491
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,419,297	2,978,940	8,118,749	8,118,749	6,485,401	7,814,532
Checks and other cash items.....	108,242	74,790	61,983	307,462	108,180	190,173
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	2,249,487	1,517,959	9,304,234	6,229,857	3,229,641	734,547
Bills of other National Banks.....	110,180	110,911	1,832,298	2,185,266	448,072	385,947
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	10,944	10,546	8,922	27,548	18,382	3,838
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:.....						
Gold coin.....	676,149	633,195	479,022	18,305,467	1,698,718	1,591,638
Gold Treasury certificates.....	173,000	168,000	155,000	19,043,600	2,604,075	2,801,900
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	380,000	380,000	2,791,890	2,815,060	298,150	298,680
Silver dollars.....	38,452	18,500	170,000	230,858	63,495	51,591
Silver Treasury certificates.....	642,692	897,759	444,728	2,408,243	1,063,637	611,697
Silver fractional coin.....	64,310	67,153	271,699	263,047	27,189	30,049
Legal-tender notes.....	970,756	806,597	72,493	16,333,246	2,404,094	2,402,033
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	58,800	28,800	17,600,000	2,170,000	570,000	580,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	12,500	5,000	81,000	63,500	294,167	217,417
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....			68,000	62,020	1,408	17,910
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$23,359,324</b>	<b>\$21,735,414</b>	<b>\$23,656,946</b>	<b>\$20,024,318</b>	<b>\$7,663,785</b>	<b>\$61,994,480</b>
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,852,000	\$1,352,000	\$18,450,000	\$18,450,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000
Surplus fund.....	2,800,000	2,300,000	9,820,900	9,347,900	2,755,000	2,675,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	462,898	867,573	3,866,836	2,545,340	981,737	1,063,290
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	577,800	570,620	1,215,875	767,625	4,276,985	3,898,965
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	60,401,941	66,192,334	12,673,506	12,395,067
Due to other National banks.....	419,808	386,629	386,051	385,732,443	4,823,327	5,782,079
Due to State banks and bankers.....	380,308	380,540	6,369	36,039	8,579	6,088
Dividends unpaid.....	438	662	299,179	104,540,941	22,840,235	24,919,510
Individual deposits.....	17,064,633	16,306,617	92,062,717	93,285,967	2,083,916	2,083,916
U. S. deposits.....	178,976	188,053	999,571	1,046,556	2,931,696	2,931,696
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	19,479	18,535	84,643	60,023	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	30,651	30,138	13,000	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$53,890,324</b>	<b>\$51,795,414</b>	<b>\$53,656,946</b>	<b>\$50,024,318</b>	<b>\$57,663,785</b>	<b>\$61,994,480</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$3,025,155	\$2,744,750	\$3,819,904	\$3,819,904	\$5,452,745	\$6,131,907
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$4,841,155	\$4,464,606	\$4,837,215	\$4,837,215	\$6,516,367	\$7,831,158

	CLEVELAND, OHIO.		DES MOINES, IOWA.		DETROIT, MICH.	
	Dec. 1, 1898.	Apr 4 6, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Apr 4 6, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Apr 4 6, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$30,716,424	\$30,994,715	\$33,913,183	\$3,841,188	\$14,597,141	\$13,984,085
Overdrafts.....	63,811	28,588	28,881	37,407	1,482	2,351
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,690,000	1,730,000	387,000	377,000	1,400,000	1,400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	160,000	160,000	300,000	300,000	700,000	700,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	701,500	650,000	112,180	28,000	894,900	846,700
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	89,135	140,098	40,982	35,534	253,438	253,698
Stocks, securities, etc.....	988,200	1,410,297	298,988	237,505	738,070	1,148,470
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	217,713	527,628	142,041	80,088	20,528	20,088
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	3,550,324	2,710,891	1,431,541	1,210,123	361,664	375,694
Due from National banks (not reserve agents)	1,194,197	8,982,475	8,701,232	115,392	402,181	1,723,862
Due from State banks and bankers.....	6,094,369	1,348,678	259,935	404,446	1,664,715	1,723,862
Due from approved reserve agents.....	190,410	11,277,714	78,983	60,827	670,847	670,847
Checks and other cash items.....	421,650	188,882	895,031	1,107,973	3,650,164	3,226,300
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	28,019	460,242	23,619	7,969	20,509	31,517
Bills of other National banks.....	491,650	800,434	72,023	107,491	238,596	352,618
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents	288,019	187,085	30,988	37,555	242,170	181,081
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	4,410	5,560	1,184	1,209	5,421	6,804
Gold coin.....	1,650,322	1,781,860	118,722	91,485	1,332,377	1,224,690
Gold Treasury certificates.....	257,770	260,170	6,000	6,000	21,500	21,500
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	108,767	141,447	19,500	18,353	118,932	136,326
Silver dollars.....	257,450	145,432	24,904	11,487	148,909	145,942
Silver Treasury certificates.....	45,966	41,258	6,708	5,317	38,984	74,923
Silver fractional coin.....	1,753,000	1,558,758	283,231	283,663	712,771	859,418
Legal-tender notes.....	72,460	73,500	16,515	16,515	63,000	63,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders	20,500	84,160	.....	1,700	15,968	20,847
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.						
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	\$51,566,086	\$57,323,156	\$4,514,922	\$4,929,079	\$28,741,531	\$27,733,887
<b>Total.....</b>						
Capital stock paid in.....	\$9,651,760	\$9,765,250	\$900,000	\$900,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000
Surplus fund.....	2,184,500	2,184,500	221,500	204,000	605,000	606,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	505,769	670,286	94,708	34,670	300,968	183,559
National bank notes issued, less amt' on hand	1,438,580	1,460,160	321,265	313,142	1,122,170	1,136,360
Due to other National banks.....	5,278,335	6,130,537	981,431	1,285,081	3,623,660	3,623,660
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,145,917	4,198,947	1,411,041	1,877,519	6,272,477	6,693,857
Dividends unpaid.....	3,973	3,973	4,627	6,988	170	408
Individual deposits.....	28,532,419	32,147,124	2,004,622	2,119,165	10,940,555	11,476,975
U. S. deposits.....	48,082	150,283	298,287	286,407	618,352	641,642
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	15,064	12,325	82	82	55,259	80,188
Notes and bills rediscounted.....						
Bills payable.....						
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	764,726	761,148	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	\$51,566,086	\$57,323,156	\$4,514,922	\$4,929,079	\$28,741,531	\$27,733,887
Average reserve held.....	\$4,063,905	\$3,933,035	\$461,443	\$396,395	\$2,376,374	\$2,461,865
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$27,350,849	\$27,350,849	\$27,350,849	\$27,350,849	\$27,350,849	\$27,350,849

	HOUSTON, TEXAS.			KANSAS CITY, MO.			LINCOLN, NEB.		
	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,167,149	\$2,078,500	\$2,190,000	\$18,590,306	\$17,912,197	\$19,440,991	\$2,087,732	\$1,444,919	\$1,464,696
Overdrafts.....	384,064	123,572	190,763	196,548	281,462	328,960	14,630	10,959	12,530
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	250,000	250,000	250,000	623,000	663,000	817,000	150,000	160,000	160,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	710,000	600,000	600,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	222,980	193,300	249,900	40,160	28,160	28,160
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	22,683	22,683	22,200	1,252,054	52,512	53,978	5,500	5,500	11,000
Stocks, securities, etc.....	28,176	64,533	36,206	1,531,164	12,500	7,500	91,535	112,311	140,928
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	133,436	133,436	130,480	13,000	12,500	8,645	8,645	68,645	71,145
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	120,271	138,763	164,443	430,963	446,062	437,432	116,225	94,152	123,959
Due from National banks (not reserve agents)	750,680	775,110	694,365	1,394,813	1,394,812	1,064,300	510,636	510,636	567,111
Due from State banks and bankers.....	70,301	128,428	171,280	2,698,185	7,927,080	2,455,343	67,976	116,898	118,898
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,045,086	1,068,500	1,250,694	4,728,010	7,927,080	7,896,060	194,660	392,574	.....
Checks and other cash items.....	78,537	50,114	21,842	31,176	22,206	22,206	19,643	8,190	12,563
Checks for clearing-house.....	9,913	50,523	50,523	857,584	713,380	24,963	14,850	14,850	21,076
Bills of other National banks.....	87,372	84,311	60,949	206,760	207,462	292,818	6,439	4,972	5,387
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents	1,468	1,827	2,767	6,156	4,091	6,842	2,538	1,867	2,460
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	280,436	285,226	309,458	1,019,560	1,091,932	1,252,840	115,812	99,618	88,885
Gold Treasury certificates.....	137,630	138,660	138,250	25,000	25,000	15,000	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	60,954	75,871	65,170	153,046	146,116	146,116	18,562	10,812	17,025
Silver dollars.....	198,568	288,179	205,195	600,366	680,496	803,788	14,068	8,345	7,540
Silver Treasury certificates.....	10,748	13,562	19,419	38,441	44,622	42,887	11,695	7,407	9,994
Legal-tender notes.....	637,147	994,182	733,117	876,100	747,122	882,980	108,604	6,750	65,438
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders	11,250	11,250	11,250	23,000	23,250	30,442	6,750	.....	6,750
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$6,521,808</b>	<b>\$6,682,140</b>	<b>\$6,632,927</b>	<b>\$84,000,845</b>	<b>\$7,603,660</b>	<b>\$40,647,982</b>	<b>\$3,287,230</b>	<b>\$3,191,401</b>	<b>\$3,350,781</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$1,100,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$700,000	\$550,000	\$550,000
Surplus fund.....	577,300	607,300	607,300	618,000	631,000	640,000	18,000	65,000	65,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	128,567	198,284	104,712	414,962	494,978	568,087	16,670	14,732	28,285
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand	200,070	196,000	186,670	680,000	686,000	734,600	185,000	185,000	185,000
Due to other National banks.....	946,571	862,146	945,283	8,600,016	8,346,844	10,468,644	227,727	296,381	295,708
Due to State banks and bankers.....	232,084	238,479	194,818	7,466,206	8,981,538	9,204,216	466,158	466,158	371,738
Dividends unpaid.....	4,280	3,023	3,023	3,484	3,484	1,274	180	91	.....
Individual deposits.....	3,268,161	3,411,141	3,463,618	13,468,022	14,668,191	16,069,508	1,797,160	1,608,162	1,613,066
U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	573,774	682,174	676,879	57,113	57,000	57,000
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$6,521,808</b>	<b>\$6,682,140</b>	<b>\$6,632,927</b>	<b>\$84,000,845</b>	<b>\$7,603,660</b>	<b>\$40,647,982</b>	<b>\$3,287,230</b>	<b>\$3,191,401</b>	<b>\$3,350,781</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>\$4,921,813</b>	<b>\$4,682,140</b>	<b>\$4,632,927</b>	<b>\$34,000,845</b>	<b>\$7,068,000</b>	<b>\$40,647,982</b>	<b>\$3,287,230</b>	<b>\$3,191,401</b>	<b>\$3,350,781</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$1,843,608</b>	<b>\$1,688,740</b>	<b>\$1,470,010</b>	<b>\$3,764,705</b>	<b>\$3,748,100</b>	<b>\$4,184,011</b>	<b>\$203,001</b>	<b>\$184,919</b>	<b>\$194,929</b>

RESOURCES.		LOUISVILLE, KY.		MILWAUKEE, WIS.		MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.			
	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.
Loans and discounts.....	\$6,905,753	\$7,485,000	\$7,281,998	\$16,940,648	\$18,289,686	\$20,280,851	\$11,768,911	\$18,282,510	\$18,189,873
Overdrafts.....	1,417	31,246	22,967	198,748	193,688	313,846	9,719	5,024	4,599
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,950,000	2,170,000	2,170,000	680,000	680,000	680,000	950,000	950,000	950,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	1,600,000	1,900,000	1,600,000	680,000	680,000	680,000	950,000	950,000	950,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	6,620	35,180	688,180	688,280	22,180	30,450	380,880	161,940	67,840
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,223,677	324,689	2,243,789	24,450	24,450	24,450	25,074	25,074	25,074
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,163,507	1,384,289	1,601,180	1,703,412	1,689,780	2,089,005	667,416	667,206	662,401
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	167,725	196,275	186,275	126,700	124,700	124,700	174,700	174,700	174,700
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	6,118	0,401	286,672	1,062	45,895	116,916	6,875	8,275	8,275
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,446,772	1,085,995	1,685,905	2,163,675	2,496,944	1,767,615	1,147,609	1,146,013	1,653,899
Due from State banks and bankers.....	235,085	531,108	611,216	677,077	621,949	744,467	973,273	1,667,984	467,685
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,652,867	2,460,785	4,243,412	5,946,665	6,947,911	5,950,196	8,147,066	2,624,259	1,615,411
Checks and other cash items.....	11,785	36,685	31,694	22,073	18,675	32,258	82,258	96,285	25,086
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	119,823	232,616	119,019	484,024	461,784	667,122	194,088	668,785	624,256
Bills of other National banks.....	84,271	112,134	167,653	68,442	26,867	59,464	280,732	96,652	105,747
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,316	1,973	8,112	3,283	4,914	7,238	4,865	6,984	7,044
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	608,170	672,407	862,405	1,961,845	2,015,210	2,074,150	741,005	782,715	660,337
Gold Treasury certificates.....	5,000	5,000	5,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	9,000	9,000	9,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....									
Silver dollars.....	87,783	20,694	84,238	56,640	51,671	62,235	84,982	42,982	36,586
Silver Treasury certificates.....				93,867	93,867	93,867	7,500	7,500	27,000
Silver fractional coin.....	12,611	13,245	14,601	86,318	18,566	33,319	21,860	17,496	39,811
Legal-tender notes.....	486,860	722,189	873,176	1,127,861	1,107,915	1,241,009	1,168,062	601,166	641,708
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....									
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	87,760	87,760	97,660	96,900	96,900	96,900	16,750	20,250	19,062
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	2,000	6,400	2,000	3,000	3,000	5,000	3,685	1,000	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,561,287</b>	<b>\$18,950,627</b>	<b>\$22,491,998</b>	<b>\$33,615,418</b>	<b>\$38,214,901</b>	<b>\$38,646,086</b>	<b>\$21,772,282</b>	<b>\$21,589,672</b>	<b>\$19,960,283</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,800,000	\$3,050,000	\$3,050,000	\$2,950,000	\$2,950,000	\$2,950,000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500,000	\$4,000,000
Surplus fund.....	648,000	638,000	630,000	678,500	690,000	690,000	515,000	551,500	566,500
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	168,308	107,974	188,989	214,918	287,068	287,068	285,412	180,448	27,000
National bank notes issued, less m't on hand.....	1,754,582	2,705,582	3,233,908	4,388,608	4,148,548	4,388,608	4,176,088	3,898,180	354,430
Due to other National banks.....	1,848,624	2,723,263	3,067,338	2,766,709	3,062,210	3,062,210	2,292,355	2,401,057	3,309,959
Dividends unpaid.....	18,514	8,962	2,449	512	512	1,205	3,482	924	47,290
Individual deposits.....	5,121,519	5,982,608	7,767,690	22,034,477	23,982,742	24,073,837	9,465,782	9,009,788	8,761,709
U. S. deposits.....	882,894	878,491	876,990	544,028	484,000	510,444	129,405	215,208	203,964
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	598,975	590,622	598,832	129,441	160,824	137,186	14,166	7,351	29,727
Bills payable.....	21,000	12,968	10,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	1,429	5,784	.....	.....	.....	.....	107,460	72,656	78,385
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,561,287</b>	<b>\$18,950,627</b>	<b>\$22,491,998</b>	<b>\$33,615,418</b>	<b>\$38,214,901</b>	<b>\$38,646,086</b>	<b>\$21,772,282</b>	<b>\$21,589,672</b>	<b>\$19,960,283</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$0,286 p. c.	\$1,440,385	\$1,764,417	\$3,328,038	\$3,317,430	\$3,589,394	\$2,052,990	\$1,390,789	\$1,804,651
* Total lawful money reserve.....									

	NEW ORLEANS, LA.			OMAHA, NEB.			PHILADELPHIA, PA.		
	Dec. 1, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 5, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$12,277,512	\$11,078,339	\$11,280,700	\$11,501,550	\$11,714,851	\$10,300,759	\$10,487,559	\$10,7,900,212	
Overdrafts.....	1,566,967	1,184,012	1,068,573	1,252,077	1,075,000	1,039	1,039	1,039	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	622,000	300,000	401,000	400,000	1,075,000	1,075,000	1,075,000	1,075,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	120,550	133,050	131,570	102,214	130,540	130,540	130,540	130,540	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	68,448	1,044,474	82,750	98,082	101,088	101,088	101,088	101,088	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	327,337	1,920,496	2,103,517	658,981	670,049	13,983,989	3,972,298	3,972,298	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	152,180	152,358	152,174	882,291	818,541	818,541	818,541	818,541	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	499,495	952,587	953,511	417,889	411,385	411,385	411,385	411,385	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	639,524	515,285	511,029	1,005,144	1,041,439	9,801,905	9,988,102	9,988,102	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	21,872,810	4,735,359	791,451	511,040	543,190	1,847,049	1,875,066	1,875,066	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,872,810	5,549,303	5,549,303	4,017,728	3,340,218	19,238,584	28,781,030	24,965,814	
Checks and other cash items.....	1,459,626	1,077,012	1,288,963	998,472	998,472	1,915,783	1,529,400	1,529,400	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	76,253	13,118	8,646	182,742	253,274	18,344,498	7,615,561	17,821,498	
Bills of other National banks.....	13,118	8,646	14,006	10,972	11,658	418,017	316,927	316,927	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,055,612	2,145,544	232,389	949,680	1,181,282	1,142,240	2,005,711	1,775,474	
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	122,730	120,280	121,600	38,950	38,010	38,150	38,150	38,150	
Gold.....	72,675	69,042	475,000	186,189	116,742	106,250	106,250	106,250	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	582,638	894,206	823,224	159,285	143,659	209,653	209,653	209,653	
Silver.....	65,238	63,998	98,779	84,877	83,549	83,549	83,549	83,549	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	950,190	761,659	958,228	628,306	361,246	760,684	760,684	760,684	
Legal-tender notes.....	165,000	60,000	80,000	38,045	43,489	48,175	48,175	48,175	
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tenders.....	97,900	38,045	38,045	17,000	5,450	5,450	5,450	5,450	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	10,000	6,600	17,000	8,604	8,604	8,604	8,604	8,604	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....									
<b>Total.....</b>	\$24,948,779	\$27,378,874	\$27,625,462	\$24,398,661	\$24,098,547	\$24,098,547	\$24,098,547	\$24,270,400	\$285,780,622
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$19,655,000
Surplus fund.....	2,356,000	2,890,000	2,890,000	362,500	362,500	362,500	362,500	362,500	14,476,000
Undiv. profits less expenses and taxes paid.....	449,070	404,906	512,245	173,012	173,012	217,186	2,698,898	2,698,898	3,164,061
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	513,545	671,245	696,945	770,200	968,500	963,500	6,310,665	6,310,665	6,183,762
Due to other National banks.....	871,378	1,011,000	1,021,149	4,980,180	4,980,180	4,374,528	28,622,680	28,622,680	83,548,645
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,389,752	2,367,014	2,112,861	3,948,950	3,948,950	3,948,950	10,237,818	10,237,818	27,894,747
Dividends unpaid.....	9,908	17,296	8,411	8,411	8,411	8,411	56,982	56,982	42,121
Individual deposits.....	16,000,768	16,000,768	17,495,611	9,743,000	9,743,000	3,907	3,907	3,907	30,986
U. S. deposits.....	301,506	298,055	308,288	576,268	576,268	499,249	4,072,587	4,072,587	4,172,060
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	181,835	44,999	5,000	282,200	282,200	282,200	282,200	282,200	3,461
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	460,000								
Bills payable.....									
Liabilities other than those above stated.....									
<b>Total.....</b>	\$24,948,779	\$27,378,874	\$27,625,462	\$24,398,661	\$24,098,547	\$24,098,547	\$24,098,547	\$24,270,400	\$285,780,622
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.	\$0.64 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$8,014,181	\$8,065,900	\$8,498,513	\$1,008,824	\$1,008,824	\$1,008,824	\$1,008,824	\$1,008,824	\$84,884,401



U. S. NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES

	PITTSBURG, PA.		PORTLAND, ORE.		ST. JOSEPH, MO.	
	Dec. 1, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1899.	Apr. 6, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$417,082,649	\$504,184,213	\$2,637,997	\$3,062,197	\$2,240,889	\$2,012,754
Overdrafts.....	49,915	75,238	81,027	104,420	4,006	9,849
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	5,065,250	8,845,250	625,000	625,000	210,000	210,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	1,000,000	1,050,000	400,000	400,000	70,000	100,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	890,500	1,050,000	501,690	500,800	96,100	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	760,542	765,024	88,027	72,375	.....	.....
Stocks, securities, etc.....	4,478,954	6,004,024	7,441,244	2,477,311	14,800	12,900
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	3,210,066	3,208,214	63,128	63,141	72,000	72,000
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	466,361	525,880	211,188	192,347	.....	.....
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	3,078,443	4,624,084	223,749	271,105	310,085	825,143
Due from State banks and bankers.....	387,959	413,751	53,016	113,372	121,895	128,629
Due from approved reserve agents.....	7,828,507	12,098,880	898,356	905,594	804,389	1,021,106
Checks and other cash items.....	187,185	241,709	10,865	23,768	28,968	26,412
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	2,918,752	1,953,194	88,071	148,498	167,150	201,705
Bills of other National banks.....	812,477	871,689	7,680	6,070	14,265	13,695
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	18,681	18,917	1,619	1,754	829	1,165
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:						
Gold coin.....	3,173,306	3,298,280	1,156,450	891,775	68,762	122,177
Gold Treasury certificates.....	410,560	418,750	.....	12,440	10,860	15,490
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	182,680	207,421	11,556	4,060	16,036	17,229
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,325,412	1,467,464	9,832	8,105	102,237	122,274
Silver fractional coin.....	110,906	104,100	20,509	19,796	6,918	8,268
Legal-tender notes.....	3,231,989	3,631,147	12,040	13,779	194,079	171,264
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	252,821	240,511	28,125	28,125	9,450	9,450
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	48,055	40,955	38,614	105,732	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$37,750,657</b>	<b>\$37,895,007</b>	<b>\$9,725,078</b>	<b>\$9,479,448</b>	<b>\$4,493,333</b>	<b>\$4,877,245</b>

Capital stock paid in.....	\$11,800,000	\$12,050,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000	\$350,000	\$350,000
Surplus fund.....	9,112,000	9,340,000	198,000	198,000	107,250	107,250
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	2,335,195	2,098,210	588,829	584,124	13,951	21,921
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	5,024,400	4,718,200	621,700	642,000	189,000	189,000
Due to other National banks.....	9,392,792	11,580,730	1,983,647	1,987,082	623,540	623,540
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,824,424	3,060,327	755,258	712,073	1,094,226	1,051,008
Dividends unpaid.....	60,163	65,027	15	15	.....	.....
Individual deposits.....	48,191,851	53,240,730	5,084,619	4,843,908	2,025,125	2,275,990
U. S. deposits.....	841,629	922,519	942,027	48,729	2,177,294	97,371
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	143,100	162,519	.....	.....	64,521	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	24,800	107,415	425,168	463,629	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	1,665	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$37,750,657</b>	<b>\$37,895,007</b>	<b>\$9,725,078</b>	<b>\$9,479,448</b>	<b>\$4,493,333</b>	<b>\$4,877,245</b>
Average reserve held.....	31.30 p. c.	35.57 p. c.	30.71 p. c.	28.44 p. c.	50.38 p. c.	41.94 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,435,674	\$9,172,112	\$1,210,389	\$922,515	\$421,173	\$413,469

	ST. LOUIS, MO.		ST. PAUL, MINN.		SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.	
	Dec. 1, 1899.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$83,653,862	\$40,740,965	\$9,399,065	\$9,578,965	\$10,362,548	\$16,106,580
Overdrafts.....	113,254	111,732	1,280	4,685	38,708	41,106
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	3,810,000	3,730,000	292,000	292,000	700,000	700,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	1,490,000	1,400,000	475,000	528,000	860,000	860,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	19,440	25,440	162,500	98,500	1,870,000	1,870,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	178,629	153,402	2,300	14,373	770,440	772,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....	3,046,047	4,507,138	1,773,166	1,962,173	182,741	221,578
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	917,000	760,000	698,758	698,758	355,191	359,672
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	242,884	153,100	210,071	215,381	114,980	114,980
Due from State banks (not reserve agents).....	10,738,984	13,538,514	1,082,396	1,271,308	418,157	365,859
Due from National banks.....	1,374,405	1,968,281	381,780	311,169	2,682,297	2,673,587
Due from approved reserve agents.....	97,624	82,452	4,238,714	4,019,948	1,698,801	1,385,481
Checks and other cash items.....	1,616,240	2,683,380	140,417	76,853	13,041	13,786
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	286,584	213,144	362,809	168,649	482,383	456,562
Bills of other National banks.....	2,798	3,462	112,741	94,506	14,066	14,965
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,823,085	3,711,417	3,108	3,142	749	1,562
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:						
Gold coin.....	2,823,085	3,711,417	1,698,987	1,829,551	2,077,998	5,601,507
Gold Treasury certificates.....	251,640	461,880	2,000	2,000	8,000	845,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	45,533	25,582	81,702	187,100	129,869	56,068
Silver dollars.....	983,474	1,708,649	1,029,986	77,197	18,386	10,914
Silver Treasury certificates.....	19,716	32,967	48,792	48,779	67,168	50,172
Silver fractional coin.....	2,676,063	4,889,959	403,452	224,740	143,726	16,187
Legal-tender notes.....	1,750,000	2,180,000	11,888	11,888	31,465	31,465
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	1,170,825	1,651,150	11,238	11,238	31,465	31,465
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	14,000	9,000	45,308	8,902	22,805	443,511
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....						78,110
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$86,272,469</b>	<b>\$83,111,895</b>	<b>\$51,768,741</b>	<b>\$52,224,053</b>	<b>\$52,858,500</b>	<b>\$31,495,426</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>						
Capital stock paid in.....	\$8,400,000	\$8,400,000	\$3,900,000	\$3,900,000	\$3,900,000	\$4,000,000
Surplus fund.....	1,794,000	1,788,500	550,000	550,000	2,250,000	2,250,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	968,555	877,615	791,618	629,958	629,958	476,281
National bank notes issued, less amt'n on hand.....	3,369,225	3,205,285	198,550	198,550	60,000	60,000
Due to other National banks.....	17,310,384	21,567,732	2,532,688	2,653,591	2,880,682	1,984,015
Due to State banks and bankers.....	6,240,364	11,229,732	2,846,000	2,554,127	1,889,279	1,467,032
Dividends unpaid.....	42,346	22,046	2,900	2,900	4,740,118	5,493,187
Individual deposits.....	24,482,599	34,575,678	10,488,742	11,401,693	12,176,683	16,267,211
U. S. S. deposits.....	1,839,609	1,839,609	70,282	165,288	194,543	18,759,589
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			380,182	344,386	317,222	689,047
Notes and bills rediscounted.....						
Bills payable.....	7,250	9,060				
Liabilities other than those above stated.....						
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$96,272,469</b>	<b>\$83,111,895</b>	<b>\$51,768,741</b>	<b>\$52,224,053</b>	<b>\$52,858,500</b>	<b>\$31,495,426</b>
Average reserve held.....	23,132 P. C.	35,381 P. C.	46,344 P. C.	46,14 P. C.	41,100 P. C.	30,169 P. C.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$45,540,459	\$13,990,664	\$11,403,804	\$34,426,881	\$34,010,104	\$14,068,419

	SAVANNAH, GA.			WASHINGTON, D. C.		
	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 6, 1899.	Dec. 1, 1898.	Feb. 4, 1899.	April 6, 1899.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>						
Loans and discounts.....	\$1,284,895	\$1,198,898	\$1,270,964	\$10,019,239	\$10,070,260	\$10,161,987
Overdrafts.....	255	9167	1,581	82,181	14,764	18,614
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	102,000	102,000	102,000	1,095,400	1,095,400	1,095,400
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	90,000	128,000	128,000	500,000	500,000	510,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	10,400	12,548	12,548	504,280	564,070	418,880
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	30,960	30,540	30,540	123,668	130,055	78,358
Stocks, securities, etc.....	67,312	67,312	67,312	804,417	898,545	1,000,147
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	16,711	16,960	16,960	1,084,291	1,084,291	1,084,291
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	92,865	131,188	68,855	72,960	70,035	72,379
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	14,349	48,244	23,780	1,274,747	1,184,468	1,298,745
Due from State banks and bankers.....	121,730	370,273	291,981	385,852	291,558	396,775
Due from approved reserve agents.....	62,396	61,688	61,688	2,278,158	2,091,866	3,898,459
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	12,000	22,376	19,000	278,679	298,660	331,641
Bills of other National banks.....	1,149	1,627	1,185	5,070	6,450	298,171
Fractional paper currency nickels and cents.....	5,000	3,000	3,000	8,528	8,112	7,688
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:						
Gold coin.....	5,000	3,000	3,000	978,080	923,654	1,443,919
Gold Treasury certificates.....	3,000	3,000	3,000	570,280	544,560	554,770
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	30,950	28,500	8,000	8,561	8,561	9,247
Silver dollars.....	81,200	41,800	46,000	1,294,616	965,149	965,149
Silver Treasury certificates.....	8,000	11,500	22,500	38,753	30,103	28,674
Silver fractional coin.....	185,828	110,418	100,841	730,987	642,688	776,878
Legal-tender notes.....	4,590	4,590	4,590	80,000	170,000	220,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	7,890	4,590	4,590	38,302	42,062	42,062
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....						
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....						
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,163,021</b>	<b>\$2,397,522</b>	<b>\$2,223,152</b>	<b>\$21,659,402</b>	<b>\$22,642,036</b>	<b>\$24,622,000</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>						
Capital stock paid in.....	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$3,775,000	\$3,775,000	\$3,775,000
Surplus fund.....	228,000	228,000	228,000	1,217,450	1,318,900	1,319,500
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	71,116	53,229	67,301	365,968	278,784	375,172
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	87,846	83,815	79,145	788,485	816,515	814,065
State bank notes outstanding.....	189,680	221,095	91,612	444,519	496,262	432,146
Due to other National banks.....	190,878	176,274	203,617	364,913	366,779	377,701
Due to State banks and bankers.....	499	714	3,799	6,365	6,365	8,207
Dividends unpaid.....	547,405	771,437	690,489	16,166,540	16,166,507	18,060,305
Individual deposits.....	94,594	94,497	93,684	478,922	468,504	469,288
U. S. deposits.....				11,779	23,997	30,843
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....						
Notes and bills rediscounted.....						
Bills payable.....						
Liabilities other than those above stated.....						
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,163,021</b>	<b>\$2,397,522</b>	<b>\$2,223,152</b>	<b>\$21,659,402</b>	<b>\$22,642,036</b>	<b>\$24,622,000</b>
Average reserve held.....	86.98 P. C.	56.15 P. C.	48.15 P. C.	34.86 P. C.	38.69 P. C.	43.47 P. C.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$903,976	\$801,218	\$189,541	\$2,976,263	\$3,614,187	\$3,998,137

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, May 3, 1899.

THE PAYMENT OF THE \$20,000,000 INDEMNITY TO SPAIN by the United States was an interesting event of the month just closed, and although the warrants were not drawn until the last of the month the pending payment exerted considerable influence upon financial affairs. Until the matter was accomplished there was more or less mystery as to how the transfer of so large a sum would be made, and Wall street was agitated by a number of rumors.

The history of the settlement in brief is: Four warrants for \$5,000,000 each were drawn upon the sub-Treasury at New York on April 29, and were handed to the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, on May 1. At the present writing nothing had been done with the drafts, but it is known that the National City Bank of New York in connection with the Deutsche Bank of Berlin is representing the Spanish Government in the matter. The National City Bank has been accumulating foreign exchange for some time past to cover the transaction, and instead of gold being shipped, exchange will be sent and the \$20,000,000 transfer to Spain will have no effect upon the money market.

That so important an operation could be conducted without disturbance of either the stock or the money market is significant of the strides which this country has taken as a financial power. The payment is made without apparently taking a dollar of money out of the country, or causing any decrease in the cash reserves of the banks.

The Treasury surplus is depleted to some extent by the payment to Spain, but it is still in excess of \$263,000,000, an amount sufficient to assure the Government ample protection against an exhausted Treasury for a long time to come. The cash balance is \$47,000,000 more than it was a year ago, \$35,000,000 more than two years ago and \$138,000,000 more than on April 1, 1894. The Government is still expending a large amount of money for war purposes, more than \$20,500,000 for war and navy in April. The internal revenue receipts, however, were more than sufficient to meet the entire disbursements for that account, the total receipts so derived being more than \$22,000,000.

The cost of the war with Spain is now being taken account of by thinking people and the fact that war costs something is being brought home to almost everybody. While not disclosing the whole truth, a comparison of the expenditures of the Government for twelve months ending April 30 in each of the past three years will in a measure furnish the information sought for:

### GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES.

	1896-7	1897-8	1898-9
War.....	\$43,844,758	\$62,241,374	\$247,462,937
Navy.....	32,756,153	46,350,663	74,122,462
Civil and Miscellaneous.....	88,637,051	91,901,582	116,330,753
Indians.....	13,215,500	11,336,969	12,304,553
Pensions.....	142,723,394	146,433,416	140,339,148
Interest.....	37,850,676	36,903,886	33,585,715
Total.....	\$364,028,032	\$396,167,890	\$629,154,598

Compared with two years ago the expenses of the War Department increased in the last twelve months nearly \$199,000,000, and of the Navy Department more than \$41,000,000. There was also an increase of more than \$27,000,000 in the civil and miscellaneous items, a good part of which is undoubtedly chargeable to war account. During the month of April, 1898, the Government spent at least \$12,000,000 in extraordinary expenditures for war purposes; so taking the thirteen months that have elapsed since the burden of war was taken up, a moderate estimate of the cost up to date would seem to be about \$300,000,000.

While the Government has successfully financed its indemnity claim of \$20,000,000, the magnitude of the financial operations of individuals and private corporations is still more astounding. The multiplying of trade combinations goes on and the capital both real and nominal involved is without any historical parallel. In the adjoining State of New Jersey, which for years past has been the domicile of new companies created mainly to do business in New York, industrial companies with a capital of not less than \$2,000,000, and an aggregate capital of about \$500,000,000, were organized last month. In Delaware also, companies representing some hundreds of millions of dollars were organized.

Many of the corporations thus created are meeting no difficulty in marketing their securities apparently, and there must be an enormous amount of private capital finding its way into industrial investments. With such vast corporations as the Amalgamated Copper Company, capital, \$75,000,000; the American Hide and Leather Company, capital, \$70,000,000; a steel combination, capital of \$700,000,000 to \$800,000,000, and others forming and projected with similar capitalization, there can be no disputing the statement that an industrial revolution is taking place.

The Congressional Industrial Commission is about to push its investigation in the direction of the trusts; and the Circuit Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Mo., has just decided that the National Lead Company is a trust and that under the laws of Missouri therefore it cannot collect a claim from a customer. In spite of such an obstacle as these, however, the organization of trusts and the combining of competitive enterprises into single aggregations of capital proceed at a rapid rate.

One very important act of a local character was passed by the New York Legislature. It taxes the franchises of corporations as land and will affect a very large number of corporations doing business in New York State.

While Stock Exchange transactions have been influenced at times by adverse rumors the fear of hardening rates for money, etc., prices of securities generally have advanced, and although the aggregate sales were rather smaller than in March, they were about three times as large as in April last year. The sales of stocks aggregated nearly 17,000,000 shares against about 17,700,000 shares in March and 6,000,000 shares in April, 1898, and of bonds \$84,500,000 against \$89,600,000 in March, and \$28,500,000 in April, 1898.

Prices for most products outside of iron and copper have declined to some extent. Wheat is about  $\frac{1}{2}$  cent bushel lower than a month ago and forty cents less than a year ago. Corn advanced one cent in the month and is about four cents higher than a year ago. Oats have declined  $1\frac{1}{2}$  cents for the month and four cents for the year. Provisions in the main are fractionally lower. No. 1 iron is twenty-five cents higher, an advance in twelve months of \$4.50. Copper advanced \$1.50 last month and \$7.00 in the past year.

The general business of the country is constantly increasing and in no previous period has the volume of transactions been as large as at present. The revival of activity is confined to no particular industry or locality. An examination of the records of the clearing-house associations discloses an extraordinary condition of commercial activity. In April the bank clearings in New York increased from 100 to 135 per cent. each week as compared with last year, while in the cities outside of

New York the gains have ranged from about 30 to 50 per cent. The clearings of the country exclusive of New York are now at the rate of over \$3,000,000,000 a month, while this city adds about \$5,500,000,000 to the total.

The completed returns of bank clearings for the first quarter of 1899 permit a very interesting comparison to be made with previous years, indicating to what extent the development of the business interests of the country has been carried. The following table shows the number of cities outside of New York reporting, and their total exchanges for the first three months of each year since 1889, the returns of New York city being shown in another table :

	<i>Cities.</i>	<i>Clearings.</i>		<i>Cities.</i>	<i>Clearings.</i>
1889.....	48	\$4,848,976,268	1895.....	78	\$3,551,217,441
1890.....	55	5,426,859,564	1896.....	82	5,686,110,676
1891.....	60	5,466,737,951	1897.....	80	5,373,459,417
1892.....	65	6,169,788,188	1898.....	84	6,697,693,432
1893.....	73	6,621,470,241	1899.....	84	8,057,191,607
1894.....	78	5,062,962,973			

With but a slight addition to the number of clearing-houses since 1895, the volume of exchanges has increased from about \$3,500,000,000 to \$8,000,000,000 or 130 per cent. Even the year of prosperity, 1892, makes a poor showing when compared with the present year. A more interesting exhibit is presented in the following table showing the clearings of the seven most important banking cities for the first quarter of each of the last eleven years :

	<i>New York.</i>	<i>Boston.</i>	<i>Philadel- phia.</i>	<i>Chicago.</i>	<i>St. Louis.</i>	<i>Pittsburg.</i>	<i>Baltimore.</i>
1889....	\$8,554,562,182	\$1,174,464,451	\$668,202,974	\$765,496,700	\$236,475,526	\$153,209,206	\$157,349,989
1890....	8,918,801,546	1,230,640,369	902,306,240	853,794,697	265,065,771	186,563,431	190,579,927
1891....	7,707,642,984	1,132,600,706	802,659,679	972,769,715	269,237,437	158,961,434	175,941,054
1892....	10,046,731,425	1,211,029,258	970,496,580	1,167,200,186	294,811,913	179,741,691	202,706,267
1893....	9,879,032,793	1,300,664,433	961,591,656	1,296,217,632	316,613,480	188,596,835	184,507,100
1894....	5,938,415,397	1,031,468,818	699,096,629	1,006,023,983	279,550,139	152,426,211	162,429,664
1895....	6,499,854,657	1,096,277,118	791,757,362	1,063,236,643	299,818,909	154,752,789	160,958,405
1896....	7,251,661,992	1,090,855,583	820,296,001	1,082,360,828	299,431,671	184,549,817	182,593,614
1897....	7,021,669,055	1,180,293,909	746,909,074	938,074,107	324,879,239	184,882,426	181,836,408
1898....	10,624,559,877	1,380,176,293	918,170,773	1,279,322,176	356,645,847	246,823,679	235,379,982
1899....	16,143,472,966	1,729,116,201	1,186,591,377	1,612,820,861	395,204,134	387,406,927	350,361,383

Whether we compare the present time with the years of generally favorable conditions, 1892 and 1893, or with those of extreme depression, 1894 and 1895, the comparison reveals a most satisfactory state of affairs now existing. This is true of every city in the above table, as it would also be true of nearly every city in the country.

Turning to our foreign trade additional evidence is afforded not only of present prosperity, but of a permanent development that is to make estimates as to the future based upon past experience of doubtful value. It has been usual and reasonable to take much account of crop conditions in figures, estimates of what our coming trade with other countries would be. The great years of prosperity, 1880 and 1881, were years of large exports of grain, and the exports of products of agriculture were eighty-three per cent. of the total, while the exports of manufactures were only twelve to thirteen per cent. Our large wheat crops and a crop famine abroad gave America its opportunity.

In the year ended June 30, 1898, our exports of the products of agriculture exceeded in value those of any previous year, but they were only about 70½ per cent. of the total domestic exports, while 24 per cent. of the total consisted of manufactures. In the month of March the exports of manufactures reached the extraordinary total of \$36,000,000, and were more than 35 per cent. of the total, exceeding the highest record for any previous month. For the nine months ended March 31,

1899, the exports of that class were valued at nearly \$243,000,000, and made up 26.07 per cent. of the total, comparing with less than \$209,000,000 and 22.93 per cent. in 1897-8. The growth of exports and decrease in imports of manufactures are indicated in the following table :

	MONTH OF MARCH.		NINE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31.	
	Exports.	Imports.	Exports.	Imports.
1893.....	\$14,599,221	\$35,179,056	\$113,974,419	\$278,990,274
1894.....	15,572,366	19,006,459	136,794,537	184,329,255
1895.....	15,576,786	23,701,661	122,406,784	226,844,756
1896.....	19,126,785	27,025,901	163,187,926	267,963,191
1897.....	25,876,661	23,312,196	200,008,688	202,651,732
1898.....	23,214,450	23,153,896	208,788,096	175,505,496
1899.....	36,023,733	24,343,310	242,883,645	194,226,696

Only in the last two years have our exports of manufactures exceeded our imports, and in the last nine months the difference has been nearly \$48,700,000.

Importance especially attaches to these facts, because of the unfavorable report made last month by the Agricultural Department as to the condition of the winter wheat crop. The average condition on April 1 was reported at 77.9 per cent. as against 86.7 per cent. on April 1 last year, and an average of 84.4 per cent. for the last ten years. The official estimate of the area sown to winter wheat is 29,950,000 acres, while the winter wheat crop raised in 1898 came from 25,700,000 acres. With the increased acreage therefore, even the lower condition would not prevent an increase in yield, but for the fact that a considerable area has been winter killed, and it is possible that the actual area of the winter wheat crop is less than 26,000,000 acres. The winter wheat crop last year was estimated by the Government at 380,000,000 bushels. While estimates of this year's yield would be premature at this time, a total of only 300,000,000 bushels is considered as within the range of probability.

Much interest has been aroused recently in copper mining, due in a measure to the rapid extension of operations in that field and to the enhancement in the price of that metal. The domestic production of copper in the United States in the first quarter of 1899 amounted to nearly 60,500 tons, as compared with only about 55,500 tons in 1898, an increase of more than nine per cent. A consolidation of copper interests is one of the big operations now understood to be taking shape.

Some encouragement comes from the field of railroad building. The "Railway Age," of Chicago, estimates that not less than 5,000 miles of new railroad, representing an investment of \$150,000,000, will be built in the United States this year. There was only about 3,100 miles built last year.

The production of iron is again at a rate exceeding all previous records. On April 1 there were 205 furnaces in blast, having a weekly capacity of 245,746 tons, which comes very close to an annual output of 13,000,000 tons.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—The fiscal operations of large corporations have had considerable influence upon the rates for money in the local market during the past month. Then the discrimination of lenders in the matter of collateral for loans which unfavorably affected the "industrials" also for a time made money dear for those who wanted to borrow on securities of that class. Call money advanced early in the month and touched 16 per cent. on April 5 and 15 per cent. on April 7, but rates have declined since, and in the last week, while 6 per cent. ruled temporarily, the bulk of business was done at rates not much above 3½ @ 4 per cent. The month closes with the money market in a condition of ease, and time money is offered freely at low rates. At the close of the month call money ruled at 3 to 6 per cent., the

average rate being about 4 per cent. Banks and trust companies quote 4 per cent. as the minimum, some loaning at 3½ per cent. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 3 per cent. for sixty days, 3½ per cent. for ninety days to four months, and 3¾ @ 4 per cent. for five to six months. For commercial paper the rates are 3½ per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable, 3¾ @ 4½ per cent. for first-class four to six months single names, and 4½ @ 5½ per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.	May 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	2 - 2½	2 - 3	2½ - 3	2½ - 3	3¼ - 12	3 - 6
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	2½ - 3½	3 - 3½	2½ - 3	2½ - 3	6 - 8	3½ - 4
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	3 -	3 -	2½ -	3 -	4 -	3 -
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	3 - 3½	3 -	2½ - 3	3 - 3½	4 - 4½	3½ -
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	3½ -	3½ -	3 -	3½ -	4 - 4½	3½ - 4
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	3½ - 3¾	3 -	2½ - 3	3 -	3½ - 4	3½ -
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	3½ - 4	3½ - 3¾	3 - 3½	3½ - 4	4 - 5	3½ - 4½
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	4 - 5	4 - 5	4 - 5	4 - 5	5 - 6	4½ - 5½

NEW YORK CITY BANKS.—The deposits in the New York Clearing-House banks were reduced \$15,000,000 in April, making the decrease since March 4, when the total was at the highest point, \$31,000,000. The reduction in loans during the same period was \$20,000,000 and the surplus reserve is now \$10,000,000 more than on April 1. The deposits are \$225,000,000 more than they were a year ago, but the surplus reserve is \$19,000,000 less. The transactions of the banks continue to be the largest in volume ever known, the weekly exchanges last month ranging from \$1,201,000,000 to \$1,553,000,000.

NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Apr. 1...	\$779,951,100	\$187,144,300	\$53,079,800	\$898,917,000	\$15,494,850	\$13,870,000	\$1,293,330,200
8...	778,709,400	187,152,500	51,607,500	894,964,700	15,018,825	13,928,900	1,353,000,641
15...	768,354,200	188,194,900	53,456,200	888,478,300	19,471,525	13,948,300	1,494,246,285
22...	760,823,700	189,716,400	55,559,400	894,399,600	24,175,900	14,028,000	1,302,919,619
29...	760,068,400	189,168,400	57,256,100	883,596,800	25,524,675	13,956,700	1,201,119,899

DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$530,785,000	\$33,286,950	\$675,064,200	\$15,788,750	\$823,027,700	\$19,180,975
February.....	563,331,800	59,148,250	722,494,200	35,809,450	861,637,500	38,222,025
March.....	573,789,300	57,520,975	739,214,800	22,729,125	910,573,600	30,384,900
April.....	569,226,500	47,666,575	682,236,800	36,720,800	898,917,000	15,494,850
May.....	576,863,900	48,917,625	658,503,300	44,504,675	883,596,800	25,524,675
June.....	575,600,000	46,616,100	696,006,400	58,704,600		
July.....	604,983,700	41,384,975	750,074,600	62,013,500		
August.....	623,045,000	45,720,150	741,680,100	41,904,475		
September.....	636,996,000	39,517,700	752,389,800	14,990,050		
October.....	619,353,200	15,550,400	702,128,200	15,327,150		
November.....	625,339,000	24,271,800	761,574,200	26,061,550		
December.....	666,278,600	22,122,950	789,525,800	17,097,950		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$914,810,300 on March 4, 1899, loans, \$780,67,000 on March 4, 1899, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.



NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

Dates.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Apr. 1.....	\$61,127,000	\$67,408,000	\$2,824,300	\$3,783,300	\$7,553,100	\$3,929,000	\$1,237,500
" 8.....	62,264,500	69,161,200	2,875,200	3,848,400	8,140,800	3,798,500	1,368,800
" 15.....	63,636,400	69,323,100	2,819,000	4,084,200	7,147,900	3,460,000	180,725
" 22.....	64,182,900	69,863,200	2,744,900	3,910,900	7,688,300	3,384,900	213,100
" 29.....	64,743,900	71,101,800	2,747,700	3,968,600	8,126,400	3,550,900	638,060

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following tables :

BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Apr. 1.....	\$193,089,000	\$234,265,000	\$18,643,000	\$6,654,000	\$5,068,000	\$124,941,800
" 8.....	203,829,000	244,980,000	18,604,000	6,531,000	5,118,000	174,514,800
" 15.....	205,089,000	237,119,000	18,510,000	6,498,000	5,183,000	137,063,700
" 22.....	204,230,000	236,213,000	17,636,000	6,634,000	5,120,000	128,400,100
" 29.....	202,537,000	237,737,000	17,369,000	6,972,000	5,109,000	153,708,000

PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Apr. 1.....	\$134,394,000	\$155,312,000	\$46,740,000	\$6,051,000	\$77,096,700
" 8.....	134,555,000	159,571,000	48,028,000	5,969,000	118,847,900
" 15.....	137,669,000	162,968,000	45,707,000	5,920,000	97,821,100
" 22.....	138,563,000	165,481,000	48,456,000	5,632,000	97,727,100
" 29.....	138,823,000	166,335,000	48,965,000	5,649,000	89,046,100

MONEY RATES ABROAD.—The interest rate in the foreign money markets has declined during the past month although no change has been made in the posted rates of discount of the leading banks. The Bank of England maintaining its rate of 3 per cent., France 3 and Germany 4½ per cent. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London at the close of the month were 2½ per cent. against 2¾ @ 2½ per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was 2¾ per cent., against 2¾ per cent. a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort 3½ @ 3¼ per cent. against 4½ @ 4¼ per cent. a month ago.

MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Nov. 13.	Dec. 16.	Jan. 11.	Feb. 10.	Mar. 10.	Apr. 14.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	4	4	4	3	3	3
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	3¼	3¾	2¾	2	2¼ — ¾	2¼ — ¾
6 months bankers' drafts.....	3	2½ — 3	2¾	2¼	2¾ — ¾	2¼ — ¾
Loans—Day to day.....	2½	2½	2	1½	1½	1½
Paris, open market rates.....	3	3	3	2¾	2¾	2¾
Berlin, .....	4¾	5¼	4¾	3¾	4¼	3¾
Hamburg, .....	5¼	5¾	4¾	3¾	4¼	3¾
Frankfort, .....	5¾	5¾	4¾	3¾	4¾	3¾
Amsterdam, .....	2¾	2¾	2¼	2¼	2¾	2¼
Vienna, .....	4¾	4¾	4¾	4	4¾	4¾
St. Petersburg, .....	5½	5¾	5½	6	6	6
Madrid, .....	5	5	5	4	3	3
Copenhagen, .....	5	5	5	4¾	4	4¾

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Jan. 11, 1899.	Feb. 8, 1899.	Mar. 16, 1899.	Apr. 12, 1899.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£27,721,420	£26,484,765	£26,553,840	£27,859,375
Public deposits.....	7,690,790	11,283,618	16,796,784	11,859,879
Other deposits.....	41,513,333	40,308,312	36,824,021	38,041,902
Government securities.....	15,192,036	18,383,488	13,896,274	13,362,728
Other securities.....	32,040,707	32,650,966	34,913,574	34,872,798
Reserve of notes and coin.....	20,058,988	23,715,319	23,284,293	19,494,025
Coin and bullion.....	30,980,408	33,400,064	33,033,133	30,350,400
Reserve to liabilities.....	40½%	45½%	43½%	38½%
Bank rate of discount.....	4%	3%	3%	3%
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	2½	2%	2¼@2½	2¼@2½
Price of Consols (¾ per cents.).....	110¾	111½	110½	110½
Price of silver per ounce.....	27½	27½d	27½d	27½d
Average price of wheat.....	27s. 0d.	26s. 6d.	26s. 10d.	24s. 7d.

EUROPEAN BANKS.—The changes in the gold holdings of the leading European banks during the last month were not important. Since early in April gold has been flowing back into the Bank of England, and that institution now has \$2,000,000 more than on April 1, but about \$2,500,000 less than a year ago. The Bank of France gained less than \$1,000,000 during the month, and the Bank of Germany lost \$4,000,000.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	March 1, 1899.		April 1, 1899.		May 1, 1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£24,062,851		£20,806,265		£31,271,922	
France.....	73,014,109	£47,860,189	72,567,656	£48,013,247	72,721,370	£48,287,969
Germany.....	29,083,000	14,831,000	30,441,000	15,982,000	29,626,000	15,261,000
Austro-Hungary.....	35,789,000	12,471,000	35,905,000	12,534,000	36,053,000	12,571,000
Spain.....	11,156,000	9,205,000	11,625,000	11,463,000	11,654,000	12,565,000
Netherlands.....	4,813,000	6,832,000	3,998,000	6,997,000	3,825,000	6,851,000
Nat. Belgium.....	3,173,000	1,587,000	3,157,000	1,578,000	2,949,000	1,475,000
Totals.....	£190,560,960	£91,816,189	£188,501,921	£96,170,247	£188,110,293	£97,010,969

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion:

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .55	\$ .70	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.76
Mexican dollars.....	.49	.51	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	.44	.48	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.73	4.82
English silver.....	4.82	4.88	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.88	4.88	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.70
Five francs.....	.98	.98	Ten guilders.....	3.96	4.00
Twenty francs.....	3.85	3.87			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 28¾d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 62¼ @ 64 c. Fine silver (Government assay), 63 @ 64½ c.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—Rates for sterling exchange have continued to advance until now they are pretty close to the gold exporting point. It is not, however, considered likely that there will be any outward gold movement at this time. The sterling market has been affected somewhat by the impending transfer of \$20,000,000 from the United States to Spain, but the uneasiness has since been allayed and it is probable that the arrangements for making the remittance were completed some time ago.

RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Ap'l 1.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.88½ @ 4.84	4.88½ @ 4.84½
" 8.....	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.86 @ 4.86½	4.86½ @ 4.87	4.88½ @ 4.83½	4.88½ @ 4.85½
" 15.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.88½ @ 4.84	4.88½ @ 4.84½
" 22.....	4.84½ @ 4.85	4.86½ @ 4.87	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.88½ @ 4.84½
" 29.....	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.84½ @ 4.85	4.84 @ 4.85

FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	January 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	April 1.	May 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.81½ — 2	4.83 — ¼	4.84½ — ¼	4.84½ — ¼	4.85½ — ¼
" " Sight.....	4.84½ — ¼	4.85 — ¼	4.86½ — ¼	4.86½ — ¼	4.87½ — ¼
" " Cables.....	4.81 — ¼	4.85½ — 6	4.87 — ¼	4.87½ — ¼	4.87½ — 8
" Commercial long.....	4.85 — ¼	4.82½ — ¼	4.83½ — ¼	4.83½ — ¼	4.84½ — 5
" Documentary for paym't.....	4.80½ — 1¼	4.82½ — ¼	4.83 — ¼	4.83½ — ¼	4.84 — 5
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.20½ — 1½	5.18½ — 7½	5.18½ — 15	5.17½ — 16½	5.18½ — 8½
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.20½ — 1½	5.21½ — 1½	5.20 — 17½	5.20½ — 17½	5.19½ — 8½
" Bankers' sight.....	5.21½ — 1½	5.19½ — ¼	5.17½ — 15	5.18½ — 17½	5.18½ — ¼
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.24½ — 1½	5.21½ — 1½	5.20 — 20	5.20½ — 18	5.19½ — 18
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94½ — 1½	94½ — 1½	94½ — 1½	94½ — 1½	94½ — 1½
" Bankers' sight.....	94½ — 1½	94½ — 1½	95½ — 1½	95½ — 1½	95½ — 1½
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.22½ — 1½	5.19½ — 8½	5.18½ — 15	5.19½ — 18½	5.18½ — 7½
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	39½ — 40	40 — 1½	40 — 1½	40½ — 18½	40½ — 18½
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	26½ — 1½	26½ — 1½	26½ — 1½	26½ — 1½	26½ — 1½
Italian lire—sight.....	5.52½ — 50	5.58½ — 50	5.55 — 2½	5.56½ — 3½	5.55½ — 51½
Austrian florins sight.....	40½ — 7½	40½ — 7½	40½ — 7½	40½ — 7½	40½ — 7½

SILVER.—The London silver market was quiet until the last few days of the month when a sharp advance carried the price to the highest point touched since April, 1897. The price declined a fraction to 27½ early in the month, the advance carried it to 27½ and the closing price was only 1½ off, 28¼d, a net advance for the month of 1 5-16d.

MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1897, 1898, 1899.

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.		MONTH:	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	29½	29½	26¾	26¾	27½	27¼	July.....	27½	26¾	27¾	27		
February	29½	29½	26¾	25¾	27½	27¾	August..	26½	26¾	27½	27½		
March.....	29¾	28¾	26¾	25	27½	27¾	Septemb'r	27¼	26¾	28½	27½		
April.....	28½	28½	26¾	25½	28½	27¾	October..	27½	25¾	28½	27½		
May.....	28½	27½	26¾	25¾			Novemb'r	27½	26¾	28½	27½		
June.....	27¾	27¾	27½	26½			Decemb'r	27¾	26½	27¾	27½		

GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.—The coinage of the United States mints in April

COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$7,903,420	\$1,964,800	\$3,420,000	\$1,624,000	\$18,032,000	\$1,642,000
February.....	10,152,000	1,519,794	4,085,312	1,167,564	14,848,800	1,598,000
March.....	13,770,900	1,617,854	5,385,463	1,488,139	12,176,715	2,346,557
April.....	8,800,400	1,535,000	8,211,400	948,000	7,894,475	2,159,449
May.....	4,489,950	1,600,000	7,717,500	1,433,000		
June.....	2,100,547	1,858,754	6,903,932	1,432,185		
July.....	377,000	260,000	5,853,900	1,127,834		
August.....	8,756,250	701,438	9,344,200	2,350,000		
September.....	8,762,375	1,050,082	7,385,315	2,178,389		
October.....	3,845,000	2,301,000	5,180,000	3,354,191		
November.....	3,544,000	2,103,000	5,006,700	2,755,251		
December.....	3,626,642	1,977,167	9,492,045	3,275,481		
Year.....	\$76,023,484	\$18,486,897	\$77,985,757	\$23,084,034	\$52,951,990	\$7,746,006

aggregated \$10,066,994, of which \$7,894,475 was gold, \$2,159,449 silver, and \$13,070 minor. There were 1,634,000 standard silver dollars coined.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—The decline in National bank circulation which was interrupted by the new issues of bonds, appears to have been resumed, the circulation secured by Government bonds having decreased nearly \$2,000,000 in April. As there was an increase of \$1,600,000 in lawful money deposited to retire circulation, the decrease in notes actually in circulation was only about \$400,000.

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Jan. 31, 1899.	Feb. 28, 1899.	Mar. 31, 1899.	Apr. 30, 1899.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$243,241,501	\$242,902,367	\$243,062,317	\$242,714,333
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	211,041,299	211,165,017	209,923,969	207,968,287
Circulation secured by lawful money....	32,200,202	31,747,351	33,138,348	34,746,046
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Pacific R.R. bonds, 6 per cent.....	55,000			
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	21,283,900	21,512,550	21,582,650	21,430,150
"    "    1907, 4 per cent.....	132,048,050	130,976,650	129,765,350	128,821,800
Five per cents. of 1894.....	14,530,400	14,620,400	14,228,900	13,988,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	20,051,150	19,608,650	19,069,650	18,854,150
Three per cents. of 1896.....	48,409,340	49,337,440	49,737,340	49,442,800
Total.....	\$236,479,840	\$233,075,000	\$234,433,800	\$232,167,910

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 2 per cents of 1891, \$1,514,500; 4 per cents of 1907, \$24,880,100; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$3,453,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$10,268,500; 3 per cents. of 1896, \$7,279,840; a total of \$72,305,940.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$22,375.

**FOREIGN TRADE.**—While the exports of merchandise in March were valued at about \$8,000,000 less than the total of March a year ago, still the aggregate was large—nearly \$104,500,000—an increase over February of \$10,600,000. The imports of merchandise increased \$12,500,000 over February and \$11,000,000 over March, 1898, the total being nearly \$73,000,000, the largest since the sugar-importing period of 1897. The balance of net exports is \$19,000,000 less than for March, 1898, but as it is nearly \$32,000,000 it is evident that our foreign trade is not yet approaching a position which will make gold exports a reasonable contingency. About \$2,000,000 gold net came into the country in March while nearly \$30,000,000 came in during the corresponding month last year. For the nine months of the present fiscal year the gold imports amount to nearly \$67,000,000, or \$9,000,000 greater than in 1897-8.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF MARCH.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1894.....	\$70,640,839	\$65,081,080	Exp., \$4,609,150	Exp., \$2,680,241	Exp., \$2,387,722
1895.....	65,161,847	69,295,493	Imp., 4,138,646	Imp., 4,226,697	" 2,042,450
1896.....	75,574,184	66,455,663	Exp., 9,118,521	" 354,596	" 2,200,688
1897.....	87,232,247	76,851,444	" 10,380,803	" 864,284	" 2,940,338
1898.....	112,620,496	61,562,188	" 51,058,318	" 29,979,618	" 1,518,388
1899.....	104,468,969	72,793,200	" 31,670,769	" 2,077,730	" 2,160,748
<b>NINE MONTHS.</b>					
1894.....	709,467,660	486,308,146	Exp., 223,159,544	Imp., 50,374,068	Exp., 23,074,607
1895.....	623,027,515	535,529,109	" 87,518,406	Exp., 37,888,091	" 19,676,680
1896.....	678,241,057	607,650,493	" 70,590,561	" 52,090,697	" 23,632,061
1897.....	822,280,460	498,866,538	" 323,413,922	Imp., 65,363,476	" 25,012,078
1898.....	925,905,356	455,253,362	" 470,651,994	" 57,561,112	" 17,431,263
1899.....	947,919,405	499,965,083	" 447,924,372	" 66,896,761	" 20,265,515

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—The April statement of the Treasury was affected by the payment of the \$20,000,000 indemnity to Spain. This swelled the total expenditures to nearly \$66,000,000, the largest in a number of years with the single exception of July last when war expenditures carried the total to more than \$74,000,000. The receipts compare unfavorably with those of March, as

in the latter month nearly \$12,000,000 paid by the Central Pacific Railroad was included in the receipts. The deficit in April was \$24,000,000, about \$4,000,000 of which was for the ordinary expenses of the Government.

UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	April, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.	Source.	April, 1899.	Since July 1, 1898.
Customs.....	\$17,645,946	\$169,456,063	Civil and mis.....	\$28,657,604	\$104,419,224
Internal revenue....	22,207,100	223,503,680	War.....	15,937,159	210,645,587
Miscellaneous.....	1,758,541	81,093,321	Navy.....	4,627,866	55,522,594
Total.....	\$41,611,587	\$424,056,014	Indians.....	995,963	11,288,743
Excess of expenditures.....	24,337,519	109,395,395	Pensions.....	10,369,068	116,889,043
			Interest.....	5,361,446	34,685,968
			Total.....	\$65,949,106	\$593,451,409

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1898.			1899.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$37,333,628	\$36,666,711	\$164,236,793	\$41,774,930	\$51,122,771	\$228,652,341
February.....	28,572,358	26,599,256	187,623,182	37,909,332	43,918,929	231,124,638
March.....	32,958,750	31,882,444	174,584,116	57,090,239	42,978,571	*245,413,706
April.....	83,012,943	44,314,062	181,234,137	41,611,587	65,949,106	*246,116,482
May.....	30,074,818	47,849,909	171,818,055			
June.....	33,599,313	47,852,281	187,004,410			
July.....	43,847,108	74,283,475	189,444,714			
August.....	41,782,707	56,280,717	217,904,485			
September.....	39,778,070	54,223,921	243,297,543			
October.....	39,630,051	53,982,276	239,885,162			
November.....	38,900,915	49,090,980	241,663,444			
December.....	41,404,793	41,864,807	246,529,176			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.—An increase of \$6,000,000 in April is reported in the volume of money in circulation, the gain being entirely represented by an increase in gold coin. Increases in silver certificates and United States notes were offset by decreases in Treasury notes, currency certificates and bank notes.

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.	May 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$687,796,579	\$702,305,289	\$694,855,942	\$701,077,442
Silver dollars.....	65,183,553	63,135,375	64,536,498	64,023,325
Subsidiary silver.....	70,627,818	69,143,844	69,496,609	69,784,194
Gold certificates.....	35,200,259	32,966,839	32,892,649	32,845,029
Silver certificates.....	392,331,995	396,410,705	393,874,006	400,379,249
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	94,942,741	94,204,459	94,075,701	98,559,041
United States notes.....	312,415,738	308,305,398	310,519,117	312,057,405
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	20,485,000	23,105,000	22,335,000	21,265,000
National bank notes.....	238,337,729	239,275,723	240,261,430	238,877,207
Total.....	\$1,897,301,412	\$1,928,842,612	\$1,927,846,942	\$1,933,867,892
Population of United States.....	75,330,000	75,801,000	75,737,000	75,675,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$25.19	\$25.51	\$25.45	\$25.49

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.—The net cash in the United States Treasury increased about \$1,500,000 last month. The Treasury gained \$1,400,000 gold, \$600,000 silver dollars, net, and \$1,000,000 bank notes, and lost \$500,000 United States notes.

## MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.	May 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$139,654,545	\$136,708,410	\$156,745,506	\$158,155,309
Gold bullion.....	142,074,889	127,385,067	121,560,849	120,829,945
Silver Dollars.....	405,061,304	410,157,482	410,856,670	412,803,838
Silver bullion.....	92,192,207	90,189,188	8,825,937	87,916,328
Subsidiary silver.....	5,959,343	7,185,217	6,994,375	6,826,631
United States notes.....	84,265,278	88,375,618	86,161,899	84,623,611
National bank notes.....	5,481,141	3,709,359	2,873,462	3,919,501
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$824,087,707</b>	<b>\$818,708,341</b>	<b>\$823,718,698</b>	<b>\$825,175,158</b>
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	542,939,995	546,877,008	548,177,356	548,048,319
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$281,747,712</b>	<b>\$267,031,338</b>	<b>\$275,541,342</b>	<b>\$277,126,839</b>

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—The net debt of the Government, less cash in the Treasury, was increased more than \$23,000,000 in April, of which \$20,000,000 is due to the payment made to Spain under the treaty of peace. The gross debt has been increased only slightly, but the cash balance in the Treasury was reduced from \$284,000,000 to \$263,000,000. The net debt is now nearly \$1,173,000,000.

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.	April 1, 1899.	May 1, 1899.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
"          "          1897, 4	559,650,200	559,650,500	559,650,500	559,652,060
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	39,100	38,970	38,890	38,010
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
"          "          1905, 4	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
Ten-Twenties of 1898, 3 per cent.....	192,848,780	193,366,000	198,406,000	198,678,720
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$1,040,215,980</b>	<b>\$1,040,735,270</b>	<b>\$1,045,775,290</b>	<b>\$1,046,048,680</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,237,200	1,231,670	1,219,420	1,218,390
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,735,013	346,735,013	346,735,013	346,735,013
National bank note redemption acct.....	28,868,814	31,422,722	32,935,782	34,830,371
Fractional currency.....	6,893,974	6,883,229	6,883,220	6,882,342
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$382,497,801</b>	<b>\$385,040,964</b>	<b>\$386,554,016</b>	<b>\$388,447,727</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,423,940,982</b>	<b>1,427,007,904</b>	<b>1,433,548,726</b>	<b>1,435,714,797</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	36,808,999	34,592,729	34,526,829	34,496,829
Silver ".....	399,430,504	402,289,504	402,627,504	404,026,504
Certificates of deposit.....	20,685,000	23,135,000	22,895,000	21,325,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	96,523,280	95,511,280	94,954,280	94,518,280
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$553,447,783</b>	<b>\$555,528,513</b>	<b>\$555,003,613</b>	<b>\$554,356,618</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>1,977,388,765</b>	<b>1,982,536,417</b>	<b>1,988,552,339</b>	<b>1,990,071,410</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	930,431,351	908,350,971	919,562,087	917,165,517
Demand liabilities.....	635,066,656	639,247,458	635,518,924	654,037,984
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$294,764,695</b>	<b>\$269,103,513</b>	<b>\$284,043,163</b>	<b>\$263,127,533</b>
Gold reserve.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	194,764,695	169,103,513	184,043,163	163,127,533
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$294,764,695</b>	<b>\$269,103,513</b>	<b>\$284,043,163</b>	<b>\$263,127,533</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>1,129,176,286</b>	<b>1,157,904,391</b>	<b>1,149,505,563</b>	<b>1,172,587,264</b>

## SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Mar. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.	May 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$807,451,124	\$839,011,679	\$851,601,448	\$859,232,751
Gold bullion.....	142,074,889	127,385,067	121,560,849	123,829,945
Silver dollars.....	470,244,857	473,262,857	475,193,158	476,827,158
Silver bullion.....	92,192,207	90,189,188	8,825,937	87,916,328
Subsidiary silver.....	76,587,161	76,329,061	76,390,984	76,710,825
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	243,817,870	242,985,082	243,134,892	242,796,706
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,179,049,124</b>	<b>\$2,195,873,950</b>	<b>\$2,203,368,254</b>	<b>\$2,210,994,781</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of April, and the highest and lowest during the year 1899, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1898:

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				APRIL, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	19½	10¼	24½	18	Feb. 23	Jan. 7	22½	20¼	20½
"    preferred	52½	22½	67	50½	Feb. 23	Jan. 7	64	50¼	60¾
Baltimore & Ohio	73¾	12½	75½	63½	Apr. 12	Jan. 6	75½	70½	73¼
Bay State Gas	9½	2½	8½	2½	Jan. 10	Mar. 11	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit	78½	35	137	77½	Apr. 15	Jan. 8	137	106½	181¼
Canadian Pacific	90½	72	98¼	84½	Apr. 29	Mar. 15	98¼	85½	98¼
Canada Southern	58	44½	70	54	Jan. 23	Jan. 5	59¼	56	57½
Central of New Jersey	99	83¼	122¾	97	Apr. 22	Jan. 8	122¾	114	120¼
Central Pacific	44½	11	56½	41	Feb. 18	Jan. 5	53	49½	51¾
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cfs.	26½	17¼	31½	24½	Feb. 2	Jan. 5	28¾	26	27½
Chicago & Alton	172	150	175¼	168	Mar. 25	Jan. 11	171	171	171
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	125¼	85½	149¼	124¼	Feb. 18	Jan. 7	146½	139¼	143½
Chicago & E. Illinois	66	49	79	59¼	Apr. 28	Jan. 4	79	71¾	78¾
"    preferred	118½	102	125	112¾	Mar. 2	Jan. 3	124	123	124
Chicago, Great Western	18	9½	20½	15	Jan. 23	Jan. 20	16½	15	15
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville	11	7	12½	7¾	Apr. 25	Jan. 6	12½	9	11
"    preferred	38¼	23	49¾	31	Mar. 6	Jan. 4	49	42	45¾
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul	12¾	83¼	138¾	120½	Feb. 20	Jan. 8	128¾	124½	127½
"    preferred	166½	140	173¼	160½	Mar. 17	Jan. 8	171	160	166½
Chicago & Northwestern	143¼	113¼	166	141¼	Mar. 29	Jan. 4	164	154	160
"    preferred	191½	163	194½	181	Mar. 21	Jan. 19	194	193	193½
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific	114½	80	122½	113	Jan. 27	Jan. 7	120½	115	116¼
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	94	65	100¼	91	Jan. 19	Feb. 8	98	92	97¼
"    preferred	170	148	178	170	Mar. 21	Jan. 16	.....	.....	.....
Chicago Terminal Transfer	9½	4½	25¼	7¾	Mar. 27	Jan. 6	23	15¼	18¾
"    preferred	37½	22½	56½	36¼	Mar. 27	Jan. 8	53¾	47	50
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	47½	25	63¾	42¼	Apr. 10	Jan. 4	68½	56½	60
"    preferred	97	77½	102¾	95	Jan. 26	Jan. 21	98	96¼	97¾
Cleveland Lorain & Wheeling	19¼	11¼	16¾	10¾	Jan. 26	Jan. 23	18¼	13¾	13
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	32½	17	55	30¼	Apr. 21	Feb. 8	55	34	52¾
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	8¼	2½	11¾	8½	Apr. 25	Apr. 17	11¾	8½	11
"    preferred	27½	12½	20	17	Mar. 30	Apr. 4	20	17	17½
Consolidated Gas Co.	205½	164	223¼	185	Mar. 11	Apr. 10	205½	185	191
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	114½	93	125¾	106¼	Apr. 20	Jan. 8	125¾	115	120¼
Delaware, Lack. & Western	159	140	179	157	Apr. 4	Jan. 7	179	168	171
Denver & Rio Grande	21½	10	25½	18¼	Apr. 27	Jan. 7	25½	21½	24½
"    preferred	71½	40	80	68¼	Apr. 27	Jan. 11	80	73½	78½
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	195	119	199	190	Jan. 20	Jan. 4	.....	.....	.....
"    1st pref.	16¼	11	16¼	19½	Apr. 26	Apr. 26	14½	13½	13¾
"    2d pref.	43¾	29¼	42	37	Apr. 7	Apr. 7	36¾	37	37¼
"    3d pref.	21½	15½	22¼	19	Jan. 4	Jan. 4	20¼	19	19
Evansville & Terre Haute	41½	22	41¼	36	Jan. 3	Mar. 28	39¼	36¼	39¼
Express Adams	180	97¼	119	108¾	Jan. 16	Jan. 16	115½	113	113
"    American	153	116	145	138	Jan. 9	Jan. 21	142¼	140	141
"    United States	58¼	38	60	52½	Mar. 27	Mar. 27	55¼	53	54
"    Wells, Fargo	131½	112½	129¾	125	Jan. 16	Jan. 10	129	126	128¼
Great Northern, preferred	180	122	195	142¼	Mar. 13	Jan. 6	195	180¼	191¾
Illinois Central	115½	96	122	113¼	Jan. 23	Jan. 3	118¾	113½	117¼
Iowa Central	11½	7¼	13¼	10¼	Apr. 28	Mar. 7	13¼	11¼	13
"    preferred	42½	25	51¼	42¾	Feb. 15	Jan. 8	47¼	45	47¾
Kansas City, Pitts. & Gulf	25¼	15	18	17	Jan. 6	Mar. 15	12½	7½	10¼
Laclede Gas	54¾	37½	57¼	51	Jan. 9	Mar. 4	55	53	53¼
Lake Erie & Western	23½	12	22¼	15	Jan. 27	Jan. 16	19¾	17	17¾
"    preferred	83	52	75	60	Jan. 27	Jan. 15	69¼	66½	69
Lake Shore	215	170¾	208	196¼	Jan. 24	Jan. 5	201	200	200
Long Island	59½	40	85	56¼	Apr. 4	Jan. 5	85	77	78
Louisville & Nashville	65¼	44	69	63	Jan. 27	Mar. 6	69	63	68
Manhattan consol.	120¼	90	133¾	97	Apr. 3	Jan. 4	133¾	111	119¾
Metropolitan Street	194¼	125¼	239	187¾	Mar. 28	Jan. 11	207	204	242½
Michigan Central	118	99½	116	112	Jan. 24	Jan. 13	115	113	114¼
Minneapolis & St. Louis	38¾	24	62¼	35¼	Apr. 23	Jan. 6	62¾	50¼	61½
"    1st pref.	100	84	100	97¼	Apr. 25	Jan. 9	100	98¼	100
"    2d pref.	78½	46	90	73¼	Feb. 23	Jan. 10	89¼	83	89
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	14¼	10	15	12¾	Jan. 10	Apr. 22	14	12¾	13
"    preferred	41	28¾	42¼	36¼	Apr. 3	Feb. 8	42¼	38¼	39

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				APRIL, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	46½	22	52¼—Apr. 4	43¼—Feb. 8	52¼	46	49½	46	49½
Mobile & Ohio.....	32½	24	49¼—Apr. 17	32—Jan. 3	49¼	42	46	46	46
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River..	124½	106	144¼—Mar. 29	121¼—Jan. 8	143¼	134	189	189	189
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis....	15½	11½	19¼—Jan. 23	13¼—Mar. 14	14½	14	14	14	14
1st preferred.....	76	65	79—Jan. 23	65—Mar. 7	79	65	65	65	65
2d preferred.....	40¼	28	41—Jan. 23	32—Apr. 20	34	32	34	34	34
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.	201	178¼	222—Apr. 20	199—Jan. 19	222	210	218	218	218
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	19½	13½	23¼—Mar. 27	18¼—Jan. 3	23¼	25¼	26¼	26¼	26¼
Norfolk & Western.....	19½	11½	22¼—Apr. 27	17¼—Mar. 17	22¼	17¼	21¼	21¼	21¼
preferred.....	63½	42½	71¼—Feb. 2	61¼—Jan. 6	70¼	64¼	66	66	66
North American Co.....	7¼	4¼	12¼—Apr. 19	6¼—Jan. 6	12¼	9	12	12	12
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.	44¼	19	55¼—Feb. 16	42¼—Jan. 7	54¼	49½	53	53	53
pref tr. receipts.....	78½	56½	81¼—Jan. 23	76¼—Jan. 7	80	77	79½	79½	79½
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	61¼	35¼	52—Jan. 23	40—Apr. 27	43¼	40	40	40	40
preferred.....	78	65¼	70¼—Jan. 23	60¼—Apr. 27	69¼	69¼	69¼	69¼	69¼
Oregon Short Line.....	43	19½	48—Jan. 23	41—Feb. 8	48	40	40	40	40
Pacific Mail.....	46	21	55—Jan. 30	43¼—Jan. 4	53½	48	51¼	51¼	51¼
Pennsylvania R. R.....	123½	110¼	142—Jan. 23	122¼—Jan. 5	135¼	130	134¼	134¼	134¼
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	112	86½	129¼—Apr. 3	109¼—Jan. 23	129¼	111¼	120¼	120¼	120¼
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis..	63½	38½	88—Jan. 23	45—Apr. 7	81¼	45	55	55	55
preferred.....	84¼	57	93—Jan. 23	80—Feb. 10	89¼	82	86¼	86¼	86¼
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	216	132	164¾—Jan. 4	156—Jan. 21	161¼	158¼	160¼	160¼	160¼
Reading Voting Tr. cts.....	23½	15½	25—Jan. 24	20¼—Feb. 8	24¼	22¼	22¼	22¼	22¼
1st preferred.....	54½	36	68¼—Apr. 4	51¼—Jan. 7	68¼	63¼	64¼	64¼	64¼
2d preferred.....	29	17¼	38¼—Mar. 22	20¼—Jan. 7	37¼	34	34¼	34¼	34¼
Rome, Wat. Ogden's g.....	128½	118¼	132—Apr. 25	130—Jan. 10	132	132	132	132	132
St. Louis & San Francisco....	9¼	6	14¼—Feb. 1	8¼—Jan. 6	12¼	10¼	11¼	11¼	11¼
1st preferred.....	70	52¼	75¼—Jan. 26	66—Jan. 9	72¼	71	71	71	71
2d preferred.....	35	22¼	44¼—Jan. 31	33¼—Jan. 5	41	37¼	38½	38½	38½
St. Louis & Southwestern....	7½	3¼	15—Apr. 28	6¼—Jan. 4	15	11¼	14¼	14¼	14¼
preferred.....	18	7¼	35¼—Apr. 1	17—Jan. 8	35¼	30¼	33¼	33¼	33¼
Southern Pacific Co.....	35	12	44—Jan. 31	32¼—Mar. 6	35½	33	33¼	33¼	33¼
Southern Railway.....	109¼	7	14—Jan. 16	10¼—Jan. 5	13¼	12	12¼	12¼	12¼
preferred.....	43½	28½	55—Apr. 22	40¼—Jan. 4	55	49¼	53¼	53¼	53¼
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	38¼	17	68—Apr. 18	36—Jan. 9	68	51	61¼	61¼	61¼
Texas & Pacific.....	20½	8½	25¼—Mar. 1	17¼—Jan. 5	24¼	21¼	22¼	22¼	22¼
Union Pacific.....	44½	16½	50¼—Feb. 21	41¼—Jan. 7	49	44¼	46¼	46¼	46¼
preferred.....	74½	45½	84¼—Jan. 23	72¼—Jan. 6	81¼	76¼	79¼	79¼	79¼
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf...	13½	5½	14¼—Jan. 6	11¼—Mar. 3	13	12	12¼	12¼	12¼
Wabash R. R.....	9¼	6¼	8¼—Jan. 24	7¼—Jan. 5	8¼	8	8¼	8¼	8¼
preferred.....	24¼	14¼	25¼—Apr. 5	21¼—Feb. 8	25¼	22¼	23¼	23¼	23¼
Western Union.....	95½	82¼	98¼—Jan. 24	91¼—Apr. 24	97	91¼	92¼	92¼	92¼
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	6¼	3¼	14¼—Apr. 21	10¼—Feb. 8	14¼	11¼	13¼	13¼	13¼
preferred.....	30¼	8	37—Jan. 30	29¼—Apr. 7	30¼	29¼	34¼	34¼	34¼
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:									
American Co. Oil Co.....	39¼	15¼	39¼—Apr. 17	33¼—Mar. 6	39¼	35	37¼	37¼	37¼
preferred.....	90½	66	94½—Apr. 29	88¼—Jan. 5	94½	90½	94½	94½	94½
American Spirits Mfg Co....	15½	6¼	15¼—Mar. 13	12¼—Feb. 28	15½	13¼	13½	13½	13½
preferred.....	41¼	16	41¼—Mar. 13	12¼—Mar. 1	41	37	37	37	37
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	146½	107½	182—Mar. 20	123¼—Jan. 4	176¼	149¼	168¼	168¼	168¼
preferred.....	116	103	123—Mar. 20	110—Jan. 16	119	116	118	118	118
American Tobacco Co.....	153¼	89¼	229¼—Apr. 5	132¼—Feb. 17	220¼	214	220	220	220
preferred.....	135¼	112¼	150—Mar. 9	132—Jan. 4	146¼	140	146¼	146¼	146¼
Consolidated Ice Co.....	52	27¼	50¼—Jan. 30	44¼—Jan. 9	47¼	45¼	46¼	46¼	46¼
Federal Steel Co.....	52	29	75—Apr. 3	46¼—Feb. 8	75	57¼	68¼	68¼	68¼
preferred.....	85¼	69¼	93¼—Apr. 3	78¼—Apr. 7	93¼	78¼	86¼	86¼	86¼
General Electric Co.....	97	76	122—Apr. 17	96¼—Jan. 3	122	112½	118¼	118¼	118¼
International Paper Co.....	67	48	68¼—Jan. 23	49—Apr. 7	65	49	55¼	55¼	55¼
preferred.....	95	85	95—Jan. 5	80—Apr. 7	96¼	80	85	85	85
National Lead Co.....	39½	26¼	40¼—Jan. 20	32¼—Mar. 17	37¼	33¼	38¼	38¼	38¼
preferred.....	114¼	99	115—Jan. 21	111¼—Jan. 13	113¼	112¼	113¼	113¼	113¼
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	10½	3¼	12—Jan. 10	8¼—Jan. 3	11¼	10	10¼	10¼	10¼
U. S. Leather Co.....	8¼	5¼	8—Jan. 23	6¼—Mar. 7	7¾	6¼	6¼	6¼	6¼
preferred.....	75¼	53¼	78—Apr. 4	69—Mar. 2	78	70	72¼	72¼	72¼
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48¼	14¼	57—Apr. 5	42¼—Jan. 5	57	48	53¼	53¼	53¼
preferred.....	113¼	60	120—Jan. 9	111—Jan. 3	119	115¼	116	116	116



# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
<b>Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.</b> .....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mar. 25, '99	.....	.....	.....
<b>Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.</b> .....	1995	7,000,000	Q J	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	Apr. 27, '99	89	88	128,000
<b>Aтч. Top. &amp; S. F.</b>								
{ Aтч Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.1995		126,823,000	A & O	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	Apr. 29, '99	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	100	2,176,500
{     " registered			A & O	101	Mar. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " adjustment, g. 4's. ....1995		51,728,000	NOV	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	Apr. 29, '99	84	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	2,186,000
{     " registered			NOV	83	Feb. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's 1902		750,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's. ....1915		1,500,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ <b>Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.</b> 1934		1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ <b>Atlanta &amp; Danville 1st g. 5's.</b> ....1950		1,238,000	J & J	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	Apr. 14, '99	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	6,000
<b>B. &amp; O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.).</b> 1919		3,000,000	A & O	116	Jan. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				112	Oct. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " g. 5's. ....1885-1925				115	Oct. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " coupons off. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " registered		10,000,000	F & A	120	Jan. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Speyer & Co. eng. cf. dep.				120	Feb. 1, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				119 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " con. g. 5's. ....1988				118 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sept. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " registered		11,968,000	F & A	116	Aug. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " J. P. M. & Co. cfs. dep't't. ....				114 $\frac{1}{2}$	July 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				118 $\frac{1}{2}$	Oct. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " bonds of loan of 1853 ext. to 1935 at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ Tr. Co. cfs.		1,161,000	A & O	120	Nov. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " sterling 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1872 due 1902 Trust Co. cfs.		£1,921,800	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " sterling 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1874 due 1910 Trust Co. cfs.		£1,990,600	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ term. bonds. ....1894		8,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " sterling 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1883 (Philadelphia Branch).		£2,400,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " ster. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1877 due 1927 (B. & O. & Chic.) Tr. Co. cfs.		£1,382,200	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd.</b> 1900		6,000,000	M & N	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mar. 8, '99	.....	.....	.....
<b>W. Virginia &amp; Pftts. 1st g. 5's.</b> 1990		4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
<b>Monongahela River 1st g. 5's</b> 1919		700,000	F & A	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
<b>Gen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4<math>\frac{1}{2}</math>'s.</b> 1930		2,500,000	M & S	111	Feb. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
<b>Ak. &amp; Chic. Junc. 1st g. int. g. 5's.</b> 1930		1,500,000	M & N	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 21, '95	.....	.....	.....
{     " coupons off.				105	Aug. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " Tr. Co. cfs. ....				115	Jan. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
<b>Pittsb. &amp; Connellsville 1st g. 4's.</b> 1946		2,536,000	J & J	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " 1st 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ bds 1898 Tr. Co. cfs.		£1,419,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " con. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ bonds Tr. Co. cfs.		£1,352,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>B &amp; O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4<math>\frac{1}{2}</math>'s.</b> 1990		10,667,000	J & J	108	Mar. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " coupons off.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " S'w'n Ry 1st con g 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1998		10,511,000	J & J	94	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " coupons off.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " 1st inc. g. 5's, series A. 2043		8,651,000	NOV	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " 1st inc. g. 5's, series B. 2043		9,655,000	DEC	12	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				11 $\frac{1}{2}$	Feb. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
<b>B. &amp; O. S'w'n Term Co. gtd g 5s.</b> 1942		1,200,000	M & N	105	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Ohio &amp; Miss. 1st con. 4's.</b> .....	1947	2,615,000	J & J	112	Jan. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " coupons off.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{     " 2d con. 7's. ....1911		2,952,000	A & O	123	Apr. 13, '99	123	123	6,000
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				127	Apr. 29, '99	127	127	11,000
{     " 1st Spr'g field div. 7's. 1905		1,984,000	M & N	103	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				105	Apr. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " 1st gen. 5s. ....1932		405,000	J & D	89	Feb. 4, '99	.....	.....	.....
{     " Trust Co. cfs. ....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest price and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Brooklyn E. Tr. Co. cfs 1st g. 6's, 1924		3,464,000	.....	106%	Apr. 13, '99	106%	106%	34,000
Tr. Co. cfs. 2d g. 5's, 1915		1,246,000	.....	88	June 27, '98			
all instal. paid.				105%	Apr. 1, '99	105%	105%	1,000
Seas. & B. B. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 5's, 1942		1,867,000	.....					
all instal. paid.				106%	Apr. 4, '99	107	106%	27,000
Union Ele. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st g. 6's, 1967		6,124,000	.....	A & O	111%	Apr. 23, '99	111%	100%
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's, 1945		6,625,000	.....	J & J	117%	Apr. 5, '99	117%	117%
Bklyn City R. R. 1st con. 5's 1916, 1941		4,373,000	.....					1,000
Bklyn Qu. Co. & Sur. 1st con. gtd								
g. 5's, 1941		2,255,000	M & N	108%	Apr. 23, '99	108%	107%	300,000
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4's, 1938		3,000,000	J & J	7%	Sept. 1, '98			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitta. g. 5's, 1957		4,407,000	M & S	110%	Apr. 23, '99	110%	106	30,000
deb. 6's, 1947		1,000,000	J & J					
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's, 1921		1,300,000	F & A	127%	Mar. 15, '99			
cons. 1st 6's, 1922		3,920,000	J & D	128	Jan. 20, '98			
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. 5's, 1943		650,000	J & J	121%	May 23, '98			
Buff. & St. Mary's S'w'n 1st g. 5s, 1927		1,000,000	F & A	105	Apr. 23, '99	105	104	36,000
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's, 1913		1,211,500	A & O	100	Feb. 27, '96			
registered.								
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's, 1906		6,500,000	J & D	109	Apr. 27, '99	109	109	5,500
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's, 1934		7,260,000	A & O	115	Apr. 25, '99	117	114%	47,000
registered.				A & O	110%	Feb. 4, '99		
Minneap. & St. Louis 1st 7's, g. 1927		150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st g. 5's, 1921		1,905,000	A & O	7%	Jan. 6, '99			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's, 1908		13,920,000	J & J	110%	Apr. 29, '99	110%	109%	67,000
2d mortg. 5's, 1913		5,100,000	M & S	111	Apr. 27, '99	111%	110	14,000
registered.				M & S	108%	May 22, '98		
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's, 1948		2,500,000	J & D	91%	Apr. 20, '99	92	91%	15,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's, 1967		4,880,000	M & N	96	Apr. 23, '99	96	96	2,000
Central R'y of Georgia, 1st g. 5's, 1945		7,000,000	F & A	116%	Mar. 23, '99			
registered \$1,000 & \$5,000			F & A					
con. g. 5's, 1945		16,500,000	M & N	100%	Apr. 29, '99	100%	98	2,096,000
con. g. 5's, reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000			M & N					
1st. pref. inc. g. 5's, 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	43%	Apr. 29, '99	43%	41	883,000
2d pref. inc. g. 5's, 1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	14	Apr. 25, '99	14	11	42,000
2d pref. inc. g. 5's, 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	7	Apr. 18, '99	7%	7	10,000
Macon & Nor. Div. 1st								
g. 5's, 1946		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 23, '98			
Mobile div. 1st g. 5's, 1946		1,000,000	J & J	99	July 6, '98			
Mid. Ga. & Atl. Div. g. 5's, 1947		413,000	J & J	86%	Sept. 6, '98			
Central Railroad of New Jersey,								
1st consolidated 7's, 1899		3,836,000	Q J	100%	Apr. 11, '99	100%	100%	11,000
convertible 7's, 1902		1,167,000	M & N	112	Jan. 11, '99			
deb. 6's, 1908		463,800	M & N	112%	Mar. 20, '99			
gen. g. 5's, 1957		43,924,000	J & J	119%	Apr. 27, '99	119%	118%	143,000
registered.			Q J	118	Apr. 23, '99	118	116%	56,500
Lehigh & W.-B. con. ased. 7's, 1900		5,384,000	Q M	102%	Apr. 29, '99	102%	100%	84,000
mortgage 5's, 1912		2,691,000	M & N	99	Mar. 20, '99			
Am. Dock & Improv't Co. 5's, 1921		4,987,000	J & J	114	Apr. 27, '99	114	114	5,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd. g. 5's, 1920		1,062,000	J & J					
N. J. Southern int. gtd 6's, 1899		411,000	J & J	104	Nov. 13, '96			
Gen. P. ex. g. 5's Speyer & Co. cfs. A, 1898		2,985,000	.....	103%	Mar. 15, '99			
B C D, 1899		3,393,000	.....	105%	Apr. 24, '99	105%	104%	36,000
E, 1898		3,997,000	J & J	106%	Feb. 28, '99			
F G H I, 1901		15,508,000	.....	103%	Mar. 23, '99			
San Joaquin br. g. 6's, 1900		924,000	A & O	108%	Mar. 29, '99			
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs., 1899		5,156,000	A & O	84%	Sept. 16, '96			
gtd. g. 5's, 1899		4,270,000	A & O	128	Apr. 29, '99	123	120%	500,000
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs., 1900		8,004,000	A & O	107	Apr. 10, '99	107	107	1,000
land grant g. 5's, 1900		591,000	A & O	112	Apr. 19, '99	112	112	5,000
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs., 1918		1,703,000	J & J	101%	Dec. 6, '97			
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 5's, 1918		1,188,000	J & J					
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs., 1899		9,152,000	J & J	104%	Apr. 5, '99	104%	104%	3,000
Western Pacific g. 6's, 1899		539,000	J & J	105%	Apr. 15, '99	105%	105%	19,000
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs., 1907		2,196,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97			
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's, gtd. 1907		3,904,000	A & O	105%	Dec. 19, '98			
gtd. g. 5's, 1908		4,800,000	J & J	106%	Dec. 13, '98			
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's, 1936		1,500,000	A & O	117	Apr. 14, '99	117	116%	17,000
Che. & Ohio 6's, g. Series A, 1908		2,000,000	A & O	118%	Mar. 2, '99			
Mortgage 6's, 1911		2,000,000	M & N	121	Apr. 25, '99	121	118%	56,000
1st con. g. 5's, 1939		25,858,000	M & N	118%	Mar. 15, '99			
registered.			M & S	95	Apr. 29, '99	95	96%	551,000
Gen. m. g. 4 1/2's, 1992		24,060,000	M & S	92%	Jan. 18, '99			
registered.			J & J	107	Apr. 20, '99	107	106	12,000
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's, 1989		6,000,000	J & J	97	Dec. 2, '98			
2d con. g. 4's, 1989		1,000,000	J & J					

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. .... 1940		650,000	J & J	95½	May 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	101¼	Apr. 29, '99	101¼	101	20,000
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	102¼	Apr. 29, '99	102¼	101½	10,000
Chicago & Alton's king fund 6's. 1903		1,722,000	J & J	110¾	Apr. 19, '99	110¾	110¾	1,000
{ Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. .... 1900		1,785,000	F & A	104	Feb. 1, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d 7's. .... 1900		300,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		501,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		28,924,000	J & J	115¾	Apr. 26, '99	115½	115	87,000
5's, sinking fund. .... 1901		2,315,000	A & O	105	Mar. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
5's, debentures. .... 1913		9,000,000	M & N	112½	Apr. 29, '99	113	112½	15,000
convertible 5's. .... 1903		5,896,000	M & S	143¾	Apr. 28, '99	145¼	141½	67,200
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,818,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
4's. .... 1919		9,050,000	A & O	105½	Apr. 19, '99	105½	105½	6,000
Denver div. 4's. .... 1922		5,856,000	F & A	102	Apr. 1, '99	102	102	11,000
4's. .... 1921		3,150,000	M & S	100	Apr. 11, '99	100	100	4,000
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. .... 1905		2,320,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Nebraska extens'n 4's. 1927		26,110,000	M & N	112½	Apr. 28, '99	112½	108½	475,000
registered. ....		8,000,000	M & N	97	May 9, '99	.....	.....	.....
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	121½	Apr. 11, '99	121½	121½	1,000
Chic. Burl. & Northern, 1st 5's. 1926		8,241,000	A & O	105¾	Apr. 27, '99	107	105¼	14,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	116½	Apr. 21, '99	116½	116½	9,000
small bonds. ....		2,653,000	J & D	112	Apr. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 6's, gold. .... 1934		2,653,000	A & O	134	Jan. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
gen. con. 1st 5's. .... 1937		9,767,000	M & N	115¾	Apr. 28, '99	115½	115	45,000
registered. ....		4,626,000	M & N	103½	Nov. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. .... 1936		4,626,000	J & J	107	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville, { Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	116¼	Mar. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. Ind. & Louisv. ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,177,000	J & J	104½	Apr. 29, '99	104½	95	97,000
refunding g. 6's. .... 1947		4,700,000	J & J	110½	Apr. 21, '99	110½	106¾	31,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul, { Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's \$ g. R.d. 1902		2,246,000	J & J	168	Mar. 22, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's £. .... 1902		76,000	J & J	120	Feb. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
1st m. Iowa & D. 7's. .... 1899		1,715,000	J & J	168¼	Apr. 10, '99	168¼	168¼	1,000
1st m. C. & M. 7's. .... 1903		9,075,000	J & J	168½	Apr. 12, '99	168½	168½	7,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1905		2,996,000	J & J	168½	Apr. 12, '99	168½	168½	167,000
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		4,000,000	J & J	168½	Apr. 13, '99	168½	168½	1,000
1st 6's, Southw'n div. .... 1909		2,500,000	J & J	120½	Mar. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. .... 1919		7,432,000	J & J	115½	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st So. Min. div. 6's. .... 1910		5,677,000	J & J	122	Apr. 27, '99	122	121	7,000
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		990,000	J & J	131	Apr. 15, '99	131	131	7,000
5's. .... 1910		3,000,000	J & J	109	Mar. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		25,340,000	J & J	121½	Mar. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st Chic. & P. W. 5's. 1921		3,083,000	J & J	122½	Apr. 28, '99	122½	121¼	73,000
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1926		2,840,000	J & J	121½	Apr. 21, '99	121½	121½	12,000
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		1,360,000	J & J	112½	Apr. 24, '99	112½	112½	6,000
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		4,748,000	J & J	115¼	Dec. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
Wis. & Min. div. 5's. .... 1921		1,250,000	J & J	120½	Apr. 27, '99	120½	119	12,000
terminal 5's. .... 1914		509,000	J & J	117½	Apr. 28, '99	117¼	116	106,000
Far. & So. 6's assu. .... 1924		2,856,000	J & J	127½	Jan. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
cont. s'l'k. f'd 5's. .... 1916		23,676,000	J & J	106½	July 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
Dakota & Gt. S. 5's. .... 1916		2,500,000	J & J	114	Feb. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
g. m. g. 4's, series A. .... 1989		2,500,000	J & J	114½	Apr. 28, '99	114½	111¼	43,000
registered. ....		2,155,000	Q & J	105½	Feb. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 3¼'s, series B. 1989		2,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		2,155,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		5,092,000	J & D	121	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st convt. 6's. .... 1913		10,308,000	J & D	126	Jan. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's. 1915		10,357,000	Q F	144½	Apr. 19, '99	144½	144	4,000
coupon gold 7's. .... 1902		6,069,000	J & D	114½	Apr. 24, '99	114½	113	25,000
registered d. gold 7's. 1902		7,197,000	J & D	114	Apr. 14, '99	114	114	2,000
sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929		9,800,000	A & O	117½	Mar. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. .... 1879-1929		5,900,000	A & O	108½	Oct. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
5's. .... 1909		10,000,000	A & O	105¾	Apr. 27, '99	107	106½	16,000
registered. .... 1933		5,900,000	A & O	122	Mar. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
debenture 5's. .... 1903		10,000,000	M & N	119½	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. .... 1909		10,000,000	M & N	111½	Apr. 5, '99	111½	111	3,000
25 year deben. 5's. .... 1921		18,632,000	M & N	109½	Mar. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
registered. .... 1880-1926		7,368,000	A & O	118	Apr. 11, '99	118	118	5,000
30 year deben. 5's. .... 1921		7,368,000	A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95	.....	.....	.....
registered. .... 1987		109½	F A 15	108	Apr. 27, '99	109	106	19,000
extension 4's. .... 1987		109½	F A 15	106½	Feb. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. .... 1987		109½	M & N	109½	Apr. 26, '99	109½	105½	341,000
gen. g. 3¼'s. .... 1987		455,000	Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered. .... 1901		600,000	J & J	107¾	May 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's. 1901		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84	.....	.....	.....
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's. .... 1907		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.**

**NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.**

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's. . . . .	1900	1,086,000	A & O	133	Oct. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's. . . . .	1907	1,592,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's. . . . .	1905	1,600,000	M & S	117½	Feb. 6, '90	.....	.....	.....
Ottumwa C. F. & St. 1st 5's. . . . .	1909	1,600,000	M & S	111	Jan. 5, '99	.....	.....	.....
Northern Illinois 1st 5's. . . . .	1910	1,500,000	M & S	113	Apr. 24, '99	113	113	8,000
Mil., Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's. 1927		5,000,000	M & N	141½	Apr. 25, '99	141½	140¼	7,000
"    con. deb. 5's. . . . .	1907	436,000	F & A	105½	Feb. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    ext. & imp't. s. f'd g. 5's. 1929		4,148,000	F & A	121¼	Apr. 14, '99	121¼	120	16,000
"    Michigan div. 1st 6's. 1924		1,281,000	J & J	138	Dec. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    Ashland div. 1st 6's. . . . .	1925	1,000,000	M & S	142½	Apr. 25, '99	142½	142½	8,000
"    income. . . . .		500,000	M & N	112	Apr. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup. . . . .	1917	12,100,000	J & J	133½	Mar. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    registered. . . . .	1917		J & J	134	Apr. 10, '99	134	133½	30,000
"    gen. g. 4's. . . . .	1988		J & J	110	Apr. 27, '99	110¼	107	2,808,000
"    registered. . . . .		47,971,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 6, '99	107½	107½	8,000
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's. 1905		1,200,000	J & J	85	Mar. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    1st 2½'s. . . . .	1905	1,200,000	J & J	83½	Apr. 29, '98	83½	83½	2,000
"    extension 4 s. . . . .		672,000	J & J	83	Mar. 15, '97	.....	.....	.....
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's. 1923		2,750,000	A & O	114½	Apr. 25, '99	114	112½	11,000
"    small bond. . . . .	1923		A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		13,789,000	J & D	139½	Apr. 28, '99	139½	138	25,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		2,624,000	M & N	137	Apr. 14, '99	137	137	10,000
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	140	Mar. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. . . . .	1919	6,070,000	A & O	131	Apr. 18, '99	131	131	2,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's. 1947		13,000,000	J & J	100	Apr. 29, '99	101	99	509,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		783,000	M & N	106	June 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    gen'l mortg. g. 6's. . . . .	1932	9,868,000	Q M	120¾	Mar. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. . . . .	1921	5,753,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 13, '93	.....	.....	.....
"    coupons off. . . . .		996,000	A & O	119	Oct. 26, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    2d g. 4½'s. . . . .	1937	2,000,000	J & J	103½	Mar. 13, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	112¾	Mar. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    City Sub. R'y, Balto. 1st g. 5's. . . . .	1922	2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1930		730,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. ctf's. 1st 5's for. 1917		1,907,000	.....	90	Apr. 21, '99	91	89	104,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1933		7,574,000	J & D	95½	Apr. 27, '99	95½	92½	288,000
"    do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & J	91½	Dec. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1990		9,750,000	M & N	102½	Apr. 24, '99	102½	102½	5,000
"    registered. . . . .				90	Mar. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. . . . .	1940	1,035,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. . . . .	1940	650,000	J & J	87	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1991		4,000,000	J & J	96½	Apr. 24, '99	97	96½	4,000
"    Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,685,000	Q F	103½	Mar. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    registered. . . . .				95	Nov. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
"    con. 6's. . . . .	1920	751,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '93	.....	.....	.....
"    Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,571,000	J & J	114	Oct. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    Ind. Bloom. & W., 1st pfd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	103½	Apr. 29, '99	103½	103½	1,000
"    Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's. . . . .	1938	500,000	Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. . . . .	1940	8,103,000	A & O	85½	Apr. 29, '99	85½	82¾	406,000
"    income 4's. . . . .	1990	4,000,000	A	30	Apr. 29, '99	33½	30	118,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	102½	Feb. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    consol mortg. 7's. . . . .	1914		J & D	137½	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    sink. fund 7's. . . . .	1914	3,991,000	J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '89	.....	.....	.....
"    gen. consol 6's. . . . .	1934		J & J	132¼	Nov. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    registered. . . . .		3,205,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	108½	Feb. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's. 1933		4,300,000	A & O	107	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. . . . .	1938	2,936,000	J & J	130	Feb. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    registered. . . . .			Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Col. Middl Ry. 1st g. 2-3-4's. . . . .	1947	6,250,000	J & J	65½	Apr. 28, '99	65½	63¾	101,000
"    1st g. 4's. . . . .	1947	1,011,000	J & J	74½	Apr. 27, '99	74½	72½	45,000
Col., Hoek. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. . . . .		208,000	M & S	74	Mar. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    J. P. M. ctf., \$85 pd. . . . .	1891		.....	79	Apr. 26, '99	79½	73	300,000
"    stamped assented. . . . .		7,792,000	.....	30¼	Apr. 25, '99	31	29½	88,000
"    gen. g. 6's, J. P. M. ctf. std. 1904		1,941,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    gen. lien g. 4's. . . . .	1996		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    registered. . . . .		1,556,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,090	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,067,000	M & S	124	Nov. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,966,000	A & O	126	July 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. . . . .	1914	5,000,000	M & N	144	Mar. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    bonds, 7's. . . . .	1900	281,000	J & J	109	Nov. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    7's. . . . .	1871-1901	4,991,000	A & O	111	Mar. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    1st c. gtd 7's. . . . .	1915		J & D	143½	Mar. 25, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    registered. . . . .		12,151,000	J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....

BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's.	1821	12,000,000	J & J	142	Apr. 26, '99	142	142	1,000
	const. 5's.	5,000,000	F & A	118½	Apr. 5, '99	118½	118½	1,000
	term. imp. 4's.	5,000,000	M & N					
	Warren 2d 7's.	750,000	A & O	106	Aug. 1, '95			
<b>Delaware &amp; Hudson Canal.</b>								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's.	1917	5,000,000	M & S	146	Sept. 13, '98			
reg.	1917		M & S	143	May 4, '96			
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's.	1906	3,000,000	A & O	120¼	Apr. 21, '99	120½	120½	8,000
registered.			A & O	128¼	Feb. 12, '94			
6's.	1906	7,000,000	A & O	117½	Feb. 21, '99			
registered.			A & O	114¼	Apr. 25, '99	114½	114½	3,000
Bens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's.	1821	2,000,000	M & N	153	Mar. 24, '99			
1st c. 7's.	1821		M & N	141	May 6, '98			
Denver Cen. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's.	1833	730,000	A & O	92	Jan. 24, '99			
Denver T'way Co. con. g. 8's.	1910	1,219,000	J & J					
Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's.	1911	913,000	J & J					
Denver & Rio Grande 1st g. 7's.	1900	1,934,500	M & N	108½	Mar. 8, '99			
1st con. g. 4's.	1836	28,650,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 28, '99	102½	100¼	193,000
con. g. 4½'s.	1906	4,348,000	J & J	110	Apr. 29, '99	110½	109½	33,000
Imp't. m. g. 5's.	1828	8,105,500	J & D	107½	Apr. 28, '99	107½	106	12,000
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's.	1917	628,000	M & N	108	Apr. 27, '99	108	107½	7,000
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s.	1905	900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95			
g. 4s.	1905	1,250,000	J & D					
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.	1867	6,734,000	A & O	109¼	Apr. 27, '99	109½	109	8,000
registered.			A & O	101¼	July 23, '99			
2d l m 6s.	1916	2,000,000	J & J					
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.	1823	500,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 11, '96			
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's.	1937	4,000,000	J & J	114¼	Apr. 24, '99	114½	113½	22,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's.	1941	7,417,000	M & N	110	Apr. 25, '99	110	109¼	51,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.	1897	2,482,000	M & S	117	Apr. 4, '99	117	117	5,000
2d extended 5's.	1919	2,149,000	M & N	119¼	Aug. 2, '98			
3d extended 4½'s.	1923	4,618,000	M & S	112	Nov. 11, '98			
4th extended 5's.	1920	2,926,000	A & O	123½	Mar. 30, '99			
5th extended 4's.	1928	709,500	J & D	100½	Apr. 14, '99	106½	105	4,000
1st cons. gold 7's.	1920	16,890,000	M & S	143½	Apr. 29, '99	143½	142½	24,000
1st cons. fund c. 7's.	1920	3,899,500	M & S	143	Dec. 30, '98			
Long Dock consol. 6's.	1953	7,500,000	A & O	139½	Apr. 14, '99	139½	139½	4,000
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.	1916	2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6, '99	139½	139½	4,000
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's.	1908	1,500,000	J & J					
small.			J & J					
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's.	1909	2,900,000	A & O	108	Feb. 8, '99			
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.	1822	12,000,000	M & N	116¼	Apr. 28, '99	116¼	116	57,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.		1,100,000	M & N					
1st g. currency 6's.	1922							
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.		3,396,000	J & J	102	Aug. 31, '96			
Co. 1st currency 6's.	1913							
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's.	1946	1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '96			
small.								
Erie R. R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds.	1906	30,000,000	J & J	98¼	Apr. 29, '99	94	96	278,000
registered.			J & J	93¼	Mar. 13, '99			
gen. lien 8-4s.	1906	30,927,000	J & J	72½	Apr. 28, '99	73	72	179,000
registered.			J & J					
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refdg. g. 5's.	1907	3,750,000	J & J	110	Apr. 21, '99	110	108½	26,000
2d g. 4½'s.	1907	453,000	F & A	92¼	Aug. 25, '98			
gen. g. 5's.	1940	2,546,000	F & A	96	Apr. 28, '99	98½	97	107,000
term. 1st g. 5's.	1943	2,000,000	M & N	111	Oct. 6, '96			
registered.	\$5,000 each		M & N					
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's.	1942	3,000,000	J & D	108	Apr. 29, '99	108¼	106	68,000
Midland E. of N. J. 1st g. 6's.	1910	3,500,000	A & O	120	Apr. 28, '99	120	120	19,000
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.	1933	500,000	F & A	65	Nov. 10, '97			
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.	1921	3,000,000	J & J	124	Apr. 24, '99	124	124	10,000
1st General g 5's.	1942	2,223,000	A & O	103¼	Apr. 24, '99	104¼	103½	48,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.	1923	375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93			
Sul. Co. Beh. 1st g 5's.	1930	450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91			
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g 6's.	1926	1,591,000	J & J	97½	Apr. 21, '99	97½	96	56,000
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.	1920	3,999,000	A & O	122¾	Apr. 18, '99	122¾	121	26,000
1st con. gold 5's.	1939	2,600,000	M & N	104	Apr. 28, '99	104	102½	84,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.	1939	3,983,000	A & O	103	Apr. 19, '99	103¼	103	25,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.	1918	3,000,000	J & J	101	Mar. 20, '99			
1st land grant ex. g 5's.	1930	423,000	J & J					
1st con. g 5's.	1943	4,370,000	J & J	80¼	May 14, '96			
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.	1941	1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98			
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctfs. dep. 1st 6's.	1921	8,176,000	J & J	85¼	Apr. 29, '99	86	83	260,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.	1928	2,863,000	J & J	64¼	Apr. 20, '99	66	64¼	87,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s.	1913	2,000,000	A & O	103¼	Apr. 26, '99	103¼	100	33,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's. 1945		2,280,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12, '98	....	....	.....
1st con. g. 5's. 1945		2,022,000	J & J			....	....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1927		5,360,000	J & J	108	Apr. 23, '99	108	108	23,000
Houston E. & W. Tex. 1st g. 5's. 1933		2,700,000	M & N	108	Apr. 22, '99	104	106	27,000
<b>Illinois Central, total out-</b>								
standing.....	\$13,950,000							
1st g. 4's. 1894-1951		1,500,000	J & J	113½	Apr. 8, '99	113½	113½	10,000
registered.....			J & J	112½	Nov. 23, '98	....	....	.....
1st gold 3½'s. 1951		2,490,000	J & J	107	Apr. 29, '99	107½	107	7,000
registered.....			J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98	....	....	.....
1st g. 3's sterl. £500,000. 1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 30, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
collat. trust gold 4's. 1952		15,000,000	M & N	108	Apr. 20, '99	106	104½	40,000
regist'd.....			M & N	104½	Jan. 30, '99	....	....	.....
col. f. g. 4's L. N. O. & Tex. 1953		24,079,000	J & J	106½	Apr. 25, '99	107	104	61,000
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
col. trust 2-10 g. 4's. 1904		4,808,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 23, '98	....	....	.....
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1951		5,425,000	F & A	108	Apr. 25, '99	108	108	25,000
registered.....			F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1953		14,320,000	J & J	104½	Apr. 29, '99	105½	98	1,752,000
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
St. Louis div. g. 3's. 1951		4,939,000	J & J	91	Apr. 26, '99	91½	81½	388,500
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
g. 3½'s. 1951		6,321,000	J & J	104½	Apr. 27, '99	104½	98	547,000
registered.....			J & J	103½	Apr. 28, '99	103½	108½	100,000
Calro Bridge 4's g. 1950		3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98	....	....	.....
registered.....			J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Middle div. registered 5's. 1921		600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '98	....	....	.....
Sp'gfield div 1st g. 3½'s. 1951		2,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's. 1951		16,555,000	J D 15	128	Apr. 25, '99	128	128	4,000
gold 5's, registered.....			J D 15	123	Sept. 12, '97	....	....	.....
g. 3½'s. 1951		1,352,000	J D 15	100	Apr. 15, '99	100	100	5,000
registered.....			J D 15	....	....	....	....	.....
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		3,500,000	J & D	104½	Feb. 17, '98	....	....	.....
registered.....			J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Belleville & Carott 1st 6's. 1923		470,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99	....	....	.....
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		538,000	M & S	93	Dec. 2, '97	....	....	.....
Carbond'e & Shaw't'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		241,000	M & S	90	Nov. 22, '98	....	....	.....
<b>Ind., Dec. &amp; West. 1st g. 5's. 1935</b>								
		1,824,000	J & J	105½	Apr. 22, '99	105½	105½	1,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st refdg. 5's. 1948		2,500,000	A & O	108	Apr. 21, '99	108	105½	19,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st. 6's, gold. 1919		7,954,000	M & N	125½	Apr. 24, '99	128	125½	7,000
2d g. 5's. 1906		6,593,000	M & S	95	Apr. 24, '99	95	92	226,500
3d g. 4's. 1921		2,722,000	M & S	82½	Apr. 29, '99	82½	80	79,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's. 1938		6,572,000	J & D	110	Apr. 23, '99	110	108½	9,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st			A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
gtd g. 5's. 1929		3,000,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
Kan. C. Pitt. & Gulf 1st & col. g. 5's. 1923		22,578,000	A & O	97½	Apr. 29, '99	68	63	1,694,000
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's. 1925		3,177,000	J & J	85	Mar. 29, '99	....	....	.....
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A. 1929		1,979,000	M & S	89	Apr. 3, '99	89	89	1,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's. 1937		7,250,000	J & J	120	Apr. 25, '99	121	118	17,000
2d mtge. g. 5's. 1941		3,625,000	J & J	108½	Apr. 29, '99	108½	108	23,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's. 1945		2,500,000	A & O	105	Mar. 30, '99	....	....	.....
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's. 1927		5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98	....	....	.....
registered.....			M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s. 1940		15,000,000	J & J	107	Apr. 17, '99	107	107	6,000
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Lehigh Val. Tr. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1941		10,000,000	A & O	113½	Mar. 13, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....			A & O	109½	July 1, '97	....	....	.....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1933		10,280,000	J & J	96	Feb. 7, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's. 1945		2,000,000	M & S	93	Feb. 6, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's. 1914		750,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
g. 4's. 1914		1,250,000	A & O	101	Sept. 16, '97	....	....	.....
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. cts. for 1st			Q J	....	....	....	....	.....
g. 5's. 1937		3,145,000	....	35½	Apr. 20, '99	35½	35	3,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's. 1931		3,610,000	Q J	124	Apr. 19, '99	124	123	8,000
1st con. g. 4's. 1931		1,121,000	Q J	....	....	....	....	.....
Long Island gen. m. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & D	101	Apr. 22, '99	101	100	20,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s. 1922		1,500,000	M & S	99½	Mar. 7, '99	....	....	.....
g. 4's. 1932		325,000	J & D	91	Sept. 27, '97	....	....	.....
deb. g. 5's. 1934		1,500,000	J & D	100	May 25, '97	....	....	.....



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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's, 1927		984,000	M & S	100	Jan. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d m. inc. .... 1927		1,000,000	S	106 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	July 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's, 1935		1,728,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's, 1911		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's, 1911		750,000	M & S	107 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	July 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st con. gold garn't'd 5's, 1932		1,425,000	QJAN	100 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Apr. 27, '99	100 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	100 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	2,000
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. d' 5's, 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's, 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louis'v Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. Tr. Co. ct. gold 5's, 1909		3,627,000	J & J	62	Apr. 29, '99	67	62	190,000
Gen. mtg. g. 4's, 1943		2,482,000	M & S	9	Mar. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
Louis. & Nash. Cecilian brch. 7's, 1907		435,000	M & S	106	Nov. 11, '97	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's, 1890		5,000,000	J & J	131 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 4, '99	131 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	131 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	4,000
2d 6's, 1900		1,000,000	J & J	121 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 19, '99	121 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	121 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	15,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's, 1919		1,980,000	J & D	117	Nov. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
general mort. 6's, 1930		9,794,000	J & D	120	Apr. 20, '99	120 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	119 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	14,000
Pensaoola div. 6's, 1920		580,000	M & S	107	Apr. 19, '97	107	107	1,000
St. Louis div. 1st 6's, 1921		3,500,000	M & S	125	Dec. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
2d 3's, 1980		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's, 1900		1,900,000	J & J	107	Nov. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
So. & N. Ala. s'g fd. 6s, 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Sept. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
con. gtd. g. 5's, 1936		2,677,000	F & A	108 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 5, '99	108 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	108 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	10,000
gold 5's, 1937		1,764,000	M & N	109 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 4, '99	110	109	14,000
Unified gold 4's, 1940		14,994,000	J & J	99	Apr. 29, '99	99	99	231,000
registered, 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
coll. tr 5-20 g 4's, 1909-1918		12,500,000	A & O	99	Apr. 29, '99	99	99 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	343,000
Pen. & At. 1st 6's g. g. 1921		2,753,000	F & A	112 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 29, '99	112 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	112	8,000
collateral trust g. 5's, 1931		5,129,000	M & N	110	Apr. 18, '99	110	109	14,000
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st g. 4's, 1945		4,000,000	M & S	109 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	July 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's, 1937		2,096,000	F & A	107 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 29, '99	107 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	107 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	52,000
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's, 1937		6,742,000	J & J	95 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 24, '99	95 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	95	29,000
L. & N. Louv. Cin. & Lex. g. 4's, 1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's, 1945		8,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's, 1930		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's, 1990		24,065,000	A & O	110 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Apr. 23, '99	112 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	109 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	2,291,500
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's, 1906		10,818,000	J & J	120	Apr. 27, '99	120	117 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	87,000
2d 6's, 1899		4,000,000	M & N	102 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Apr. 4, '99	102 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	102 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	11,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Colontza'n g. 5's, 1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's, 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Metro. St. Ry. gen. col. tr. g. 5's, 1997		12,500,000	F & A	123	Apr. 28, '99	123 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	121	326,000
B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's, 1997			J & D	124	Apr. 27, '99	124	124	2,000
registered, 1997		7,650,000	J & D	112 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	May 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's, 1996		3,000,000	M & S	125	Apr. 19, '99	125	125	5,000
registered, 1996			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's, 1993		5,000,000	M & S	125 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 28, '99	126	125 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	8,000
registered, 1993			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Central.								
con. mtge. 4's, 1911		59,011,000	J & J	68 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Jan. 4, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. inc. 3's, 1939		17,072,000	JULY	24 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Apr. 29, '98	25 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	16 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	592,000
2d 3's, 1939		11,310,000	JULY	13 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Apr. 29, '99	14 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	9 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	2,510,000
equip. & collat. g. 5's, 1917		950,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Internat'l 1st con. g. 4's, 1942		4,635,000	M & S	88 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Apr. 29, '99	89 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	87	238,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's, 1927		11,075,000	J & D	99	Mar. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	15	Dec. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
March 1, 1899, stamped 1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> paid								
2d inc. 6's "B" 1917		12,265,000	A	14	Apr. 6, '99	14	14	25,000
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's, 1910		1,313,000	J & D	97	Feb. 11, '97	.....	.....	.....
registered, 1910			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's, 1926		6,103,000	F & A	105 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	Feb. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's, 1927		950,000	J & D	150	Apr. 20, '99	150	150	1,000
1st con. g. 5's, 1934		5,000,000	M & N	115	Apr. 18, '99	115	113 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	12,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's, 1909		1,015,000	J & D	125	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's, 1910		630,000	J & D	127	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's, 1921		1,382,000	J & A	128	Dec. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's, 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.								

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1925		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '95	.....	.....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	.....	.....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1838		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,050,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,718,000	J & D	94½	Apr. 29, '99	94½	92½	1,105,000
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	67½	Apr. 29, '99	68½	67	691,000
" 1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	91¼	Apr. 27, '99	91¼	89¾	53,000
" of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	88½	Apr. 28, '99	88½	85½	312,000
" Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	79	Apr. 26, '99	79	79	20,000
" Dal. & Waco 1st g. g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	95	Apr. 27, '99	95	95	32,000
" Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		558,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tobo. & Neosho 1st 7's. .... 1908		187,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mo Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	108	Apr. 29, '99	108	102	22,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	121½	Apr. 28, '99	121½	119	238,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	114½	Mar. 1, '99	.....	.....	.....
" trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,876,000	M & S	99	Apr. 29, '99	100¼	99	392,000
" registered. ....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	93	Apr. 28, '99	94	92¼	58,000
" registered. ....		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	108	Apr. 28, '99	108	107	28,000
" 2d extended g. 5's. .... 1938		2,573,000	F & A	115	Apr. 20, '99	115	113¼	4,000
" 750,000		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1928		4,000,000	F & A	105½	Apr. 27, '99	105½	105¼	6,000
" St. L. & I'rn. Mt. 1st ex. 4½'s. .... 1897		6,000,000	M & N	107½	Apr. 28, '99	107½	106¾	47,000
" 2d. ext. g. 5's. .... 1946		2,500,000	J & D	106½	Apr. 6, '99	106½	106¼	5,000
" Ark'nsas b'nch ext 5's. 1895		21,769,000	A & O	111½	Apr. 29, '99	111½	108	2,153,000
" g. con. R.R. & l. gr. 5's. 1931		6,945,000	A & O	111¼	Mar. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
" stamped gtd 5's. .... 1931		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mob. & Birm. prior lien. g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small. ....		226,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small. ....		500,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	129¼	Apr. 27, '99	129¼	127½	40,000
" 1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	118¼	Apr. 25, '99	118¼	118¼	1,000
" gen. g. 4's. .... 1938		9,547,000	Q J	86	Apr. 29, '99	88	84	198,000
" Montg'yrdiv. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	108	Apr. 26, '99	108½	107¼	70,000
" St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	132¼	Apr. 8, '99	132¼	132¼	18,000
" 2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	105½	Nov. 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		6,213,000	A & O	105½	Apr. 27, '99	106	105¼	55,000
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 1st 6's McM. M. W. & Al. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	115	Mar. 22, '99	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		19,917,000	J & J	114½	Apr. 11, '99	114½	114½	10,000
" 1st registered. .... 1903		.....	J & J	114½	Apr. 15, '99	114½	114½	35,000
" debenture 5's. .... 1904		5,403,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 28, '99	109¼	107½	12,000
" debenture 5's reg. ....		.....	M & S	113¼	Jan. 26, '99	.....	.....	.....
" reg. debent. 5's. .... 1889-1904		706,000	M & S	108½	Feb. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
" debenture g. 4's. 1890-1905		6,180,000	J & D	104	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....		.....	J & D	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		4,194,000	M & N	105	Apr. 24, '99	105	105	8,000
" registered. ....		.....	M & N	104½	June 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" g. mortgage 9½'s. .... 1907		38,020,000	J & J	112½	Apr. 26, '99	112½	112½	143,000
" registered. ....		.....	J & J	112½	Apr. 14, '99	112½	112½	25,000
" Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. 1908		18,484,000	F & A	100½	Apr. 28, '99	100¼	98½	198,000
" registered. ....		.....	F & A	99	Apr. 4, '99	99	99	10,000
" Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		90,420,000	F & A	101¼	Apr. 29, '99	101½	99½	698,000
" registered. ....		.....	F & A	100	Apr. 25, '99	100¼	98½	354,000
" Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	108	Mar. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 7's registered. .... 1900		.....	M & N	108	Mar. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
" N. Jersey June. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1886		1,650,000	F & A	103	May 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
" reg. certificates. ....		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	114½	Apr. 28, '99	114½	113½	175,000
" registered. ....		.....	J & J	113¼	Apr. 27, '99	114½	113¼	39,000



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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Beech Creek 1st. g. gtd. 4's.....1926		5,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 5 '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		500,000	J & J	108	June 17 '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 5's.....1926		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Hit. Coal Corporation, } 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940 } small bonds series B.....		770,000	J & J	95	July 28 '98	.....	.....	.....
" 23.100		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's.....1922		9,081,000	A & O	128½	Apr. 25 '99	128½	128½	19,000
coup. g. bond currency.....		180,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		375,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		400,000	F & A	118	Apr. 13 '94	118	118	2,000
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		1,800,000	J & J	107	Aug. 13 '98	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14 '94	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1991		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Carthage & Adiron 1st gtd g. 4's. 1881		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22 '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1993		1,200,000	A & O	123½	Dec. 20 '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern } Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1906 } Lake Shore con. 1st 7's.....1900 } " con. 1st registered.....1900 } " con. con. 2d 7's.....1903 } " con. 2d registered.....1903 } " g 3/4's.....1907 } " registered.....		924,000	F & A	121	Apr. 28 '98	.....	.....	.....
" 108½		9,153,000	J & J	106½	Apr. 1 '99	108½	108½	29,000
" 106½		.....	Q J	117½	Feb. 20 '99	.....	.....	.....
" 117½		8,725,000	J & D	116½	Apr. 13 '99	117½	117	8,000
" 116½		.....	J & D	111½	Jan. 5 '99	.....	.....	.....
" 111½		28,166,000	J & D	111	Apr. 27 '99	111½	109½	105,000
" 111		.....	J & D	108½	Apr. 27 '99	111	111	6,000
" 108½		1,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's. 1901		840,000	J & J	121	Oct. 24 '98	.....	.....	.....
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1928		1,500,000	J & J	112	Mar. 20 '99	.....	.....	.....
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....1924		8,000,000	M & N	104½	Apr. 20 '98	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's.....1902		2,000,000	M & N	122	Dec. 25 '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 5's.....1902		1,500,000	M & S	121½	Dec. 21 '98	.....	.....	.....
6's.....1909		3,576,000	M & S	121	Dec. 6 '97	.....	.....	.....
coup. 5's.....1931		.....	J & J	108	Feb. 25 '98	.....	.....	.....
reg. 5's.....1931		2,600,000	J & J	108	Jan. 7 '98	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's.....1940		476,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
mtge. 4's reg.....		.....	A & O	107½	Apr. 27 '99	107½	105½	179,000
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's.....1929		19,425,000	A & O	105½	Apr. 19 '99	105½	105½	56,000
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1927		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1903		2,000,000	J & D	104½	Oct. 7 '97	.....	.....	.....
con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	180	Apr. 25 '99	191	181	184,000
small certifs.....\$100		1,430,000	.....	184	Apr. 30 '99	184	184	100
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's.....1937		2,898,000	M & N	129½	Aug. 28 '97	.....	.....	.....
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15 '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1905		6,000,000	J & J	120½	Apr. 10 '99	120½	120½	1,000
1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	114½	Apr. 10 '99	114½	114½	2,000
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1929		2,884,000	J & D	107½	Apr. 29 '99	107½	107	152,000
Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1922		11,831,000	M & S	104½	Apr. 29 '99	104½	103	226,000
Registered.....\$5,000 only.		.....	M & S	101½	Nov. 30 '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m. R. R. & L. G. S. F. g. c. 6's.....1921		5,815,000	J & J	119½	Apr. 12 '99	120	119½	5,000
" registered.....		.....	J & J	117	Oct. 15 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's.....1923 } " registered certificates.....		7,985,000	F & A	131½	Dec. 17 '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered certificates.....		.....	Q F	180	Sept. 28 '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. Ry prior in ry. & id. gtd. g. 4's.....1997		87,770,000	Q J	104½	Apr. 29 '99	104½	101½	1,637,000
" registered.....		.....	Q J	104	Apr. 28 '99	104	103½	6,000
" gen. lien g. 3's.....2047		56,000,000	Q F	68½	Apr. 29 '99	68½	67	801,000
" registered.....		1,538,000	Q F	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948		.....	QMCH	95	Apr. 28 '99	95	93	39,000
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1933		3,871,000	J & J	119	Apr. 21 '99	119	117	13,000
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's.....1941		880,000	M & N	102	June 27 '98	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1931		7,283,000	M & N	130½	Feb. 27 '99	.....	.....	.....
" New River 1st 6's.....1932		2,000,000	A & O	128	Nov. 25 '98	.....	.....	.....
" im'pment and ext. 6's.....1934		5,000,000	F & A	119	Mar. 15 '99	.....	.....	.....
" Scl'o Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & N	101	Apr. 24 '99	101	97½	108,000
" C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. 5's. 1922		800,000	J & J	101	Feb. 23 '97	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s. 1896 " registered.....	}	23,316,000	A & O	95¾	Apr. 29, '99	95¾	92	610,000
" small bonds.....			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's..... 1936		2,000,000	J & D	102¼	Jan. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. mortg. g 6's..... 1937		2,428,000	A & O	85	Dec. 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's..... 1901		2,376,000	J & J	82½	Mar. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1909		691,000	J & J	114	Apr. 28, '99	114	111½	27,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		19,481,000	J & D	103¾	Apr. 28, '99	103¾	101	457,000
Oregon Short Line 1st g. 6's..... 1922		13,651,000	F & A	131¼	Apr. 29, '99	131¼	128	146,000
Utah & Northern 1st 7's..... 1908		4,993,000	J & J	121	June 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" g. 5's..... 1926		1,877,000	J & J	102	May 24, '94	.....	.....	.....
Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946		10,337,000	J & J	112¼	Apr. 29, '99	112¼	111	101,500
" non-cum. inc. A 5's..... 1946		7,185,000	SEPT.	89¼	Apr. 29, '99	89¼	86½	313,000
" non-cum. inc. B. & col. trust		14,841,000	OCT.	73¼	Apr. 29, '99	74½	70½	468,000
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's..... 1946		4,446,600	J & D	108	Apr. 19, '99	108	107	11,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s..... 1917		1,859,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" s. f. subsidy g 6's..... 1910		1,611,000	M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st..... 1921		19,467,000	J & J	117¼	Apr. 28, '99	117½	116½	51,000
" reg..... 1921		.....	J & J	113¾	Mar. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
" gtd. 3½ col. tr. reg. cts. 1937		5,000,000	M & S	114½	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g. 4½'s " Series A..... 1940		10,000,000	A & O	114¼	Apr. 13, '99	114¼	114¼	5,000
" Series B..... 1942		10,000,000	A & O	114	Apr. 11, '99	114	114	5,000
" Series C..... 1942		2,000,000	M & N	113	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series D gtd. 4's..... 1945		4,863,000	M & N	107	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's..... 1900		6,863,000	F & A	105½	Apr. 13, '99	105½	105½	3,000
" 1st reg. 7's..... 1900		.....	F & A	109¾	Apr. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912		2,917,000	J & J	141	Mar. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 7's..... 1912		2,546,000	J & J	141	Nov. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 3d 7's..... 1912		2,000,000	A & O	126	Aug. 26, '95	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932		1,506,000	A & O	113	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered..... 1900		1,310,000	M & N	108	Apr. 19, '98	108	108	25,000
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's..... 1940		3,000,000	J & J	113	Apr. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
" gen. gtd. g. 4½'s Ser. A. 1942		2,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Series B..... 1942		2,250,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3½'s Ser. B. 1940		1,118,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" " " " C. 1940		1,118,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g. 4½ g. 1941		4,455,000	J & J	107	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's. 1942		5,389,000	M & S	102	Nov. 10, '97	.....	.....	.....
Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		1,400,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st RI Est. g 4's. 1923		1,675,000	.....	108	May 12, '97	.....	.....	.....
" con. sterling gold 6 per cent. 1905		22,762,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. currency, 6's registered. 1905		4,718,000	Q M 15	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. gold 5 per cent. 1919		4,998,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered..... 1919		.....	Q Mch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. gold 4 per cent. 1943		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s. 1935		1,250,000	M & N	111	July 8, '97	.....	.....	.....
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's. 1944		5,046,000	M & S	115½	Feb. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
Del. R. RR. & Bge Co 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1936		1,300,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sunbury & Lewistown 1st g. 4's. 1936		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peo., Dec. & Ev. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920		1,140,000	J & J	101	Mar. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Ev. div. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920		1,453,000	M & S	92½	Apr. 3, '99	92½	92½	2,000
" Tr. Co. cts. 2d mort 5's. 1926		1,851,000	M & N	20	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st instal. paid.....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's..... 1921		1,495,000	Q F	126	Apr. 28, '99	126	126	5,000
" 2d m 4½'s..... 1921		1,499,000	M & N	90	Sept. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pine Creek Railway 6's..... 1922		3,500,000	J & D	137	Nov. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 28, '93	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1922		1,440,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 23, '93	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's. 1922		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89	.....	.....	.....
"    "    2d g. 6's. 1924		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	Oct. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		3,000,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    "    1st cons. 5's. 1943		408,000	J & J	98	July 14, '97	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		1,953,000	J & J	99½	Apr. 29, '99	99½	99	29,000
"    "    J. P. M. & Co., ctfs., ....		7,747,000	.....	99½	Apr. 28, '99	99½	98½	27,000
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. 1907		62,456,000	J & J	88¾	Apr. 29, '99	89½	88	1,424,000
"    "    registered. ....			J & J	87½	Mar. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. 1939		15,200,000	J & J	97¾	Apr. 28, '99	97¾	97	257,000
"    "    Utah Cen. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1917		550,000	A & O	88	Apr. 20, '99	88½	87½	124,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1939		1,850,000	J & D	102½	Feb. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4. 1940		4,510,000	J & J	79¾	Apr. 10, '99	74	78¾	13,000
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.842. 1947		3,500,000	J & J	81½	Apr. 11, '99	81½	81	11,000
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	115	Mar. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    2d g. 6's. Class B. 1906		2,709,500	M & N	115	Apr. 12, '99	115	115	3,000
"    "    2d g. 6's. Class C. 1906		2,400,000	M & N	115	Mar. 25, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    1st g. 6's P. C. & O. 1919		1,023,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
"    "    gen. g. 6's. 1931		7,807,000	J & J	124¼	Apr. 28, '99	124¼	122	87,000
"    "    gen. g. 5's. 1931		12,233,000	J & J	110½	Apr. 29, '99	110½	109½	201,000
"    "    1st Trust g. 5's. 1937		1,099,000	A & O	101	Apr. 20, '98	101	101	17,000
"    "    Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's. 1910		304,000	A & O	105	Oct. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1936		6,388,000	J & D	88¾	Apr. 17, '99	88¾	88	45,000
"    "    South'n div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		1,500,000	A & O	101½	Apr. 29, '99	101½	99½	6,000
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctfs. 1939		20,000,000	M & N	95¾	Apr. 29, '99	96	92	2,888,000
"    "    2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctfs. 1939		9,000,000	J & J	55¾	Apr. 29, '99	57	53½	2,616,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	108¾	Mar. 9, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    gtd. gold 5's. 1937		1,138,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. 1913		1,000,000	F & A	120	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    "    2d 5's. 1917		2,000,000	A & O	113¾	Apr. 26, '99	118¾	118¾	5,000
"    "    1st con. g. 4's. 1968		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	121¼	Apr. 28, '99	121¼	121	49,000
"    "    Dakota ext'n 6's. 1910		5,876,000	M & N	125	Apr. 21, '99	125	124¾	24,000
"    "    1st con. 6's. 1933		13,344,000	J & J	140	Apr. 7, '99	140	140	5,000
"    "    1st con. 6's registered. ....		.....	J & J	137¾	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    1st c. 6's. red'd to 4½'s. ....		21,882,000	J & J	119	Apr. 27, '99	119	118¾	15,000
"    "    1st cons. 6's registered. ....		.....	J & J	105	Nov. 4, '85	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,805,000	J & D	108¾	Apr. 25, '99	108¾	106¾	11,000
"    "    registered. ....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Minneapolis Union 1st 6's. 1922		2,150,000	J & J	127¼	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	134¼	Mar. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    1st 6's. registered. ....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    "    1st g. g. 5's. 1937		2,700,000	J & J	115	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,000	A & O	110¼	Apr. 27, '99	110¼	110¼	3,000
"    "    registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Eastn. Ry Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		3,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '99	120	115	7,000
"    "    registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,940,000	M & S	96	Mar. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100¼	Oct. 30, '97	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. 1934		4,056,000	A & O	125½	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    1st g. 5's. 1934		1,780,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. 1926		2,500,000	J & J	104¾	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    "    Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's. gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '88	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's. 1919		5,250,000	M & N	111	Apr. 28, '99	111	106¾	83,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Southern Pacific Co.								
{ Gal. Harrisb'gh & S.A. 1st g 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	114	Apr. 28, '99	114	114	5,000
" 2d g 7's. .... 1905		1,000,000	J & D	110	Feb. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Mex. & P. div 1st g 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	105	Apr. 19, '99	105	104	237,000
Houst. & T C 1st Waco & N 7's. 1903		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 20, '92	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g 5's int. gtd. .... 1937		7,107,000	J & J	112½	Apr. 25, '99	112½	112	17,000
" con. g 6 s int. gtd. .... 1912		3,455,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
" gen. g 4's int. gtd. .... 1921		4,297,000	A & O	87½	Apr. 29, '99	88	87½	87,000
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's. .... 1920		1,494,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st 7's. .... 1918		5,000,000	A & O	139	Jan. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's. .... 1927		18,842,000	J & J	105	Mar. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
San Ant. & Aran Passlst gtd g 4's. 1943		18,886,000	J & J	83¼	Apr. 28, '99	83¼	80	316,000
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's. .... 1905		1,620,000	F & A	116	Dec. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Sabine div. 1st g 6's. .... 1912		2,575,000	M & S	106¼	Nov. 17, '97	.....	.....	.....
" con. g 5's. .... 1943		1,620,000	J & J	106	Apr. 29, '99	106	105	245,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	114½	Apr. 10, '99	114½	114½	63,000
{ South. Pac. of Cal. 1st g 6's. 1905-12		30,577,500	A & O	118½	Dec. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's. .... 1937		6,696,000	M & N	105½	Mar. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
" stamped. .... 1905-1937		12,788,000	.....	109½	Apr. 26, '99	110	108½	248,000
{ Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. .... 1941		1,920,000	J & J	100¾	Apr. 29, '99	101	100	220,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's. .... 1937		5,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. .... 1911		4,180,000	J & J	113¾	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's. 1994		27,859,000	J & J	110¼	Apr. 29, '99	110½	108	1,069,000
" registered. .... 1994		.....	J & J	106¼	Mar. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Memph. div. lstr. g 4½-5's. 1996		5,083,000	J & J	107½	Jan. 4, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered. .... 1996		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. .... 1938		4,500,000	M & S	109	Apr. 22, '99	109	107	35,000
" registered. .... 1938		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Alabama Central, 1st 6's. .... 1918		1,000,000	J & J	112¼	Aug. 17, '97	.....	.....	.....
Atl. & Char. Air Line, income. 1900		750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. .... 1916		2,000,000	J & J	117	Mar. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. .... 1900		3,123,000	J & J	105¼	Apr. 24, '99	105¼	105½	23,000
" divisional g 5's. .... 1930		3,106,000	J & J	117¼	Apr. 4, '99	117¼	117½	1,000
" con. 1st g 5's. .... 1956		12,770,000	M & N	119¾	Apr. 26, '99	119¾	117¾	40,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. .... 1922		5,660,000	J & J	124	Apr. 10, '99	124	124	2,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. .... 1925		2,000,000	J & J	123	Apr. 25, '99	123	122	45,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. .... 1915		5,597,000	J & J	125	Apr. 26, '99	125	123¾	28,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's. 1909		818,000	M & S	100	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
" deb. 5's stamped. .... 1927		3,368,000	A & O	106	Apr. 24, '99	106	106	9,000
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small. .... 1906		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ser. B 6's. .... 1911		1,900,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small. .... 1911		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ser. C 6's. .... 1916		1,100,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small. .... 1916		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ser. D 4-5's. .... 1921		950,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small. .... 1921		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ser. E 5's. .... 1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99	.....	.....	.....
" small. .... 1926		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ser. F 5's. .... 1931		1,310,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's. .... 1936		2,392,000	M & N	115	Apr. 21, '99	115	112¼	15,000
" gen. 5's. gtd. stamped. 1926		2,466,000	M & N	110	Dec. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. .... 1924		1,025,000	F & A	90	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. .... 1914		2,531,000	J & J	120½	Apr. 14, '99	120½	120½	3,000
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g 6's. .... 1939		2,812,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4½s. 1943		500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½s. 1939		7,000,000	A & O	109	Oct. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
{  " 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	111½	Dec. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g. 5's. 1930		3,500,000	A & O	103	Oct. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. 1914		444,000	Q JAN	105¾	Dec. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. .... 1905		3,346,000	M & S	105	Apr. 20, '99	105	105	1,000
" fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth		21,216,000	J & D	115	Apr. 29, '99	115	113	153,000
" 1st gold 5's. .... 2000		23,227,000	MAR.	55½	Apr. 29, '99	56	53¼	5,475,000
" 2d gold income, 5's. .... 2000		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Third Avenue 1st g 5's. .... 1937		5,000,000	J & J	128½	Apr. 27, '99	128½	128½	41,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's...1935		3,000,000	J & J	106	Apr. 28, '99	106½	106	7,000
{ " 1st m. g 5's West. div...1935		2,500,000	A & O	102	Dec. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " gen. g. 5's...1935		1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's...1930		2,340,000	A & O	88	Apr. 28, '99	88	86	24,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's...1917		4,400,000	J & D	83	Apr. 22, '99	83	82	18,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's...1916		8,234,000	M & N	106	Apr. 29, '99	106	102½	178,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's...1928		1,852,000	J & D	100	Apr. 28, '99	100	99	13,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's...1945		4,387,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Pacific R. R. & ld gt g 4s...1947		90,000,000	J & J	106½	Apr. 29, '99	106½	104½	10,498,500
{ " registered...1935		.....	J & J	105½	Apr. 27, '99	105½	105	19,500
{ Union Pac. Tr. Co. cts. g. 4½s...1918		2,000,000	M & N	68½	Apr. 27, '99	68½	68½	5,000
{ U. P. Den. & GT. Co. of. 1st c. g 5's...1930		15,288,000	J & D	90½	Apr. 17, '99	92	90½	30,000
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's...1939		31,664,000	M & N	117½	Apr. 29, '99	117½	115½	205,000
{ " 2d mortgage gold 5's...1939		14,000,000	F & A	100	Apr. 29, '99	100	99½	280,000
{ " debent. mtg series A...1939		3,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " series B...1939		25,740,000	J & J	97½	Apr. 28, '99	98½	96	3,385,000
{ " 1st g. 5's Det. & Chi. ex...1940		3,436,000	J & J	109	Apr. 3, '99	109	109	2,000
{ St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.								
{ " 1st 6's...1908		1,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's...1937		10,000,000	J & J	112½	Apr. 17, '99	113½	111½	25,000
{ " gen g. 3-4's...1943		9,789,000	A & O	64½	Apr. 29, '99	64½	63½	351,000
{ " inc. 5's...1943		10,000,000	Nov.	22½	Apr. 28, '99	24½	22½	118,000
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's...1928		3,989,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 40 years con. g. 5's...1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's...1911		3,250,000	J & J	113	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's...1928		1,018,000	A & O	105½	Apr. 27, '99	105½	105	14,000
{ " Trust Co. certificates...1928		1,982,000	.....	104½	Dec. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's...1928		1,500,000	J & J	96	Apr. 14, '99	96	96	1,000
{ " exten. and imp. g. 5's...1930		1,624,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g 5's...1937		1,967,000	J & J	34	Nov. 16, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ " eng. Trust Co. certificates...1937		10,013,000	.....	70	Apr. 29, '99	70½	66	1,647,000
{ " income mortgage 5's...1937		7,775,000	A & O	8	Apr. 11, '99	8	8	8,000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1899.		APRIL SALES.		
				Hgh.	Low.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered.....Opt'l		25,364,100	Q M	99½	99	.....	.....	.....
{ " 3's registered.....1898			Q F	106½	106½	106½	107½	70,000
{ " 3's coupon.....1898			Q F	109	109½	109	107½	693,000
{ " 3's small bonds reg.....1898		198,406,000	Q F	107½	107½	.....	.....	.....
{ " 3's small bonds coupon.....1898			Q F	109	106½	109	107½	2,780
{ " 4's registered.....1907		559,650,500	J A J & O	112½	111	112½	112½	87,000
{ " 4's coupon.....1907			J A J & O	114	112½	113½	112½	174,500
{ " 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	129½	128	129½	129½	2,000
{ " 4's coupon.....1925			Q F	130½	128	130½	129½	89,000
{ " 5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	113½	111½	113½	112	61,000
{ " 5's coupon.....1904			Q F	113½	111	113½	113	17,500
District of Columbia 3-65's.....1924			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " small bonds.....1924		14,083,900	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " registered.....1924			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " funding 5's.....1899		800,400	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " small.....1899			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " registered.....1899			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	106¾	Apr. 29, '99	106	105	62,500
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		3,088,000	Q F	107	Apr. 28, '99	107	105	61,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1915		1,890,000	M & S	94	Apr. 23, '99	94¾	89¾	217,000
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		17,500,000	F & A	90¾	Apr. 29, '99	91	89¾	319,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	109¾	Feb. 9, '97			
non-cum. inc. 5's. 1907		2,575,000	J & J					
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	100¾	Apr. 18, '99	100¾	100¾	2,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	81	Feb. 11, '97			
Coupon off. ....								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108	Dec. 1, '98			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	90	Apr. 29, '99	91¾	87¾	490,000
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2307			Q & J	103¾	Nov. 10, '98			
registered. ....		10,480,700	Q & J	104	Feb. 16, '98			
Total amount of lien, \$13,000,000.								
Det. Mack & Mar. Id. gt. 8¾ S. A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	22¼	Apr. 25, '99	22¾	18	371,000
Elie Tele. & Tel. col. tr. g's fd 5's. 1925		1,905,000	J & J	110	Jan. 31, '99			
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1923		1,090,000	J & J	107¾	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,705,000	M & S	111	Aug. 23, '97			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99			
non-cum. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75¼	Dec. 4, '95			
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's. 1918		8,947,000	F & A	113	Apr. 18, '99	113	112	8,000
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's. 1928		1,975,000	J & D	105¾	Oct. 10, '98			
2d g. 5's. 1928		1,400,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97			
Knickerbocker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g. 5's. 1925		2,000,000	A & O	98	Apr. 27, '99	98	98	27,000
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97			
Manh. Bch H. & L. lrm. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95			
Metrop. Tel. & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108	Feb. 17, '99			
registered. ....								
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S	98	Dec. 2, '98			
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,089,000	J & J	102	Apr. 15, '99	102	100¾	4,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1909		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's env. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	92¾	May 5, '98			
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. 1889-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. 1920		580,000	M & N	106¾	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	113	Apr. 4, '98			
Roch & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946		1,100,000	M & N					
St. Louis Term. Cupples Station & Property Co. 1st g. 4½'s 5-20. 1917		2,000,000	J & D					
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,975,000	M & S					
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		2,912,000	F & A	89¾	Apr. 29, '99	90¾	89	140,000
inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000		31	Apr. 29, '99	33½	30	743,000
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		379,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917		1,244,000	A & O	107¾	Apr. 17, '99	107¾	107	8,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,731,000	J & J	109¾	Apr. 28, '99	111¾	109¾	157,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & J	84	May 2, '95			
De Bard. C. & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910		2,771,000	F & A	104¾	Apr. 28, '99	106	104¾	245,500
U. S. Env. Co. 1st sk. fd. g. 6's. 1918		2,000,000	J & J					
U. S. Leather Co. 6s g. s. fd. deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	119¾	Apr. 4, '99	119¾	119¾	7,000
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co.								
Real Estate 1st g col tr. bonds.								
Series B 5's. 1890-1914		1,000,000	M & N					
" C 5's. 1900-1915		1,000,000	A & O					
" D 4½'s. 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J					
" E 4's. 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D					
" F 4's. 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S					
" G 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A					
" H 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N					
" I 4's. 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A					
Small bonds. ....								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's..1910		640,000	J & D					
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		3,840,000	M & N	103	Nov. 21, '98			
"    7's, registered.....1900			M & N	105	Mar. 11, '98			
"    debenture, 7's.....1884-1900		1,000,000	M & N	105½	July 7, '97			
"    registered.....1900			M & N	104½	Nov. 12, '97			
"    col. trust cur. 5's.....1903		8,502,000	J & J	115½	Apr. 23, '99	116½	114½	62,000
"    Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 5's.....1911		1,957,000	J & J	112	Mar. 21, '99			
"    Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904		1,250,000	J & J					
"    Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g. 5's.1919		846,000	J & J	68	Dec. 23, '98			
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's..1947		1,150,000	J & D					
Bost. Un. Gas 1st cdfs s'k f'd g. 5's.1939		7,000,000	J & J	91½	Oct. 12, '98			
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.1945		13,239,000	M & N	119½	Apr. 19, '99	119½	117	15,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1932		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98			
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,313,000	J & J	101½	Apr. 29, '99	102½	96	444,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918		1,049,000	F & A	101	Apr. 25, '99	101	95	61,000
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's.1910		4,312,000	M & S	110½	Apr. 25, '99	110½	110½	25,000
"    1st con. g. 5's.....1905		2,156,000	J & J	123½	Apr. 23, '99	124	122½	61,000
"    Brooklyn 1st g. 5's.....1940		1,500,000	A & O	110½	Feb. 4, '97			
"    "    registered.....1939		2,000,000	A & O					
"    1st con. g. 4's.....1939		2,000,000	J & J					
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1932		2,500,000	M & S	102	Feb. 14, '98			
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....1922		6,000,000	J & D	116½	Apr. 14, '99	116½	115½	26,000
Grand Rapids Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....1915		1,225,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '95			
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g. 5's.1922		3,750,000	A & O					
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.1919		10,000,000	Q F	111	Apr. 29, '99	111	108½	47,000
"    small bonds.....1905				97½	Nov. 1, '95			
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g. 6's.1904		2,100,000	M & N	125	Feb. 25, '99			
"    2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	109½	Apr. 24, '99	109½	109½	3,000
"    1st con. g. 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	127½	Apr. 25, '99	127½	123	31,000
"    refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 18, '98			
"    refunding registered.....1900			M & S					
"    Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's.1907		10,000,000	J & J	112	Apr. 23, '99	112	112	2,000
"    Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd g. 5's.1906		4,346,000	J & D	111½	Apr. 20, '99	111½	110	5,000
"    Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd g. 5's.1905		2,000,000	J & J	106	Feb. 20, '99			
"    Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.1947		5,000,000	M & N	107½	Apr. 14, '99	107½	107½	10,000
"    Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....1933		3,805,500	M & N	101	Mar. 16, '98			

New York State Banks.

The following table shows the condition of the 204 State banks of New York State at the close of business March 30, 1899, as per official statements made to the Superintendent of Banks:

RESOURCES.		LIABILITIES.	
Loans and discounts, less due from directors.....	\$189,759,318	Capital .....	\$29,445,700
Liability of directors as makers..	6,398,818	Surplus fund .....	13,554,671
Overdrafts.....	152,747	Undivided profits .....	8,448,470
Due from trust companies, banks, bankers and brokers..	33,554,256	Due depositors on demand.....	290,988,919
Real estate.....	10,229,247	Due to trust companies, banks, bankers and brokers.....	38,016,985
Mortgages owned.....	3,574,514	Due Savings banks.....	16,991,168
Stocks and bonds.....	25,530,396	Due the Treasurer of the State of New York.....	258,718
Specie.....	27,902,854	Amount not included under any of the above heads.....	355,845
U. S. legal tenders and circulating notes of National banks...	15,647,494	Add for cents.....	831
Cash items.....	69,219,288		
Assets not included under any of the above heads.....	1,392,248		
Add for cents.....	652		
	\$403,050,805		\$403,050,805

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

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**Baker.**—J. D. Baker, President of the First National Bank, Weatherford, Texas, died April 1. He was head of a large dry-goods establishment and was interested in many other business enterprises. He was a public-spirited citizen and was held in high esteem.

**Barber.**—Col. E. L. Barber, ex-President of the Ketcham National Bank, Toledo, Ohio, and one of the incorporators of the bank, died April 3.

**Ham.**—Christopher D. Ham, President of the Ham National Bank, Mount Vernon, Ills., died April 17. He was one of the organizers of the Mount Vernon National Bank in 1872, and became its Cashier. The bank was later superseded by C. D. Ham & Co., and this firm was in turn succeeded by the Ham National Bank, in 1895, Mr. Ham being elected President.

**Olcott.**—John J. Olcott, Vice-President of the Mechanics and Farmers' Bank, Albany, N. Y., died April 10. He was born at Albany in 1823.

**Patterson.**—James S. Patterson, President of the Union Trust Co., Jamestown, N. Y., and a heavy manufacturer and oil operator, died April 7.

**Phinney.**—Major Sylvanus Phinney, formerly prominently connected with banking at Barnstable, Yarmouthport and Hyannis, Mass., died April 7, aged over ninety years. He had also held a number of important official positions, and for a long period held a leading place in the business, religious and political life of the locality where he lived.

**Shiffer.**—J. B. Shiffer, President of the People's Savings Bank, Pittston, Pa., while attempting to cross the street, April 8, was run over by a wagon and fatally injured. He was eighty years of age.

**Smith.**—Henry W. Smith, President of the First National Bank, Aurora, Ind., since 1884, died April 11, in the seventy-second year of his age.

**Speedy.**—B. F. Speedy, President of the Cambria National Bank, Johnstown, Pa., and former city treasurer of that place, died April 7, aged fifty-four years.

**Steers.**—Edward P. Steers, President of the Twelfth Ward Bank, New York city, died April 22.

**Strickland.**—Louis Strickland, Vice-President of the Merchants' Bank, Valdosta, Ga., and a prominent and successful merchant, died April 4.

**Stuart.**—James Stuart, President of the Madison State Bank, Madison, Neb., and of the Elkhorn Valley Bank, Tilden, Neb., and the Bank of Elgin, Neb., died at Lincoln, Neb., April 6. He was forty-seven years of age at the time of his death. Mr. Stuart was very energetic in carrying on his business enterprises, and was a successful country banker. His large estate is left to his widow, and the banking business will be continued as heretofore.

**Sullivan.**—John H. Sullivan, President of the Columbia Trust Company, Boston, died by a self-inflicted pistol shot wound, April 10. He was eminently connected in politics as well as business.

**Sweetman.**—Lawrence H. Sweetman, President of the First National Bank, Circleville, Ohio, since 1896, died April 12. He was born in Ireland in 1833, coming to this country with his parents the following year.

**Turnure.**—Lawrence Turnure, head of the banking firm of Lawrence Turnure & Co., New York, died May 1, in his seventy-fourth year. He was a descendant of Daniel de Tourneur, a Huguenot, who came to this country from Holland in 1652.


**Williams.**—D. R. Williams, President of the Housatonic National Bank, Stockbridge, Mass., died April 19, aged nearly eighty-eight years. He became a director of the Housatonic Bank in 1837, Cashier in 1853, and since 1868 President, and besides had held several other important positions.

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**WANTED**—By an experienced Street Railway Manager and Engineer, a change of position. A. C. H., 429-435 E. Pearl Street, Cincinnati, Ohio.







*Geo E Roberts*

THE  
**BANKERS' MONTHLY**

*Devoted to the interests of the banking community*


For the Month Ending July 31, 1917

**THE SAVINGS BANK ASSOCIATION** held its annual meeting in New York City, the report of the meeting will be found on page 10.

The two most important subjects of our debt of the State carried by the State and its dormant accounts. It was stated by the president of the association that the State carried \$8,500,000 on the books of the State, lack of retail demand upon it, and the indebtedness of such a magnitude in the State. The speaker called for secure legislative action to municipal debt may be secured. The dormant accounts were mentioned as banks to find the persons who have active were set forth.

The immense influence which they try on the money markets, and the funds of the public. Their decisions are commonly who stand on the threshold of the banks' interest, interest by the community, and sympathy. At least a trust not only to the banking in which the reserves of the

The savings banks are the investor takes a share in the growth. They encourage thrift because of of saving and steady investment, and it is a common and a habit of spending less than is earned.



*Wm. E. Roberts*

THE

# BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTY-THIRD YEAR.

JUNE, 1899.

VOLUME LVIII, No. 6.

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THE SAVINGS BANKS ASSOCIATION of the State of New York held its annual meeting in New York city on May 10. A report of the meeting will be found in another part of this number.

The two most important subjects of discussion were the municipal debt of the State carried by the Savings banks, and what are known as dormant accounts. It was stated by JOHN HANSEN RHOADES, the president of the association, that the Savings banks of the State carried \$181,000,000 of the municipal debt, and he referred to the lack of reliable data upon which to form a judgment of the value of the indebtedness of each of the 219 cities, towns, counties and villages in the State. The president recommended that steps be taken to secure legislative action so that the necessary information as to municipal debt may be collected by a properly authorized official. The dormant accounts were discussed, and the pains taken by the banks to find the persons to whom they belonged and render them active were set forth.

The immense influence wielded by the Savings banks of the country on the money markets can not be too strongly impressed on the minds of the public. Their deposits are gathered from all classes in the community who stand on the common ground of industry and thrift. The banks pay interest on these deposits. They procure this interest by the ability given by their resources to loan to the best advantage. The least distrust of their methods is apt to prove disastrous not only to the Savings banks but also to the commercial banks in which the reserves of the Savings banks are deposited.

The Savings banks are the mediums through which the small investor takes a share in the great financial operations of the world. They encourage thrift because they place before everyone the power of easily and safely investing their money. The power of earning money is a common and ordinary faculty. The faculty of thrift, of spending less than is earned, and of accumulating savings, is also

possessed by many. But the ability to safely keep and at the same time profitably use money saved up, is not possessed by one person in a hundred.

Without such artificial contrivances as the Savings bank, the only way in which the bulk of mankind could save money would be by burying it in the ground or locking it up in some other hiding place till wanted. To make safe loans of small sums saved is beyond the power of the ordinary man. The miserly habit of hiding money does not appeal to many. It is safe to say that a vast majority of men see no object in saving unless the money saved can be placed so as to earn more money. Of course the opportunities afforded by the Savings bank do not reform the spenthrift habits of all men alike, but by affording a place of safety, and a sure income from all moneys deposited, these banks accumulate capital that would otherwise have been dissipated as soon as earned.

Institutions of the nature of Savings banks have not been known for over eighty years, and the world's Savings banks of to-day hold deposits amounting to between seven and eight billions of dollars. The establishment of Savings banks was the means of giving an opportunity to those inclined to be provident to obtain a competence. Theoretically it was always easy to say that money could be put at interest by any one. In practice it was found that the profitableness and safety of investments by the individual depended upon conditions as to amount, time and security that he could very rarely discover. The Savings bank and other institutions of the kind relieve the individual investor of his difficulties and at once remove the difficulties and dangers that were the invariable concomitants of his single efforts.

In the Savings bank the small surpluses of thousands of individuals are welded together in one mass. Each one of those thousands receive the same power to make safe loans as if he possessed a capital of a million. It is easy to account for the success of these institutions. They are founded on that great principle of human nature by which the individual recognizes his own weakness and learns to acquire strength by combination with others.

The power of the Savings bank, disguised though it may be, is of the same nature as that of the power of an army. Each one of its depositors is a paid soldier of the institution. But unlike an army no force except that of intelligent self-interest is necessary to maintain discipline among them. Like an army, too, the depositors of a Savings bank are liable to panic, and it is in this peculiarity that the greatest danger of these institutions lies. The vast sums collected from their depositors are invested in all directions throughout the community; in bonds and mortgages, in Federal, State and municipal securities, and in deposits in commercial banks. These last are

the reserves first drawn upon to meet urgent demands, and when a sudden distrust by depositors causes any widespread run on Savings banks, the commercial banks, and through them the money market, are bound to suffer.

The popularity of the Savings bank is of great importance, and the knowledge that under ordinary conditions a depositor can obtain his money without notice, adds to their attractiveness to the public. Yet there are times when the power to demand notice before deposits can be withdrawn is of infinite value.

It is of great importance that in legislative enactments in regard to the management of Saving banks precautions should be taken to prevent as far as possible the rise of any distrust on the part of depositors. This can be done in a measure by guarding the character of the investments. This is of the greater importance, inasmuch in all cases where Savings banks have failed, investigation has shown that the failure was due not so much to dishonest management as to poor judgment in making investments. Therefore, it is well that legislatures should move slowly in enlarging the circle of securities permitted to Savings banks. It is a much more delicate task to amend a Savings bank investment law after the Savings banks have attained their growth than it was to adjust the law when the banks were first inaugurated. The promoters and holders of investments which they wish to dispose of look upon Savings banks as a power which by taking them up can double the value of their holdings. So there is a temptation to have the Legislature, in regulating Savings bank investments, father schemes for putting a fictitious value on securities that can not stand on their own intrinsic worth. On the one hand, if the investments of these banks are too restricted they must sooner or later reduce the returns to their depositors; on the other, if new latitude is legally given it is often apt to be in a dangerous direction. It is believed, however, that if in permitting investments of certain classes a legislature exerts no compelling pressure, danger of loss would be largely averted if the particular securities taken be left to the judgment of the experienced management of each bank.

The Savings banks of the country should be cherished and protected. No matter of what class, whether instituted by special laws or by private enterprise, they encourage thrift by affording a safe and profitable investment for small sums of money.

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THE HOUSE CAUCUS COMMITTEE which met recently in Atlantic City has agreed to frame a bill, which will provide for the redemption of all the obligations of the Government on demand, and that

when greenbacks are once redeemed for gold they shall be reissued only for gold. The issue of National bank notes is to be increased to 100 per cent. of the par value of the bonds deposited, and the minimum capital of these banks reduced from \$50,000, as at present, to \$25,000. This bill does not go very far into the question of bank currency reform, but the other provisions are excellent. The agreement of the caucus committee upon a measure does not by any means show that the caucus will agree to the report or even accept it. The caucus may agree to recommend a much more complete bill or it may conclude not to bring forward any currency measure at all. Much time will elapse before the meeting of Congress and many things may happen in the interval. The November elections will exercise an important influence.

On the whole the action of the caucus committee, none of whom is personally interested or biased by the introduction of currency measures in the last Congress, is rather encouraging, as indicating a considerable advance in the minds of men who would be chiefly guided in their report by the political aspects of the case. Not so many years ago no committee constituted as this was would have dared to make a recommendation as to currency legislation without doing something, ostensibly at least, for silver. Their report would certainly have begun with a preamble stating the firm belief of the committee in the adoption of bimetallism as the only solution of the currency problem. It indicates that these astute observers of political prognostics, no longer believe there is any silver sentiment to conciliate.

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PENSIONS FOR BANK EMPLOYEES are being provided for by many of the older banks of the country, which realize the need of some systematic method of caring for employees who have served the bank faithfully during the period of health and vigor and who have become infirm and incompetent by reason of age or illness. To discharge such men when they become useless to the bank would be the purely utilitarian and practical method, but there are objections on the ground of humanity. Still, it might be urged in defense of this course, that every young man when he enters into service of an institution like a bank, which pays a good salary and furnishes a form of employment so desirable that it is much sought for, knows that there is an end to health and vigor, that old age will surely come and that sickness may render him useless at any time. Knowing this, he ought also to know that he should exercise the foresight, which it is said distinguishes intelligent human beings from brutes, though not from some insects, and provide for his future. Every man receiving a regular salary should place a certain percentage of it aside regularly



in an insurance company or Savings bank, and this practice will insure him a competence when old age or disaster overtakes him.

There are thousands of men having no fixed salary or employment who manage to provide for their future helplessness, by taking advantage of the means which to-day are so freely offered to the public, through many excellent institutions for encouraging providence and savings. In the Government departments at Washington, where the pay is as a rule much higher than it is in a bank, the authorities experience the same trouble with superannuated employees who have from one cause or another neglected to provide out of their salaries for their declining years. Retiring pensions are customary in the army and the navy, but Congress has not yet seen the wisdom of granting them in the civil service. Nor as long as the permanency of civil service offices is in doubt is it probable that there will be any pensions attached to them. Notwithstanding the efforts of civil service reformers, the public service is still believed to be, by a large portion of the public, a reward for the friends and helpers of victorious politicians.

In strict justice, therefore, a man who takes a public office knows that its tenure is uncertain, and he should govern himself accordingly. Where an office or position is bestowed for life unless forfeited by misbehavior, there is an agreement to pay the salary until the man is dead. When he becomes incompetent, it is an advantage to the employer to retire him on half-pay, because half the salary is thus saved. This is the principle upon which retiring pensions are given to judges and army and naval officers. A civil service employee has no such agreement with the Government; he should therefore provide against the time of his incapacity, if he prove so valuable as to be retained so long.

The contract between banks and their employees is much of the same nature as that between the Government and its civil servants.

Of a large number of men whether under the Government, in banks or in other employments, a certain number are naturally provident, and will set aside some of their earnings, either from a view of their ultimate incapacity or from an instinctive desire to save. Many of these men are not only saving but they acquire shrewdness in investing their savings and become well to do.

In most of the plans for pensioning old and faithful servants of banks or of the Government, the suggestion is to retain from the regular salary a certain percentage to be invested for the employee and to form in the end a fund for his support. This plan, while doubtless the only practical one under the circumstances, has this defect, that while it protects the improvident and unfortunate ones against the defects in their nature, and their misfortunes, it is rather

to the disadvantage of the saving and independent men who can be trusted to make wise use of all of their earnings, and who might in the long run do better for themselves with their own than could the banks or the Government. But from the standpoint of the bank or the Government, the plan is no doubt a profitable one.

In the case of the banks which propose to create retiring pensions, not only the percentage deducted from salaries, but all bonuses and perquisites, which are now customarily bestowed on employees on certain occasions or at certain seasons of the year, would all go to swell the pension fund. Such a plan carried into effect would relieve the managers of the banks of many painful struggles between a feeling of humanity and a feeling of proper economy in the employment of help. There is no doubt that the action of the few banks which have taken up this idea of pensioning employees will be adopted by others.

Retiring pensions, except for judges and army and navy officers and soldiers, seem to be hard for American minds to regard approvingly; they seem in some way to be antagonistic to the ideal of the free and independent American citizen who from youth to old age is capable by his natural superiority to take care of himself, wanting nothing from anybody. But this ideal of the average citizen is as impossible of attainment, except by the few, in the United States as elsewhere in the world. There will everywhere be the usual number of incompetents and unfortunates who must be protected and cared for by those who are stronger. Banks will find that to make this systematic provision is in the long run an economy. Such provisions should, however, be legalized, by making the pension fund a preferred claim in case of the failure of the bank.

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THE PAYMENT TO SPAIN OF THE \$20,000,000 awarded in exchange for the Philippine Islands by the treaty at Paris has been made, and there has been no such revulsion in the exchange market as was anticipated. It was believed by many that the payment would exhaust American credits in Europe and that the result would be manifested in the exportation of gold from this country. But the rates for exchange have not yet reached the point which will permit the exportation of gold.

The payment to Spain was made through the National City Bank, of New York, and the manner in which the transaction was conducted without any disturbance in the money market emphasizes the great resources of this institution and the skillful management exercised. There appears to have been no special effort to create exchange by the exportation of securities. The exchange utilized in the payment

was such as had accumulated in the ordinary business between the two countries. The American credits drawn on were, it is said, largely held in France and Germany. The proceeds of the payment received by the Spanish Government were turned over to the Bank of Spain in liquidation of debt due that institution by the Treasury.

The value represented might by transfer have caused some disturbance in the European money market, but beyond some returns of American securities for sale, there was very little change noticeable. The amount was paid in installments of \$5,000,000, the checks going through the clearing-house in the usual course.

As long as the net exports of the country continue at their present figure, there is little danger of a withdrawal of gold for export, although the stability of the prosperity of the country would be greater if it were not subject to the apprehensions which may be exerted by the possibility of withdrawals of gold from the Treasury in certain contingencies.

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THE USE OF BANK ACCOUNTS AND CHECKS to carry on the business of a country is an important factor in determining the amount of currency notes needed. A much smaller amount of bank notes is required in Great Britain than in France, because in the former nation the custom is to make almost all business payments by checks. In France, on the contrary, checks are very little used and the payments that in Great Britain are made by checks are in France made in bank notes. In both countries the paper currency of the country is furnished by the banks, and there is no arbitrary legal requirement that a fixed amount of circulating notes shall be forcibly kept in the hands of the public, so that the amount of bank notes outstanding both in Great Britain and France is a fair criterion of the public demand.

In the United States the general methods of effecting payments have more resemblance to English than to Continental practice. The business public here are accustomed to the use of checks and have no distrust of them, and the percentage of payments made by checks is very nearly if not quite as great as the percentage of payments by checks in Great Britain. This country, too, shows conditions that have a tendency to cause a much greater use of actual money than in the British Islands. The vast extent of territory and the large proportion of the people engaged in agriculture, would seem to have a tendency to diminish payment by check, and require the use of actual money.

There is no doubt that the increased use of checks has been fostered by the restrictions which have been placed on the issue of bank

notes. The ten per cent. tax on State bank notes has prevented the State banks from using their issues to meet the demands of their depositors, and the severely restricted currency of the National banks has been of little service in this direction. A National bank, after it has issued the circulation to which its required bond deposit limits it, very seldom has any of its notes on hand, and when an emergency caused by unusual demands for currency arises, finds its so-called privilege of issuing notes of no avail to it. But all of the banks have experienced a tremendous lightening of the burden on their reserves, on account of the custom constantly growing among their customers of making payments both at home and abroad by means of personal checks. By means of the clearing-house machinery of the money centers, both great and small, and by means of the exchanges which are effected without special clearing-houses, among banks outside of the money centers, the amount of checks presented for payment in cash has been very much reduced.

It would be interesting to determine by inquiry of the banks what proportion of checks drawn on each is settled by exchanges—not only of the banks in the money centers but of the banks generally throughout the country.

There seems also to be very little improvement in the prospects of obtaining more freedom in the issue of bank currency through the action of Congress. The committee appointed by the Republican caucus of the House of Representatives to elaborate a plan for financial reform seems to have concluded its labors, but is unwilling to announce what conclusions have been reached. But it is intimated by those who have closely watched the proceedings of the committee that the plan agreed upon will not include any great change in the laws relating to a bank currency. If, however, the committee recommend simply the strengthening of the gold standard by a plan preventing the reissue of legal-tender notes when once redeemed, except for gold, and this plan should be adopted by Congress, it would in the end effect a gradual retirement of any portion of the Government notes not really required to do the business of the country, and would by degrees create a demand for an increase of the bank currency.

The use of checks for making payments has reduced the demand for actual money to a minimum and will continue to do so. The charges for collection on outside checks may for a time be some slight check on their use, but it is believed that these charges will not as a rule be continued for any great length of time. Competition among the banks, as it was the cause in the first place of the free collection of these checks, will lead to the gradual dropping of the recently made rules as to charges, and a reversion to the old practice except in extreme cases.

The individual check against a bank account is to-day the principal currency of the United States. It has in itself the most important constituents of a safe and elastic currency. The check is rendered safe, because of the criminal penalties imposed on any one who draws a check and makes a payment therewith when he has no corresponding credit in bank. It is elastic, because as soon as the transaction for which the check is drawn is completed, the check is redeemed and destroyed. Just the moment it ceases to be wanted as a medium of payment it is irresistibly attracted to the bank of its redemption.

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THE RETURNS OF THE NATIONAL BANKS at the close of business, April 5, 1899, made to the Comptroller of the Currency, compared with the returns of December, 1898, show the great expansion of the business of the country between the two dates; but a comparison of the April, 1899, figures with those of May, 1898, shows the same thing more strikingly.

The loans of the banks during the year have increased over three hundred millions. About a third of this expansion of loans has taken place during the two months beginning with February, 1899. The deposit accounts have also increased correspondingly and there has naturally been some reduction in reserves, especially at the financial centres. The reserves always increase far beyond the legal requirement during periods when business is dull, and the surplus money of all the banks being sent to the reserve agents at the monetary centres, the piling up of reserves is always more noticeable at those places. On the other hand, when the business of the country begins to revive the very opposite takes place; the home reserves of the country banks are strengthened and the reserves in the money centres diminish toward the legal limit. The reserves are, however, amply strong.

The increased business of the country is also shown by the immense increase in the operations of the New York Clearing-House, which so far during 1899 have far surpassed those of any year in its history.

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THE BONDS OF THE LAST UNITED STATES LOAN of \$200,000,000 are still said to be held to a very great extent by the original subscribers, and it is claimed that there has been no tendency to consolidation in the hands of banks and corporations as was anticipated. However this may be, the Treasury reports show that of the three per cent. loan of 1898 the banks held on April 30, \$49,442,862 to secure circulation, and \$27,279,840 to secure United States deposits—a total of \$76,722,702, or nearly forty per cent. of the whole loan. It is true

that the bonds held to secure deposits may not belong to the banks depositing them but may be borrowed for the occasion.

There is also a tendency to reduction of National bank circulation and a withdrawal of bonds, due no doubt to the rising premiums on United States securities. There is every reason to believe that with the revival of business and the increased prosperity of the country, the National bank currency will continue to contract even more rapidly than it has hitherto done.

The retention of the last United States loan in the hands of the original subscribers would indicate a growing demand among the people for this kind of security, and that this demand will absorb all the bonds which the banks desire to sell.

Although the National bank circulation is decreasing, the aggregate currency in circulation is more than holding its own. This is chiefly due to the gold that is constantly being added to the existing stock. The demand for bonds, and the increase in the aggregate of money in circulation, will keep up the premium and as a result hasten the retirement of National bank circulation.

There are indications that the margin of protection to the Treasury, afforded by the favorable conditions of the past year, viz., excess of exports, increase of gold reserve, etc., is being gradually lessened, and that contingences might now arise which may again cause apprehensions for the safety of the gold demand obligations of the Government. These contingencies are, fortunately, remote; but they are sufficiently impressive to keep in full view the necessity of some reform of the financial laws of the country which will place the Treasury in a position less open to attack.

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THE CHARGE FOR COLLECTING COUNTRY CHECKS fixed by the New York Clearing-House is not altogether popular with other banks in various parts of the country, as the protests which are being made indicate. Competition is greater in some sections than it is in others, and it cannot be controlled so easily by agreement as it has in respect to checks by concerted action of the banks in New York city. The practice of collecting all deposited checks free of charge grew out of competition for business, and it will remain an element of this competition unless the latter can be abrogated by agreement. The New York banks have simply agreed not to compete with each other on this particular line. Whether this agreement will prove lasting is another matter. Similar agreements have been made in other cities in times past, but they were very seldom lived up to for any length of time. First it would be discovered that some one bank was violating the spirit if not the letter of the agreement, and in the race for

accounts the whole thing gradually would fall into desuetude. Whether this will be the result in New York city remains to be seen. The banks here are, perhaps, more firmly united than elsewhere and there are stronger reasons for each bank remaining in line. Even if such an agreement is not lived up to for any great length of time, it has its uses. It enables banks to make discriminations between desirable and undesirable accounts and to secure concessions from customers in return for concession on this point.

The check system has, however, become so firmly engrafted in the business practice of the country that it is hardly to be believed that this attempt to charge for collections will not within a reasonable time be modified more or less to meet the demands and necessities of the business men who are the best customers of the banks.

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THE DECLINE IN THE PRICES OF SECURITIES which followed the recent death of ROSWELL P. FLOWER indicates the influences which control the ups and downs of the market, and also the almost hypnotic character of these influences. There was a large crowd of speculators who had looked upon EX-GOV. FLOWER as their oracle, and who had blindly followed him in his operations. When the rumors of his impending death commenced, the market, dreading a liquidation of properties in which he was interested, at once showed signs of weakness, which culminated in panicky conditions, followed by quick recovery.

In speculation, in order to make profits, there must be fluctuations either up or down, and the greater the fluctuations the greater the profits to those who foresee their approach. If all stocks and bonds remained at a fixed price there would be no such thing as speculation; and the object of the leaders in the game is to buy and sell so as to control the changes in prices according to their own wishes.

Every property represented by a security has a certain intrinsic value, but this intrinsic value of the property may have very little to do with the price of the security at any given time in the market. The prices of stocks and bonds within certain limits depend to a very great extent upon the demand and supply influenced by what may be called artificial buying and selling, that is buying and selling not to obtain or get rid of a certain stock but merely to temporarily affect its price. Of course the more fixed and known what may be called the real or intrinsic value of a stock may be, the less can its price be moved by this artificial buying and selling. But every price, whether of good or bad securities, depends upon general opinion, although this opinion is more settled and fixed in one case than in another. There are two kinds of speculation: one where the actual

security is bought and passes from hand to hand, and the other where contract is made to buy or sell and a margin put up to cover fluctuations during the time intervening before the fulfillment of the contract. There is a chance of greater losses or profits by the latter method with the same amount of capital.

The accumulation of wealth in the hands of single individuals or firms and corporations has to-day reached such a point that almost any fluctuation in price can be controlled by the action of those possessing this great capital. The only check upon the extreme use of such means is that men who have the control are generally very conservative and understand full well that ruin to the community and eventually to themselves would be the consequence of extreme methods. When, however, one of the strong men who through his accumulated wealth and credit has been a controlling force in the market, dies suddenly or otherwise, the machinery of the stock exchange runs for a time like any machinery that has lost its governor.

In the United States the stock markets have always been more or less controlled by men who represented certain great interests. Thirty years ago or more, there were great contests for this control between VANDERBILT and FISK and GOULD. The controllers of the great railway properties of the country have always manipulated the markets more or less in their own interests. As the other railway properties became more secure and of more definite and fixed value in public opinion they required less of this kind of support, and have been succeeded by the securities based upon newer enterprises which have still to build up their reputations.

The operations of a great capitalist manipulating the speculative markets are subject to certain other controlling influences. The power of the greatest millionaires to buy and sell is influenced by their ability to procure ready money, and when the money markets are stringent and rates are high they find their power correspondingly restricted. Their securities upon which they depend for loans are not so readily accepted as collaterals. The outside public, also, although any single speculator may be weak and impotent in comparison with the great speculator, when it does happen to combine, is much stronger than any conceivable capitalist, and the latter to be safe has to have a due regard for popular opinion.

The greatest millionaire, thinking it for his interest to depress the price of United States bonds, would come to grief if he undertook to do so, without taking into account the popular belief as to their value. If he offered to sell them below the price the popular belief warranted, he would find takers for all he could offer. In a speculation in a security of such a character, the dealer must follow a depression caused by natural causes.



The same influence is at work in regard to every security, from those of the highest credit to those of the least. The stocks of uncertain value, however, depend more for their current price on the faith the public has in the opinion of the great capitalist. The process of getting rich by watching the fluctuations of the various securities dealt in in the stock markets, seems to be a sure one for those who have capital and who are willing to take time. The great disappointments and losses are experienced by those who try to get rich by some great and sudden stroke. There are many comparatively small capitalists who purchase stocks of known character when through stringency in the money market or other reason they are quoted below their average price, and hold them until they have regained their usual status or have gone to high-water mark. They raise their ship from the rocks by taking advantage of the successive high tides.

It is these continuous and changing investments that contribute largely to the legitimate profits of the stock exchange. This form of speculation is inextricably mixed up with the more uncertain margin speculation. The chances or mischances of the one affect the other and they both are acted upon and react upon the money market. When so much of the wealth of this and other countries consists of properties of various kinds dealt in on the stock exchange, disaster that occurs there, from fluctuations in prices that cause men to lose their heads and lose faith for the time in all securities either good or bad, threatens at once to engulf all the enterprise of the nation.

It is this fear of danger spreading unnecessarily that makes the great dealers in securities very anxious to reduce the effects of public scare to a minimum. In all the great money markets of the world, when such danger threatens, it is now the custom of the great controllers of capital to combine against it. At the time of the failure of the *BARINGS*, in 1890, the Bank of England called all the banks and bankers of England together and by its influence compelled them to combine to carry the indebtedness of the *BARINGS* until better times. The same thing was done in France, at the time of the failure of the copper syndicate, and it has been done in other countries.

There is an element of certainty in speculation in stocks and similar securities that makes a reasonable control of the market more certain than it could possibly be in the case of a market for natural products. The amount of every security is known, and only by fraudulent increases can this be changed without the knowledge of the public. Every precaution is taken against overissues of stocks and bonds. With natural products, whether metals, cereals, or fibres, it is impossible to tell accurately what supply may be available. It is this fact that has brought disaster to wheat corners and to silver and copper corners when every other element of the speculation had

seemed favorable. In all speculations, too, whatever the precautions taken, there may be a combination of elements that usually occur singly, and this combination of opposing influences may bring any calculations and resources to misfortune. The great capitalist who undertakes to control the security market is like a general with a great army. He can not always win victory, but he may generally save his army by a judicious retreat, and be able thus to fight again when circumstances are more propitious. If he is too rash or too confident of his good fortune and resources he may meet with destruction. The so-called Napoleons of finance, like the genuine NAPOLEON, have been most distinguished by their Waterloos.

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THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE BANKS AND EXPRESS COMPANIES in the matter of making remittances will prove interesting before it is settled. In Montreal the contest has been vigorously revived by the express companies offering to do better for those who remit money than the banks. The express companies in this regard have the advantage over the banks, in that they receive money at almost all the points to which remittances are asked and it costs them little or nothing for exchange. In addition, when currency has to be transported from one point to another, they have all the facilities for this purpose, while a bank has none for which it must not pay the express companies. It would therefore seem that the latter, in regard to remittances of currency in the lines they undertake, are better equipped for the purpose than the banks, and can afford to do it more cheaply though, as a fact, they charge in many cases more than the banks. The five or six express companies in the United States each seem to have separate fields for their special activity so that they do not compete with one another. Each in its field is like a bank with branches in every city, town and village or railway station.

The great rival to the express company in making remittances is the individual check. The only way in which the banks can get ahead of the express companies in small remittances is to encourage the opening of deposit accounts by all classes of the population, and the use of individual checks when remittances are necessary. People who do not keep bank accounts and those who do will generally use the cheapest form of remittance. If the express companies can furnish this service more cheaply than the banks, as they seem to be able to do, they will get the business.

The banks would seem to be the proper and natural agencies for making transfers of funds between different parts of the country; but the express companies are alert and with the facilities at their command they will certainly be strong competitors.

## TERRITORIAL AND COMMERCIAL EXPANSION.

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Africa, the last of the continents to be taken possession of by civilization, is soon to be crossed by a railroad extending from Cape Colony to Cairo. It is said that Cecil Rhodes has succeeded in securing the financial assistance which is to build the last seven hundred and fifty miles necessary to connect the lines already completed from the cape in the south and from Cairo in the north. In like manner the Russians are pressing the completion of their railway across the Continent of Asia, and it will not be many years before Asia and America will be practically united by a line connecting at the Strait of Behring.

The age is one of intense industrial development. The discoveries in science which have been made during the past generation under the protection of civilized governments are now being applied in developing the waste places of the earth. The backwoods peoples, whether living in a state of comparative savagery like the inhabitants of Africa and the islands of the Pacific, or in a state of arrested civilization like the Chinese, will be brought by means of these improved systems of transportation into more direct communication with the more advanced races, and the result will make in the end for the advantage of all. The desire for financial improvement, for the means of better and healthier methods of life, will spread throughout the world.

The first effects of the introduction of superior methods of an advanced race among less civilized races are sure to be accompanied by unpleasant symptoms. The faults and vices of the superior people are more apt to impress themselves on the inferior than their virtues and accomplishments. But this manifestation of the human trait of copying the models set before them is only temporary. In the end the nations will become assimilated, and the general level of all will be raised.

An incapacity for administering a government that shall permit the masses to prosper to the greatest possible extent is manifested in nearly all the countries that are now being brought under the protection or domination of the civilized nations.

There is no doubt in carrying the benefits of civilized government to peoples comparatively savage, or in inculcating the oriental civilization of China with that of the western nations, that there will be many evils developed. But no great changes for the better can be wrought without individual suffering. The question as to the expediency of carrying modern industrial and financial methods into new fields until they cover the whole earth, is whether this will be a benefit in the long run. If these methods have been beneficial to the nations now seeking to spread them, there is every reason to believe that they must be a benefit to all humanity whenever they can be fully applied. This full application requires time and effort. It is also easy to sneer at the motives which underlie the tendency to bring less favored races under the influence of those more advanced. Human progress is rarely ever made from motives which are wholly unmixed with selfishness and aggrandizement. All great migrations and changes of population and governments seem to

be guided by instinct more than by reason. Probably the civilized nations to-day in their tendency to spread their commerce, manners, customs and industrial methods throughout the world are following in their own fashion the same instinct that led the northern swarms of emigration to overrun Europe. The old home is becoming too crowded for the development of the race on the lines marked out and wider spheres for industry and activity must be invaded.

It is useless to expect, even were this tendency in the blood of the civilized races altogether evil, that the people of the United States would escape its influence. But probably the result will be, after sufficient time has elapsed to deaden the undulations of the advancing wave, a newer and better civilization throughout the world accompanied by a higher and better morality.

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**AN INTER-OCEANIC CANAL.**—The Nicaragua Canal Commission is ready to report the feasibility of the construction of the canal at a cost of \$118,113,790. One of the chief reasons for the activity which has recently been manifested in regard to the construction of a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific, has been the supposed necessity of more rapid communication between our fleets in the two oceans. Of course, when finished an inter-oceanic canal will be valuable for other purposes than those of mere naval strategy. It would seem, however, if the canal is really a necessity for ordinary commercial purposes, that private capital might be induced to construct it without the assistance of any Government. The fate of the Panama inter-oceanic canal enterprise will doubtless have a retarding effect upon the investment of private capital in any similar enterprise.

The commission which has reported the feasibility of the Nicaragua Canal at an expense of \$118,000,000, will have finished the purpose of its appointment with this report. It will be succeeded by another commission which will make a wider investigation and report on the relative merits of other routes as compared with the Nicaraguan.

It seems as if the desire to have a short route from the Atlantic to the Pacific, for our naval forces, founded on the experience of the Spanish war and the difficulties in the Philippines, would result in the construction of some inter-oceanic canal by the United States. Of the two most feasible routes, the Panama and the Nicaraguan, both are owned by private companies, and to obtain a clear right of way the United States will probably have to satisfy these claimants of vested rights.

As between Panama and Nicaragua, the expense of buying out the private company settled on the former route would be greater than the expense of buying out the Maritime Company at Nicaragua.

Seeing that the question of construction by the United States rests chiefly on the necessity of the canal as a means for the naval protection of the sea-coasts, it may be well to suggest that the cost of the canal named by the commission, viz., \$118,000,000, would, if expended in the construction of battle-ships, build over forty such vessels, so that fleets of sufficient power might be maintained on both sea-coasts at once, without the necessity of reinforcement of one by the other. It is very likely that the construction of the fleet would prove of greater benefit to the industries of the country than the construction of the canal.

## SIMPLIFYING THE CURRENCY.

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One great difficulty in establishing a safe and elastic bank currency, in place of the diverse styles of paper currency now in use, will be to reconcile the views of the banks which now carry on business. There are National banks, State banks, private banks, Savings banks and trust companies. Of these at present the National banks only issue circulating notes. The National bank notes are all based upon the deposit of bonds by the banks, and decrease in amount as the market price of the bonds deposited tempts their sale. They increase in amount with the lowering of the market price of the bonds; but except in an indirect and roundabout way, the increase and decrease of National bank circulation is not dependent upon the business wants of the country. Of course prosperity and depression of business each in its turn has its effect on the price of bonds and may thus indirectly and in a roundabout way cause fluctuations in the volume of National bank notes. This indirect effect is, however, never sufficiently great to meet the actual wants of the time, and it may be directly opposed to those wants. Depression in business causes the price of bonds to fall, and this would be an inducement to the banks to increase their circulation, but the same depression lessens the demand for money, so that when the supply is naturally the greatest it is not called for. On the contrary, prosperity tends to enhance the price of bonds, and causes the banks to retire their circulation to withdraw them to obtain the premium. When the demand for money is greatest the supply is apt to be reduced under the present National Banking Law.

But National bank notes are now a part, and a comparatively small part only, of the aggregate paper currency. There are four other kinds of paper money making up this aggregate—United States notes, Treasury notes, gold certificates and silver certificates. The mind of man naturally prefers simplicity to confusion, and there would be much greater simplicity in the working of the monetary system could all these different forms, including National bank notes, be got rid of and some one form of paper currency substituted. It would be much better than the present system if silver certificates, gold certificates, Treasury notes and National bank notes were all retired, and legal-tender notes alone issued, say denominations of five dollars and under for silver dollars and larger denominations for gold only, all denominations being redeemable in gold if required. But still better would be the retirement of all Government notes and the substitution of some form of bank currency.

There are five kinds of institutions doing a banking business and five different kinds of paper money. Of the five kinds of institutions doing a banking business, the Savings banks and trust companies would probably not feel that they were slighted if a law for the issue of bank currency should not give the privilege to them. The State banks of the country, particularly in the South, are chafing under the prohibitive effect of the ten per cent. tax on their notes. They would probably oppose any enlargement of the bank-note issuing power to be enjoyed by National banks alone. Even among the National banks

there are many that fear this enlargement of the privilege as proposed in some of the bills introduced at the last session of Congress would open the door to serious abuses.

All this jealousy between the State and National banks and these apprehensions of abuse of a new and extended bank currency, might be avoided by depriving the existing National banks of the legal right to issue circulating notes and, in this respect, placing them on a par with State banks. Then following the analogy of the Bank of England in which the note issue department is kept entirely separate from the discount department, let the present banks of the country be confined to the discount and deposit line of the banking business, and in our system let them correspond to the discount and deposit compartment of the Bank of England in the English system. Then let there be authorized by law a class of banks—created solely for the purpose of issuing circulating notes, which they shall do by making loans to the discount and deposit banks, on the collateral of their commercial paper and specie. These banks could be located at the more important monetary points, and they could make a profit in loaning the notes to the other banks as they required them. Not being allowed to take deposits they would not in any way compete with the existing banks. Any bank requiring money to meet its liabilities or maintain its reserves could procure it by depositing the necessary amount of its bills receivable as collateral.

The law could, without interfering with the present banking business of the country, require the most ample safeguards from the new class of banks, whose entire profits would depend on their loaning their issues of currency. The issues when redundant would return to the banks for redemption. In this way one class of banks would have entire control of the deposit and loan business, and a different class of the issue of circulation. The issue department, following the analogy of the Bank of England, would be separate and distinct from the discount and loan department.

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**SOUTH AMERICAN EXPLORATION.**—The Amazon River has recently been explored by the United States steamer *Wilmington*, Captain Todd, under the direction of the Navy Department. It has hitherto been supposed that the head of steam navigation was at Manaos, where the Rio Negro joins the Amazon. The *Wilmington*, however, ascended a thousand miles above that point, or 2,100 miles in all from the mouth of the river.

The possibility of steam vessels penetrating so far into the heart of the South American Continent, being thus proved by actual experiment, will be of vast commercial importance.

The country is rich in products of value, particularly rubber, and will afford a market for many kinds of American goods.

Since the acquisition of the Spanish West Indies the trade of the Continent of South America with this country will doubtless grow in importance.

The possibilities of this trade do not appear to have been properly estimated by American merchants, and the methods heretofore taken to secure a share of it seem to have been, in many instances, poorly adapted to meet the peculiar conditions of the country. With the better knowledge resulting from an expansion of our markets in other directions, an improvement in this respect may be looked for.

## \* THE PRINCIPLES OF A BANKING CURRENCY.

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### THE NECESSITY FOR LIQUID ASSETS.

The possession of short-term commercial paper gives the assets of a bank an essentially liquid character. Every day in times of normal business should bring into the bank nearly as many persons having paper to pay as it brings persons asking the redemption of notes or the payment of deposits. The cash brought in by the trader to pay maturing paper supplies the cash for making new loans or for the redemption of notes. Under modern banking methods both transactions are largely made by the transfer of credits rather than by the payment of cash, but the effect is substantially the same upon the accounts of the bank in reducing or increasing its liabilities. If, for instance, a trader has secured the discount of a promissory note for \$1,000 at the bank, the note constitutes a claim against him and an asset of the bank. If \$1,000 in bank notes was issued when the loan was made upon the paper, the notes constitute a liability of the bank. If the trader brings back to the bank, for the purpose of taking up and paying the paper, a sum of \$1,000 in the notes of the bank, whether those originally issued to him or others which have reached his hands in the course of business, the bank does not receive cash, but only the evidences of its own indebtedness. The effect upon its accounts is the same, however, as if cash had been received, for its outstanding liabilities are reduced by the amount of its notes paid in. The notes cease to be a liability when they are in the custody of the bank, whether they are at once cancelled and destroyed or are laid aside to be issued again.

It is obvious that if the resources of the bank were of a less liquid character, there might be occasions on which it would be receiving less cash than it was paying out. If, for illustration, \$5,000 was loaned upon a mortgage for three years, this amount would be "locked up," in banking parlance, and would not afford any resources to the bank until the expiration of the three-year period. The notes issued might be presented again and again in the meantime for redemption and the money loaned upon the mortgage could not be recovered for meeting them. On the other hand, when the securities of a bank consist of short-term commercial paper, money is constantly pouring into its hands. If there is a special demand for cash, it is within the ready and usual resources of the bank to increase its cash and diminish its outstanding indebtedness. This can be done by retaining the cash paid in and diminishing the number and amount of new discounts. A few days of this policy make a radical difference in the accounts of a bank having a great number of pieces of commercial paper in its portfolio. Pieces mature daily and it is only necessary to restrict new loans in order to change the proportion of the cash reserve to the outstanding liabilities. There are objections to a hasty curtailment of credit in times of crisis, which will be referred to later on, but credit can be freely granted without impairing the strength of a

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\* Continued from the May number, page 879.

bank where its standing is such, and the use of banking credits is sufficiently established in the community, as to assure the acceptance of notes as the equivalent of coin.

#### BEST FORM OF SECURITY FOR A BANK-NOTE CURRENCY.

Short-term commercial paper forms, therefore, the most trustworthy and available security for a bank-note currency. The obligation of a trader to pay his commercial paper is of such a high character and has been surrounded by so many special safeguards of law in commercial countries, that a bank can safely count upon payment by the trader up to the last moment before his complete insolvency. The losses upon such paper are trifling in proportion to the volume of business done by banks.\* The only other resources which can be considered as meeting in any degree the requirements of quickly convertible assets are negotiable securities—the stocks and bonds of governments and corporations. These are often held by banks of issue in considerable amounts under two separate conditions. They are held as collateral for advances of money and credit to borrowers, and are held as a part of the invested capital and reserves of the bank.

Advances upon securities have become a growing element in banking business in recent years with the great increase in the number of such securities on the market. The statistics of increase in such holdings are difficult to reduce to a common basis of comparison for different periods, because of the different methods of making up bank reports. The increase is less striking in the case of the great issuing banks, moreover, than it would be if they continued, as they did a generation ago, to do the larger part of the banking business of their respective countries.

The average advances upon securities at the Bank of France were 121,600,000 francs in 1870, 248,900,000 francs in 1890, and 390,600,000 francs in 1898. The great discount houses have increased their advances in much larger proportion. The *Crédit Lyonnais*, which had advances on securities to the amount of only 18,800,000 francs (\$3,600,000) at the close of 1870, and 170,700,000 francs at the close of 1880, had increased these advances to 260,500,000 francs on June 30, 1898. The total advances and loans to brokers on securities (*reports*) by the five large banking corporations of Paris on December 31, 1898, were 586,700,000 francs (\$113,000,000), while the loans on commercial paper were 1,222,000,000 francs.† The eleven large Berlin banks, exclusive of the Imperial Bank, had advances on securities to the amount of 339,000,000 marks (\$80,000,000) at the close of 1897, out of total assets of 1,862,000,000 marks.‡ The London joint stock and private banks at the close of 1897 had £91,000,000 invested in Government and other securities. The relative progress in recent years of loans upon negotiable securities and upon other paper among the National banks of New York is indicated by the following table: ||

\* An estimate of the liabilities of failed firms in 1874 showed that they amounted to less than one-quarter of one per cent. of the commercial liabilities of the country for the year. The net losses, after taking account of the assets of the failed firms, would be a much smaller fraction of the total operations.—Dunbar, p. 25.

† “*L'Économiste Européen*,” March 8, 1899, XV, p. 268. The figures for early dates are given in “*A History of Banking in All Nations*,” III, p. 125.

‡ “*L'Économiste Européen*,” March 17, 1899, XV, p. 331.

|| These figures are compiled from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency for the fiscal year 1898, p. 413, and reports for previous years. The classification in the reports



DATE.	Loans on commercial paper.	Advances on securities.
October 7, 1886.....	\$146,238,820	\$107,493,556
October 2, 1890.....	151,499,745	145,610,806
September 30, 1892.....	160,830,916	133,399,025
October 2, 1894.....	168,154,139	192,146,320
October 6, 1896.....	151,796,229	162,361,654
October 5, 1897.....	182,698,786	225,636,687
September 30, 1898.....	181,632,651	280,073,904

The loans made upon securities in these four great centers—Paris, Berlin, London and New York—are obviously in excess of one thousand millions of dollars, and when all the private banks are included are far beyond this amount. The stock loans in the United States outside of New York amounted in 1898 to more than \$500,000,000. Negotiable securities constitute of themselves an important means of giving mobility to capital and form a large part of the basis upon which banking credits rest. They are one of the best forms of security for loans under normal business conditions, because the default of the borrower simply requires the lender, in order to recoup himself, to sell the securities for cash. This can be done through any broker in a few hours and the lender is fully protected against even a fractional loss by the margin which he allows between the market value of the securities and the amount which he lends. Under normal business conditions, such securities seem to possess even greater safety than commercial paper. The paper depends upon the solvency of two or three individuals, who have given it their endorsement; the securities depend upon the solvency of governments or great corporations, which is not open to question in the case of those securities which are usually accepted by a prudent banker. Prof. MacLeod declares, in speaking of the banks of Scotland, where crises have been few:\*

“The safeguard of the Scotch system has been the uniform practice adopted of retaining a large portion of the capital and deposits invested in Government securities, capable of being converted into money at all times and under all circumstances. This requires a sacrifice, because the rate of interest is small, and, in times of difficulty, the sale involves a loss, but it has given the Scotch banks absolute security, and enabled them to pass unhurt through periods of great discredit.”

The relative merits of these two classes of securities—commercial paper and stocks—change somewhat in times of panic or depression. Loans made upon negotiable securities in the money centres are now largely made to brokers for purposes of speculation and are nominally “call loans,” subject to repayment on call. The brokers, however, have no other assets than their personal capital, their securities and their speculative profits. In a time of panic the securities in their hands become unsalable and they have no means for obtaining cash or credit for meeting their liability to the bank. The securities which the bank holds as collateral, even when of the best class, have their salable character impaired by the pressure for money and the large offerings of securities, and cannot be sold readily without loss. On such occasions commercial paper is likely to prove the better rather than the worse security. Even if the trader has not the means for taking up his obligations in full without delay, he is usually able to make a partial payment, which increases the cash reserve of the bank. An illustration of this principle

is not exactly the same for all years, and includes in some cases loans for small amounts of a special character, but the table affords a general idea of the growth in loans on securities.

\* “The Theory and Practice of Banking,” 11, p. 222.

occurred in the panic of 1873, when the New York banks were called upon to repay large proportions of the deposits of the "country banks." The situation in which they found themselves is thus described by Mr. Bolles:\*

"The \$90,000,000 of call loans on which they relied for an emergency of this kind were entirely unavailable." The banks held collaterals, it is true, for their loans, but these shrank so rapidly in value that the banks could not sell them except at a large sacrifice. This is one of the peculiarities of that kind of loan. In good times nothing is safer, because the bank daily knows the worth of the collateral, while an ordinary borrower may deceive a bank concerning his real condition. In bad times the entire list of stocks is apt to shrink, but the credit and ability of merchants do not, and so the banks have learned from much experience that while both kinds of loans have their advantages, the ordinary mercantile ones, in the long aggregate, are the safest."

The situation is a similar one in England. Securities cannot be sold in a panic, even where they are of the best character. As Mr. Bagehot defines the reason, in discussing the manner in which the Bank of England may protect its reserve:†

"The bank at such a time is the only lender on stock, and it is only by loans from a bank that large purchases at such a moment can be made: unless the Bank of England, lend, no stock will be bought—there is not in the country any large sum of unused ready money ready to buy it. The only unused sum is the reserve in the Banking Department of the Bank of England; if, therefore, in a panic that department itself attempted to sell stock, the failure would be ridiculous, it would hardly be able to sell any at all—probably it would not sell £50 worth."

If this is the case in a period of stress due purely to financial reasons, it is much more so at times when political events indicate domestic disorder or foreign war. The strength of Great Britain did not prevent a fall in the price of consols from 109½ to 106½ between October 19 and October 25, 1898, when war with France was threatened by the French occupation of Fashoda, and it was pertinently asked by a financial authority, "Would it have been possible to sell £100,000 consols or even a fraction of that sum, without lowering prices far more than the figures quoted?" ‡

The statement of the true character of bank notes and money affords a sufficient explanation of the reason why a banking currency must derive its value from metallic redemption in the first instance and from quickly convertible securities as its ultimate resource. A commercial bank issuing either notes or banking credits for circulation as the equivalent of money, must be able to convert all its resources within a brief time into money or some medium of exchangeable character. The absence of a basis like this is not made good by any amount of substantial wealth behind the notes. Even the existence of a considerable metallic reserve will not maintain the value of circulating notes if the reserve is not employed for the redemption of the notes at par on demand. Gold locked up in reserves and not employed for redemption purposes does not differ, in the language of M. Léon Say, "from a vein of unmined gold a thousand meters deep in the bowels of the earth." The

\* "The Financial History of the United States from 1861 to 1885," p. 350.

† "Lombard Street," Works, V, p. 123. Mr. Bagehot's statements are subject to some qualifications, in view of the large private banking credits whose owners may be tempted to exchange them for securities, if the price of the latter falls, and the foreign money which may be attracted by the same influence; but the essential point—that securities have their dangers as the safeguard of demand liabilities—is not impaired. *Vide* Cauwès, III, p. 406.

‡ "London Bankers' Magazine," January, 1899, LXVII, p. 25.

effect of the different policies pursued by the Bank of England and the Bank of France in this respect are thus described by M. Pareto: \*

"It is not millions of gold, piled up in the vaults of a bank which affect directly the value of its notes; it is the greater or less facility for exchanging the notes for gold. The Bank of France certainly merits as much confidence as the Bank of England, but its notes are exposed to a loss in relation to gold, while those of the Bank of England are always at par. This depends upon the fact that the Bank of England always exchanges its notes for gold, while the Bank of France may give silver five-franc pieces. Let the Bank of France to-morrow pay only silver, as it has the right to do, and in spite of the two billion francs which it has in its cash, the premium upon gold would become considerable."

#### FAILURE OF MORTGAGE SECURITY FOR NOTES.

It has sometimes been believed by the framers of banking laws that some other security was more complete than that of commercial paper. The National Banking Law of the United States requires the deposit with the United States Treasurer of Government bonds to cover the bank notes issued and notes are issued only in the proportion of ninety per cent. of the par value of the bonds. Similar requirements were imposed by local laws in many States of the American Union prior to the inauguration of the National banking system. The theory of these laws was that a Government bond afforded absolute ultimate security. Even if this were the fact (which it was not, since these bonds fell far below their nominal value in gold), ultimate security is not the sole object to be attained in a banking currency, nor even the chief object to be attained. In the language of Mr. Bagehot: †

"Ultimate payment is not what the creditors of a bank want; they want present, not postponed payment; they want to be repaid according to agreement; the contract was that they should be paid on demand, and if they are not paid on demand they may be ruined."

Immediate convertibility into coin is the test of a sound banking currency. Ultimate convertibility by the sale of securities through a receivership is not a proper basis for any paper intended to circulate as money. As M. Pareto declares: ‡

"It is often thought that paper guaranteed by the State by a hypothecated pledge, or in some other manner, can be substituted for real money. But this guarantee, which will take effect only at an indeterminate date, does not eliminate the risks of the transformation of present into future goods of which one has the option of enjoyment at a definite date."

It was because of the lack of comprehension of this distinction and not because of any inherent defect in the system of banking by means of note issues, that many of the early banks came to grief. The attempt to base circulating notes upon land and other wealth of unquestioned value, but not of immediate exchangeability, was the defect of the scheme of John Law and the French *assignats*. A like experiment failed in Norway early in the present century, and the leading banks of Belgium were compelled to suspend payments in 1838 and again in 1848. The leading bank of Belgium, the

\* "Cours d'Économie Politique," I, p. 373.

† "Lombard Street," Works, V, p. 29.

‡ "Cours d'Économie Politique," I, p. 172. One of the higher courts of Italy in 1895 declared that "simple good sense and experience demonstrate that the immediate or proximate power of converting notes and other credit paper into silver is the adequate guarantee of the acceptance and circulation of such money." M. Pareto comments upon this by reminding the court that if when they were about to seat themselves at table, their dinner should be snatched from them with a promise to return another in a year or two, "simple good sense and experience" would teach them that there is some difference between a present and a future good.

*Société Générale*, was a strong institution and was well conducted in the main, except in respect to its note issues, which were not secured by a sufficient amount of liquid assets. The bank, in the language of M. Courcelle-Seneuil, "had become by degrees the centre of all the credit enterprises of the country and ended by becoming essentially an investment bank. Treasurer of the State, depository of the sums amassed by saving and foresight, lender alike upon mortgages, public securities and merchandise as well as commercial paper, shareholder and founder in almost all the great enterprises of the country, it issued side by side money bills and interest-bearing time obligations, combining thus almost every banking operation.\* Even the new Bank of Belgium, which was founded under the encouragement of the Government to take over the work of the Treasury, pursued the same methods, and both banks found their liquid resources inadequate in the hour of business disaster. The note-issuing function was practically taken away from both in 1850 by the organization of the National Bank of Belgium, which conducted a legitimate banking business. The two older institutions were eminently successful within their proper sphere and are still among the strong banking companies of Belgium, but their assets are not of a character to give convertibility to note issues.

#### EXPERIENCE OF THE ITALIAN BANKS.

The banking system of Italy has been subjected to a similar experience within the last generation. A law of June 14, 1866, authorized the Bank of Naples and several other institutions to make loans upon real estate and to issue negotiable bonds, such as are issued by the *Crédit Foncier* of France and other land credit banks. The same privilege was extended at a later date to the Bank of Sicily, and in 1885 to any banking institution with a capital of 10,000,000 lire (\$2,000,000).† Such corporations were permitted to issue mortgage obligations to the amount of ten times their paid-up capital. The National Bank of the Kingdom of Italy availed itself of this authority to set aside 25,000,000 lire as a capital for mortgage operations. The result was a demand for loans in the first year amounting to 272,901,000 lire (\$54,000,000), of which 61,898,500 lire were granted, and other applications were pending at the close of the year. The Bank of Naples within a few years locked up 35,000,000 lire of its capital in a similar manner. This was the situation when the banking scandals of 1892 came to light and it was found that the Bank of Italy, the Roman Bank, the Bank of Sicily and the Bank of Naples—all banks of issue—had issued circulation beyond the limit fixed by law and had among them 628,620,686 lire (\$121,000,000) locked up in investments which were not readily convertible into cash. The Roman Bank was compelled to liquidate and the entire financial system was so shaken that exchange became heavily adverse, subsidiary silver fled across the border, and the Government was finally compelled to issue paper scrip for the smallest amounts in order to provide small currency.‡

These incidents were due in some degree to the fact that the country was already upon a paper basis and the Treasury showed an almost constant

\* "Traité des Opérations de Banque," p. 382. Vide an article by the present author on "The National Bank of Belgium," *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, October, 1898, LVII, p. 620.

† "L'Économiste Européen," January 20, 1899, XV, p. 76.

‡ Vide the author's "History of Modern Banks of Issue," pp. 30-35.

deficit, but the condition of the banks was made much worse by their heavy mortgage loans than if their funds had been in readily convertible form.

The law of 1893 reorganizing the banking system required the banks of issue to cease to conduct mortgage operations, and eventually a mortgage bank was formed with a capital of 100,000,000 lire, partly contributed by the banks of issue and partly by German and Swiss financiers, which undertook to take charge of the mortgage business of the old banks. The mortgage bank, the *Instituto Italiano di Credito Fondiario*, which was constituted by a law of May 6, 1891, has no other important form of obligations than its mortgage bonds, and is not required, therefore, to maintain a large cash reserve for the purpose of meeting demand liabilities.

The lack of discrimination by the early bankers regarding the limited class of banking securities upon which the issue of notes could be safely based, has led to much misconception regarding the security and benefits of a banking currency. A currency actually based upon commercial assets, in the form of short-term paper, affords practically the best security in the world for its immediate redemption on demand and for its ultimate redemption within a short time out of the assets, in case of default in redemption on demand. It was because many of the early banks in the United States did not base their issues upon commercial assets that they were unable to redeem their notes and the notes fell below par in coin. Banks were founded and issued notes upon all manner of security which was not of a character to be quickly convertible into money. They lent their resources to every form of speculation and took risks which no bank in a more settled country would have taken, even if the basis of note issue had not been clearly understood. Upon this subject the Report of the Monetary Commission has the following illuminating paragraph (p. 287):

“The feature of the earlier banks, which was probably the most destructive to them was their use as auxiliaries in all sorts of speculations. The banks were not regarded as regular institutions founded for the sole purpose of furnishing loanable capital to persons of unquestioned credit. This speculative use of the banks was not so marked in the case of the State-owned institutions as in that of private corporations, but the former frequently lent their assistance in operations of a doubtful character. Thus, in 1837, an extended scheme of internal improvements in Illinois led to the increase of the capitals of the two State banks by \$1,000,000 and \$2,000,000 respectively. A State loan of \$3,000,000 to pay for the new stock was authorized, but the bonds could not be sold for par, and had to be taken by the banks themselves in payment of the installments of the stock. Private banks sprang up in immense numbers wherever there was a doubtful speculation to be carried on. Those who had no capital sought to acquire it by starting a bank and utilizing its ‘credit.’ Many who could not obtain loans at reputable banks were among those who established new institutions.”

It is an important requisite, in order that a bank note shall circulate as currency, that it shall not bear interest. The function of money is to circulate, not to constitute a fixed investment yielding profit from holding it. As Mr. Jevons declares:\*

“A bank note being payable on demand bears no interest, and is never bought at a discount, except when the ultimate payment is doubtful. Hence the holder of a note has, like the holder of ordinary coins, no motive in keeping it, except to make future purchases. If a man has more notes than he expects to pay away in the next week or two, he will do best to deposit them in a bank, where they will be safer and at the same time bear interest.

\* “Money and the Mechanism of Exchange,” p. 240.

There is thus an inherent tendency in notes to circulate like coins, and to be kept down in amount to the lowest quantity consistent with the accomplishment of retail purchases."

This essential character of the bank note is supported by the arguments derived from the inconvenience of computing interest every time a note might be used to make a payment. As Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu declares: "To fulfill the office of money and effectively supplement it, the bill should, like money, be deliverable at a glance, without the necessity for a pencil or for ten seconds of reflection."\* The allowance of interest on bank notes was practiced by some of the earlier banks, but fell into disuse as their true function as a medium of exchange was developed. The first notes of the Bank of England drew interest at the rate of two pence per day, and, in the language of Prof. Rogers, "so drew money out of the goldsmiths' hands, in exchange for bills, and this naturally made the goldsmiths their enemies, as they allowed no interest on deposits."†

#### ADVANTAGES OF UNIFORMITY IN NOTE ISSUES.

Bank notes should be issued in round sums and uniform styles in order to facilitate handling and prevent counterfeiting. Much time would be lost in examining and adding together the amounts of bills for various odd sums. The evolution of the bank note has adapted the denominations to the habits and requirements of the community in which they are issued. The minimum denomination is large in most countries where specie payments are maintained. The note for £5 is the smallest in England, fifty francs (\$10) in France and Belgium, and ten florins (\$5) in Austria-Hungary. Among the countries upon a specie basis permitting the lowest denominations of notes are Scotland, where the amount is £1, and the United States and Canada, where the amount is \$5.‡

It is a frequent device when specie payments are suspended to authorize the issue of notes for very small denominations, in order to take the place of coin, which disappears from circulation when its value rises above that of the depreciated paper. Notes for £1 were authorized in England after the suspension of specie payments in 1797, and the authority to issue them was withdrawn from the Bank of England in 1819 and from the English country banks in 1833. § The Government of Austria undertook to obtain resources for the war with Italy in 1859 by authorizing the National Bank to issue 133,000,000 florins in notes for five florins (\$2.50), and the French Government, after the suspension of specie payments following the Franco-Prussian War, authorized the Bank of France in 1871 to issue notes for five francs (\$1) and ten francs (\$2). Notes for much smaller amounts have been issued to supply the place of metallic currency, but more often by governments than by banks.

#### DESIRABILITY OF UNIFORMITY OF DESIGN OF NOTES.

Some degree of uniformity of design is desirable in the bank-note issues of a country in order to enable the receiver to rely upon the goodness of the notes and escape fraud. It is here that the legitimate function of the State

\* "Traité d'Economie Politique," III, p. 471.

† "First Nine Years of the Bank of England," p. 22.

‡ The Government reserves for itself the privilege, in the latter two countries, of issuing notes for smaller amounts.

§ Vide "A History of Modern Banks of Issue," p. 115.

begins in respect to bank notes. The intervention of authority for giving uniformity and security to the notes, in order that they may pass from hand to hand without endorsement and without requiring research as to the credit of the issuer, is for the same purpose as the imprint of the Government stamp upon coins. It simply gives the public guaranty to the assertion that the coin or the note is what it purports to be—in the one case a given weight of fine metal; in the other, the promise of a solvent bank or association of banks to deliver a given weight of metal on demand. The intervention of the State does not differ in principle in either case from its intervention in other occupations—by establishing standard measures, by laws regulating contracts and enforcing judgments—for the purpose of ensuring the honest fulfillment of obligations. The function of money and its substitutes is such, however, that misconceptions have arisen regarding the true function of government, and governments have availed themselves of these misconceptions to load the paper instruments of credit with onerous restrictions and to pervert the form of the paper note to their own needs by making forced loans upon the community and debasing the monetary standard.

One of the merits of the National Banking Law enacted for the United States in 1864, followed by measures driving the notes of State banks from circulation, was the uniformity which it introduced into the bank-note circulation. Bank notes were dragged below parity with gold by the ups and downs of public credit, with which they were absolutely linked, but within these limitations the value of one bank note was uniform with that of all others through the length and breadth of the Union. The convenience of the public under modern conditions justifies Federal regulations to ensure uniformity and safety. The lack of uniformity, growing out of the absence of Federal regulation, was one of the greatest inconveniences of the issues of the State banks in the United States before the Civil War. Mr. White says:\*

“The heterogeneous state of the currency in the fifties can be best learned from the numerous bank-note reporters and counterfeit detectors of that period. It was the aim of these publications to give early and correct information to enable the public to detect spurious and worthless bank notes, which were of various kinds, viz. : (1) Ordinary counterfeits; (2) genuine notes altered from lower denominations to higher ones; (3) genuine notes of failed banks altered to the names of solvent banks; (4) genuine notes of solvent banks with forged signatures; (5) spurious notes, as of banks that had no existence; (6) spurious notes of good banks, as 20's of a bank that never issued 20's; (7) notes of old closed banks still in circulation.

The number of counterfeit and spurious notes was quite appalling. ‘Nicholas’s Bank-Note Reporter,’ had 5,400 separate descriptions of counterfeit, altered and spurious notes. There were thirty counterfeits of the Bank of Delaware described in ‘Nicholas’s Reporter’ for November, 1858. \* \* \*

Extras were frequently issued by the publishers giving descriptions of new and dangerous counterfeits or containing important information like the following :

July 1, 1859. ‘The Farmers and Merchant’s Bank of Tennessee having failed, sharpers have altered its notes to those of the Martha’s Vineyard Bank, Mass., Oriental Bank, New York city, and eight others.’

August extra. ‘Immense quantities of counterfeits on the Oneida County Bank, Utica, N. Y., are afloat, \$6,400 having been seized by the police.’

August 9. ‘Ones, 2’s, 3’s and 5’s of the Wisconsin Miner’s Bank are in circulation. There is no such bank.’”

The bank note should be transferable to bearer, without formality, without the necessity for indorsement or any other writing, and without responsi-

\*“Money and Banking,” p. 397.

bility on the part of prior holders. This condition is necessary to make the note a convenient substitute for money. Endorsement and recourse to each successive holder in case of the default of the bank would make the bank note simply a bill of exchange, and would detract much from its efficiency as a substitute for money. Many of the laws governing bills of exchange also govern bank notes, but it is declared by Judge Cooley, "The property in these notes follows possession; grace is not allowed upon them, and they bear no interest until after demand of payment and refusal."\* Judge Cooley adds another condition which is one of the most important attributes of bank notes: "They never become overdue in the law and the statute of limitations does not apply to them." The reason for this lies in the nature of the note. It is payable on demand and not within any fixed time. Having no date of maturity, the time never comes after which failure to present it constitutes negligence on the part of the holder. The holder has a right which it lies with himself to assert by the presentation of the note; until that time his right is inchoate and imprescriptible.† In this respect bank notes differ from other promissory notes and checks, whose holders lose some of their rights if they fail to exercise due diligence in presenting them for payment. The Bank of England received 1,400 notes of the denomination of £1 in 1843, which had been hoarded for at least twenty-four years, since the suspension of the issue of notes of that denomination. The same year witnessed the presentation of a £20 note which had been issued 125 years before.‡ They were all promptly redeemed in full. If these amounts had been in any other form of commercial paper, the right to recover would have been impaired by neglect to present them. |

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\* "Cooley's Blackstone," Third Edition, II, p. 470, note.

† "The bank bill is not prescriptible—this is one of its essential features, for there is no prescription possible where the obligation has neither point of departure nor fixed maturity."—Bouché, "Dictionnaire du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de la Banque," I, p. 533.

‡ Turner, "Chronicles of the Bank of England," p. 150.

| If some phases of the note-issuing function seem to have escaped discussion in this article, it is because it is to be supplemented by other articles on "The Regulation of a Banking Currency" and "The Benefits of a Banking Currency."

SCHOOL SAVINGS BANKS.—According to the statistics of the school Savings bank system for the year 1898-99, as compiled by J. H. Thiry, of Long Island City, N. Y., the father of the system in this country, Savings banks are maintained in 351 schools in eighty-nine cities of the United States. During the year \$649,247.01 has been deposited in the banks, and \$441,825.83 has been withdrawn, leaving a balance due the little depositors of \$207,421.18. Mr. Thiry's report also shows that the system is gradually being extended.

NO HOPE FOR BRYAN.—The Salt Lake City (Utah) "Tribune," one of the ablest and most persistent champions of free silver, says:

"Our judgment is that it is useless to make another stand for silver in this country until conditions change. When the American farmer, between the crest of the Alleghenies and the crest of the Rockies, is starving at home and a mortgage is pressing upon him, he is a good silver man. Just as soon as he gets a fair price for one crop, then he takes high moral ground and thinks it would be a cheat to force 'fifty-cent dollars' upon this country.

If the campaign was on to-day and the election was to come in November, if there is anything in the signs of the times at all, Mr. Bryan would lose a full million of the votes that he polled in 1896, and the opposition would poll one and one-half millions more than it polled in 1896."



## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

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**Spanish Credit and the Bank of Spain.** The sharp upward movement of Spanish securities which occurred in March was checked in April, but without causing any marked fall in the quotations of the foreign debt. Comparisons with March, 1898, and March, 1899, show a slightly higher rate for the domestic four per cent. bonds, which were quoted at the later date at 62.86, but a fall in the foreign four per cents, which were quoted at 72.17. The difference between these two classes of securities is that a distinction is made by the Government between the foreign debt, on which the interest is paid in gold, and the domestic bonds, on which interest is paid in current Spanish money. This distinction has contributed to materially increase the holdings of Spanish securities abroad, as indicated by the official reports which are required, based upon the place of payment of the interest coupons. The entire reported holdings of Spanish securities abroad in the six foreign countries where they are most largely held showed an increase in such holdings from 883,317,100 pesetas on July 31, 1898, to 1,290,092,800 pesetas on March 31, 1899. The increase for France, as set forth in an official table printed in "*l'Economiste Européen*" of April 14, was from 582,151,700 pesetas to 664,727,100 pesetas; England, from 125,621,700 to 264,061,600; Belgium, from 79,566,600 to 205,163,300; Germany, from 49,499,400 to 104,009,700; The Netherlands, from 33,537,000 to 34,762,000; Portugal, from 12,940,700 to 17,369,100.

The Spanish cabinet have not yet completely formulated their programme of financial reform. Senor Villaverde, the new Finance Minister, denied early in May in the most emphatic manner that any of the information afloat regarding his plans was well founded. He declared that he made it a rule to maintain absolute reserve on questions affecting the public credit until his plans were completed, and that none of the information given out was authorized or had any other purpose than to affect stock speculation. The energetic action of the Government in granting an extraordinary credit of 3,324,500 pesetas by royal decree of April 12 for meeting the interest and sinking fund requirements of the Philippine debt, greatly strengthened public confidence in these securities. A minor step in administrative reform was taken by a decree revising the pension list paid on account of the colonies, by reducing all pensions above 1,000 pesetas (\$200) by fifty per cent. until a systematic revision shall be made. The charge for this service has been 10,963,975 pesetas a year for Cuba, 1,810,000 pesetas for Porto Rico, and 4,110,000 pesetas for the Philippines. This amount of about 16,000,000 will be reduced to 8,500,000 pesetas by the proposed reform.

Senor Villaverde is credited with the opinion that an increased revenue of 92,000,000 pesetas (\$18,000,000) would balance the budget, even with the assumption of the colonial debts and the obligations growing out of the war with the United States. This is an optimistic view and is not fully shared by foreign observers. The recent volume of receipts is, however, an encour-

aging feature of the situation. The receipts for the nine months ending with March were 724,518,437 pesetas (\$140,000,000 at gold parity), which is 99,836,226 pesetas more than the collections for the same period in 1898. It is declared by the Madrid correspondent of "*l'Economiste Européen*," in the issue of April 28, that these figures indicate collections for a year amounting to 966,000,000 pesetas. This would be 200,000,000 pesetas beyond the old average of receipts, upon which the calculations of Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu (outlined in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE for May), and other critics, have been based. A deduction of 100,000,000 pesetas for transient receipts during the past nine months would still afford a monthly average of 69,300,000 pesetas and an annual total of 831,600,000 pesetas. The correspondent of the French journal adds:

"This simple computation shows that the budget problem is far different from that which certain pessimists have formulated. The Ministry of Finance is able to base its calculations upon a revenue of 900,000,000 pesetas, for certain receipts present efficient elasticity to afford a larger revenue than that which they now give. It may be added that capital abounds and that the resources of the country tend to develop considerably."

M. E. Fournier de Flaix, in the "*Revue des Banques*" for March, estimates that there will be a deficit of 210,000,000 pesetas, which might be reduced to 115,000,000 by suspending the sinking fund requirement. He does not believe that this amount can be raised by new direct taxes. He favors a charge of twenty-five or thirty per cent. upon the bond holders which he believes would not do them serious injustice, in view of present quotations. He says in regard to French interests in the settlement:

"The share of French capitalists in Spanish exterior four per cents and in Cuban bonds is estimated at 820,000,000 francs, with annual interest of 36,000,000 francs. A tax of thirty per cent. would represent 10,800,000 francs. French capitalists would recoup themselves by the rise of quotations which would be assured. At the rate of sixty francs, the 'exteriors' give more than six per cent. Subjected to a tax of a fifth, they would produce more than five per cent. at the rate of sixty and would permit under normal conditions a quotation of eighty francs, upon which 3.20 per cent. interest payments would represent four per cent. The interest of France is to know as soon as possible the intentions of Spain and to clearly comprehend the pending liquidation, because the present uncertainty paralyzes dealings. At the rate of sixty francs, even with a tax of thirty per cent., the 'exteriors' would become a good investment. The fall of the rate of interest is forcing capital into second-rate securities."

The Bank of Spain has profited greatly by its dealings with the Government during 1898, in spite of the depreciation of its notes. The profits obtained by discounting Treasury paper were 40,993,390 pesetas, the interest on funded debts was 17,592,389 pesetas, and the interest obligations of the Treasury paid 12,007,404 pesetas. The commercial profits of the Bank were only 14,444,555 pesetas, of which 5,433,615 pesetas was derived from discounts. The chambers of commerce and agriculture throughout the country are insisting that the relations of the Bank with the Treasury shall be reduced in future, in order that the institution may be more useful to commerce.

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The Exchange Problem in Switzerland. The adverse rate of exchange in Switzerland continues to cause much embarrassment to the banks and to be the subject of speculative operations. The mean rate of exchange upon Paris, which was only 100.14 in 1889 and 100.04 in 1894, rose to 100.24 in 1896, 100.35 in 1897 and 100.36 in 1898. The maximum,

which was rarely above 100.35 prior to 1896, rising in the latter year to 100.48, in 1897 to 100.69, and in 1898 to 100.71. These figures, as presented in "*l'Economiste Français*" of April 15, are determined by the average rates for short-term paper on the markets of Geneva, Basle and Zurich. The high rate has prevailed so persistently that the banks near the border have been compelled to employ considerable sums—217,000 francs for the Bank of Commerce of Geneva during 1898—in buying back the gold necessary to meet the demands of the speculators. The Bank of Geneva has even taken the extreme step of requesting authority from the Council of State to cease the issue of notes, while the Central Bank of Berne has changed the branch at Porrentruy, near the frontier, into a simple discount office in order to escape the necessity of redeeming its notes there.

The Bank of Geneva had already reduced its note issues from 5,000,000 to 4,400,000 francs during 1898, before seeking authority to abolish its circulation, while the Bank of Commerce kept its authorized circulation of 24,000,000 francs down to an actual amount at the close of March of 12,941,000 francs.

The Council of State has approved the application of the Bank of Geneva and the Bank is refusing to reissue notes received, pending the action of the Federal Council. The manner in which the speculators are profiting by the rates of exchange and the redemption of bank notes in gold on demand is thus set forth in the "*Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" of April 23:

"With five franc pieces which are found at the banks, especially in the branches on the frontier, Paris exchange is bought, which is at a premium. It is resold and the operations begun over again as often and as long as a profit is found—that is, as long as the premium upon foreign paper (which is actually seven tenths of one per cent.) is higher than the cost of transportation, loss of interest, etc., which the shipment costs. The Swiss banks of issue have made a fight against this speculation, which involves nothing illegal, but it has been in vain, and the Bank of Geneva has preferred to withdraw rather than to submit to it. While exchange has been constantly unfavorable, the speculation upon shipments has attained remarkable proportions. It has become organized. In the case of the Bank of Geneva the figures are significant. While in 1898 the Bank was compelled to furnish coin for speculation to the amount only of 2,775,000 francs for the twelve months, it has been obliged to provide 2,000,000 francs for January and February, and the situation has only grown worse. From March 1 to March 11, the notes deposited for exchange represent 495,000 francs; from March 13 to 17, 161,700 francs; for the entire month of March, 1,700,000 francs; and for the thirteen first days of April, 900,000 francs."

The question is raised by the editor of the Belgian journal whether even the Central Bank which has been proposed will not be confronted by the same speculation. He says upon this subject:

"We understand fully that the Central Bank will have means of operation which are not within reach of a private bank, but it is not in Switzerland only where the banks are compelled to guard against speculation in coin, and the National Bank of Belgium scarcely conceals the efforts which it makes to reduce the transfer of coin in the direction of Lille. Nevertheless, with the exchanges unfavorable, a negative commercial balance, and little or no national metallic money in circulation, the future bank will not begin its operations under happy auspices."

The unfavorable conditions of exchange have not been arrested by high discount rates. The official rate of the Swiss banks was four per cent. for thirty weeks, four and a half per cent. during twelve weeks, and five per cent. during the last ten weeks of 1898. The average for the year was 4.31

per cent.—slightly above the official German rate of 4.27 per cent., and sensibly higher than the average English rate of 3.25 per cent., the Belgian rate of 3.04 per cent., and the French rate of 2.20 per cent.

An illustration of the wide extent of French banking enterprise is afforded by the numerous branches and large business of the *Crédit Lyonnais*, the largest joint-stock bank in France. A few figures from the balance sheet of this institution were given in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for April (p. 532), but the magnitude of its gross transactions was not then set forth.

The number of commercial bills discounted during 1898 was 14,840,192, which was an increase of 1,300,688 over 1897, while the value of these bills was 10,189,264,662 francs (\$2,000,000,000) an increase over 1897 of 1,595,826,622 francs. This large volume of business paid net profits of 25,051,500 francs (\$4,850,000), which was an increase of 5,041,021 francs over the profits of 1897. Of this amount only 16,000,000 francs was distributed in dividends; the remainder was carried to profit and loss or added to the reserves. The scope of the operations of the bank in promoting French interests abroad is indicated by the following summary of its branch operations in "*l'Economiste Européen*" of April 14:

"The progress of the foreign branches of the *Crédit Lyonnais* is always interesting. Those in the Indies did not meet in 1898 the hopes which were entertained, and those of Moscow and Odessa are not yet operating under the conditions desired. On the other hand, the Egyptian group—Alexandria, Cairo and Port Said—have given results similar to those of preceding years and the branch at St. Petersburg has witnessed an important movement of business. In another direction, at Constantinople and Smyrna, profits have remained within normal limits although commercial affairs have not been active, and the offices at Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia have not been afflicted by disaster, in spite of the profound disturbances in Spain. On the contrary, the gravity of conditions there has brought to these branches a notable increase of deposits from the public which, in view of the trouble existing in business relations, have brought their capital to the *Crédit Lyonnais*, which was known to be beyond the reach of the crisis. As to the branch at London, it is realizing little by little the development which was revealed from the first day of its creation. It is becoming more and more the correspondent of a great number of houses in different countries; its exchange transactions, dealings in securities and orders for the Bourse acquire a growing importance; and finally it has assisted the extension of the transactions of many other branches, whose operations are directed upon London."

The recent publication of a British blue book, giving the final installment of the evidence taken by the Indian Currency Committee, has revived the discussion of the proper monetary system for British India. The report of the commission will evidently be substantially unanimous against the reopening of the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver. Even those who opposed the closing of the mints in 1893 do not consider it wise to take a backward step in the matter at the present time. There is a disposition among the experts who testified to recommend a further trial of the present experiment for giving a fixed exchange value to the rupee. Those who advocated a gold standard before the committee generally insisted that it could not be adopted without opening the mints to gold coinage, if not procuring a stock of gold and providing for the exchangeability of gold and silver. Lord Northbrook, whose testimony elicits the praise of the London "*Economist*" in its issue of April 22, said:

"A gold standard means that by law a certain quantity of gold of a certain fineness marked in a certain manner shall be the measure of value for commodities, and I do not understand how such a standard can be introduced for any practical purpose unless the Indian mints are opened for the coinage of gold, and this is the same thing as to introduce a gold currency."

He went on to urge, as other witnesses had previously done, that the sovereign should be made legal tender in India, and that the Indian mints should be opened to the coinage of sovereigns and that these should be legal tender throughout the Empire, in the same way as Australian sovereigns.

The necessity for providing an adequate currency of some sort in British India, and maintaining it at par with gold, is thus discussed by the "Economist":

"Obviously, it is necessary if the Indian mints are to remain closed against silver, to introduce some further element of elasticity into the currency. Such an element is provided to a certain extent at present by the provision under which the Government is bound to give rupees in exchange for gold at the rate of 1s. 4d. But there are very wide seasonal variations in the demand for money in India, and while this provision renders possible an expansion of the currency in the times of pressure, there is no such automatic means of contraction. If, however, a certain quantity of gold can be got into circulation which, unlike the rupees, can flow freely abroad, the volume of the currency will be able to accommodate itself to a contraction as well as to an expansion of the demand. And while, of course, it must remain a matter of doubt how far an option of taking gold to the Indian mints for coinage would be exercised, it is obviously desirable that the option should be given, and all reasonable facilities for putting gold coin into circulation afforded. We expect, therefore, that the Committee will make this one of their recommendations. \* \* \*

And finally, the committee will have to determine whether or not provision is to be made for the convertibility of the silver currency into gold. In our view, some measure of convertibility is not only desirable, but almost essential. It is right that such convertibility should be hedged round with restrictions, and the Government could not wisely undertake so much in that direction as has been proposed in the Lindsay scheme. Still, the fact has to be recognized that the flow of capital into India has been checked by the fear that it could not be brought back again if desired without a more or less heavy loss, and nothing would so effectually remove that fear as some moderate measure of convertibility."

A law of March 31, 1899, promulgated in the "*Bulletin de Statistique*" for April, has given effect to the provision of the new charter of the Bank of France by which the Bank agreed to place 40,000,000 francs at the disposal of the Treasury for the promotion of agricultural credit. The new law provides for the creation of district banks of mutual agricultural credit, to be constituted according to the provisions of the law of November 5, 1894. These associations will discount paper signed by members of the local societies and endorsed by them. They are permitted to make advances to these local credit organizations from the 40,000,000 francs advanced by the Bank of France, and it is proposed that they may obtain additional accommodation from the Bank of France when they are able to present paper of sufficiently early maturity to justify loans by a commercial bank.

The advances made by the district banks to the local associations are limited to five years, but may be renewed. They are not permitted to exceed the paid-up capital of the district banks. The distribution of the fund is entrusted to a special committee, which will be made up as follows: the Minister of Agriculture; two Senators; three deputies; a member of the Council of State; a member of the Court of Accounts; the Governor of the Bank of

France or his representative; two officers of the Ministry of Finance; three officers of the Ministry of Agriculture; six representatives of the agricultural credit associations chosen from among their members; and three members of the Superior Council of Agriculture. Methods of supervising and regulating the subject are to be framed by the committee, and the statutes of the district banks must be deposited with the Minister of Agriculture.

The District Agricultural Bank of the East has already been constituted under the stimulus of an address delivered at Epinal on Sunday, April 23, by M. Méline, the French Premier, and an allotment for its use will soon be made. M. Méline discussed fully the question of agricultural credit in France in this address and his remarks were widely published in the financial journals. M. Edmond Théry, the editor of "*L'Économiste Européen*," in the issue of April 28, declares that the local agricultural syndicates have already afforded marvellous results to the national agriculture, in suppressing the consequences of the sub-division of agricultural holdings. "Thanks to them," he said, "our small cultivators are now able to employ the best seed, fertilizers of the first quality and implements of the latest model, at cost price, without fictitious charges, and at an insignificant commission. They thus obtain the same advantages as the great proprietors and reach a maximum of production with a minimum of cost."

Only a few, however, know how to employ this resource and there hardly exist as yet ninety associations based upon the law of 1894. There are several other classes, modelled on the Raffeisen and Rayneri plans, but all of them do not number 800 and many do little more than exist on paper. These societies act chiefly as intermediaries between the individual farmer and manufacturers, affording the guarantee of payment for products and agricultural implements, but do not furnish much money for the purpose. The question how further aid should be extended to agriculture has been one of the serious thoughts of M. Méline for a long time. The difficulty of the problem was thus expressed by him in his address at Epinal:

"The problem has been how to invoke the aid of the Bank of France, without destroying its credit, in operations of agricultural credit, which by their very nature are in conflict with the traditional statutes and fundamental principles which have always regulated this great financial institution. It makes discounts only for ninety days in order not to lock up its capital for too long a period and to have it always in some degree in its own hands. This period, which is sufficient for commercial and industrial operations, which are conducted usually for short terms, would be entirely insufficient for agricultural operations, which usually embrace the period of a harvest and which are liquidated only in ten months, often after even a year of delay. \* \* \*

One has thus been led to avoid the difficulty by seeking another solution, which has been quickly found. This was already indicated and formulated in the project of law which I presented in 1892, with a certain number of my colleagues, and from which originated the law of November 5, 1894. It consists in interposing between the local banks of agricultural credit, of which I have spoken, and the Bank of France great intermediary agricultural banks, destined to receive and discount agricultural paper and to hold and nurse it, as it is called in banking parlance, until the day when it may be presented at the Bank of France with the three required signatures."

M. Méline went on to review the reasons for the failure of previous attempts to promote agricultural credit. The large establishments for the purpose, he pointed out, had been too far removed from the local borrower and had not the facilities for obtaining correct data regarding his standing and ability to pay. Such information could be obtained only from his neigh-

bors; and accuracy, instead of complacent generalities, could be obtained from them only by making them partners in the responsibility. They could be made responsible only by enlisting their own interests by affording them the opportunity of the coöperative guarantee of their credit when they wished to obtain loans. M. Méline pointed out that the new French legislation differed from the German in limiting the liability of those who joined in a guaranty and that the creation of the district banks would bring to their aid a point of support, which was also lacking in the German system. He predicted that the new institutions would promote the extension of agricultural credit and agricultural improvements and pointed out that they afforded a model upon which the laborer and mechanic might organize mutual credit societies for establishing himself in his occupation.

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The Preference for Industrials      There has been a considerable reaction recently upon European bourses in the high prices of gilt-edge government obligations. The change is not attributed so directly by the leading financial journals to the actual scarcity of capital as to the desire of investors for the higher returns which are afforded by industrial securities.

The German Government has been finding difficulty in placing a recent loan at three per cent. and even three and a half per cent. obligations are hardly at par.

The quotations for several leading securities early in 1898 and in April last, are thus compared by the "*Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels*" of April 16:

	March, 1898.	December, 1898.	April 14, 1899.
English consols.....	111½	110¼	110¼
Prussian three per cents.....	98	94¾	91.85
Austrian gold four per cents.....	105½	101¾	101
Russian gold three per cents.....	97½	96¾	93

These securities are selected from among those not likely to be affected by recent political events nor by lack of financial foresight in the issuing States. Among minor securities the decline has been even more marked. In France the two and a half per cent. Tonkin loan, although guaranteed by the French Government, has fallen to eighty-five, two per cent. below the rate of issue and ten per cent. below the maximum quotation in 1897. In Belgium the three per cents have fallen below ninety-nine, and in Prussia even the three and a half per cent. consols have been down to 100½. The explanation given by the Belgian publication is that the investor, wearied of successive conversions, is seeking more remunerative use for his money. He no longer wishes to content himself with three per cent. The fact that capital is not altogether lacking is indicated by the upward movement in mining and other securities, which is thus commented on by the Berlin correspondent of the London "Economist" in the issue of April 22:

"The upward movement of values has been very general, excepting low-interest bearing Government funds, in which the market continues to show but slight interest. Prussian and Imperial three per cents continue below ninety-two, and show little fluctuation. Since a week ago coal and iron shares have been continuously strong, and there have been some sensational advances, supported by the uninterrupted reports of phenomenal activity in the coal and iron districts. Within the week there has been an advance of from three to six points in the standard coal and iron shares, while some specialties have bounded upward at a much more rapid rate. The shares of the Schalker Mining and Smelting Co., for example,

scored an advance of over seventy points. The upward movement in coal and iron shares since the beginning of the year has been very considerable."

A further proof of the increasing supply of capital in Germany and the continued demand for industrial securities is afforded by the Berlin correspondent of "*l'Economiste Européen*" in the issue of May 5. The subject of the reduction of the discount rate of the Imperial Bank from four and a half to four per cent. was already under discussion at the close of April and private money was below the official discount rate. The *Disconto Bank* decided at that time to delay no longer the increase of its capital from 40,000,000 to 50,000,000 marks, while the *Essener Credit Anstalt* and several other provincial banks decided upon the same course. The issues of industrial shares, the correspondent declared, "are more numerous than ever, and all these issues seem to be assured of success, popular preference continuing to lean towards these securities." Several of the economic journals attribute the recent pressure for money in Germany to the large purchases of raw materials abroad and the resulting exports of gold.

The twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the National Bank of Bulgaria was made the occasion of a review of its history and operations in the Bulletin of the Sophia Chamber of Commerce, from which extracts appear in "*l'Economiste Européen*" of May 5. The Government turned over to the Bank as working capital in 1879 the sum of 1,800,000 francs, and as a reserve, 200,000 francs. The statutes of the bank were revised by a law of January 27, 1885, which went into operation on the first of September following. The new statutes gave a remarkable impulse to the operations of the Bank, which in 1885 amounted to only 164,281,000 francs. The amount of these operations was increased to 540,364,000 francs in 1890, to 1,225,312,000 francs in 1895, and to 1,589,465,000 francs (\$300,000,000) in 1897. The figures for 1898 have not been quite completed, but will probably exceed 1,750,000,000 francs.

These are the figures of all the business passing through the Bank, including the branches. The main office at Sophia handled the largest volume of business in 1897—856,400,000 francs. The branch at Roustchouk handled business to the amount of 331,300,000 francs; Varna, 141,300,000 francs, and Philippopolis, 140,500,000 francs. The deposits for fixed terms at interest in the meantime increased from 1,217,000 francs in 1886, to 13,575,000 francs at the close of 1890, 39,790,000 francs at the close of 1895, and 58,744,619 francs at the close of 1898. The capital was raised to 6,000,000 francs in 1885, and to 9,100,000 francs in 1889, while the reserve fund rose to 3,300,000 francs in 1896.

The note circulation of the Bank was not cordially received by the public at first, but has made great headway during the last few years. The amount in 1885 was only 213,000 francs (\$41,000), and in 1889, 401,000 francs. The circulation was increased to 1,957,000 for 1890, but fell again to 471,000 francs in 1892, and only in 1896 took a permanent upward course, when the amount reached 2,396,000 francs. The circulation outstanding on December 29, 1898, was 3,162,115 francs (\$600,000). The Bank has established relations with several large European banks, including the *Deutsche Bank*, and has placed upon favorable terms several important loans.



**The Bank of  
Portugal.**

The annual report of the Bank of Portugal for 1898 shows some improvement over previous conditions. The total assets on December 31, 1898, were 158,157 contos (\$160,000,000), of which 34,828 contos made up the cash reserve, 14,858 contos the commercial paper, 26,296 contos the floating debt of the Treasury, and 43,454 contos the bills of exchange. The cash reserve contained 21,141 contos in notes, 4,836 contos in gold, and 8,426 contos in silver. The gold has increased 40,704 milreis during 1898, and the silver, 386,865 milreis. The total assets at the close of 1896 were 122,045 contos, and at the end of 1897, 128,591 contos. The note issues have increased from 58,934 contos at the close of 1896 and 65,060 contos at the close of 1897 to 90,796 contos (\$95,000,000) at the close of 1898. The net profits of the Bank during 1898 were 1,565,348 milreis (\$1,700,000), of which 945,000 milreis was distributed in dividends. The commercial portfolio increased from 12,623 contos at the close of 1897 to 14,858 contos at the close of 1898. The discounts granted during the year were 47,675 in number for an amount of 33,230 contos. This was a considerable reduction from 1897, when the number of pieces of paper discounted was 54,592, and the amount was 33,797 contos (\$35,000,000). Exchange operations increased from 8,716 contos in 1897 to 11,434 contos in 1898.

**The Financial Status in  
Brazil.**

The new President of the Brazilian republic has contributed considerably to restore the credit of the country by his message to Congress and the measures already adopted, which have included the withdrawal and destruction of \$14,000,000 of the paper currency. He urges economies in administration and new taxes in order to put the country upon a sound basis. These measures have already improved exchange materially and inspired a degree of confidence which is regarded by some of the financial journals as excessive. The "Rio News," in its issue of April 11, says:

"Some of the local journals have announced in a tone of exultation that the Government, besides paying in the last five days of March debts belonging to the year 1898 to the amount of about \$14,000,000, has redeemed Exchequer bills amounting to \$20,250,000, and has reimbursed the *Banco da Republica* over \$11,000,000 which had been advanced on account current by that Bank, at which the Government is said to have had on the 31st ult. a balance of \$2,589,000. It seems to us that our contemporaries have allowed themselves to become unduly elated. It must not be forgotten that since the first of last July the Government has had the benefit of a funding scheme that gives it temporary relief from obligations estimated at £2,877,531 per annum. Up to the end of last month, then, that scheme had placed at the Government's disposal resources amounting to £2,158,148, a sum equivalent at the present rate of exchange to over \$75,000,000. It is, of course, gratifying to learn that old debts to the amount of \$45,000,000 have been paid, and that at the *Banco da Republica* there is a balance in favor of the Government, even if it is only \$2,500,000. But what has become of the remaining \$27,500,000? We do not hear that the Government has made any currency deposits at the foreign banks in this city, as is required by the contract of June 15 last, and the Treasury notes burnt up to the present do not exceed \$8,000,000. Nor has the Government paid the interest due on the gold bonds of 1868 and 1898."

**BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.**

—The official brokers in Spain are up in arms against the Bank of Spain because of a proposal to authorize the Bank to buy and sell Government obligations directly on account of its clients. The project would seriously

affect not only the official brokers but the private bankers. It is believed that the amendment to the statutes of the Bank will be refused approval by the Minister of Finance, even if it passes the general assembly of the institution. The Bank of Spain, like the Bank of France, is under the close supervision of the Government, which even goes so far as to require a change in the Governor with a change of ministry. The Governor during last year, Senor Eguillor, tendered his resignation, according to custom, when his party fell from power, and was succeeded by the Count des Josseannaz, a member of the council of the Bank.

—A new institution which is intended to promote trade between Belgium and Hungary and their colonies, is the Belgo-Hungarian Bank, which was organized at Brussels on April 15. Count Imre Karolyi was elected President. A capital of 10,000,000 francs was subscribed, of which Hungarian noblemen and bankers contributed 5,000,000. Count Alexander Karolyi alone subscribed 1,200,000 francs, Count Michael Esterhazy and Baron Springer, half a million each, and a syndicate of Hungarian deputies to the Reichstag, half a million. The new bank's first undertaking will be to collect 50,000,000 francs with which to found a Hungarian Institute of Credit for Agriculture, which will provide capital and machinery for working the extensive and fertile districts of corn-growing Hungary.

—The foreign capital invested in industrial enterprises in Russia during 1898 is stated in "*L'Economiste Européen*" of April 14 at 360,000,000 francs (\$70,000,000), as compared with only 7,000,000 francs in 1893, and 190,000,000 francs as recently as 1897. This amount is divided in the proportions of 107,000,000 francs in Russian corporations, 109,000,000 in Belgian, 89,000,000 in English, 33,000,000 in French, 14,000,000 in German, and 7,000,000 francs in Austrian corporations. Many of the Belgian corporations are supplied with French capital. The capital provided for Russian industrial corporations from 1893 to 1898 has been 700,000,000 francs (\$135,000,000); and if Government loans are included, 3,388,000,000 francs in foreign capital have entered Russia.

—President Diaz, in his message to the Mexican Congress at the opening of April, expressed the opinion that the new Mexican Central Bank would give a powerful impulse not only to commercial and industrial enterprises of all sorts, but also to agriculture.

C. A. C.

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VENEZUELAN CURRENCY.—In transmitting the returns showing the value of exports declared for the United States at Puerto Cabello for the quarter ended March 31, 1899, Consul Ellsworth reports as follows relative to Venezuelan currency:

*Venezuelan peso.*—No coin of this designation is in circulation, but four bolivars pay all accounts of one peso, and it is still the custom to render accounts in pesos. The Treasurer of the United States has fixed the value of the bolivar, the monetary unit of Venezuela, at 19.3 cents, which makes the value of the peso 77.2 cents in United States currency.

*Venezuelan dollar.*—This is in actual circulation, and is of silver. It calls for five bolivars, and, calculating the bolivar at our Treasury valuation, the Venezuelan dollar is worth 96.5 cents. In rendering accounts, making invoices, purchasing products of the country, market values, etc., this dollar is not considered, it being well understood that the peso is the basis of calculation; but in paying accounts, etc., it is taken at its face value—five bolivars (96.5 cents United States.)

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### *COLLECTIONS—FORWARDING DIRECT TO DRAWEE—LIABILITY OF FORWARDING BANK.*

Supreme Court of Minnesota, May 2, 1899.

*MINNEAPOLIS SASH AND DOOR CO. vs. METROPOLITAN BANK.*

1. For the purposes of collecting a check or draft deposited or left for collection, a bank must employ a suitable sub-agent, if an agent be necessary. It must not transmit checks or drafts directly to the bank or party by whom payment is to be made. No party upon whom rests the obligation to pay upon presentation can be deemed a suitable agent, in contemplation of law, to enforce, on behalf of another, a claim against itself.
2. This rule is not affected by notice to a depositor that the bank attempting a collection limits its liability so that it acts as agent only for the depositor, and in forwarding items for collection is only bound to select agents who are responsible according to its judgment and means of knowledge, and assumes no risk or responsibility on account of the omission, negligence, or failure of such agents.
3. Nor will an established usage and custom existing among banks to send checks or drafts payable by other banks, at distant points, to the drawee directly, and by mail, in case there is no other bank of good standing in the same town, excuse or justify such a course of procedure. In case of loss through the bad conduct of the drawee, the sender of the check or draft must bear it.

START, C. J., dissenting.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

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*COLLINS, J.:* On the admitted facts in this case, the only question necessarily to be determined, in our opinion, is whether defendant bank, doing business at Minneapolis, was negligent when it sent by mail, and for collection, the Norton check, directly to the bank at Mapleton, 117 miles distant, upon which bank the check was drawn; loss having resulted by reason of the adoption of this method of presenting the paper for payment. The defendant seeks to justify its procedure upon the ground that it had restricted its liability to its depositors, when collecting checks and drafts, by means of the notice printed upon its depositors' bank or pass books, of which notice plaintiff's secretary had actual knowledge; and also because of a well-settled usage and custom then prevailing in banks; and, further, because the same result would have ensued had another correspondent been selected.

1. Although the defendant had limited its liability so that when receiving checks or drafts for collection, or on deposit, it acted as an agent only, and in forwarding these items to other points, for collection, it was only bound to select agents who were responsible, according to its judgment and means of knowledge, and assumed no risk or responsibility on account of their omission or neglect or failure, defendant was obliged to exercise reasonable care and diligence in adopting a method of pre-

senting the check in question to its drawee for payment, in selecting its agent. Now, can it be held that defendant exercised reasonable care when it sent the check by mail to the very party most interested against the payee and principal, and thus to place such principal entirely in the hands of its adversary. Norton had ample funds on deposit when he drew the check, and also when the check reached the drawee, presumably on July 31, at the opening of business hours. It was important that it should speedily be presented for payment, in order to fix his liability in case of non-payment. This was of the utmost importance to both payee and maker, in order that the interests of each might be protected. The interest of the drawee would naturally be to procrastinate, and possibly this would be his inclination.

It seems to be settled by all of the authorities that, "for the purposes of collection, the collecting bank must employ a suitable sub-agent. It must not transmit its checks or bills directly to the bank or party by whom payment is to be made, with the request that remittances be made therefor. It is considered that no firm, bank, corporation, or individual can be deemed a suitable agent, in contemplation of law, to enforce in behalf of another a claim against itself." (1 Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* 328a; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 809; *Drovers' Nat. Bank vs. Anglo-American Packing and Provision Co.*, 117 Ill. 100, 7 N. E. 601; *Bank vs. Goodman*, 109 Pa. St. 422, 2 Atl. 687; *Wagner vs. Crook*, 167 Pa. St. 259, 31 Atl. 576; *Bank vs. Burns*, 12 Colo. 589, 21 Pac. 714; *Anderson vs. Rogers*, 53 Kan. 542, 36 Pac. 1067.) See note to this last case in 27 *Lawy. Rep. Ann.* 248, in which the authorities are carefully considered.

The truth of the remark as to the unsuitability of the drawee of a check as the agent selected to enforce its collection, and what may be expected if the practice is upheld, is well illustrated by the facts now before us.

As before stated, the check must, in due course of mail, have reached Mapleton on the morning of July 31. Had it been in the hands of a properly designated third party, it would have been presented and paid that day. The proceeds would, if promptly transmitted, have reached defendant on the morning of August 1 or 2.

Even if the payment had then been made, as it finally was, in a check upon the Mankato Bank, and defendant had pursued the course it did as to its collection, no loss would have resulted. But instead of accounting for the Norton check, so that defendant would receive the proceeds as early as August 2, the Mankato check was made out on August 4, and came to defendant's hands the next day. With sufficient funds in its hands to meet the check, the Mapleton Bank postponed a remittance for three days, and then sent a check, which proved to be worthless when seasonably presented for payment.

2. We have stated the grounds upon which defendant attempts to justify. It did show that it was usual and customary for banks to send checks and drafts, payable by other banks at distant points, to the drawee direct, and by mail, provided there was no other bank of good standing in the same town, while plaintiff was allowed to prove that an express company, whose business it was to collect and transmit money, had offices in both places.

We fail to see what possible effect upon a case of this kind the fact that the drawee is the only bank in good standing in the town can have upon the duty of a bank which undertakes a collection. Any reason for such a course is equally as sound where there are two or more banks in the town as where there happens to be but one.

While the syllabus of one of the cases cited in support of counsel's proposition (*Wheeled Scraper Co. vs. Sadliek*, 50 Neb. 105, 69 N. W. 765), may justify him, the opinion does not.

We cannot agree with counsel that the usage and custom here relied upon is a defense to the claim that defendant was negligent when forwarding this check to the

Mapleton Bank for presentation and payment. As a general rule, usage and custom will not justify negligence.

It may be admitted that such a course is frequently adopted, but it must be at the risk of the sender, who transmits the evidence of indebtedness upon which the right to demand payment depends, to the party who is to make the payment. Such a usage and custom is opposed to the policy of the law, unreasonable and invalid. It was so decided in *Drovers' Nat. Bank vs. Anglo-American Packing and Provision Co.* and *Bank vs. Goodman (supra)*. Counsel for defendant has cited two cases from the English Law Reports and three from the New York Court of Appeals as authority upon this question. An examination of these cases will show that this exact question was not decided. (See 27 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 248, note, *supra*.)

3. Counsel for defendant also urges that plaintiff ought not to recover, because the result would have been the same had another correspondent been selected to present the check. This assumes that a third party would have waited until August 4 for payment, and then would have accepted a check upon the Mankato Bank as payment, which would have been transmitted to defendant August 5. Such an assumption reflects seriously upon the ordinary methods of bank officers, and is without foundation. Primarily, the loss to plaintiff grew out of the fact that defendant negligently selected an unsuitable party to present the check, the payee, to compel payment, or, in case of refusal, to protect its rights, as against Norton, by due protest and notice of non-payment. We need not discuss the further contention that payment of the Norton check could only be made in money.

The order refusing a new trial is reversed, and, on the findings of fact, judgment must be ordered in plaintiff's favor in the court below, unless such court, in its discretion, grants a new trial.

START, C. J.: I dissent. Under the undisputed evidence in this case, as to the universal custom of banks in collecting paper drawn upon a bank in good standing, which is the only bank at the place of its location, it cannot in my opinion be held, as a matter of law, negligence for the collecting bank to send the paper to the drawee bank for collection.

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*PROMISSORY NOTE—PROTEST NOT NECESSARY.*

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, April 4, 1899.

WILLOW RIVER LUMBER COMPANY *vs.* SEEGER FURNITURE COMPANY.

In order to charge an indorser upon a promissory note, timely presentation and demand of payment, and notice of dishonor are sufficient; and protest is not necessary.\*

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Plaintiff sold defendant a car load of lumber, amounting to \$238.36, on sixty days' time. Soon after the account became due, defendant sent plaintiff a note of one G. A. Dols for \$209.86, and a draft to balance the account. The note was held by plaintiff until it became due, but the maker failed to pay it. Thereupon plaintiff returned the note, and brought suit for the balance due. Defendant answered, setting up the delivery and acceptance of the note in full payment of the account. The case was tried by the court without a jury.

The court found the facts as stated, and that the note was not taken by plaintiff, or accepted by it, as payment of the balance due upon the account, and that plaintiff was not guilty of laches in presenting the note for payment, or in notifying defendant of the maker's default.

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\* The Negotiable Instruments Law, which has been adopted in Wisconsin, provides that "Where any negotiable instrument has been dishonored it may be protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, as the case may be; but protest is not required, except in the case of foreign bills of exchange." (Section 118.) This has always been the rule of the law merchant.

Judgment was ordered for plaintiff for the balance due, with interest, which judgment the defendant seeks to review on this appeal.

BARDEEN, J. (omitting part of the opinion): Counsel contends that, because the plaintiff failed to protest the Dols note, it made it its own, and hence cannot recover in this action. We know of no rule of law that requires the holder of the note to protest it for non-payment. Timely presentation, and demand of payment, and notice to the indorser, are all that the law requires. (*Sumner vs. Bowen*, 2 Wis. 524.) This the court substantially finds was done. In view of this fact, the defendant has no reasonable ground for complaint.

**COLLECTIONS—CHECK RECEIVED IN PAYMENT OF DRAFT—TIME FOR PRESENTING.**

Supreme Court of Alabama, Feb. 2, 1899.

MORRIS vs. EUFAULA NATIONAL BANK.

Where a bank receives a check in payment of a draft presented by it, it owes no duty to the acceptor or drawer such as it owes to its own principal, and it discharges its obligation to him by presenting the check within the reasonable time allowed by the commercial law.

The reasonable time allowed the holder for presenting a check, when he receives it in the same place where the bank on which it is drawn is located, is till the close of banking hours on the next secular day.

PER CURIAM: A draft had been drawn by the Mound City Distilling Company on the plaintiff, Morris, and duly accepted by him. It was due on March 30, 1891, and was held by the defendant, the Eufaula National Bank, for collection. The latter made due presentment of it to the drawee and acceptor thereof for payment on March 30, and received from him a bank check drawn by him for the amount due on the accepted draft on the John McNab Bank, another banking institution then doing business at Eufaula, Ala., where the payee thereof was located. The check, dated March 30, was payable to the Eufaula National Bank, and was delivered about ten o'clock in the forenoon. The John McNab Bank continued to pay checks drawn on it and presented during the remainder of the day of March 30, and, having then closed its doors, did not thereafter resume business operations. The plaintiff had funds on deposit with the drawee sufficient to meet the check, which would have been paid if presented within banking hours on the day it was delivered to defendant. On March 31, the John McNab Bank being then closed, the plaintiff took up his check, and paid the defendant the amount called for therein, \$470.22.

The first amended count, from which the above facts appear, states that the plaintiff "was compelled" by the defendant to take up the check, and we therefore assume that it was taken up and the amount paid on the insistence of the defendant that it should be done.

The plaintiff afterwards brought his action against the defendant, wherein he claims damages on account of the failure of the defendant to present the check on March 30.

A check is payable on presentation and demand. To charge the drawer, the holder is required to present it within a reasonable time, and after the lapse of a reasonable time from its delivery by the drawer the holder retains it at his peril. (*Sarings Co. vs. Weakley*, 103 Ala. 458, 15 South. 854; *Watt vs. Gans* [Ala.], 21 South. 1011.)

As between the holder and drawer of the check, however, presentment may be made at any time, and delay in presentment does not discharge the liability of the drawer unless loss to him has resulted. (*Carroll vs. Sweet*, 128 N. Y. 19, 27 N. E. 763; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1587; *Sarings Co. vs. Weakley*, *supra*.)

Without questioning these general principles, it was held on the former appeal in this case (106 Ala. 383, 18 South. 11) that the amended complaint showed a cause of action. The conclusion of the court was reached upon a distinction, therein pointed out, as being established by the authorities cited in the opinion.

In illustrating the proposition announced by him (2 Morse. Banks, § 421), quoted in our former opinion, that learned author was not as lucid as he usually is, but the proposition itself is clear. He thus states the same doctrine in Section 240 :

“ But when a check is taken, instead of money, by one acting for others, a delay of presentment for a day, or for any time beyond that within which, with proper and reasonable diligence, it can be presented, is at the peril of the party retaining the check and postponing presentment, as between him and the persons in interest whom he represents. And where loss occurs because such a check is not presented on the day of its reception, the agent is liable.”

The same doctrine is thus stated by Mr. Daniel :

“ The allowance of a day to present the check does not extend to an agent who receives one for a debt of his principal. He must present it instanter.” (2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1590.)

The authority cited by each of these text writers is *Smith vs. Miller* (43 N. Y. 171); Mr. Daniel citing, in addition, *Farwell vs. Curtis* (7 Biss. 165, Fed. Cas. No. 4,690), and *First Nat. Bank of Meadville vs. Fourth Nat. Bank of New York* (16 Hun, 332).

As the case of *Smith vs. Miller* (43 N. Y. 171, 52 N. Y. 546) is cited as sustaining the conclusion of the court in this case on the former appeal, it is proper to make a fuller statement of it than we would otherwise feel called on to do. The plaintiffs in that case brought an action to recover the unpaid balance of the price of a bill of goods sold by the plaintiffs to the defendants. The defendants set up a defense of payment by a draft for \$2,968.69 drawn by them on James K. Place & Co., of New York, to the order of plaintiffs, who resided and did business in New York, the defendants residing at Buffalo. The plaintiffs received the draft by mail on the morning of November 19, and immediately indorsed it, and at about half-past one in the afternoon of the same day presented it for payment at the counting-house of James K. Place & Co., the drawees, who were merchants in New York in good standing. In payment of the draft James K. Place & Co. gave their check on the Manufacturers' National Bank of New York city, to the order of plaintiffs, for the full amount. At the time plaintiffs received the check of James K. Place & Co. the latter had funds in the Manufacturers' Bank to meet the check, which would have been paid had it been presented on that day. The check was deposited during the same afternoon in the Citizens' Bank for collection, and was not presented for payment at the Manufacturers' National Bank till twelve o'clock the next day, on the morning of which James K. Place & Co. had failed, and on that account payment of the check was refused. The action therefore was between parties to the original draft, and was not between the parties to the check which James K. Place & Co. had given to plaintiffs. The court, in its opinion, says :

“ When a check is taken, instead of money, by one acting for others, as was done by the plaintiffs, a delay of presentment for a day, or for any time beyond that within which, with proper and reasonable diligence, it can be presented, is at the peril of the party thus retaining the check and postponing presentment, as between him and the persons in interest whom he represents.” (43 N. Y. 176.)

In *First Nat. Bank of Meadville vs. Fourth Nat. Bank of New York* (16 Hun, 332, 77 N. Y. 320), it appeared that the Meadville Bank had forwarded to the Fourth National Bank a sight draft drawn by another bank in Meadville on certain bankers in New York. On receipt of the draft, the Fourth National Bank presented it to the drawees for payment, who gave their check on another New York bank for the

amount, and the draft was delivered to them. The Fourth National Bank did not present this check for payment on that day, but sent it through a clearing-house, and it was presented the next day for payment, but payment was refused, the drawers of the check having failed on that day. The Fourth National Bank thereupon returned the check to the drawers, received back the draft, made formal demand of payment and caused the draft to be protested for non-payment, and on the next day due notice of protest was served by mail upon plaintiffs and upon the drawer of the draft. The action was brought by the Meadville Bank against the Fourth National Bank to recover damages resulting from alleged negligence on the part of defendant in the performance of its duty, as agent for plaintiff. It was held that it was the duty of defendant to have presented the check for payment as soon as, with reasonable diligence, it could, and for any damages arising from the delay in presentation it was liable.

This case, it will be observed, was between the drawer or owner of the draft and its agent for collecting the same.

The question presented in *Farwell vs. Curtis* (7 Biss. 165, Fed. Cas. No. 4,690), so far as it bears on the point under discussion, was of the same general nature as that in *Smith vs. Miller*, which was there cited and approved.

If the Mound City Distilling Company were suing the Eufaula National Bank for accepting the check of the drawee of the draft, and thereby causing loss to it, the cases referred to would be in point, but that is not the case presented by the record before us. And that the court in *Smith vs. Miller* did not intend that its language or decision should be construed to apply to the relative rights of the parties to the check itself drawn by James K. Place & Co., is apparent from its language just preceding that above quoted, the court saying :

“But a check is payable instantly, and, as between the drawer and drawee, the latter has, in analogy to the rules applicable to inland bills of exchange, until the day after the receipt of a check to present it for payment, when drawn on a bank in the same place where given and received. But,” continues the court, “the duty of the plaintiffs is not determined by that rule of commercial law. That rule has respect only to the contract and liability of parties to the instrument.”

And we may say further that in *Railroad Co. vs. Collins* (8 Lans. 29, 57 N. Y. 641), the question decided in *Smith vs. Miller* is clearly pointed out. There the defendant had given the plaintiff a check on a local bank for the amount of freight bills on May 4. The bank on which it was drawn failed on the 5th, and the check was not presented or paid. The action was for the amount of the freight bill, for which the check had been given. The court held that there was no laches in not presenting the check before the bank closed, as the plaintiff had the whole of the next day after receiving it (*i. e.* of the 5th) in which to present it; and, referring to *Smith vs. Miller*, distinguished it in the particular above pointed out, namely, that that case was not disposed of upon the rules of law regulating the rights and duties, respectively, of the drawer and drawee of a check, but upon the rules applicable to one who takes a check for collection, acting for one not a party to it.

The distinction, therefore, to be drawn from the foregoing authorities is this: That, as between the drawer or owner of the draft on the one hand and the party charged with the duty of collecting it on the other hand, the question of their relative rights is to be determined by the rules of law applicable to principal and agent; and that, as between the drawer and the payee of a check given under the circumstances and for the purpose shown in this case, the question of their respective rights and liabilities is to be ascertained and fixed by the principles of the commercial law.

The defendant here, in collecting the draft, was the agent of the drawer thereof, and in no proper sense can it be said to have been the agent of the plaintiff. (1 Morse,



Banks, § 214; *Dodge vs. Trust Co.* 93 U. S. 385; *Anderson vs. Gill*, 79 Md. 312, 29 Atl. 527.)

There are numerous cases, besides those already adverted to, some of which are referred to hereafter, where the action was upon the check itself, or upon the original indebtedness, and the defense was interposed of payment, by reason of laches in the presentation of the check for payment, which resulted in a loss or damage to the drawer; and such laches and consequent damage we have held may be shown under a plea of payment. (*Watt vs. Gans* [Ala.] 21 South. 1011.)

Manifestly, the drawer's case is not made any stronger by the mere fact that he is plaintiff than it would, under the same circumstances, be if he were defendant, and pleading that he was discharged by the payee's or holder's delay in presenting the check. It would, indeed, be an anomaly to decide that the defendant had a reasonable time within which to present the check for payment, in order to charge the drawer, and, under the same state of facts, to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in not presenting it before the expiration of such reasonable time.

Under the facts stated in the count of the complaint under consideration, the only obligation, so far as concerned the plaintiff, which rested upon the defendant, was to use due diligence to make presentment and demand of payment of the check within the reasonable time allowed by the rules of the commercial law, and, upon its being dishonored, to give due notice to the drawer. (1 Morse, Banks, § 218.)

What, then, is the reasonable time which the defendant had within which to discharge the obligation, under the facts of this case? We consider it thoroughly settled that the reasonable time allowed the holder for presenting a check, when he receives it in the same place where the bank on which it is drawn is located, is till the close of banking hours on the next secular day; and if, in the meantime, the bank fails, the loss will fall on the drawer. (*Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 1590; 1 Morse, Banks, §§ 240, 421; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 1103; *Bank vs. Spicer*, 6 Wend. 443; *Wear vs. Lee*, 87 Mo. 358; *Bickford vs. Bank*, 42 Ill. 288; *Simpson vs. Insurance Co.* 44 Cal. 139; *Loux vs. Fobz*, 171 Pa. St. 68, 38 Atl. 190; *Anderson vs. Gill*, 79 Md. 312, 29 Atl. 527; *Holmes vs. Roe*, 62 Mich. 199, 28 N. W. 864; *Smith vs. Miller*, 43 N. Y. 171; *O'Brien vs. Smith*, 1 Black, 99.) We recognized and approved this rule in *Savings Co. vs. Weakley*, *supra*.

In *Bank vs. Nelson* (105 Ala. 180, 16 South. 707,) this court held that checks were included in the word "bills" as used in Section 1761 of the Code of this State, relating to instruments governed by the commercial law. In that case Judge Haralson, speaking for the court, says:

"We fail to see why checks, as well as other commercial instruments, do not require the protection of the statute. They are well known, and from the necessities of the case enter as largely into the commercial transactions of the country as other species of commercial instruments; and, after all we have said and attempted on the subject of negotiable instruments for these many years, to regulate them to take their chances as commercial bastards, and make their own way in the commercial world, deprived of the protection which is accorded to other negotiable instruments, it seems would be against reason, authority, and the interest of the country."

Nothing is shown by the count we have discussed which calls for any modification of the well-settled rule above announced. The acceptance of the check by the defendant was only a payment of the draft *sub modo*, and could become operative as a payment in fact only when the check was paid (*Smith vs. Miller*, *supra*); and the drawee bank being closed on March 31, the defendant could on that day have tendered back to the drawer his check, and made formal demand for the payment of the accepted draft (*First Nat. Bank of Meadville vs. Fourth Nat. Bank of New York*, 77 N. Y. 320). Whether, therefore, his payment on March 31 be treated as a payment of his check or of the acceptance, the result is the same as to him, as he

was, by reason of having accepted the draft, liable thereon as the principal debtor. (8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 470; *Ticknor vs. Bank*, 8 Ala. 135.) His liability was not discharged, and under the views we have expressed the defendant was not liable to him in damages.

It follows that the demurrer to the first count should have been sustained, and that the former opinion in this case (106 Ala. 383, 18 South. 11) must be overruled.

After the case returned to the circuit court, the plaintiff was allowed to amend his complaint by filling an additional count, which averred substantially the same facts that appear in the original complaint, except that he averred that at the time he delivered his check to defendant the latter "contracted with plaintiff to present the same within a reasonable time to said John McNab Bank for payment," and "that defendant violated its contract with plaintiff in that it did not present said check for payment to the John McNab Bank within a reasonable time on said March 30, 1891." Without stopping to determine whether the meaning of the averments is that a contract was made whereby the defendant agreed to present the check on March 30, the day of its receipt, we are satisfied the court's ruling is free from error on this branch of the case.

As we construe the original complaint, it counted on the want of due diligence or negligence of the defendant in presenting the check, and was therefore in case. The new count claiming damages by reason of the alleged violation of the contract therein set out was in assumpsit. But it is not allowable to join a count in case with one in assumpsit. By the introduction of the additional count the complaint was made to contain a misjoinder of counts, and the defect was properly taken advantage of by the demurrer to the entire complaint as amended. (*Wilkinson vs. Moseley*, 30 Ala. 562.)

The plaintiff having declined to plead further, judgment was rendered against him, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

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#### INSOLVENT STATE BANK—PREFERENCE OF CLAIMS DUE SAVINGS BANK.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department, March, 1899.

CHENANGO VALLEY SAVINGS BANK vs. GEORGE W. DUNN, AS RECEIVER OF THE MERCHANTS' BANK OF BINGHAMTON, et al.

Where a State bank has become insolvent deposits made with it by a Savings bank under the authority of Sections 118 and 119 of the Banking Law are entitled to preference. Such preference extends to any part of the "available fund" of the Savings bank deposited under the authority of Section 119.

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Action by the plaintiff to recover, as a preferred claim under Section 130 of the Banking Law, the amount of the sum on deposit to the credit of the plaintiff in the Merchants' Bank of Binghamton, of which, on account of its insolvency, the defendant Dunn had been appointed Receiver.

The trial court allowed the amount claimed as a general debt against the insolvent bank, but held that it was not entitled to a preference under the above section. Judgment was entered directing that it be paid by the Receiver, *pro rata* with other creditors and allowing costs against plaintiff to such Receiver.

PER CURIAM: Section 130 of Chapter 689 of the Laws of 1892, known as the Banking Law, provides that the Receiver of an insolvent bank, after providing for the payment of its circulating notes if it has any, shall apply all its property to the payment in full of any sum or sums of money deposited therewith by any Savings bank, but not to an amount exceeding that authorized to be so deposited by the provisions of this chapter, etc., etc.

It appears in the case before us, that at the time the Merchants' Bank, of which the defendant is Receiver, was closed by the Banking Department as being insol-

ent, the Chenango Valley Savings Bank had on deposit to its credit therein the sum of \$50,943.50.

Within the provisions of Section 130, above cited, it was the duty of the defendant to pay the whole of that amount to the Savings bank, from the assets of the insolvent bank, in preference to all claims other than its circulating notes, unless such sum exceeded the amount which the Savings bank was authorized to deposit under the provisions of the chapter above cited. To the extent that it exceeded such amount, the Receiver was justified in refusing to prefer it.

The right of a Savings bank, to make deposits in another bank, is given by Sections 118 and 119 of such chapter. By those two sections two distinct funds are recognized as the subject of deposit by the Savings Bank. First, a fund not exceeding ten per cent. of its deposits, which may be kept uninvested by the Savings Bank and on hand "for the purpose of meeting current payments and expenses in excess of its receipts." It is termed in Section 118 "an available fund;" and the Savings Bank is authorized to deposit it in other banks, but in no one bank may it deposit a greater portion of such fund than shall equal twenty-five per cent. of the paid-up capital and surplus of such bank. It is the evident purpose of the statute, that all the moneys received by the Savings bank shall be loaned and invested in the securities authorized by Section 116 of that act, except this "available fund," which may be kept as a permanent deposit, under the limitation above cited.

Secondly. The Legislature, recognizing the fact that a Savings bank may, in addition to this "available fund," accumulate money faster than it can find proper investments for the same, provided in Section 119 that "temporary deposits" might be made of such accumulations, in other banks "until such time as the same can be judiciously invested in the securities required by this article." No limitation is placed upon the amount of such moneys which may be deposited in any one bank. The officers of the Savings Bank are authorized to use their own judgment as to the amount of such temporary deposits, subject only to the supervisory control of the Superintendent of Banks which the same section imposes upon them.

The capital stock of the Merchants' Bank was \$100,000, and, as a matter of fact, when the deposits above mentioned were made by the Savings bank the former bank had no surplus whatever, although it did at that time report to the department and advertise that it had a surplus of \$85,000. And if such deposits of \$50,943.50 were authorized by the provisions of Section 118 only, the question would be presented, as to whether anything more than \$25,000 thereof (being twenty-five per cent. of the capital only of the Merchants' Bank) should be preferred. But, if we may consider that such deposit of \$50,943.50 was also authorized by the provisions of Section 119, then there being no limit to the amount which might be so deposited, there is not any reason apparent why the whole of such deposit was not authorized, and therefore to be preferred.

In its decision the trial court finds as a fact that during the period between December 2, 1893, and January 21, 1895, being a little more than a year, the plaintiff deposited with the Merchants' Bank sums aggregating \$50,943.50, for the purpose of meeting current payments and expenses in excess of its receipts, "and as temporary deposits."

Clearly it was not forbidden, nor irregular for the Savings bank to deposit with one bank and in one account, money for the purpose of meeting its current expenses, and also such accumulations as it was holding for investment. That is, it might mix in one deposit, the whole or a portion of its "available fund" and also temporary deposits awaiting investment; and if it did so the whole of such deposit would be authorized.

Under the above finding of fact, which is also a conceded fact in the case, we must assume that the deposit in question was just such a one as that. The plaintiff

availed itself of the authority given by the two Sections 118 and 119 to deposit a part, at least, of its "available fund" and also such amount of its funds awaiting investment as it deemed judicious, with the Merchants' Bank. So far as its "available fund" was concerned, it was limited to a certain proportion of the Merchants' Bank's capital and surplus, but as far as the other funds were concerned, the amount which it was authorized to deposit was unlimited.

It is urged upon us by the defendant, that it does not appear that any of such deposits were of funds awaiting investment, and hence the court must assume that it was authorized if at all only by the provisions of Section 118. Also it is further urged that, if it must be conceded that some part of such deposit was of funds awaiting investment, yet it does not appear but that it was a small fraction only of the whole deposit and that the rest, being of the "available fund" it exceeded the amount allowed by Section 118, and was therefore not authorized.

But we are not to assume, under such finding, that the plaintiff had deposited any larger amount of its "available fund" than was authorized. It being shown that the Savings bank made this deposit for the purposes authorized by the two sections, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it cannot be said that any part of such deposit was without authority. There is a plain authority appearing for the deposit, as a whole, and hence the preference given by Section 180 must be given it by the defendant, unless he makes it to appear that such *prima facie* authority does not in fact exist.

It is strongly urged upon us by the defendant's counsel, that the words "and as temporary deposits," used in the concession and finding, were not intended to mean such "temporary deposits" as are named in Section 119, and that the finding does not warrant the conclusion that any part of such deposit was of that character.

We are not at liberty to construe such concession by an occurrence that does not appear in the record before us. The plain reading of the finding is to the effect that the deposit was made for the two purposes above mentioned, and such is the claim now presented by the appellant's counsel.

Moreover, why should not the deposit be now so considered, without reference to the purpose of the Savings bank in making it? All the moneys accumulated by a Savings bank are the excess of its daily receipts over its current expenses and payments; and if the sum of \$50,000 is deposited with one bank and in one account, with the intent of checking against it for expenses incurred, in the event that an emergency requires it, and of withdrawing a portion thereof as soon as it can be judiciously invested, authority for so doing is found in the two sections above cited. And the proportion of the amount which should be applied to expenses and that which should be applied to investments is a matter which should be left to the final judgment of the Savings bank. At least such bank should not be forced to treat any part as an unauthorized deposit because it had an erroneous idea when it made the deposit that the surplus of the bank was much larger than it proved to be. The statute, since the amendment of 1892, evidently intends to give a preference to all deposits, whether they are a part of the available fund or a part of those temporary ones awaiting investment, and inasmuch as the deposit in question might lawfully have been made under the authority of Section 119, there is no good reason apparent why it should not be justified by it. Certainly it seems to be incumbent upon the Receiver to show affirmatively that some portion, and how much, of such a deposit was unauthorized, if he would justify a refusal to prefer the same. (*Erie Co. Savings Bank vs. Coit*, 104 N. Y. 532, 537.)

Under this view of the case, it becomes necessary to determine whether or not the Savings Bank was authorized to deposit under the provisions of Section 118, an amount equal not only to twenty-five per cent. of the capital but also twenty-five per cent. of \$85,000, the reported surplus of the Merchants' Bank. Having the

authority of Section 119 as well as that of Section 118 for making this deposit, the whole amount of it is preferred.

It is conceded that when the bank was closed on January 21, 1895, it was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of \$50,943.50, with interest thereon at the rate of three per cent. per annum, from January 1, 1895, to such date, making in all the sum of \$51,028.40. It being the duty of the Receiver to pay that whole amount as a preferred debt, as soon as he could reasonably ascertain that there were sufficient assets properly applicable thereto to pay it, and he having on July 29, 1895, paid \$25,000 thereof, and then declined to pay the balance as not being preferred, and thereby necessitated this action to determine that question, it would seem that the plaintiff is entitled to interest from that date on such balance unpaid. (*People vs. Remington*, 59 Hun, 307; *Id.* 126 N. Y. 679.)

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

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**APPLICATION OF DEPOSITS TO DEBTS DUE BANK—PARTNERSHIP AND  
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY.**

Supreme Court of North Carolina, April 25, 1899.

HODGIN vs. PEOPLE'S NATIONAL BANK.

Deposits made by a surviving partner in the name of the firm may be applied to a firm debt to the bank, whether matured or not, where the deposits were not made as a special deposit, and it was not agreed that such application should not be made.

A bank cannot apply deposits on behalf of a firm, whether made during its existence or by a surviving partner, to an individual debt of a deceased partner, evidenced by a note, indorsed by the survivor, for firm debts.

Individual deposits of a partner cannot be applied to firm debts to a bank.

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CLARK, J.: A bank has the right to apply the debt due by it for deposit to any indebtedness by the depositor, in the same right, to the bank, provided such indebtedness to the bank has matured. (*Bank vs. Hill*, 76 Ind. 223; *Knapp vs. Crowell*, 77 Iowa, 528; *Coates vs. Preston*, 105 Ill. 470; *Bank vs. Bowen*, 21 Kan. 354; *Clark vs. Bank*, 160 Mass. 26; *Bank vs. Armstrong*, 15 N. C. 519; *Muench vs. Bank*, 11 Mo. App. 144; *Morse, Banks*, § 324; *Bank vs. Hughes*, 17 Wend. 94; *Eyrich vs. Bank*, 67 Miss. 60.)

Even if the indebtedness to the bank has not matured, if the depositor becomes insolvent, the bank, by virtue of the right of equitable set-off, may apply the deposits with it of such debtor to his indebtedness. (*Dammon vs. Bank*, 50 Mass. 194; *Kentucky Flour Co.'s Assignee vs. Merchants' Nat. Bank*, 90 Ky. 225; *Nashville Trust Co. vs. Fourth Nat. Bank*, 91 Tenn. 336; *Georgia Seed Co. vs. Talmadge & Co.* 96 Ga. 254; *Wat. Set-Off*, 432.)

The money deposited by Hodgin as surviving partner was kept under the same heading in the bank's books, "Hodgin Bros. & Lunn," as before the death of Lunn, and was merely a continuation of the old line of deposits. This would have been equally true if the deposits, after the death of Lunn, had been made in the name of "Hodgin, surviving partner." In either event, the deposits were in behalf of the firm, and were in the same right as the note held by the bank against said firm; and on the insolvency of the firm the bank had the right to apply the deposit made by the surviving partner in behalf of the firm to the indebtedness of the firm, whether matured or not. If the surviving partner had made the deposit a special deposit, or if there had been an agreement with the bank that these deposits should not be applied to the indebtedness of the firm to the bank, then the bank's right of set-off would have been tolled. (*Morse, Banks*, § 325.) But there was no evidence to that effect.

It is true that deposits made by an executor or administrator in a bank cannot be applied to the indebtedness to the bank of the deceased. (*Jordan vs. Bank*, 74 N. Y. 467; *Appeal of Farmers and Mechanics' Bank*, 48 Pa. St. 57.) But that is because the personal representative holds the funds of the estate for the payment of the debts in the order prescribed by statute, and then *pro rata* in each class, which would be disturbed if the bank could apply the funds deposited by the executor or administrator to the indebtedness due to it by the deceased, though the deposits at the death of the testator could be applied to any indebtedness of his then due. (*Jordan vs. Bank*, *supra*.)

It is otherwise as to the surviving partner who merely continues the business for the purpose of winding it up, and of whom the law does not require the application of the funds in his hands to the debts in any prescribed order. The bank had no right, however, to apply the deposits on behalf of the firm, whether made during its existence or by the surviving partner, to the indebtedness held by it against one of the partners, and it could make no difference that this was the note of one partner indorsed by the other. It was an individual indebtedness, and partnership deposits could not be applied to it. A partnership is not liable for the debts of its members. (*Strauss vs. Frederick*, 91 N. C. 121.)

Though each partner (except in limited partnerships) is severally responsible for the entire indebtedness of the firm, yet, notwithstanding that fact, the individual deposits of a partner cannot be applied to the indebtedness of the firm to the bank. (*Adams vs. Bank*, 118 N. C. 332; *Bank vs. Jones*, 119 Ill. 407; *Raymond vs. Palmer*, 41 La. Ann. 425; *Dawson vs. Bank*, 5 Ark. 283.)

Upon the issues as found, the judgment might have been corrected to accord with the above opinion but for the finding upon the eighth issue. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess of the deposits above the indebtedness of the firm, with interest from date of demand. New trial.

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#### LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER—SET-OFF.

Supreme Court of North Carolina, April 25, 1899.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK vs. RIGGINS.

A stockholder in a National bank in process of liquidation cannot set off his distributive share in the assets against his liability on his stock.

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FAIRCLOTH, C. J.: The plaintiff, the First National Bank, is in liquidation, and a committee duly appointed has charge of its property, to collect the assets, pay its debts, and distribute the balance among the stockholders.

The defendant is a stockholder in plaintiff bank, and is indebted to it for his stock, which was deposited as collateral security; and this action is brought to collect the amount due on said stock, and to sell the stock in payment, or part payment, of the amount found to be due.

The defendant alleges that upon a final settlement of the bank's affairs he will be entitled to \$800 as his distributive share of the assets, and demands a credit on his debt for that amount.

This allegation and this right are denied, and it does not appear what will be his distributive share.

In cases of insolvency, private or corporate, the general rule is that the net balance must be distributed *pro rata* among the beneficiaries. Under the National Banking Act, when an assessment is made, each stockholder is required to pay his part in full, regardless of whether he is a debtor or creditor of the bank, and when the collections are made, and all debts and expenses are discharged, an equitable distribution of the assets is made.

The same rule applies in the settlement of insolvent estates by executors and administrators. And so it is in winding up the business of insolvent building and loan associations, as was held by this court in *Mears vs. Duncan* (123 N. C. 208, 31 S. E. 476) and cases cited.

If the defendant's contention was allowed, he would get the full value of his stock, at least *pro tanto*, and thus the net amount for the other stockholders would be reduced, and the principle of an equitable settlement would be disturbed, as the liability of the stockholder would be diminished, and that of the other stockholders increased, which would be a result not contemplated in law or equity.

As a stockholder, he is liable to an amount equal to his stock, or to a just proportion, if all is not required; but, as a creditor, he is entitled only to a dividend in proportion to other creditors. His liability as a contributor for the benefit of creditors must be distinguished from his character as a simple contract debtor to the bank upon ordinary business transactions. The money arising from unpaid shares is a trust fund for all the creditors, and cannot be affected by any individual transactions of the stockholder, to the prejudice of the other stockholders. (*Hobart vs. Gould*, 8 Fed. 57; *Morse, Banks*, p. 500.)

Besides, the distributive share of the defendant is unknown, and it seems it would be impracticable to ascertain it with any certainty. The above authorities do not stand upon facts on all fours with the present case, but they all enunciate a principle plainly applicable to the present case; and that principle is so manifestly just that we have no hesitation in adopting it.

We think, therefore, that the defendant cannot set off what he supposes to be his distributive share against his individual indebtedness to the bank. **Affirmed.**

DOUGLAS, J. (concurring): I concur in the judgment of the court, but not in the opinion, which is based upon principles some of which have apparently no application to the facts, and may be confusing to us in other cases.

I do not think this case involves any equitable principles, but is simply a plain question of legal set-off or counterclaim, as all such matters are now designated under the Code. Neither does it come within the principles governing the rights of creditors to the assets of an insolvent corporation, for the simple reason that there are no creditors, as is expressly alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer.

Strictly speaking, the bank is not insolvent, because it owes no debts, but it has gone into voluntary liquidation, because its capital has become impaired to such an extent as to prevent its carrying on a profitable business.

It is true that all corporations, in their statements, place their capital stock among their liabilities; but this is necessary to offset the asset representing the money paid in on the stock. Paid-up stock may in one sense be a liability of the corporation, but in no sense can it be a debt. It represents a certain share or part of the corporation, and for that reason, in England, the holders of such shares are called "shareholders" instead of "stockholders." Such holders cannot withdraw their stock at will, but only upon the dissolution of the corporation, and then they are entitled, not to any particular sum, but to such a proportion of its assets as their respective shares bear to the entire stock. This cannot be definitely ascertained until the assets are all collected or reduced to a certainty. They are, of course, entitled to reasonable dividends; but such dividends should come only from profits, and should never impair the capital. As a stockholder is entitled only to his distributive share, he cannot demand it in advance of a general distribution. By this is not meant a final distribution, but such a distribution, in whole or in part, as applies equally to all the stockholders.

In other words, if one stockholder is given ten per cent., all can demand ten per cent. As the defendant's share was not demandable at the bringing of this action, or at any time before judgment, it was not the subject of set-off, which at common

law applied only to mutual debts, upon which independent actions could have been brought.

The counterclaim is the creature of the Code, and is an extension of the set-off, enlarging the class of claims that may be pleaded, and enabling the defendant to obtain judgment for the excess; but the Code (Section 244) specifically provides that "the counterclaim \* \* \* must be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff, between whom a several judgment might be had in the action." This question is discussed in *Electric Co. vs. Williams*, 123 N. C. 51, 31 S. E. 288.

If the stock itself and the money due in payment therefor were mutual debts, capable of mutual set-off, then no stock subscription could ever be collected; and if the stockholders could individually withdraw their shares at their option, the very purpose of incorporation would be defeated. As the defendant could not have brought suit for his individual stock, then he cannot set it off against the debt due the plaintiff.

The note sued on is clearly a debt, although given in part payment of a stock subscription. The defendant subscribed for twenty shares of the capital stock of the plaintiff bank, and apparently paid \$700 in cash, and gave his note for the balance, with the stock itself as collateral security.

It appears that by consent the capital of the bank was reduced one-half on account of losses; but, as the reduction was uniform, the actual value of the stock remained the same, as it represented the same relative proportion of ownership in the same amount of assets. It therefore makes no difference in this suit. It is the duty of those winding up the affairs of a corporation to do so with the least possible expense and inconvenience to the stockholders; but, in the absence of any allegation of fraud or oppression, we should not interfere with their reasonable discretion even in a proper action. We certainly cannot do so on a mere plea of set-off or counterclaim.

For the reasons herein stated, I concur in the judgment of the court.

MONTGOMERY, J.: I concur in the concurring opinion.

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#### FAILURE OF BANK—WAIVER OF DEMAND.

Supreme Court of Illinois, October 24, 1898.

ARNOLD vs. HART.

When a bank suspends payment and closes its doors, it thereby waives demand by its depositors.

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This was an action to recover the amount of a deposit made with the defendant, as a banker.

WILKIN, J. (omitting part of the opinion): It is further contended that the suit was prematurely brought, because no demand was made on the bank, as provided by the printed conditions in the pass book, and in any event, after the dissolution, the retiring members being solvent, the bank should have had the benefit of the sixty days' notice provided for in the printed conditions. We are unable to find any merit in these contentions. As we said in *Meadowcroft vs. People* (168 Ill. 56, on page 82, 45 N. E. 308, 310): "When a bank or banker suspends payment, and closes the doors against depositors and creditors, and discontinues banking operations, it or he waives the necessity for a demand on the part of its or his depositors." (See *Watson vs. Bank*, 8 Metc. [Mass.] 217; *Planters' Bank vs. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank*, 8 Gill & J. 449.)

Counsel seem to overlook the fact that appellee's recovery for the deposit subsequently to the dissolution is upon the liability of the original partnership. As to him, under the facts found, there was no dissolution. It is immaterial whether the



retiring members were actually solvent, and able to pay his claim or not. By closing the doors of the bank, and proclaiming its financial inability to continue operations, they thereby waived the right to insist on a demand.

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**INSOLVENCY—LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS—PROCEDURE.**

Supreme Court of Georgia, March 4, 1899.

MOORE, *et al.* vs. RIPLEY.

1. When a petition filed against a number of the stockholders of a bank, alleging that such bank is insolvent and has no funds or assets to pay either creditors or depositors, that about the sum of \$75,000 is due to depositors, that in order to pay the same it would be necessary for each stockholder to be assessed the full amount of his statutory liability, and that under the terms of its charter each stockholder is individually liable for the ultimate payment of the debts of the corporation to an amount equal to the amount of stock held by him, makes the persons named as stockholders defendants to the action, and prays judgment against each of them for the amount of their statutory liability, such petition, in the absence of a special demurrer, not specifically pointing out the want of definite allegations as to the actual indebtedness of the bank, the names of its creditors, and the amounts due them, respectively, and the failure of the petition to pray for a judgment for a specific sum against each of the defendants, will be held to set forth, in substance, a cause of action against the defendants.
2. Where an act incorporating a bank provides that each stockholder shall be individually liable for the ultimate payment of the debts of said corporation to an amount equal to the amount of stock held by him, such liability, since the passage of the act of 1894, may be enforced by the Receiver of an insolvent corporation, notwithstanding the act was passed subsequent to the act of incorporation which fixed the liability. The provision of the subsequent act that such liability shall be considered as an asset of the bank, and enforced by the Receiver, is remedial in its nature, does not affect any vested right of the creditor, and is applicable in this case.
3. When a banking corporation has been shown to be insolvent, and its assets placed in the hands of a Receiver, and in pursuance of an order of court the Receiver undertakes to collect by suit the liability of the stockholders for the payment of the debts of the bank as fixed by the statute, all of the stockholders so liable may be joined as defendants in one action.
4. In such a suit it is not necessary that the bank, as a corporation, shall be made a party defendant.
5. Courts of law have jurisdiction, on proper petition, supported by proof, to render a judgment in such a case.  
(Syllabus by the Court.)

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**LOAN—CONTRACT TO RENEW NOTE.**

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, March 2, 1899.

HALL, *et al.* vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHELSEA.

An oral agreement of a bank to renew the notes of a customer until such time as the improvement in the business situation should enable him to proceed in business without such assistance, contradicts the promise expressed on the face of the notes, and will not be enforced by a court of equity.

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HOLMES, J.: The understanding alleged in the bill that the bank would renew the plaintiff's notes until such time as the improvement in the business situation should enable the plaintiff to proceed in business without such assistance, is an understanding which directly contradicts the promise expressed on the face of the notes; for whereas, the promise expressed in the notes is a promise to pay money at the maturity of the instrument, the contemporary understanding cuts it down to a promise to give a new promise to pay.

It is not denied, and, on the contrary, rather is implied, in the bill that the agree-

ment to renew was not in writing. (*Adams vs. Wordley*, 1 Mees. and W. 374; *Young vs. Austen*, L. R. 4 C. P. 558.)

If so, it could not be proved in contradiction of any written contract, and especially not in contradiction of a bill or note in an action at law. (*Spring vs. Lovell*, 11 Pick. 417, 420; *Batchelder vs. Insurance Co.* 135 Mass. 449; *Hoare vs. Graham*, 8 Camp. 57; *Young vs. Austen*, L. R. 4 C. P. 558; *Abrey vs. Cruz*, L. R. 5 C. P. 37, 44; *Hill vs. Gaw*, 4 Pa. St. 493; *Heist vs. Hart*, 73 Pa. St. 286, 289.)

In *Flight vs. Gray* (8 C. B. N. S. 320), there is an intimation that relief might be given in equity upon such a promise, and some American cases treat the repudiation of an oral understanding, even though entered into with no intent not to perform it, as itself a sufficient fraud. (*Rearich vs. Swinehart*, 11 Pa. St. 238, 238, 240; *Taylor vs. Gilman*, 25 Vt. 411; *Murray vs. Dake*, 46 Cal. 644.) But this last notion has been denied by this court in cases depending upon somewhat similar principles. (*Bourke vs. Callanan*, 160 Mass. 195, 197.)

In *Flight vs. Gray*, Willes, J., seems to have doubted; and, where there is no fraud other than that of relying upon the principles of law, we see no satisfactory ground for allowing the engagement in a note to be varied in this way in equity any more than at law, at least on behalf of a plaintiff seeking specific performance of the oral agreement. (*Dwight vs. Pomeroy*, 17 Mass. 308; *Woollam vs. Hearn*, 7 Ves. 211, 219, 2 White and T. Lead. Cas. Eq. [6th Ed.] 513, and see note page 525; *Omerod vs. Hardman*, 5 Ves. 722, 780, 781; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. [2d Ed.] § 854, note. See *Goode vs. Riley*, 153 Mass. 585, 587; *Quinn vs. Roath*, 37 Conn. 16, 30.)

Again, it is highly improbable that such an agreement as is alleged can mean to leave the determination of the time when money may be demanded to any one but the holder of the notes. (See *Hawkins vs. Graham*, 149 Mass. 284.) On the face of it, it does not import a legally binding promise, but rather a hopeful encouragement, sounding only in prophecy. We cannot discover an actionable contract; still less one that can be specifically enforced. Every allegation in the bill is too vague and uncertain. Bill dismissed.

#### INSPECTION OF BOOKS—RIGHTS OF STOCKHOLDERS.

Supreme Court of Louisiana, January 9, 1899.

1. A shareholder, or other person, with a laudable object to accomplish, or a real and actual interest upon which to predicate his request for information disclosed by the books of a bank, is given by the fundamental law the right to inspect them.
2. The claim that the right of inspection is strictly personal to the shareholder, and cannot be exercised by another for him, and in his stead, as an agent or executor, is without force: for, if that were true, the possession of the right would be futile in many instances.
3. A by-law of a corporation, which provides that no stockholder or other person shall have the right to inspect the books without special authority from the board of directors, must be subordinated to the provisions of the charter and the general and fundamental law.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

#### TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANKS—PERSONAL PROPERTY.

United States Circuit Court, N. D. California, February 25, 1899.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO vs. CROCKER-WOOLWORTH NATIONAL BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO.

The personal property of a National bank cannot be directly assessed for taxation by State authorities.

DE HAVEN, *District Judge*: The defendant is a National banking association, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the United States, and

having its principal place of business at the city and county of San Francisco, State of California. The action is brought to recover the sum of \$7,754.64 and interest thereon, alleged to be due from the defendant for State, city and county taxes on personal property, consisting of fixtures and money belonging to and assessed to it under the laws of the State for the purposes of taxation for the year 1896. The defendant has demurred to the complaint, and the single question arising thereon is whether personal property belonging to a National bank is subject to taxation by the State.

Congress, in the exercise of its undoubted power, has, in Section 5219, Rev. St. U. S., declared what property of National banks may be thus taxed. It is therein provided that real property of National banks shall be subject to State, county and municipal taxes, "to the same extent, according to its value, as other real property is taxed," and that the shares in any such association shall be assessed as other personal property, to the owner or holder of such shares. The effect of this statute is to exempt personal property belonging to National banks from direct assessment and taxation by the State; that is, the personal property of such banks cannot be directly assessed to them by the State for purposes of taxation. That this is so is well settled as not to require discussion at this time. (*Rosenblatt vs. Johnston*, 104 U. S. 462; *People vs. Weaver*, 100 U. S. 539-543; *Covington City Nat. Bank vs. City of Covington*, 21 Fed. 484; *People vs. National Bank of D. O. Mills & Co.* Sup. Ct. Cal. Dec. 19, 1898, 55 Pac. 685.)

The demurrer will be sustained, and judgment thereupon entered in favor of the defendant, the defendant to recover costs.

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## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

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Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

NEW YORK, MAY 15, 1899.

SIR: On May 10 A draws a check and delivers the same to B. A dies suddenly on the morning of the 11th. The check is deposited by B in his bank on the 11th, and on the morning of the 12th the check is presented through the clearing-house to the bank on which it is drawn. The officers of the bank have learned of A's death, but have had no formal notice thereof. Should they pay the check?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—It is not entirely clear whether the death of the drawer revokes the authority of the bank to pay a check. We think the correct view is that expressed in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, where it is said: "The death of a drawer of a check, as is stated by many authorities, operates as a revocation of the authority of the bank or banker upon which it is drawn to pay it; and though it is conceded that if the bank or banker pay the check before notice of the death, the payment is valid; otherwise, it has been considered, it is not. This view has been generally based upon the decision in the English case of *Tate vs. Hilbert*, where it was held that the gift of a common check on a banker payable to bearer was not a valid *donatio mortis causa*, or an appointment or disposition in the nature of it. It is quite true that authority to an agent is revoked as a general rule by death of the principal; but this doctrine is qualified by the equally well-settled principle, that if the authority be coupled with an interest in the thing vested in the agent, the death of the principal operates no revocation. Now, where a check is given to the payee for a valuable consideration (and the check imparts value), the authority of the payee to collect the amount from the bank is coupled with a vested interest in the check. He can sue the drawer upon the check if it be dishonored. The drawing of

a check without funds to meet it is a fraud, and the English case above referred to does not determine, as has been supposed, that when the check is given for value, the authority of the banker to pay it is revoked. The death of the drawer of an ordinary bill of exchange does not revoke it, and we can discern no principle of law which allows the death of the drawer to affect the rights of a check holder who has given value for it. The idea that the death of the drawer of a check given to the payee for value, operates a revocation, is, as it seems to us, a total misconception of the law. For a check is a negotiable instrument as often, if not more frequently, given for value, than any other species of commercial paper. The drawer is deemed the principal debtor; and it is anomalous to hold that his death in anywise lessens his obligations, or the right of the bank to pay it, when given for value." We also think that this would be the effect of Section 321 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

—, So. Dakota, May 3, 1899.

SIR: Suppose a draft is drawn by a bank on one of its correspondents with due precautions, say on safety paper and with figures for amount punched out, and suppose the amount is raised, say from \$10 to \$1,000, and is paid for the raised amount by correspondent bank and mistake not discovered till statement for month is received and checked up, which bank has to stand the loss, and is this point definitely settled by the courts? CASHIER.

*Answer.*—The rule is that, unless the drawer of the check or draft has been guilty of negligence in discovering the alteration, and notifying the drawee bank thereof, the loss must fall upon the latter; and if notice is given with reasonable promptness after the regular statement is submitted, the drawer is not chargeable with negligence. (*Leather Manufacturers' Bank vs. Morgan*, 117 U. S. 96.) Nor is the drawer required to use safety paper, or any other device to prevent the fraudulent alteration of the instrument. On the contrary, it has been held that though the amount is filled in in such a way that it can be easily raised, or where a blank space is left, the loss will not be imputed to the negligence of the drawer.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MONROE, La., May 26, 1899.

SIR: On June 10, 1892, John Doe draws a check in favor of Richard Roe against his deposit account in bank. The latter does not present the check to the bank for payment until April 5, 1899, and same is dishonored, there being no funds to the credit of the drawer. Richard Roe then makes demand on John Doe, the drawer. The latter refuses to make it good on the grounds that the check, as an obligation against him, the drawer, has prescribed. Is this correct, or does prescription begin to run only from demand and dishonor by the bank? When the check was given and for some time thereafter, John Doe, the drawer, had sufficient funds to his credit in bank to pay same, but afterwards closed his account at the bank and drew out all of his deposit, not knowing at the time that the check was out, as he did not keep a record of his checks drawn. T. E. FLOURNOY, Cashier.

*Answer.*—By the statute of Louisiana an action upon a check is prescribed after five years from the time the right of action accrues. The question in the case submitted by our correspondent, therefore is, did the right of action accrue before payment was refused by the bank, and if so, when? If the depositor had had no funds in bank when the check was delivered, then he would have become immediately liable upon the instrument without any presentment made to the bank. (*Brush vs. Barrett*, 82 N. Y. 400.) And for similar reasons demand would be dispensed with and the check would become immediately due, when the drawer withdrew all his funds from the bank and closed the account; and if this happened more than five years since, then the action is plainly barred. But it is not clear that the action can be maintained, though less than five years have elapsed since the account was closed; for a check is payable immediately, and the holder has it in his power to perfect his cause of action at once; and it would appear that he should do this within a reasonable time (see 13 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 726), which, under ordinary circumstances, would be within a few days after the delivery of the check to him.



**\* MODERN BANKING METHODS.**

**A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.**

**THE CERTIFICATION OF CHECKS.**

Part of the duties of the paying teller of a bank is to certify checks. This is a custom almost exclusively confined to the large cities, although there is nothing to

<b>certified</b>	<b>MIFFLINTOWN, PA.</b>		<i>March 8 1899</i>		<b>No. 135</b>	
	<b>JUNIATA VALLEY BANK</b>					
<i>Pay to the order of</i>			<i>Sam'l Barron</i>		<b>\$4500<sup>00</sup>/<sub>100</sub></b>	
<i>Forty five hundred</i>					<b>DOLLARS</b>	
			<i>P. S. Kelly &amp; Sons</i>			

**FORM 1.—CERTIFIED CHECK.**

prevent it being done in any banks unless some local rule against it should prevail. While in some banks certifying is done by the Cashier, still the general custom makes it one of the duties of the teller.

*Certified Check Register*

<i>Date</i> <i>Certification</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>To whom Order</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>When Paid</i>	<i>Amt. Paid</i>
<i>1899</i> <i>March 5</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>Jas. E. Tramer</i>	<i>B. F. Brown</i>	<i>3600</i>	<i>March 21</i>	<i>3600</i>
<i>7</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>Sam'l Barron</i>	<i>W. B. Shields</i>	<i>2975 46</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>2975 46</i>
	<i>53</i>					
	<i>54</i>					
	<i>55</i>					
	<i>56</i>					
	<i>57</i>					
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	<i>59</i>					
	<i>60</i>					
	<i>61</i>					
	<i>62</i>					
	<i>63</i>					
	<i>64</i>					
	<i>65</i>					

**FORM 2.—CERTIFIED CHECK REGISTER.**

Great care should be exercised to see that the depositor has the amount *actually on deposit* before certifying a check.

\* Continued from the May number, page 738. This series of articles commenced in the MAGAZINE for August, 1898, page 249.

**CLEARING HOUSE DUE BILL**

Number: *240*

*Barboursdale, Pa. Mich 8 1899*

**Pay to the order of THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK**

*Twenty Second National Bank*

*Five hundred and thirty thousand*

*Five hundred and thirty thousand Dollars.*

*J. H. Simpson*

*J. H. Simpson*

*17530-00*

This Due Bill is not valid unless signed by one and countersigned by another authorized person and is payable only in the currency of the United States.

FORM 3.—CLEARING-HOUSE DUE BILL.

*No 240*

*Mich 8 1899*

*Twenty Second*

*Natl Bank*

*1753000*

Section 5208 of the Revised Statutes makes it an offense "for any officer, clerk or agent of any National banking association to certify any check drawn upon the association unless the person or company drawing the check has on deposit with the association, at the time such check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check."

The penalty for the violation of this law is the placing of the bank in the hands of a Receiver, and the punishment of the offender by a fine of not more than \$5,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, at the discretion of the court.

It is right that this law should be a strict one, and the penalty severe, for more than one bank has been wrecked by its non-observance. The certifying of a check is virtually the paying of the check, and the bank agrees, by marking the check "good," to set aside the money for it by which it shall be paid on proper presentation.

A bank, however, cannot be compelled to certify a check. It may prefer for good reason to pay the check, and it has the right to so elect if preferred. A banker will rightly hesitate to certify a check for a small sum, as many cases have occurred where such checks have been raised to much larger amounts and passed to an innocent third party. It is certainly good banking to cash such checks instead of certifying.

The customary way to certify a check is to write or stamp across its face the sentence "Good when properly endorsed," the signature of the officer immediately following. A safe plan is to also number and date the certification, the number to be that shown by the certified check register.

Form 1 shows a check certified by the method suggested.

It is necessary that a book called the certified check register be kept by the teller, or his assistant, in which should be noted at the time of certification of a check, opposite its regular number, the description of the check, and when the check is presented for payment, the date

of payment and the amount should be entered opposite the first entry. This book is numbered consecutively, fifty numbers on a page. A good form for such a book is seen in Form 2.

At the close of the day the bookkeeper obtains his entry from the certified check register and charges the depositor's account with the amount, and the certified check account should be credited with the same amount on the general ledger. When the check is paid, the proper entry should be made on the register as before stated and the certified check account charged with the amount.

**CLEARING-HOUSE DUE BILLS.**

Another one of the duties attached to the paying teller's desk, in cities where there is a clearing-house, is the issuing of the clearing-house due bills. These due bills are given in settlement of the balances due to the clearing-house and to individuals for immediate use, such as the payment of a note at another bank. In this they often take the place of the certifying of checks. They also pass between banks in payment for exchange.

The due bills are bound in a book with a stub, and when issued are to be signed by one officer and countersigned by another. Form 3 shows the customary form for due bills.

**MONEY FOR PAY-ROLLS OF CUSTOMERS.**

In some manufacturing cities where the competition between the banks is great, for the purpose of securing accounts some banks agree to put up the money for the pay-rolls of their customers in the necessary individual packages, these rolls being furnished them by the manufacturing companies and others. Where the pay-rolls are large this requires a great amount of extra labor, and I think it is questionable whether it really pays.

Some banks furnish their customers who draw money for large pay-rolls with a blank slip on which they can indicate the amount of money required in the various denominations. This is a convenience both to the bank and to the customer. The slips being retained on file by the paying teller become one of his vouchers. Form 4 shows the customary form for these pay-roll slips.

**The Philadelphia National Bank**

*will please prepare for*

*Chester Woolen Mills*  
 pay roll Oct 15<sup>th</sup> 1899.  
15965<sup>45</sup>/100 Dollars.  
*in amounts as follows:*

NOTES, 100's . . . . .	500	
" 50's . . . . .	250	
" 20's . . . . .	1000	
" 10's . . . . .	1000	
" 5's . . . . .	1500	
" 1's & 2's . . . . .	1000	
<b>TOTAL NOTES,</b>	<b>5250</b>	<b>00</b>
SILVER, 1's . . . . .	500	
" Halves . . . . .	100	
" Quarters . . . . .	50	
" Dimes . . . . .	30	
NICKELS . . . . .	25	
PENNIES . . . . .	10	45
<b>TOTAL,</b>	<b>5965</b>	<b>45</b>

*Please count all pay rolls immediately on your return to your office, and report at once any errors to the Teller.  
 Bank opens at 9 A. M. on Saturdays only.*

FORM 4.—PAY-ROLL SLIP.

**RECEIVING TELLER'S DEPOSIT RECORD.**

The receiving teller generally keeps a record of all the deposits received by him during the day. These he enters upon a book by name and amount from the deposit

tickets before these tickets are given to the bookkeeper. It is right that he should keep this record and that none of the tickets or vouchers should be given up until the record has been made.

This book upon which such a record is kept is usually called the deposit scratcher, and Form 5 gives the usual style.

The narrow column in which figures are seen is used for noting the amount of currency contained in the deposits. Many times it may aid the teller in discovering errors in his balance by keeping such a record.

The usual form of the deposit ticket is well known, but I give here in Form 6 one with a little improvement.

The improvement consists in having the deposit tickets made three-quarters of an inch wider than usual, then procure a small fish-tail letter file that has the double punch attached, and at the close of each day's business punch holes in the left-hand side of the tickets and place them on the rods on the file. The file will hold the tickets for a month, as a general rule. At the close of the month slip the tickets off the file and bind them by running a light copper wire through both holes and twisting the ends together on the under side. They can also be bound by running a

*Deposit Scratcher* *May 15<sup>th</sup> 1899*

<i>J. B. Smith</i>	50	24715	<i>Brought forward</i>
<i>A. L. Jones</i>		175	
<i>Saul Barrow</i>	100	75516	
<i>Jos. E. Trammor</i>	50	450	
<i>W. B. Brown</i>		31560	
<i>A. Y. Peterson</i>	75	75	
<i>B. F. James</i>		240	
<i>Forward</i>			

FORM 5.—DEPOSIT SCRATCHER.

stout cord through the holes with a bagging needle. If the wire or cord is not drawn too tightly the tickets can be very easily referred to, like the pages of a book. It is an excellent plan to put a piece of strong Manila paper around the back and top and bottom of the monthly package, running the wire or cord through the whole, thus binding it on like a cover of a book. It protects the tickets and makes a good place on which to note the month and year before filing away. This method will, I think, be found much more convenient than the old custom of tying up in package, and certainly much easier to refer to whenever necessary.

An excellent custom in use in some banks is that of requiring that whoever receives a deposit shall put his initials on the deposit ticket. I know of instances where banks have been saved considerable loss by such a method. Another useful feature is that of stamping all the deposit tickets that come in before noon with the letters "A.M." as it is sometimes very important to be able to state when a deposit was received. An instrument is in use in some institutions which is extremely useful in this respect. It is called a "time stamp," the time part being run by clock work, which is wound up every day, and when used at the receiving teller's desk to stamp deposit tickets, it stamps the word received with the date and time of the day. When used at the paying teller's desk it stamps the word paid instead of received. In law-suits it is sometimes of great advantage to be able to tell definitely at what time of the day a transaction took place.



One of the most useful books I have found in a bank is called the proof book. In banks of comparatively small size one book will generally answer, but in larger banks two books one for the debit items and one for the credit items, are found necessary. I give below in Form 7 the form for such a book, both pages, for a bank using only one book.

This form, as will be seen, has also two columns on the credit page for the teller upon which to make up his daily cash, and is used in place of a cash settlement book. This will answer very well for banks of a moderate size. The items, of all kinds, before being removed from the teller's desk, are entered in their proper columns in this book, and the totals of each of these columns must agree with the totals as shown by the various departments to which the items have been distributed.

As will be seen, the proof is made about three times during the day, which saves the annoyance of going over the whole day's work at the close of the day, if there should be difficulty in balancing.

The items as given can be traced into the "cash" with the exception of those under the head of exchanges, totaling "\$4,169.46," for the reason that these items represent the exchange checks carried over into the next day's work, and would be found listed on the page belonging to the next day.

The last item of the cash, exchanges \$6,058.94, is the total of the exchange checks received from the other banks, as will be seen by a reference to the last items on

DEPOSITED BY

*J. S. Brown*

IN THE

**Traders National Bank**

Centre City,

*Sept. 19 1899*

PLEASE LIST EACH CHECK SEPARATELY.

NOTES	150	
GOLD	10	
SILVER	50	
CHECKS	32	50
<i>1st</i>		
<i>Mch to</i>	217	65
<i>2<sup>d</sup></i>	95	14
<i>Pin to</i>	145	
<i>Newark</i>	38	16
<hr/>		
738		45
<i>AM</i>		

FORM 6.—DEPOSIT TICKET.



Credits Proof Book Tuesday Feb. 16<sup>th</sup> 1899

	Cash		General Credits			Individual Credits	Currency	Acid.
			Letters	Summit	Profits			
Balance		46627.36	46837	1	62	20828		115
General Credits	6098.98		522.51	1228	2230	28875		400
Individual	17149.78	23288.76	320	700	5088	1087		110
			549.62	76	8487	16.58		83
			311.16	20	2156	24877		20
			5276	80	21858	2880		38
		69891.12	25274	10	1	13220		30
			50	20		8800		38
Cash			3650	1108	120327	101		1
Silver Dollars	2508		1746	283		32832		10
Gold	5010		74507	928		13220		50
Legal Tender	14035		43003	100		116		50
Fractional	962		32173	5		26601		60
Nickels & Cents	5837			5		11779		100
Natl. Bank Notes	5805	7837537		5		115		15
				100		118650		20
Exchanges				147748		160		20
Timet	132243			5		2251		30
Second	49621			5		57		10
Merchants	197526			100		20164		50
Traders	37556			5		30441		15
				5		20		50
				5		408907		20
				5		7096		50
				5		170		10
				5		18892		10
				5		92774		50
				5		50		70
				5		36574		50
				5		5		10
Cash Items	416946	488990		5		13641		10
	22044			5		704		10
				5		12260		10
Total Cash		3776527		5		46012		10
General Debits	1433233			5		59220		10
Individual	1673453			5		1714773		10
Exchanges	605894	3712585		5				10
		6989112		5				10

FORM 7.—PROOF BOOK (CREDITS).

Where a receiving teller keeps a deposit scratcher, as mentioned above, in which is entered the name and amount of each deposit ticket, the column in the proof book styled individual credits may be done away with, as the entering of the items again would be unnecessary duplication.

I think the use of the deposit scratcher is preferable, as the items can be more easily identified where necessary.

A. R. BARRETT.

**A PROFIT AND LOSS ITEM.**—The efficacy of praying for rain has received a strong illustration in California. H. H. Pitcher, of the Bank of Livermore, told a number of preachers who came into his bank during a long drought, that if they would secure four inches of rain by praying for it he would pay the debt of their churches. It now appears that about eight inches fell immediately after they began to get in their work, and the astonished President is in for about \$4,000. At the latest accounts he was trying to compromise.—*Northwestern Banker.*

## JOHN HARSEN RHOADES.

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*PRESIDENT OF THE SAVINGS BANKS ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF  
NEW YORK.*

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There are few organizations whose purposes are more laudable and unselfish than those of the Savings Banks Association of the State of New York. It is designed to protect the interests of Savings bank depositors, and on more than one occasion its influence has been successfully brought to bear in preventing the enactment of unwise laws relating to Savings banks. The judicious aims of the association were well expressed by its chief executive officer, President John Harsen Rhoades, in the address delivered at the recent annual meeting, a report of which will be found in another part of this issue of the *MAGAZINE*.

As the head of an association representing depositors having \$816,144,367.58 to their credit, and as President of the Greenwich Savings Bank, of New York, an institution whose deposits amount to over \$36,000,000, Mr. Rhoades is a proper subject of public interest.

John Harsen Rhoades was born in New York city in 1838, and is descended from an old Knickerbocker family, his maternal ancestors, the Harsens, having settled in New York in the old colonial days. His paternal ancestors were English, the branch which came to America settling in Massachusetts, where the father of Mr. Rhoades was born, though taken as a child to Manlius, near Syracuse, N. Y., and afterwards to Skaneateles in the same State, where the old farm still remains in possession of the family.

The subject of this sketch began his business career at an early age, entering the store of Messrs. Spring, Bradley & Buffum, New York, at the age of seventeen. He afterwards entered the employ of Woodward, Lawrence & Co., and at the age of twenty-five went into business, becoming a junior partner in the dry-goods commission house of Leonard, Schofield & Co. The firm afterwards changed to Leonard & Rhoades and to Leonard, Rhoades & Grosvenor, and then to Grosvenor & Carpenter. In 1877, at the age of thirty-eight, he retired from business.

The high position which Mr. Rhoades has attained in financial circles is shown by the number of important institutions with which he is identified, and by the weight which is given to his views on banking affairs, particularly such as relate to Savings banks, which have been the objects of his special solicitude and study. He became a trustee of the Greenwich Savings Bank in 1863, and has served in that capacity continuously for more than thirty-five years, and was for many years Secretary of the board. In 1878 he became President, and has continued to discharge the duties of that office with marked ability up to the present time.

Mr. Rhoades is a director in the Bank of America, the United States Trust Company, the Greenwich Bank and the Northern Dispensary; is President of the Eye and Ear Infirmary, was at one time a trustee in the Women's Hospital and a governor of the New York Hospital, and is now a trustee of the Roosevelt Hospital. He became President of the Northern Dispensary at the age of thirty-four, and Vice-President of the Eye and Ear Infirmary at forty, holding office in the last-named institution ever since. He is also a member of the Union League Club, the Century Club and the Metropolitan Club, member of the Chamber of Commerce of the State



*Handwritten signature*

## JOHN HARRISON RHODES

THE HISTORY OF THE SAVINGS BANKS ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK,  
N. Y., 1905.

The following observations are prepared mainly in accordance with the views of the Savings Banks Association of the State, and will be found to be in accord with the interests of Savings Bank depositors, and of the community at large, in general, as to the desirability of being incorporated in the State laws now relating to Savings Banks. The judicious aims of the Association expressed in its annual reports, and the identical views of the undersigned, delivered at the recent annual meeting, a report of which was published as a part of the issue of the May, 1905.

As a holder of over a cent of the depositors having \$50,000,000 of deposits in the First National Greenwich Savings Bank, of New York, a State whose laws are to amount to over \$20,000,000, Mr. Rhodes is in a position of public interest.

John Harrison Rhodes was born in New York City in 1838, and is a member of the Knickerbocker family, his maternal ancestors, the Harsens, being of New York in the colonial days. His paternal ancestors were of the branch which came to America settling in Massachusetts, where the Rhodes was born, though taken as a child to Maryland, near St. Georges, afterwards to Kentucky, in the same State, where the old family still possess land to the day.

The education of this student began in his business career at an early age, in the office of Messrs. Sprigg, Barclay & Buffum, New York, at the age of thirteen, which office in the company of Woodward, Leitch & Co. and in the twenty-five years to his death, becoming a junior partner in the city of Cambridgeport, England, Seligman & Co. The firm afterwards being merged with Rhodes and to Leonard, Knapp & Grosvenor, and the latter firm in 1877, at the age of thirty-eight, he retired from business.

The chief position which Mr. Rhodes has attained in his life is that of President of the numerous institutions with which he is identified, the most important of which are, several of six or seven leading offices, particularly Savings Banks, which have been the objects of his special study and attention. He is a member of the Greenwich Savings Bank in 1861, and has served as its President for nearly twenty years, that thirty-five years, and was for many years its President. In 1878 he became President, and has continued in that position for a number of years with much ability up to the present time.

Mr. Rhodes is a director in the Bank of America, the United States National Bank, the Greenwich Bank and the Northern Dispensary, as also in the National Loan and Trust Company, was at one time a trustee in the Warehouse, and in New York Trust and Safe Deposits, and a trustee of the New York Dispensary, the Northern Dispensary, of the age of twenty years, was President of the Eastern Loan and Trust Company, and of the New York Dispensary ever since. He is also a member of the Union League Club, the Chamber of Commerce Club, the Metropolitan Club, the Club of the Chamber of Commerce, and



John Hanson Rhoades





of New York, and chairman of its committee on finance. He is executor and trustee of the estates of I. N. Phelps and Geo. Bliss, late of the firm of Morton, Bliss & Co.

Though urged to go into politics, Mr. Rhoades has never done so. He was chairman of the New York city delegation to the Indianapolis Sound Money Convention. As foreman of the grand jury a few years ago, he rendered a noteworthy service to the city by his forceful presentation of irregularities then existing in the sheriff's office. This led a leading city paper to propose Mr. Rhoades as a suitable candidate for Mayor of New York.

The following from the annual address of President Rhoades at the recent meeting of the Savings Banks Association will serve to illustrate the principles which govern the management of the Savings banks of the State of New York, and which have been so strictly adhered to in recent years as to make them almost unique among the world's financial institutions. Mr. Rhoades said :

"Let us remember that the Savings bank in its essence and purity was founded as a means to lessen pauperism, and as an incentive to thrift. Let us not forget that it rests upon foundations born of philanthropy. No selfishness, no greed, no profit to ourselves, must be the motto which marks our administration of this great and solemn trust. Our trustees are chosen from among those who are willing to serve the public for the public's good and for no other purpose, and the well-doing of the charge we have thus assumed is the only reward we can expect to receive, and the only reward we should wish to receive."

While this injunction is kept in mind by those charged with these great trusts, the Savings banks of New York will continue to be what they now are—beneficent agents for promoting thrift and prosperity.

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#### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

**THE BREAK-UP OF CHINA**, with an Account of Its Present Commerce, Currency, Waterways, Armies, Railways, Politics and Future Prospects. By LORD CHARLES BERESFORD; with Portraits and Maps. New York and London : Harper & Brothers.

There is at present an unusual degree of interest in whatever relates to the Chinese Empire, because of its apparently impending disintegration and the growing importance of our own Oriental trade, which is likely to be still further enlarged as the result of the occupation of the Philippines by the United States.

At this juncture of affairs it is opportune that a book should appear embodying the results of the observations of so well-trained and competent an observer as Lord Charles Beresford. His visit to China was at the instance of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain, and its purpose was to obtain information for developing the trade of that country with China. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the object of his mission was to gather facts to show how desirable it is that the policy of the "open door" shall be insisted on, and that Great Britain shall be allowed to trade with China on the same terms as are granted to other nations.

Lord Beresford is opposed to the policy of establishing what are known as "spheres of influence," and favors the reorganization of the military and administrative systems of the country as the only effectual means of preserving the integrity of the Empire and affording security for foreign capital. He is convinced that the dismemberment of China would be a menace to the trade interests of Great Britain and the United States, and would probably provoke a war amongst the States of Europe.

Though there is a manifest disposition of the author to deal fairly and courteously with the Chinese, it is plain enough to see from the book that the country is in a decaying condition.

There is so much valuable and interesting information about trade subjects in China that we shall not attempt to review the volume in detail, but recommend that it be read by all who wish to gain a better knowledge of those matters.

The style of the book is frank and engaging, and it nowhere approaches dryness.

A chapter on the Currency reveals a most anomalous situation in respect to this important adjunct of commerce. Compared with China the complex currency system of the United States is simplicity itself.

## NATIONAL BANK RESERVE LAW A FEEDER TO WALL STREET AND OTHER CENTRES.

[Communicated.]

New York city banks are the natural depositories for much of the idle or surplus money of the country. But there was created by the National Bank Act of 1864 a monetary discrimination in favor of large cities—especially New York—which has grown to great proportions.

In order to a clear understanding of the matter, it is better to quote so much of the law as is referred to, from the United States Revised Statutes :

(SEC. 5191.) "Every National banking association in either of the following cities: Albany, Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Louisville, Milwaukee, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Saint Louis, San Francisco, and Washington, shall at all times have on hand, in lawful money of the United States, an amount equal to at least twenty-five per centum of the aggregate amount of its notes in circulation and its deposits; and every other association shall at all times have on hand, in lawful money of the United States, an amount equal to at least fifteen per centum of the aggregate amount of its notes in circulation, and of its deposits."

(SEC. 5192.) "Three-fifths of the reserve of fifteen per centum required by the preceding section to be kept, may consist of balances due to an association, available for the redemption of its circulating notes, from associations approved by the Comptroller of the Currency, organized under the Act of June three, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, or under this title, and doing business in the cities of Albany, Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Louisville, Milwaukee, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Richmond, Saint Louis, San Francisco, and Washington."

(SEC. 5195.) "Each association organized in any of the cities named in section fifty-one hundred and ninety-one may keep one half of its lawful money reserve in cash deposits in the city of New York."

By subsequent enactment, ordinary reserve cities must have at least 50,000 population, and central reserve cities 200,000.

Amendments have been made so as to require reserves to be maintained against deposits only, and also under which in recent years Chicago and St. Louis have become like New York (Sec. 5195), central reserve cities, their banks keeping their entire reserves on hand in lawful money. Charleston and Richmond ceased to be reserve cities, and Brooklyn, Savannah, Houston, Des Moines, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Kansas City, St. Joseph, Lincoln, Omaha and Portland, Ore., have become ordinary reserve cities.

It is to the permissive clauses in sections 5192 and 5195 that attention is especially directed.

By Section 5192 reserves required to be kept on hand, by banks in villages and smaller cities throughout the country, are reduced to six per cent. ; the remaining nine per cent. may consist of "balances" or deposits with National banks in any of the twenty-seven reserve cities.

By Section 5195 the reserves of banks in twenty-four ordinary reserve cities required to be kept on hand are reduced to twelve and one-half per cent. ; the remaining twelve and one-half per cent. may consist of "cash deposits" in National banks in the cities of New York, Chicago, or St. Louis, instead of as formerly, New York alone.

The law practically says to 3,261 banks now existing in small cities and towns of the country, "You must keep a reserve of fifteen per cent. in lawful money against your deposits; you shall not loan any portion of this to your customers, but you may deposit three-fifths of it with National banks in any of the reserve cities, including New York." It likewise says to 251 banks in twenty-four reserve cities, "You must keep a reserve of twenty-five per cent. in lawful money against your deposits; you shall not loan any portion of this to your customers, but you may make 'cash deposits' of one-half of it with National banks in the cities of New York, Chicago or St. Louis."

The words "balances" in Sec. 5192 and "cash deposits" in Sec. 5195 are treated by the Comptroller and banks as having the same meaning, the latter being "balances" also.

Sec. 5192 induces banks in villages and small cities to place up to three-fifths of their reserves at interest with banks in reserve cities, which may loan seventy-five per cent. of same.

Sec. 5195 operates as a similar device for banks in twenty-four reserve cities, which may deposit one-half of their twenty-five per cent. reserves at interest with banks in New York, Chicago or St. Louis, which may loan seventy-five per cent. of same.

The following figures are tabulated from Abstract of Reports of Condition of National Banks on February 4, 1899, issued by the Comptroller of the Currency.

<i>3,261 Country Banks.</i>	
Fifteen per cent. reserve required.....	\$173,893,175.03
Less redemption fund with the Treasurer of the United States, included by law.....	7,492,606.50
	\$166,393,568.53
Cash held.....	118,285,188.55
Remainder as deposits in all (27) reserve cities.....	\$48,108,379.98
<i>251 Banks in Twenty-four Ordinary Reserve Cities.</i>	
Twenty-five per cent. reserve required.....	\$196,076,150.86
Less redemption fund.....	1,788,509.25
	\$191,287,641.61
Cash held.....	115,590,848.44
Remainder as deposits in New York, Chicago and St. Louis.....	75,687,793.17
Total belonging to bank reserves deposited in all (27) reserve cities.....	\$123,796,173.15

This sum on February 4, 1899, represented the extent of this great and continuing discrimination and diversion of lawful money, from the many points where the law prohibits its use, to the few points where free use of seventy-five per cent. is permitted.

The total deposits by 3,261 country banks with their reserve agents in all (27) reserve cities including New York, amounted to \$267,162,101.08—being \$219,053,721.10 in addition to their reserve deposits. The total deposits by 251 banks of twenty-four ordinary reserve cities with their reserve agents in New York, Chicago and St. Louis, amounted to \$164,873,400.77—being \$89,185,607.60 in addition to their reserve deposits.

Reserve deposits are not separately accounted for by banks holding same, being included with other deposits due to National banks. The totals "due to other National banks" by banks of central reserve cities were as follows:

New York city.....	\$289,976,300.82
Chicago.....	86,906,972.56
St. Louis.....	21,567,001.98
By banks of twenty-four ordinary reserve cities.....	158,967,812.18
Total.....	\$530,588,087.49

The proportion due by New York banks being about fifty-three and one-half per cent., by Chicago banks about twelve and three-quarters per cent., by St. Louis banks about four per cent. and by banks of twenty-four ordinary reserve cities about twenty-nine and three-quarters per cent.

Reserve deposits were presumably in like proportion, namely New York city about \$66,000,000; Chicago, about \$16,000,000; St. Louis, about \$5,000,000; twenty-four ordinary reserve cities, about \$37,000,000.

Boston National banks had on deposit with reserve agents in New York \$44,826,109.68, of which \$25,132,107.86 belonged to their reserves. Philadelphia banks had \$28,781,030.56 with reserve agents in New York, of which \$11,103,534.33 belonged to their reserves.

Herein is accounted for the undue money power of Wall Street especially, which Mr. Bryan and his followers mistakenly attribute to the so-called "Crime of 1873" and a monopoly of gold.

The business of attracting reserve deposits and other excessive National bank deposits to New York, by payment of interest thereon, is principally availed of by less than a score of institutions. These must always be ready to repay on demand, and therefore reimburse themselves by demand loans on stock exchange securities. It is open to serious question whether National banks should thus be virtual continuing borrowers from other National banks throughout the country, to lend again. But the figures show that money is abundantly concentrated in New York by thus draining the banking system without depleting the reserves. High rates complained of at the West and South are likewise accounted for. The stability of the entire banking system, in case of panic or monetary distress is made to hinge upon the ability of Wall Street borrowers to repay, or of a few New York banks to realize upon the immense volume of collaterals, in case the borrowers fail to pay.

Reserves of fifteen per cent, and twenty-five per cent. are but a reasonable and moderate protection against emergencies, and should therefore be kept intact in lawful money. No portion whatever should be loaned in Wall Street or elsewhere; and the law should be so amended.

The ability of banks throughout the country to meet any general emergency, and their own sense of security, would thereby be greatly increased; every legitimate business and industry rest upon a surer and steadier basis; and the ocean of money used to float and promote trusts, monopolies and corporate schemes, which are opposed to justice, equal rights and the public welfare, be thereby lessened.

United States Treasury statistics state the money in use outside the Treasury, per head of population, as follows:

1890.....	\$18.85	1890.....	\$19.41
1870.....	17.50	1890.....	22.82
1873.....	18.04	1898.....	24.87

The figures of the Comptroller confirm the abundance thereby indicated. Not the volume therefore, but defects in distribution are chargeable with disparity in supply.

O. H. SCHREINER.

BROOKLYN.

\* HON. GEORGE E. ROBERTS.

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*DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES MINT.*

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It is perhaps true that the State of Iowa occupies a more advanced position on the financial question than most of the other States, east or west. The people are too shrewd and intelligent to be misled by the heresies which have elsewhere received acceptance. Gov. Shaw, the present chief executive of Iowa, is an able advocate of monetary and banking reform along the safest and most approved lines.

There have been few clearer statements of the essential principles governing the issue of bank notes than that made by the subject of this sketch, Hon. Geo. E. Roberts, in an address delivered before a meeting of bankers at Rolfe, Iowa, January 20, 1898. A speech which he delivered before the Grant Club, Des Moines, Iowa, December 2, 1897, also contains a lucid exposition of a bank-note currency, as well as many important truths relating to metallic money. In addition to these two notable addresses he is the author of the following pamphlets: "Coin at School in Finance;" "Money, Wages and Prices," and "Iowa and the Silver Question."

The National Sound Money League and other agencies for distributing sound financial literature aided in giving a wide circulation to these pamphlets. That they exercised great influence for good in the campaign of 1896 is beyond question. Among those who were attracted by the writings and speeches of Mr. Roberts was the present Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. Lyman J. Gage, who recommended him to President McKinley for appointment as Director of the Mint, on the resignation of Mr. Preston. This recommendation was favorably acted upon by the President, the nomination of Mr. Roberts being made on January 24, 1898. The appointment was made without the solicitation of Mr. Roberts, and the first intimation that he was being considered for the place was an official inquiry asking him if he would accept the office.

His high personal character, combined with special qualifications for the office, made the appointment a source of great satisfaction to Mr. Roberts' many friends in Iowa. It was regarded as a proper recognition of the ability and skill he had shown in exposing the fallacies of the free silver theorists.

The office of Director of the United States Mint is one of great importance, not only because of the duties immediately connected with it, but also for the reason that the reports of this officer are accepted as authority in the United States and in most European countries. They are of great value in giving all the facts relating to the production and coinage of the money metals. Mr. Roberts' investigations and studies have been such as to qualify him especially for the duties of this office.

George E. Roberts was born in Iowa forty-one years ago; his father was born at Utica, N. Y., of Welsh descent, and his mother was a native of Maine. His education was obtained in the common schools of Iowa. At the age of sixteen he entered the office of the Fort Dodge, Iowa, "Messenger" to learn the printer's trade. By the time he was twenty-one he had become a partner in the business, and a year later was sole proprietor. At the age of twenty-four he was elected State Printer for Iowa by the joint ballot of the General Assembly, after being nominated in the Republican joint caucus. He held this office three terms of two years each.

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\* A portrait of Mr. Roberts, especially engraved for the BANKERS' MAGAZINE from a recent photograph, is presented in this number as a title illustration.

Mr. Roberts has been an active member of the Republican party; has served as Secretary of the State Central Committee, and for twelve years as Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee for the Tenth Iowa District.

Mention has been made of his writings in behalf of sound finance. In addition to what has been named, he is the author of a sketch on "Bimetallism in France," and has contributed a number of valuable articles to leading newspapers, chiefly on economic and financial topics.

His writings and addresses evince a thorough comprehension of the principles underlying sound finance, and they are presented in a manner adapted to popular understanding. Some of the most effective facts and arguments in behalf of the gold standard were advanced by Mr. Roberts, and their influence in checking the spread of the free silver heresy was very great.

There is probably no greater force in American politics to-day than the country editor, and in selecting Mr. Roberts as the chief officer of the Mint Bureau, Secretary Gage and the President not only recognized this fact, but they placed a man in office whose character was known and whose fitness has been established by his works.

#### MAKING COUNTRY CHECKS AVAILABLE IN NEW YORK.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR: The resolution of the New York Clearing-House of March 13, 1899, does not go far enough. It provides a method for throwing the cost of collecting all country checks upon the holder. It should also provide a method so that some country checks should be payable in New York at the cost of the maker. In other words, some country checks should read as payable at a New York bank at par. Permit me to explain.

A merchant at Buffalo should be furnished by his banker with two books of checks: one book to be of the usual style, and when such a check is found in New York it will be subject to the resolution of March 13, and the holder will pay the cost of collecting. The other book should be of similar form with the addition of words of the following import:

The Nineteenth National Bank, New York, will cash this check at par as the agent solely of the endorsers. Exchange hereon will be paid to said bank by the maker.

The latter check will be payable at par to the known holder at a New York bank; if it is dishonored at the Buffalo bank then usual protest and recourse is had upon the last endorser and by him upon his predecessor.

I respectfully submit that many merchants outside of New York city are willing to pay for the privilege of issuing such checks and save the delay incurred by sending to the local bank for its drafts on New York.

Furthermore, the country banker has always one or two rich clients for whom he must arrange that their checks shall be paid at the counter of a metropolitan bank; this he does by issuing a letter of credit and then his troubles begin, for all his clients request the same favor. The country banker cannot comply in any manner which will be agreeable to all concerned.

I suggest the model above described as a solution of one of the vexed problems of banking.

F. M.

SACRAMENTO, Cal., May 24.

LIVE BANKERS NEED IT.—Edward P. Metcalf, National bank examiner at Providence, R. I., writes as follows under date of May 13:

"I enjoy the BANKERS' MAGAZINE very much, and find many helpful suggestions in it, and do not see how any live banker can get along without it."

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
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*Albert Steingard*



## APPENDIX

A. A. C. is a public utility company of the first class in the business of providing the highest quality of electric service. The only other utility company in the State of New York is the New York State Electric and Gas Corporation.

The company is a public utility company which is called to take a part in the service of the State. The only other public utility company in the State of New York is the New York State Electric and Gas Corporation. The only other public utility company in the State of New York is the New York State Electric and Gas Corporation.

The subject of this statement is a member of the National Park Board, New York, New York, 1896. His services were rendered in 1896 in the State of New York.

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Mr. Wiegman is a member of the National Park Board, New York, New York, 1896. His services were rendered in 1896 in the State of New York. He is a member of the National Park Board, New York, New York, 1896. His services were rendered in 1896 in the State of New York.

It will be seen that the subject of this statement is a member of the National Park Board, New York, New York, 1896. His services were rendered in 1896 in the State of New York.

A. A. C. is a public utility company of the first class in the business of providing the highest quality of electric service. The only other utility company in the State of New York is the New York State Electric and Gas Corporation.

We have received a copy of the report of the Board of Directors of the company for the year ending December 31, 1917.

The report shows that the total assets of the company are \$1,000,000.00, and the total liabilities are \$1,000,000.00. The net assets are \$0.00.

To be certified by the Board of Directors of the company, the report must be approved by the Board of Directors of the company.



Albert H. Wiggin

## ALBERT H. WIGGIN.

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As the financial and commercial center of the country, New York tends to absorb the best available business talent. The magnitude and scope of its transactions require the highest qualifications in those who are to occupy the leading places in its activities. There is no department of business where the requirements are higher than in the great banking institutions of the city.

It is, therefore, a recognition of one's peculiar fitness for large responsibilities when he is called to take a prominent share in one of the principal banks of the city. Though he may have been identified with a powerful bank in any of the other great commercial centers, the call to New York is a distinct promotion. Usually, as in the present instance, these honors are bestowed upon a young banker who has shown exceptional ability in some special line of bank work.

The subject of this sketch, Mr. Albert H. Wiggin, who was elected Vice-President of the National Park Bank, of New York, on May 2, was born in Medfield, Mass., February 21, 1868. His early education was obtained in the public schools of Boston, and in 1885 he graduated at the English High School.

He immediately entered upon his business career in a private banking house in Boston, where he remained eight months. At the end of this time he was engaged by the National Bank of the Commonwealth, of which A. L. Newman was then President. His services with this bank embraced a period of six years, and included training in all the various clerical positions through the different departments. He had so fully demonstrated his ability for bank work that National Bank Examiner Alfred Ewer selected him as his assistant, and he continued in this capacity in the Boston district for three years, discharging its responsible duties with conspicuous fidelity and zeal. In 1894 Mr. Ewer was transferred to another district outside of Boston, where he did not require the services of an assistant.

Mr. Wiggin soon re-entered active banking by accepting a position as Assistant Cashier of the Third National Bank, of Boston, remaining there for two years and a half, when he was elected Vice-President of the Eliot National Bank, and continued in that capacity until his recent election as Vice-President of the National Park Bank, of New York.

It will be seen that his promotion has been rapid. There are few young men who are fortunate enough to reach such a high position in banking in a space of fourteen years.

As may be learned from the brief account of his banking career, Mr. Wiggin has had valuable experience, both as a clerk, bank officer and in the work of examining National banks. During this time he has improved the opportunities presented for gaining a practical insight into the details of banking, and has had the faculty of making a right use of his knowledge and experience.

We have recently spoken of the advanced place the National Park Bank occupies among the banks of the United States but the facts will bear repetition.

Its capital is \$2,000,000; surplus fund, \$2,500,000; undivided profits, \$693,000. The deposits exceed \$75,000,000, while the loans are \$48,125,972. Specie held amounts to \$21,804,849, and legal tenders \$2,890,496. Total resources are \$80,832,177.

To be identified with an institution of such size and reputation is an honor of which any banker might be proud.

## NEW YORK SAVINGS BANKS ASSOCIATION.

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The annual meeting of the Savings Banks Association of the State of New York was held at the rooms of the Chamber of Commerce, New York city, May 10. J. Harsen Rhoades, President of the Greenwich Savings Bank, presiding. There was a large attendance of Savings bank officers from the city and from different parts of the State.

The annual address of President J. Harsen Rhoades was delivered, as follows :

### ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT JOHN HARSEN RHOADES.

"Gentlemen—By your kindness and courtesy elected your presiding officer, it is with a feeling of sincere pleasure that I welcome you once again to the annual meeting of our association, and to the hospitalities in which we here all share.

When I think of the many years which the officers of Savings banks in this State have allowed to pass without affording an opportunity to know one another better, and to consult with one another upon questions of vital importance to the welfare of the cause we serve, I hold all the more precious the years that remain to each of us, and look forward to these recurring meetings somewhat as old friends do with one another in the joy of the oncoming after a long separation.

The work of the association, devolving as it does largely upon your executive committee, renders it difficult to realize how much has been done, and that this association is in reality an active, forceful and valuable agent in fostering the best interests of our depositors; and yet the fact remains that were it not for our united effort, we would quickly find that the Savings bank system in this State was being undermined by bad laws, corruptly or ignorantly created, and we would fail to secure the passage of good laws needed to strengthen and extend the beneficent influence of these great eleemosynary institutions.

The report of your executive committee will give you the skeleton of the work done during the past year; but it cannot give you the details, or count the days and hours given to accomplish what is thus outlined; and for this reason I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without telling you how much we are indebted to Mr. Rainey, chairman of your executive committee, for his share in this work. Watchful, earnest, intelligent and faithful, your officers have leaned on him for counsel and direction, and have recognized that largely to his effort is due whatever of success has crowned our efforts during the past year.

There are some questions of moment which should command our attention, reference to which will be made in the report of your executive committee; but there is also another question which, I think, demands our careful consideration, and to which, with your permission, I will now refer.

### THE DEBTS OF MUNICIPALITIES.

In the annual report of the Comptroller of the State, in giving a statement of the debt of the municipalities, he called attention to the fact that he had been unable to secure reliable data as to such indebtedness, and had been compelled to rely largely upon statistics given to him second-hand, for the correctness of which he could not vouch. He found from the returns as made by officers of the municipalities, and the figures collated elsewhere, that the municipal debt of the State amounted to four hundred and twelve millions of dollars; but he estimated that, if a correct statement could be obtained, it would probably be found to be four hundred and fifty millions of dollars. In view of the fact that the Savings banks are carrying one hundred and eighty-one millions of dollars of this debt, it seemed to me a matter of vital importance to our interests that such a condition of ignorance as to the municipal indebtedness of the State should in some way be remedied, and that this association should lend its efforts to secure such additional legislative action as is requisite to regularly supply this needed information—for it is needed, both as a guide in making investment in these securities, and as a check to extravagance on the part of the municipalities themselves.

To this end I called the attention of the Superintendent of the Banking Department to the statement made by the Comptroller, and sought his aid in obtaining such information as was available for comparison. Mr. Kilburn at once saw the importance of the subject, and immediately undertook the work of analyzing that portion of such debt carried by the Savings banks. Comparing these figures with those collated by the Comptroller, they show some

facts which go to prove the absolute need of the reform suggested; but, in giving these conclusions, it must be borne in mind the Comptroller has stated clearly that his figures are based only upon the best knowledge he could obtain, and, therefore, that they could not possibly be correct in every instance. Comparing, then, the amount of debt for each municipality as given in his statement with that carried by the Savings banks, and basing the *per capita* indebtedness of each municipality referred to upon the population as given in the census of 1880, these facts appear:

The banks are carrying the bonds of 206 towns and villages to the extent of about five and one-half millions of dollars, the indebtedness of which is not reported at all by the Comptroller. They are carrying either the entire debt, or within fifteen per cent of the entire debt of 219 cities, towns, counties and villages in the State. There are thirty-two municipalities in which the banks are carrying more bonds in amount than the entire debt of each as reported by the Comptroller.

Now, as to the question of the *per capita* indebtedness of some of these municipalities.

Leaving out the smaller municipalities included in the Greater New York, and also quite a number of which, for lack of knowledge as to debt, I have been unable to make a comparison, I find that there are at least sixteen having a *per capita* indebtedness of between \$50 and \$90; eight \$90 to \$70; three \$70 to \$90; five \$90 to \$90; one \$90 to \$100; one \$100 to \$110; one \$110 to \$120; three \$120 to \$140; one \$150 to \$160, and two \$210 to \$220.

This examination also shows some interesting figures as to the debt of some of the smaller municipalities embraced in the city now called the Greater New York, and it may be well to give these figures as going to show the enormous volume of *per capita* indebtedness on the part of some of these small municipalities, a large portion of which was created just prior to consolidation. These figures are as follows:

Four have a *per capita* indebtedness of \$90 to \$70; one \$90 to \$90; one \$100 to \$110; three \$120 to \$130; one \$130 to \$140; one \$180 to \$190; two \$220 to \$230; one \$260 to \$270, and one over \$500. And nothing could have saved some of these towns and villages from bankruptcy but the fact that the burden of debt is now being borne by the city at large. Leaving out the city of New York and a few large cities through the State, a few moments' consideration only is needed to convince any prudent investor that a *per capita* municipal indebtedness of \$90 to \$230 is altogether too heavy a burden to carry, especially for towns or small villages. Think for a moment of a municipal debt of \$180 upon each man, woman and child within the precincts of a small community like a village. If the figures upon which these estimates are based were thoroughly reliable, we might well feel anxious over the situation. There is, however, enough truth in the statement made to demand not only our attention, but that of the public, to the end that a better knowledge of the municipal indebtedness of this State may be at all times obtainable.

This is a debt-creating era in the history of our country, and the growth of municipal indebtedness not only in this State but all over the land should be carefully watched.

And what is the remedy? There ought to be some department of the State (and that of the Comptroller is the proper department) to which should be sent annually a sworn statement, signed by the proper officials of each municipality, giving the exact condition of the indebtedness of each, and the amount applicable as a sinking fund; and a failure to make such an annual statement should constitute a misdemeanor. In addition to this, in view of the laxity and want of method in keeping the accounts of many of the municipalities, especially those constituting a small population, which laxity and want of method have been repeatedly shown when investigations have been made by those purchasing bonds, and which, I think, has been publicly stated by the comptroller of the city of New York in connection with his effort to arrive at the debts of some of the smaller municipalities now embraced in the Greater New York, there should be some uniform system of bookkeeping, so far as the general basis is concerned, which should be required and enforced throughout the State.

We must bear in mind that the Savings banks, as I have already said, are carrying one hundred and eighty-one millions of the municipal debt of the State, and that the moneys in our charge are largely made up of the savings of the masses in our population. If these thrifty workers, through our hands, become the greatest loaners to our municipal departments, and thus contribute so largely to the welfare of the public as they do, then they have a right to demand at the hands of the Legislature such protection as will enable those who act for them to be advised in detail at all times of the condition of the municipal debt of each municipality.

#### ENLARGED SCOPE OF INVESTMENTS.

During the past session of the Legislature a bill has been passed enlarging the scope of investment of the funds in our charge. This measure, after careful consideration, was approved by your executive committee. The need for an enlarged scope of investment is keenly felt. The great increase of wealth over the country has created a largely increased demand for such securities as we can now purchase. The municipal bonds of our large cities are being absorbed in all directions, both within and without the State, and the demand has

extended throughout the middle West, and even beyond that, while the exemption from liability to taxation embodied in the bonds of New York city and elsewhere has opened up a new and large competition both from individuals and corporations. The demand for loans secured by mortgage on real estate has increased so largely as to exceed the supply throughout the farming districts, and moneys from the interior have been sent for investment in loans on real estate in all the large cities; while in view of the high price for the securities of the general Government, the banks have found it extremely difficult to obtain such securities as are quickly available in periods of mercantile depression, and consequent sudden drain for deposits, for it must be borne in mind that our deposits are at all times subject to payment on demand, and, in consequence, our available resources, quickly convertible into cash, should be ample at all times.

For these reasons (and many more might be given) it seemed wise and expedient that your executive committee should favor a proper bill widening the scope of investment; but, in doing this, we are well aware of the importance and the necessity of preventing the admission of securities not regarded as of the first quality, both in credit and security, and of opposing with all the powers we possess any and all efforts to force upon the banks more securities than prudence, safety and the needs of the hour demand. Against this tendency we must all stand as firm as a rock.

#### BENEFICENT INFLUENCE OF SAVINGS BANKS.

And now, gentlemen, I have spoken too long and said too much. Permit me, however, in closing, to add a word about ourselves. Let us remember that the Savings bank in its essence and purity was founded as a means to lessen pauperism, and as an incentive to thrift. Let us not forget that it rests upon foundations born of philanthropy. No selfishness, no greed, no profit to ourselves, must be the motto which marks our administration of this great and solemn trust. Our trustees are chosen from those who are willing to serve the public for the public's good and for no other purpose, and the well-doing of the charge we have thus assumed is the only reward we can expect to receive, and the only reward we should wish to receive.

When I think of the work we are doing—how, through our effort, we cause joy to dwell in the homes of the poor, and sorrow to rest less heavily upon those to whom sorrow must and will come—when I realize how, through our efforts, we are encouraging thrift, lessening poverty and pauperism, and, by the free will of the humble toiler, gathering together his little capital until, by the combined force of partnership, he becomes a great power of wealth throughout the land, wealth, the purest and best in quality, blessed at its birth as it is by the sweat which comes from honest toil, and then giving it out in great volume to help create, build up, extend, and render more secure the grand commonwealth we call by the dear name of country—when I think of these things, I realize that we are in truth doing something for our fellow man that is well worth the doing, and that in the serving we have a reward more precious than gold or silver, in the consciousness that we are helping uplift the race upon a higher, a better and a nobler plane.

Let us, therefore, work not for the day but for the morrow, remembering that what we build both for the day and the morrow. It is in this spirit and with this aim in view that our work should go on, and unless we do this work unselfishly, without profit to ourselves and in the pure spirit of philanthropy in which such work was created, we will sow the seeds of distrust among the people, and eventually the system itself will break down.

Savings banks are not the proper depositories for the moneys of the rich and the well-to-do. They are alone for the working classes, and for those incompetent, through experience, to care for their savings themselves. The thrifty worker, the widow and the orphan, are alone entitled to the privileges and benefits here granted. The State has wisely exempted these deposits from taxation, and we must see to it that we do not allow those able and competent to take care of their own moneys to use the banks as a refuge for the purpose of avoiding liability to personal taxation. Unless we do this the time will surely come when the burden of taxation will also be laid upon the banks, with the sure result of causing the withdrawal of the moneys deposited by those who have no moral right to use the banks, and leaving the burden to be borne by those the least able to bear it. Such has been the experience in all efforts to enforce personal taxation at large, and the same result must and will follow any attempt to tax the small savings of the poor.

The Savings bank in its various forms has thus far proved to have been one of the greatest agencies at work in the civilized world to improve the condition of the laboring classes, and make available their small savings for the purpose of creating wealth, by which the State and the nation are greatly benefited.

Therefore, let us see to it that, so far as the great State of New York is concerned, we will do our own full share in strengthening and maintaining in all its purity this great agency for good of which we are the directors, and the development of which marks an era of advanced civilization, and of higher conception of what man owes to his brother man."

The report of the executive committee was presented by Samuel R. Rainey, Secretary and Treasurer of the Hudson City Savings Institution, Hudson. It gave an account of the work done during the year in preventing unwise legislation, and especially commended Superintendent Kilburn, Senator Humphrey, chairman of the Senate Committee on Banks, and James B. McEwan, chairman of the Assembly Committee on Banks, for their assistance in guarding the interests of the depositors in Savings banks.

Hon. Charles S. Fairchild, former Secretary of the Treasury, made an interesting address in the course of which he spoke of the possible dangers to business interests and of the losses to depositors themselves by reason of large withdrawals in time of panic. He thought the right of withdrawal might be wisely limited, speaking on this point as follows :

"I hesitate to suggest the remedy; but I have sometimes thought that if the mutuality of interests of your depositors was more generally recognized, and a greater limit put upon the right of withdrawal, even going to the extent of looking upon the transaction as an investment payable only out of receipts taken subsequent to notice of withdrawal, that a menace to the business community would be removed, with consequential net benefit to your depositors in the way indicated."

There was a general discussion of the subject of dormant accounts. Superintendent of Banks F. D. Kilburn, in the course of an address, said that twenty-eight per cent. of the population of the State were Savings bank depositors. He gave some statistics bearing upon the business, and said that because an account had not been disturbed in twenty-two years it need not necessarily have been forgotten.

On motion of Charles E. Hanaman, President of the Troy Savings Bank, the following resolution was adopted :

"Resolved, That in our judgment, steps should be taken by the Legislature to investigate, by commission or otherwise, the methods now in use by the treasury officials of the various municipalities in keeping their official accounts, especially those of counties, towns and villages, and, if found to be necessary, to require by law that such accounts shall be kept by a regular system of double-entry bookkeeping."

Prof. W. G. Sumner, of Yale University, delivered an interesting address, speaking in part as follows :

#### THE POWER AND BENEFICENCE OF CAPITAL—ADDRESS OF PROF. SUMNER OF YALE UNIVERSITY.

"Some years ago I listened to an address by a social agitator who said: 'I can get along with anybody in my audiences except these mean, stingy, little fellows who have saved up a few hundred dollars in the Savings bank and then have borrowed enough more to build a little house of two tenements, one of which they rent. When I begin to talk about interest, and rent, and Henry George, they get up and go out by the whole seat full at a time.' The statement was the most eloquent recognition I ever heard of the power and beneficence of capital. It has always remained in my memory as a confession by an opponent of the education effected by savings and of the benefit conferred on society by Savings banks. I make it the text for the remarks which I will address to you on this occasion.

We hear a great deal in these days about social discontent. It seems to be taken for granted that discontent is a sufficient proof of grievance which third parties are bound to take cognizance of and redress. It might be argued with far greater plausibility that discontent is a proof of prosperity. If you look around the world to-day you will find that discontent is greatest where the chances are greatest. A man who has never had anything or a chance to get anything is not discontented. He rests contented with what he has always been accustomed to. Let him enjoy an opportunity and win something and the effect will be to excite his wish to win more. There is more discontent in one house in the United States or in England than in the whole Russian Empire. Discontent exists, then, where there are opportunities, and it is a stimulus to take advantage of opportunities. In that case it is an agency which produces achievement and drives on what we call progress. In other cases discontent is a result of conviction that opportunities have been lost and that it is too late to recover them. Then again discontent is the twin sister of envy, when it is seen that others have profited better by opportunities. In no case does discontent, as a naked fact, prove anything, and when the details are known it never is proof of a grievance. \* \* \*

The social philosophy which has been in fashion for a century past has educated us in the notion that we ought all to be 'happy' (as the phrase goes) on this earth, and that, if we are not so, we ought to cry out and then that somebody is bound to come and take care of us. Liberty, equality and happiness have been declared to be natural rights, which is interpreted to mean that they were laid in our cradles as our endowment for the battle of life. Every human being, on this theory, comes into the world with an outfit and a patrimony of metaphysical, if not of physical goods.

This doctrine is, of course, very popular. The men who preach it are sure of popular applause and political power. Tell a man that he ought to have and enjoy all the highest acquisitions of civilization, just because he has been born, without labor, self-denial or study, and that he is a victim of injustice if he does not possess all those good things, and he will be sure to be delighted. \* \* \* We may be very sure that all these theories of world beatification can produce nothing but disillusion and disappointment for those who put faith in them, and disintegration for the society in which they are current. The human race never received any gratuitous outfit of any kind whatever. No heathen myth ever was more silly and empty than such a notion. \* \* \* We know that the human animal is, by nature, more helpless in the face of nature than many other animals, and that nature did not start the human animal off with any other rights than those of all the other animals. The human race came upon this globe with no outfit at all. The mere task of existing and continuing here was so great that the human race was taxed to the utmost to meet it. The obvious proof of that is that large groups of men have, in innumerable instances, utterly perished from the face of the earth. These are facts of knowledge at the present time. So far as I know they are not disputed by anybody. \* \* \*

If we men have, to any extent, conquered the task of existence, if we have risen to some command over nature, and if we have created a domain of rights between ourselves, it is by civilization that we have done it. The good things were not given to us gratuitously at the outset. They are the product of the toil and suffering of mankind. They belong at the end, not at the beginning. The people who are nowadays examining the product and passing judgment on it are only betraying their own ignorance and folly. They are quite dissatisfied with it. They write books, hold conventions, and pass resolutions about how we ought to change it, and they draft ideas about how they would like to reconstruct it. If we arrive at some correct idea of what society is and what civilization is, we shall regard all such speculations as more absurd than witchcraft or astrology.

We are the children of the society in which we were born. It makes us. We are products of the civilization of our generation. Only a handful of men can react upon the society and the age in which they live so as to modify it at all. They are the very *élite* of the human race, and after all what they can do is only infinitesimal.

Civilization means the art of living on this earth. All men have always been trying to learn it. All that now is in the order of society is the product of this struggle of ages. It pours along in a mighty flood which bears us all with it. In it are all the efforts, passions, interests and strife of men. It is the play of these upon each other which produces the heaving and swaying of the flood and determines its vast modifications of direction. If you come to a faint understanding of this the man with a scheme in his pocket for the 'reorganization of society' is made to appear very ridiculous.

#### CAPITAL THE GREAT INSTRUMENT OF DEVELOPMENT.

The instrumentality by which, from the beginning, man has won and held every step of this development of civilization is capital. Some people talk about ideas and philosophy which, they think, have ruled the affairs of men. The ideas are only secondary. The philosophy, when it has acted as a cause, has taken the form of dogma, and has done harm as often as good. We may take illustrations in proof from the present time. There is a dogma afloat that labor alone makes wealth so that the whole product should belong of right to the laborer. Another dogma is that limiting the hours of labor would make work for more laborers, and another is that any wealth which one man accumulates is so much taken from some or all other men. Another is that all increase in the value of land or franchises is due to the social organization and activity, and therefore should not go to the holders.

These dogmas are all false, but they are of great scope. They are great fighting dogmas because they serve interests. It is for this reason that they win acceptance, because the great reason for inventing dogmas, principles and phrases is to use them in controversy. In the meantime the social development is going on by slow accretions which nobody notices. They are won by adjustments between the interests of men who meet new problems every day and solve them as well as they can under the conditions prevailing. These adjustments are all made by means of capital, because the interests are all matters of capital, and all the readjustments are secured by capital. In their turn they favor the creation of capital, because the readjustments which serve interests always mean attempts to win a given result by a smaller expenditure of labor and capital.



Others think that 'organization' is the great force which has made civilization. They think that organization is arbitrary and subject to manipulation, and consequently it is upon the organization that they bring their efforts to bear. Organization has, of course, been a commanding phenomenon in the development of civilization. A student of that development is not likely to disregard organization. For myself, I am convinced that much is yet to be gained by better appreciation of the element of organization. But organization is only the *mode* under which the work of life goes on. It is not a force. It never can cause anything. \* \* \*

The proposition to adopt a policy of organization can never do anything but disturb the harmony of the societal system which is its greatest advantage. They never will really change the societal organization. It is already controlled by the mighty forces of interest. For instance: if so-called trusts are now a real step in the evolution of the industrial organization, a legislative policy of sweeping and destructive opposition to them is vain. After producing great confusion and animosity and loss, it will have to be abandoned. The case of department stores is similar and more simple and obvious. \* \* \*

#### PROGRESS DUE TO LABOR AND SELF-DENIAL.

If men are not now in beastliness and utter want, it is by virtue of labor and self-denial. Labor and self-denial have been embodied in useful things, that is, capital. The things won on the stage have become new instrumentalities on the next stage. It is not strange that the growth has been so slow, especially in its earlier stages, when we see how hard the struggle has been, and how much it has been at war with human nature. It is only when we have won some conception of the painful and toilsome effort by which every step has been won, that we can estimate at its full value the civilization which we have inherited, but then, too, we are driven to believe that we never can gain anything more except by the same means.

The great reason why the advance of civilization has been so slow is that it has never gone forward steadily. It progress has been broken up. It has been broken up by ignorance and superstition, which is, of course, simply saying that it never could go on faster than men knew enough to carry it on. It has also been broken up by passion, and by strife over questions of policy. All this remains just the same now as it ever was. Discord, strife and war break up the orderly and co-operative effort to reach a higher satisfaction of our interests, which seems to be alone worthy of intelligent and civilized men. The ignorance, folly and strife destroy capital. The orderly and well-organized efforts to satisfy, create and preserve capital.

The presence of capital does not insure the extension of civilization, for the capital may be wasted by error, or it may be employed entirely in an increase of population: but an extension of civilization without an increase of effective capital or a diminution of members, is impossible.

#### SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITOR A HERO OF CIVILIZATION.

It may seem to you that the course of thought on which I have so far led you was somewhat too academical or philosophical for this occasion, but I am now ready to return to the orator and the Savings banks depositors whom I mentioned at the outset.

The facts and ideas which I have presented to you show that the Savings bank depositor is a hero of civilization, for he is helping in the accumulation of that capital which is the indispensable prerequisite of all we care for and all we want to do here on earth. The more convinced you are that the notions and devices which are offered to us by social speculators as the means of social progress are all in vain, and that the whole effort to find some means of easily making everybody happy is a waste of time, the more you will be thrown back on the industrial virtues as the only moral resources at our command which enable us men to fight the battle of life with success.

The industrial virtues are industry, frugality, prudence and temperance. We cannot deny the presence of another element which is powerful in determining our success. That is the element of good or ill fortune. \* \* \*

#### POWER OF THE INDUSTRIAL VIRTUES.

I repeat that the industrial virtues are our only moral resource for winning success in the battle of life. The greater the disadvantages under which one starts in life, the higher the value of these virtues for winning the first foothold and making the first step to something better.

There is reason for profound faith in any device which is proposed for societal improvement if, upon strict analysis, we can find that it will touch the springs of industrial virtue and raise the industrial virtues to higher activity. There is no ground for faith in any device which does not stimulate those virtues. It is not necessary to add that, if devices which are proposed are found upon examination to stimulate envy or vanity, or fondness for talk or a desire to live by one's wits, they are only mischievous.

It is not easy for us to form estimates of each other's virtues, especially when we look at each other in classes, but the Savings bank depositor as a type gives the surest and most concrete evidence of the industrial virtues. He must be industrious, frugal, prudent and temperate. He is a capitalist. He is getting in hand that power which, as I have said, has created and now upholds all civilization. He is winning a share in its power. He is getting the upperhand of the tasks of life. He is fortifying himself against bad luck and disaster. He is developing his own character by the self-denial and persistent pursuit of a selected purpose which he is obliged to practice. You find nowhere else such guarantees of sound judgment, sober reason and moderate temper as are offered by the fact of saving. There is no other guarantee of good citizenship which is as simple and positive, and at the same time as far-reaching as the possession of savings. The seats full of Savings bank depositors who went out of the lecture proved it.

The old classical saying was, He who has wife and children has given pledges to fortune. He has opened avenues by which misfortune can reach him through other lives. Capital is the chief means of protecting those dependents. It gives education to the children and puts them on a higher plane for the battle of life than that on which their parents stood. It is right to conceive of the human race on this earth as engaged in an endless battle with the conditions of existence, striving to so modify them that men may get more out of their lives in the way of satisfaction of the possibilities of human nature. For a century past the current popular notion has been that the way to win the battle is to 'raise the lower classes.' The notion seems to be that the vicious criminal and poverty-stricken classes are a certain number of human beings who are miserable or harmful. It is thought that, if this number can be cured of social disease, all will be well. This notion is based on childish misconceptions as to what society is and as to the nature of social disease. Projects to abolish poverty are worthy of an age which has undertaken to discuss the abolition of disease. Why not abolish death and be as gods once for all? Why not resolve that everybody shall be good and happy? Why not vote that everybody shall have whatever he wants? Why trifle with details? If these agencies can get us anything they can just as well get us everything. \* \* \*

If we turn away from all these notions and devices and try to understand the case of man on earth just as it is, we find that our task always is to do the best we can under the conditions in which we are and with the means which we possess. Then it appears that capital is the means with which we do it and that it is by capital spent on the education and training of the rising generation that we keep up that advancing fight against the ills of life to which I have referred.

I do not suppose that the Savings bank depositors who left the lecture knew much about all this, but that class of men have a way of their own of getting at things. The possession of capital gives an acuteness of insight into whatever affects capital. Men who have tried saving have not much patience with rhetoric and dogmatism about how to get on in life, and we know how acute they become in perceiving that the upshot of the schemes is to make them share their savings with those who have never done any saving. I suppose that when the Savings bank depositors got up and left the lecture, it was an expression of this impatience.

I never saw a poem about the Savings bank depositor. Poems are all written about heroes, kings, soldiers and lovers. There are plenty of poems about glory, and love, and ambition, and even about poverty, but saving is passed by as sordid and mean—utterly unpoetical. It has always been thought noble to spend and mean to save, which only shows how far we are yet, with all our boasting, preaching and discussing, from sound standards of judgment about the operations of society. It has, however, always been recognized that, among subjects of dramatic interest and power, the hero struggling against adversity with fortitude and perseverance is one of the grandest. In our modern commercial and unadventurous life, you will hardly find nobler examples of it than those seats full of people who, after saving a little to make a beginning, had built two-tenement cottages on which they were trying to pay off the mortgages.

Some people will answer that they see the utility and even the moral grandeur of savings by poor people, but that they dread and disapprove of accumulation. If the Savings bank depositor saves enough to pass on up into the class of large and independent investors and finally to enter the class technically known as 'capitalists,' our social philosophers withdraw their sympathy and respect from him and denounce him because he is rich. Savings banks would then seem to be useful institutions because they are vicious only up to a certain point. Savings banks are the most efficient institutions for aggregating capital which we possess. That is the most useful function which they perform, when we regard them from the standpoint of society, not of the individual depositor. In fact we must believe that, if the motives of thrift could be made to actuate the population far more widely than they now do, resources of capital could be found in the increased savings of the mass of the population of which we have at present but little idea. Savings are like taxes. If you want big results you must look to the aggregation of millions of small sums from the whole population, not to the aggregate of a few big sums from the million. lres.

## DECLINE IN THE RATES OF INTEREST.

In this connection the movement of the current rate of interest, regarding that rate as a stimulus to saving, is a very interesting and important phenomenon. If we knew more about the causes of the fluctuations of the interest rate we should gain a deeper insight than we now possess into some of the operations of the industrial system; especially we should gain a text which we very much need for the effects of legislation and taxes. The rate at present favors the borrower, not the depositor. If such a tendency of the rate was a result of an accumulation of capital more rapid than the extension of enterprise, it would no doubt be advantageous. It would bring about a reaction which would produce readjustments and would be ultimately healthful. I find it difficult to conceive of an increase of capital in excess of the extension of enterprise, under the circumstances of industry and of public temper which characterize our society. The fact that the interest rate is as low here as in Western Europe, or even lower, seems to me to be abnormal and even irrational. It seems to me to point to errors of legislation.

Our people have been congratulating themselves for two years on an enormous balance of trade in our favor. We have had large crops of cereals when other people had small ones, and so we have sold the whole at high prices. The consequence is that we have paid our debts, have got out of bad times into good ones, have dispelled our political anxieties, and have capital out in Europe, but when we try to draw home our credits we find that our rate of interest falls. Within a year we have seen it fall a full point.

I find one statesman quoted in a newspaper as saying: 'If present conditions continue, it looks as if all the gold in the world will come into the United States.' That is probably the most grotesque notion that could enter anybody's head. It seems clear that the fluctuation which we have experienced does not correspond to the normal action of the forces which should produce the rate of interest, and that the effects of it are not subject for congratulation. A higher rate than that now prevailing would give tone to the money market. It would be a benefit to small investors. It would remove perils which threaten speculation, and would lessen the dangers of discount banking. It would be a benefit to enterprise by giving greater steadiness and sobriety, especially as to the future. It would restore the relation which should exist between a new country and old ones. How can things be in a normal and healthful condition when we cannot earn greater interest on capital in a new country than what people will bid for it in old ones?

## DEMAND FOR LARGE AGGREGATIONS OF CAPITAL.

I was led to notice the rate of interest because I was speaking of the possible increase in the accumulation of capital which might be produced if the motives of saving could be stimulated throughout the mass of the people. By the side of the facts to which I have referred, which are sometimes interpreted as showing that the formation of capital at present outstrips the extension of enterprise, there are other facts which show enormous demand for capital on account of unprecedented extensions of enterprise. It is idle folly to meet these phenomena with wallings about the danger of the accumulation of great wealth in few hands. The phenomena themselves prove that we have tasks to perform which require large aggregations of capital. Moreover, the capital, to be effective, must be in few hands, for the simple reason that there are very few men who are able to handle great aggregations of capital. This is also the reason why the attempts to execute great enterprises by the State or municipality, that is by elected officers, especially in a democratic republic, are sure to be wasteful and comparatively failures. The men who are competent to organize great enterprises and to handle great amounts of capital must be found by natural selection, not by political election. It is plainly childish to attack those elements of a case which are essential to it. If the aim is to establish tests and guarantees, or regulations, then there is room for discussion, but it is evident folly to say that we want a certain result and then to say that we will not consent to the most fundamental conditions of what we want. The aggregation of large amounts of capital in few hands is the first condition of the fulfillment of the most important tasks of civilization which now confront us. If, therefore, the view which I have suggested is correct, that, in spite of some present appearances to the contrary, there is to be, in the near future, a greatly increased demand for capital, then a great increase of the popular desire to save would be contributory to the present needs of society.

## EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF SAVING.

I have suggested, in this paper, that the Savings bank depositor gets an education and development of character from the practice of saving. He gets a point of view and a way of looking at things which are substantially the same as those of all capitalists. The seats full of Savings bank depositors, whom I mentioned at the outset, incurred the ire of the agitator because they showed this. He was addressing poor men and men of the wages class, to which

they belonged, but instead of responding to his class appeal as he wanted them to do, they showed the sentiments of the capitalist class. Hence his dissatisfaction with them. We have had experience of the political value and importance of the same conservative sentiments and property interests of the small capitalists. It is a matter for regret that the Savings bank depositor does not know more about the investment of his own savings. If he knew, so to express it, where his money is, how it is being used, how the interest which he receives is won, and what is the nature of the political risks and perils to which his savings may be exposed, the social and political consequences would be most beneficial.

#### THE 'DEVIL OF INTEREST.'

I once also heard another orator who was dilating upon the ills of life declare that the great cause of human woe was the 'devil of interest.' There is no doubt that interest is an awful devil. Your feeling toward this devil, however, depends on whether you are working for him or he is working for you. If you are working for him, especially if you have bound yourself to terms which are imprudent, beyond your strength, and full of gambling risk, then he is an awful taskmaster. You dare not eat, or sleep, or play. Pay-day seems to come every other day. Instead of winning release by work, you may see your load grow bigger and bigger in spite of all you do, until you come to ruin. Therefore, when you are going to work for him, which we all have to do sometimes, you must be sure that you undertake only what you can accomplish within the conditions in which you find yourself. But if the 'devil of interest' is working for you, he will work while you eat, and sleep and play, and while you work to earn more. You must be careful to have him well harnessed and to give him proper superintendence and directions. Then, if time seems to you to slip away rapidly, and if old age comes on apace, the 'devil of interest' will give you the only consolation you can get for your failing powers. When you turn to your Savings bank book you will see that your capital is increasing just as rapidly as the flight of time, and that it will be ready to support your existence when your ability to work gives out.

I have spoken about the power and beneficence of capital to maintain civilization; this last is its power and beneficence to guide the fate and sustain the happiness of the individual."

The following officers, most of whom served last year, were elected: President, John Harsen Rhoades, President Greenwich Savings Bank; first vice-president, James McMahon, President Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank; treasurer, Andrew Mills, President Dry Dock Savings Bank; secretary, William G. Conklin, Secretary Franklin Savings Bank. Executive committee—Samuel R. Rainey, Secretary and Treasurer Hudson City Savings Institution; William C. Sturges, President Seamen's Bank for Savings; Edward S. Dawson, President Onondaga County Savings Bank, Syracuse; James M. Wentz; J. Howard King, President Albany Savings Bank; Alexander E. Orr, President South Brooklyn Savings Institution, and Bryan H. Smith, President of the Brooklyn Savings Bank.

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THE SPEAKERSHIP CONTEST.—Already the contest for the Republican caucus nomination for Speaker of the House of Representatives of the next Congress is well advanced, and the chances are that the nomination will go to Gen. D. B. Henderson, of Iowa, and since the Republicans will control the organization of the next House, his election is certain to follow his selection as the caucus candidate.

Gen. Henderson was born in Scotland in 1840, but has resided in this country since a very early age. He served on the Union side in the Civil War, and was elected to Congress in 1882, and re-elected continuously since that time.

Gen. Henderson's election as Speaker will have an important influence in shaping the work of currency legislation next winter. He is chairman of the Republican caucus committee which lately met at Atlantic City to consider this question. The published conclusions of this committee probably furnish a fair representation of his views as to what legislation is needed. He is believed to be in thorough accord with the Administration, and favors a conservative policy in dealing with the subject. His election, while not foreshadowing a result entirely satisfactory to the most advanced currency reformers, will satisfy those who believe that something ought to be done, but that no radical departure from our present policy should be made for the present.

## STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATIONS.

### REPORTS OF RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE MEETINGS.

#### NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION, GROUP VI.

The regular spring meeting of Group VI of the New York State Bankers' Association was held at the Murray Hill Hotel, New York city, June 8.

Charles F. Van Inwegen, President of the First National Bank, Port Jervis, presided, and Frank Barber, Cashier of the Sullivan County National Bank, Liberty, was secretary.

David Cromwell, President of the White Plains Bank, on behalf of the chairman of the executive committee, presented a report showing a generally satisfactory condition of business in the group territory.

A committee was appointed, with Bradford Rhodes, President of the Mamaroneck Bank, as chairman, to prepare a testimonial in recognition of the entertainment of the group by the Sullivan County National Bank at the meeting held at Liberty.

At the conclusion of the business meeting luncheon was served, after which there were brief addresses by Warner Van Norden, President of the National Bank of North America; Alvah Trowbridge, President of the North American Trust Company; Cornelius A. Pugsley, President of the Westchester County National Bank, Peekskill; Bradford Rhodes, President of the Mamaroneck Bank; David Cromwell, President of the White Plains Bank, and Charles F. Van Inwegen, President of Group VI and President of the First National Bank of Port Jervis.

Several of the speakers paid especial attention to the subject of charges imposed by the New York Clearing-House banks for the collection of country checks. The general opinion seemed to be that it was hard for the country banks to bear the burden thus imposed, because, not being associated together as the city banks are, they could not compel one another to observe especial regulations.

"We are decidedly against the rule of the clearing-house," said Mr. Van Inwegen, "because we do not think it the best for all concerned."

He thought, however, that the country banks would be able to protect their interests.

In the course of his remarks Mr. Van Norden, President of the National Bank of North America, said:

"Gentlemen, it is very kind of you to ask me to meet with you. I will only say a few words upon the aspect of banking which has occurred to me by reason of some statements I have recently seen in the newspapers, and that is the character which the banker assumes in the mind of the public.

We are all working for the common good. If we can believe the newspapers—or some of them—bankers are a class who have in mind the welfare of their fellow men, the good of the community, and, incidentally, dividends.

I remember well when I was a boy I went for my father to the bank, often taking the book to have notes entered for discount. One day the President left word that he wanted to see me. I had never spoken to him before in my life. I remember the feeling of awe with which I entered that august presence. He was a tall, fine-looking man, with white side whiskers and wearing glasses, bearing himself with a grand dignity, and measuring every word he uttered.

When I look back upon that bank with its \$300,000 to \$400,000 total deposits, and reflect that now we have in our own bank many customers whose single accounts amount to that

much, I often find myself thinking of that President with my old boyish feelings, laughing to myself, and wondering if people think of me as I did of that terrible man of the past.

People have certain erroneous notions about a banker. They exaggerate his importance and his possibilities. I have read in the newspapers recently a great deal about 'Industrial.' The papers informed the public that the recent check to speculation in industrial was because the banks had stopped loaning on them, that they saw trouble ahead, and decided that a time had come to put a check to operations in that line of investments, and that the banks had an understanding to that effect among themselves. We who know the facts in the case are aware of course that this is quite contrary to the fact. So far as I know, there has been no discussion, much less an arrangement, among the bankers regarding the matter. Each bank loans its money, and each bank carries on its business, to suit itself. If we want to loan money on industrials, or on anything else, we do so, without regard to the other banks. Each bank is run by its officers for the good of that institution, without consultation with any other bank as to what its general policy shall be.

To show you just how little we New York bankers know of each other. On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Bank of the Manhattan Company, while at dinner, we noticed a fine-looking man go up and speak to the President. All the bank Presidents around were anxious to know who that man was. I was asked if he was the President of one of our large city banks, and I was obliged to admit that I had never seen the man referred to. Six or eight of us agreed that it must be the banker in question, however, though none of us were sure. Then a gentleman from that part of the room came over and in reply to our question, he answered: That man, that is the head waiter.

Another view of bankers, and this view is held by populists and scientific cranks, is that the bank Presidents of New York meet every night in some subterranean chamber, which is hung in black, and the desk of which is covered with skulls and cross-bones, there to concoct their nefarious schemes for defrauding their fellow citizens of their rights. It is the belief of some people that the sole object in life of bankers is to make money for themselves, and beggar the community, and that this selfish class are the enemies of free Government, and should be banished. If we only could get rid of banks and bank Presidents there would be some hope, they say. Those of us who are familiar with banks and their inside workings, realize how little truth there is in all these views of the public, and how the banker, like all other laborers, is working hard, day and night, and earning his bread by the sweat of his brow, and trying to make a success in his line of business, the same as the farmer or any other hard worker.

The real view to take of the banker is that he is laboring earnestly for the good of the community. It seems to me that the banker must be a man of intelligence, of ready tact and great dignity, or he cannot retain his position. He is one of the active factors in the prosperity of the country and the wealth of the Republic—this magnificent land of ours, which excels every other land. When we reflect upon the great blessings that we enjoy, the splendid climate, the unrivalled fertility of the land, with its magnificent scenery, its effective lines of inter-communication, and its energetic industrious population, we behold a stimulus to every citizen to work for the common good that no other land offers.

Right here in the Eastern part of these United States came the men who have since conquered everything in the interests of civilization. They brought with them English laws and the English love of liberty and English institutions, and above all the English Bible. The Anglo-Saxon is occupying our Pacific slope too, which, but for the barrier wall which Providence has erected, might have been populated by the barbarians of Asia. We have now a population of over 70,000,000—one hundred years from now there will be over 700,000,000. The men who will lead this mighty host in their financial and commercial life, combining intelligence, energy, knowledge of the world and industrious application, are the present and future bankers."

In reference to the collection of out-of-town checks Mr. Van Norden said that the bankers had little to do in such matters. They had a clearing-house committee—as it was necessary to have some one do their thinking, and they do it. The committee fixes something up, and tells the bankers to vote for it, and they obediently do it.

Before introducing the next speaker Chairman Van Inwegen remarked:

"I am glad to know that it is the clearing-house which is solely responsible for this new rule about checks. All of us country bankers know some of you big city fellows who were dreadfully surprised at that rule—they would never have thought of such a thing themselves. I am sure we are all glad to know who it was that got up such a job as that."

Mr. Trowbridge spoke on the question of collection charges in part as follows:

"There are two sides to this question, and perhaps three. First, there is your side, and then there is ours. We all understand that. But there is a third person, who makes the

trouble for the other two, and that is the man who makes a check when he has not got the money in bank to meet it. He sends the check to New York, and calculates that by the time it gets back to his town—six, eight or ten days later—he will be able to raise the money. Three-fifths of the checks that come to New York are not good when they start. You may doubt that, but I know it to be true.

Well, some fine day a customer comes to you and explains that you will get a check of his the next day, and he has not the money to meet it. 'Oh, no,' you say, 'it came in to-day.' And such men send in more checks than others, because they have to buy in smaller quantities. Of course, your customer promises to make good to-morrow, and the question is, Are you, in order to make twenty-five cents, going to accommodate him?

It is the same way with drafts and notes, and you have more of it than we do.

There is another thing to be considered. Banks in New York are not selling merchandise. We don't care whether cotton goes up half a cent or codfish goes down a cent, yet, because we try to make an arrangement that shall make our business pay, we are accused of trying to antagonize the business interests of the whole country.

Still another point is the position of the post office and the express companies. Often, while a country banker is trying to make a little business with two or three checks, the express companies will sell dozens of money orders at seven or eight cents apiece. In 1896 more than 78,000,000 post-office money orders were issued payable in New York, and express companies did nearly as much business in that manner. They come to us by the basketful.

I give you this to think about. While your customer is pestering you with checks that are not good the man whose check is good pays eight cents to the express company. Let the country bankers and others get together and talk this over."

The chairman read a letter from W. E. Frew, President of the Queens County Bank, Long Island City. Mr. Frew advocated the establishing of a country clearing-house, which would attend to these country checks. He said that such a clearing-house would cost less proportionately than the New York City Clearing-House.

C. A. Pugsley, President of the Westchester County National Bank, Peekskill, made a brief but interesting talk, speaking in part as follows :

"I would like to say something about the recent action taken in regard to currency reform. It is a subject which, I believe, interests every banker in this country and every man of affairs. It is undoubtedly true that there are other matters pertaining to our country in great need of reform; but it is equally true that the reform of the currency is of far greater moment and demands immediate attention. The endless chain of legal-tender operations, by which gold has been drawn from the United States Treasury, is unnecessary expense and should be broken. Greenbacks when once redeemed in gold should not be reissued. The banking and currency system of the country must be put upon a solid foundation before the financial condition of the United States can be placed upon the elevation to which our country's greatness entitles her. Our standard of value must be made fixed and unchangeable, and it should be the very best, so that there will be no doubt in the minds of our own people or among the nations of the world as to our metallic standard."

Bradford Rhodes, President of the Mamaroneck Bank, and Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, made a short address. He said :

"Mr. Chairman, as this is simply a business meeting of Group VI, it is certainly a hopeful sign that so many of our friends are present. There is a spirit of co-operation and good-fellowship here which is both helpful and encouraging.

Looking around the table, I am reminded of the first meeting of our group held in this room in 1894, shortly after the New York State Bankers' Association was organized. Many changes have occurred since then, and it must be acknowledged that the association has in some measure at least met the expectations of the bankers of the State. Improvements have been introduced in methods of doing business; our lawmakers at Albany have learned that banks are usually managed by broad-gauge men of affairs, who aim to conserve the best interests of the community in which they do business. The successful banker cannot be selfish and narrow. He is necessarily a co-worker as well as a custodian, his success being closely allied with the prosperity and enterprise of the people whom he serves.

Speaking of legislation, I have but little sympathy with those people who are continually carping at our legislators, either at Washington, Albany, or elsewhere. Those who are loudest in their criticisms are usually the persons who do nothing to remedy existing conditions. Our lawmakers are just what we make them, and public opinion can always shape legislation. After a service of several terms in the Legislature of this State, I can say that as a rule the men who are elected to that honorable body are not only faithful and honest, but in their public service seek to promote the best interests of the people."

Mr. Rhodes also referred to the value of the association as an educational force, stating that the course of legislation at Albany last winter justified its existence. No bills inimical to the interests of banking were passed. In closing he referred to the next annual convention of the association to be held at the Thousand Islands, July 14 and 15, and expressed the hope that Group VI would be fully represented.

David Cromwell, President of the White Plains Bank, said that the cost of collecting a check was just as legitimately a part of the bank's expenses as rent or clerk hire.

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#### MISSOURI BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

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Kansas City entertained the ninth annual convention of the Missouri Bankers' Association, which met on May 24 and 25.

There was a general discussion of the benefits of the organization, participated in by a number of the delegates. Gordon Jones, President of the St. Joseph Stockyards Bank, in the course of some remarks, said :

"It is mainly owing to the work of this association that the Missouri Legislature, which, thank Heaven, has adjourned, was prevented from passing certain laws which, if enacted, would have forced out of business one-third of the banks in the State."

G. L. Crenshaw, President of the C. H. Brown Banking Co., Lamar, discussed the question of bank reserves. He thought that the country bankers should be careful to maintain an adequate reserve, as the resources for quickly building up a reserve were not so readily available in the country as in the city.

Ex-Gov. Thos. T. Crittenden, former Consul General to Mexico, made an interesting address on "Our Consular System; Its Objects and Needed Reforms."

Mr. Crittenden prefaced his remarks with an eulogistic tribute to Missouri and a complimentary reference to the bankers, quoting Henry Watterson's well-known saying: "Never fuss with your wife, your doctor or your banker." He continued by deploring the system of political rotation of consuls to foreign countries.

"Consuls should not be changed every time there is a change in the executive power of the nation," said Mr. Crittenden. "Let the diplomatic service go, if you will, but adhere to the consular. Commerce is stronger than diplomacy, and for that very reason when a suitable consul is secured for a certain city or country, he should be retained at his post so long as he can efficiently carry out his duties, regardless of the political changes in the government of his country."

Mr. Crittenden said that when he was notified of his appointment as Consul General to Mexico he really did not know where the City of Mexico was nor what railroad to take to get there.

"That is the case with most of our consuls when they are appointed," he said, "and it should not be so. They should never be removed except for cause. And more than that, the United States should have more consuls in foreign countries. We need them."

At the close of Mr. Crittenden's address, a resolution urging that the consular system of the United States be established upon a permanent basis "regardless of politics" was unanimously adopted. The resolution further provides that in order to place our nation upon an equal footing with the other leading commercial nations, our Government should establish an academy for the special training of those who wish to enter the consular service, and that the members of the association urge the need of this upon the Senators and Representatives from Missouri and request other State bankers' associations to do likewise.

A resolution was adopted in favor of taking proper steps to secure an exhibition of American corn at the Paris Exposition.



New officers were elected as follows :

President—Frank P. Hays, St. Louis.

Vice-President—Geo. B. Harrison, Jr., Assistant Cashier Glasgow Savings Bank.

Secretary—Gordon Jones, President St. Joseph Stockyards Bank.

Treasurer—J. S. Calfee, Cashier Citizens' Bank, Windsor.

A reception and ball at the Coates House concluded the meeting.

Next year's convention will be held at Carthage.

### NEBRASKA BANKERS' MEETING.

The Bankers of Northeast Nebraska held their second annual meeting at Wayne, Neb., April 21. A prominent feature of the meeting was a paper by V. B. Caldwell, Cashier of the United States National Bank, Omaha, which was in part as follows :

#### CREDIT RISKS OF A CITY AND COUNTRY BANK.

"In banking our regular reserve is our cash and exchange maintained in a certain safe ratio governed by the character and demands of our deposits, and our business is profitable only as we keep the funds intrusted to us well at work. The deposits do their work best when fully loaned out with due regard to a safe reserve.

Now, to bend a city or town bank so as to loan out our money fully and keep it well at work, is the desire of us all. Large reserves of cash and exchange is not good banking. Profitable returns on our invested capital are ours by right, and heavy reserves will not bring us a fair return upon our investment in the capital stock of our bank. To get this we must keep the money at work fully, but so divide our credit risks that at no time do we endanger the solvency of our institutions.

How shall we do this? The most essential feature of a well managed bank is to build up another reserve in and with its loans. This is sometimes called the second reserve and I have grown to call it the ideal reserve of a bank; ideal because it is alive, at work, drawing interest and daily adding to the profit and loss account, a reserve that is the finest and greatest feature in banking.

Now, then, this ideal reserve, let us call it that, is the loans we put out that we can have paid without in any way disturbing the customer of our own bank. A contraction of loans necessarily disturbs a bank's business and, if sudden, injures the business of its customer, while a contraction of loans persistently means that more or less every customer of the bank is considerably embarrassed in his arrangements and unduly disturbed, to say nothing of the shock given to a bank's profits. When a bank by reason of an established policy continually carries this second or ideal reserve in its loans, it can contract with little disturbance among its clients and with little loss of its profits.

In the panic of 1893 our own bank had about two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in outside loans that were maturing during the latter part of June, July and August, the worst days of the panic. These were loans made upon warehouse receipts, to commercial houses not our own customers; loans upon sundry available collaterals all made to firms, corporations or individuals who were not customers of our own bank. These were all 'called' at maturity and this reserve used before calling upon our own customers to pay off or reduce their lines.

#### WHAT SHOULD COMPOSE THE SECONDARY RESERVE.

In the country it is not feasible or advisable to loan customers of another bank—but there exists a still better material for this second or ideal reserve of the loans than that, better for the banks in the town, better for the banks in the city. I mean to so place the credit risks of the bank that they are best available for any emergency that may arise. If a bank carries a large cash and exchange reserve for a dim future undefined disturbance, it may run safely, but with small comfort to its stockholders. As I said before a large cash reserve is not necessarily a sign of good banking. Indeed, weak banks must carry large reserves, for with a weak bank that is all they have between bankruptcy and starvation. The resources of this country we all live in, this great garden spot of the Great Middle West, are such that we may safely conduct our business with small reserves of cash and exchange if only we all carry in each of our banks this second or ideal reserve of live, interest-bearing paper not loaned for a definite time. The temptation for higher rates of interest leads many of us to loan for sixty or ninety days upon paper that is renewed indefinitely, sometimes from year to year.

The good material I spoke of for our second reserve, the class of loans that must be paid at maturity, is loans upon cattle in the feed lot upon full feed of corn. These are the ideal credit risks and always at our elbow for this second reserve. In this section of the country a bank that maintains a fair proportion of its loans in good, first-class cattle paper, say at least twenty-five per cent., is an absolutely independent institution whose credit risks are so divided that maturing paper and its regular reserve will relieve its owners from the greatest amount of risk and worry during a general financial depression. Loans upon matured cattle in the feed lot will be paid when due. The cattle have no feelings to injure, no concessions to ask or demands to make for past favors shown to the bank, and when they are ripe they go to the market regardless of the wishes of the maker or holder of the paper. This class of securities speaks for itself, and in some form or other by sale or rediscounting will always bring home the principal and accrued interest.

In the South Platte country where there is little feeding, comparatively speaking, one of the best risks for the second reserve is loans upon grain in elevator or crib which, in an emergency, is equally at service of the banker so he may readily realize upon this class of security. These securities are in the reach of all of us, whether in city or town, and a safe proportion of such loans, maturing at different times, gives a stability to the assets of a bank that is more than compensated for, even when taken at the slightly lower rates of interest, than the rate they bear in comparison to the average run of bills receivable.

So, instead of letting all the good cattle men run to the commission houses for their funds, I believe every bank should select some of the best of these loans for their own funds as a safety valve on their business. If the rates of interest are lower than they usually receive, yet for their second reserve the rate is higher and better than any loans in their bank, because the cattle pay the note when they go to market.

Credit risks in town and city vary only in degree and volume. We have all learned that the resources of the borrower, his ability to pay and what he has to pay with, require the closest scrutiny. Machinery, equipment, plants and unsalable assets are poor stuff with which to pay depositors, and the necessity of having an exact knowledge of our client's business affairs has led us to demand signed statements to a greater degree than ever before. The value of a statement is most essential to learn from it the quick assets that exist behind the paper for which we give up our good money. The merchant who shows to his banker the exact proportion of his realizable assets to the balance of his resources meets with ready encouragement and compliance with his needs. He establishes a confidence that cannot exist where we have only an indefinite knowledge that perhaps he is worth so and so much in stuff we don't precisely locate.

The National Credit Men's Association, of which there is a branch in Omaha and Sioux City, is rapidly bringing it about so every merchant asking credit will make to some one an exact and comprehensive signed statement of his business. This in time will be universal and of great assistance to us in that it will become a universal and general custom to have a comprehensive statement from every merchant who asks an accommodation of his bank. With the general run of farmers asking loans for expense money, etc., the bankers are in close touch and the loss on such loans is scarce. The time of payment may not at all correspond with the first or actual maturity of the paper, but its ultimate payment is generally only a question of time. These are the loans forming the preponderance of the credit risks of a bank and that bank is not run on a conservative or safe plan which confines its risks exclusively to this paper of higher interest rates.

I cannot dwell too strongly on the fact before-mentioned that each and all of us ought to constantly aim to have in our banks a second reserve of live interest-bearing paper whose maturity means payment; such loans that we ourselves cannot renew, no matter how much we dislike to see them paid.

I do not believe a bank can run for a long period of time and meet no loss in its credit risks. Every well managed commercial business runs on a basis of a certain percentage of loss on the volume of its sales as well as on waste, shrinkage and depreciation. Bankers are merchants, pure and simple and their commodity, money, differs not at all from sugar, cotton goods, shoes, hardware or other staple merchandise. We sell our money at a price just as merchants sell their goods. Every time a bank meets a loss and acknowledges it, it will suffer little by its promptly charging out the loss, which fact makes us but more cautious.

I know of one bank in this State, owned, it is true, by three parties, who declare their annual dividend, now listen, in notes owned by the bank which they divide among themselves in amounts equal to their dividends. The Cashier collects them as soon as he can and he told me that they hadn't yet got all of their '94 and '95 dividends while they had collected '97 and '98. Of course most of us would starve if we followed this course, but I use it to illustrate that something should yearly be set aside for contingent losses likely to be incurred in our wide extensions of credit.

## THE HAZARDS OF THE BANKING BUSINESS.

I know of no well recognized commercial business really so hazardous as the banking business, no business where so great credit risks are extended for such a small proportionate profit. We would not certainly like to make loans to others who owed as much as we do. Our directors and stockholders should know and understand our business is a hazardous one, that it requires the most careful attention and well balanced judgment, and when it is a valuable business we should plan to preserve and keep it so. To do this we must make good profits to provide for future probable losses. We must loan out our funds fully and safely and the carrying of this reserve in our loans will enable us to do this, i. e., a certain amount of live interest-bearing paper loaned outside of our customers' regular needs, something that will pay itself at its maturity so we can contract our loans at will without disturbing the patronage of the bank.

With a careful knowledge of our customer's business, which we may obtain and verify through the statements he makes of his conditions, with a due regard to loaning him in proportion to his quick assets, with a second or ideal reserve of choice paper, whose conditions render it certain to be paid at maturity, this at-work-all-the-time, interest-bearing reserve, with a fair amount of cash and exchange, with these requisites for the best kind of banking, we are absolutely at all times independent of our customers, of our city correspondents, and our business is actually our own and we will control and master all situations as they may arise."

Resolutions were adopted favoring the reorganization of the State Bankers' Association on the basis of the group system, urging the repeal of the present bankruptcy law, which was declared not to be properly framed to meet the just requirements of such a law; opposing the establishment of branch banks, on the grounds that such a system would savor of trusts and monopolies. On the question of collections the resolution adopted declared:

Be it resolved that the practice of affording free exchange or making free collections for the sake of drawing or holding business, is contrary to the true interest of banking, but that, instead, all persons enjoying the facilities afforded by bankers should pay an equitable fee as compensation therefor, and we recommend the following as lowest equitable rates:

For issuing drafts for amounts under \$10, five cents. For amounts over \$10, ten cents per \$100 or fraction thereof.

For remitting for cash items: For amounts under \$10, ten cents. For amounts over \$10, fifteen cents for the first \$100 and ten cents per hundred for each additional hundred. For checks drawn "with exchange" the rates above quoted are to be charged the drawer. For cashing express orders same as for remitting cash items.

A resolution was adopted in favor of making the war tax more equitable by imposing a tax on all corporations having a capital of \$25,000 and over, similar to the tax paid by the banks.

Officers for the ensuing year were chosen as follows:

President, J. D. Haskell, of Wakefield; Vice-President, E. A. Wiltse, Pender; Secretary, A. M. Merrill, Hartington; Treasurer, G. L. Wood, Ponca; Trustees—F. G. Hoffman; Randolph; E. F. Kearney, Jackson; H. B. Jones, Wayne; Geo. H. Haase, Emerson.

## TEXAS BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The fifteenth annual convention of the Texas Bankers' Association met at San Antonio May 9.

In his annual address President Loyd congratulated the bankers of Texas on the prosperity which prevails throughout the State and the country generally. He thought the district system of organization had not proved satisfactory.

Secretary G. W. Voiers presented his report, which showed a membership of 216, an increase of about twenty during the year.

A. P. Wooldridge, President of the City National Bank, of Austin, told of the good work done by the legislative committee in preventing the enactment of laws injurious to the banks and business interests generally.

T. S. Henderson, of Cameron, read a paper on "The Banker as a Citizen."

At the second day's session considerable time was devoted to the discussion of the necessity for crop diversification. It was especially thought desirable that the farmer should raise less cotton and pay more attention to raising high-grade cattle, the bankers being willing to make loans to aid in bringing about the change. Among those who advocated this course were: Geo. E. Webb, President of the Concho National Bank, of San Angelo, and Theodore Buhler and G. A. Levi, of Victoria.

The responsibility of a bank in buying a draft with bill of lading attached, arising out of a recent decision to the effect that a bank was the guarantor of the quality of grain represented by the bill of lading, was next considered, and a special committee appointed to make further investigation of the subject, and to present a report for the guidance of the banks.

E. Rotan, President of the First National Bank, Waco, read a very entertaining paper on "The Humors of Banking," which was followed by interesting experiences related by a number of other members.

It was voted to continue the district system of organization.

At the final day's session on May 11, Judge O. E. Dunlap read an instructive paper on the new bankruptcy law. The paper was discussed by G. A. Levi, of Victoria, and L. Z. Miller, of Belton.

Suitable resolutions were adopted in regard to the death of J. W. Ferris, Vice-President of the Citizens' National Bank, Waxahachie.

Officers were chosen as follows:

President—Geo. E. Webb, President Concho National Bank, San Angelo.

First Vice-President—F. F. Downs, President First National Bank, Temple.

Second Vice-President—H. P. Hilliard, Cashier Austin National Bank.

Secretary—G. W. Volers, Cashier National Bank of Forney.

Assistant Secretary—J. W. Butler, Cashier Farmers and Merchants' Bank, Clifton.

Treasurer—E. Rotan, President First National Bank, Waco.

Delegates to American Bankers' Association—O. E. Dunlap, President Citizens' National Bank, Waxahachie; Charles F. Smith, Cashier First National Bank, McGregor; J. N. Brown, Cashier Alamo National Bank, San Antonio; E. J. Gannon, Cashier American National Bank, Dallas; A. P. Wooldridge, President City National Bank, Austin; T. J. Groce, President Galveston National Bank.

Next year's convention will be held at Fort Worth.

#### GEORGIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The eighth annual convention of the Georgia Bankers' Association was held at Warm Springs June 9. An interesting programme had been prepared for the meeting, which will be fully reported in the next number of the *MAGAZINE*.

#### IOWA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The thirteenth annual meeting of the Iowa Bankers' Association was held at Burlington June 14 and 15. A report of the convention is necessarily deferred until the July issue.

#### NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The sixth annual convention of the New York State Bankers' Association will be held at Alexandria Bay, N. Y., Friday and Saturday, July 14 and 15.

There will be an interesting programme and plenty of entertainment. Ladies

are specially invited to attend, and particular attention will be given to their comfort and pleasure.

Reduced rates on railroads and at hotels—not limited to dates of convention.

This will be an excellent opportunity to visit the beautiful St. Lawrence River.

The council meeting will be held at 9 o'clock Friday morning; at 10, first session of the convention; after dinner there will be a trip through the islands, lasting about four hours, on the steamer "New York," which is the largest and handsomest boat of the Folger Line, returning to the hotels for supper. In the evening the officers of the Thousand Islands Club house have put their house at the disposal of the convention, and there will be a reception with music and dancing. On Saturday there will be two sessions of the convention. At 4 o'clock there will be a reception at the island home of Mr. and Mrs. G. C. Boldt of the Waldorf-Astoria. Saturday night there will be a search light trip among the islands and illuminated cottages, on the fine steamer "St. Lawrence," returning before midnight.

First-class train service going and returning, including sleepers, is promised.

The Crossman and Thousand Isle houses give a special rate of \$3 per day (\$4 with bath), and the International, \$2.50 per day.

George W. Thayer, of Rochester, is chairman of the committee of arrangements.

Full information regarding programme, routes and rates will be mailed to members in due season.

The president of the association is Charles Adsit, of Hornellsville, and the secretary W. I. Taber, of Herkimer.

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#### NORTH CAROLINA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The third annual meeting of the North Carolina Bankers' Association was held at Raleigh June 7, 8 and 9. In addition to the usual reports and addresses the following specially-prepared papers were on the programme:

"When the South was the Richest Section of the Country and when it Can Be Again," by Col. W. H. S. Burgwyn, National Bank Examiner; "Competition among Banks," by T. W. Dewey, Cashier Farmers and Merchants' Bank, New Berne; "The Trust Company, What It is and What It Does," by F. H. Fries, President Wachovia Loan and Trust Company, Winston; "The Influence of the Banker," by Hon. Ro. B. Glenn, Winston; "Bank Credits," by Caldwell Hardy, President Norfolk National Bank; "The Personnel and Methods of the Bank of North Carolina, 1859-67," by Hon. Kemp P. Battle, University of North Carolina; "The Country Banker," by C. N. Evans, Cashier Bank, of Reidsville; "The Bankrupt Law," by Col. John W. Hinsdale, of Raleigh; "To Establish a General Depository in the South," by J. A. Stone, Cashier Pilot Bank and Trust Company.

An extended report of the meeting will appear in the July number.

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#### WEST VIRGINIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The sixth annual convention of the West Virginia Bankers' Association was held at Huntington June 7 and 8. A report of the meeting will appear in the July number.

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**Useful to Bankers.**—The remarkable reduction in bicycle prices has at last been equalled in the typewriter field; but while all wheels are cheaper, only one writing machine with the Universal Keyboard has appeared at a low price. The Commercial Visible, No. 300 Broadway, New York, seems to surpass the \$100 machines in convenient features, but retails at \$40 and \$50. Besides, the machine is portable and durable, and Cashiers and others desiring a typewriter suitable to place upon the desk will find the Commercial the one best adapted for this purpose, and filling all the requirements of the banking office.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc.**, under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—On the evening of June 1 a dinner was given by Simon H. Stern, at the New York Club, to A. G. Loomis, the new Vice-President of the National City Bank. Mr. Stern is an old friend of Mr. Loomis, and took this way of affording him an opportunity of meeting many of the leading bank officers of the city who were guests at the dinner.

—Charles H. Stout, Cashier of the National Bank of the Republic, and Miss Henrietta M. Schroeder were married at the Church of the Transfiguration, May 27, the ceremony being performed by the Rev. Geo. C. Houghton, rector of the church and an uncle of the bride.

Mr. Stout has been connected with the National Bank of the Republic for many years and has established an excellent reputation as a bank officer.

Mr. and Mrs. Stout will reside at Seabright, N. J., during the summer.

—Extensive improvements have been made in the equipments of the Bank of New Amsterdam at Broadway and Thirty-ninth street, still better enabling it to handle its largely increased business. Within the past three years deposits have almost quadrupled.

—The North American Trust Company has been appointed Government depository in the Island of Cuba. It has already received an appointment as United States fiscal agent, so that at present the company has practically all of the Government's business there, receiving customs, local tax and other revenue collections in charge of the War Department.

—A seat on the Stock Exchange sold recently for \$40,000, the highest sum ever paid.

—The stockholders of the National Bank of North America are to vote on June 14 on an increase of the bank's capital stock from \$700,000 to \$1,000,000.

—At a recent meeting of the board of directors of the Knickerbocker Trust Co. Charles I. Barney, formerly Vice-President, was elected President; Frederick L. Eldridge, First Vice-President; Joseph T. Brown, Second Vice-President; Alfred B. Maclay, Secretary and Treasurer; Frederick Gore King, Assistant. A. Foster Higgins was elected a member of the executive committee, and Charles W. Gould of the board of directors and the executive committee.

—William M. Woods has been appointed Assistant Cashier of the National Citizens' Bank.

—Anson R. Flower, of Messrs. Flower & Co., has been elected a director of the National Bank of the Republic.

—Leonard Schafer has been admitted as a member of the firm of Zimmermann & Forshay.

—At a meeting of the board of directors of the Seventh National Bank, May 16, Wm. H. Kimball, for the past seven years National Bank Examiner for this city, was elected director and Vice-President, and J. Preston McAnerney, Assistant Cashier. Mr. McAnerney is the son of the President of the bank, and has been in its service about ten years.

Mr. Kimball's long experience as bank examiner will be of great assistance to him, and also valuable to the bank, in his new capacity.

It is reported that Perry S. Heath, First Assistant Postmaster-General, and his brother, together with Mayor Quincy, of Boston, and New York and Western capitalists, have acquired a controlling interest in the bank.

—The Trust Company of America was recently incorporated with \$2,500,000 capital and the same amount of surplus. It is reported that the scope of the institution will be somewhat more extensive than that of most of the companies now operating. Following are the names of the incorporators, many of them being bankers and other well-known capitalists:

William Barbour, Samuel A. Maxwell, H. S. Manning, Charles F. Cutler, Samuel C. T. Dodd, A. Trowbridge, Willard Brown, Edward F. Cragin, John R. Hegeman, J. William Clark, Anson R. Flower, Emerson McMillin, Myron T. Herrick, Joel Francis Freeman, William

Spier, James M. Donald, Henry S. Redmond, Ashbel P. Fitch, Philip Lehman, E. C. Converse, H. O. Havemeyer, C. I. Hudson, G. Blumenthal, Horatio S. Byrne.

The place of business will be at 149 Broadway. A number of the important cities of the country are represented in the subscriptions to the stock.

—S. D. Scudder, Southern Manager for the Germania Fire Insurance Co., was recently elected Vice-President of the Produce Exchange Trust Co. He began his business career with the Bank of Montreal, in this city, in 1877, and later engaged in banking in Minnesota. He subsequently went to San Antonio and organized a fire insurance company. Since 1895 he has been connected with the Germania Fire Insurance Co., first as manager for Texas, and then of the Southern department with headquarters at New Orleans. In January of this year, his department was enlarged and removed to New York. Mr. Scudder has established a reputation for aggressiveness and ability in the insurance field, and will doubtless be equally successful on his return to the banking business.

—Anthony N. Brady has been elected a director of the Corn Exchange Bank, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Roswell P. Flower.

—Alvah Trowbridge, Vice-President of the National Bank of North America, has been elected President of the North American Trust Company, succeeding Hon. Wm. L. Trenholm, who desires to be free of business cares. Mr. Trowbridge, the new President, was elected Cashier of the National Bank of North America in 1898, having been paying teller for several years prior to that time. On June 30, 1897, he was elected Vice-President. He has been prominently identified with the American Bankers' Association, and is now chairman of the executive council.

Mr. Trowbridge is a capable financier, and the interests represented by his election will promote the business welfare of the company.

The North American Trust Company, in addition to its New York and London offices, has branches at Santiago and Havana, Cuba, which are reported to be in a flourishing condition.

An increase of the capital from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000 is reported, and the surplus from \$200,000 to \$1,000,000.

—A business meeting and dinner of the New York Credit Men's Association was held at the rooms of the Wool Club on the evening of May 11. Following the dinner a number of addresses were made. G. Waldo Smith proposed that the Credit Men's Association and the bankers co-operate in exacting of every business man a statement upon his application for credit, or upon his presenting a note to be discounted. Following Mr. Smith's address a paper, prepared by Hugo Kanzler, was read by Secretary Sayers, calling attention to defects in the new National Bankruptcy Act. In speaking on the subject of credit, Erastus Wiman said: "The weakest link in the chain of business instrumentalities is the inadequacy of information and the inaccuracy of reports."

E. Galland dwelt at length upon the methods essential in gauging a man's right to credit. He said: "It is a mistake to extend credit solely upon a man's capital. No man is entitled to credit unless he possesses in a substantial measure, character, capacity and capital. The last, though not least important, is insignificant if the claimant for credit does not possess honor to carry out his obligations." He also said: "The services given us by the mercantile organizations are very bad. The credit men should form an organization of their own for the purpose of securing information."

This organization is doing good work in raising the standard of mercantile credits—a service which is of especial value to the banks of the country.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—At the annual meeting of the Bank Officers' Association, May 17, the following officers were elected:

President, Thomas W. Andrew; Vice-Presidents, Charles H. Johnson, Harry L. Burrage; Secretary, Edwin A. Stone; Treasurer, Henry A. Tenney; directors for two years, Charles G. Schirmer, Lindley H. Hill; trustee for three years, Alonzo P. Weeks; auditing committee—Arthur F. Lane, William E. Timlin, Frank W. Bryant; nominating committee—F. W. Brown, Bank of the Republic; C. C. Patten, Old Boston National; J. S. Adams, Provident Institution; L. B. Seaver, Old Colony Trust Company, and John Barrows, Shawmut National Bank. The report of the board of managers shows that the organization consists of 735 members, a gain of sixteen since the last annual meeting; there is \$6,486 in the treasury, a gain of \$1,046.

—Extensive alterations and improvements are to be made in the building of the Atlantic National Bank.

—The Savings Banks Commissioners of Massachusetts have decided, after a ruling on the question by the Attorney-General, that Savings banks may invest in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy bonds under the recent act of the Legislature.

—The Eliot National Bank has elected Harry L. Burrage, formerly Cashier of the Third National Bank, Vice-President to succeed Albert H. Wiggin, who is now Vice-President of the National Park Bank, New York. Wm. J. Mandell succeeds Geo. W. Grant as Cashier of the Eliot National, and Wm. F. Edlefson becomes Assistant Cashier in place of Wm. J. Mandell.

—Geo. W. Grant, late Cashier of the Eliot National, has been elected Vice-President of the Third National; N. F. Perkins succeeds Harry L. Burrage as Cashier, Mr. Burrage having been elected Vice-President of the Eliot National.

**Maine Savings Banks.**—As per the official reports for April 30, just published, the deposits of the fifty-one Savings banks of Maine amount to \$62,583,434.52, an increase of \$1,730,877.18 over the amount reported at the date of the previous official statement.

**An Error Rectified.**—In the last number of the MAGAZINE it was stated that David N. Williams had been appointed National bank examiner for the district comprising Connecticut and Rhode Island. This was an error. Charles S. Perkins is the correct name of the appointee.

**Meeting of Connecticut Bankers.**—A meeting of representatives of a number of the banks of Connecticut was held at Hartford, May 11, to discuss the propriety of making some change in the method of collecting checks, and a committee was appointed to consider and report upon the matter. It was the general opinion that the New York Clearing-House rule was arbitrary and unjust to the Connecticut banks. The meeting voted to resolve itself into the Connecticut Bankers' Association, and to assemble again the second Tuesday in June for permanent organization.

**A Banker's Gift.**—J. Pierpont Morgan, the New York banker, has given \$10,000 toward the fund which is being subscribed for a new public library building in Holyoke, Mass. Mr. Morgan's father, Junius Spencer Morgan, of J. S. Morgan & Co., London, who died a few years ago, was born in Holyoke.

**Bangor, Me.**—The annual meeting of the Penobscot Savings Bank was held May 8, the trustees and officers being re-elected.

A very satisfactory condition of affairs was disclosed by the annual report of the trustees. The bank holds no real estate under foreclosure, and there is no overdue interest on loans. Holdings of Government, municipal and railway bonds amount to \$1,416,125, and of railway and corporation stock, \$116,750.

Total open accounts are 5,105, an increase of 961 over the previous year's report, and average to each depositor \$419.

The bank was organized in 1860, and has paid its depositors in dividends \$1,146,958.18.

Since December, 1898, the bank has received deposits from 671 pupils in the public schools, deposits being made by the teachers.

**To Reduce Capital.**—At a meeting of the shareholders of the Stratford National Bank, Dover, N. H., on May 10, it was voted to reduce the capital from \$200,000 to \$100,000, which will then equal the surplus, there being also \$20,000 of undivided profits.

## MIDDLE STATES.

**Baltimore, Md.**—Mayor Wm. T. Malster, recently an unsuccessful candidate for re-election, was elected President of the Atlantic Trust and Deposit Company on March 11.

—Additional property has been bought by the National Union Bank of Maryland on which it may decide to erect a new bank building.

—A modern fire-proof office building is to be erected by the Guardian Trust and Safe Deposit Company, at a cost of about \$250,000.

—It is reported that the Home Trust Company has decided not to open for business until fall. Subscriptions for the capital were largely in excess of the required amount.

—An important real estate deal has been concluded by the purchase of the Massachusetts building by the new Atlantic Trust and Deposit Company. About \$650,000 is represented by the transaction.

**New Trust Companies.**—The Trust Company of New Jersey, which recently commenced business at Hoboken, has opened prosperously. A substantial building for the use of the company will be erected soon.

—Well-known capitalists are reported to be planning the organization of a new trust company at Newark, N. J., with \$500,000 capital and a like surplus.

—The Utica (N. Y.) Trust and Deposit Company is a new institution with \$200,000 capital and an equal surplus. Reports that it would absorb the Second National Bank are denied.



—The Hackensack (N. J.) Trust Company is being organized. Edward E. Poor, President of the National Park Bank, New York, will have a large interest in the new company.

**Will Liquidate.**—At a meeting of the stockholders of the Farmers' Bank of Delaware, May 18, it was decided to close the branch at New Castle.

**A New National Bank Examiner.**—William H. Bryan, for the past six and a half years Cashier of the East Orange (N. J.) National Bank, has resigned his position to accept appointment as a National bank examiner. His district includes all of New Jersey and Delaware, and all of Southern New York south of Poughkeepsie and east of Port Jervis, with the exception of New York city.

**Wilkes-Barre, Pa.**—The First National Bank recently added \$10,000 to its surplus, making the total \$210,000.

**Syracuse, N. Y.**—At the election of officers of the Onondaga County Savings Bank, on May 3, Geo. B. Kent was elected first Vice-President, in place of Wm. E. Abbott, deceased. Alva W. Palmer was elected second Vice-President, and E. B. Judson, Jr., trustee in place of Thomas Molloy, deceased.

—At a meeting of the directors of the Commercial Bank, May 5, Willis A. Holden was elected a director to succeed Hamilton S. White, deceased.

—The Salt Springs National Bank now occupies its new banking rooms in the Gridley block.

**New State Bank.**—The City Bank, of New Rochelle, N. Y., has been organized with \$50,000 capital. Henry Henneberger is President and Clarence S. McClellan, Vice-President.

**Named as Bank Examiner.**—Hon. Thomas J. Power, State Commissioner of Banking, has appointed ex-Senator A. F. Bannon, of Bradford, as one of the State bank examiners.

**Ithaca, N. Y.**—The First National Bank, which was organized in 1864, has recently refitted the interior of its banking rooms. Geo. R. Williams is President of the bank; he is the son of Josiah B. Williams, a former President. Alonzo B. Cornell, afterwards Governor of New York, was the first Cashier. In 1866 he was succeeded by Henry B. Lord, who is still Cashier. The bank has \$250,000 capital and surplus and profits of about \$85,000.

#### SOUTHERN STATES.

**Chattanooga, Tenn.**—Deposits of the First National Bank, according to the report of April 5, amounted to \$1,844,548, and total resources were \$2,440,114. Cash and exchange on the date named amounted to \$1,058,154.

—John W. Faxon, Secretary of the Tennessee Bankers' Association, reports that days of grace are abolished by a recent law. Instruments falling due on Saturday are payable the next succeeding business day, except that instruments payable on demand may, at the option of the holder, be presented for payment before noon on Saturday, when that entire day is not a holiday.

Saturday has been made a half-holiday from noon till midnight, but its observance is optional, and the banks have not yet adopted the privilege of closing accorded them by the new law.

**Nashville, Tenn.**—At a meeting of the stockholders of the City Savings Bank, May 15, the directors and officers were re-elected and the usual six per cent. dividend declared. Reports submitted showed the condition of the bank to be more prosperous than ever before.

**Suffolk, Va.**—The new building of the Farmers' Bank of Nansemond recently completed is a substantial and well-appointed structure. It is built in tasteful style, with granite front and limestone trimmings, and in its vaults and other equipments all the requirements of convenience, comfort and safety are met.

**North Carolina State Bonds.**—An issue of \$110,000 North Carolina State bonds was recently awarded to the Wachovia Loan and Trust Company, of Winston, N. C., which paid \$120,202.50 for the whole issue, competing successfully with a large number of bids, some of which were from the bond houses in the large cities. The ability of the State to place its bonds among its own citizens is obviously a matter for congratulation, representing a growing independence of outside capital.

#### WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—The First National Bank has adopted a plan under which pensions are to be paid hereafter to officers and employees who have been in its service for a certain number of years, and to the heirs of such officers and employees in case of their death.

The principle on which the fund is established is to have the employees pay an arbitrary amount into the fund. This has been fixed for the present at three per cent. of their salaries, and the bank is to contribute, from time to time, such an amount as may be necessary

to maintain the solvency of the fund. The bank has contributed a liberal amount to start the fund with, and while it has assumed no legal obligation binding it to contribute to the fund in the future, it is the understanding that it will regularly, say once a year, charge an amount to the ordinary expenses and place it to the credit of the fund, sufficient to maintain its solvency.

—The American Trust and Savings Bank has moved into new offices in the New York Life building at La Salle and Monroe streets, having about four times the space occupied in its previous quarters.

The rate at which the business of the American Trust and Savings Bank is increasing may best be illustrated by the following figures: January 10, 1898, the books showed deposits of \$4,800,000 and loans of \$3,600,000. At the present time the deposits are in excess of \$10,000,000 and the loans have been swelled to \$5,100,000, an increase of \$5,800,000 in the former item and of between \$1,200,000 and \$1,400,000 in the latter. About \$1,000,000 is invested in high-grade railroad bonds.

**Failed to Organize.**—The new bank which was chartered at Montpelier, Ohio, a short time ago, did not complete its organization, the promoters deciding instead to acquire an interest in the existing bank, the Montpelier Banking and State Savings Co., the capital of which has been increased from \$25,000 to \$40,000.

**New Reserve City.**—On May 11 the Comptroller of the Currency designated Indianapolis, Ind., as a National bank reserve city.

**Duluth, Minn.**—James J. Hill, President of the Great Northern Railroad, and F. Weyerhaeuser, a wealthy lumberman, have secured an interest in the First National Bank of this city. This will add to the strength of the bank, which is already unquestioned, since it has \$500,000 capital, \$250,000 surplus, deposits of over \$2,500,000, and a board of directors including the names of men of large means. It is the policy of the bank to do a strictly commercial banking business, and in this field it has prospered and has substantially aided the business enterprises of the city.

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—Mention has been made heretofore of the merging of the Western Reserve National and the National Bank of Commerce into the Bank of Commerce National Association, with \$3,000,000 capital and \$1,000,000 surplus, all of which was paid in at the beginning of business May 31. The new organization will purchase such of the assets of the old banks as it desires.

Officers of the new bank are: President, George A. Garretson; 1st Vice-President, Samuel Mather; 2d Vice-President, Jephtha H. Wade; 3d Vice-President, Frederick E. Rittman; Cashier, George S. Russell; Assistant Cashier, George F. Clewell.

Directors: George A. Garretson, Samuel Mather, Jephtha H. Wade, John H. McBride, David Z. Norton, Andrew Squire, James H. Hoyt, Charles W. Bingham, Harvey H. Brown, James Parmalee, William Chisholm, Calvary Morris, Edward P. Williams, George S. Russell, Frederick E. Rittman.

—Officers have been elected for the new Coal and Iron National Bank, which commenced business May 20 with \$500,000 capital.

—The new State Banking and Trust Company opened for business May 10.

—William G. Mather was recently elected President of the American Trust Company, succeeding Ryerson Ritchie, resigned. Mr. Mather has been identified with the banking interests as a director, and is prominently connected with manufacturing and railway enterprises. His qualifications for his new position are regarded as exceptional by his banking and business associates.

**Lincoln, Neb.**—The First National Bank and the American Exchange National Bank have consolidated under the title of the former. While the latter bank technically goes out of existence, its shareholders acquired a controlling interest in the First National. S. H. Burnham, former President of the American Exchange National, will be President, and H. B. Freeman will be retained as Cashier. Capital of the bank will be \$300,000, and it is expected that deposits will be nearly \$2,000,000. Many prominent capitalists are numbered among the shareholders, including John R. Walsh, President of the Chicago National Bank, and C. E. Perkins, President of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Co.

**Louisville, Ky.**—Owing to cheapness of money and the light demand compared to the large deposits, a reduction of the capital of the Third National Bank from \$300,000 to \$200,000 has been proposed for consideration by the shareholders.

—The Southern National Bank, with \$250,000 capital, has been organized to succeed the Farmers and Drovers' Bank, a State institution. James S. Escott, who has been a National bank examiner for about six years, and who has made an exceedingly creditable record in that capacity, will be the President.

## PACIFIC SLOPE.

**San Francisco.**—Dangerous counterfeits of the standard silver dollar are reported to be in circulation on this coast. They contain the required amount of metal and of the proper fineness, but the figures in the dates '88, '94, '96, and '99, are a trifle narrower than the genuine, and the wreath around the eagle is broken and the nose of "Liberty" is not clearly defined. The color also differs somewhat from the genuine.

—Messrs. E. J. & O. J. Bamberger have been appointed attorneys for the Bank of Commerce.

—Reports have just been received of the half-yearly ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Yokohama Specie Bank, held at the head office, Yokohama, Japan, March 10. The statement for the half-year ending December 31, 1898, was submitted, making a most satisfactory exhibit of the bank's business. Gross profits for the half-year, including 339,817 yen brought forward from last account, were 5,611,848 yen, of which 3,942,258 had been deducted for current expenses, interest on deposits, etc., leaving a balance of 1,669,589 yen, out of which 79,786 yen were written off for officers' remuneration. The directors proposed that 340,000 yen be added to the reserve fund, increasing it to 7,300,000 yen, and that 100,000 yen be set aside for the contemplated new building. From the remainder the directors recommended a dividend at the rate of fifteen per cent. per annum, which will absorb 450,000 yen on the old shares and 337,500 yen on the new shares, a total of 787,500 yen. The balance, 362,208 yen, was carried forward to the credit of next account.

**Spokane, Wash.**—Charles Sweeny and F. Lewis Clark, owners of extensive mining properties, have bought the majority of the stock of the Exchange National Bank. There will be no change in management at present.

**Change of Organization.**—It is reported that the First National Bank, of Kendrick, Idaho, will change its form of organization, becoming the Kendrick State Bank. There will be no change in the officers, directors or capitalization.

**Banks to Consolidate.**—It is reported that the two banks at Santa Clara, Cal., will unite and form a new organization to be known as the Valley Bank.

**Wyoming Bank Deposits.**—At the date of the last official statement the deposits of the State banks of Wyoming were \$222,145, and of the private banks \$913,638. There are seven State banks and eleven private banks.

## CANADA.

**New Branch Opened.**—A branch of the Canadian Bank of Commerce has been opened at Fort Frances, Ont.

**Roseland, B. C.**—The exterior work is completed on the new building being erected here for the Bank of Montreal.

**Montreal.**—There is prospect of a contest between the banks and express offices here in the matter of money orders. Last year the banks introduced a system of cheap money orders to offset the competition of the express companies. The express companies have met this by issuing money orders to customers, making a large cut in charges, and only asking payment when the books are used up. They are also imitating the banks in asking for reports on the standing of customers. The express companies have requested this information of banks whose customers they are trying to secure.

## Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.

**Alaska.**—The First Bank, of Skaguay, closed May 29 with \$16,000 liabilities. It is reported that depositors will probably get eighty per cent. of their claims.

**Kentucky.**—The Citizens' Savings Bank, of Owensboro, has decided to pay off all depositors at once and go out of business.

It is reported that the Farmers and Traders' Bank is also liquidating.

**Maryland.**—The National Farmers and Planters' Bank, of Baltimore, voted on May 16 to go into voluntary liquidation, it having been absorbed some time ago by the National Mechanics' Bank.

**Minnesota.**—The Citizens' State Bank, of Nicollet, has gone into voluntary liquidation, notifying depositors that their funds were ready for them on demand.

**New Hampshire.**—The Coheco National Bank, of Dover, suspended on June 5.

The Coheco Savings Bank also closed on the same date.

Harry Hough, who was paying teller of the National bank and Treasurer of the Savings bank, is reported to be short in his accounts with the latter institution.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

- 5191—Coal and Iron National Bank, Cleveland, Ohio. Capital, \$500,000.  
5192—Grayson County National Bank, Sherman, Texas. Capital, \$100,000.  
5193—First National Bank, Rantoul, Illinois. Capital, \$50,000.  
5194—Bank of Commerce National Association, Cleveland, Ohio. Capital, \$2,000,000.  
5195—Southern National Bank, Louisville, Kentucky. Capital, \$250,000.  
5196—First National Bank, Wayland, New York. Capital, \$50,000.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- First National Bank, Schuylkill Haven, Pa.; by I. B. Heim, *et al.*  
Beaumont National Bank, Beaumont, Texas; by D. Call, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Wayland, N. Y.; by William W. Clark, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Blackwell, Okla.; by M. E. Richardson, *et al.*  
People's National Bank, Delta, Pa.; by Robert S. Parke, *et al.*  
Lamberton National Bank, Franklin, Pa.; by C. W. Gillilan, *et al.*  
Monessen National Bank, Monessen, Pa.; by James N. Shoonmaker, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Ridgewood, N. J.; by Lucius F. Spencer, *et al.*  
Citizens' National Bank, Warren, Ill.; by S. A. Clark, *et al.*  
People's National Bank, Shippensburg, Pa.; by S. M. Kitzmiller, *et al.*  
City National Bank, Mobile, Ala.; by E. J. Buck, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

- ENSLY—Bank of Enslay; capital, \$50,000; Cas., R. F. Berry.  
GREENSBORO—Lee M. Otts (successor to M. Jones & Son).  
SCOTTSBORO—Merchants' Bank (branch of Florence, Ala.); Pres., M. B. Shelton; Cas., S. S. Broadus.

#### ARIZONA.

- SAFFORD—Bank of Safford; Cas., W. F. Holt.

#### CALIFORNIA.

- SANTA CLARA—Valley Bank (successor to Bank of Santa Clara and Santa Clara Valley Bank, consolidated).

#### COLORADO.

- EATON—Bank of Eaton.  
HOOPER—Costilla County Bank.

#### CONNECTICUT.

- HARTFORD—New England Savings and Trust Co.; organizing.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

- WASHINGTON—National Trust Co.; capital, \$150,000.

#### FLORIDA.

- DE FUNIAK SPRINGS—W. L. Cawthon, exchange and collections.

#### ILLINOIS.

- COLLINS—People's Bank; Pres., C. L. Van Doren; Cas., M. S. Campbell.  
GIBSON CITY—Farmers and Merchants' Bank (successor to H. C. McClure & Sons).

SADORUS—Sadorus Bank.

SPRINGFIELD—Scott & Co.

WARREN—Warren State Bank; capital, \$35,000; Pres., Daniel Keller; Vice-Pres., H. H. Diggs; Sec., W. H. Glasgow.

#### INDIANA.

- DANVILLE—Danville Trust Co.; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Cyrus Osborn; Vice-Pres., Wm. C. Osborn; Sec., Mord Carter.  
HOBART—First State Bank; Pres., Geo. Stocker; Vice-Pres., P. P. Gordon; Cas., J. C. Cavender; Sec., N. B. White.  
LEBANON—American Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., A. C. Daily; Vice-Pres., J. N. Ritchie; Sec., O. R. Daily.

PLAINFIELD—B. F. Worth.

STAR CITY—Citizens' Bank (W. D. Snider).

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

SAPULPA—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital \$10,000; Pres., H. C. Miller; Vice-Pres., A. C. Menfee; Cas., W. J. Burnett.

#### IOWA.

- BRADYVILLE—Farmers' Saving Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., L. E. White; Vice-Pres., L. C. Lawrence; Cas., Lee G. Martin.  
DUNKERTON—Farmers' Bank.  
EAST PERU—Bank of East Peru.  
FENTON—Farmers' Fenton Savings Bank.  
RINGSTED—Danish-American Savings Bank; Pres., B. F. Robinson; Vice-Pres., John Dows; Cas., L. P. Ginno.  
RUTLAND—Bank of Rutland.

## KANSAS.

**BURRTON**—Burrton State Bank (successors to Burrton Bank and J. A. Welch & Son); capital, \$10,000; Pres., J. W. Shive; Cas., G. H. Welch.

**EL DORADO**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., N. F. Frazier; Cas., John Y. Adams.

**ELK CITY**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

**NEOSHO FALLS**—Sain & Snow.

## KENTUCKY.

**BARBOURVILLE**—Miller & Miller; capital, \$10,000.

**LOUISVILLE**—Southern National Bank (successors to Farmers and Drovers' Bank); capital, \$250,000; Pres., W. J. Thomas; Cas., J. W. Nichols.

**WICKLIFFE**—I. N. Trimble Banking Co.; capital, \$10,000.

## MARYLAND.

**QUEENSTOWN**—Queenstown Savings Bank; capital, \$5,000.

**WOODSBORO**—Woodsboro Savings Bank; capital \$25,000; Pres., W. H. Wagner; Cas., J. Vernon Silance.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—C. H. Cameron & Co.

## MINNESOTA.

**ERSKINE**—Bank of Erskine.

**FOLEY**—Bank of Foley.

**MERRIAM PARK**—H. M. Crosby & Co. (successors to Bank of Merriam Park).

**NICOLETT**—Bank of Nicolett (successors to Citizens' State Bank); capital, \$5,000; Cas., A. T. Swenson.

**RED LAKE FALLS**—Merchants' State Bank; Pres., L. S. Simons; Vice-Pres., T. La Bissonnerre; Cas. J. A. Duffy.

## MISSISSIPPI.

**OCEAN SPRINGS**—Ocean Springs Branch of Scranton State Bank; Cas., Frank J. Lundy.

**PASS CHRISTIAN**—Exchange Bank; capital, \$25,000.

## MISSOURI.

**GREEN CITY**—Citizens' Bank.

## MONTANA.

**VIRGINIA CITY**—Elling State Bank (successor to Henry Elling); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Henry Elling; Cas., Thomas Duncan.

## NEBRASKA.

**ELM CREEK**—First Bank (successor to First National Bank); capital, \$5,000; Pres., William Gaslin; Cas., J. M. Forristall.

**GLENVILLE**—Bank of Glenville; capital, \$6,000.

**OMAHA**—United States Trust Co.

## NEW JERSEY.

**HACKENSACK**—Hackensack Trust Co.

**HOBOKEN**—Trust Company of New Jersey; capital, \$100,000; Pres., W. E. Heppenheimer; Treas., A. P. Hexamer; Asst. Treas., Marmaduke Tilden, Jr.

## NEW YORK.

**BUFFALO**—Security Safe Deposit Co., organizing.

**NEW ROCHELLE**—City Bank of New Rochelle; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Herman Henneberger; Vice-Pres., Clarence S. McClellan; Cas., Geo. F. Flandreaux.

**ROCHESTER**—Myron W. Greene.

**SILVER CREEK**—S. U. Newton.

**UTICA**—Utica Trust and Deposit Co.; capital, \$200,000.

**WAYLAND**—First National Bank (successor to John J. Morris); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Wm. W. Clark; Vice-Pres., Martin Kimmel; Cas., John J. Morris.

## NORTH CAROLINA.

**GRAHAM**—Bank of Alamance.

## NORTH DAKOTA.

**WASHBURN**—Farmers' State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., T. L. Beiseker; Cas., G. M. Digen.

## OHIO.

**BRYAN**—Union Trust and Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$25,000.

**CLEVELAND**—Bank of Commerce National Association (successor to National Bank of Commerce and Western Reserve National Bank); capital, \$2,000,000; Pres., Geo. A. Garretson; First Vice-Pres., Samuel Mather; Second Vice-Pres., Jephtha H. Wade; Third Vice-Pres., Frederick E. Rittman; Cas., Geo. S. Russell; Asst. Cas., Geo. F. Clewell.—Coal and Iron National Bank; capital, \$250,000; Pres., J. C. Gilchrist; Cas., A. B. Marshall; Asst. Cas., John Caswell.

**EUCLID**—Euclid Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.

**NELSONVILLE**—People's Bank.

## OKLAHOMA.

**GUTHRIE**—Western Savings, Loan and Trust Co.

**LEXINGTON**—Lexington State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., R. F. Graw; Cas., A. M. Perdue.

**MOUNTAIN CITY**—State Bank; capital, \$50,000.

**NARDIN**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

**ATHENS**—Athens National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Vine Crandall; Cas., M. J. Murphy.

**PHILADELPHIA**—MacLeod & Pancoast, 137 South Fifth Street.

## RHODE ISLAND.

**PHENIX**—Phenix Trust Co.

## SOUTH DAKOTA.

**DE SMET**—Germania State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Eli Cole, Jr.; Cas., L. F. Altfillisch.

## TENNESSEE.

**WAVERLY**—Home Bank; Pres., W. C. Carnell; Cas., W. H. Meadow; Asst. Cas., Jacob K. Meadow.

## TEXAS.

**LUFKIN**—L. W. Wettermark; capital, \$15,000.

**MOUNT CALM**—J. B. McDaniels.  
**SHERMAN**—Grayson County National Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., John P. Withers, First Vice-Pres., C. A. Andrews; Second Vice-Pres., J. R. Christal; Cas., J. W. Blake.  
**SAN ANTONIO**—San Antonio Loan and Trust Co.; Pres., Geo. W. Brackenridge; Vice-Pres., M. D. Monserrate; Treas., John A. Fraser; Sec., Geo. B. Taliaferro.

**VERMONT.**

**ENOSBURG FALLS**—Enosburg Falls Savings Bank and Trust Co.

**VIRGINIA.**

**DRAKE'S BRANCH**—Bank of Chase City; capital, \$15,000; Pres., Geo. A. Endly; Cas., John W. Long.

**NEWPORT NEWS**—American Exchange Bank; Pres., F. F. Finch; Vice-Pres., A. E. G. Klor.—City Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., R. P. Orr; Vice-Pres., J. W. Elliott; Cas., D. M. Ausley.

**PEARISBURG**—Bank of Giles; capital, \$20,000; Pres., P. F. St. Clair; Cas., C. L. King.

**WASHINGTON.**

**CONCONULLY**—Commercial Bank; capital,

\$15,000; Pres., Charles Herrmann; Cas., L. L. Work.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**AMOS**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**BECKLEY**—Bank of Raleigh; capital, \$2,500.  
**FAIRVIEW**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank.

**HARRISVILLE**—People's Bank; capital, \$65,000.

**WHEELING**—Wheeling Real Estate and Banking Co.

**WISCONSIN.**

**MERRILLON**—A. S. Trow.

**STANLEY**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$15,000; Cas., Geo. D. Bartlett.

**CANADA.****ONTARIO.**

**ELORA**—Merchants' Bank of Canada; Manager, J. E. Magee.

**FORT FRANCES**—Canadian Bank of Commerce.

**BRITISH COLUMBIA.**

**BENNETT**—Merchants' Bank of Halifax; Manager, F. L. Murray.

**GRAND FORKS**—Eastern Townships Bank; Manager, T. W. McLaughlin.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.****COLORADO.**

**GLENWOOD SPRINGS**—First National Bank; A. J. Marion, Asst. Cas.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**HARTFORD**—Charter Oak National Bank; John E. Morris, elected director.

**FLORIDA.**

**JACKSONVILLE**—National Bank of the State of Florida; Henry B. Tompkins, President in place of Albion W. Knight.

**GEORGIA.**

**ATHENS**—Exchange Bank; John A. Benedict no longer Cashier.

**IDAHO.**

**KENDRICK**—First National Bank; reported changed name to Kendrick State Bank.

**ILLINOIS.**

**ALTON**—Citizens' National Bank; Lucas Pfeiffenberger, Vice-Pres.; Louis A. Schlafly, Asst. Cas.

**CHICAGO**—Illinois Trust and Savings Bank; voted to increase capital to \$3,000,000.—Garden City Banking and Trust Co.; John Buehler, director, deceased.

**DU QUOIN**—First National Bank; J. R. Perkins, Cas. in place of Robert O. Lehn.

**GRAYVILLE**—First National Bank; W. W. Gray, Cas. in place of Albert E. Fuller, deceased.

**MOUNT VERNON**—Ham National Bank; Albert Watson, Pres. in place of C. D. Ham, deceased.

**MURPHYSBORO**—City National Bank; John G. Hardy, Pres. in place of J. Van Cloostere; E. A. Wells, Cas. in place of John G. Hardy.

**INDIANA.**

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Merchants' National Bank; Geo. B. Caldwell, Asst. Cas.

**IOWA.**

**ALBIA**—First National Bank; L. T. Richmond, Cas.

**BUFFALO CENTER**—First National Bank; B. J. Thompson, Vice-Pres. in place of J. F. Thompson; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. P. Strong.

**IDA GROVE**—Ida County Savings Bank; J. T. Hallam, Pres., deceased.

**KANSAS.**

**ARKANSAS CITY**—Home National Bank; Howard Ross, Vice-Pres.; W. E. Wilcox, Cas. in place of Howard Ross; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. E. Wilcox.

**LAKIN**—Kearney County Bank; B. B. Bacon, Cas., deceased.

**KENTUCKY.**

**CATLETTSBURG**—Big Sandy National Bank; Charles Russell, Pres. in place of A. J. Loar.

**TRENTON**—Bank of Trenton; capital reduced to \$20,000.

**LOUISIANA.**

**LAKE CHARLES**—Calcasteu National Bank; Herman W. Rock, Asst. Cas.

**MAINE.**

**AUBURN**—First National Bank; H. M. Packard, Pres. in place of J. Dingley, Jr., deceased; B. F. Briggs, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—Traders' National Bank; Geo. A. Dubreuil, Pres. in place of I. S. George; John Burrows, Vice-Pres. in place of H. G. Vickery; M. B. Williams, Cas. in place of

Clayton Cannon.—Nat. Exchange Bank and Central Savings Bank; David T. Buzby, director, deceased.—National Farmers and Planters' Bank; D. L. Bartlett, director, deceased.—Fraternal Trust and Banking Co. (successor to United States Trust Co.); Charles O'D. Lee, Pres.; Wm. T. Wheatley, 1st Vice-Pres.; Louis Beitz, 2d Vice-Pres.; John D. Blake, 3d Vice-Pres.; Frank J. Kohler, Sec. and Treas.; capital stock increased to \$200,000.

**MASSACHUSETTS**

**BOSTON**—Third National Bank; George W. Grant, Vice-Pres.; N. F. Perkins, Cas. in place of Harry L. Burrage; no Asst. Cas. in place of N. F. Perkins.—Eliot National Bank; Harry L. Burrage, Vice-Pres. in place of Albert H. Wiggin; William J. Mandell, Cas. in place of Geo. W. Grant; Wm. F. Edlerson, Asst. Cas. in place of Wm. J. Mandell.

**NEW BEDFORD**—Merchants' National Bank; H. C. W. Mosher, Pres. in place of Gilbert Allen; Thomas H. Knowles, Vice-Pres.; L. S. Swain, Cas. in place of H. C. W. Mosher.

**STOCKBRIDGE**—Housatonic National Bank; D. A. Kimball, Pres. in place of Daniel R. Williams, deceased; no Vice-Pres.; W. A. Seymour, Cas. in place of D. A. Kimball; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. A. Seymour.

**WARE**—Ware National Bank; William S. Hyde, Pres., deceased; also Vice-Pres Ware Savings Bank.

**WINCHESTER**—Winchester Savings Bank; Stephen Thompson, Pres.

**MICHIGAN.**

**CHARLOTTE**—First National Bank; J. M. Smith, Pres. in place of Philip T. Vanzile.

**GRAND RAPIDS**—Fifth National Bank; R. D. Graham, Pres. in place of Charles D. Stebbins; Charles H. Chick, Vice-Pres. in place of R. D. Graham.

**TRAVERSE CITY**—First National Bank; Frank Welton, Cas. in place of C. A. Hammond; no Asst. Cas. in place of Frank Welton.

**MINNESOTA.**

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Minnesota Loan and Trust Co.; J. E. Bell, A. M. Keith, T. B. Casey and S. S. Cargill, elected directors.

**ST. CLOUD**—Merchants' National Bank; O. H. Havill, Pres. in place of C. M. Hertig; A. H. Reinhard, Cas.

**MISSOURI.**

**PALMYRA**—Marion County Savings Bank; capital increased to \$60,000.

**NEBRASKA.**

**ALLIANCE**—First National Bank; S. Fickell, Cas. in place of E. Brennan.

**ELGIN**—Bank of Elgin; James Stuart, Pres., deceased.

**GENOA**—First National Bank; L. L. Green, Vice-Pres.; B. D. Gorman, Asst. Cas.

**LINCOLN**—First National Bank and American Exchange National Bank; consolidated

under former title; S. H. Burnham, Pres. in place of D. D. Muir; A. J. Sawyer, Vice-Pres.; W. C. Phillips and H. B. Evans, Asst. Cas.

**MADISON**—Madison State Bank; L. A. Stuart, Pres. in place of James Stuart, deceased.

**SOUTH OMAHA**—Packers' National Bank; Charles A. Dunham, Asst. Cas.

**TILDEN**—Elkhorn Valley Bank; James Stuart, Pres., deceased.

**WAYNE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Nathan Chace.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**DOVER**—Strafford National Bank; voted to reduce capital to \$100,000.

**NEW YORK.**

**ALBANY**—Merchants' National Bank; J. Wilbur Tillinghast, Pres., deceased.

**BREWSTER**—First National Bank; Charles Denton, President, deceased.

**ELMIRA**—Chemung Canal Bank; John H. Arnot, Cas., deceased.

**NEW YORK**—National Citizens' Bank; Ewald Fleitmann, Pres.; David C. Tiebout, Vice-Pres. in place of E. Fleitmann; William M. Woods, Asst. Cas.—Seventh National Bank; William H. Kimball, Vice-Pres. and director; J. Preston McAnerney, Asst. Cas.—National Bank of the Republic; Anson R. Flower, elected director.—Corn Exchange Bank; Anthony N. Brady, elected director in place of Roswell P. Flower, deceased.—Colonial Trust Co.; Roswell P. Flower, Vice-Pres. and director, deceased.—Flower & Co.; Roswell P. Flower, deceased.—North American Trust Co.; Alvah Trowbridge, Pres. in place of William L. Trenholm.—Clark, Dodge & Co.; Geo. Blagden, Jr. and Donald G. Geddes, admitted to firm June 1.—E. Naumburg & Co.; Edward S. Naumburg admitted to firm.—Maitland, Coppel & Co.; Herbert Coppel admitted to firm June 1.—Zimmermann & Forshay; Leonard Schafer admitted to firm June 1.—Kingsley, Mabon & Co.; successors to Kingsley & Mabon.—C. H. White & Co.; removed to 71 Broadway.—Taintor & Holt; removed to 10 Wall street.—Produce Exchange Trust Co.; S. D. Scudder, Vice-Pres.—Mercantile Trust Co.; Clinton Hunter, Asst. Treas., deceased.—Harris & Fuller; Smith W. Harris, deceased.—American Surety Co.; John M. Hutchinson, director, deceased.—Home Bank; Otto Wessell, director, deceased.—Knickerbocker Trust Co.; Charles T. Barney, Pres.; Frederick L. Eldridge, First Vice-Pres.; Joseph T. Brown, Second Vice-Pres.; Alfred B. Maclay, Sec. and Treas.; Frederick Gore King, Asst. Sec. and Asst. Treas.

**ROCHESTER**—Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Co.; Haywood Hawks, Sec., deceased.

**SYRACUSE**—Onodago County Savings Bank; Geo. B. Kent, First Vice-Pres. in place of

Wm. E. Abbott, deceased; Alva W. Palmer, Second Vice-Pres.—Commercial Bank; Willis A. Holden, elected director in place of Hamilton S. White, deceased.

WAPPINGER'S FALLS—Wappinger's Savings Bank; title changed to Wappinger Savings Bank.

WELLSVILLE—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of F. H. Furman.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

FARGO—First National Bank; J. W. Smith, Pres. in place of Wm. H. Crosby; L. B. Hanna, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles H. Miner; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. E. Robbins.

#### OHIO.

CIRCLEVILLE—First National Bank; B. F. Benford, Pres. in place of L. H. Sweetman, deceased.

CLEVELAND—American Trust Company; William G. Mather, Pres. in place of Ryerson Ritchie.—State Banking and Trust Co.; S. K. Barstow, Vice-Pres.

GENEVA—Savings Exchange Bank; J. L. Morgan, Pres., deceased.

MILFORD—Milford National Bank; F. L. Cook, Cas. in place of Alex. L. Parker.

MONTPELIER—Montpelier Banking and State Savings Co.; capital increased to \$40,000.

TIRO—Farmers and Citizens' Bank; J. M. Dickson, Pres. in place of A. C. Robinson.

#### OKLAHOMA TERRITORY.

OKLAHOMA—Bank of Commerce; capital increased to \$25,000; C. H. Everest, Cas.; J. H. Everest, Vice-Pres.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

COLUMBIA—Central National Bank; Andrew J. Kauffman, Pres., deceased.

NORRISTOWN—Montgomery National Bank; Benjamin Thomas, Pres. in place of John Slingluff, deceased.

PHILADELPHIA—Ninth National Bank; B. T. Walton, Asst. Cas.

TUNKHANNOCK—Wyoming National Bank; E. N. Stone, Cas. in place of John B. Fassett.

WILKESBARRE—First National Bank; surplus increased to \$210,000.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

PROVIDENCE—Industrial Trust Co.; Albert L. Calder, director, deceased.

WARREN—National Warren Bank; Joseph

W. Martin, Pres. in place of H. F. Drown, deceased; Luther Cole, Vice-Pres. in place of Joseph W. Martin.—Warren Institution for Savings; John Waterman, Pres. in place of H. F. Drown, deceased; Samuel L. Peck, Vice-Pres.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

SALEM—McCook County State Bank; L. S. Tyler, Pres.; H. L. Tyler, Vice-Pres.; Cas., S. W. Appleton.

#### TENNESSEE.

CARTHAGE—Smith County Bank and Trust Co.; Wm. DeWitt Fisher, Asst. Cas., deceased.

KNOXVILLE—Mechanics' National Bank; G. L. Ross, Vice-Pres., deceased.

#### TEXAS.

BALLINGER—First Nat. Bank; Sam Baker, Asst. Cas. in place of Joe Wilmeth.

HILLSBORO—Farmers' National Bank; E. B. Hughes, Cas.

MARLIN—First National Bank; D. S. Eddins, Asst. Cas.

#### WASHINGTON.

SEATTLE—Scandinavian-American Bank; E. E. Grondahl, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of O. O. Searle, resigned.

WHEATCOM—Graves & Backus; firm name changed to Graves, Backus & Purdy.

#### WISCONSIN.

BELOIT—L. C. Hyde & Brittan; title changed to L. C. Hyde & Brittan Bank; capital, \$50,000; W. M. Brittan, Pres.; E. S. Greene, Cas.; R. K. Rockwell, Asst. Cas.

MANITOWOC—National Bank of Manitowoc; G. J. Moses, Cas. in place of Clarence Hill; no Asst. Cas. in J. G. Moses.

#### WYOMING.

ROCK SPRINGS—First National Bank; T. W. Boyer, Asst. Cas. in place of A. M. Gilder-sleeve.

#### CANADA.

##### ONTARIO.

ELMIRA—Traders' Bank of Canada; — Farmer, Mgr.

RIDGETOWN—Traders' Bank of Canada; E. E. Newman, Mgr.

##### QUEBEC.

MONTREAL—Bank of Nova Scotia; Frank Kennedy, Mgr., deceased.

### BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.

#### ALASKA.

SKAGUAY—First Bank; closed May 29.

#### IDAHO.

KENDRICK—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation May 20.

#### ILLINOIS.

PANA—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation March 16.

#### KENTUCKY.

OWENSBORO—Citizens' Savings Bank.—Farmers and Traders' Bank.

#### MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE—National Farmers and Planters' Bank; in voluntary liquidation May 16.

#### MINNESOTA.

NICOLLET—Citizens' State Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

#### NEBRASKA.

ELM CREEK—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation May 16.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

DOVER—Cochecho National Bank and Cochecho Savings Bank; suspended June 5.



# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

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## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

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NEW YORK, June 2, 1899.

A SUDDEN TURN IN SPECULATION AND DROP IN THE STOCK MARKET last month brought an experience to Wall street which has developed a degree of caution that promises to be beneficial. Conservative operators for some time had been anticipating a reaction, and the passage of the original Ford bill taxing franchises helped the natural conditions which were influencing a decline.

The climax came when, on Saturday May 18, the daily press announced the sudden death of Mr. Roswell P. Flower, the evening before. Mr. Flower, for some time past, was recognized as a leader in Wall Street, and confidence in him materially aided the bull movement. His death caused a shock to the stock market with results temporarily more disastrous than followed the death of either William H. Vanderbilt or Jay Gould. Mr. Flower was largely interested in "industrial" securities, and it was that class which suffered the most severely when his death was first known. Saturday being a half-holiday the stock market lasted only two hours, but in that time some extraordinary declines from the highest prices of the previous day occurred. We need cite only a few to show into what a panic the market was thrown. American Steel fell from  $66\frac{1}{2}$  to  $58\frac{1}{2}$ , Federal Steel from  $68\frac{3}{8}$  to 50, National Steel from 59 to  $48\frac{1}{2}$ , American Sugar from  $156\frac{1}{2}$  to 146, International Paper from  $50\frac{3}{4}$  to 35, New York Air Brake from 185 to 125, Brooklyn Rapid Transit from  $121\frac{3}{4}$  to 100, and People's Gas of Chicago from  $121\frac{3}{8}$  to 101. There were some severe declines in the railroad share market, but nothing approaching the break in industrials. While there was a recovery later, a large number of stocks have declined since the panic, and in many cases the lowest prices of the year were recorded on May 31.

The stock market continues to show much greater activity than it did a year ago, about 14,800,000 shares being dealt in last month as compared with only about 9,000,000 shares in May, 1898. The sales of bonds aggregated about \$83,500,000, a decrease of \$1,000,000 from April's total, but an increase of \$29,000,000 over May last year.

The unfavorable influence of the Ford franchise bill was somewhat lessened by the Governor calling the Legislature in special session and having an amended bill passed, which he has since signed. The measure was stripped of some of its most onerous features, but the law is looked upon in Wall Street as a bear card.

Wheat, as is usual at this time of year, has been a prominent topic in Wall Street circles. The May report of the Department of Agriculture on the condition of winter wheat was considered favorable in that it did not show any serious decline since April 1. But there is no longer any doubt that the yield of winter wheat this year will be very much less than that of last year. A greatly increased area was sown to winter wheat last autumn, but owing to damage to the crop about 4,000,000 acres have been abandoned, the result being that the area of the growing crop is now but little more than that harvested last year, possibly a trifle less, or 25,900,000 acres. The condition of the crop as reported by the Department on April 1 was 77.9 against 86.7 in 1898, and on May 1, 76.2 as compared with 86.5 a year ago. The yield of winter wheat last year was about 380,000,000 bushels, the largest of any year ex-

cepting 1892 and 1891. Estimates of this year's crop suggest a yield of about 300,000,000 bushels, which would be less than in 1897 or 1898, but greater than in 1894 or 1895.

The decrease in wheat production in the United States is not considered an un-mixed evil, as it is thought it will cause the price of wheat to be maintained at a more profitable figure for the producer. Statistically, the present position of the wheat supply in this country is favorable to the producer, as the following comparison will show :

DATE.	Crop Previous year.	Exports, July 1 to May 1.	Visible supply, May 1.	Farmers' stock, March 1.
	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.
1890.....	415,968,000	75,074,000	28,046,000	112,000,000
1891.....	490,580,000	98,689,000	23,982,000	156,000,000
1892.....	399,262,000	85,518,000	20,980,000	112,000,000
1893.....	611,780,000	194,596,000	87,996,000	171,000,000
1894.....	515,949,000	160,380,000	75,027,000	135,000,000
1895.....	398,132,000	148,063,000	68,563,000	114,000,000
1896.....	460,267,000	122,074,000	65,776,000	75,000,000
1897.....	467,103,000	107,180,000	55,519,000	123,000,000
1898.....	427,684,000	128,341,000	34,412,000	88,000,000
1899.....	530,149,000	182,384,000	23,263,000	121,000,000
1899.....	675,149,000	191,560,000	23,144,000	196,000,000

An estimate of the world's wheat crop of 1898 as prepared by the Department of Agriculture, makes the total 2,879,924,000 bushels as compared with 2,226,745,000 bushels in 1897, 2,488,349,000 bushels in 1896 and 2,562,518,000 bushels in 1895. Last year North America produced 758,303,000 bushels, the United States being credited with 675,149,000 bushels, Canada with 68,154,000 bushels and Mexico with 15,000,000 bushels. The largest wheat-producing countries outside of the United States were, Russia 404,000,000 bushels, France 371,000,000 bushels, British India 243,000,000 bushels, Austria Hungary 171,000,000 bushels, Italy 133,000,000 bushels, and Germany 115,000,000 bushels.

Even should there be a considerable falling off in our wheat exports during the coming year, it is not unlikely that our total exports will continue to be largely in excess of our imports by reason of the extraordinary increase in exports of manufactures. Although our exports of breadstuffs have fallen off recently the month of April witnessed an excess of exports over imports of more than \$28,000,000, an amount never exceeded in April, except in 1878 and 1898. In the first four months of 1899 the net exports of merchandise were over \$145,000,000, a balance never equalled in a similar period before.

While our large exports have had much to do with the recent revival of confidence, the extraordinary evidences of financial strength displayed by the country have also increased confidence. The entire \$20,000,000 indemnity to Spain was paid last month without causing any disturbance in the local money market. In fact, the payment was largely made by a reduction in balances held abroad to the credit of American banking institutions. Then the placing of large blocks of securities of newly organized companies has called for unusual sums of money, and no better evidence of the situation is to be afforded than in the apparent ease with which subscriptions of unparalleled volume have been settled for without causing the money market any uneasiness.

The incorporation of new companies and the forming of new combinations with capital mounting up into the many millions, proceeds apace. When a single State which offers special inducements to new corporations, the State of New Jersey, collects in one month \$92,000, and in eight months more than \$528,000, just for charter fees from new companies, the business of projecting new financial ventures is evidently not slow. Companies interested in the manufacture or sale of nearly every-

thing merchantable are being formed with capital ranging anywhere from \$1,000,-000 to one hundred times that figure, and the supply of new securities does not seem to exceed the demand.

The event in the industrial world which received the greatest consideration last month was the announced retirement of Mr. Andrew Carnegie from business, and the proposed consolidation of the Carnegie-Frick interests into a single company with a capital of \$250,000,000. This is an important business event, and it is also significant of the wonderful growth of the iron and steel industries of this country. There are other immense concerns in the business; the Republic Iron and Steel Company was only recently organized with a capital of \$55,000,000, and never was the iron trade of this country more gigantic or more prosperous than at present.

On May 1 the weekly capacity of iron furnaces in blast reached 250,095 tons, or at the rate of more than 13,000,000 tons per annum. Even while the output is the largest ever known the consumption is in excess of the supply. The furnace stocks decreased in April from 311,963 tons to 280,708 tons, and the stocks of warrant iron from 109,700 tons to 86,500 tons. There has also been a pronounced advance in prices of all classes of iron and steel, and at no previous time has the future for iron in this country looked more promising.

The annual report prepared by Mr. James M. Swank, General Manager of the American Iron and Steel Association, shows that the production of pig iron in 1898 was 11,773,934 tons, as compared with 9,652,680 in 1897, and 9,446,308 in 1895, the two years of previous largest production. The approximate consumption was 12,005,659 tons in 1898, which compares with 9,381,914 tons in 1897, and 8,275,774 in 1896. These figures represent an increase in consumption in two years of nearly fifty per cent., and indicate the marvellous change in the business situation in that time.

The improvement which has occurred outside of Wall Street must, by the nature of things, have been reflected in the operations at the Exchange. It is a mistake to suppose that the advances that have occurred have been confined to the one class of securities which has come into prominence in recent years. We append a list of stocks which for years have been more or less active in the New York Stock Exchange, showing the range of their prices since 1894. The table shows that the most conservative railroad stocks have scored a large advance.

	1894.		1895.		1896.		1897.		1898.		1899.	
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
Canada Southern...	53½	47	57½	42	51½	40¾	62½	44½	58	44½	70	52¾
Central of N. J.....	117¾	87½	116½	81½	110	87½	108¾	88½	99	83½	122¾	97
Chic. Bur. & Quincy	84½	68¾	92¾	60	83¾	58	102¼	69¾	125¼	85¾	149¼	124¼
Chic. Mil. & St. Paul	67¾	54¼	78¾	53¾	80	59¾	102	69¼	120¾	83¼	133¾	120½
Chic. & N'western...	110¾	96¼	107½	87¾	106¾	85¾	132½	101¾	142¾	113¾	166	141¼
Chic. R. I. & Pacific...	72¾	58¼	84¾	59	74¾	49¼	97¼	60¼	114¾	80	132½	107¾
Chic. St. P. & Omaha	41¾	32	46	28¾	49¾	30¾	80½	47	94	65	100¼	91
Delaware & Hudson	144½	110¾	134¾	118	129¾	114¾	123	99¾	114½	93	125¼	106¼
Del. Lack. & West'n	174	155¼	174	154	166	138	164	146½	159	140	179	157
L'ville & Nashville...	57¾	40¾	68½	30	55¾	37¾	63¾	40½	65¼	44	69	63
Manhattan.....	127¾	102¼	119¾	95	113½	73¼	113	81¾	120¼	90	133¾	97
Missouri Pacific.....	32½	18¼	42½	18¾	20¾	15	40¼	10	46¼	22	52½	39¾
New York Central...	102½	95¼	104¾	90	90½	88	115½	92½	124¾	105	144¾	121¾
Northern Pacific...	6¼	3¼	8½	2¼	14¾	12¼	22¾	11	44¼	19	55½	42¾
Reading.....	23¾	14¼	22¾	4¾	31¾	2¾	20¼	16¾	23¾	15½	25	19¾
Southern.....	14¾	10¾	14¾	7	11¾	6½	12¼	7	10¾	7	14	10¼
Texas & Pacific.....	107½	7	14¾	6¾	12	5	15	8	20½	8½	25¾	17¾
Union Pacific.....	22½	7	17½	4	12¾	3½	27¾	4½	44¾	16½	54¾	40½
Wabash.....	8½	5¾	10½	5	8	4½	9¼	4¾	9½	6¼	8½	7½
Western Union.....	92¾	80¾	95¾	82¼	90¼	72¾	96¾	75¾	96¾	82¼	98¼	90¾
Average.....	68¼	54¾	70¾	52¾	66¼	49	76½	52¾	81½	60¼	92¼	77¾

Fresh interest has been aroused in the question of currency reform by the announcement of a plan agreed upon by the caucus committee of the Republican

members of the House of Representatives. Its principal feature is a provision to prevent the reissue of legal tender notes after they are redeemed, except upon a deposit of gold in the United States Treasury. An increase in National bank circulation to the par value of bonds deposited and reduction of the minimum capital of National banks to \$25,000, with a declaration in favor of the gold standard, comprise the remaining features of the plan. On June 9 the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee will hold an informal conference to consider a currency measure.

The proposition to prevent the reissue of legal tender notes except for gold deposited presents an interesting problem. From 1833 until 1893 while the Government was issuing gold certificates the payment of customs duties at New York were largely in that class of currency during most of the time from 80 to more than 90 per cent. of the payments being made in gold certificates. Similarly at one time nearly the entire balances paid by the Sub-Treasury at New York to the Clearing-House banks were in gold certificates while since they have been paid in United States notes.

Should the Treasury adhere to its present policy of refusing to issue gold certificates, and the reissue of legal tenders be prohibited, the fiscal operations of the Government to a large extent will have to be conducted with coin.

There has been some public expression of the view that the issue of gold certificates should be resumed. There is complaint of scarcity of paper currency, and with about \$228,000,000 net gold in the Treasury, an amount larger than was ever held before last autumn, there is no question of the ability of the Government to maintain its gold reserve, even were it to return to its former custom of issuing certificates against gold.

Gold certificates, however, never formed an important part of the money in actual circulation, although they did relieve United States notes of a large part of the burden now imposed upon them in operations between the Treasury and the banks. The largest amount of gold certificates outstanding at any one time was about \$163,000,000 in 1892, while now there are only about \$33,000,000. The larger proportion of gold certificates issued has always been in denominations of \$10,000, \$5,000 and \$1,000, while \$14,000,000 is about the largest amount of \$20 certificates outstanding at one time, and \$10,000,000 the largest amount of \$50 certificates. The following table shows the extent to which gold certificates have been used since 1882 :

YEAR ENDED JUNE 30.	Largest amount.	Smallest amount.	Extreme fluctua- tion.	AMOUNT OUTSTANDING CLOSE OF YEAR.			
				Denomina- tion \$20.	Denomina- tion \$50.	Denomina- tion \$100, to \$10,000.	Totals.
1883.....	\$59,907,370	\$4,907,440	\$54,999,930	\$0,163,540	\$9,050,800	\$84,184,800	\$82,878,640
1884.....	77,843,430	52,076,180	25,767,250	13,355,960	9,119,000	75,918,800	96,392,660
1885.....	128,553,010	71,146,640	57,406,370	12,344,340	10,443,850	117,535,000	140,323,140
1886.....	126,729,730	76,044,370	50,685,355	11,976,860	9,717,855	109,479,400	131,174,245
1887.....	105,665,107	74,718,517	30,946,580	10,872,062	8,225,355	102,369,400	121,456,817
1888.....	119,887,370	88,765,340	31,122,080	12,062,000	10,245,150	118,816,000	142,023,150
1889.....	140,613,058	116,762,759	23,820,899	10,979,162	8,443,350	134,626,100	154,048,552
1890.....	158,637,162	116,675,349	21,961,820	11,853,474	9,043,205	136,546,300	157,542,979
1891.....	158,104,739	120,850,399	37,251,340	14,221,774	8,455,836	129,783,900	152,461,429
1892.....	163,178,059	108,273,079	54,905,989	12,120,974	7,106,835	137,371,000	156,598,929
1893.....	141,235,339	92,970,019	48,265,320	9,277,634	5,124,335	78,444,200	92,846,189
1894.....	92,970,019	66,344,409	26,625,610	7,464,594	4,118,005	54,805,300	66,397,899
1895.....	66,344,409	48,361,599	17,982,840	6,198,964	3,637,405	38,613,000	48,409,959
1896.....	48,361,599	42,320,759	6,060,810	5,305,734	3,097,755	34,414,700	42,818,189
1897.....	42,320,759	37,285,919	5,034,840	4,930,614	2,808,555	31,043,000	38,763,169
1898.....	37,285,919	35,820,639	1,465,280	4,674,694	2,956,355	30,069,100	37,430,149
1899.....	*35,820,639	*32,786,479	*3,034,160	†4,530,374	†2,590,955	†27,435,500	†34,536,829

\* To May 31st.

† March 31st.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—After a slight upward spurt in call money early in the month, due to some apprehension concerning the payment of the Spanish war indemnity of \$20,000,000 and fear of gold exports, the local money market became easy again, and rates are tending downward. Call money got no higher than 7 per cent. and has been down to 1½ per cent. At the close of the month call money ruled at 1½ to 3 per cent., the average rate being about 2½ per cent. Banks and trust companies quote 3 per cent. as the minimum, some loaning at 2½ per cent. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 3 per cent. for sixty days to four months, and 3½ per cent. for five to six months. For commercial paper the rates are 3¼ @ 3¾ per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable, 3½ @ 4 per cent. for first-class four to six months single names, and 4 @ 5 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

**MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.**

	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.	May 1.	June 1.
	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	2 — 3	2½ — 3	2½ — 3	3¼ — 12	3 — 6	1½ — 2½
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	3 — 3½	2½ — 3	2½ — 3	6 — 8	3½ — 4	2½ — 3
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	3 —	2½ —	3 —	4 —	3 —	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	3 —	2½ — 3	3 — 3½	4 — 4½	3½ —	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	3½ —	3 —	3½ —	4 — 4½	3¾ — 4	3½ —
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	3 —	2¾ — 3	3 —	3¾ — 4	3½ —	3¼ — 3¾
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	3¼ — 3¾	3 — 3½	3¼ — 4	4 — 5	3¾ — 4½	3½ — 4
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	4 — 5	4 — 5	4 — 5	5 — 6	4½ — 5½	4 — 5

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—There were sweeping changes in the items reported by the Clearing House banks during the month, the fluctuations in loans being ex-

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.**

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
May 6...	\$776,702,800	\$188,438,700	\$55,819,600	\$869,625,400	\$19,351,950	\$18,883,200	\$1,439,472,965
" 13...	770,746,100	193,844,300	51,833,900	901,562,300	27,187,625	18,827,500	1,394,838,511
" 20...	793,542,200	213,183,600	57,029,400	902,325,900	34,631,525	13,801,300	1,245,292,959
" 27...	745,823,400	206,874,500	59,438,500	889,705,100	43,983,725	13,785,700	1,231,015,611
June 3...	746,602,200	205,695,200	59,530,800	890,061,600	42,710,600	13,639,900	954,342,888

**DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.**

MONTH.	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$530,785,000	\$33,286,950	\$675,064,200	\$15,788,750	\$823,087,700	\$19,180,975
February.....	563,331,800	59,148,250	722,484,200	35,609,450	861,637,500	39,232,025
March.....	573,769,300	57,520,975	729,214,800	22,729,125	910,573,600	30,384,900
April.....	599,226,500	47,696,575	682,236,800	35,720,800	896,917,000	15,494,850
May.....	576,863,900	43,917,625	658,506,300	44,504,675	883,595,300	25,524,675
June.....	575,600,000	46,616,100	696,006,400	53,704,600	890,061,600	42,710,600
July.....	604,983,700	41,384,875	750,074,600	62,013,550		
August.....	623,045,000	45,720,150	741,680,100	41,904,475		
September.....	636,996,000	39,517,700	752,389,800	14,990,050		
October.....	619,353,200	15,560,400	702,123,200	15,327,150		
November.....	625,339,000	24,271,800	761,574,200	26,091,550		
December.....	666,278,600	22,122,950	789,525,800	17,097,950		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$914,810,300 on March 4, 1899, loans, \$780,677,700 on March 4, 1899, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

ceptionally important. After increasing \$16,600,000 in the first week of May they fell off nearly \$31,000,000 in the following three weeks, and they are now \$18,000,000 less than at the close of April. Deposits increased until May 20, gaining about \$19,000,000 in three weeks, but fell off nearly \$13,000,000 in the following week. They are now about \$6,500,000 larger than they were a month ago. These changes explain the increase of more than \$17,000,000 in the surplus reserve, which is now nearly \$43,000,000.

## NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

Dates.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Apr. 29.....	\$64,749,900	\$71,101,800	\$2,747,700	\$3,988,600	\$8,126,400	\$3,550,800	\$638,050
May 6.....	65,642,300	70,261,300	2,710,400	3,854,900	7,897,300	2,812,400	786,825
" 13.....	64,496,300	69,962,800	2,750,500	3,994,300	7,513,600	2,802,200	430,100
" 20.....	64,374,200	68,697,700	2,698,200	3,971,400	7,002,200	2,622,000	880,625
" 27.....	64,214,700	68,855,200	2,722,600	4,089,100	6,615,900	2,667,900	1,118,300

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following tables :

## BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Apr. 29.....	\$202,527,000	\$287,737,000	\$17,899,000	\$6,972,000	\$5,109,000	\$153,708,000
May 6.....	203,409,000	237,177,000	17,427,000	6,471,000	5,157,000	160,537,600
" 13.....	202,052,000	234,765,000	17,544,000	6,661,000	5,171,000	142,875,500
" 20.....	199,596,000	232,513,000	17,258,000	6,821,000	5,024,000	132,761,000
" 27.....	193,832,000	228,256,000	17,003,000	6,912,000	4,716,000	127,426,100

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Apr. 29.....	\$138,823,000	\$166,335,000	\$48,965,000	\$5,649,000	\$89,046,100
May 6.....	139,650,000	199,306,000	50,413,000	5,604,000	101,109,900
" 13.....	142,796,000	171,949,000	48,710,000	5,612,000	94,771,300
" 20.....	144,226,000	173,053,000	48,068,000	5,620,000	90,417,300
" 27.....	144,743,000	170,547,000	46,393,000	5,602,000	85,968,800

MONEY RATES ABROAD.—There has been little change in the market rates for money abroad, rates at the close of the month being a fraction higher than a month ago. The Bank of Germany, however, reduced its rate of discount from 4½ to 4

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Feb. 8, 1899.	Mar. 16, 1899.	Apr. 12, 1899.	May 17, 1899.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£26,484,765	£26,553,840	£27,859,375	£27,681,890
Public deposits.....	11,283,618	16,756,784	11,859,879	11,457,538
Other deposits.....	40,303,312	36,824,021	38,041,902	37,461,029
Government securities.....	18,383,438	13,896,274	13,362,728	13,373,128
Other securities.....	22,656,986	34,913,574	34,872,793	34,110,510
Reserve of notes and coin.....	23,715,319	23,284,293	19,494,025	19,320,156
Coin and bullion.....	33,400,084	33,036,133	30,360,400	30,201,986
Reserve to liabilities.....	451½	494½	387½	394½
Bank rate of discount.....	3%	3%	3%	3%
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	2%	2¼@2½	2¼@2½	2¼@2½
Price of Consols (2¾ per cents.).....	111½	110½	110½	110½
Price of silver per ounce.....	27½d	27½d.	27½d.	28½d
Average price of wheat.....	26s. 6d.	25s. 10d.	24s. 7d.	25s. 4d.

per cent., on May 9, the higher rate having been maintained since February 21. The Bank of England rate is still 3 per cent., and also that of the Bank of France. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London at the close of the month were 2½@2½ per cent., against 2½ per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was 2⅜ per cent., the same as a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort 3¼@3⅝ per cent., against 3⅝@3¾ per cent. a month ago.

EUROPEAN BANKS.—The Bank of England has again lost gold, the decrease in holdings for the month amounting to about \$5,500,000, nearly \$20,000,000 less than three months ago, and nearly \$35,000,000 less than a year ago. France and Germany both gained last month; the former now having within \$5,000,000 as much as it held a year ago, and the latter having \$9,000,000 more.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The sterling exchange market was strong early in the month pending the transfer of the Spanish indemnity fund, but when it was learned that exchange had been accumulated in anticipation of the transfer, the market became weaker. Later it advanced, and while irregular, rates are closer to the gold export point than they were a month ago, and, in fact, \$1,000,000 in gold was shipped by the City National Bank on June 3, although no profit can be figured upon the transaction.

RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
May 6.....	4.85¼ @ 4.85½	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.87¼ @ 4.88	4.84¼ @ 4.85	4.84 @ 4.85
" 13.....	4.84¼ @ 4.85	4.86¼ @ 4.87	4.87¼ @ 4.87¾	4.84¼ @ 4.84½	4.83¼ @ 4.84½
" 20.....	4.85¼ @ 4.85½	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88¼	4.84¼ @ 4.85	4.84 @ 4.85
" 27.....	4.85¼ @ 4.85½	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88¼	4.85 @ 4.85½	4.84¼ @ 4.85¼
June 3.....	4.85¼ @ 4.85½	4.87¼ @ 4.88	4.88¼ @ 4.88¾	4.85 @ 4.85½	4.84¼ @ 4.85¼

FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	April 1.	May 1.	June 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.83 — ¼	4.84¼ — ½	4.84¼ — ½	4.85¼ — ½	4.85¼ — 6
" " Sight.....	4.85 — ¼	4.86¼ — ½	4.87¼ — ¾	4.87¼ — ¾	4.88 — ¾
" " Cables.....	4.85¼ 6	4.87 — ¼	4.87¼ — ½	4.87¼ — 8	4.88¼ — 9
" Commercial long.....	4.82¼ ¾	4.83¼ 4	4.83¼ 4	4.84¼ 5	4.85¼ — ½
" Docu'tary for paym't.....	4.82¼ ¾	4.83 — 4	4.83¼ 4¼	4.84 — 5	4.84¼ — 5¼
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.18¼ 7½	5.16¼ 15	5.17¼ 16½	5.16¼ 9½	5.15¾ 15
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.21¼	5.20 — 17½	5.20¾	5.19¾ 8¼	5.18¾ — ½
" Bankers' sight.....	5.18¼ ½	5.17¼ 15	5.18¼ — 17½	5.16¾ ¼	5.16¼ — 15¾
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.21¼	5.20 — 20	5.20¾	5.19¾	5.18¾ — ½
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94¾ 7a	94½ ¾	94¾ ¾	94¾ 7½	94½ 7½
" Bankers' sight.....	94 — 95	95¼ — ½	95¼ — ½	95¾ — ½	95 — ½
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.19¾ 8¼	5.18¾ — ½	5.19¾ — 18¼	5.18¾ 7½	5.16¾ —
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight....	40 — ½	40 — ½	40 — ½	40 — ½	40 — ¾
Kronos—Bankers' sight.....	26½ ¾	26¾ — ¾	26½ ¾	26½ ¾	26½ — 27
Italian lire—sight.....	5.58¼ — 53½	5.55 — 2½	5.56¼ — 3¾	5.55¼ — 61¼	5.51¼ — 46¼
Austrian florins sight.....	40 — ½	40¼ — ¾	40 — ½	40 — ½	.....

SILVER.—The price of silver in London declined sharply early in the month, falling from 28¾d to 28d between May 1 and 5. Subsequently the market fluctuated within a narrow range, and the closing price for the month was 28 1-16d, a net decline of 11-16d.

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.—The volume of bank note circulation continues to decrease, and the decrease is caused by banks voluntarily reducing their circulation, not by reason of banks becoming insolvent or retiring from business. The circulation secured by Government bonds was reduced \$1,660,333 in May, and the money deposited to retire circulation was reduced \$1,010,553, while the notes outstanding were reduced in amount \$649,779.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Feb. 28, 1899.	Mar. 31, 1899.	Apr. 30, 1899.	May 31, 1899.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$242,002,367	\$248,052,317	\$242,714,888	\$242,064,554
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	211,165,017	209,925,999	207,993,287	205,315,854
Circulation secured by lawful money....	31,747,351	38,126,318	34,743,046	35,753,600
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	21,512,550	21,582,650	21,450,150	21,235,700
1897, 4 per cent.....	130,976,650	129,765,350	128,921,850	128,106,300
Five per cents. of 1894.....	14,620,400	14,228,900	13,996,900	14,113,600
Four per cents. of 1895.....	19,808,650	19,099,650	18,354,150	17,500,250
Three per cents. of 1896.....	49,357,440	49,787,340	49,442,860	49,262,460
Total.....	\$236,075,600	\$234,458,890	\$232,187,910	\$230,800,310

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 2 per cents of 1891, \$1,564,500; 4 per cents of 1907, \$26,835,100; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$8,668,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$9,223,500; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$25,291,840; a total of \$73,385,940.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$75,000.

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The United States Mints coined \$4,808,400 gold, \$2,879,416 silver and \$121,750 minor coins in May, a total of \$7,804,566. There were \$2,214,000 silver dollars coined.

## COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1897.		1898.		1899.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$7,903,480	\$1,964,800	\$8,420,000	\$1,624,000	\$18,082,000	\$1,642,000
February.....	10,152,000	1,519,794	4,085,302	1,167,564	14,848,800	1,568,000
March.....	18,770,900	1,617,654	5,335,463	1,498,189	12,179,715	2,846,557
April.....	8,800,400	1,535,000	8,211,400	946,000	7,894,475	2,159,449
May.....	4,488,950	1,600,000	7,717,500	1,435,000	4,808,400	2,879,416
June.....	2,100,547	1,858,754	6,903,982	1,422,185		
July.....	877,000	260,000	5,858,900	1,627,884		
August.....	8,756,250	701,436	9,344,200	2,350,000		
September.....	8,762,375	1,050,982	7,385,315	2,178,389		
October.....	8,845,000	2,301,000	5,180,000	3,354,191		
November.....	8,544,000	2,108,000	5,006,700	2,755,251		
December.....	3,636,642	1,977,167	9,492,045	3,275,481		
Year.....	\$76,028,484	\$18,486,697	\$77,985,757	\$23,084,084	\$67,755,390	\$10,625,422

**FOREIGN TRADE.**—From the report of our foreign trade for April it appears that exports are decreasing and imports are increasing, and this may be described as a normal condition at this time of year. Our exports, however, are still larger than in any previous year in about twenty years, excepting last year. They were \$88,000,000 in value, while the imports were \$65,000,000, leaving an excess of exports of \$23,000,000 to be added to the previous balance, makes \$471,000,000 for the ten months ended April 30. That is \$48,000,000 less than for the same period last year.

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF APRIL.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1894.....	\$64,124,812	\$60,080,087	Exp., \$4,084,775	Exp., \$9,402,110	Exp., \$3,489,488
1895.....	65,255,641	68,749,958	Imp., 3,494,317	Imp., 2,177,404	" 2,711,301
1896.....	71,091,747	58,649,579	Exp., 12,442,168	Exp., 2,512,524	" 3,010,969
1897.....	77,618,780	101,322,406	Imp., 23,673,620	" 5,639,710	" 2,714,917
1898.....	99,814,916	55,946,410	Exp., 43,368,408	Imp., 31,256,134	" 2,008,086
1899.....	88,377,194	65,231,536	" 23,145,658	" 1,309,639	" 2,263,536
<b>TEN MONTHS.</b>					
1894.....	773,592,502	546,398,183	Exp., 227,194,319	Imp., 40,971,988	Exp., 31,564,095
1895.....	688,303,156	604,279,067	" 84,024,089	Exp., 35,710,687	" 22,867,961
1896.....	749,332,904	663,300,075	" 88,032,729	" 54,532,191	" 26,663,070
1897.....	899,923,246	600,189,244	" 299,740,002	Imp., 59,703,776	" 27,726,925
1898.....	1,025,221,172	511,199,772	" 514,020,400	" 88,817,246	" 19,459,857
1899.....	1,036,363,504	565,259,435	" 471,104,069	" 68,303,400	" 22,290,367





**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**—There was an increase in the volume of money in circulation during May of \$21,633,117. The gain in gold coin was \$23,200,000 and in silver certificates more than \$900,000, but silver dollars decreased nearly \$800,000, and notes of all kinds about \$2,000,000.

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.	May 1, 1899.	June 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$867,796,579	\$894,855,942	\$701,077,442	\$724,282,177
Silver dollars.....	65,153,558	64,530,488	64,023,325	63,434,217
Subsidiary silver.....	70,627,818	69,490,609	69,734,194	70,044,960
Gold certificates.....	85,200,259	82,862,649	82,845,029	82,786,189
Silver certificates.....	362,331,995	368,874,006	400,379,249	401,298,642
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	94,942,741	94,075,701	93,559,041	93,101,782
United States notes.....	312,415,738	310,519,117	312,057,406	311,095,424
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872.....	20,465,000	22,335,000	21,295,000	21,340,000
National bank notes.....	238,337,729	240,261,430	238,877,207	238,117,588
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,897,301,412</b>	<b>\$1,927,846,942</b>	<b>\$1,993,887,892</b>	<b>\$1,955,501,009</b>
Population of United States.....	75,330,000	75,737,000	75,875,000	76,011,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$25.19	\$25.45	\$25.49	\$25.73

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The evidence of the payment of the Spanish indemnity is afforded in the decrease of nearly \$18,700,000 in the gold coin holdings of the Treasury, partly offset by a gain of about \$3,900,000 in gold bullion. The total cash was reduced \$16,284,000 and the net cash nearly \$17,000,000.

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.	May 1, 1899.	June 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$139,654,545	\$156,745,506	\$158,155,309	\$139,459,075
Gold bullion.....	142,074,889	121,560,849	120,829,945	121,742,353
Silver Dollars.....	405,061,304	410,646,870	412,803,833	415,606,941
Silver bullion.....	92,192,207	8,825,937	87,916,328	85,909,876
Subsidiary silver.....	5,959,343	6,994,375	6,628,631	6,593,355
United States notes.....	34,265,278	39,161,899	34,623,611	35,585,562
National bank notes.....	5,480,141	2,873,462	3,919,501	4,029,191
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$824,687,707</b>	<b>\$823,718,698</b>	<b>\$825,175,158</b>	<b>\$808,926,383</b>
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	542,939,995	548,177,356	548,048,319	548,526,613
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$281,747,712</b>	<b>\$275,541,342</b>	<b>\$277,126,839</b>	<b>\$260,399,770</b>

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**—The total stock of money continues to increase, the gain last month being nearly \$5,000,000. The gold supply increased about \$5,400,000, but the decrease in bank notes affected the total. Since January 1 the aggregate supply of money has increased \$36,000,000.

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Jan. 1, 1899.	Apr. 1, 1899.	May 1, 1899.	June 1, 1899.
Gold coin.....	\$807,451,124	\$851,601,448	\$859,232,751	\$863,741,252
Gold bullion.....	142,074,889	121,560,849	120,829,945	121,742,353
Silver dollars.....	470,244,857	475,193,158	476,827,158	479,041,158
Silver bullion.....	92,192,207	8,825,937	87,916,328	85,909,876
Subsidiary silver.....	76,587,161	76,390,984	76,710,825	76,638,335
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	243,817,870	243,134,892	242,796,708	242,146,789
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,179,049,124</b>	<b>\$2,203,388,254</b>	<b>\$2,210,994,731</b>	<b>\$2,215,900,779</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of May, and the highest and lowest during the year 1899, by date, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1898:

	YEAR 1898.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1899.				MAY, 1899.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.		
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	199 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	247 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 23	17 —May 9	209 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	17 $\frac{1}{4}$		
"    preferred.....	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 —Feb. 23	509 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	51	54		
Baltimore & Ohio.....	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	129 $\frac{1}{2}$	759 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 12	66 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	73	67	67		
Bay State Gas.....	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	89 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 10	29 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 11	.....	.....	.....		
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	789 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	137 —Apr. 15	779 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	1339 $\frac{1}{2}$	100	1069 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Canadian Pacific.....	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	72	99 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 31	849 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 15	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	959 $\frac{1}{2}$	999 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Canada Southern.....	58	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	70 —Jan. 23	529 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 31	57	529 $\frac{1}{2}$	529 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Central of New Jersey.....	99	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	1229 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 22	97 —Jan. 3	1219 $\frac{1}{2}$	1009 $\frac{1}{2}$	1149 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Central Pacific.....	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	559 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 18	41 —Jan. 5	539 $\frac{1}{2}$	459 $\frac{1}{2}$	50		
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cdfs.....	269 $\frac{1}{2}$	179 $\frac{1}{2}$	319 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 2	239 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 31	279 $\frac{1}{2}$	239 $\frac{1}{2}$	24		
Chicago & Alton.....	172	150	1759 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 25	168 —Jan. 11	.....	.....	.....		
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	1259 $\frac{1}{2}$	859 $\frac{1}{2}$	1499 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 18	1249 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 7	1449 $\frac{1}{2}$	1279 $\frac{1}{2}$	1279 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago & E. Illinois.....	66	49	799 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 1	599 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 4	799 $\frac{1}{2}$	739 $\frac{1}{2}$	739 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	1139 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	125 —Mar. 2	1129 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	1249 $\frac{1}{2}$	1239 $\frac{1}{2}$	1239 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago, Great Western.....	18	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	209 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 23	139 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 31	159 $\frac{1}{2}$	139 $\frac{1}{2}$	139 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville.....	11	7	129 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 25	79 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	109 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	9		
"    preferred.....	389 $\frac{1}{2}$	23	499 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 6	31 —Jan. 4	46	37	37		
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	1299 $\frac{1}{2}$	839 $\frac{1}{2}$	1339 $\frac{1}{2}$ Feb. 20	1209 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	1289 $\frac{1}{2}$	1209 $\frac{1}{2}$	1229 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	1669 $\frac{1}{2}$	149	1739 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 17	1669 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	170	169	169		
Chicago & Northwestern.....	1499 $\frac{1}{2}$	1139 $\frac{1}{2}$	166 —Mar. 29	1419 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 4	158	1499 $\frac{1}{2}$	1509 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	1919 $\frac{1}{2}$	163	1949 $\frac{1}{2}$ Mar. 21	188 —Jan. 19	1909 $\frac{1}{2}$	1909 $\frac{1}{2}$	1909 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.....	1149 $\frac{1}{2}$	80	1229 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 27	1079 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 13	1169 $\frac{1}{2}$	1079 $\frac{1}{2}$	1069 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.....	94	65	1009 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 19	91 —Feb. 8	96	929 $\frac{1}{2}$	939 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	170	148	180 —May 9	170 —Jan. 16	180	175	175		
Chicago Terminal Transfer.....	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	259 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 27	79 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	219 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	18		
"    preferred.....	379 $\frac{1}{2}$	229 $\frac{1}{2}$	589 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 27	369 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	559 $\frac{1}{2}$	429 $\frac{1}{2}$	49		
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.....	479 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	639 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 10	429 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 4	609 $\frac{1}{2}$	51	51		
"    preferred.....	97	779 $\frac{1}{2}$	1029 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 26	94 —May 10	96	94	969 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Cleveland Lorain & Wheeling.....	199 $\frac{1}{2}$	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	169 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 26	109 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 28	11	11	11		
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.....	329 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	55 —Apr. 21	309 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 8	539 $\frac{1}{2}$	399 $\frac{1}{2}$	42		
Consolidated Gas Co.....	2069 $\frac{1}{2}$	164	2239 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 11	1669 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 31	1939 $\frac{1}{2}$	1659 $\frac{1}{2}$	1679 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.....	1149 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	1259 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 20	1069 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	122	115	116		
Delaware, Lack. & Western.....	159	140	179 —Apr. 4	157 —Jan. 7	1719 $\frac{1}{2}$	165	169		
Denver & Rio Grande.....	219 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	259 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 27	189 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	249 $\frac{1}{2}$	219 $\frac{1}{2}$	219 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	719 $\frac{1}{2}$	40	80 —Apr. 27	689 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 11	799 $\frac{1}{2}$	749 $\frac{1}{2}$	759 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	195	119	199 —Jan. 20	189 —Jan. 4	.....	.....	.....		
Erie.....	169 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	169 $\frac{1}{2}$ Jan. 19	129 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 25	139 $\frac{1}{2}$	129 $\frac{1}{2}$	129 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    1st pref.....	4399 $\frac{1}{2}$	299 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 —Jan. 24	339 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 24	379 $\frac{1}{2}$	339 $\frac{1}{2}$	36		
"    2d pref.....	219 $\frac{1}{2}$	159 $\frac{1}{2}$	229 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 30	189 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 8	189 $\frac{1}{2}$	169 $\frac{1}{2}$	179 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	4199 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	419 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	36 —Mar. 28	409 $\frac{1}{2}$	379 $\frac{1}{2}$	389 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Express Adams.....	180	979 $\frac{1}{2}$	119 —Feb. 25	1089 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 16	115	112	112		
"    American.....	153	116	145 —Jan. 9	138 —Jan. 21	143	139	142		
"    United States.....	589 $\frac{1}{2}$	38	60 —Jan. 11	48 —May 31	53	48	48		
"    Wells, Fargo.....	1319 $\frac{1}{2}$	1129 $\frac{1}{2}$	130 —May 8	125 —Jan. 10	130	128	130		
Great Northern, preferred.....	180	122	195 —Mar. 13	1429 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	1919 $\frac{1}{2}$	170	170		
Hocking Valley.....	.....	.....	29 —Apr. 27	259 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 15	279 $\frac{1}{2}$	239 $\frac{1}{2}$	249 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	.....	.....	609 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 27	549 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 13	599 $\frac{1}{2}$	549 $\frac{1}{2}$	55		
Illinois Central.....	11599 $\frac{1}{2}$	96	122 —Jan. 23	111 —May 31	1179 $\frac{1}{2}$	111	111		
Iowa Central.....	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	139 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 28	109 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 7	113	1139 $\frac{1}{2}$	1139 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    preferred.....	429 $\frac{1}{2}$	25	519 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 15	429 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 31	469 $\frac{1}{2}$	429 $\frac{1}{2}$	429 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Kansas City, Pitts. & Gulf.....	259 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	18 —Jan. 6	7 —Mar. 15	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	99 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Laclede Gas.....	549 $\frac{1}{2}$	379 $\frac{1}{2}$	579 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 9	51 —Mar. 4	55	529 $\frac{1}{2}$	529 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Lake Erie & Western.....	239 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	229 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 27	15 —Jan. 16	179 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	16		
"    preferred.....	83	53	75 —Jan. 27	60 —Jan. 15	699 $\frac{1}{2}$	669 $\frac{1}{2}$	679 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Lake Shore.....	215	1709 $\frac{1}{2}$	208 —Jan. 24	1969 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 5	200	200	200		
Long Island.....	599 $\frac{1}{2}$	40	85 —Apr. 4	599 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 5	769 $\frac{1}{2}$	70	739 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Louisville & Nashville.....	659 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	69 —Jan. 27	63 —Mar. 6	689 $\frac{1}{2}$	639 $\frac{1}{2}$	649 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Manhattan consol.....	1209 $\frac{1}{2}$	90	13399 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 3	97 —Jan. 4	1199 $\frac{1}{2}$	1049 $\frac{1}{2}$	105		
Metropolitan Street.....	1949 $\frac{1}{2}$	1259 $\frac{1}{2}$	209 —Mar. 28	1879 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 11	2419 $\frac{1}{2}$	2079 $\frac{1}{2}$	2099 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Michigan Central.....	118	909 $\frac{1}{2}$	116 —Jan. 24	112 —Jan. 13	1139 $\frac{1}{2}$	1139 $\frac{1}{2}$	1139 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	389 $\frac{1}{2}$	24	629 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 28	359 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	629 $\frac{1}{2}$	539 $\frac{1}{2}$	539 $\frac{1}{2}$		
"    1st pref.....	100	84	101 —Apr. 28	979 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 9	101	101	101		
"    2d pref.....	789 $\frac{1}{2}$	48	969 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 5	739 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 10	969 $\frac{1}{2}$	88	89		
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.....	149 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	15 —Jan. 10	119 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 10	13	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	12		
"    preferred.....	41	289 $\frac{1}{2}$	429 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 3	309 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 31	39	309 $\frac{1}{2}$	309 $\frac{1}{2}$		

ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1908.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1909.				MAY, 1909.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.		
Missouri Pacific.....	46¼	22	52¼—Apr. 4	30 —May 31	49¾	30	30¾		
Mobile & Ohio.....	32½	24	49¾—Apr. 17	32 —Jan. 3	44½	37	37		
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River..	124¾	105	144¾—Mar. 29	121¾—Jan. 3	130	128¼	129¼		
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis....	15¾	11½	19¾—Jan. 23	12¾—May 9	13¾	12¾	13		
1st preferred.....	76	65	79 —Jan. 23	65 —Mar. 7	67	66	66		
2d preferred.....	40¾	28	41 —Jan. 23	29¼—May 24	31¼	29¼	30		
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.	201	178¼	222 —Apr. 20	180 —Jan. 19	215	212	215		
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	19¼	13¾	20¼—Mar. 27	18¾—Jan. 3	27	23¾	24¼		
Norfolk & Western.....	19¾	11½	25¾—Apr. 27	17¾—Jan. 17	21¾	18¾	19¾		
preferred.....	63¾	42¾	71¼—Feb. 2	61¾—Jan. 6	68¾	65	65¾		
North American Co.....	7¾	4¼	12¼—Apr. 19	6¾—Jan. 6	12¾	10¾	11		
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.	44¼	19	55¼—Feb. 16	42¾—Jan. 7	53¾	46¾	46¾		
pref tr. receipts.....	70¾	56¾	81¼—Jan. 23	75 —May 13	79¾	75	75¾		
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	61¼	35¼	62 —Jan. 23	34¼—May 31	38	31¼	34¼		
preferred.....	78	65¼	76¾—Jan. 23	60 —May 9	70¾	60	70		
Oregon Short Line.....	43	19¾	46 —Jan. 23	41 —Feb. 8	.....	.....	.....		
Pacific Mail.....	46	21	55 —Jan. 30	43¼—Jan. 4	51¾	46¾	47¼		
Pennsylvania R. R.....	123¾	110¾	142 —Jan. 23	122¼—Jan. 5	134¼	125¾	126¾		
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	112	86¼	129¼—Apr. 3	101 —May 13	127¾	101	115¾		
Pitta., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis..	63¾	38¾	66 —Jan. 23	43 —May 11	55¼	43	44		
preferred.....	84¼	57	98 —Jan. 23	80 —Feb. 10	89¾	82	83		
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	216	182	164¾—Jan. 4	156 —Jan. 21	161	156	157¾		
Reading Voting Tr. cdfs.....	23¾	15¼	25 —Jan. 24	19¼—May 13	22¾	19¾	20¾		
1st preferred.....	54¾	36	68¼—Apr. 4	51¾—Jan. 7	64¾	53	56¾		
2d preferred.....	39	17¾	38¼—Mar. 22	25¼—Jan. 7	34¾	29	33¾		
Rome, Wat. Ogdens' g.....	128¾	116¼	132 —Apr. 25	130 —Jan. 10	131	130¾	131		
St. Louis & San Francisco....	9¼	6	14¾—Feb. 1	8¾—Jan. 6	11¾	9¼	10		
1st preferred.....	70	53¼	75¼—Jan. 26	64 —May 13	71	64	70		
2d preferred.....	35	22¼	44¾—Jan. 31	33¼—Jan. 5	38	35	35¼		
St. Louis & Southwestern....	7¾	5¾	15 —Apr. 26	6¼—Jan. 4	14¾	11¼	11¾		
preferred.....	18	7¾	25¼—Apr. 1	17 —Jan. 3	23¾	20¾	20¾		
Southern Pacific Co.....	35	12	44 —Jan. 31	27 —May 9	34¼	27	30		
Southern Railway.....	10¾	7	14 —Jan. 16	10¼—Jan. 5	12¾	10¾	10¾		
preferred.....	43¾	23¾	55 —Apr. 22	40¾—Jan. 4	54	47¾	49¾		
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	38¾	17	68 —Apr. 18	36 —Jan. 9	63¾	54	57		
Texas & Pacific.....	20¾	8¾	25¾—Mar. 1	17¼—Jan. 5	23	18¾	18¾		
Union Pacific.....	44¾	16¼	50¾—Feb. 21	40¼—May 13	46¾	40¼	41¼		
preferred.....	74¾	45¾	84¼—Jan. 23	72¾—Jan. 6	79¼	73¾	74¼		
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf...	13¾	5¾	14¾—Jan. 6	11¾—Mar. 3	.....	.....	.....		
Wabash R. R.....	9¼	6¼	8¾—Jan. 24	7¼—May 26	8	7¼	7¼		
preferred.....	24¼	14¼	25¼—Apr. 5	19 —May 24	22¼	19	19¾		
Western Union.....	95¾	82¼	98¼—Jan. 24	80¼—May 31	92¾	80¼	91		
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	6¾	3¼	11¼—May 9	8¼—May 31	11¼	8¾	8¾		
preferred.....	30¾	8	32¾—May 13	24 —May 25	32¾	24	24		
<b>"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:</b>									
American Oil Co.....	30¾	15¼	30¼—Apr. 17	29¾—Mar. 6	33¾	34¼	34¼		
preferred.....	90¾	68	95 —May 9	89¼—Jan. 5	96	90	91¾		
American Spirits Mfg Co.....	15¾	6¼	15¼—Mar. 13	9¾—May 27	13¾	9¾	10¼		
preferred.....	41¾	16	41¾—Mar. 13	30 —May 27	37	30	30		
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	146¾	107¼	182 —Mar. 20	123¼—Jan. 4	168¾	139¼	139¾		
preferred.....	116	103	123 —Mar. 20	110 —Jan. 16	118	116	116¾		
American Tobacco Co.....	153¾	83¾	229¼—Apr. 5	93 —Jan. 31	220	93	93		
preferred.....	135¼	112¼	150 —Mar. 9	132 —Jan. 4	145¼	140	141		
Consolidated Ice Co.....	52	27¼	50¼—Jan. 30	40¾—May 31	47	40¾	40¾		
Federal Steel Co.....	52	29	75 —Apr. 3	46¾—Feb. 8	70¼	50	55		
preferred.....	85¼	60¾	83¼—Apr. 3	72¼—May 13	67¾	72¾	79¾		
General Electric Co.....	97	76	122—Apr. 17	95¼—Jan. 3	120	114	117¾		
International Paper Co.....	67	48	68¼—Jan. 23	35 —May 13	50¼	35	42¼		
preferred.....	95	85	95 —Jan. 5	78 —May 13	85	78	79		
National Lead Co.....	39¾	28¼	40¼—Jan. 20	28 —May 31	34¼	28	28		
preferred.....	114¾	99	115 —Jan. 21	111 —May 27	113¼	111	111		
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	10¾	3¼	12 —Jan. 10	7¾—May 30	10	7¾	7¾		
U. S. Leather Co.....	87¼	5¼	8 —Jan. 28	6 —May 10	6¾	6	6		
preferred.....	75¼	53¾	78 —Apr. 4	68¼—Jan. 9	72¾	68¼	68¼		
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48¼	14¼	57 —Apr. 5	42¾—Jan. 5	54¾	43¾	47		
preferred.....	113¼	60	120 —Jan. 9	111 —Jan. 3	117	113	114¾		

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1923	2,800,000	M & N	100 $\frac{3}{4}$	Mar. 25 '99	.....	.....	.....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1905	7,000,000	Q J	98	May 31 '99	98 $\frac{3}{8}$	87 $\frac{3}{4}$	177,000
Atch. Top. & S. F.								
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1905	126,535,500	A & O	103 $\frac{3}{4}$	May 31 '99	103 $\frac{3}{4}$	100 $\frac{3}{4}$	3,420,000
{ " registered.....			A & O	101	Mar. 29 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " adjustment, g. 4's.....	1905	51,728,000	NOV	81 $\frac{3}{4}$	May 31 '99	83 $\frac{3}{4}$	81	2,518,500
{ " registered.....			NOV	88	Feb. 20 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	750,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " Atlau. av. of Brook'n Imp. g. 5's.....	1904	1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,238,000	J & J	102	May 31 '99	102	102	17,000
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.), 1919		3,000,000	A & O	116	Jan. 18 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....			A & O	115	May 15 '99	118	115	20,000
{ " g. 5's.....	1885-1925			115	Oct. 5 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....						.....	.....	.....
{ " registered.....						.....	.....	.....
{ " Speyer & Co. eng. cf. dep.		10,000,000	F & A	120	Jan. 18 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				120	Feb. 1 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " con. g. 5's.....	1888			120	May 15 '99	120	120	3,000
{ " registered.....				118 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sept. 7 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " J. P. M. & Co. cfs. dep't.....		11,988,000	F & A	116	Aug. 22 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				114 $\frac{1}{2}$	July 29 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " bonds of loan of 1853 ext.		1,161,000	A & O	125	May 17 '99	125	125	10,000
{ " to 1935 at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ Tr. Co. cfs.				120	Nov. 18 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " sterling 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1872 due		21,921,800	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1902 Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " sterling 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1874 due		21,990,600	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1910 Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ term. bonds.....	1894	8,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " sterling 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1883		22,400,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " (Philadelphia Branch)				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " ster. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ loan of 1877 due		21,382,200	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1927 (B. & O. & Chic.) Tr.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Balti. Belt. 1st g. 5's int. gtd., 1900		6,000,000	M & N	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mar. 8 '99	.....	.....	.....
W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....	1900	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12 '95	.....	.....	.....
Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's.....	1919	700,000	F & A	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	July 1 '92	.....	.....	.....
Gen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's.....	1900	2,500,000	M & S	111	Feb. 28 '99	.....	.....	.....
Ak. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. int. g. 5's.....	1900	1,500,000	M & N	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	Nov. 21 '95	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....				105	Aug. 9 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Tr. Co. cfs.....				115	Jan. 19 '99	.....	.....	.....
Pittsb. & Connellsville 1st g. 4's.....	1946	2,536,000	J & J	107 $\frac{1}{4}$	July 23 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ bds 1898 Tr. Co. cfs.		21,419,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " con. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ bonds Tr. Co. cfs.		21,352,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
B & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's.....	1900	10,667,000	J & J	106	Mar. 13 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " S'w'n Ry 1st con g 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's.....	1903	10,511,000	J & J	94	Jan. 27 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st inc. g. 5's, series A.....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	Jan. 11 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st inc. g. 5's, series B.....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	12	Feb. 23 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				11 $\frac{1}{2}$	Feb. 10 '99	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. S'w'n Term Co. gtd g 5s.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	105	Nov. 30 '98	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio & Miss. 1st con. 4's.....	1847	2,615,000	J & J	112	Jan. 30 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 2d con. 7's.....	1911	2,952,000	A & O	128 $\frac{1}{4}$	May 22 '99	128 $\frac{1}{4}$	128 $\frac{3}{4}$	1,000
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				128 $\frac{3}{4}$	May 24 '99	128 $\frac{3}{4}$	128	10,000
{ " 1st Spr'gfield div. 7's.....	1905	1,984,000	M & N	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	May 19 '99	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,000
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				104	May 18 '99	104	104	1,000
{ " 1st gen. 5s.....	1882	405,000	J & D	89	Feb. 4 '99	.....	.....	.....
{ " Trust Co. cfs.....				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest price and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's. 1945		6,625,000	A & O	111½	May 31, '99	112¼	110	226,000
Bklyn City R. R. 1st con. 5's 1916 1941		4,373,000	J & J	117½	Apr. 5, '99			
Bklyn Qu. Co. & Sur. 1st con. gtd g. 5's.		2,255,000	M & N	106	May 26, '99	107	106	56,000
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4's. 1949		3,000,000	J & J	74	Sept. 1, '98			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitta. g. 5's. 1907		4,407,000	M & S	110	May 13, '99	110	110	4,000
deb. 5's. 1947		1,000,000	J & J					
Hochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's. 1921		1,300,000	F & A	128	May 15, '99	128	128	2,000
con. 1st 6's. 1922		3,920,000	J & D	129	May 15, '99	129	129	7,000
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. 5's. 1943		650,000	J & J	121¼	May 26, '98			
Buff. & St. Mary's 5's w'n 1st g. 5's. 1927		1,000,000	F & A	105	May 12, '99	105	105	10,000
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's. 1913		1,211,500	A & O	100	Feb. 27, '98			
registered.			A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's. 1906		6,500,000	J & D	110	May 31, '99	110	109½	21,500
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's. 1906		7,250,000	A & O	117½	May 26, '99	117½	117	55,000
registered.			A & O	110½	Feb. 4, '99			
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st 7's. g. 1927		150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
(Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 5's. 1921		1,905,000	A & O	105	Jan. 6, '99			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1908		13,820,000	J & J	111¼	May 27, '99	111¼	110	50,000
2d mortg. 5's. 1913		5,100,000	M & S	111	May 22, '99	111	110½	22,000
registered.			M & S	108¼	May 22, '98			
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's. 1948		2,500,000	J & D	91½	May 12, '99	91½	91½	10,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1907		4,880,000	M & N	96	Apr. 26, '99			
Central R'y of Georgia. 1st g. 5's. 1945		7,000,000	F & A	116¼	Mar. 23, '99			
registered \$1,000 & \$5,000			F & A					
con. g. 5's. 1945		16,500,000	M & N	96½	May 31, '99	96	95½	879,000
con. g. 5's. reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000			M & N					
1st pref. inc. g. 5's. 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	40½	May 31, '99	43¼	40¼	178,000
2d pref. inc. g. 5's. 1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	14	Apr. 25, '99			
3d pref. inc. g. 5's. 1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	6	May 31, '99	6½	6	16,000
Macon & Nor. Div. 1st g. 5's. 1946		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 23, '98			
Mobile div. 1st g. 5's. 1946		1,000,000	J & J	99	July 6, '98			
Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5's. 1947		418,000	J & J	86½	Sept. 6, '98			
Central Railroad of New Jersey,								
1st consolidated 7's. 1899		3,836,000	Q J	101	May 17, '99	101	100¼	20,000
convertible 7's. 1902		1,167,000	M & N	109¼	May 3, '99	109¼	109¼	1,000
con. deb. 6's. 1906		432,800	M & N	112¼	Mar. 20, '99			
gen. g. 5's. 1907		43,924,000	J & J	120½	May 31, '99	121	119¾	58,000
registered.			Q J	118	May 27, '99	118	117	30,500
Lehigh & W.-B. con. ased. 7's. 1900		5,384,000	Q M	102½	May 5, '99	102½	102½	30,000
mortgage 5's. 1912		2,691,000	M & N	100	May 6, '99	100	100	11,000
Am. Dock & Improv'm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	114	Apr. 27, '99			
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's. 1920		1,082,000	J & J					
N. J. Southern Int. gtd 6's. 1899		411,000	J & J	104	Nov. 13, '98			
Gen. P. ex g. 5's Speyer & Co. cfs. A. 1896		2,995,000		103¼	Mar. 15, '99			
B C D. 1899		3,393,000		108½	May 31, '99	108½	105	285,000
E. 1898		3,997,000	J & J	108¼	Feb. 28, '99			
F G H I. 1901		15,506,000		103½	Mar. 23, '99			
San Joaquin br. g. 6's. 1900		924,000	A & O	106½	Mar. 29, '99			
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs. 1899		5,156,000		118½	May 31, '99	119¼	118	27,000
gtd. g. 5's. 1899		4,279,000	A & O	84¼	Sept. 16, '98			
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs. 1900		8,004,000		125½	May 27, '99	125½	122	108,000
land grant g. 5's. 1900		591,000	A & O	107	Apr. 10, '99			
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs. 1900		1,793,000		112	Apr. 19, '99			
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 5's. 1918		1,188,000	J & J	101½	Dec. 6, '97			
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs. 1899		9,152,000		122¼	May 27, '99	122¼	120¼	68,000
Western Pacific g. 6's. 1899		539,000	J & J	104¼	Apr. 5, '99			
Speyer & Co. eng. cfs. 1900		2,196,000		105½	Apr. 15, '99			
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's. gtd. 1907		3,964,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97			
gtd. g. 5's. 1908		4,800,000	A & O	105¼	Dec. 19, '98			
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1898		1,500,000	J & J	108½	Dec. 13, '98			
Che. & Ohio 6's. g. Series A. 1906		2,000,000	A & O	117	Apr. 14, '99			
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	118¼	Mar. 2, '99			
1st con. g. 5's. 1909		26,858,000	M & N	119	May 26, '99	119½	118	120,000
registered.			M & N	118¼	Mar. 15, '99			
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1902		24,050,000	M & S	94¼	May 31, '99	95	93½	554,000
registered.			M & S	92½	Jan. 18, '99			
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1899		6,000,000	J & J	107	May 31, '99	107½	107	67,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1899		1,000,000	J & J	97	Dec. 2, '98			

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. . . . .	1940	650,000	J & J	95½	May 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. . . . .	1941	400,000	M & S	101¼	Apr. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. . . . .	1902	3,007,000	M & S	102½	May 31, '99	103	102½	25,000
Chicago & Alton s'king fund 6's. . . . .	1903	1,722,000	J & J	108	May 5, '99	108	108	1,000
{ Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. . . . .	1900	1,785,000	F & A	104	Feb. 1, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d 7's. . . . .	1900	300,000	M & N	106¾	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st a. f'd g. 6's. . . . .	1912	501,000	A & O	105¼	Oct. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. . . . .	1908	28,924,000	J & J	116	May 31, '99	116	115½	41,000
5's, sinking fund. . . . .	1901	2,315,000	A & O	105	Mar. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
5's, debentures. . . . .	1913	9,000,000	M & N	110¼	May 17, '99	111	109¼	59,000
convertible 5's. . . . .	1908	3,590,800	M & S	142¾	May 4, '99	142¾	141¼	45,000
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. . . . .	1919	2,818,000	A & O	116¼	May 28, '99	116¼	115½	18,000
4's. . . . .	1919	9,050,000	A & O	106¼	May 28, '99	106¾	105½	20,000
Denver div. 4's. . . . .	1922	5,856,000	F & A	105	May 28, '99	105	105	12,000
4's. . . . .	1921	3,150,000	M & S	100	Apr. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. . . . .	1905	2,320,000	F & A	107¼	Jan. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Nebraska extens'n 4's. . . . .	1927	2,820,000	M & N	111¼	May 31, '99	111¼	109¼	326,000
registered. . . . .		26,110,000	M & N	97	May 9, '99	.....	.....	.....
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. . . . .	1911	8,000,000	M & S	123¼	May 31, '99	123¼	121¼	6,000
{ Chic. Burl. & Northern, 1st 5's. . . . .	1923	8,241,000	A & O	107	May 19, '99	107	106½	53,500
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. . . . .	1907	2,980,000	J & D	116¼	Apr. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
small bonds. . . . .			J & D	112	Apr. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 6's, gold. . . . .	1934	2,653,000	A & O	114	Jan. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
gen. con. 1st 5's. . . . .	1937	9,767,000	M & N	115	May 31, '99	115	118	43,000
registered. . . . .			M & N	103¼	Nov. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. . . . .	1936	4,626,000	J & J	107	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville. Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. . . . .	1910	3,000,000	J & J	116¼	Mar. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Chic. Ind. & Louisv. ref. g. 5's. . . . .	1947	3,177,000	J & J	105¾	May 24, '99	106½	105	73,000
refunding g. 6's. . . . .	1947	4,700,000	J & J	118¼	May 24, '99	118½	115	59,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul. Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's & 8's g. R.d. . . . .	1902	1,961,000	{ J & J { J & J	168 120	May 24, '99 Feb. 8, '94	168	168	2,000
1st m. C. & M. 7's. . . . .	1903	1,114,000	J & J	168¼	May 20, '99	168¼	168	107
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. . . . .	1905	8,702,000	J & J	168	May 5, '99	168½	168	19,000
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. . . . .	1908	2,970,000	J & J	168½	Apr. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's, Southw'n div. . . . .	1909	4,000,000	J & J	121¼	May 31, '99	121¼	121¼	9,000
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. . . . .	1919	2,500,000	J & J	115¼	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st So. Min. div. 6's. . . . .	1910	7,432,000	J & J	123¼	May 27, '99	123¼	122	19,000
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. . . . .	1910	5,677,000	J & J	132½	May 25, '99	132½	132½	2,000
5's. . . . .	1910	990,000	J & J	109	Mar. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. . . . .	1910	3,000,000	J & J	123	May 2, '99	123	122½	4,000
1st Chic. & P. W. 5's. . . . .	1921	25,340,000	J & J	123¼	May 31, '99	124	122½	129,000
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. . . . .	1923	3,083,000	J & J	121¼	Apr. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
Mineral Point div. 5's. . . . .	1910	2,840,000	J & J	113¼	Apr. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. . . . .	1921	1,360,000	J & J	115¼	Dec. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
Wis. & Min. div. 5's. . . . .	1921	4,755,000	J & J	122¼	May 24, '99	122¼	121	2,000
terminal 5's. . . . .	1914	4,748,000	J & J	118¼	May 18, '99	118¼	117¼	32,000
Far. & So. 6's assu. . . . .	1924	1,250,000	J & J	127¼	Jan. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. s'k. f'd 5's. . . . .	1918	509,000	J & J	106¼	July 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
Dakota & Gt. S. 5's. . . . .	1918	2,854,000	J & J	118¼	May 12, '99	118½	119¼	3,000
g. m. g. 4's, series A. . . . .	1939	23,678,000	J & J	114½	May 26, '99	114½	113¼	78,000
registered. . . . .			Q	105½	Feb. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 3¼'s, series B. . . . .	1939	2,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. . . . .			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. . . . .	1910	2,155,000	J & J	121	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st convt. 6's. . . . .	1913	5,082,000	J & D	128	Jan. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's. . . . .	1915	10,306,000	Q F	144¼	May 12, '99	144¼	142¾	6,000
coupon gold 7's. . . . .	1902		J & D	115	May 24, '99	115	114½	8,000
registered d. gold 7's. . . . .	1902	9,820,000	J & D	114	Apr. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929	1929	6,080,000	A & O	122¼	Mar. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. . . . .			A & O	117¼	Oct. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
5's. . . . .	1879-1929		A & O	106¼	Apr. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. . . . .		7,197,000	A & O	105¾	Mar. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
debenture 5's. . . . .	1883		M & N	122	May 18, '99	122	121¼	3,000
registered. . . . .		9,800,000	M & N	110¼	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
25 year debent. 5's. . . . .	1909		M & N	108	May 12, '99	108	108	3,000
registered. . . . .		5,900,000	M & N	109¼	Mar. 10, '97	.....	.....	.....
30 year debent. 5's. . . . .	1921		A & O	117¼	May 22, '99	118	117¼	4,000
registered. . . . .		10,000,000	A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95	.....	.....	.....
extension 4's. . . . .	1886-1926		FA 15	109	May 9, '99	109	109	1,000
registered. . . . .		18,632,000	FA 15	108¾	Feb. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
gen. g. 8½'s.....1907		7,023,000	M & N	108½	May 31, '99	108½	108½	85,000
registered			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98			
Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's.....1901		455,000	J & J	107½	May 26, '98			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's.....1900		1,085,000	A & O	106	Oct. 21, '96			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,562,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '96			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1905		1,600,000	M & S	117½	Feb. 6, '90			
Ottumwa C. F. & St. 1st 5's.....1909		1,600,000	M & S	111	Jan. 5, '99			
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	113	Apr. 24, '99			
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	113	Apr. 24, '99			
Mil., Lake Shore & W'n 1st 6's.....1921		5,000,000	M & N	140½	May 24, '99	140½	139½	9,000
con. deb. 5's.....1907		436,000	F & A	103½	Feb. 24, '97			
ext. & imp't. s. f'd g. 5's.....1929		4,148,000	F & A	125½	May 24, '99	125½	122	55,000
Michigan div. 1st 6's.....1924		1,281,000	J & J	138	Dec. 12, '98			
Ashland div. 1st 6's.....1925		1,000,000	M & S	142½	Apr. 25, '99			
income.....1925		500,000	M & N	112	Apr. 27, '98			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup.....1917		12,100,000	J & J	135½	May 22, '99	135½	134½	31,000
registered.....1917			J & J	134½	May 19, '99	134½	134½	20,000
gen. s. f'd.....1908		47,971,000	J & J	110½	May 31, '99	110½	109	3,508,000
registered.....1908			J & J	107½	Apr. 6, '99			
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	98½	May 1, '99	98½	98½	2,000
1st 2½'s.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	83	May 9, '98	83½	83	3,000
extension 4's.....1902		672,000	J & J	98½	May 18, '99	98½	98	8,000
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's.....1923		2,750,000	A & O	114	May 18, '99	114	114	1,000
small bond.....1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oms. con. 6's.....1900		18,832,000	J & D	140	May 24, '99	141½	139½	29,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's.....1918		2,591,000	M & N	134½	May 8, '99	134½	134½	2,500
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's.....1930		800,000	J & J	140	Mar. 23, '99			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's.....1919		6,070,000	A & O	132	May 27, '99	132	131½	6,000
Chic., Term. Ind. R. R. g. 4's.....1947		18,000,000	J & J	101½	May 31, '99	102½	100	822,000
Chic. & Wn. 1st. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's.....1919		783,000	M & N	106	June 22, '98			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's.....1922		9,828,000	Q M	122	May 5, '99	123	122	5,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's.....1921		5,753,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 13, '93			
coupons on.....1921								
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's.....1906		996,000	A & O	119	Oct. 26, '96			
2d g. 4½'s.....1907		2,000,000	J & J	108½	Mar. 12, '97			
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1941		3,500,000	M & N	118	May 5, '99	113	113	15,000
City Sub. R'y. Balto. 1st g. 5's.....1922		2,450,000	J & D	106½	Apr. 17, '98			
Clev., A. & N. & Col. gen. & 2d g. 6's.....1930		730,000	F & A	91	May 31, '99	91	90½	114,000
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. cts. 1st 5's for 1917		1,907,000		91	May 31, '99			
Clev., Cin. & St. L. gen. m. 4's.....1908		7,574,000	J & D	95½	May 31, '99	95½	94	187,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's.....1930		5,000,000	J & J	95½	May 27, '99	95½	95½	16,000
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's.....1930		9,750,000	M & N	101½	May 31, '99	102	100	38,000
registered.....1940				99	May 4, '99	99	99	2,000
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's.....1940		1,085,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '95			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's.....1940		650,000	J & J	87	Aug. 31, '98			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's.....1901		4,000,000	J & J	96½	Apr. 24, '99			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's.....1936		7,686,000	Q F	103½	Mar. 30, '99			
registered.....1920				95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's.....1920		731,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's.....1928		2,571,000	J & J	118½	May 31, '99	119½	118½	3,000
Ind. Bloom. & W. 1st pfd. 7's.....1930		1,000,000	J & J	103½	Apr. 29, '99			
Ohio, Ind. & W. 1st pfd. 5's.....1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's.....1940		8,108,000	A & O	85½	May 31, '99	85½	84	291,000
income 4's.....1940		4,000,000	A	30	May 31, '99	31	30	64,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. con. 7's.....1914		3,901,000	J & D	135½	May 11, '99	135½	135½	1,000
sink fund 7's.....1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '89			
gen. consol 6's.....1904		3,205,000	J & J	132½	Nov. 26, '98			
registered.....1901			J & J	108½	Feb. 10, '99			
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's.....1901		1,000,000	A & O	107	Dec. 27, '98			
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's.....1933		4,300,000	A & O	107	Feb. 16, '99			
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's.....1938		2,936,000	J & J	130	Feb. 16, '99			
registered.....1947			Q J	64	May 24, '99	64½	64	24,000
Col. Midd'l R'y. 1st g. 2-3/4's.....1947		6,250,000	J & J	74	May 20, '99	75	74	31,000
1st g. 4's.....1947		1,011,000	J & J	64	May 20, '99			
Colorado & Southern 1st g. 4's.....1929		17,500,000	F & A	89½	May 31, '99	87½	85½	1,186,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's.....1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93			
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's.....1907		3,087,000	M & S	124	Nov. 7, '98			
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's.....1900		1,886,000	A & O	128	July 23, '98			
Morris & Essex 1st m. 7's.....1914		5,000,000	M & N	143	May 26, '99	143	142	8,000
bonds, 7's.....1940		281,000	J & J	106	Nov. 22, '97			
7's.....1871-1901		4,861,000	A & O	106½	May 19, '99	106½	106½	6,000
1st c. gtd 7's.....1915		12,151,000	J & D	145½	May 1, '99	145½	145½	53,000
registered.....1915			J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98			



BOND SALES.

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's... 1921		12,000,000	J & J	142½	May 18, '99	142½	142	8,000
const. 5's... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	118½	Apr. 5, '99			
term. imp. 4's... 1923		5,000,000	M & N					
Warren 2d 7's... 1908		750,000	A & O	108	Aug. 1, '98			
<b>Delaware &amp; Hudson Canal.</b>								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's... 1917		5,000,000	M & S	146	Sept. 18, '98			
reg. 1917			M & S	143	May 4, '98			
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's... 1906		3,000,000	A & O	120½	Apr. 21, '99			
registered... 1906			A & O	128½	Feb. 12, '94			
6's... 1906		7,000,000	A & O	115	May 2, '99	115	115	2,000
registered... 1906			A & O	114½	Apr. 25, '99			
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's... 1921		2,000,000	M & N	150½	May 31, '99	150½	150½	2,000
1st r 7's... 1921			M & N	91	May 6, '98			
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's... 1933		730,000	A & O	142	Jan. 24, '99			
Denver T'way Co. con. g. 6's... 1910		1,219,000	J & J					
Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's... 1911		918,000	J & J					
Denver & Rio Grande 1st g. 7's... 1900		1,934,500	M & N	105½	May 5, '99			
1st con. g. 4's... 1936		23,650,400	J & J	104	May 31, '99	105½	103½	10,000
con. g. 4½'s... 1936		4,948,000	J & J	112½	May 31, '99	104	102	349,500
impt. m. g. 5's... 1928		8,103,500	J & D	108½	May 27, '99	112½	110	75,000
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's... 1917		628,000	M & N	108	Apr. 27, '99	108½	107½	128,000
Detroit & Mack 1st lien g. 4s... 1906		900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '98			
g. 4s... 1906		1,250,000	J & D					
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's... 1937		6,734,000	A & O	109	May 26, '99	109	108	21,000
registered... 1916		2,000,000	A & O	101½	July 23, '99			
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's... 1928		500,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 11, '98			
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's... 1937		4,000,000	J & J	114½	May 11, '99	114½	114½	17,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's... 1941		7,417,000	M & N	110	Apr. 26, '99			
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's... 1897		2,482,000	M & S	117	Apr. 4, '99			
2d extended 5's... 1919		2,149,000	M & N	121	May 25, '99	121	121	1,000
3d extended 4½'s... 1923		4,618,000	M & S	112	Nov. 11, '98			
4th extended 5's... 1920		2,928,000	A & O	123½	Mar. 30, '99			
5th extended 4's... 1928		709,500	J & D	106½	Apr. 14, '99			
1st cons. gold 7's... 1920		16,890,000	M & S	144½	May 24, '99	144½	144	15,000
1st cons. fund c. 7's... 1920		3,899,500	M & S	143	Dec. 30, '98			
Long Dock consol. 6's... 1953		7,500,000	A & O	139½	Apr. 14, '99			
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's... 1916		2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6, '99			
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's... 1908		1,500,000	J & J					
small... 1909		2,300,000	A & O	106	Feb. 8, '99			
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's... 1909		12,000,000	M & N	114½	May 16, '99	114½	113½	40,000
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's... 1942		1,100,000	M & N					
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co. 1st g currency 6's... 1922		3,396,000	J & J	102	Aug. 31, '98			
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's... 1913		1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '98			
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's... 1946								
small... 1906		30,000,000	J & J	93½	May 31, '99	94	92½	655,000
registered... 1906		30,927,000	J & J	93½	May 25, '99	93½	93½	1,000
gen. lien 3-4s... 1906			J & J	73	May 31, '99	73	70½	198,000
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refd. g. 5's... 1937		3,750,000	J & J	111	May 10, '99	112	111	9,000
2d g. 4½'s... 1937		453,000	F & A	92½	Aug. 25, '98			
gen. g. 5's... 1940		2,546,000	F & A	97½	May 19, '99	98	97½	7,000
term. 1st g. 5's... 1943		2,000,000	M & N	111	Oct. 6, '98			
registered... \$5,000 each			M & N					
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g 5's... 1942		3,000,000	J & D	108	May 31, '99	108	107½	55,000
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's... 1910		8,500,000	A & O	120	May 3, '99	120	120	5,000
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g... 1933		500,000	F & A	65	Nov. 10, '97			
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's... 1921		3,000,000	J & J	124	Apr. 24, '99			
1st General g 5's... 1942		2,223,000	A & O	103	May 20, '99	103½	102½	29,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's... 1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93			
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's... 1930		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91			
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g 6's... 1926		1,591,000	J & J	102½	May 24, '99	103	102½	18,000
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's... 1920		3,999,000	A & O	123½	May 31, '99	124	123½	17,000
1st con. gold 5's... 1939		2,600,000	M & N	103½	May 18, '99	105	103	63,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's... 1939		3,983,000	A & O	110	May 31, '99	110	109½	124,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's... 1918		8,000,000	J & J	101	Mar. 20, '99			
1st land grant ex. g 5's... 1930		423,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '98			
1st con. g 5's... 1943		4,370,000	J & J	105	May 11, '98			
Ft. Smith Un' Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s... 1941		1,000,000	J & J	85	May 31, '99	86½	84	128,000
Ft. Worth & D. C. cts. depl. 1st 6's... 1921		8,176,000	J & J	85	May 31, '99	86½	84	128,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's... 1928		2,863,000	J & J	65½	May 24, '99	66½	64	107,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s... 1913		2,000,000	A & O	104½	May 31, '99	105	108	29,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's...1945		2,380,000	A & O	108	Dec. 12, '88	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5s...1945		2,322,000	J & J					
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's...1927		5,360,000	J & J	101	May 12, '99	101	101	1,000
Hock. Val. Ky. 1st con. g. 4½'s...1909		7,300,000	J & J	102	May 31, '99	108½	101½	1,169,000
registered			J & J					
Col. Hock's Val. 1st ext. g. 4's...1948		1,401,000	A & O	107	May 8, '99	107	105½	6,000
Houston E. & W. 1st g. 5's...1938		2,700,000	M & N	102	May 31, '99	102½	101	54,000
<b>Illinois Central, total out-</b>								
standing.....	\$13,950,000							
1st g. 4's.....1894-1951		1,500,000	J & J	115½	May 25, '99	115½	114	2,000
registered			J & J	112½	Nov. 23, '98			
1st gold 3¾'s.....1951		2,490,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 29, '99			
registered			J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98			
1st g. 2e sterl. £200,000...1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 30, '99			
registered			M & S					
collat. trust gold 4's...1952		15,000,000	M & N	108	May 22, '99	108	105½	38,000
regist'd.....			M & N	104½	Jan. 30, '99			
col. l. g. 4e L. N. O. & Tex...1953		24,679,000	J & J	105½	May 24, '99	108	104½	61,000
registered			J & J					
col. trust 2-10 g. 4's...1904		4,806,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 28, '98			
registered			J & J					
West'n Line 1st g. 4's...1951		5,425,000	F & A	112½	May 25, '99	112½	112½	11,000
registered			F & A					
Louisville div. g. 3½'s...1953		14,320,000	J & J	104½	May 17, '99	104½	103½	531,000
registered			J & J					
St. Louis div. g. 3's...1951		4,989,000	J & J	91½	May 22, '99	92	91	117,000
registered			J & J					
g. 3½'s.....1951		6,321,000	J & J	104½	May 31, '99	104½	104½	72,000
registered			J & J	103½	Apr. 28, '99			
Chicago Bridge 4's g...1950		3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98			
registered			J & D					
Middle div. registered 5's...1921		600,000	F & A	123	May 24, '99	123	123	1,000
Sp'gfield div 1st g. 3½'s...1951		2,000,000	J & J					
registered			J & J					
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's...1951		16,555,000	J D 15	125½	May 8, '99	125½	125½	2,000
gold 5's, registered.....			J D 15	123	Sept. 12, '97			
g. 3½'s.....1951		1,852,000	J D 15	100	Apr. 15, '99			
registered			J D 15					
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's...1951		3,500,000	J & D	104½	Feb. 17, '98			
registered			J & D					
Belleville & Carolt 1st 6's...1923		470,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99			
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's...1931		598,000	M & S	93	Dec. 2, '97			
Carbondale & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's...1932		241,000	M & S	90	Nov. 22, '98			
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's...1935		1,924,000	J & J	105	May 19, '99	105	105	1,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st refdg. 5's...1948		2,500,000	A & O	108	Apr. 21, '99			
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st. 6's, gold...1919		7,954,000	M & N	125	May 27, '99	125	123	32,000
2d g. 5's...1909		6,563,000	M & S	93	May 25, '99	94	91	85,000
8d g. 4's...1921		2,722,500	M & S	61½	May 23, '99	62½	61	80,500
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's...1968		6,572,000	J & D	114½	May 27, '99	115	113	104,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's...1929		3,010,000	A & O					
Kan.C.Pitt.&Gulf 1st & col. g. 5's...1923		22,578,000	A & O	66	May 25, '99	67½	65	426,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's...1937		7,250,000	J & J	120½	May 31, '99	121½	120	53,000
2d mtg. g. 5's...1941		3,625,000	J & J	108½	May 31, '99	109	108½	9,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd. g. 5's...1945		2,500,000	A & O	102½	May 26, '99	102½	102½	2,000
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's...1997		5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98			
registered			M & N					
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4¼'s...1940		15,000,000	J & J	109½	May 31, '99	110½	108½	66,000
registered			J & J					
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd. g. 5's...1941		10,000,000	A & O	113½	Mar. 13, '99			
registered			A & O	109½	July 1, '97			
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's...1933		10,280,000	J & J	96	Feb. 7, '99			
registered			J & J					
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd. g. 4's...1945		2,000,000	M & S	93	Feb. 6, '99			
registered			M & S					
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's...1914		750,000	A & O					
g. gtd 5's.....1914		1,250,000	A & O	100	May 31, '99	100	99½	43,000
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. ctf's. for 1st g. 5's...1937		3,145,000	Q J	35½	May 31, '99	35½	35½	12,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's...1931		3,610,000	Q J	124½	May 22, '99	124½	124½	5,000
1st con. g. 4's...1931		1,121,000	Q J					
Long Island gen. m. 4's...1938		3,000,000	J & D	100½	May 25, '99	102	100½	18,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s...1922		1,500,000	M & S	100	May 25, '99	100½	100	29,000
g. 4's...1932		325,000	J & D	91	Sept. 27, '97			
deb. g. 5's...1934		1,500,000	J & D	100	May 25, '97			

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's. 1927		984,000	M & S	100	Jan. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    "    2d m. inc. .... 1927		1,000,000	S	106½	July 9, '97	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B'kln & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's. 1935		1,728,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's. .... 1911		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    1st 5's. .... 1911		750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn'd 5's. 1932		1,425,000	QJAN	100½	Apr. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. g'd 5's. .... 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's. .... 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. Tr.Co.ct. gold 5's. 1939		3,627,000	J & J	56	May 22, '99	60	56	20,000
Gen. mtg. g. 4's. .... 1943		2,432,000	M & S	9	Mar. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
Louis. & Nash. Occilhan brch. 7's. 1907		435,000	M & S	106	Nov. 11, '97	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's. 1930		5,000,000	J & J	132½	May 31, '99	132½	132½	3,000
"    "    2d 6's. .... 1930		1,000,000	J & J	122	May 18, '99	122	120	24,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's. 1919		1,990,000	J & D	117	Nov. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
general mort. 6's. .... 1930		9,794,000	J & D	120½	May 17, '99	121	120½	9,000
Pensacola div. 6's. .... 1920		550,000	M & S	107	Apr. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. 1st 6's. .... 1921		3,500,000	M & S	125	Dec. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    "    2d 3's. .... 1920		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's. .... 1900		1,900,000	J & J	105½	May 22, '99	105½	105½	5,000
So. & N. Ala. si'g fd. 6s. 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. gtd. g. 5's. .... 1936		3,673,000	F & A	109½	May 12, '99	109½	109½	12,000
gold 5's. .... 1937		1,764,000	M & N	107½	May 15, '99	107½	107½	2,000
Unifed gold 4's. .... 1940		14,994,000	J & J	98½	May 31, '99	99½	99½	232,000
registered. .... 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
coll. tr 5-20 g 4's. 1903-1918		12,500,000	A & O	98½	May 26, '99	99½	99½	251,000
Pen. & At. 1st 6's. g. 5's. 1921		2,753,000	F & A	112½	May 26, '99	113	112½	10,000
collateral trust g. 5's. 1931		5,129,000	M & N	108	May 18, '99	108	108	7,000
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st. g. 4½s. .... 1945		4,000,000	M & S	109½	July 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's. 1937		2,098,000	F & A	109½	May 25, '99	109½	107½	30,000
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's. .... 1937		6,742,000	J & J	96	May 25, '99	96	96	8,000
L. & N. Louv. Cin. & Lex. g. 4½s. 1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		3,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's. .... 1930		24,665,000	A & O	109½	May 31, '99	110½	109	468,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's. .... 1908		10,818,000	J & J	121	May 31, '99	121	120	32,000
"    "    2d 6's. .... 1939		4,000,000	M & N	101½	May 24, '99	101½	100½	18,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's. 1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Metro. St. Ry. gen. col. tr. g. 5's. .... 1927		12,500,000	F & A	123½	May 31, '99	123	122	137,000
B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1927		7,650,000	J & D	123½	May 27, '99	124	123½	29,000
"    "    registered			J & D	112½	May 29, '93	.....	.....	.....
Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1933		3,000,000	M & S	125	May 17, '99	125	125	1,000
"    "    registered.			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1933		5,000,000	M & S	125½	May 26, '99	126	125½	13,000
"    "    registered. .... 1933			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Central.								
con. mtge. 4's. .... 1911		59,011,000	J & J	69¾	Jan. 4, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. inc. 3's. .... 1939		17,072,000	JULY	22¼	May 17, '98	22¼	21	121,000
"    "    2d 3's. .... 1939		11,310,000	JULY	12¾	May 18, '99	13¾	11¾	198,000
equip. & collat. g. 5's. .... 1917		950,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's. 1942		4,635,000	M & S	87¾	May 31, '99	88½	87	198,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's. .... 1927		11,075,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	15	Dec. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
March 1, 1899, stamped 1½s paid								
2d inc. 6's "B" .... 1917		12,265,000	A	14	Apr. 5, '99	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's. .... 1910		1,813,000	J & D	97	Feb. 11, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    "    registered. .... 1910			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mill. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's. 1926		6,103,000	F & A	105½	Feb. 16, '99	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	150	Apr. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's. .... 1934		5,000,000	M & N	114¾	May 26, '99	115	113¾	31,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1909		1,015,000	J & D	125	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1910		636,000	J & D	127	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. .... 1921		1,382,000	J & A	128	Dec. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    "    stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.								

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.			
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.	
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1928		3,280,000	J & J	94	Apl. 2, '95	.....	.....	.....	
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				86½	June 18, '91	.....	.....	.....	
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1938		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,050,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....	
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtg g. 4's. 1900		89,718,000	J & D	95½	May 31, '99	96	94	1,080,500	
2d mtg. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	88½	May 31, '99	88	65½	468,000	
1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		988,000	M & N	91½	Apr. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....	
of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	89½	May 25, '99	89½	87½	219,000	
Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	78	May 23, '99	79	77	13,000	
Dal. & Waco 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,840,000	M & N	95	Apr. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....	
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1908		558,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Tebco. & Neosho 1st 7's. .... 1908		187,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Mo Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	104½	May 26, '99	106	108	66,000	
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	116½	May 26, '99	119	116½	121,000	
3d mortgage 7's. .... 1908		3,828,000	M & N	116	May 27, '99	116	114	24,000	
trusts gtd 5's. .... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	98	May 31, '99	99	98	50,000	
registered		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	91	May 31, '99	93	90½	23,000	
registered		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1928		7,000,000	M & S	108½	May 2, '99	108½	108½	5,000	
2d extended 5's. .... 1928		2,573,000	F & A	115	Apr. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....	
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1928		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1928		520,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
St. L. & I'rn. Mt. 1st ex. 4½'s. .... 1907		4,000,000	F & A	106½	May 23, '99	104½	106	13,000	
2d. ext. 5's. .... 1946		6,000,000	M & N	105	May 20, '99	105	105	2,000	
g. con. R.R. & l. gr. 5's. 1931		24,289,000	A & O	111	May 31, '99	111½	109½	1,601,000	
stamped gtd gold 5's. 1931		6,945,000	A & O	111½	Mar. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....	
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		874,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
small		228,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
small		500,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	120¼	May 7, '99	120¼	120	80,000	
1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	122	May 23, '99	122	122	2,000	
gen. g. 4's. .... 1928		9,547,000	Q & J	86½	May 31, '99	87½	86	153,000	
Montg'ry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	108½	May 19, '99	108½	107½	45,000	
St. Louis & Cairo gtd. g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....	
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	132¼	Apr. 8, '99	.....	.....	.....	
3d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	105½	Nov. 9, '97	.....	.....	.....	
1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1923		6,213,000	A & O	103	May 31, '99	106	105½	31,000	
1st 6's T. & P. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
1st 6's McM. M. W. & Al. 1917		750,000	J & J	106	Mar. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....	
1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		871,000	J & J	115	Mar. 22, '99	.....	.....	.....	
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....	
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1908		19,446,000	J & J	115½	May 31, '99	115½	115	26,000	
1st registered. .... 1908			J & J	115	May 31, '99	115	115	20,000	
debenture 5's. .... 1904			M & S	113½	Jan. 20, '99	108½	108	8,000	
debenture 5's reg. .... 1904			M & S	108½	Jan. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....	
reg. debent. 5's. .... 1889-1904			706,000	M & S	108½	Feb. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
debenture g. 4's. 1880-1905			6,128,000	J & D	105	May 3, '99	106	106	1,000
registered			.....	J & D	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905			4,181,500	M & N	104½	May 25, '99	104½	104½	5,000
registered			.....	M & N	104½	June 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
g. mortgage 3½'s. .... 1907			33,723,000	J & J	112½	May 31, '99	112½	111½	198,000
registered		.....	J & J	112½	Apr. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....	
Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		18,511,000	F & A	101½	May 27, '99	101½	100½	296,000	
registered		.....	F & A	100	May 25, '99	100	100	11,000	
Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		90,538,000	F & A	102½	May 27, '99	103	101	510,000	
registered		.....	F & A	102½	May 31, '99	102½	100½	24,000	
Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	106	Mar. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....	
7's registered. .... 1900		.....	M & N	105	May 10, '99	106	106	4,000	
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1866		1,650,000	F & A	106	May 7, '97	.....	.....	.....	
reg. certificates		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	114½	May 31, '99	114½	114	121,000	
registered			J & J	114½	May 31, '99	114½	113½	110,000	

BOND SALES.

921

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's.....1936		5,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered		500,000	J & J	108	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 5's.....1936		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, } 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940 }		770,000	J & J	95	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds series B.....		33,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswego 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's.....1922		9,061,000	A & O	129	May 26, '99	129	129½	19,000
" coup. g. bond currency.....		180,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		375,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		400,000	F & A	113	Apr. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
" Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		1,800,000	J & J	107	Aug. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
" Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1991		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Carthage & Adiron 1st gtd g. 4's. 1981		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
" N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1993		1,200,000	A & O	129½	Dec. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		924,000	F & A	121	Apr. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Lake Shore & Mich. Southern		9,153,000	J & J	107	May 15, '99	107	107	5,000
" Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1906		8,725,000	Q J	106½	Feb. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Lake Shore con. 1st registered.....1900		28,166,000	J & D	117	May 1, '99	117	117	3,000
" con. co. 2d 7's.....1903		1,000,000	J & D	116¼	Jan. 5, '99	.....	.....	.....
" con. 2d registered.....1908		1,000,000	J & D	112	May 23, '99	112½	111½	221,000
" g 3½s.....1997		840,000	J & D	111	Apr. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		1,500,000	A & O	109¼	Dec. 1, '97	.....	.....	.....
" Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's. 1901		840,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1988		1,500,000	J & J	121	Oct. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....1984		8,000,000	M & N	110	May 27, '99	110	109	26,000
" Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's.....1902		2,000,000	M & N	108	May 9, '99	103	103	2,000
" 1st con. 5's.....1902		1,500,000	M & S	122	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 6's.....1909		3,576,000	M & S	121¼	June 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
" coup. 5's.....1931		2,600,000	Q M	121	Dec. 6, '97	.....	.....	.....
" reg. 5's.....1931		476,000	J & J	108	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" mort. 4's.....1940		19,425,000	J & J	108	Jan. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
" mtg. 4's reg.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's.....1969		.....	A & O	107	May 27, '99	107	108¼	196,000
" N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1937		.....	A & O	105¼	Apr. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1903		2,000,000	J & D	104¼	Oct. 7, '97	.....	.....	.....
" con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	185	May 31, '99	186	185	15,000
" small certifs.....\$100		1,430,000	.....	184	Apr. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's.....1937		2,838,000	M & N	129¼	Aug. 26, '97	.....	.....	.....
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		575,000	M & N	115¼	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1905		6,000,000	J & J	121	May 31, '99	121	121	1,000
" 1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	115	May 11, '99	115	114¾	2,000
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1939		4,765,000	J & D	108¼	May 31, '99	108½	107½	180,000
" Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1932		12,856,000	M & S	105¼	May 31, '99	106	104	396,000
" Registered.....\$5,000 only.		.....	M & S	101¼	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m. R. R. & L. G. S. F. g. c. 6's. 1921		5,875,000	J & J	119¼	Apr. 12, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered		7,986,000	J & J	117	Oct. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
" St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's.....1923		.....	F & A	131¼	May 15, '99	131¼	131¼	2,000
" registered certificates.....		.....	Q F	180	Sept. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. P. Ry prior in ry. & ld. g. g. 4's. 1997		88,921,000	Q J	106¼	May 31, '99	106¼	108¼	1,415,500
" registered.....		56,000,000	Q J	104¼	May 12, '99	104¼	103	23,000
" gen. lien g. 3's.....2047		.....	Q F	67¼	May 31, '99	68	66¼	884,500
" registered.....		1,538,000	Q F	65¼	May 16, '99	65¼	65¼	12,000
" Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948		.....	QMCH	95	May 11, '99	96	94¾	40,000
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1933		3,371,000	J & J	119	Apr. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's.....1941		830,000	M & N	107½	May 22, '99	107½	107½	2,000
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1931		7,283,000	M & N	130¼	Feb. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
" New River 1st 6's.....1932		2,000,000	A & O	123	Nov. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" imp'tment and ext. 6's.....1934		5,000,000	F & A	119	Mar. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Sci'o Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1939		800,000	J & N	99¾	May 31, '99	100	98¼	52,000
" C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. g. 5's. 1922		.....	J & J	101	Feb. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'd Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s. 1906		24,828,000	A & O	95	May 31, '99	95	94	606,500
" registered.....			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds.....			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's..... 1906	2,000,000		J & D	102½	Jan. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. mortg. g 6's..... 1907	2,428,000		A & O	85	Dec. 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's..... 1901	2,376,000		J & J	75	May 25, '99	81½	65	30,000
Oregon Ry. & Nav. 1st a. f. g. 6's. 1900	691,000		J & J	118	May 27, '99	114	113	3,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946	19,481,000		J & D	104½	May 31, '99	105	102½	324,000
Oregon Short Line 1st g. 6's..... 1922	13,651,000		F & A	132	May 25, '99	132	131	87,000
{ Utah & Northern 1st 7's..... 1908	4,993,000		J & J	121	June 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" g. 5's..... 1928	1,877,000		J & J	102	May 24, '94	.....	.....	.....
{ Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946	10,337,000		J & J	113½	May 21, '99	113½	111½	155,000
" non-cum. inc. A 5's..... 1946	7,185,000		SEPT.	89½	May 24, '99	89½	88½	212,000
" non-cum. inc. B. & col. trust	14,841,000		OCT.	70½	May 24, '99	71	70	206,000
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's..... 1946	4,446,800		J & D	108	May 26, '99	108	105½	19,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s.... 1917	1,850,000		A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" a. f. subsidy g 6's..... 1910	1,611,000		M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
{ Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s. 1st..... 1921	19,467,000		J & J	118	May 22, '99	118	117½	8,000
" reg..... 1921	.....		J & J	118½	Mar. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
" gtd. 3½ col. tr. reg. cts. 1937	5,000,000		M & S	114½	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s	10,000,000		A & O	114½	Apr. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Series A..... 1940	10,000,000		A & O	115½	May 12, '99	115½	115½	12,000
" Series B..... 1942	2,000,000		M & N	118	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series C..... 1942	4,863,000		M & N	107	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series D gtd. 4's..... 1945	6,863,000		F & A	105½	Apr. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's..... 1940	2,917,000		F & A	109½	Apr. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 1st reg. 7's..... 1900	2,546,000		J & J	141	Mar. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912	2,000,000		A & O	126	Aug. 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 7's..... 1912	2,546,000		J & J	140½	May 1, '99	140½	140½	2,000
" 3d 7's..... 1912	2,000,000		A & O	126	Aug. 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932	1,506,000		A & O	113	May 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....	.....		A & O	110	May 8, '92	.....	.....	.....
{ Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's. 1900	1,310,000		M & N	108	Apr. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. gtd. g 4½'s Ser. A. 1942	3,000,000		J & J	113	Apr. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
" Series B..... 1942	2,000,000		A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g 3½'s Ser. B. 1940	2,250,000		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" C. 1940	1,118,000		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½ g 1941	4,455,000		J & J	107	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g 4's. 1942	5,389,000		M & S	102	Nov. 10, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ Newp. & Cin. Brg Co. gtd g 4's. 1945	1,400,000		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st RI Est. g 4's.... 1923	1,675,000		.....	106	May 12, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ con. sterling gold 6 per cent..... 1905	22,762,000		J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. currency, 6's registered... 1915	4,718,000		QM 15	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" con. gold 5 per cent..... 1919	4,998,000		M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....	.....		QMch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ con. gold 4 per cent..... 1943	3,000,000		M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s..... 1935	1,250,000		M & N	111	July 8, '97	.....	.....	.....
" U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's.... 1944	5,646,000		M & S	115½	Feb. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ Del. R. RR. & BgeCo 1st gtd g. 4's. 1938	1,300,000		F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Sunbury & Lewiston 1st g. 4's. 1938	500,000		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peo., Dec. & Ev. Tr. Co. ctf. 1st g. 6's. 1920	1,140,000		J & J	101	Mar. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ Ev. div. Tr. Co. ctf 1st g. 6's. 1920	1,433,000		M & S	94½	May 5, '99	94½	94½	2,000
" Tr. Co. ctf. 2d mort 5's. 1928	1,851,000		M & N	20	Dec. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st instal. paid.....	.....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's.... 1921	1,495,000		Q F	126	Apr. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ 2d m 4½'s..... 1921	1,489,000		M & N	100	May 16, '99	100	100	44,000
Pine Creek Railway 6's..... 1932	3,500,000		J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93	.....	.....	.....

BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'ed Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1922		1,440,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's. 1922		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 6's. 1924		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	Oct. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		3,000,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. 5's. 1943		408,000	J & J	98	July 14, '97	.....	.....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		1,953,000	J & J	100	May 24, '98	100	98½	23,000
J. P. M. & Co. ctf's. ....		7,747,000	.....	99½	May 31, '99	99½	99½	42,000
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. 1907		62,456,000	J & J	88½	May 31, '99	89½	86½	3,656,000
registered. ....		.....	J & J	87½	Mar. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. 1939		15,200,000	J & J	99½	May 31, '99	100½	97½	243,000
Utah Cen. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1917		550,000	A & O	88½	May 31, '99	88½	87½	187,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1939		1,850,000	J & D	104	May 2, '99	104	104	3,000
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4. 1940		4,510,000	J & J	78½	May 23, '99	79½	78½	5,000
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.342. .... 1947		3,500,000	J & J	81	May 24, '99	81½	81	81,000
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	112½	May 9, '99	112½	112½	1,000
2d g. 6's. Class B. .... 1906		2,709,500	M & N	114½	May 23, '99	114½	112½	5,000
2d g. 6's. Class C. .... 1906		2,400,000	M & N	113½	May 17, '99	113½	112½	12,000
1st g. 6's P. C. & O. .... 1919		1,028,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 6's. .... 1931		7,807,000	J & J	125½	May 25, '99	125½	124	47,000
gen. g. 5's. .... 1931		12,282,000	J & J	112	May 31, '99	112	110½	181,000
1st Trust g. 5's. .... 1937		1,099,000	A & O	100½	May 21, '99	100½	100½	1,000
Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's. 1910		304,000	A & O	105	Oct. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		6,388,000	J & D	88	May 25, '99	88½	87	107,000
South'n div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		1,500,000	A & O	100½	May 25, '99	102	100½	4,000
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's. 1939		20,000,000	M & N	98½	May 31, '99	94½	92½	1,657,000
2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's. .... 1939		9,000,000	J & J	55½	May 27, '99	55½	53½	3,022,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	108½	Mar. 9, '99	.....	.....	.....
gtd. gold 5's. .... 1937		1,138,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1913		1,000,000	F & A	120	Feb. 8, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d 5's. .... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	113	May 25, '99	113	113	2,000
1st con. g. 4's. .... 1938		1,000,000	J & D	101½	May 31, '99	102	100	95,000
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	121½	May 22, '99	121½	121½	11,000
Dakota ext'n 6's. .... 1910		5,676,000	M & N	122½	May 11, '99	122½	122½	6,000
1st con. 6's. .... 1933		13,844,000	J & J	140	Apr. 7, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 6's. registered. ....		.....	J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st c. 6's. red'd to 4½'s. ....		21,833,000	J & J	119	May 31, '99	119½	119	72,000
1st cons. 6's register'd. ....		.....	J & J	105	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,805,000	J & D	108	May 4, '99	108	108	1,000
registered. ....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's. .... 1922		2,150,000	J & J	127½	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	134½	Mar. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's. registered. ....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st g. g. 5's. .... 1937		2,700,000	J & J	115	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,000	A & O	110½	Apr. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eastn. R'y Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		3,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,940,000	M & S	108½	May 12, '99	108½	108½	27,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100½	Oct. 20, '97	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. .... 1934		4,056,000	A & O	123½	Feb. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's. .... 1934		1,780,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. .... 1928		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's. gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date: highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Dur.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Southern Pacific Co.								
{ Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g 6's. 1910		4,766,000	F & A	114	Apr. 28, '99			
" 2d g 7's. 1905		1,000,000	J & D	110	Feb. 27, '99			
" Mex. & P. div 1st g 5's. 1961		13,418,000	M & N	108	May 31, '99	108	102½	230,000
Houst. & T C 1st Waco & N T's. 1903		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92			
" 1st g 5's int. gtd. 1967		6,877,000	J & J	113	May 24, '99	113	112	62,000
" con. g 6's int. gtd. 1912		3,455,000	A & O	111	May 31, '99	111	111	1,000
" gen. g 4's int. gtd. 1921		4,297,000	A & O	89½	May 31, '99	89½	87½	225,000
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's. 1920		1,494,000	J & J	120¼	Feb. 17, '98			
" 1st 7's. 1914		5,000,000	A & O	139	Jan. 21, '99			
" N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O					
" Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's. 1927		18,842,000	J & J	105	Mar. 23, '99			
" San Ant. & Aran Pass 1st gtd g 4's. 1943		18,886,000	J & J	82½	May 31, '99	84	80½	458,000
" Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's. 1906		1,620,000	F & A	116	Dec. 14, '98			
" Sabine div. 1st g 6's. 1912		2,575,000	M & S	108¼	Nov. 17, '97			
" con. g 5's. 1943		1,620,000	J & J	108	May 31, '99	106½	105	143,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's. 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	113¾	May 31, '99	113¾	113¾	126,000
{ South. Pac. of Cal. 1st g 6's. 1906-12		30,577,500	A & O	116¼	Dec. 17, '98			
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's. 1937		6,696,000	M & N	105¼	Mar. 2, '99			
" stamped. 1906-1937		12,788,000		107	May 25, '99	107½	106½	228,000
" Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. 1941		1,920,000	J & J	100½	May 27, '99	100¾	100	115,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1937		5,500,000	J & J					
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. 1911		4,180,000	J & J	113¾	Nov. 23, '98			
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's. 1904		27,850,000	J & J	110¾	May 31, '99	111¼	109¾	754,000
" registered. 1905			J & J	106¼	Mar. 21, '99			
" Memph. div. 1st g. 4-4½-5's. 1906		5,983,000	J & J	108¼	May 19, '99	108¾	108¼	2,000
" registered. 1907			J & J					
" East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. 1908		4,500,000	M & S	108¼	May 6, '99	108¼	108¼	3,000
" registered. 1909			M & S					
" Alabama Central, 1st 6's. 1918		1,000,000	J & J	112¼	Aug. 17, '97			
" Atl. & Char. Air Line, income. 1900		760,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95			
" Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. 1916		2,000,000	J & J	117	Mar. 18, '99			
" East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. 1900		3,123,000	J & J	105¾	May 25, '99	105¾	105½	18,000
" divisional g 5's. 1930		3,106,000	J & J	117	May 9, '99	117	117	1,000
" con. 1st g 5's. 1966		12,770,000	M & N	116¼	May 31, '99	118¾	116¼	48,000
" Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. 1922		5,600,000	J & J	124¼	May 1, '99	124¼	124¼	5,000
" Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. 1925		2,000,000	J & J	124¼	May 19, '99	125	124	34,000
" Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. 1915		5,597,000	J & J	125¼	May 26, '99	125¼	125	31,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's. 1909		618,000	M & S	100	Mar. 17, '99			
" deb. 5's stamped. 1927		3,368,000	A & O	108	Apr. 24, '99			
" South Caro'a & Ga. 1st g 5's. 1919		5,250,000	M & N	109	May 26, '99	109	108	80,000
" Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S					
" small. 1907			M & S					
" ser. B 6's. 1911		1,900,000	M & S					
" small. 1912			M & S					
" ser. C 6's. 1916		1,100,000	M & S					
" small. 1917			M & S					
" ser. D 4-5's. 1921		960,000	M & S					
" small. 1922			M & S					
" ser. E 5's. 1923		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99			
" small. 1924			M & S					
" ser. F 5's. 1931		1,810,000	M & S					
" Virginia Midland gen. 5's. 1906		2,392,000	M & N	114	May 25, '99	114	113¾	22,000
" gen. 5's gtd. stamped. 1926		2,466,000	M & N	113¾	May 13, '99	113¾	113¾	5,000
" W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. 1924		1,026,000	F & A	90	Feb. 23, '99			
" W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. 1914		2,581,000	J & J	120	May 11, '99	120	120	5,000
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g 6's. 1930		2,812,000	J & J					
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4½'s. 1943		500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. 1930		7,000,000	A & O	109	Oct. 12, '98			
" 1st con. g 5's. 1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	114¼	May 8, '99	114¼	114¼	4,000
" St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd. g 5's. 1930		3,500,000	A & O	108	Oct. 27, '98			
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. 1914		444,000	Q JAN	105¾	Dec. 18, '95			
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. 1906		3,348,000	M & S	105¼	May 5, '99	105¼	105¼	4,000
" fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth								
" 1st gold 5's. 2000		21,568,000	J & D	116	May 27, '99	116¼	115	91,000
" 2d gold income, 5's. 2000		1,816,000	MAR.	54¾	May 12, '99	54¾	53¾	27,000
" eng. Trust Co. cfts. 2000		21,411,000		55¼	May 31, '99	55¾	53¾	1,221,000



BOND SALES.

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'st Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Third Avenue 1st g 5's.....	1987	5,000,000	J & J	128½	May 2, '99	128½	128½	8,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's....	1985	3,000,000	J & J	108	May 12, '99	107	108	8,000
{ 1st M. g 5's West. div....	1985	2,500,000	A & O	102	Dec. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ gen. g. 5's.....	1985	1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's....	1990	2,340,000	A & O	88	May 17, '99	88	88	14,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....	1917	4,400,000	J & D	82	May 27, '99	83	82	21,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's.	1916	8,284,000	M & N	110½	May 31, '99	111	108½	238,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....	1928	1,862,000	J & D	102	May 31, '99	102	100	38,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g.5's.	1945	4,387,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Pacific R. R. & Id gt g 4s.	1947	90,000,000	J & J	108½	May 31, '99	109½	108½	2,066,500
{ registered.....			J & J	108½	May 26, '99	109½	106¾	14,000
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's....	1939	31,984,000	M & N	117	May 31, '99	117	114	151,000
{ 2d mortgage gold 5's....	1939	14,000,000	F & A	99	May 31, '99	100	99	143,000
{ debent. mtg series A....	1939	3,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ series B....	1939	26,740,000	J & J	83½	May 31, '99	87½	83½	1,194,000
{ 1st g.5's Det. & Chic. ex. 1940		3,430,000	J & J	109	Apr. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.								
{ 1st 6's.....	1908	1,000,000	A & O	110	May 4, '99	110	110	1,000
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's..	1937	10,000,000	J & J	114½	May 31, '99	114½	113	30,000
{ gen g. 3-4's.....	1943	9,789,000	A & O	64½	May 22, '99	64½	63½	178,000
{ inc. 5's.....	1943	10,000,000	Nov.	22¾	May 17, '99	22¾	21½	7,000
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's.	1928	3,969,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ 40 years con. g. 5's.....	1936	6,031,000	M & N	89	Dec. 28, '97	.....	.....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's.	1911	3,250,000	J & J	113	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's.	1923	3,250,000	A & O	107½	May 31, '99	107½	106¾	25,000
{ Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's.	1923	1,500,000	J & J	96	Apr. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ & ext. & imp. g. 5's....	1930	1,624,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g.5's	1937	1,987,000	J & J	74	Nov. 16, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ emg. Trust Co. certificates.	.....	10,013,000	.....	84	May 31, '99	74½	69	5,612,000
{ income mortgage 5's....	1937	7,775,000	A & O	5	May 31, '99	5	3	108,000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'st Paid.	YEAR 1899.		MAY SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered.....	Opt'l	25,364,700	Q M	90½	90	.....	.....	.....
{ 8's registered.....	1898		Q F	108¾	108½	108¾	108¾	18,000
{ 3's coupon.....	1898		Q F	109½	108¾	109½	107½	248,000
{ 3's small bonds reg.....	1898	198,678,720	Q F	107½	107½	.....	.....	.....
{ 3's small bonds coupon....	1898		Q F	109	108½	108½	107½	11,900
{ 4's registered.....	1907		J A J & O	112½	111	112½	112½	58,900
{ 4's coupon.....	1907	559,652,050	J A J & O	114½	112¾	114½	112¾	57,500
{ 4's registered.....	1925	162,315,400	Q F	129½	128	129½	129½	3,000
{ 4's coupon.....	1925		Q F	130½	128	130½	129	142,000
{ 5's registered.....	1904	100,000,000	Q F	113½	111¾	112½	112½	10,000
{ 5's coupon.....	1904		Q F	113½	111	112½	111¾	43,000
District of Columbia 3-45's.....	1924		F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ small bonds.....		14,033,800	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ registered.....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ funding 5's.....	1899		J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ small.....		800,400	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

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MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'nt Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	103¼	May 31, '99	106¼	106	83,000
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		3,068,000	Q & F	106	May 25, '99	106	106	19,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1915		1,899,000	M & S	92	May 31, '99	94¼	89	41,000
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		17,500,000	F & A	92	May 31, '99	92	91	175,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	109¼	Feb. 9, '97			
non-cum. inc. 5's. 1907		2,575,000	J & J					
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	100¼	Apr. 18, '99			
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd. g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	81	Feb. 11, '97			
Coupon off.								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	103	Dec. 1, '98			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g 5's. 1943		2,308,000	F & A	88¼	May 24, '99	90	87	65,000
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2397			Q & J	103¼	Nov. 10, '98			
registered.		10,480,700	Q & J	104	Feb. 16, '98			
Total amount of lien, \$13,000,000.								
Det. Mack. & Mar. ld. gr. 3½ S. A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	19	May 15, '99	22	18¼	69,000
Erie Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. g s rd 5's. 1926		3,905,000	J & J	110	Jan. 31, '99			
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,080,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,705,000	M & S	111	Aug. 23, '97			
Hoboken Steel & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99			
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75¼	Dec. 4, '95			
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's. 1918		8,947,000	F & A	113	May 19, '99	113	112	37,000
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's. 1928		1,975,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98			
2d g. 5's. 1928		1,000,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97			
Knick'rker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g 5's. 1925		2,000,000	A & O	98	May 19, '99	98	97	16,000
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97			
Manh. Bch H. & L. Hm. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95			
Metrop. Tel. & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	103	Feb. 17, '99			
registered.			M & N					
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g 6's. 1920		3,089,000	J & J	100	May 22, '99	101	100	33,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g 5's conv. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g 6's. 1910		448,000	F & A	92¼	May 5, '98			
Peoria Water Co. g 6's. 1889-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	120	May 31, '98	124¼	120	6,000
Roch & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946		1,100,000	M & N					
St. Louis Term. Station Cupples. & Property Co. 1st g 4½'s 5-20. 1917		3,000,000	J & D					
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S					
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1948		2,912,000	F & A	88	May 27, '99	89	85	147,000
inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000		25	May 31, '99	31	25	978,000
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		879,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 6's. 1917		1,244,000	A & O	105	May 27, '99	105	103	21,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,731,000	J & J	108¼	May 24, '99	109	107¼	122,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & J	84	May 2, '95			
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 6's. 1910		2,771,000	F & A	104	May 27, '99	104¼	102¾	87,000
U. S. Env. Co. 1st sk. fd. g. 6's. 1918		2,000,000	J & J					
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	116	May 31, '99	116	116	4,000
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col tr. bonds.								
Series B 5's. 1899-1914		1,000,000	M & N					
C 5's. 1900-1915		1,000,000	A & O					
D 4½'s. 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J					
E 4's. 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D					
F 4's. 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S					
G 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A					
H 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N					
I 4's. 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A					
Small bonds.								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	H'gh.	Low.	Total.
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's..1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		8,640,000	M & N	107½	May 6, '99	107½	107½	1,000
"    7's, registered.....1900			M & N	106	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    debtenture, 7's.....1884-1900			M & N	102½	May 22, '99	102½	102½	8,000
"    registered.....1900			M & N	104½	Nov. 12, '97	.....	.....	.....
"    col. trust cur. 5's.....1888		8,502,000	J & J	119	May 26, '99	119	116	29,000
"    Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 6's.....1911		1,967,000	J & J	110	May 5, '99	110	110	1,000
"    Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904		1,250,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Wheel L. E. & P. C. Co. 1st g 5's.1919		848,000	J & J	68	Dec. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.1947		1,150,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bost. Un. Gas tra cfts s'k f'd g. 5's.1909		7,000,000	J & J	91½	Oct. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.1945		13,239,000	M & N	120	May 27, '99	120	117	113,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1902		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,313,000	J & J	101	May 31, '99	102	100	911,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918		1,049,000	F & A	101	Apr. 25, '99	.....	.....	.....
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's.1910		4,312,000	M & S	111	May 31, '99	111	110½	14,000
"    1st con. g. 5's.....1905		2,156,000	J & J	123½	Apr. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    Brooklyn 1st g. 5's.....1940		1,800,000	A & O	111	May 18, '99	111	111	1,000
"    "    registered		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. g 4's.....1909		2,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y.		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. g. 5's.....1902		2,500,000	M & S	102	Feb. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....1922		5,700,000	J & D	120½	May 24, '99	120½	115½	111,000
Grand Rapids Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....1915		1,225,000	F & A	92½	Mar. 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's.1922		3,750,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.1919		10,000,000	.....	109½	May 31, '99	110	109	42,000
"    small bonds.....			Q F	97½	Nov. 1, '95	.....	.....	.....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 6's.1904		2,100,000	M & N	125	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	109½	Apr. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. g 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	127½	Apr. 25, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
"    refunding registered.		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Chic. Gas Lt. & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's.1907		10,000,000	J & J	112	May 18, '99	112	111½	58,000
"    Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1906		4,346,000	J & D	111½	Apr. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1905		2,000,000	J & J	105½	May 17, '99	107½	106½	12,000
"    Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's.1947		5,000,000	M & N	107½	Apr. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
"    Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....1903		3,805,500	M & N	101	Mar. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....

Exports to New Possessions.—American producers are already finding an enlarged market in Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines. The figures of the Treasury Bureau of Statistics, just issued, indicate that the exports of the fiscal year which ends with this month will show a larger exportation to Hawaii and the Philippines than ever before, and larger to Cuba and Porto Rico than in any previous year except those in which the reciprocity features of the McKinley law were in operation.

The exports to Cuba in the ten months ending April 30, 1899, were fifty per cent. in excess of those of the corresponding months of 1898, and more than double those of the same months in the fiscal year 1897. To Porto Rico the exports are thirty-three per cent in excess of the corresponding months of last year, and to Hawaii the exports of the ten months are fifty-seven per cent. in excess of those of the same months in 1898, and double those of the corresponding months of 1897. To the Philippines the exports, despite the continuous war conditions, are three times as much as in the corresponding months of any preceding year.

The total exports to Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines in the full fiscal year which ends with this month will reach about \$30,000,000, against \$17,000,000 last year. Our sales to these islands in the fiscal year 1899, even under the unsettled conditions which have prevailed in all of them, except Hawaii, will exceed those of any previous year save those of 1893, the most successful year of the reciprocity term.

These figures of course do not include any of the supplies sent by the Government for its troops in the islands nor supplies sent by the Government to the suffering Cubans.

It is also interesting to note that the exportations to Spain are approaching their normal condition, those for the ten months ending with May 1 being \$8,000,000, against \$10,000,000 in the corresponding months of last year, and less than ten million dollars in the corresponding months of the fiscal year 1897.

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

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**Arnot.**—John H. Arnot, Cashier of the Chemung Canal Bank, Elmira, N. Y., died May 26, at the age of thirty-eight years.

**Bacon.**—B. B. Bacon, Cashier of the Kearny County Bank, Lakin, Kans., died May 24.

**Bartlett.**—David L. Bartlett, President of the National Farmers and Planters' Bank, Baltimore, Md., until about a year ago, died May 11. Mr. Bartlett was the head of the firm of Bartlett, Hayward & Co., extensive manufacturers of iron, and was prominent in the financial, business and social circles of Baltimore.

**Briggs.**—Hon. B. F. Briggs, Vice-President of the First National Bank, Auburn, Me., and also a director of the National Shoe and Leather Bank, of that place, died May 10. In 1894 and 1896 he was a member of the Maine Legislature and had held other important offices.

**Buehler.**—John Buehler, who in 1860 organized the Garden City Banking and Trust Co., Chicago, and who was its President until 1894, and a director after that year, died May 7. He was born in Germany sixty-seven years ago.

**Denton.**—Charles Denton, President of the First National Bank, Brewster, N. Y., died May 13, aged sixty-nine. He was prominent in business and social circles.

**Drown.**—Henry F. Drown, President of the National Warren Bank and the Warren Institution for Savings, Warren, R. I., died April 21. He had been a member of both branches of the State Legislature, and was held in high regard as a banker and citizen. His death occurred on his eighty-first birthday.

**Fisher.**—Wm. D. Fisher, Assistant Cashier of the Smith County Bank and Trust Co., Carthage, Tenn., died April 24, aged twenty-six years.

**Flower.**—Roswell P. Flower, head of the firm of Flower & Co., Vice-President of the Colonial Trust Co., New York city, former Governor of the State of New York, and one of the leading capitalists of the country, died May 12.

**Hallam.**—J. T. Hallam, President of the Ida County Savings Bank, of Ida Grove, Iowa, died recently at Minneapolis, Minn.

**Hawks.**—Haywood Hawks, Secretary of the Rochester (N. Y.) Trust and Safe Deposit Co., died May 22. Mr. Hawks was born in Rochester in 1830, and had been connected with banking in that city from an early period in life. For some years prior to 1888 he was Cashier of the Powers Bank, when he was chosen to the position he held at the time of his death. He was also a director of the Flour City National Bank. In his business and social relations Mr. Hawks was deservedly popular.

**Hyde.**—William S. Hyde, President of the Ware (Mass.) National Bank, died May 26. He was born at Ware in 1838, and in early life he entered the bank as Cashier, succeeding his father as President in 1888. Mr. Hyde was also Vice-President of the Ware Savings Bank. He had been a member of the State Legislature, and was identified with many local benevolent and business enterprises.

**Kauffman.**—Andrew J. Kauffman, President of the Central National Bank, Columbia, Tenn., died recently at the age of fifty-nine years.

**Kennedy.**—F. Kennedy, Manager of the Montreal, Que., branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia, died May 25.

**Morgan.**—J. L. Morgan, President of the Savings Exchange Bank, Geneva, Ohio, died May 23.

**Pennock.**—Morris C. Pennock, President of the Alliance Bank Company, Alliance, Ohio, and a member of one of the oldest business firms there, died May 27.

**Ross.**—G. L. Ross, a former mayor of Knoxville, Tenn., Vice-President of the Mechanics' National Bank, and President of the Chamber of Commerce, died May 20.

**Slingluff.**—John Slingluff, President of the Montgomery National Bank, Norristown, Pa., was killed in a railway accident May 12.

**Tillinghast.**—J. Wilbur Tillinghast, President of the Merchants' National Bank, Albany, N. Y., died May 26, aged sixty-four years.















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